ISSN 0(M9.2310

THE SOVIET SPRING OFFENSIVE 12 MAY TO 21 MAY 1942

2 S&T nr. 88, publl, hed Mey/ Jun.1978

In this issue page

StraQy 8(!5tICS KHARKOV 4

The Magazine of Conflict Simulation .,;,,,,,10>1,,,,: •. 000

The Soviet Spring Offensive 12 May t021 May 1942

Editor/ Publisher James F. Dunnigan

Art Director/ Co-Editor Redmond A. Simonsen

Stephen B, Patrick

Simulation: R1 EdilorM/; Joe 8alkoeki, Howard 8..-asch. Richard Berg. Eric: Goldberg. Marty Goidt.>erver. Mart. Harman, Sf..:! Hessel, Oavid C.lsby, Tony MIII'­ridy. Slept>en B. Pallid<., StlMN1 Rou, RobertJ . RYl!<. Sid Sack..,n, linde Sapin, Thomas Walczyk, Oavid Werd8f1 . Graphic Production; Larry Ce'liano. Kate HIgIII.... Manfred Mllkuhn, Stepllen PlrI(In •. Ad· minI,/ral;"": Theul ... Canto. Ida ChianoeM\e, Tom Domenech, Eugene Harty, Sidnev Irgang, Carl Jacobsen, Jotm Undem&rm, Anna lomb/l.do . George Murisoo, Bridge' Murphy. Sarba,. N~n. Winiam O'COOnof, Kathy Tenn'f8O'l. G_ Eullhn60n and RIS8MCh Aui$tlmce: Martin Campion, Omar DeWitt, 51_List, LeoNiehomer, Joe SBli;a.

KHARKOV The Soviet Spring Offensive 12 Mey to 21 May 1942

AGINCOURT

Stephen B. Patrick Redmond A. Simonsen

25 Original EditOland FoundM; Christopher WIIlIn&f

PriMinglJ 8inding: American p,_. Inc .. Gordonsville, V •. Die Currirtg: Fl'Mdmllln Oie-Cuttert, NswYork, N.Y.

The Triumph of Archery Over Armor

STRATEGY & TACTICS Magazine Is cOpyrlgl\t CI 1978 by Simuiatiool PubliutioN. Inc. Printed in USA. A. rights .--.ed. All fldilorilll lind geneflll m&II should be Hnt to Simulalic>nl Publiclltio ... Inc .• 44 East 23<d Slr1Iet New Yol'1<. N.Y. 10010. STRATEGY & TACTICS is published bi­monthly. One vee. (.uc iuulliaubtcriptio .. a ... '4 ,00. PIeeM MAd checks or money Ofde<s only. easic ed fill is .',5!iO PI< plglI for g.a ....... " '.,1I0<I p.Qducts.

25 October 1415 AI Nofi

GREAT BRITAIN & EUROPE: British and Europeen customers should place thIII. Ofde<s for SPI products or aubKriplic>nl with SIMULATIONS PUBLICATIONS. UNITEO KINGDOM, C.own Passages, HII&, Altrinchem, C~i .. , WA 15 9SP, UoitOlod Kingdom. Billie aubscription tlte for SPUK II lpounds) 9.90 per vee •. AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALANO residents should pIaca orden with MILITARY SIMULATIONS PlY LTO., 18 Fonceca SU-eet, MordaHIoc, VlctoriaJI95, AulJtrlllla . Simulalic>nl Publicatlo .. , Inc. does notuaue!ly consid .. lor publication un· 1IOIicit0<l g.amw IOld lI<Iiclet aubmitled fa S9T or Slmulationa S .. ies Games. Freqlillfltty, however, unsolicited metnl dNling with g.arne ~n or ~CI will find publica tion in MOVES Magazine. In 1111 eases. SPI cannot-.me f8I4)OIlSibiIity f or such unsolicited melerial,

OUTGOING MAIL

BRIEFINGS

FOR YOUR EYES ONLY

DATAFILEOO4

FEEDBACK

S&T nr. 6B ENCLOSURES:

The Editors 2

15

21

38

Vox Populi, Vox Dei 42 The publication 01 paid lIdvwtisements In SPI publications does nol <;on­.titutl an ~I by SPI of the goods Of services oIferad. SPI does, however, allllmPt 10 prevenl fff\Jdu lent Of misleadiny paid advertisements from Ippearing In its publicallorw. SPI.-- thll nghtlo .ajtlct any paid ~t it consideni misleadl!'9 0. hermful. 01 oIfensivelo the Hn· aIbIIiti8J 01 the edilOlS or the .tIIIde<shlp.

1. Kharkov Playing Piece. 3. Business Reply Order Form 2. Kharkov Game Map 4. Special Offar/ Feedback Forms

Ad\l8flisements 01 SPI products e .. becked by a guatlnt$$d c.edit Of ctlsh refund lupon prompt Ullum of the productl if the buyer is dissatisfied 0' replacement if the product II dalT\&Qed in trarait.

SIMULATIONS PUBLICATIONS, INC.

Looking Ahead to Next Time The game will be Tllnnenburg, an operational~

level simulation of the Russian offensive into eastern Prl,Issla in the autumn of 1914. Oeve Isby is the designer. An overview of the First World Waf in the eallt written by Richard Spence will also appear. A second article wrinen by Charles Kampt will analyze another Russian offensive to the West - the one that could begin tomorrow (or anytime in the next few yeara) in Europe. Plu. our regular features. Domestic Subscribers: If you have not received your copy of S&T69 by 12 September 1978, notify our Customer Service Department. Please include your Customer Code and issue of expiratiotl, both of which may be found on this issue's maiting label. Just above your name. Foreign Subscribers: Add eight weeks to the above to allow for the snaif-like pace of inter­national mail .

44 Ealt 23rd Street. New York, N.Y. 10010 Telephone (2121673-4103

Outgoing Mail 1I-I1I'*lIling TtfIfIds, p. 2 Won in Progf8SS, p . 19 FeedbIIcl:, p. 19

8ig Tsimmi$. p. ' 9 NOI6S from Undergroond. p. 19 GO$Si(J, p. 20

Marketing Trends I could write an eyeful 01 marketing trends

every month. but the changes seem more drastic If we do it less frequentlY. One of the most dramatic changes is nOt really a change at all, but the Culmination of a long-present demand: the de­mand for in formation in games. All the games con tam mformation. That's what makes an historical game an historical game. But while there is a discernable minimum of information, the max­imum is way out there somewhere. Somewhere in the neighborhood of the larger games. Bigger may not always be bener, but it can ohen mean more mformation. which explaIns a lot of the popularity

of the larger games. We have found that they are not played as much assmaller games, not so much because of their SIze, but more because people want them primarily for mformatlon. Those of you more inclined to playing the g.ames la mmOflty among those who conscIously buy the gamesl are getting fewer "playe." games. prlmarllv because the demand is for more informational games. And presently these a.e only .ecognlzed as being the larger games.

People should not look at things thIS way, and in o.de. to rectify thasitua\lon, we ara underta~mg a number of ma.ketmg changes. Fi.st, we have already begun publishing additional hIStorical material with all Inearly alii new games. The sec· ond change is a b,t more dramatIc. We are raIsIng the prices of new games thst have a lower thsn average proiected sales. ThIS will mean more gsmes flom "obscure" peflods and situatIons. Previously such games SImply dId not get pub­lished. because to do so would put us out of busmess. All elements of this operatIon are based on selling games in certain QuantiheS at a certaIn price while Incurring certain COSIS. The e~menlS of thIS formula had to remain fairly fi)(ed in order

~1f~_",,_.16J

AGINCOURT The Triumph of Archery Over Armor

• Ranged Artillery Fire • Innovative Morale and Fugitive Rules • Leader to Leader Personal Combat Rules

The Captain 01 the West County archers turned to face hiS live CDntOn.ars and shou ted "Ten scorel" ThnlY '8lght yards 10 hiS rear. and to the left lind right, Ihe Cap­tain's Ilvo Centenars wheeled. each to face hiS own respecbv8 live Vlnte"ars, and repeated the command "Ten scorel" CriSp­ly, the order passed to the eighteen Of so ar­chers who were deployed In three hies behind each V,IHanar maSIDr archer. The Vln tenars fle.ed their long bows and angled them sky­ward \0 bring t heir clo lhvard sh.a/ts \0 the ground some 200 yards away The Captain, who had resumed the lasle 01 tracing the enemy advance, now turned again to shout the awaited command : "loose]" Within seconds, nearlv 500 steel-tipped arrows streaked through the air in 8 deadly parabola. Two hundred yards across a muddy flek:l. the charging body of the Cornte de Vendome's 5CKl armored horsemen shuddered al the Im­pact of the heil of destructIOn Dozens of horses went down, most 01 their flders m­jured and effectlvaly eliminated from the b<It ­,.

Ten seconds latel. anolhe!' volley of ar­rOWSSlfuck And fmally. anothe!' By the time the horsemen had crossed the held, nearly half theIr numbel' - the f,nest chIvalry 01 15th Century France - lay broken on the ground. 01 those who escaped the deathly hall. many Impaled themselves on the sharp wooden Slakes behind whICh lhe archers had retrealed. Ihe remaInder retrealed Ig­nomInIOUsly The Battle 01 AglncOUrt had begun 85 It WOUld end, WIth English longbow lire slaughtermg French Ch,valry .

Agmcourt was a uniqlle batUe, and a unique game has been deSIgned 10 simulale It HIstorically. the English wele heavily out­numbered. Yflt they won handIly Thel! VIC· tory was allrlbutable both 10 the'f own Inlrln­SIC advantages over the French, and 10 the way In whIch the English eKploued land the French played intol these advantages. II was necessary 10 Slmulata the dynamICS 01 the battle. whIle Illuslfat,ng the ellects 01 seem­Ingly Instgnlhcant alternallWl possiblhllBS whose ellects could mushroom Into decISIveness

The Agincourt deSIgn has broken new glound In several areas. For eKample, the sIze 01100 counters IS related to the actual SIze 01 lhe unIt Hence, while nOfmal-Slzed 1%- by ~ -, counters are used 10 represent the small , lIeKlble English formatrons. double-sLZe U­by Y, 0) counters are used lor lhe massIve and clumsy French "baUles "

Morale is criticalm Agincourt After any combat loss, there IS a chance that fugI tIves may stream towards the rear, affectIng lhe morale 01 any oncomIng troops There are

counters which represent the actual casualtIeS whICh, on the restriCted Aglncourt bailie/laid, literally piled up 10 further affect the morale of troops attempting to advance

Archery fire is covered In detail, wi th rules l or range 8UenuatiOn, affect on ar~

mared an.cl ur'IIIrmored targets, rates o f fire, and arrow supply The English can lire al a del/aSIa!lng fate, but the supply 01 arrows IS l iMIte, and IhO\lgh some shafts can be "retr ieved". they must be employed JudicIOusly .

One of the more interesting aspects 01 tho game IS the IndIVidual hand-to-hand com­bat system used lor leaders VICIOIY IS measured 10 some extent by the numbel" o f enemy leaders capll.n ed Iw hlch were Subject

to ransoml and kIlled. and each side utiliZes leaders and theIr household retaIners 10 roam about the batUelreld In search of opposmg leaders.

SpecIal rules Include the SUICide squad bent on kIlling Kmg Henry, lhe French Burgundl8n and ArmanJOC ContIngents, the u-ansport and deploymenl 01 the archers' Slakes, and the constraIntS 01 "decorum" thaI restrICted Ihe Ulctical alternatIves 01 the French.

Palnstakmgly researched down 10 lhe heraldry 01 the IndIVIdual lamlhes Involved. AglflCOUn IS not merely another collec tIon 01 WWII mechanICS dressed up w ith Medieval names But despIte lIS novelty, the game system is playable and clean.

Agincourt will sell for $10. Available 30 June 1978.

3

4

THE SOVIET SPRING OFFENSIVE The war between Germany and the Soviet Union was such a monumental war that many battles which, in other wars, would be considered major conflic ts, pale to relative insign ificance. Relative to the battles before Moscow in 1941 or the drive on Stalingrad. the fighting which took place in May 1942 around Khark.ov was a small battle. Yet six Soviet armies and parts of three German armies were involved .

In the spring of 1942, both the Germans and the Soviets began to think of going on the offenSive. The Soviets had made major gains In their winter offensive in 1941 and felt that they were ready to take advan­tage of the good summer weather, once the spring muds were gone. The Germans, by contrast, Viewed the winter fighting as a temporary set-back and a fluke brought about by German over-confidence and Soviet good luck . The German high command saw no reason why they could not, by repeating their 1941 suc­cesses, wrap up the war in 1942.

Formation of Izyum Pocket: Winler 1942

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1821 • Dniepropetrovosk

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by Stephen B.Patrick Fall B/au

The German plan was Cillied r(JH Blav (Case Blue! Hitler had actually planned \0 call II Fall Sl6gfried ICase Slegfriedl, but when he con­templa ted the defeats which marked the end of the 1941 BarbaroSSB offenSIVe. he decoded that he would Stay away from calling OPerations names whICh were drawn !rom German herOIC ltadJlJOOS He I'Iad become SUpelStJllOUS about those thingS, In the same way he renamed the pocket battleship Deutset/mOO 85 Lutzow, to .!Vold having defeat at­tached \0 things which werll central \0 the Ger­manIC myth he was wOI'km9 on.

1'811 8lauwould be a Plnan operauon aimed al pocketing the SOVMlIS between the Donets and the Don, followed by II dove \0 secure the 011 fields In the CauCilSlJs. Aher Ihal, II lhe SOYlelS had any light lelt, the Germans would swing up the Volga Rivet hne and take Moscow /rom lhal direction PrOYlded the campaign came off 85 planned,

Hitler calculated that the SOViets would realty be finIShed - probablv not an Invalid assumption

The lirst step would be a minor opefatlOfl tin relationship to the whole campalgnllOvolvlng the redUCtion of the bulge south of Khalkov, located around Izyum and BafVenkovo. ThiS preliminary operation was to be called FrideficuS. The plan was to reduce the bulge, secure the Donets rNer IlOe, regroup, and then Jump 011 IOf FaN BlBu

The German attack was scheduled to begin 18 Mav 1942. However, In one 01 hlstorv's ,ronIeS, the SOVl8ts locused on the same bulge for thell planned operation Khe/kov was an Important (;Ity in the Ukraine, second onlV to Kiev In prestige value, nOt to mention real value. Recapturing Kharkov would set the tone for the whole year's operallonsand, hopelulty, mark the beginning 01 a successful cleallng of the Ukraine bV the Red Army.

The opPOSIng commanders were the com· mander 01 Heeresgruppe Sud (Army Group

Soviet Kharkov Offensive and Operation Fridericus (Axis Counter-Offensive):

Kev:

South!, Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock, and the commander of a combined force from Southwest and South Fronts, Mal$hal S K Tlmo­shenko. Tlmoshenko had made hIS mark ,n the reorganization which followed the 1940 war against Finland That reorganization was stilt in· complete when the Germans attacked In 1941, but It was ne<lrlV finished bV the spring of 1942 Under von Bock were Ihe61h Armv-commanded bV the newly Installed GeneraloberSI Flledllch Paulus. holdong the northern s,de 01 the bulge-and the 17th Army, commanded by GeneraloberSI RIChard Ruoll on the sou thern Side 01 the bulge, FIISI Panzer Army under GeneralObefst Ewald von Kleist was to the south 01 17th Army. limo­shenko·s command compllsed the 28th Armv under lieutenant General Ryabrshev and 38th Ar· mV under lieutenant General Maslov to the 28th Army's south_ On the left of 38th ArmV and holding the northern flank 01 the bulge was 6th Ar· my under ll8Ulenant General A M Gorodnvanskv

Spring 1942

==> German Counterattack

__ ~~. Soviet A !tack

"..,..,,- R ivar Note that German units are indicated In italic type; Soviet units are indicated in bold type.

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while the SOUthern flank was held, In its western part, by 57th Army under Ll&Utenan\ General K P Podlas find 9th Army under Major General F_M: Khantonov The southernmost corner of the bulge, which was dos1Jned 10 be a rather inactIVe S8Ct()l", was held by the 37th Army.

The Soviet Plan The SOViet plan enviSIoned a two-pronged at­

tack toward Kharkoy. ThIS would put the main wetght on Paulus' 6th Army Maslov would lake 28th Army Irom the VICinity of Volchansk and 81-tack westward, while Gorodnyansky would attack out of the bulge with 6th Army to meet around Krasnograd and pocket the German 6th Army If IT chose to defend Khalkov They would then swing wast, adding 57th Army 10 the IIHack. to take OniepropetrQvsk and Zaporo~hve. Unul 28th and 6th Armies Imked up, 57th and 9th Armies were to probe and I'k the German !OIces SOUth of the bulge but nOtlsalty be too aggr6SSlve When II be­~me fashIOnable to cuuc'~e Stalin's leadership. Khrushchev contended that Statin had pul too many troops screening Moscow whon he shoutd halle put them tnto IhlS operation.

tn fairness to Stalin. the Germanssull kept the mass of lhelr troops In front of Moscow. and II Moscow was the goal in 1941 . thore was no reason to assume it would not be a major oblectlve for 1942. As it was. 28th Army had 13nfteandcallatry dllllSlOnS. two lank bngades, and a motorized nile bndgade, whde 6th Army had 12 tlfle and callalry dllliSlOns and SJx tank brigades Defending against them were eight Infantry dillisions. 01"18 tight dilli­Slon and two German Panzer dlllisions. The 57th Army and 9th Army between lhem mustered 25 ri­fle and callatry dIVISions and 11 tank brigades. as well as another motonzed title bngade They Wilre facing a somewhat lighter force. On the west end of Ihe bulge was the German 11 th Corps. control­ling three German infantry dlllISIOnS and three RumanJan infantry dllllSions under therr own 6th Corps. ThIS force was actually grouped together under the name Gruppe lion Kortzllelsch. lion Korullelsch being the 1111'1 Corps commander With control Oller both force! . The southern flank 01 the bulge was held by fIve Inlantry dlIlISlonS. a mountain d11l1510n. three bght dlll1510ns, two PanZef dllllSlons and a motoriZed Infantry dIIlISlOO. One final curiOSity was the presence 01 the 454th Security Dillision In the front _ This organization. normatty charged wah rear area secUflty, found llsellln the thick of the battle

IntngUltlQly, neither side seems to have been aware thaI the other was planning an attack The Germans IIlfJWed the reduction 01 the POCket as a rather baSIC exercise. Their two armies would SImply crush the bulge between them Their start time was set lor Mav 18. The SOIIl8ts set their Start for May 12 and, consequently. achieved surprise

Early Going IOilially. the SOl/lOts poured through the Ger­

man 1100$. The Germans wore able to allOld a rout In front of KharkOll ooly by forming up the same type 01 strong POints which had broken the back of the So ... oet Winter offensives. Ha ... ing these forces in the rear forced the SOIIiets to detalt forces to reduce them_ or aliesst hold them in place-and those W1lfe forces no longer a ... allable for the main attaCk. The So ... iet 6th Army, In the midst 01 genaral SOlllOt successes. literally tore open the German front In snuatJon maps published as the batlls Wilnt on. the German! showed large gaps In thelf ~ne where there wINa simply no UOltS 8y 15 May, Krasnograd had fallen and Tarano ... ka was also in SO"'lEIt hands. By 16 May. SOlliet recon elements had come to wnhln 40 km of HG Sud heaclQuartersat PoIta ... a. the scene of the defeatol

an earllOf WOUld-be conqueror 01 RUSSia, Charles XII 01 Sweden in tha S8IIenteenth century

By a rapid mo ... ement of the 3d and 23d Panzer dl ... ISlons into the breach, Paulus was able to halt the dlllle of 28th Army twelve miles Irom Kharkov. Von Bock was In a quandary as 10 what to do, Paulus could barely keep himself afloat. much less launch a counterattack. The onlv thlOg a ... allable 10 him was the element whICh would be the southern wmg 01 Fridericvs. lhe 17th Army. However. 11 was apparentthet they would have to be relnfOfced Von KleISt was sent up Wllh elements Irom 1st Panzar Army to command the coun terattack force TimOShenko was plaYing IntO the Germans' hands 10 thiS regard He had been slow to commit hiS re!lefVe5 Instead 01 pushing Ihem out as soon as he opened a gap 10 the Ger­man lines. as the Germans would ha ... e done had they been making the anack, he committed them Pl8Cemeal. One of the alHoms 10 USing a reserve IS that It must not be comml1led too soon nor too late. and the declSlVO moment I! the point al whICh the entire w8lght of Ihe reserve can 'lIlter the course of the battle. By sending them In driblets they had linleimpacl. At lhesame time. by merely probing on the SOUlh, the SOIIl8tS failed to restrIC t German plans for countefat1aCk As 11 was, by 16 May Tlmoshenko was recellling reports that In­dicated the strength of the lorce wailing to the south. He realized that he was In a lIap JUSt waiting TO be sprung, and his main body was well to the west . The Germans launched Thoor attack Irom the south on 17 May

Counterattack By nightlall on the 17th. the Germans had

reached the Donets, and the next day they took their northerly obtectllle, BogorodlChnoye They then dispatched the 16th Panzer diviSion 10f Izyum. a commUOIcaTlon center for the whole bulge. By noon of the 18th. the 1611'1 Panzer cen­trolled the maIn road across the Donets at Oonet­sklv and had entered the suburbs of Izyum

The main attack was camed out by the 3d Panzer Corps under lion Mackenson. Thev drove northward, and on 22 May they secured Berek, on the Donets_ On lhe other side was the 44th Inlan­tty DIVISion-the SovielS had been pocketed In the meanume, Tlm05henko had been telling STaim to call off the attack, reporllng to Stalin The force which was CUlling Into his southern lIank. Stalin would not hear 01 a change of plan and. asa result. the SOIIlets were unable to Stop the Germans from closIng off theIr rear Once CUt of I. though, Tlmoshenko began 10 dillen lorees to reopen a path across the Donels. The SOlll8tS deployed forces from the 38th and 37th ArmIes In a lIne to keep the Germans from expandlOg their ring 10 the east. and Tlfnoshenko planned to ha ... e them at­tack Inward as he attacked OUt.

The situation was hl9hly lIuld at thiS time as Ihe Germans had lillia time to prepare strong defensille pOSitions. Tha SOlliets Ihrew everything they could get into thIS effon_ They broke the f,rst German defensive 1100$ The mUTilation of the Ger. man dead discovered after the bailie attested to the fierceness 01 the attack . In the end. Ihe local point of the SOIIlet attack fell on lhe German 101st Light Infantry or ... ision- the only unit that stood between Tlmoshenko and breakmg the German flng Again, Tlmoshenko had no reserves 10 add 10 thJ1; cfltlCal bailie SImply because they could nOI disengage and mOlle rapidly enough to prollide the weight needed to break out 01 the DOCket.

The result was a blood bath, but by the third day 01 lhe Soviet ellort, the 101st still held. and the 50"'181 allack ran out of steam The pressure on the German 6th Army was. by then. relieved. and they were able to add their weight to the aT. tack from the south to keep the remainder of the

SOIIl8t forces engaged The rest of the battle was reduced to a mopping up opera\lOn as the pockel was destroyed When the lighting was over, the Germ8ns had bagged 22 inlantry and seven ca ... alry dlVISIO/lS The SOIIl8ts lost 239.CXX> men. 1250 tanks. and 2026 guns As ItlUrned out It was the last pocket the Germans would make in the war, though neither Side would ha ... e prediCted thaI at the tIme For the Germans there was the great otfeosrve coming up. For the SO"'l8lS, they had to scrape together a defense out 01 what was lelt after Kharko ... Certainly they would miss those men and lan~s during the coming summer. as they must ha ... e known e ... en then.

The 6th, 9th, and 57th SO ... l8t Arml8S Wille desuoved and thel! commanders killed, wllh the excepllon 01 Khantono .... 01 the 9th Army. who was flownOUlatthe laSt mInute Theseweregood generals who were lost Looking back. Khrushchev laId full blame for the defeat at Sta"n's door.

Aflt rmath There were a number 01 lessons which thiS

battle taught. but few were !earned The Sovl8tS had worked on the assumptIon thai the Germans were spent and that the SO"'l8t sucoesses of the wlOter would be repeated In the summer They did learn the lesson that they could not \'81 stand toe to toe With the Germans and slug it out Un. doubtedly this was leflected In the tacllCS the 50111815 developed While retreating to the Volga and InlO the Caucasus: Il9htlong enough to force the Germans to stOP and deploy. then break off and mo ... e. Don't stand and lIght. The lesson they failed to learn was how to execute an armored penetratIOn They were never very successlul In

executing one throughout the war. The German technIQue of roiling up the flanks while the tanks penetrated deep 1010 the enemy rear was never mastered The SOIIiets perSlsted- In the lew tunes they tfled such operations-in Simply drl ... lng straJght forward Less than a vesr later, With the Germans In retleat. the SOVlI!ts tried a SImilar tank lhrust and Wefe chopped up and thrown back OUt 01 KharkOll .

One lesson the Germans should have learned concerned Paulus He lacked the ImagInation needed 10 contJnue the successes 01 the paSI He was a stall officer pnor to taking command of the 6th Army. and he displayed the traits which make for a good stall officer, but not so good a com· mander he was loyal to hIS superlOrs- to the poInl 01 leulng them make deaSJons and InOeed wailing on them to make decISIOns whICh he was In the best positIon 10 make-hewas thorough but not o ... erly imaginatllle. and he heSitated before acting ThaI he was caught flat-footed was Simply a lallure of intelligence With air superiority on the German SIde. he should have been able to delect the signs of bUild-up that forewarned of an attack The 6th Army report on the SO ... let order of bailie. publ ished for 12 May. was qUite accurate. vat he seemed to ieel that the SOlllOts Wilf8 there only lor defenSIve purposes. waiting lor the Germans to make the flft;! move At the least such an attITude bespeaks oller"COnlidence. and perhaps an ar· rogance. that the SOllietS were so lacking In im. agination that they would Sit qUlEltty and let the Germ8ns force the ISSUe The fighting," thewlOter should have warned Paulus.

The second lesson the Germans Should have learned was thaI this Red Army was not the one which had dISintegrated In the summer of 1941 The army was benar trained and belter led. In good weather. WhICh the German! regarded as thell sole property. lhe SOII181S had exened sur. pflsing pressure. It might halle been assumed that the SOIIl8tS would learn something hom thiS about the force rallo needed to deleat a strong German

force. Events proved that the SOYlets (lid leam thiS

lesson In Ihe great sweep of events In 1942. this was

It minor bau le It is so insignilocan t that there is no agreement even 85 to Its name The Germans call­ed II FnderlCtls Of the Bailie althe Izvum Bulge or the Second 881 11e of Kharkov The SOVl9ts called it the Bau le o f the Barenkoyo Bulge. Yet the loss was sagleat to the Sovl(!tS lhalthey suppressed it fight through to the Khrushchev Bfa The first word they released ind ICated IMISOOO wef8 dead,

THE STRONG POINT The German Army was trained, almost

from tna stan of its r9llival under tna Nazi government, as an offensive force. Any mili· tal'( theorist knows thet gening the initiative and keeping it is the prime ingredient for vic· tory, and attacking lhe bMt way to keep the 11)+ itialive. As a resuh, defansive doctrine was not emphaslzed, aspecially one in\lolving giving up ground. Attacking and holding ground were the only lechniques emphasized. For this reason, the German defensive operations of World War II were a lribute to the abWity of the Army. Untrained in tna technique which was forced 00 them in e\ler· lncreasing amounts, the G8fmllns Improvised a highly successful doctrine.

The winter of 1941-42 forced this new concept upon the Germans for tna f irst lime. The initial Soviet offensive In front of Moscow threw the Germans back rapidly . Then came Hitler's order to stand and hold, and the Army had to fWld a means to do this. At th is stage the mere notion of having to yield ground was much harder to swallow all down the line than il would be later on, when the SO\liet Army's sheer size made it the tactic of choice. The reauh of this need was the hedoehog or strong­point defense.

Improvisii"lg as lhey want, the Germans developed a technique which turned on the use 01 natural and man· made obstacles. Ohen these were hasty defanHI since the Germans had to move into them on anon notice, with lit· tle time 10 prepare them. One of the most pop-ular obstacles was the lImall town. This gave concealment for the Germans even if the houses were made out of wood, and if they were mora substantial. they would afford the coYer needed 10 accomplish the mission. Of course, In the winter the towns provided the added benef it of giving shetter to the defender while the attacker had to move across the open CQUntrysidoa in the cold and .now.

Once in such a position, the Germans would try to improva It with whalever was at hand- O\ler· turned carts, knocked down walll - anything which would make it hard to o\ler· run. From these positionl they would launch limited anacks. The net effect wa. thet the Soviets would hesitate 10 limply by-pass las the Germans might ha\le donel for fear that an acti\le force would later gal Iree In their rear. The Soviets would either try to storm tna posi. tion with their first attack or, if thet Wilre unsuccessful, try to by·pass with tna main force and detall second echelon elements to reduce Ihe strong point. However, if the force in the strong poInl were large enough, the first echelon forces would try to reduce It. All of this sapped Itrength from the drive - which was one of the desired effects.

Ideally Ihe strong point would be so located and so reinforced that it could not be

70,000 mISSIng To those accustomed to roadlng between the lines, 8 defeat of mllior prOPOnion could be soon

Yet. nad the ba ttle never been foughl, It

w hole 8r/ltV of pos5IbllillEtS present themselves The SOViets mlQht stili have mISread the Germans as bamg weak, tned 10 hold the line, and hillen VIC­lim to the pocke t Hitler had concElived between lhe Donets and the Don . Or they might have had the force to f&$lS I SO well thatlhe Germans would never reach Stallngrad or the Caucasus The bat·

overcome by a rapid assault . The Soviets would have 10 stop, deploy and make a deliberate attack, primarily led by infantry. This took time to accomplish and afforded tlma to the Germans to shift forces to deal with the penetration. Of course, it wit not seriously e_· peeted that all of these would hold. If possible, the defenders would puY OUI and try to form a new strong point elsewhere, all with the goal of slowing Ihe Soviets and forcing them to grind out the anack.

In many ways, the slrongpoint technique IMde U58 of the German Army's strongest facet : a highly developed coocept of mobility. A IIrong point would be organi2:ed for all around delenses but probably could not be manned with equal strength at all ~ints. E\lery man or unit would not only have I prjrnel'( flJ· ing position, situated to deal with the most likely enemy a\lenues of apprO&Ch, but would also ha\le what are called In the U.S. Army alternate and supplemental'( positions, the first being positions which would permit f ira on the same sector as the primal'( position, the latter affording fire on a secondal'( aV811ue of approach. Tha IIfongpoint would then work so that if the Soviets launChed their first anack from the n'IOYtI, they could be expeeted to come down the most likely avenue of ap­proach. Hopelully they would be repelled. Then, when it was determined where the SO\liets would make their second tl'( from, the units would redeploy to mass their fires in that sector, and so on unt~ either the Soviets wera able to ov_helm one position because the defenders were spread 100 thin or, as often oc· curred, the defender1l were able 10 hold off tha Soviets and keep their position. Some of the key pockets such as Oemyansk and Cholm

Germsn inflmtry defending Iff II srrongpoirrr.

tie, Ihough small 1M companson to w hat loIlowed, was 1M lacl a mIIJor one, w here almost a quarter 01 a mi llion men wele los t . 8'11 way o f compalison, the Falal58 Pocket 01 1944 cos t the Germans only 5O,(XX) men, and the Ruhr Pocket of Apnl 1945, the biggest podet In the west, caught somewhat 1M e_cess of :IXl,OOO members of the defeated Weh/macht. The comparison reflec ts that the Second Battle of Kharkov deserves gleater recognition than history has 8CCOfded II - usually a few lines pnor 10 the Sialingrad campaign

were formed this way and held out success­fully until relieved months later.

The ultimate problem for Hitler was that he saw this tactic as r~ succesaful tactic for the eastern front. All the units had to do is hedgehog and they could hold the line indefil)+ itely, as he saw it . However, a strongpoint, 9IIen one reinlorced through engineering ef· forts, can only hold out againsl a force as long as there Is something near parity in odds. An attacker sl_ limes stronger than the delender can be beaten off; when the atUlcker is t811 Of twenty times strong9f he may not be able to storm lhe strong point on the first 8ssauh but will probably overwhelm it eventuelly, if the commander is willing to lake the losses. More­over, lhe firsl shock agalnsl one of these strong points is the most critical. If the defel)+ denr can stop the atlKkers' momentum, their chances of lasting get a linle better- how much better, which depends on how many at· tackerslhere are, cannol be readily reduced to a formula lince, again, willingness 10 take losses can have a major impact. The Soviets grew stronger and stronger as the war wenl on and as a result, this tactic was less and less successful. Hitler saw fit to blame It 00 lack of nerve on the part of the defenders. ACl\lally, the strong point was then and remains today an effective means for the defender to stop a much larger force. In their recent r9llision of defensi\la taclics, the U .S. Army is empha· sizing this tactic as an effecli\le means of slow· ing - and hopefully slopping - Warsew Pact attacks. The chances of success remain the same as always: giv811 a large enough force, lhe attacker will overwhelm the position. But it buys time and in the wlntarof 1941-42Ihal was what tna Germans needed most.

7

8

COMMAND CONTROL or Why Things Don' t Always Work Oul

Tilil battle pitted two very different mili­tary 'vst~ agalns' Neh omer. Yet. their very differenc .. tended toward similar results. The neleffectwutnatlneachcase, theover-alef· fect of their systems' Ihoncomings produced the same impact.

The Soviets nad developed II system of Yery strict contra. PMhaps thil was to be 8)1;­peeled in light of the Communist Party struc­ture, which gave little latitudalo lower ranking figures once I decision had been made in the higher echelon • • Certainly Ihedisasleraof 1941 had shown that It therll WII to be any chance 01 succeu, the control had to be centralized so IhIIl there could be no buck passing and the responsible person could be Identified and dealt with. The ability of the Junior com­manders to handle 8 situation on the lPOt WIS limply not trulted. Then, 100, tMfe Is some­thing to be said lor Iha traditional Russian way of doing things. The practice Will alw8VS against decentralization. The Tsarist regime had found itself with revolt on iu hands when it let too much power 100M. and mil Iessoo had been cerried oyer unGer the Communists. Whatever lne telllson, the planning was done at a yery high echelon, and planswara rehe8~­

ed prior to e~lIIC1.Ition as much as possible through the lower levels untll every one was as familiar al possible with the plan. Since the raolution of any contingencial depended on the balie plan being folowed, deviation was discouraged. Even deviation which was suc­cessful WItS frowned upon, ~mply becaule, aven if suce_ful this time, a pertOn who took this sort of initiative might find himsaH too ready to deviate at another time when it would be <iflngeroul to permit him to do SO. Initiative at the Iowflt level wal ancouraged. This was for two rllllsoot. First, awarding heroat at this leyel didn't put any ona out of }oint at higher leyels -one cen alwaysappiaud awards to the troops ~nce they do most of the fighting and dying. Second, it helped enlure their suppon. They knew who did the good work and who shirked,and when one of their number did well and was recognized by higher headquanelll, that certainly camented thalr suppon.

The point wa. that a commander who deviated from the plan in tha Red Army was not ~mply ralieYfld If his deviation COlt tha Soviet. some pan of thair plan: as a minimum he could expect a penal banalion. Ha could teIIIlistkally anticipata being lOot, eapecially if ha ware one of the more junior leaders. This draconian .tandard tended to maka com­pliance much more enthusiastic since people might also be removed if ~ fBit they were not trying their best. The net effect, in thill banJe, was that any deviation from the plan required approval from Moscow. This operation Willi conceived 'n Moacow; changes would heye 10 be approved from there. Although Timoshenko had command of a joint force from two Fronts !the equlvalenl of Army Groupa), he could 1'101 rNct 10 lhe situation as he saw it. Instead, he had to have approval from Moscow and Iheir approyal tumed on how they perceived the .ituatioo. In fact, this prablem persis ted throughout the war. The ability to deviate from a pian In rNction to the actual altul tlon was always limited by the

perception of the controlling headquartel1l as to what was going on. Almost never was the local commander's yiew considered conlfoi­ling or aven especially weighty. If Moscow lhought that Tmoshenko should preA on, then TImoshenko would press on or lose his

"""'. The rul impact was that when Tirno-shenko got reports back that there were elements of both the 17th and 1st Panzer Ar­mies on his fLank, he was told to keep pressing onward. So, when the attack was launched by the Germans. the forces he might haye used to repel the attack were fer to the west and unable to do anything.

On the German side, the problems with command control were rather more difficult. The Germans always allowed more latitude thlln the SOyiets to subordinate commanders. Hitler was not concerned, In the eany yeara of the war, with the literal e_ecutlan of orders down to the last man. He had general direc­tiyes and e~pected them followed . It waa only lifter Stalingrlld, when retreat became the norm, thclt Hitter began to interfere with eyen lower levels of command. Tha critlcel deci­sions at Izyum were not made by Hitler, but were made within the army hierarchy.

One of the individuals who had a par­ticular impact on this banI!! was GeneraloberSt Friedrich Paulus. He had assumed commend of 6th Army upon YOn Reichenau 's promotion to command of HG Sud. IWhen Reicl'leneu was kijled in a plane crash, von Bock assumed the HG Sud command.) Paulus had been a staff man fot the whole of the war up to that point. In France he had bean Chief of Staff of the 6th Army, a position he carried over to the Russian campaign. Now, without even a divi­sion command during peacetime, he found himself in command of an army. Paukl.wasoo fool. and he undoubtedly had good men work­ing around him, but he was to show, both here and during the drive on Stalingrad, that the task of moying an army til the commander was really somewhat beyond him. Here the SOyiets opened a large gap In his lines, and he simply did not seem to know what to do about it. Later, in the moye eastward, he refu58d to recognile that his force could nOt keep pace with the withdrawing Sovieu. Hed he had a

l.-• •

larger tank force, he might haye out­maneuvered the SOyiets. He apparently never complained. This is a good ataff officer action. The staff officer should make 81 of the pros and cone available to his commander, but once the military decision is m&de, he should bend every effort to e~lIIC1.Iting the plan, keeping the commander posted as 10 what is going on but nOI trying to undermine the plan. The c0m­mander, by contrast, has the need to be decisive. He must be ready to make a decision to clwlnge lhepian, if the needarises. Heil also the man who must bring to the anention of his superiol1l problems during the execution.

Paukls simply did not do these things. He kept trying to make it all won.: while the world was falling apan around him. Moreoyer, he seemed to have no definite sense of whet strategy to take. Was he to defend Klwln.:ov at all costs? Was I.e to keep thl Soviets from penetr8ling in his rear and cuning him off? He seems to have done the former but not the lat­ter . He took Hitler's stand-and-fight directives literally lind, given II choice as to where to allocate his troope, seems to haye accepted penelrations in his rear rather than losing ground in the front. The soundness of this was Questionable. MOte Impottantly, one canoot but wonder whether the SOyiets did I'IOt &88

Paulus' conduct here as a faYOl'llbie portent when they launched their attack at StRlingrad. There, 100, he held the 88$ternmost positions but allowed the Soviets to run free in his rear.

The second problem the Germans en­countered was a flaw in their basic $taff system. They had a plan to attack on 18 May. The Soviets had pr.empted them by attacking on 12 May. They were caught in a quandary III to whet to do. Should they deviate from their plan? Or, since they were in position and vir­tually ready for the anack, should they rush through to completion and send the southem jaw of the pincen fOfWard as soon III possible. It was obyious that 6th Army had its hands full and could scarcely attack: It was finding it difficult to defend. The Iongel they waited, the more difficult the 6th Army's posi­tion became. It was becoming lIpparent that unless they took pressure off 6th Army, the Soyiets might get enough leyerage againSt them 10 accomplish their goal in tha t sector

RU$SilJninfantry advancing behind T-34 tanks.

dnpite any gainl lchleved by the German 17th Army.

As it was, the aitu8tion had deteriorilted to the polnt where they were forced to add elements of the 1st Panzer A.rmy to the 17th Army'. forces in orde, to put sufficient pressure on the Soviets 10 call off their offen­tive. Of course, thaI the Soviets would mis­rllltd lhe situation and perM, in their attack despite their own imminent disaster is. course 01 action which the German, cen be pardoned lor dilCounting as. po .. ible Soviet choice.

Stili , as anyone could see, if Ihe 6th Army continued to fall apart, there would be a point when I major defeat would be inflicted on 6th Army despite whIIt might be dooe to limo­wnko', attack. Certainly this WIll one of the flClori which forced MOCIing elements of 151 Perue, Army to reinfOl'ca 17th Army's lUiCk, once the decision was made to go ahead.

Therl are confusing f,pora to the effect that Helder, Chief of Staff of the Army. had wanted to delay the counterattack until the Soviets IJOt a. close II. poaible to Kharitov in OI'def that they would hev, committed a~ 01 their available fOfCes and not be able to counter the German attack. Allegedly aga inst him WII von Bock who wanted to attack a, soon as It became spparentthat6th Army WIS in troubla. The truth of the mailer may lie lOmewhere In between. It certainly was ob­vious thai the IInack had caught the Germans by surprise. Halder woold then have u, believe that he suddenly IcqUil'ed sufficient know· ledge of Soviet capabilities that he knew eXlc t· Iy I'OW close he could ulaly Illow them to come without hiving the maner get com­pletely out of hlfld in the 6th Army area. The other lide of the "gument would contend that they were ready to attack It any time and waited only for the word. If they wara schedul· ed to attack on 18 Mly, the logistical syppon would have been geared to bring them up to IIfangth at that time. Undoubtedly they were not fully fueled . Their ammunition, while pro­bably not low, had been expended in the routine .xchanges of firing going on afld that would have been worked Into the figures. In all probability preparations would have Deen vit­tually complete aroufld 16 May, had plans gone II scheduled. By the ume token, the emergency resupply which might be needed could be carried oot QUickly- no mora than a day 01' two would be ~. Therefore, in all probeb~ity between planning afld preparation, the Germans could ha ..... attacked on the 14th. Altel III, Patton'l r8lleBBI of direction in 24 hooll WI' leQ8rded II a mlsterpiece, and it is unlikely that the Germans would ha ..... done much bener. This, then, reducn the time left to dither to three daya. One can ISlIUme that the fillt day the Germans did not believe that the attack would serioully Itflin Paulu,. lt was only, perhaps, on the lIICond day that PIUI!J, began to show signs of not being Ible to hold. Thl situation would have worsened on the third day Ind that, alone, would have pro­grammed In the deIIIy which could Iccount for vinulJIy.U of the time apent, Thus, there wal, perhap', only one day of r_llndecision befOl'e the Germans decided to go lhead. If that were the case, they could not know that Paulul would atop the drille on Kharitov ftom the east nOl' that the advance elements woold get within 40 km of Poltava when the basic plan·

ning would have been set in operation to at· tick on the 17th. at the latest . Still, there was Ifldeci,ion which almoll COlt the Germans the 6th Army. That they were able to pull victory Irom this apparent defeat il due to more far ringing errors.

The command control problem was reaMy manifested on two levell. The most obvioul one was In the Ictual conduct of the bettie. This would be called, in German parlance, the operational level. However, both sides made IlIlteglc errors which caused the battle to oc· cur In the first place.

The Soviets had concluded that the blow they dealt the Germani during the winter was indicative that the tide hed turned end that the Germans had spent themselves. To some ex, tent they were right . Never agaio would the Germans attack atonv a whole front . They l imply didn't have the manpower and materiel to do it . Still, the Germani _re given the respite of the spring muds to make good their 10lI8l. Compared to the size of the "my they were fielding in tne USSR. amounting to 2.800,000 at this tima, the loss of the previous year was not a serioul I8tback. Of course, as ell8ll~ were to lhow, it WII not the size 01 the German Irmy oot the lize of the Soviet "my which ultimately decided matters. The Soviet "my was scarcely recovered from the eHecli of 1941's defeall. Their luccess in the winter could be attributed more to German over­extension and lack of supply than to any in· herent weakf18Sll in the Wehrmacht. But the Soviets chose to read the signs differently. In addition, they chose to ignore the information they Oed to have been receiving from the par· tisan, of the Germen reinlOl'cement. There are lOme basic techniqun for finding out the enemy strength. Paltols are sent out to capture the enemy and find out what they know about future plans and what ha, happened in their unit . Certainly adequate patrolling mathodl Ihould have alerted the Soviets to the fact that the \oases I'I&d been made good. Moreover, there are signs which an attentive commander can interpret to discem what the enemy'l plans are . Certainly the Soviets found f_ signs that thl! Germani were building the per. manent type of defensiva positions whiCh would Imply that they were digging in for the duration. They .110 ahould ha ..... known that there were reinforcements coming in. a l of which pointed mostllrongly toward an attack.

AD of this infOl'mation must have been Ivailable at the Iront. The Question is whether Inyone recognized it lor what it was 01' fOl'­warded it up the chain 01 command to I level where they coold react to it. Whate ..... r the case, the Soviets seemed more guided by their p(lrceprion of what the situltion was than ill reality. AI a result, they attac:ked not an· ticipating a German Ittack in the making. They felt they were attacking a weakened foe which would collapse when they hit hard and they Illumed th8t the summar would be theirs lor campaigning in 1942. All 01 these assumptions limply had no basil in fact. From them came the horrendous IoIIn suffered. The conse­Quences of these IosaeI on the ensuing cam· paign can only be ntimated,oot the impact was there.

The Germans, 101' their pan, had leal realOll than the Soviell to be caught off guard. They had Ilr superiority 8fld should have been able not only to detect the Soviet

build·up but to interdict it. They did neither. This has to rank as one of the law tilTl8l that the Germans were caught completely off their guard in intelligence matters. In III fairness, Reinhard Gehlen had JUII taken over at Fremda Haeres Ost [Foreign Armies. East) and In fact had mede the fint 01 hil detailed analyan of the situltion. AI a result, he had deduced thet an offensive WII coming. By 1 May he had issued a report fixing the IlV\Im Bulge II ooe of the places where In Impending Soviet attack WII developing. How8ller, he had not yet achieved his reputetlon lor reliability. Prior to Gehlen, Fremde HeerH all W8S not panicular­Iy better It deducing enemy intentions than any other intelligence-gathering ileadqulners. Consequently, his warnings were ignored.

Here, however. it would appear that the lower echelonl- the Army GrouP. Army, Corps and 8\l8n divisional units - ignored the logical impact 01 what the Soviell were plan­ning. One mull, lor example. assume they had the same order 01 battle information Gehlen had since the principallOUrce of his informa· tion was from the collection agenclel of these subordinate unill. He had supplemental infOl'­mation, afld one can Irgue that it was thilsup­plemental material which really fleshed out the picture. The Irgument, howell8l. really is not vllid . It iI standard prlctice- or It leall it ,hould be- to send out combat patrols to tlke prilOners Ind allo to sefld out recon patrols to '" what the enemy II doing. Thil iI npecially true in I fairly ltable situation where the chances of getting back are fairly good and where inaction will normally cause com· manders to become edgy about what the enemy is doing. These patrols should have returned with information reflecting that the Soviets were not digging in es if they were planning I long defense. They ahould 1110 hava revealed when the word W8S put down to the troops. In OI'der to ensure compliance. the Soviets woold have had to send orders for the lonhcoming operations relatively far in ad­vance of the actual plan. With the notm8l abllt­ty of the troops to know information which headQulnell believes is atill not widely known. rumors. aI least, woold have been rife In the days before the attack. This. coupled with overflighll, should hava revealed the extent of attack preparatiol1l.

The most ~kely conclusion is thet this in· formation was In Germen hands, but that they fell into the most common trap of the In· telligence game: they used the information received to bollter pre-concaived notionl, ig. noring as misleading that infOf1T\8tion which did not suppon these ideal. Sending trOOPI up may mean preparing fOf an attack. It may allO mean reinfOl'cing fOl' defense in depth. The rlllding of the lignl ilthe Intelligence In, and sometimes it takas on elements of In EtrulCln heruspex rMCIing entraill. Certainly, this WI. not the last time the Germans were to misread Soviet signl- Stalingrad and Kursk were two more instancllll . The Americans proved they could 00 the same trick In the Ardennes In 1944.

Wnatevet the reason, the Germans flOt away relatively lightly. They took more IoIIn than they should have, oot the Soviet offen· sive did not seriously Upt8t final plans fOf Fd 8Jau. StiM, from the Germen point of view, thill Soviet offensive ahould never have caught them off gUlrd.

9

10

THE SOVIET PHOENIX In the lete summer of 1941, Hitler consid­

ered the wet in the Soviet Union vinually over. Pode! ah'r pocket I'Iad been 10fI'n8d; thou­sand. upon thousands of Soviet pn.oners had been taken, Inc! tnere w81 nothing which could Mit the advenceof the Wehrmacht. Gar­many WII well aware of Ihe manpower polen­tial of the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet 101181 during the summer had gutted 1M trained manpower pool. TM Ger-rn.ns could foresee more troops being pressed into _ . vice, but theM lfoops would be neither trained nor well led. Then came the mud end In. bitter cold WlnlM, fOfWhich the German. _r. une,· Iy unPfIPllred. Aher that came the Soviet wintef counter-offensive, throwing the Ger­manti back from the Soviet capital. Vel the Germani took 8V1Irything the Soviets threw at them and did oot break; in facl, once the initial .hock Will over, the Germans held well, lind Soviet advances in the latllr phases of the operation were made only 8t great cost. With the lPI'inog would come 8 MW German offen­sive Ind, .. flit liS IInyone could for_, new pockets, more Soviet prisonefll, Ind probable German victory.

On the Soviet side, lpan from the men­power reserve, they hid introduced the T34 tank during the summer months, and it was obviollaly IUpeOOr to whit the GenTllntl hid in the wly of tlnks. The KV· I Ind KV-2 helVY tlnkl were In added problem, since the only thing the Germln, had which cooid Slop them was the B8mm Inti'lircfllft gun. From the Ger­man polnt of view, 81ch WIS I cause of con­cern, oot neither WIS I critical problem. The Soviets had showfl that they did not know how to use their tanks. They committed the heavy tank. alone or in paifll Ind the T34s in small units. The Germans, on the other twlnd, twld I tested Ind lliable doctrine lor using their tank •. They had been able to Idvlnce aglinst the Soviet tanks during the summer, Ind only the bad weather _mad to reduce Germln capa­bilities.

At the Slme time, the Germen, cooid look to their own highly trlined forces . They twld IUffered losses during the 1941 campaign­OIIIIr JOO,()(X) - oot saw no serious reduction in their capabilities. The degree of training which hid II~ them to opefllte 110 succ.ufully up to that point Wli not changed; offICer and NCO qUllity WlS lbout the lime, Iithough calUll!ieI It both 1eveIs fT1Nnt that leA e){­perienc::ed people were now in these positions. However, promotion llone would haye forced younger men Into these Slme positions.

The Soviets twld fought one low comedy wlr In Flnllnd end hid lost the cream of their pre,wlr Irmy In th-e debecie of the 1941 sum· mer. Their leaders hid been l8yerely depleted by the 1938 PIIf{JfI, II'Id the IUmmer 1941 operltionl twld not demonstrated that those who twld IUrvilied the purge _re Inything more than poIiticllly retieble. They certainly demonstf1lted no reason for optimism in fuwre operations. Finally, there was virwatly no lir force to cont .. t the skies with the luftwlffe. It had been vinuilly destroyed on the ground in the first daY' of the war. Without IIOme lliable Ilr force, the Germans would be eble to anlck

Soviet coIumos a. they moved up, destroying them before they evlf fired I shot.

To Iny rllional observer, the thought of Soviet IUrviYll, much leu victory, lllflmad lit ­tle more IUbstantlal thin the smoke from Un­cle Joe Stillin's ubiquitoos pipe. Yet. before Inother yellr was out. the Soviets had not only managed to IYoid destruction, but had actual· Iy launched a crulhing offensive and were never really to lose the initiative Iglin. This was pemaps the greatest Iccomplishment of WoOd Wlr II .

The first Itep WI. to initiate the flow of soldiers from tha NIt. TI'Ie Soviets did have some tra ined divisions Ill11ioned along the border of Manchuria, now occupied bv the Japanese. Whether there WIS some informal understanding or the SOyiel!l simply feh they had to chose between losing the 81st or losing the west, they did strip forces from the east to send into the offensive in front of Moscow. HowlIYer, there were Ilso the polyglot people of the Soviet Union to draw upon. While most of the peoples In tl'le German·occupied sector spoke Russian or a dieiect of it which could be undeflilood by a Rusaian-speaklf, the Asiatic elements of the Soviet Union S90ke Turkish Ind other oriental dialects. This posed I serious problem in terms of le&dership as the more senior officers spoke Russien and were generally either Russian or Ukrlinian in back­ground. Nonetheless, these problems had to be overcome, becaUI8 withoot th-e manpower pool, th-e Soviets cooid not risk the losses of life which wooid be nec8llllry to drive the Ger­mans beck.

Almost simultaneously, a change had to be made in the leaders. It is a credit to Staiin that he took this step once I'Ie realixed its necessity. He had Installed offICers who _re politically comICt but without partic\Jlar m~i­IIry skm. Thev hid oblliou$ly fliled , and Sta~n now hid to tum towlrd military skill and ac­cept e tower leyel of political acceptability (which is not to Illy that I'Ie wanted politicil I'Ieretics as the price for victory). Some of the military formalities were reinsllted, such I. renk, saluting, and 110 forth . The most imper­lin! step WIIS to eal8 out the hacl<land replace them with .killed g_rals and offICers of lower rank.. Oblliou$ly some graca had to be used here, sincfI the hacks had been put in for their political suitability. To calhier them because that 5<lme trait was Insufficient for command was not Stalin'. style. So he simply transferred them where they could do no damage.

In their place came I crop of young offi­cers, headed by Georgi Zhukoy, the g81l8ral who nevI!" lost a banla for the Soviet.. New names, such lIS Vlllutin, Rokossovsky, Yere­menko, Chuikoy, Malinovsky, and the like began to appear. They were chosen based pri­marily on one c riterion: their ability to win.

At the lime time, Stalin accomplished one of the most critical feats of the war: he managed 10 mustlf J>OP(Jlar opinion behind the government. Th-e Communist government was not ~ially popular at the time. Many simply endured it. Others, I' showfl by the IUppon the Germans received on initially entering the Ukra Ina, acwally opposed the Communists. Stalin, however, wei able to

point to the German Itrocitie. Ind the speeches made by the Nni hierarchy to show what the fuwre had in Itora for the people of tl'le Soviet Union es Unttlfmf1nSCMn in the twlnds of the Reich. Fortunately for him, Hitler made no effon to conceal his contempt for the Slayic peoples and the other peoples who composed the Soviet Union. His actionl In Poland Ihowed what he would do, given the chance. Stalin WOA:ed on this and cOfl\linced the people that this was not simply a mattlf of which IVStem of government would prevd: it would be • manl!" of actual IJUrvivlt. losing the Wlr would fT1Nn losing their liv ... His thesiI Will that no SlcriflCe wa. too great as long III it led to victory.

By the Slme token, I'Ie ICCepted nothing which did not proceed directly towerd that goal. He was therefore eble to conYlnce the people that he WI' IS demanding on those It the top III he Will of them. And 110 they sup­poned the Soviet affon with pemal)' unparal· leIed dll\'Otion. The tales of what some soldiers endured to clrry out their mission - hiding for days in a destroyed tank, with roning corpses, Jull to get a snol It another German; ~tlfally fighting to the last man just 10 delay the Ger· mans lnother minute - cannot siml)lybelnri· buted to the fear of being shot lSI slacklf. The Russians tried lhe Slme thing during World War I Ind oot I new government for their pains, eyen though the Germans were not hall lIS successful against the Rllssiln Army.

The new crop of military leaders toiereted nothing Ie" than IJUccess. A skillful retreat Will accepted - if it were Igreed by the high com· mend that such I retreat WlS needed. This, In effect, WlS what happened during the IUmmer of 1942 to prevent the Germllns from making that one last pocket. But there wes tinle mercy for a comrnInc:Iar who deviated from instruc· tions. The Soviets deyeloped I tectmlque which Will to hold them in good stead throughoul the war and in fect characteri~es their operations today. They adopted a .ystem of meticulous rehearllli of ell operatlo"" prior to launching them, of wOA:ing out detliled plans down to almost the lowest IeYeland then Insisting that they be carried out. The SOyiets may have erred 81 times in developing plans which were not realistic. Yet the conse­quences of not carrying out plans to the best of one's ab~itv were 110 severe that ohen plan. were made to work when they shouldn' l have. II wa. not al all uncommon for banalion com­manders who failed to ellen what their supan-0t1 felt to be the ma~imllm effort to find them­selves court-manialed and Ihot Of sent to I penal battilion. Nor were generll officers e){' empted from ......ere treatment. During the par· Iod of the Second Blnle for KhlA:OV, the sep­arating of the wheat from the chaH WI. pur· sued ruthlessly, rapidly, sometimes unfairly, oot Ilways relentlessly. Zhukov had none of the compassion of one such al Omer Bradley and WI. more of I task rnallltf than George Panon ever thought of being. Panon might slap a soldier to try to jar him beck to his 8If\I&I; Zhukoy would Ihip the lime man off to a penal banalion "to encOl.lr&ge tl'le others." By these methods, Zhukoy, TImoshenko, and

ITI/Iny other leaders of the period were involved in creating a fighting army out of an army which was undergoing one of the worst de-­featl In history.

When the Soviet counter-offensive in front of Moscow was examIned by post-war Soviet historians, several mistakes wele noted. They faulted the UM of the reser-les, claiming lhat lhey were olten thrown in with­out adeqUate training. They all-O were faulted for the lack of large mechanized and armored unit.. These elemenu were to be corrected over the coming year. HUITI/In beings ale rather flexible and, given a IIIrga manpower pool.

The Phoenix in NumMrs The IIccompanying chan shows the addi-

lions and losses of the various typeS of units at lzy\Jm from the ltart of the wal to the end of April, 1942, together wrth the number of each type at lerum. The Totlll column reflecu the total nUlTlber of each type unit in the Red Army at the time.

1941

J", TANK. DIVS

N_ 12 Destroyed 3

Disbanded 0

TOl81 • TANK. BDES

N_ O

"""""" 0

• "" .. ' ' . .., Tot.' 0

RIFL E DlVS N_ 56 - 0

Oilbanded 0 T_ ..

RIFLEBDES N_ O - 0

Oisbllnded 0 T_ O

CAVALRY DlVS N_ 10

OeItrowed 0 Disbanded 0 T.,., 10

those who couldn't adapt quickly were killed off and replaced by Ihose who could. The big problem, and perhaps the real miracle of the revival of the Soviel forces. was the industrial build-up which allowed them to turn out the necessary equipment. Beforl the stan of the war , most of the indu, try in the USSR WI. in Ihe lands which now were under G&rman oc· cupation. The benefit. of Iend·l68se were b&­ing lell, to some extent, in limited lank deliveries, but the United Stales couldn't be too generous with them since they were not only rebuilding their own army, which had been allowed to languish over the yeers, IxII

Several poinu are worth noting. The dis-banded tank divisions generally want to make the tank brigades, a unit which the Sovieufelt to be a more viable size lhan the division. Secondly, although the Soviets'had more than 100 divisions destroyed, only in September and October !the Smolenlk pocket and the

J"' A", S.p Oc, N., OK

34 10 2 4 2 1

7 8 11 , 0 0

7 5 , 4 1 2

29 26 " 5 6 5

0 0 10 29 9 6 0 0 0 5 0 , • ,

, " , , 0 0 /0 34 40 ..

108 '" 31 35 15 37

12 13 ., ., 5 0

3 3 1 4 0 3 , . , .. ,., II. , .. 21.

0 1 7 14 5 12

0 0 0 2 0 • 0 0 0 3 3 0 , 1 IS " 30

2 11 , 11 10 4

0 2 2 0 2 0 3 0

9 IS :u 30 37 .,

wefe also 8ssilling In boilding up the British af­mored force. What Ihe US could and did send was trucks. But land-lease cannot lake awey from the fact thaI the Soviets had to relocate their factories without losing too much prG­duction and that theM factories had to vinuaJIy fe-equip the Intire army. in light of the Ios.s8I of the summer of 1941 . They did this weN enough to be able to launch the 1941 counter· offensives, to execute II fighting withdrawal across southern RUSBia egaintlthe mllin force of the German army end, In the end, launch e crushing counter-attack. This revival Is pro­bably without parallel in mititary history.

Kiev pocketl did rifle division 10$S8S exceed gains. Finally, the chan does reflect lhat more than naif of the tank brigades then in the Red Army were al Izyum al well as almost nail 01 the cavalry dMsiona. In other WOfdl, the Red Armycommined - lind IoIt - thecleamofiu mobile force here.

1942 M" J., F.b M" AiN /lzyum!

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0

2 0 2

4 , , 0 0

7 9 , 5

0 0 0

4 3 ~ , ......... 0.-.-, " "

" 52 65 60 34

31 18 10 8 0 2 0 0

0 2 0 0

260 264 '74 :NI2 31

16 10 15 12 0 0 0 • • 3 9 .. .,

'" "" ,

4 1 0 0

0 0 0 0

0 2 0 1 .. .. .. .. ,.

11

" "

12

THE OPPOSING FORCES The Red Army of this period was in transi­

tion. The army which had blundered its WilY to victory over the Finnsand had been crushed by the Germans in 1941 was on its way 001, but the army which was to wjn the war was yet to arrive. The mein difference wsa that Ihe people ware in piece, the equipment was arriving, but the formal reorganization not 'leI complele.

Several types of units were in the Izyum sector: rille divisions, tank brigades, cavalry divisions !organized in corps), the new guards rifle divisions, motorized rifle brigades, and in­dependent rifle brigades.

The Soviet rifle division was somewhat different from its Germs" counterpan. It had an IInti -tank battalion and, in the armored re­connaissance squadron, had 16 light tanks; both of these elements were missing from the typical German infantry division of the period !elthough the anti-tank element was later ad­ded!. By contrast, the Soviet division lacked any support servic8l - maintenance, supply, and the like. These were supplied by higher heildquarters. The division was a stripped­down force, suited solely for fighting. This has been a constant controversy over the yeaB ­whether the SOViel system of austerity was preferable to the western practice of having suppon services with the divisions. At this Slage the corps, which nad provided those support services, nad already been pnased out and the combat service support was being drawn from the army.

Soviet Rifle Dh'ision xx

~ .!. o

Manpower: 9,354 MG: 494 SMG: 2,221 Guns 75mm + : 44 Mortars: 160 AFV: 16

" f- @

The cavalry division was somewhat similar to the rifle division in that it lacked ex­tensive support elements. The cavalry units were intended for use in aruas in which mechanized units could not operate, although in practice the Soviets simply used cavalry u heavily armored mounted infantry.

The tank division and mecnanized corps found at the beginning of the war hed elso been pnased out, at least In this sector. One of their replacementll was the independent tank brigade. Thill, in turn, existed in two formsdur­iog this period. There were both regular tank brigades and guard tank brigades. The major difference was tnat the latter had T34s while the non-guardl units nad whatever wu handy, Including lendlease U.S. Grant and British Churchill and Mllilde medium tsnks.

Soviet Tank Brigade, New

x

T .

-~

Manpower: 1,306 MG: 29 SMG: 354 Guns 75mm+ : 0 Mortars: 10 AFV's: 65

The independent motorized rifle brigade was little more than e rifle regiment with sup­porting artillery 8nd other combat support ele­ments. It lacked the punch of its counterpan, the German infentry regiment.

Finally, the Soviets fielded e separate rifle' brigade.

The Soviets hed guards versions of the ri­fle divisions, tank brigades, and cavalry divi­sions all present in the Izyum sector. The main difference, in each case, from their regular counterparts, wu the quality of equipment they received. The guards units always got the best available.

By contrast, the Germans fielded larger units of almost as many types. Present in the Izyum sector were regular infantry divisions, e motorized infantry division, a light infantry division, e mountain division, a security divi­sion, and a Panzer division.

The German infantry divisions were not all uniform, although they were organized Iiong gene rilly the lime outlines. They were formed in Welle or waves. Sometimes the differences between them were in the combat elements; more often they were in the lervice support elements. Prior to the Izyum campaign the Germans had reached the 19th Welle. Repre­sented It Izyum were the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 8th end 18th/ 19th Welle. While the differences were not really important, they do show that the Germans were not simply turning out cookie-cutter divisions with teutonic reguleri­ty. The accompanying diagram shows the combet elementa of I 1st Welle division. The 2d Welle differed from the first In having fewer light machineguns and no infilntry mortaB; the 3d Welle was the lime 85 the first but with dif­ferences in the combat service support; the 4th Welle wes like the second, but with differences In the combat service support elements; the 5th Wella was originelly equipped with former Czech equipment; the 8th Welle wes organized along the lines of the 1st Welle but, egain, with combat service support differences; the 18th and 19th Welle were similar to the fiBt but, again, with combat service support variations.

The motorized Infantry division was In trensition to the Panzergrenadier division et this time. The only one present here wes the 6Othlm!. It h.ecI been motorized in the summer of 1940. It had two infantry regiments, one of which was the l20th Fusilier regiment, Fe/d­herrnha/IB. The normal regimental type was styled a "Grenadier Regiment" but the "Fusilier" designation was an honorary one. This was one of the few reguler army regiments to beer a title. In place of the third

regiment was a tank battalion. OrigioaUy it nad been a motorcycle battalion, but the Germans were upgrading as they went.

German Motorized Inrantry Division

.! . ~

Manpower: 16,000 MG: 712 SMG: 810

,!.

Guns 75mm +: 62 ( - enti·tank guns) Mortars: 96 AFV's: B2

The light (Leicht) Infantry Division was designed for fest movement, but not herd fighting (which, paradoxically, they found themselves In during this battle!. As the light companies in tha Eighteenth Century, their function wes to perform screening missions and to find and fix the enemy 10 that the regular divisions could come up for the kill. Leter in 1942 they were redesigoated Jage, IHunter) divisions.

The mountain division wes essentielly a light division specially trained end equipped for mountain fighting. They had moved into the Izyum sector in enticipation of the mountain fighting in tho Caucasus, later in 1942. Their principal use prior to this had been on the Mur­mansk front, in northern Finland.

The Panzer division was, of course, the premier unit of the German Army. During this period it still hed some curious elements, luch as 8 motorcycle rifle banalion.

The Security (Sicherungs) Division was e peculiar entity, designed for rear aree security. For some reason it had a representative on the front lines. It wes really nothing more than e re­Inforced infantry regiment.

German In fantry Division. 1st Welle

.! . @lJ

xx 181

-1;;;'1

0 - " -I~h

Manpower: 17,200 MG: 643 SMG: 700 Guns 75mm +: 74 (- ATt Mortars: 142 AFV's: 3

" -6

" -@

" -[SJ

German Securily Division )0(

m . ~

The TO&E of thit unit varied conside.ably

The Initial Order or Bailie

SOVIET 28th Army: 13 Gd, 81 , 124, 175, 169, 244 Rifle

Div; 10, 36 Tank Bde; Reserve: I1Gd, '127 Rifle Div; 6 Gd Tank Bde; 34 Mot Rifie Bde; III Guard Caval ry Corps - 5Gd, 6 Gd, 7Gd Cay Div]

38th Army: 119, 300, 304, 337 Rifle Div; 23 Tartk Bdt

6th Army: 41 , 47, 103, 253, 2f)6, 393, 41 1 Rifle DiY; 38 Tank Bde; 26 Cay Div; R~: 1103, 248, 343 Rille Div; 5Gds, I , 13, 36, 133 Tank Bde; 2B Cav Div]

57th Army: 99, 106, 150, 270, 317, 341 , 351 Ri­fle o iv; 7, 16, 131 Tank Bde; VI Cavalry Corps - 25, 38, 49 Cav Div; Reserve: 1255 Rifle Div; 130 Tank Bde; II Cavalry COrpi - 34, 48, 62, 64, 70 Cav Div]

9th Army: 51 , 333, 335, 349 Rifle Div; 78 Tank Bde; ResflfVfl: 114 Gd, 216 Rifle Div; 11 Rille Bde; 23 Mot Rifle Bde; 6, 7, lB, 121 Tank Brigade; V Cavalry CorlM - 30, 50, 68, 79 Cay

0"" 37th ArmV: 275, 295 Rifle Div; Reserve: 115,

176. 230 Rifle Div; 130 Mot Rifle Bde; 2, 3 , 54 Tank Bde]

GERMAN

6th Army:

d.Ib T

XVII Corp,: 179. 294, 1S7 101 Div]; LI COI'ps.: 13 P:l, 23 PI, 44 IHoch ur1d Deutschmeist«), 71 Inf Div]; VIII Corps.1 08 1e, 113, 260, 3051nf, 454 Sich Divl

17th Army: GflJppe Komf~ch: IXI Corps: 298, 380, 384, 389 Inf Div; VI (Ruml Corps: 2, 4, 20 Rumanian Inf Div];

11/ (mo toriz«iJ Corps: 114 Pz, 16 Pz, 60 1m) Inf, 1 Gab., 100 Ie Inl Div];

XXXXIV Corps: 197 Ie, 257, 295, 384 Inl Div]; LII Corps: 1101 Ie , 9, 1l11nl Div)

HOW THEY ALL GOT THERE

Initially, the only winter offen.rve lauoched by the Sovietl wa. the one which stopped the Gennan offentlve on Moscow. This was begun in December and soon had the Gennans in reu.at in most placet and In trouble in the few where they held out.

However, success et Moscow led the So­vielS to consider a general counter-offensive, intended to relieve leningf&c:l , al well as to deliver a crushing blow to Army Group Center and regain land in the IOUth. In all probability, the absence of offentive operations lulled the Germani in the IOUth into thinking tllat the Soviets had thrown all available r_rvll Into the Moscow operation and thet there wa.llttle to fear in the south. As a result, they proceed­ed with their bluer, grinding attack on Sevu­topol which was entering itt final phase. Sud· denly, on 28 December, the Sovlott crossed the Kerch Straits into the Crimea, lending on its eastern tip and forcing the German, to stop operations against Sevaltopoito deal with this threat.

Thkl was not the only operation planned In the south by Marahal TImoahenko, In overall charge in the south. The obfectivlt in thll lrea were to break throogh the G8ffJ18In N~ be­tween Blklk~ and Artemcwak, head toward Zoparozhye, get behind the Germ.ns in me Donbass/ Taganrog Iree, and then swing IOUth to pin them against me SA of A:zov. At the same time SOUth,Wllt Front wHtolneck toward Krasnoder Ind..w, Kharilov.

The lneck was conducted in a piecernul fashion. The fif1lt elements attKkecl on 1 Jan­uary 1942 when 40th and 21.t Armiet of South-Wilt Front attKked in the Ku,.· Dboyan area. Initially they did rather well, with elements of 40th Army geining 20 milet on the left, though its center and right were .topped . Tirnoshenko directed 38th Army. under Mal­Iov, to take Bepod, north of Kheritov, by the evening of 5 January, but Masiov delayed his attack and did not even commence it until January 5. The Gennans Mel recovered from the initial ahock and were In a P<»ition to count8f~aneck by thll time. The nmltt wu that Masiov accompillhed nothing.

Timoahenko then shifted further lOUth, sending 6th and 57th Arm_ forward on Jan­uary 18. For four days they macfe good pro­gte$$, but when they fNChed BalIII;leyl and Siavyansk, the Germans held firmly, ptevent· ~ further expansion of the Q8P In IMt dInIc-­lion. Here, Ill11tewhere dumg the winter, the G8ffJ18Ins __ using the 1N~/.trongpoint

technique. &peclally in the de\oeloplng Q8P, the Glfmllns made u .. of the little town. .. focal points for their defenM. Thia prevented the Soviets from penetrllting with impunity. They had to winkle the Germlins out of each of these nemielS, one at a time. The _mer did not help. Although the extreme cold of the 1941-42 winter hampered Germ8n mec:hlnired opemiona, IhiI _ en infantry war and here the Germens_ more on I par.

Finally, on Janylry 22, T~o tent in three cavalry corpa: the 1st, 5th, Ind 6th.

The goal was to have them penetrate the Ger­man lines and achieve the breakthrough which had eIodecI the Soviets to that point. The 1st and 6th Cavalry Corps were to take the Krasnyl-Uman-SIaVYlnsk railway line, while 5th Cavalry CorpI would work with the 57th Army to take Barenkovo.

Again, rwnoshenlc.o added new units as the expected breakthrough failecllo develop. HI put 9th Army betw.en 57th and 37th A,­mies while hewing 38th and 6th Armies and 6th Cavalry Corpe continue their effon to get Iround behind Kherilov from the south. On 24 January Barenkovo finally fell . On the 26th, TImosl1enko wu given further objectives. He was to cut German communic.tions In the vi­cinity of Slavyansk-Chisryakovo, secura the wast bank of the Dnieper, and &end I force south to either the Mariupol or Melitopol araa , depending on the sltuetion. In addition, he wal given 315 mora tank. and four rifle bri91dll out of the ttralned Soviet rll8fVtlll. The lime dey the Soviet 6th Army cut the Kharilov­lO:lovaya road. reac:hing the Oral River, and on the following day they took lozovaya, which wal a commul'lieltion center due to the rail­waY' prOCMding through it. Still, the Garmlint held IOUth of Kharilov Ind little progress was being macfe there.

Meanwhile, Mllinovsky, the Southern Front commlnder, decided to try 10 podcl1 me Germani around Sa.VYlnstt by I two pronged It1Idt using 9th Army Ittacking *)Uth and 37th Army w.twerd. At the Nme time, 57th Army _ to -mv behind the Germans and heed for the K~oye-GevriovkI area. Seeing the danger, the Germans had llrudy detKhed III Pamer Korpa from lit Pamer A~. Under MIck_, tnil corps. moved up to the K~~oYe artll to blunt 57th Army'. attack. The lOuthern shoulder around Slavyanak held, rnitting 9th and 37th Armlel' Ittempts .

By this time the Soviele had penetrated 80 miles acfOll the Donetl ancl70 mlln wide. At thll point the Germ.n lines held. The bettie wa. to go on for more than 70 deY', but those penetratlonl made after the end of Janulry were all thrown back.

The failure of thil offensive can be diractly attributed to the piecernNl commitment of troops and, in the initilll phaMt, me lack of vigor in ~ home the attack. AI I re.ult, the Germent were not faced with I real c"",. They __ able to 0.1 with the off~ as a .. riel of brush fim. To be sure, the huge bulge wet! of Izyum _ now fotmed, but the Soviets __ ~ teriously in ~ to meltl I bretJI(-throogh. The strongpolnt de­,~ II the ovtNtlnd the commitment of re­inforcements as the battle ~ on allowed the GermMIt to fa. back where they Mel to and hold wtMtre they could. At the lime time, once me bIttIe tenIed down into more or .. per­mener'lt ~, the repelted Soviet ItIIdtI to try to get the front moving again only ..wd to bINd off more strength.

At the .. me time, both __ reeIized thllt thll bulge could MfVe as I ~ for a future at· tempt to take Kherilov.

13

14

IN THE FOX HOLE or Fritz and Feodor View Their War

The typical German soldier of the spring of 1942 was a veteran. FriU had served with the same people since the campaign in France. He had been born and raised in 8 small farm town in southern Germany, had attended school and in fact gredu8ted. He was in the process of working on the farm with his father when war broke out in 1939 and he was drafted shonly afterward, He was sent off to basic training and managed to erld up in the infantry. whiCh was satisfactory. He had seen little fighting in France because the tanks kept things too fluid for any major French operations in his sector. The nice thing about his service, if military Sf.Ir­vice could be called nice, is thaI his whole regi­ment was basically from his region of Gar­many. They spoke the same dialect, enjoyed the same jokes 81 the expense of the Prussians end the north Germans end, of course, some of his comrades in atms had actually gone to school with him, In fact, the whole division was a regional one. Some German divisions were based in cities, sucl'l as the 44th Infantry ftom Vienna or the 293rd from Berlin; others were regional. stich as the 57th, from Bavaria or the 87th from Thuringia,

Fritz had been given a thorough training in the military, But he was expected to use his in­telligence, Although it was important tnat he understood the concept of military discipline, he was expected to use his head in accom­plishing the mission. leadership was some­thing the Wehrmacht wanted developed. Eve­ry man had to be able to fill at least the next higher position in recognition of the fact that wartime castlalties might well p!Jt him in that position, and he would have to execute it well enough to preserve his fellow soldiers and, if possible, accomplish the mission, despite whatever losses put him in this position.

The net effect of all of this, cOtJpied with the quality equipment he nad, gave Fritz a strong sense of confidence in his superior of­ficers and his fellow soldiers. He knew these people. He knew that if one slacked in his duty, the word would be all around back home, so there was that pressure upon everyone to do his bast. But he also know that they had all gone through the seme training, without politi­calfavotitism.

Speaking of politics, Fritz viewed himself as non-political. Certainly Germany had become a better place since the Nazis had been there, but he didn't have a uniformly high opinion of all Nazis. The Pany representative in the town had been an employee et the Gast­naus before 1933, and now he was taking out his resentment by acting more important than he was. Most people Laughed at him behind his back; a few curried favor. Nationally, Fritz had views on political matters. He liked the Nazi program which hed restored economic pros­perity to Germany; he liked some of the con­sumer goods which were coming out. Hitler had developed a car which was to be available to everyone (though the coming of the war hed stopped that program for the time being). As a German he could not help feeling proud of the fact that Germany had also recovered from the shame of losing World War I and was once

more asserting her rightful place among na­tions. If put to the question, he would un­doubtedly say tnat he stlpported Hitler. He had not been a Nazi himself, not out of any in­herent political views, but simply because the circumstances really didn't warrant it. By the time the Hitler Youth got running, his town was too small to warrant setting up such an or­ganitation. They didn't have the Boy Scouts before Hitler, for that matter, though a group was formed just before the war broke out.

Based on what he had seen in the Soviet Union, he was inclined to go along with the Nazi theme that the Slavs were not Germany's equals. They certainly had had the same length of time to build e civilization as Germany and hadn't done as much with their time. He didn't really believe tnat the Slavs were in fact subhuman-just culturally inferior. As a result, when he saw a child wandering on the road, he might give the child some food and he tried not to be thoughtless of the women and old folks who found themselves caught up in the war without having asked for it.

He was not particularly allXious to hunt out Jews, for that matter, and was disturbed by the stories of the Ein$lltzgruppen which had followed his unit into the Ukraine and had ac­tually begun rounding up Jews before the fighting was done. His town had no Jews. He had never had any bad experiences with them. He repeated the common talk that they con­trolled the economy and that all Jews would stick together as Jews before they would as Germans but, like his views on the Nazis, he really didn't care thet much either way. He felt that if they could be rendered ineffectual, put usefully to work, there wasn't that much pro­blem. He was disturbed by the reports he would hear that foreign countries were calling ell Germans antisemitic. Fritz wasn't anti anything in particular. He wanted to get the wer over, keep Germany Itrong, and go back home.

On one point he was concerned. His ex­perience in the Soviet Union led him to give credibility to the fact that the combination of the Soviet peoples and the Bolshevik gO)lern­ment was a danger to Germany. He had seen the situation in the most civilited pans of the Soviet Union, had obse,....ed what the people had received from their Bolshevik masters, had heard the stories of the cnaos precipitated by the Communist elements in Germany at the end of the First World War. He also knew that the Bolsheviks had preached world -wide revol­ution, he egreed with Hitler tnat Germanv was the bulwark of civilitation against the Bolshe­viks. Fritz had also e)(perienced the fanaticism with which the Soviet soldiers could and would fight, even when they had no reason to do so. If that energy were harnessed by the Bol­sheviks, the west would be in trouble. Even though h!, had a reasonably easy time of it dur­ing 1941 , some of his close friends had been killed, and he nad been in stlfficiently hectic ac­tion to warrant an Iron Cross, Second Class, and a bronze wound medal. Then had come the winter with soldiers freezing without ade­quate winter clothing, followed by the offen­sive around Berenkovo during which the Soviets had demonstrated a frightening ability to Inflict losses on the Germans-an ability no one had e)(pected.

When the frozen ground turned to mud, F,iu's division wal brought back up to strength. Now the word was around that they would be resuming the offensive. He had little doubt that this one would see the end of the waf.

Feodor, by contrast, was virtually illiter· ate. He, too, came from a farming community, but the nearest large city WIIS farther away than anyone in his family had ever gone. He had grown up on the vast Ukrainian steppe and would never have even heard of the Garmans before they invaded had it not been for his father talking about World War I and their oc­cupation of tha Ukraine after the collapse of the Tsarist regime.

Feodor had been drafted in 1941. He had known that the war was going badly before he was drafted, but he did not know why. All he sew was a constant stream of refugees. He never saw the Germans when they occupied his town, because by that time he was off be­ing trained to fill the yawning gaps which had opened in the Soviet ranks. His training was spartan, though he didn't consider it so. In fact, he was fed and housed adequataly, which was somewhat above the standard ha was used to. He was issued one uniform with boots- but not socks - a helmet, and a rifle and began learning how to be an infantryman. At tha same time, he was given classes on why they were fighting. The political officer of the training camp gave those classes and for the first time he learned about the atrocities which the fascists nad perpetrated in the Soviet Union. He was shown pictures which he didn't believe at first, but some of them actuelly showed fascist soldiers standing over the peo­ple they had killed, and he came to realize why he WllS fighting.

So Feodor's training ran in two veins: the military and the political. Militarily he was taught that explicit following of directions was the only way the Soviet Union could hope to win. He knew he lacked military skill, aside from what he was taught here, and he was taught that the people who were in cherge of running the war know wnat they were doing, that they had only been surprised because they had been benevolent but now that tha fascists had shown their true colors, the forces of the Soviet Union would be mounting a!lacks which would throw them back forever. Feodor was sent to the south and took part in the offensive around Barenkovo. He had seen, first hand, the ferocity of the fascist soldiers. He had also seen what happened to those who didn't fOllow through on the instructions with the effort the Soviet forces deemed necessary. More than one officer had found himself ship­ped off to a penal battalion when the operation had wound up.

Now, his unit's losses nad been made good and the equipment shortages replaced. They were ready, once the !!pring rains and muds ended, to go into the offensive again. There were rumors that stich an offensive was planned, but only rumors. No one know what they would be doing next - nor what the fascist forces would do. All Feodor knew was that he was flOt just fighting for his own life but the life of everyone in the Soviet Union and if he failed, just 8S if anyone else failed, their cause might be irravocably lost.

Briefings

Bn.fingJ ia I three·pan collection 01 shan announce· milliS 01.- gatMa and boo!< reviewl . T~ notices do not conetitU'1 ~ ..t.lion11, and !hey I II9mPI 10 ~!he'- publiclotions objectiwIIv.

BRIEFINGS ON& RECENTLY PUBlISHEIJ WARGAMES

T.b~ Ad"'- IShIlISP,O PubhcatlOll$, Box !.137, Dept ST. ~kI, NC 2IBl2. $51 'hG IS In BO-page bound booklet 11 .. , QIWS lIflyone wllO IS tnterested In tabl&-tOP sooru SOmullll>On games eve<yth,r.g tie ever Wlllted to know l!)Out thl!! aspect Of tile "mu\anon. g.Im"'9 hobby It not only iJ1(:ludes • IIst,ng of al l (;om.­psnoes and al l games 1V.,lable Imdud,ng some remark ebty up-to-date ,ntormalOon), bu l l\ 1I1so 11M. bllel hIStory of tile hobby Tt.er. is In .)(1_ SllCtlOn on how to keep Slats. how 10 desogn gIIrnI!tS ......... peges of sample Sill ~15. and Othel rNled ,nforlTlllUCPn Perhap$ 01 IMIn more ,nterest "'1 rhe long SOClIOl1S Of! where 10 gel

rnformatlOf1 about staloSIiCS. how much I! COSts \0 desogll and market 8 1J11m11. tile legal/royalty qvosnoll! and who \0 COIIIaCt. even wtwa 10 IJdveftlse ThIS book IS a IJOIdmo .... \0 anyone In thIS aspect 01 the hobby Wntl8ll bYJ'mB .... 1>e!I

MI, dl) mow, 203 North Street. Normal. Il 817Ul, $51 TltCtK:alsta<shlp COfTlb&t In I 5 •• 120 Game Four, 8' X II " wMe·onblack papet game-ma05; 120 counters, .ules boo~let Uses a VBnallt o t HIe Stllrstup rules on TrlIvtII/ef, bur rhl5 II e boa.d gllme Sra.shlOS. rnrsstIes. world ma.ker. Veeror movemeot system. Indu· doog Iaounc:hong. Intert:eP\lon, mllld1ed cou.ses. maneu ver and eYaOe. etc Combat Includes l_ I ... e. ITI&!SIIes Wllh II vanElW 01 ~odence Iyslems. saOoCtcasnog. elC

Two-12 diceroll lor eombal plus some r.ther unusual CRT', lor Other I", woes V.new 01 damages to cr.' t W6IIPOfl enhaocemenl by l:ompUler Ilfogrammlng Isrmu leledl. loorrunutes lurn eQulv.'enT. e&eh he~ -1 ''Ohtsee­ond ModurateCOlTll)ivltv and leng th Desogned by Mprl:

."'" TIw B,Uk 01 A(lIwOOIn mow. -xI'_ .bove. $51 T". 1"15 balliu be_ H.",",. V 01 England and the French 11" " 22" tllree-wlor heavy peper 1/Bme-1!'IiIIl. 120 coun t ... s. rules booklut IlP·Iocl< bag Battlol·1ev(tI med..,.,.al warfar. SeQuence is movf!/moSSlle/roolee ra llv FllClng. ITlISSIIe <:OmbBI by ' Mlg/J. melee. end cavalry chB!ge Rules for morale. $f.lOC1iI1 unolS (such lIS rego· Cldesl. 50 meters per hex, 110 stated tune tlQurvalenl Fa ... Iy limple and short Oesigned by Marc MIller

TIw !bUk or lite AI_ mow. address above. $5)

Cnmean War ~t 11" "22" Illree-coior. hoovy peper Gilme-map; 120 counters. rules booklet. ZIp-lock beg Seroes 120 banlu!)llme Sequence includes move men t/moralol/charlOMl deciatalronlotlensrve '''e/delen· _ 1.,./meIee Sernr.'Ord ZOC·s. Fireeombat by .pproed 'ICIOfW. melee by dtllerenual St>eQ8I morale rules and .... n lor Iwong S.I ups on oame-map :m ya,ds IlIIf he~. 1'1() lome equlvalenr DesIgned by Franr. CII&c1w!d:

•• 0I'1m1 Esrops Uedko Games:. 18 Fonceca SI • Mord,aUoc. VIC_ 3195, Ausllaloa. P'1Ce not g ''o'9n. wllte lor mlorma\Klnl OPlllahonal O-Oay 24"" 22" three-<:ojo< , moun1edgame-map. 392 doe-<:ut. mounted counlers. var IOUS chans and !abies. rules booklel. be_ed T". Nor ­mandy lfI'J8SI()f\ uSlllg lhe $VStem 01 Ruu.n CMrlpatgn MtIl co-s till of France • .oo as lar tlllSt M S.lzburg and a,_ DMSIOniIISlleunots Move-I'Olll-meehmovese­quetlCll Algid ZOC·s. Standa,d oddslr.1I0 AE·AA·EX on S611 Movemenl. Naval PQWilranda"d,ops. WIth fi 'o'9 types of .i. misSIons P.rrlS8rlS, commandoes. VoIks­SlUrm. _lher. Panzer Reserve. and SuPl)ly Speaal ""let '01' Holland and Italy. M wei as Mulbernasl VlCtorv by conuol 01 CIt" 1 urn equrvalenll5 one.......,. scale not staled Modalal. eompIexltv. I""", long Desogned by Jonn Edwa,ds

W.m .. RhJ nl lFuSllret Gpmes. 21 Ashvale Place. Aberdeen. Scotland. $550 postpaldl AnetTlOr 01 P~ , sh to ,e\llke WIJISlffl '" 1944 17" ~ 22" three-coior. Silk

lCfeenr!ld he;Ivy "ad gIIlTIe'-map. 120 count.s. rules 10iders. COWII' 5'-1 Un~mlled mcwemenl. Wllh some restrlCtlOO5 Only PolISh uMS have ZOC·s. wt>och .'. Itmlled In effect Rules 10< sower mo_nl, u,b<!n te<· ra in. Gollllttls. S tuka &01 sUPpO,t, fa d gun9, etc. Oddsl ,allO combat Wllh AE. A:,r;. Con tact, EX. and Slmtla, re­lOllS Supply rules. as welt as IUies lor RUSSIan Advance and lhe Vodl<a FlICtorv FM! day tum equrv.!enl; scale IIOt Stated ModaIsle compIe_'1V and lenglll Oesogner u,,"sted

Hknhtlm lUI( Wa'game<s. 14 Cherry Tree AISII. 8UCU,U.,;t HIli. Essex. UK, 8 Pourn!s per annum. by sub· tcflpnon onlyl The M.dbQ' OUll h Banle. 11(l4 11"" 16:,r;' th,ee·coIor. paper game.map; 13) mull1-co1ored. mounted, doe·a.n COUnt.s. rules In ... z,ne I5SI.IIt 14 01 rhe W"tpllf1181 Seciuenc:e IS faotgIInIUoon/.",Ik!fy1 movemenl/comber R'Ord ZOC', Odd'''.110 combat WIth Strength POInl redUCloon 01 unIts Speaal rules lor .r "'Ietv. commanders. rl!lOfganozatlon. cavalry pursull Fall­Iv SImPle and qUICk to pllly Des>gned bv J Im Hmd

BRIEFINGS TWO: RECENTL \" PUBLISHED SELEC.TED NON-WARGAMES

- Barg

.'.II.~II starts with 9910111er tlles.nd one mal~er IIIe .andomly laced ,n. 10by 10 g.1d The 1 .. ,1 Plltverchooses alell. acI\lIDarlt to the mark •. liodudlog dtagonallV, t&l:es lhe letter. lind PIBoes the ma'~er on rhe VBCiIted SPlIC8

The players - and '.om two UP to.ny '6115Of1aob1e number can play - in lurn chooee.n adjllC8rlllutter .nd nlO'o'e the­ma,kar Plllv conlinues un t, l all Ihe- leners tleve been loken. or Ihere a'. no le llars .dJacen l 10 the mar~er Plllyers then form words - 5COI,nlllhe values 01 the 1,1es lor fou, or 1M! lell. words. double lhe yalues lor 5t~ or _ leners, and Utllle '0< etght or more 1.llers Unused luners Ire deduc1ed TIII .. 1< AlIeN 15. sorrulat !)lime USIng Ules WIth nu~ - POStIMl and ""IIBII'" Enouglllo toll an &tOllt by eogt\t ~'Id ara Pt'ovtOOd. but lor a srmpler game !moller g r>Cts . down 10 foor by lou'. are suggested Two play. onechOO$fnll to movein l:OIumns. the Olher in,ows In. turn, II player- \likes any toIe "om the samel:Olumn -or Irom lhe- same row - as the marker end moves the merker to the v_ted space Conltnue unltl al!liles ate \liken 01' I piavet' on his lurn has 110 tole tn lhe l:OIumn or row W1 tll the ma,ker H'OII net !lC()ffl WIns L.' M. 1101" .. IS another numbef gllme. lor lWO tosr~ plllyers. A deck 01 lal ca,ds conSOS1S 01 POSO lM! numbefs. negallVll num befs. zeros. plus SIgns, mInus SIgns. muhlp loeanon SIgns. d,YISIOO sogns. and paret1 li1eges Players .r. lIMi t . tlend and rhen draw and dlSCilrd .t each turn DbrBct IS 10 Pllt~ OUI the tlend by lormong aft\hmetlC VlIPI'e5SoonS resulnog In ''0'' - or .lIOlher numDef cho5ef1 In advance by the plllve<lI. 1'011111 • • Dlld uses numbefs tn .noU· ... wav The plasllC board consrs~ 01 59 IlfOtruSIOns. el>Ch Dr'I8

b,ac keted bv lWO numbers. I,om one to II~. in a modlloed clleckerboitrd PIIUern. 1he lWO plaV'" in turn throw two dICe and pI.ace B ma,ker 01 lhotr color on a P'OtruSlon bfacketed by the lWO nurnber$ th.own lInes of II pIoIyer's color SC(lr •• hom one POInt fodour ll'llhe Itne to 28 POIntS lor n,ne In the Itne For a more sklilfut game .• Plltyer can bnlak illS tOlallhrow InlO any two numbers equaltr.g that tOla l he cllooses IAII by L.,SlJ re Learnlr.g. 00 GreenWICh AVIl . G'tIIIflwlCh. CTCl6SXI $5_95ea<::hl

.:"''V QIIClf. by J W FaUll< . exercrses the deCIsIon mrlklr.g facullJ85 of hom lWO 10 SU' players Propentes o f twO dlllerentWpe5 can be pUlchased by landIng OIl con ... 5POndlng spaoBII Raw malerllll 51let. aher betog deIIeIoped by d'awlng. ca.d Wltlllhe p'OPet" etlll,.-.-tng deg,ee. collect payments hom IIISIltog opponen~ Power Illes SImoia rlV cojiecl payments. bul .ISO can be used lor generallng eloclliClly. the amount 00pend1r.g on rhe money mvoestlld and the dICe 10tai "BulletIn" cards '" tmee coIor$ regulllte an mlllltron in pnees and rhe abrupt endtog 01 the game MOSt KWH 01 eltlclftCtty WIns. money.nd Ilfoperly tlavmg novalue.l the end (Weldon P'oduclKln5. 2925 Woodland H~1s East. Columbia. SC 29210 ~9 95 plus $2 00 p0!01ilge1. TIte BI, lusl calls lor two to lou, plav"'s w 't hgambler's' trlSlfnct! ElICh Star IS at the SlIme pOInt on. ladder 01 success and tries to worl< up to lhe RItz. wh,1e iIYOtdlng linkIng 10 lhe Pus Steps up • ,. bought WIth money ea,ned I.om Irwesllng In "appor. IUl\t1oes"-from "Trillned Worms·· to "SubdMde and Conquer "land<ng on "Ctlence ot a lif.1tme·· allows the OPPOftunttoes to be sold back.l higher end lI'Ohllf Pt'1C8S. tlepend ,ng on !low la' lhe Plltyer t:!a,es to go BUI II he goes 100 lar. he-ge" clobbefed. Therea,.alsochanoos to Qamble on qUICk steps up - or dow" - IncluOlog a "Power

Slfuggle" w,tl'l an oooontnl ILakesrde ca '7 50 I p ronl " L_ os won by ,,,. I .. " to run S25(DmIO. mtIton. Play lakes place at 1M! d,ff ... nt Ie'IIIIs In 6IIctI track lhe pllll'et1~ ',om \WQ to"~ buy anloques .• rl. commod, toeS. etc In the hOpe 01 ,ese!hng them. by IIIndlng on Ihe P'OPer $pIIC8S. at UP 10 doublol Ihe- purchase pllce When a plaver IIInds on anolt\ef D!eyer's PfOPet"IY. he muSl buy II tor 150"" of ,IS value A(X;Urnulaung. IC)tlClloed 10181 01 fTIOt'I8Y IlIIffTIIlS a pie ..... 10 fTKMI up 10 tile ne>.t level 01 play In e&eh I'ack lhere IS one lucl<y space lnat 1m.

medoateiV WIns the money 'I!qUlfed to adv.nce IHojlow Stump BUfl!l8low/John N H.n5efl $10001

Nlttln. lH:I;,nofllon 1I0mt Gamt potl th'etI to rnne Plaverl ,n the uillmat. l'Oht Each. lepfll!lenllng a g.6IIt power. Stilr~ Wltn a seertll I>OII\lllltlOf'l wtIod't IS '­

augmen1ed - and. supply 0' doIlBfs. mr.IStlM. ABMs. and laclorlOS - a8 01 wlllCh carl be rep!ervshed On a "bulldlog" turn. plll ..... s seereUy decide on lhe- oolptJl 01 tI~ , faclo,lOS. whethe< ro curry lavor WIth one or more 01 erglllOOrl m."or coun llles. whetl\$ 10 sel l a faclOry to a m,m,.., or to decla,. war Once wat 5\11.11. "banlu" tUlns alternat. w,lh bulldlog lu,ns In a bailie lurn. eadI player­seer.l!Y dlleclS t'- own mossrIes.nd Iho5e 01 controlled mlflors a t othilf players' PO(IUlllnon and lactor •. ABMs ar.depIoyed lor Pt'OttIC\IOf'I, and d6i11s can be rnaoje lOCO­ord"'ate allack.s The lone SUfYMlt WIns Ifly,r.g Buffalo .."" Ou.board, by Ale_ Randolp~. Pt'oYides the sauslac-lion 01 physically ",mltlilllng lhe enemy'l preces The­plasllC b<»rd CQnSISIS 01 In terseel1ng g'OIMII. sox IT! each d"tlClron The ~ at.doscsWll11 SIems thaI hI ,.,to the gtOOU8ll Allhe-sla'!. all ollhelfilerseCllonsar.hlledWlth troe \WQ p!ayars' P_. U5tng one 01 loot symmetne:Ii st8,rl"9 poSI trons On a turn. a player PUlhes one 01 hIS PIeces any dislance on a s traight lone • • 9 long a5 enemy precesand noneol. plllver's own. ere pushed OYetboBrd Instead 01 pushIng .• player- may fTKMI one 01 Ius IlMIOtIIt

to an adJ8C8tl t vacant "' t8fSeC1IOrl ILakeside C 56001 bol&lIoa Introduces a sllunkong pIByIog held The....sad Pllt tlorm IS dMded onlO en tltgl'll by so. gnd A~ ualPI rwo 01 the !lQUII.es one.t eadI and - hav9 hoIeswhoch. al the beginnIng 01 a game. are coYflflld w'l~ IIe~Ible tiles Only lWO proces a,e uSed. one to, each plllyer. and these are Started on the rwo permanent squa,es On a lu.n a play., moves hIS poece 10 an adlacenl Itndudmg doagonalsl SQuar •• nd !hen pushes .ny one urooa:uPted Itll. th,nugll the plal'orm When. pIa ...... s pIIIDtI III

ISOlate!!. he- loses ILakesrde c. 56 001 Cu_. IS. bettie lor wrYIY. 1 on an tItO~ t toy tltgh\ boa,d. With one sqUil<9 mtSSlng 81 each co,ner Two OPPOSIte ood,ows .ro num· bared Irom "'I" to "6", and each 01 the Iwo playersS!;)'" I'll' sr_ numbered ~ on the malchtr>g SQUIIIlII 01 one tOW Movement" governed by lhe- th.ow 0151_ dtoe ~ a pttIC(I mOY"lg one squar. tn any dtrecuon. exoept back­wards. 10< eiICh nme tiS number shows. WIlli. bonus lor 10'0'9 or srx 01 lhe- same number C.ptures a,e by JUmPIng but even tn lumpong. poece must tle'o'9. doe I_ lor eiICh squa,e il moYeS Reaching 'IS own numbel ac,~ the boa,d changes a poece to a kIng, whtch ties the power to move ,n .ny dlrtIClron •• nd lWO SQU8te1 lor eecf1 Utne tnt number shows (Aemco ca $9 001

SINC. by JosepllZumchok. slilrlds 'or "SlftlUlllted InterhernrspherlC Naval Combal" 11 15 played on a mod, 'oed ten by ton field. WIth lIddolloNt! "pOrts" and "canals" along lhe edges lwo pllly. 1tiIC~ conlloj lt"ll a lleer 01 sma ll metal sh,p,· A .. c.all Ca"' . .. . Bal1~htp. 111," C'Uo5efS. liM Des1l0ver.l •• nd lhree SUbmllrrnes­whICh can be erther emerged or submerged Two A ... plllnes. usabltl only once. guIIrd lhe comts ShIps "I:IUISII" It om one 10 til"'" spaces. depending on eara­gory Wilen "Iorlog··. shlp.1so mIMIS. $lnklog en-nv bv .eaclll"9 tiS space Soma ShIpS can Itre UP to lhletl

lImes: on orre tu,n G.nerally a turn consos~ 01 one ' hIll crUISIng or ' '''r.g. 001 two or Ihfee smallet shillS may CrutStl on the "'me turn Por" oller prOtllCloon and fIlMns 01 ,.PId rnovemet'Il ISINC Games. 7tD Ackerman AIIIt, Glen Rock. NJ 07452. 11500)

Tridl " T,..p. by J CIlBIII. IS • novel mo.lIand SIIalegy game Wllh poItloca1 termoroology th,own in lor col or The boa,d IS 8 strange comblnalron o f IIIrge squates. pe r1tal c"clas. and. few tloallonais. and pllly takes place on the Inlersecl00ns ElICh player con trols • Hoose liNOer . lour S_tOfS. and loor Congressmen I.nd "nce the- onIv dlllerenltllroon 01 the wood ~ II by hetght • ll\ey should be ma,t ed) Each type of PI80I moYes dtffer ently, and !he House Leeoer - who5ecaPlUf.1S the oo,ecl 01 the- game - lias IIC)eCUII pow8fS Oceull'flog lhe rh<rd tnlersecl10n of. quarler·ellde 0< a tr"'''lIfe 'orces the op. pOn&r1 ttO move. end can Iood 10caplures IThecombina IronS can become qUI. compieJr and !he rules.re!lOtJllt-

15

16

t imes VBgu.!l, bot Just follow the 10g>C 0 1 the g!lmtI.J

IEveron Intemaloooel, 2001 FOrlUl'>e Dnve. San Jose. CA 95131 912.001 - SIdSackson

BRJEFINGS THREE: SELECTED BOOKS FOR THE HISTORY-GAMER

NolQ 01 Boolu: First. I Should lik<110 pa<O! OUI that the rEM8W 01 lila Parkinson book on the Banle of 8rm:!,n S {; r 66 Issue misspelled the rlilme5 01 Len Oetgnton and Frarx:,s 1(,. MI!ISOfI 6""sh reado<~ ml{jht be int6lested to koow thaI SPl's War 11'11"" Eurbook. revllJWtld on this column In !!SUe 65, w,11 be pubHshed in 1I\a1 country by Arms & Armout Press

Eadl of tho following worio:s is r8ted by 8 frv.digit code on II ~Ie 0 1 51ucellentJ to 1 (poor) in each of the five C81~: g.aphic 'epreMfltltion l\ilerary qualityl PlefU. accufKV. and acx:euibility of lnfollTllltion l objectMty lo_aH value. Priell$ IndH:;e11!d by an Ill'''''' isk(', " •• Ior p.II~ editions; n,p •• no price infoflN­lion ava~lble.

Ilndlwolt 011 U.S.S. M. M IUUory . 'Olftl. US War [)eopiIrlme<>\ TM 30,0:1, Wnh,ngton 1945 700pp. $2000' 413/415/5. ThiS is a reprint of the US Armv TlICh Manual on lho SO"'ltt Army. It was comp'led by G_al Gehlltn and Ius Ftemdti H_ Osr lor their new Americen bosses ~sJng el l the vast amount of intell'!J'll"ce the Germans had assembled ,n lou r years of loghnng on the Ellstern Front Whilt resulted is the bast.sJngle Enghsh.lang~alJlt $O<Jrce llboot the n~ts end bolts of the So_t A.my and A" Force of World Wllr II Wh,1e thero ~.It orrers (lIS the SOVOltt Army W8S not too cooperet,ve ,n releasmg datal, Ihos Os a book that any senous Studenl of lhe Second World War m~s{ haV9. n conta,ns chaptels 00 OfganiLllnon (TO&EsI, taCtfC$. lhell" force. hardware. logOl!tlcs. fortlheatoorl5. p,tIra·""lotary Ofgan,zBtoons. ad­mimWBI,on. Bnd thlt SOVIet milnary system. SPI has always found thos the most uselul smgla source lor data on thlt Sovlllt Army. The book 's 1IV1I,lable Irom JOM Sloan. 5218 LandgraV9 Ln. Sllnnghe!d VA. 22151. lind comes. I,ke the orlg'''''1. In loose-leuf lorm (prov,de your OWn b,nderl. Colonel Sloan - whose SPeCIal ity IS Russ'an military alfll'rs - is to be congra tulated On aga,n mak,ng Iwadable wch a valullble reference.

BaUIt Slalkru by Alan O. l,mm. OUlCks,lver PfC­ductlons; 1977 180~ 25300. RIChmond. VA 232001 4B pages, plus mIIny charts $8,00 3/3/5/514 Th,s is thil second ed iuon of BlmltJ SrarioflS. an ucellltnt set of wargame ruJe!i intendad lor ~se With naval moniatures The forst ed,t,onlfll"'lIIW!Id ,n s&rtlCn was all e~c'tong at­tempt to Cfeate both a naval wargame and 10 let players loam. through thllgame. aboul many 01 the leehniCiIh!les and oomplexl\ies 01 mode<n naval combat Ph~lIy ,

however, it looI:ed as II ,t Ilad booll produco:Kl by all orang­Utltng who hild captured a Iypesett'ng mach,ne III re­sponse 10 lheSecritic,sms o f the graphIC laVout, a second ed"'On has boon pUbliShed. wl!h adeQu~le producllon values and W,lh ooglo t pages of addi tional informlinon 81mla Stlltlons. iI9COnd ed,t'oo. is most useful alld is recommended to those ,Ilterested in na ... al wargaJ'll(lS. ta-ct a . alld technology While not the ~st .... ord 00 any 01 IheSe wbtectS, II dOO$ show that 8n eccurate Simuianon g~mu can be 8S val id a p'ece 01 hIStorICal scholarsh'p BS a

""". FulfllimUI of I MIHlon: S)'rli Ind Lrb. lloa,

INI .... by Major·Geoeral S,r Edward Spears LoodOrlI Hamden. CT 1977, .i" 311 pages. Sooley Servocel Archon . 31413/2/3 Th;:; isa memo" of "the savage wars of peace" that ~ oU the battle front ,n Woria War II Spears was '" chilrge of Sr illsh ha lson w,lh lhe F.ench '" the M,ddle East, and h,s account shows why Church ill sa,d "01 all the crosses we had !O bear , the hoav leSt was the Crosso! LorrsHle •• Theaccount ,s _y much through Spears' eves, alld though the p<cIUfe Of evenlS that reaches the reador IS lhe aUlhor's . ,t ,5 always all on · terestlng one Chilrles De Ga~lleappears ill a mosl unllat­tor,ng I)OItra'l. at on8 POrnt he threalened to shoot Free French piiols in RAF squad rons as dese<lors Spear then reminded him what the BIII,sh do to those who shoot RAF pilOts of 8ny natlonal'ly, A monumental tan tr~m followed. The subjec t 's not one o f lhe ma,nstream areas of the Seeond World War. but for those Sltllousiv study· ,ng Allgkr·Fr9r\Ch relalions. or lhe d lplorT\illlC maneulle!' Ings in the M,ddle East Ilhos book ,5 especially uselullo r the InvaSlOO of VlChv SVniI alld the Vichy role ,n the Ir8Q1 revoI tl. then thIS well ·w"tten bool< will beQUI!8 ~seful

Arm", Oe L"AI,: A Pktorialllbtof)' of tllr .·",IK~

AIr Foru 1'37-45 by PaUl Caf'l'>e!,o 11 ChriS topher Shores- 1977. Warren, MI 64 PII96S. SquadrooIS'g""j $4.95" 41213/2/3 Tlois \h," \/OIume is baslCSl"," a cotlec­lioo 01 w",",l-cap tooned phOlographs documer1llng the F.ench Air Force's ~rgaly un lortunate role ,n World Wal II . The bool< seems to be a,med ma,nly at those who Wish in16.estong color scherr.es and mIIrk,ngs for their modoI a"plaflllS. and these aro ple<1t,Iul ThIt Illlotographs aro themselves QU'le ,mllfesHng. especoa lly those 01 the rather bizarre atfcrafi whICh the Frencil PItted frultlesslv aga,nst the remorseless BI 109s- Farmall 221s aM 222s. Potaz 54s, Amoot 1431;, and theor dk a.e all here There are a lso so. order's 01 battle from d illitfent t,mes 01 the .... ar g iven. thill fo. 1945 ,ncludlllg all e:;cadrilla of captu.ed Ju-8& used to bomb German coasrsl poc~elS of rtlSlS tanc1l

Villey of n ..... _: T .... J.pn_I'Hlple end Wortd Wa, II by Thomas R H. HaVltlls. $9_!.I.i. 213141413, A bfllli bul schol~rly aocounl of the JaparlllSlt "home lront" on World War II It is a SOCIaIIl'story rathe. rhall SOCIology - those loo~mg 101 s tatm,cs rellect,ng rhe sh,hs of JapantoSe opon lon should consult the Morale studm 01 the US StrategIC Bomb'"g Survey. Aga,n. thIS 'S a bool< lor a limned ,nterest group. but those in!&rested on how the war aHeeted Japanese society will lind thIS a worlh· wh,le book II'i il poses mally onte<esnng questi ons - what elements of Japanese socie1'r' were SWltPI aSide by the war. and which rema,ned, Ing'a,ned, to appear in pOSl ­war Japan

T .... Gra nd S tra.~ ef t .... No .... n Empire, by Ed­ward N. LUltwak. the Johns Hopk,ns Un,verSity Press. Balumorel London. 1976. S1300, 256 pp 4141515/5 FIMI boo"'. I.IVIIf1 the classics ,n the fiald Ie II . Par~9f's Tfle Roman LegIOnS: WebSta<'s Tfle Roman /mpet;8/ A, my of rfle First and Second Cen/uries), oon5l00,- Roman 1TUi l1ary &SpectS from a ml l,'ary oooni of voew Few"" snl l add ress the quesnoo 01 some o_-all. coherenl Romall st rategy. For thIS rooson alone thIS booO:. ,s a must for all RomilrlollMes Although thera afe few ,lIu strat'oos, t~ cIa" ly thil V9rOO I descnpllonsol the Roman eUorlsdullrl9 therr ~arioos phases Lultwak makes a persu.asJV9 case thai lIVen manv 01 the campaoglls oo,-Ided by anclenland modern hlSlonans ICaI/gula's campaogn 01 39 AO, Oami· llan's eampa'gn 01 83-85) were pan of a coh6renl pian to sec~re defenSible borders Thil second most ... aluable pomt he ma kes '$ that Rome ntNef had enough "oops to defand all 01 ,ts lrontoers. and thai 11 basad 'IS whpje def9ll5e on being able 10 redeploy troops to moot the Ihreat As more and more sectors were attacked Slmulta · neously. the strain caused adlustmentln 1&CIICS Irom pre­emot,V9 str,kes beyOrld the borde<s to defending on the borders and. ,n the end. to acceotong larger 8M larger penetranons before troops couk! 8mV9 to repel the in · \JDders WithoUI rehash'"g the causes of the fal l of the emp"e. L~ttwak shows why , mil ,tltlltv, Roma's fate was as much a rT\iItter 01 "me as anvth,ng else ThIS should become one of !he bench mark bookS in lhe field

H~I all W ..... II: Tb. lad Armon-d IJlvlsJon. by Oonald Houston Sail FlarlCisco: 1977. ""'''. 467 PI)

PrllS'dlO Press $14 !.1.i 212/413/3 Thos lSa unn hostory 01 a famous Am<!flcan d ..... slOn. It d,ll"" from most 01 the other boob of its breed In that it wll'i p~blished in 1977. ra ther than ,mmedoately ahe. the .... ar . as most 01 the others were Thus. theauthor has been able toeall UlXln a vast range of data. 'nformal'On. and arch,ves thill Wltfe nOI a ... a llable to the d iv,s<onal hiSlor,ans 01 a j)el"lltfat,on belore The book '5 best when dealing w,th the ollgins 01 the 21ld and wuh U_S, armored doctllrlll In ,IS embryoolC form (the O,v'$Ooo dOO$Il't SIl,p out ~nl/I palJlt (18) The desc. ip!fon o f the dMS'oo's operations. however. are not as I ~COd or 'nformalMl as they m,ght be, Blld the uno!"s Operauons seem to d;:;solve before the reader's eves The lack of battle mIIPS undercuts many of thedescropt lons 01 smel l unll &Cuons, which arB ,mportant in unit hOSloroas The hIStory of the 1st Armored. though done tlllllY vasrs ago. was much better ,n th,s lespect. even though II was 1\01 as Ihorough or complele as Ih,s book

S ..... lnln .. for Sup...,macy: An&l ... A"'~rinn N ••• I Coll.b .... t1on, 1'37-41, by James R Leutze Chapel H,II, UnwltfS,ty 01 North Ca rp1inH Press J28plJ. $17 95 213/4/5/4 A lhorough. scholarlv study of the pre-war or 'a"lls 01 The Grand AIHance. the belaled (a lmost too lale) ioonmg of thlt two Ellghsh·spaaking dernocraclltS ,n the vea.s before Pear l Harbor A larj)e part 01 the reason fo r lhe Western Allies .... arplans gorng relauvely smoolhly lIor coalition warfara is often coaching a collectl oo of comprom,ses toward a goall was ,n the formauon of Plan Rainbow·Sin pre-WDO stal/ta lks Yel the Anglo-Amentan relatJonsh,p was not an unbrol<OI1 ma.ch toward the light

Age,n. thIS bool< clearly shows that the ",tllfMI pOwer­pol itiCS of the 8r>lIsh and Ameflcan dec,s<oo-maklng estabhShments wereiU5las cr~CIIII fand ohen asblttorl as thil ontllfnDt,oflll l DJ1eS Thereare manyolheretear pereep­\Ions in thos good fIIIrralMl Study Wh,le II .... ould be hard to describe it as fa$cmaung. the book" D lucid trealmenl of a potentoally opaq~a 5Ubjtict alld illS a uselul preface 10 the All oed Grand Strategy Of World War II

- DaVId C IsbY

Correspondence The marn QUeSliOn that prompts me towrrte IS

the artic le "CanadianCiviIWar" 15&T64 - ed.j,. Your lEnglish-speakrng Canad~n - ed. l aUlhor was Simply present ing a Canadian ~arlti -indepen­

dencel argument. ralher than attempting to ana· Iyze Ihe ~altous elements In Ihe s,tuat,on. Have you conSidered what such an art icle wrillell rn 1775 by a Colon,al Tory would have looked like? Th!s is perhaps (he essenltal point of which the readers 01 5& T should be aware: the ar ticle on CCW IS an argument in l a~our a l one particular opinion

There are. I Ihrnk. tWO baSic conSiderations ~ I tally necessary 10 someone Irying from the OU I­Side to understand the present relalions belween Quebec alld Canada, and the" fulura.

T he first is a clear and ever-presen t awareness thaI "Canada"· and Quebec are h,s totically two assOCiated nations (01 not sHl1esl, end Ihal they have fUllcltor\ed as two distinct elltihes w,th dll· fererlt polttlcal cultures. Whal IS going on now is gOing on ,n Quebec. and not in Canada; aile way of expreSSing Ihis is to say Ih'ill we see ourselves as a malonty In Quebec, and not as a mlnOll1y In CaMda. Mr . GOldberg's hlSIOrtcal summary ig ­nores tha t essenual aSp8(;t of the Queslion. not. I presume. due to III -w,1I on hiS part. but Simply be­cause he is livrng another hlslorv

The olher essen t,al pOint IS that the Govern· menl ,s ptOposlng a pol,ey called "soverelgllty­association" which involves negot,at lng a new aSSOCiation wllh "Canada" on the basis 01 equal sovereIgn s tates: the liMI resul t would be soma­thing resembltng the European Economic Com­mun'ty The present sys tam has no t been working for the pas t forty years, and Its 'ntermlnable clum· sv survival IS at least as dangerous as any olher result. Mr Goldberg'sapocalypse IS unerly fantas · tiC, and represents hiS own pantC. IllS Ihe one as· pec t 01 the article, alld rts attempl 10 mislead readers Ihall would unerly condemn, It leads me 10 ask ,f he conSiders ,t reprahellS,ble to seek change emouonally. but adm"eble 10 combat It

Qf course II os a thankless task to summallze a hundred years' long slfuggle in a lew pages. so I don't wanl to be too se ... ere But It tS surely pOSSI ' ble 10 try halder 10 help the readers of 5&T to understand Quebec Iweare ~OUI nelghboUls, a ltar aill . Thev dese .... e bener. I am surprised that the game (by an Ameflcanl does beUer Ihan Ihe artl' cle Come 10 thInk o f II, no, I am no t su rprised

Prerre CorbeJ/ Drummondville-5ud.

Quebec

In la te Julv, whan I was In the pr~ss of returning from a training cruise ,n the Medlterra· nean I had brought a copy of 5& T No. 62 along wtlh me. One o f the rules 0 1 the Mili tary Airli ft Command is that communist propaganda canllO! be transported Irom Europe in therr planes. In case you hava lo rgotten, S& TNo . 62's cover showed a AK-47 w,th bayonet attached s tabbing in to Soulh Alrrca. and the ca tch,ng words "South Alnca Vesllge of Colontallsm. ,. I had one hell 01 a time gelling Ihal magazille on the plalle Could you be a li ttle m ore careful on fU lure covers?

.John G. Henry, Midn. USN

OUTGOING MAll kott"~_I ___ 11

lor us to survIVe There would be some vartation In sales, but the ups compensated lor the downs Lelllng prICeS or costs get OUt 01 line only crealed survIVal problems In the nearly lour years that we have been usmg lhe above syslem, we hall'e developed a high degree of confidence ,n II -enough confidence to enable us to utilize the system In new ways Sales of our games are nOI that variable with increases or decreases In proce ThuS a game with lower potential sales I than the "avelage" iell'eI tllQUlled for publlcallon) can have ,ts pllce increased enough to make up lor the lOSt sales. The poce ,ncreases will vary between 10'111 and 25" NOIlhat many games Will be publoshed ,n thIS 'ashlon Perhaps only a few a year And If thIS melhod doesn't work, we'll drop II

Actually, we're already usmg a form of IhlS Idea Wllh our backhsl pncmg, so It'S no grealleap Especially sn'lce the dillerenliat pncong pOliCY has worked fOl backir-lled games

Gellong back 10 markelll1Q trends, Ihe old de mand pro file of 30'111 modern, 40% WW II and 20% pre·WW II has been Inel<orably changong Ihese paSI few years unllill now s!(lnds at 36%, 22%,42% ThiS shif t ,n demand lowards pre·WW II pollods has created a problem Inasmuch as there ale fewer widely p<lI)IJlar hlstoncal evenls In lhe Pfe-WW II peflod INaturally - there are a 101 more years and eV8flts from which to choose. and so lhere ale lewel people Wildly enlhuSlilSIlC about anyone bailie) ThiS IS anolher malkellng trend More people ale specializing. There are lewer "mass markels" lor a particular 10p1C. ThiS I,lS light on Wi th our altitude of pubhshong as Wide a selecllon of games as pOSSible. It's jusl one 01 thOse problems that has 10 be solved from lime to lime

AnOther bit of good news IS ImplICit on the 101· loWing leller WOllen by subscllber Terry M lewiS, II afllved here belOfe he received S&T67 IwhafOin I pushed lor more people 10 do JUSt what Tllfry lewl$ did)

Three cheenl for SPl's decision 10 publish lhe World Wa,' Elf$! Front Qu.dplus T.nnen­burgl

In meny respects this is a lettllf encourag' ing SPI to occasionally remind the readers of S&T and MOVES that they rUIIy can have a direct influence on the production of games laaturing historical situationl in Which they are gr8lltly interested,

• hava been playing "war games" since the early '60s IAH's original Getrysburg, Waterloo, etc, ); two World W"f I G1Jmes Quidlly bec1Jme favorites of mine and my Iellow gamIIf1I in Chicago whorl they wife lilllt published, 1914 and JurilJnd, My Interest in both conflict simulations and history IDOe of my unclergrad mejofll) has led me into reading numllfOUl milillry histories covering all eras from earty Greek warfare to the modern and contemporary conllicts ; histories 011N'W1 have long been one of my lavorite topics, However, unlike othllf topics such as armored warfare or the Ent Front of IN'WII, very few games hava ever been P'Jblished on WWI and those that have found their way into print have almost in· v"riably d6IlIIt with the Western Front. Also, mt.Ich to my own " disgruntlement, " Imenaged to miss out on SPI 's original T.nnenburg and even mora reeenttyon Rand's Cilmbrai.

About three or four y8lllSago, as a con ... Quenee of this paucity of WWI games, I decld· ed to aIw.ysplug WWI era games on my S&T and laler my MOVES Feedback Cards, Howell'ar, nothing really came of this and for Quill a while the Iolio game was the ant 'I' new WWltitle to appear; so I decided to change my

tactics. A little over a year ago l itarted sending in specific title and situation suggeslions - bul still no concrete results , 1 was beginning to think lhat' would have to design my own when I finally completed all of my graduate degrees! (I really do enjoy designing games, frequentfy even more than playing; but, I have never had the time to do it seriously for publication, I

Anyway, last Spring it occurred to me that with the current popularity of quad games of all types and descriptions perhaps alN'Wl Quad game would have a larger scope of appeal than individual titles. Therefore, I began submitting several "mi~ed bags" of suggested titles for such a quad, but most 01 these suggestions suffered flom the tact that situations like Vet· dun, Cambrai, the 1918 Germen offensive were already in print and the battle of YPfOS was already under considllfation by SPI.I final· Iy hit upon the idea of both an Easl Front Quad and companion West Fronl Duad; Ither! sub­mitted such a propoPl which included Tan· nenburg, Caparetto, Gallipoll, and the Russian 8rusilov Offensive althe East Front titles.

Much to my surprise and elation my prG-­posal (with the inclusion 01 Serbia/appeared in the Feedback Ouestlons of subsequenl issues of S&Tand MOVES, Yet, I walStili quiteie!lfy that there might nOI be enough of a positive response and hence.n insufficient martet for you to tackle the project, However, as noted in S&T 166, which iult arrived this week, I am Quite pleased to learn that my fears were un· founded and that not only will you be publishing the East Front Ouad, but that you will also be publishing a fifth East Front game in S&TI691

It may have taken four yealllto overcome Ihe veritable dearth of IN'WI games, but it has been well wonh the troublel II my count is cor· roct SPI has In the worits andl Ol is about to release seven new WWI games in addition to the two released in the palt couple of years or

In closing, meny thanks from myself and the other gamelll "out there" who have long btlen intllfes!ed in these IIIrgely neglected but highly fascinating areas of military history which SPI is now beginning to open up in a fine !lIhion. Likewise, occasionally remind your subscribers that the Feedback system does

work' Terry M. Lewis

So keep tho cards and lettllfs coming -JFO

Work in Progress Do not ordet these games.n advance of thell

pubhcatlonannouncement In S&T

S .. ords lIId SorC\'I")'

The game syStem lor both the Army and the Quest games are looking pretty sol,d as thiS prG-­Jecl gets trundled onto the Art Department Ithere's a 101 01 malellall, and one would ta~e thiS to mean that the game is in great shape. The game IS more than sa tisfactory In many respects, bu t a recent luror has ansen over the "lone" of the game. When S&S was onglnally leedbacked as Quest, the suggesllon was wlillen With longue planted Ilfmly In cheek and was received Quite weil. But when a "brindtesl" (ou t of house playlestl verSion was sem 10 a West Co"t fantasy bull for hiS peru· sal, he took exception 10 some of the humor In the rules, which gave him the Improsslon that SPI was maligning the fantasy genre. Of course, he could not know lhat I had not senl him tho bulk o f the "hiStory" thaI Will be oncluded In the published game, which prOVides - comple tely seriously -the raison d'e/rfJ of the game. It is true that we had

17

laken a generalty ',ghter approach wllh the rules themselves, but hardlv With any Intenllon of ·'ma· bgnlng the geme 01 fantasy" Tho outcome IS tNI\ Ihe designer and myself have looted over the rules with an el<lIemely CII IIC8I eye, \0 make sure our In· tenltonscannot be mISread

The Inilial penCil sketches amved Irom Tim Kllk, and they look quite good ASide Irom the usual fantasy charac ters, Ihele are some Illustra· lions that Will look somewhat unusual, which, II nothing else, Will prOVide diverSity in Ihe cardmi~ Swords and Sorcery wltl proVide the fantasy gamer w!lh two comple tely separate games to be played at vallous levelS 01 comple~lty, and In· cludesopen·enoed and role-plaYing versIOns

Ene Goldberg

Alinc:our1

Work on Aglflcouf/ has come IntO lhe home stretch wl\h more allentJon being diverted \01\ In each passmg day as the SlOge Quad wmds down The rules are gelling a close goong over these days le~cept when I'm wlltmg things like thisl. and the work seems to muror Ihe intenllons ol lhe Design and lhe Input 01 the play tests. All this IS to say Ihat the fmal drafts 01 lhe rules are now beong pre· pared Both maps and counters have been the prov,nce of the Art Department lor some time There are a number of new concepts whICh make Aglflcoun a lOY - and a pam - towOfkWlth . It IS Important thaI these concepts become 1m· mediately clear 10 Ihe players upon reading the rules Although comple~, the game mechaniCS 01 Aglflcourt can be el<pJalned In such a way lhat the Ideas are eaSily accessible - and that IS what we are tOiling away at now Playtestlng has been con ducted since late November, and wh8t remains IS the lesllng o f lhe language of the rules and cross· checking each modi fication 8gainSt the scenarios The major thrust of the work now IS to see that all our ontenllons are realized In the correct form and fashion. DIlvidWtvrJen

TM ul War

The Next W"r IS essentially "nlShed The maps and countelll are In the an departmam Cur lently we are plaYing mOfe campaign games, and the laSt few tOUChes are being added to the !\lies and lhe s~tem. The game wlli comaln 1600 com· bal units and fI(X) markers. But do not ielthe e~· cesslvo size scare you. There are many one-map and smaller scenallos The Bailie lor Vienna sce· n8110 IS played on one of the lillie el< tenslon maps and is only an area of 10 by 16 he~es. You can see that the scenaltos are very manageable The sce-­nallos are lhe Bailie of Hamburg, 8allie fOf 8erlln, Bailie lor VIIIflfl8, Fulda Gap, Central ScenallO INorth G9fman Plaint, and the 8allie lor the 8,,1· tIC, which IS ba5/C8l1y a naval game ThIS game WIll definitely be out by Origins. See you all there

MartHlJrman

TyphOCle

ThiS game IS lust about comple te. Typhoon's development was a constant battle between the desue to have a PGG·type game 01 last and f ree­wheeling maneuver and the n-eed 10 SimulaTe the actual German Autumn Olfensrve, with ItS slow, methodICal advances In weather nOI til lor man nor beast. There IS no doubtlhat the Ilrsl Typhoon plaVtesl resembled the Bailie of Smolensk more than IIghllflg In len-loot snow dnlts However, each play test seemed to be followed by rules changes reducing German polency to a large de· gree It now appears as If the game IS much more balanced and accurate-al though somewhat less el<cltmg to play than the Ofiglnal game. Aliln all, Typhoon appears to be the hrSI SPI "monster size" game With very Simple, playable rules 1\ is very conceivable thai the Campaign Game can be

18

completed In one IntenSive eight-hour play test session . JoeBiJlkoski

Tanntnbc'r& Thf East PruMI. Campalltn, 1914

This IS the las! Progress Aepon about Tan­nenberg, for In your ne~t Issue of SBT you shal l have your own copy of lh'5 latest hatchlmg of my alleged mmd, whelher you will or no. Tannenoorg really should be qUite good. It's got it unique end new game system. Includmg an innovative hidden movement system, step reduction, thorough command end control rules, lOgistICS (including the disolganized RUSSian effortsl, ral lroods IAus­sian and German. single and double trackedl, and such line pomts as whe ther Von Mattke In Berlin wlilloso hiS nerve and pu ll 'fOOPS out of Fiance. Of whether General Samsonoy Will shOOt himsel f If hiS Armv 15 defeated both can land somet imes In

lestlng do) happen, However. Tannenberg IS also a short game - the campaign game IS but 14 Game-Tums long and many scenariOS are shorter. and the map is foho-sized Therefore. I hope that I will have Sufficiently synthesized historical accu­racy (always, as you know. my chlel concern) With SimpliCity In a game that Will please mysell and tha 36.(XXl people who Will be ISSUed a copy_ For those who are lamillar with the campaign. here IS a chance to see if you can do bett6l' than the actual commanders For thosa who are not fami liar With What happened in the forests and swamps 01 East Prussia in the Augusl heal. even those people to whom events before 1 September 1939 are but II hazy blur. I do recommend you playa game or two You might learn something about how thear­mles of twO Empires clashed - one large and cumbersome, the other small and skillful. but both supremely Ignorant - Ignorant of lhe nature of modern war, the effect of modern weapons, and 01 how victory mighl be achieved desplle them Bul, Ignorant or not, no one could foresee that Within live years, bOlh Empires would be gone, and the modern world very much With us, The avents Ihlll brought thiS about were shaped al Tannenberg. Oavslsby

World War Olle 111 Ihe East Quad

have assumed the management/develop­ment of this prOJect, and qUite a job of co-ordina­tion II IS, too. First o f all, Ih,s IS SPl's second Quad to "inClude" a lilth game, to be published concur­rently in S&T - which means that on any given Fnday, one can more Of less take a tour of the Eastern Front all in Play test Room Three. with up to five saparate battles raging 1 Just making sure that these games afe all set-up and matching the play testers With them is a formidable task of co­ordinalloni Second o f all, we have assembled quite a disparate cast of characters to work on thiS project, three of the games being done by New York area free-lancers: AI Noli Idoing his first game since the Rand days and hiS first deSign work for SPI in live years). Jay Nelson (his lirst game since Highway 10 the Reichl, and Tony Beavers lof Gondar and Sauron famel. When they are not ligh\lng on the Eastern Front, these gentle­men are, respectively, teaching full-time at Harlem Prep (Nom, aCling (Nelson - mCldently, Boston area subscflbers had the opportunity to see Jay in a production of Ashes in late April/early Mayl, and doing undergradu8te work at NYU IBeavers). Then, of coursa, there IS the deSigner 01 the Quad Syslem, Dave Isby, and finally, Jim Dunnigan (who is developing the fourth game 01 the Quad), Naturally, In a Quadrlgame, where each game utilizes a body o f standard rules, it IS ex­tremely important thai all the games be developed in tandem, \0 ensure that any diffiCulties that arise With the standerd rules are solved in a way that IS acceptable to everyone Well, getting thasa l ive

Individuals physically together, to say, nothing of gelling them all to agree suffice It to say that after thiS game reaches print, I plan to look for some labor mediation work, or perhaps apply for a Job as a netogiator In the SALT ta lks, for a rest.

Here is a bllel report on where each game stands now' Tannenoorg lisbyl - the game is mto the final phase of testing now. With the object o f achieVing game balance and lUning the system ac· cordlng ly. The rules are undergomg bl ind-testing, and we are currently workmg on a summary onthe model 01 Cobra. CaporeltoINof,) - thiS game is also well ,nto the development/testing stage, Looz to Warsaw (Beaversl - concerning the back and forth engagements around the frontier In late 1914 and early 1915. Ih,s game has Just begun seriOUS testing after a delay in obtaining complete Order of Battfa Serbia/Galicia (Nelson) - an am­bitious attempt to show the IOter-relatlonshlp be­tween the two main fronts on which Hapsburg troops were deployed in the opening months o f the war, the deSign for thiS game IS Just now near­m9 completion. The game needs work on a few key elements. such as the logistrcs o f the lightmg In Serb~ and a clearer defmlHon 01 the general ob­Jectives (in game termsl for each side. Brosi/avOf­fensive (Ross/Dunnlganl - we are ra-checkmg the strength levels of our Order of Battle In pllmary sources and have temporarily halted testing until we are sure 01 our research. Hessel

C.poretlo Which Way to Iht Rur?

Caporetlo seems to be coming along rather nicely. We've more or less convmced the Play test­ers that the beslltalian strategy IS to retreat whilst inf licting whatever losses pOSSible on the Austro­Germans and there have been no more masSive AUSlro-German enCirclements of Italian armies Meanwhile work is beginning on a series o f addi­tional scenarios deSigned to use Ihe conveniently available map and counters for Simulation of o ther operallons on the Italian Front, mciuding a number o f hypothetical ones. These scenarios Will probab­ly be conllned to the period 1917-191B Inasmuch as the mlhtary system changed radically between 1915 and 1917 on this Iront. Now all we need is a "Rommel" counter and maybe a "Hemingway,"

A.A. Noli C.mpaign for North Africa

Thai CNA has proven to be a difficult project goes without saying. Not dlfficull because of the system mvolved. but diff icult because 01 the sheer amounl o f resaarch effort needed lor the game As CNA wmds down (it heads Into the Art Dept. in May lor probable release towards the end of the summer. but definitely be fore September I I can say that CNA Will be one of the mOSI challengmg and Inlormatlve simulations ever d8\llsad. Specifi­ca lly, there IS more Hard Information, more DB. more Loglsllcal ~nowledge In this game than any­where. And 1\ IS all wrapped up rn a system that Is easy to laarn and even eaSier to implement, All you have tohave lsalot 01 l ime_

Now, we're not klddlOg anybody by saymg that this is a simple game It is nOI; but neither is It a mind-bender. The difficulty IS not in the system, 1\ IS in dealing With the staggering amount o f IO for­malion placed before you, The players are given the same problems facing the actual commanders In Alllca - and Virtually all 01 lhasa problems have to be solved_ The truck is King_ The player who can organize his logistics In some rational format Will do well ; but th iS is eaSier said than done,

The OB work is exceptional. Not exceptional in that it is 100% accurate; I doubt whether it is that_ What is exceptional is that, for the first time anywhere, owners 01 CNA will have a comple te Order of Sattle, on a bauallon level, 01 all units that fought in Egypt and libya trom 1940-42. That in-

cludes Anti-Tank regiments (and sometimes com­panies) , Flak batta lions, 811 squadrons, Oases de­tachments, German "ad hoc" gruppen. and a host 01 other units And Ihesa units are rated for Iraln­mg and morale, even to the extentlhat many units must be tra ined rn Desert Warfare belore they can light at maximum effiCiency (al though you are free to throw these units Into the front If you need them before they are tramedi

We have worked very hard on our DB, harder Ihan on any game. Se~eral people all over the counlry have prOVided remar~able Inlormatlon, Yet the number of contradictions and the amount of Simply missing mformatlon are staggellng. We have attempted to solve that ~ we arll 51111 work­Ing on It Imostly Wi th scattered AA units and ar­rivals of types 01 guns and tanks) Trymg to deter­mine whether an artlHery regimenl has 4.5's or 25-lbers, or lS-lbers, or where the damn 6O-Ibers are can be frustrating when each source tellS you something differenl

But suffice to say Campaign 'or Nort/! Afnca is. lar and away, the most definillve simulallon of an indiVidual campaign ever designed And ItS a hell 01 a lo t of fun to boot Rich Berg

CIl)flghl & Air C."

A t the moment, I am accomphshlng very hllte work on either 01 thesa two games Cfrv'ight is in relatively worse shape, as I am slil l not solidly con­Vinced that we have a system we can be happy With, We can't know Ihat untrl we are able to test, and in order to test, deSigner Steve Patllc~ and I must still resolve some thorny Issues CQnCElrnmg the effects 01 weapons in (and ani the urban area and sighting and movementlflre sequences, We outlined our solullons some lime ago, but we have nOI been able to sit down and lfash out these ideas Into a playable prototype lalso we need a mapl Air Cavis much lurther along. wl\h a workable system m hand, and about one-third of the rules m near­final SPI-format. However, lew of the scenarios have been tes ted well, and the game IS eight to 10 weekS of intensive testing away Irom being ready to enter Ihe production cycle However. I am un­able to conduct thai testmg at present I am ten­tatrvely planning 10 resume work on the game m mid-May. once World WarOne Ouad IS in the can

Hessel

Tht CrusldH

Play testing IS linally underway for the multo­player scenallo for the game IThe First CrusadeL For this scenariO there will be a maximum of seven players, With lesser combina tions pOSSible Our first two run -throughs proved qUite exciting, as the MUSlims proceeded to beat each other up (Without any adVice or assistance from the deSign­erl while the Crusaders mellily plundered thelf way down Ihe coast.

Several problems emerged Immediately. which are bemg lor have boonl correc ted. The Fat­Imlds were much tOO s1l0ng, especially vis a VIS

the scattered position of the SYrians_ With Kerbo­gha busy up North trying to hold on to the area around Edessa_ the Syrians were hard-put to with­stand any challenge from al -Aldal from the South Thus they could afford little assistance to Kerbo­gha, who spent most of hiS time attempting to bribe the valious Armenian petty potentates In hiS area, We have solved - or hope to have solved -this problem by being somewhat more accura te With the Fatamlds and their problems (Which means hmitlng hiS early build-up o f lorces.)

The second problem emerged when we found the Crusaders having too easy a time gOing down the coas\. By giving the variOUS walled cities a Zone o f Inlelference, plus making armoes trace lines o f CommUnication back to a port, we found that stopped pretty QUldly The Cities and castles

are placed so strategICally (nol by the designer either - by nalure, as It wlliel that II IS Impossible to move South without takll'lg either Anlloch or Aleppo or, for the Fatlmlds, to move nOrlh with­out takmg Gaza or Ramleh

We have an mterestlng Movement system, which taKes into account foraging wahout reSOIl­Ing 10 weird IUles A double random-events table, wnlCh Includes treachery, assassmation, cara vans, plague, and all the other events you'vecome 10 know and Iov!!, keeps things on Ihe up-and-up

especrally the DIssr6&nce rule, whICh breaks up alhaflCBS. Normal cornballs SImple (In hed bot QUi te rare las 1\ was dUling the Crusadesl and Sf9Qe IS QUite Simple and Includes effects of Attn­tlon as well as Surrender. The "leaders" and the lesser knrghts, etc_. are all rated for a vallely of thmgs IwhlCh might change with the designl, ancl the relative weaJth of the different Crusaders 1$

taken IntO effect. We';fJ uSing 25mm hexes ancl a mat colorful map And Redmoncl has promised that he can give US 10+ different colors for Ihe counters. It looks colorful and eXCiting, and thaI's what the mil ial playlests have Shown. Rich Berg

Mrc: h W.r80

Tom Walczyk and I have been ptJshrng around counters with Increasing mtenSlty. The direct frre system IS baSically 581, and al the mo· ment 1 am addmg the mfantry Into the game. The seQuenceol play is very long due to lhe time space problem 01 haVing dismounted infantry operating with mechanized units. Dismounted Inlantry move once for every two armor movement phases. Inlantry Will have a movement allowance ot 1 movement point, but In extreme cases lhey Wlil be able 10 Increase the" movement allowance to ClOSS opeo areas. Also, ATGM systems are be· Ing handled very dillerently Once a mISSile has been flied. the larget Unit Will have some ability to dodge lhe miSSile, and If a unit IS overwatchmg and can see Ihe Illing UOl!, then the ATGM can be suppressed, decreaSing the accuracy or hit probability M8rk Herman

NATO Di~ l.!!lo" Comm.odu

Got the game up ancl playrng on a Bundes­wehr tModern Banles III map The controller has a hall'Slze version of the player's map (covered With a BY.i· x tl· sheet to keep the player properly in the darkl to keep track of the real tocatlon 01 "enemy" unitS These regular size Unit counters are placed in seven hex areas Unto which they hll The rules govern how much Intormatlon the acllve player can have. The controllel gets hIS kICks kl'lOWlng what'S really gOing on. The actIVe player gets nervous. The active player has the diVISion maneuver ba\1altOns (as In the Mod Quad gamesl, less artillery. The game fea tures ar tillery, SIgnal, engineer, air support. etc., 10rCBS (whICh are kept Irack 01 through off-board playing precas which are kept In headquarters hotdlng boxesl. Bal­tal,ons are conllOlled by a peltlcular headquarters ancl, I' wnhln range. benefrt from these support unitS The aClive player also has conlrol (alter a lashtOn) over staff secuons and subordinate com­manders whICh !If he'S lucky) Will enhance lhe power of hiS combat bonalrons. We're work ing on sohtaire and two· player versions 01 this game in whiCh you can be a RUSSian, West German, or AmerlCen diVISion commander JFD

Colftm."do

An Interesllng trend l"1li5 developed lor me -With the design of Com~ndo, Il"IIIve now worked on lour games that are In reality two games In one (ConsfanMopl6, War o'the Ring and Swords and Sorcery being the other Ihreel, Onginally, I thought 01 COfflmBndO as solely a role-play.ng game, but we have now decided 10 include a Vllf-

Slon that could be played by those not Interesled In 01 unfam~lBr WIth 101e-plaYlng games. As I worked on It, lhe "versron" became a game unto Itself. and looks to be the Simpler of the two 10 work on ThiS puts me in a pleasant Quandary - while my leaning IS towards role-plaYing II am an avowed Dungeons and Dragons enthusiastI, the hlstollcal game wilt be eaSier to work on. The only cloud In the sky IS that because 01 vallous colliding schedules, t am about a month behind on start-up time lor this game

The fJlst staff lesl scenano was a re-enact ment of the raid on Entebbe (what elsell and was played In aboul an hour The IsraelIS succeeded In rescUing all the hostages and loading them up on the c-In lor Israet, but R&D Manager Idl Amin Hesse!"s Ugandans and leflOIiStS managed to kill twO Israelis and severely wound a thlld. II hall hiS fOlce had not run away In the lace of men With guns. the commandos mrght have had deep tlOU­ble Indeed Eric Goldberg

Feedback Ralph Vickers can wllte In the opinion of the

readers of S6 T, al leasl - laStl$sue's winner was hiS article on the Siege of Constantinople

FEEDBACK RESULTS, S&T66

Rank Ilem Rating , Constant.nople (artICle) 7.15

2 FYEO 663

3 Descent on Crete 656 , Out-going Mall 654

5 Constantinople (game! 64'

6 Bnellngs 618

S6 T 66 overalt 6n

Five game proposals did well .n the S6T 66 Feedback Case Geld, War In the Easl Quad. Dune. Arnhem Bfldge. and World War One Quad The last one is already In the works ht prevlousty received very high markS In MOVESI; we have placed Amhem BndgfJ and the War If' the East Ouild on lhe schedule now 100_ Arnhem 8ndge Will be designed by Joe Balkoski while several peo. pie Will be rnvolved 10 the Quad. Avalon HIli has ac­qUllad the lightS to DUf16, and after strenuous debate, we decided not to publish C859 Geld

Big Tsimmis tJ . c_ Geld B~ Sprong ot t946, Nall A-9' A-10tCBM-s had devast~ted"",en ot New York C'IV. but the eoneen Hated bombardment had tOUllty h,,1ed to eow lhe Amef'ClinS and ttleor Common_lIh all_ .n Onawa Wh,1e the Type XXI and XX!II U boats had long SO/ICIISUC' ceedOO In SWflOlPlng most Ollhe US Merchant Ma"'1G&nd milch 01 the USN I,om the seas, the American SUDe"O"lY 0/"1 the ocean SUfi_and ,n the &or off lhecoast ot the US tas well as the _'OJ)t,ml51OC Fuehll:!f's hOl)Ol: ot anolh6t hloodless vICt""" comP8r<M*lto the one he hBd .chl4Mld WIth England ,n late 19010. loIIowong theeasv voctorv"'" F,ancel had stayed the dI!oIr4rence ot the to~t blow Howeve<. on The ...-Me ot lhe da!;liVdIy 005tn.ICloon 01 Hamburg by an atomoc bomb. dell_ed by /I lucky B 29 whICh had somehow dodged lhe German ,et loghler a'f defenses, the tome for ComPf(llTlOse was 0_ SIlPPOlIBd by a horde 01100 new klng ,ange bombers based .n Por lugal and B,,\!an~. as _II 35 3 Task FOIC9 01 JOl).llneM A"CfOit C8rrOl!fS. Ih'" NOli Armada sailed weslw~,d to set tie the IIOOOIlnt

ThiS IS IhI.I leXI of a game proposat that ap· peared 10 S6T66 When all the results were 10. It turned OUI thai more people Intended 10 purchase "Case Geld" than any other game IIIIe proPOSB<l 10 that Issue. Nevertheless, after some twO weeks 01 animated give and take, we decided In early Malch nOI 10 do a game on the h¥pothetlcal sublec t 01 an AKIS InvaSIon 01 Amellca follOWing German and

19

Japanese VICtOlIeS 10 EuroPe and ASia. despite lhe eVident "demancl" for II

The diSCUSSions Ihal led 10 thiS daoSlon touched upon several ISSUes, but the baSIC debate was ovel the Question of whelher the game pro­posal, as prrnted, constllutOO an appeal to the sort 01 Immoral "Nazl-admllatlon" that has occaSional· Iy surfaced 10 our hobby, and II so, if that onenta· tlon 10 the game proposal made II ImpoSSible 10 design the game In such a manner that would not also pander 10 "Nazl·admlratlon"

The phenomenon ol"Nazladm"allon" 10 our hobby has always seemed to me to be one of lhe mrnor Ifonres 01 human eXistence Presumably, people who a,e oflenled loward h,stoncal simuta­tlons would be more than usually ·'aware." ' historically speakrng ISurveys report Ihal lhe average high school graduate cannot accurately list the Allred and the AxIS countlles 10 World War III Thai an adm,rat.on lor the technical perf 01 mance of the German mllrtary machine could somehow echpse the ollerwhelm.ng hlslOllcal realilles 01 Nafladmlnrstered mass hate and genOCide 10 someone's mrnd IS a wonder 10 me and a dark monument 10 human "Iatlonalily and w.llful .gnorance. Yet as oUlfageous Opponents Wanted ads .n Generals past and the perSistence of Nall-memorab.ha at thOld-class wargamlng con­ventIons al1est. we do walk In lhe shadows of such monuments

The argument over "Case Getd" was ob­Viously not oller whether It was acceptable to publish a game that pandered to "Nall­admlr~!lon ., Nor was the argument oller whelher some sublects that, although based (as are all games) on eKplOling leaslble hlslollcat alter natives. 'are "too hOI to hand~ .. No one here defiles the legwmacy of senous hlstOlicalll"lQUIlY, regardless 01 subJecl Rathe •. lhe argument was whether Ihe pubhcahOn of "Case Geld"' In par­tICular would, by ItS vefY nature, pander 10 "Nall­admlfallon "

Or to pul lt another wav. how IS It pOSSible to iegmmalefy conSider the Subjecl 01 a NalllnVaSlon 01 the United States In a hYPOthellCa1 historICal sense? By "Ieg.trmatety," I mean Within lhe COl1-\(lXI of a game whICh presents Ihe SUbfllCt as a senous hlstorlCllI altemauave. and not as a sellSa tlonahloo lantasy The drsagreement here was ove' the Issue 01 whether or nOI "Case Geld" was, II you Will, "Iegllrmate •. Those whO did recognize such legitimacy enllissged a game along the hnes 01 See/owe, With the addllton of a delalled hlstollCel analySIS of the IhyPOlhetrcal! events leading up 10 the AXIS InvaSIOn Those who Ihought the prOpOsal was nOI IegUlmate pOinted QUI lhe sensatIOnalized word'ng of the proposat Itself and suggested Ihal an alternallve game ex pand the conte~t to InCOrporale dorectly the set of hlstollcal cllcumslances that (would havefcould havel blought Iha invaSion Within Ihe realm of the posSible Since lhose objecting absotutely refused 10 countenance the publlClltlon of the game, the pracllcal resolurlon 01 lhe diSCUSSIon was a dec" Slon nOl to pubhsh lhe game

We have also decided that. from now on, everyone here Will screen all feedback proposals pllor to thell pubhcallon In MOVES or S6T. and the acceptability 01 proposals mUSI be agreed to. ThiS IS the Illst l ime II has been fe lt necessary 10 overrrde the outcome of the Feedback By uSing the new screening PIOCesS, we hope 10 avoid do-Ing so again

- Hessel

Noles From Underground II you've found Ihls column Interesllng.

amusing, or welt wlillen. It'S all a tYPOQlaphical er­ror and I aSSure you It won't happen agBIn

One of the great advantages of Willing this

20

cotumn IS thai t can project 8 number 01 different outlooks and approaches thaI would be 1he envy 01 any schizophrenic. I can lecture about the need for 1horoogh game development and meaningful historical research wIth all the sweeping, solemn lervor of 01"18 01 Cromwell's Captains Pf88ch'ng to his Iroopol the New Model Armv' "looll not VB to qUick anweB In designing wane-games, but to VB bookes - nOI one Of two bot search mlght,ly Let us pray thaI the wrath 01 VB 5Ubscll~ Shall rise through the malls and smile those evildoers who relv on the catch-phrase and the glib tongue In

place 01 substance, and they shalt be cast down mto the tlflmslone 01 Baltimore," It would go on Irom there. foundmg ofl WIth companng Charles I to Jim Dunnigan ,f "m In good form

Perhaps' can puff mVsei! up 85 "'he moral eqUIvalent 01 competitIon," lor SP"ndeed has no real market competItion AH and GDW have thelf own audiences, and our sales do not encroach on them. ThiS leaves us autonomous and free. With­OUt the excuse o f bemg able to blame the needs of competition for our actions. BeSides. GDW and AH are Nice Guys They wouldn't tell if anything was rotlen in Denmark.

However, some people say my own personal sense o f moralilV is about equal to that of Jack the Ripper, SO II would be hard for me 10 function as the mOfal eQulVa~nt of anything (With the poSSible e)fceptlon o f Alliia the Hun!. So, Instead, I can warn you which 5PI games under development are turkeys m gestation, and Will hatch through lhe shell 01 palnlul Progress Reporls as a real gob­blef'sgobbler Our newedl\Jng systems, however, have dr8StJcally cut back on tUlkey producllon -although I lear we shall SIIII have a few new ones m

lime for Thanksglvmg Besides, I don't have Ihe time 10 stJc~ my nose InlO other people's games as much as I used 10, and I am reluctant 10 rely on second hand mformauon_ So, Ihe most alarmmg thing I can say IS lhal IhlS or that game has a few mmor errors lhallook like lhey are gomg to get m­to print I have alSO lOSt much 01 my taste for Ihrowlng SIOnes Since mOVing InlO a glass house myself

I can always ~ and frequently do - leclure on what makes good games and magazme aru­cles. 01 course, those phihSllne5 who have nOI ap­preciated my effons oval the laSt 91ghl '(tIars Will say lhat I may know how, bul can'l do II myself That's often said about edllors (and eunUChS). But 1 don't think I have been gOing m the wrong direc­tion In hiS column, Jim Dunnigan Willes lhat reo cent trends are emphaSIZing the value 01 informa lion In games and articles - real, valuable dala tha t the player or reader can use to further hiS or her understandmg of the subJecl ThiS IS Ideally whal separates our SOrt 01 games Irom Monopoly and OUI alilcles Irom what you might lead m Newsweek . Yet if a game or article IS to Mve thiS value. the 'n formallon must be put In And that takes umeand effor t

In these variOUS gUiseS, I have very occaSion­ally raised my vOice in ImpaSSioned outcry, and perhaps 100 ollen aVOided leal problems and ISSUes Ihrough generallues and repe1ll10n Bu t II could be worse. If I dldn'l Wflle thl5 column, all you'd get IS mOle Progress Repons - "well, the gameiscomlngatongfll"le etc., etc "

ThiS IS the IasllSSUe that WIll appeal before Ih,s year's Origins. Alas. due to Other obligations, It looks like I shall have to miSS thiS one, and With It

Ihe Char1C8 10 parllCipate In the SPI so ftball team's complete. Uller, Clausewtlzlan defeat of thell Avalon HIli opponentS. If the tru th be known, 5PI wlIl probably be beller off lor my absence, as lam pretty poor at plaYing softball In lhe ',151 SPlteam praC\lce, I anlully struck DUIIO cnes 01 "ThIS isn'l crlCkel. Isby" coming from my colleagues If\tle do they know t am almost as bad at cllckel

- Osvelsb'r'

Gossip Fire end Movement magazine Will be under

gOing some changes In edl\onal personnel The curren t edltor·in·chlOl, Rodger MacGowan, Will be StepPing down because 01 a heavy WOfk toed In hiS "real" Job Richard DeBaun, the lISSOCl9te editor, will also be devO\lng conSIderably less lime for the same reasons. We all hope lhat Ihe new edllors, who Will be named shortly, Will conunUB along the same high road that lhelr predecessors have paved

Well folks, SPllost out to Avalon Hil i on the field 01 licenSing. BOlh o f us wera bidding on the roghts 10 do a game on Frank Herbert's book, DUfI6. It seems Ihat lhev had the beller "m" sinca Robert Heinlein and Frank Herbert used the same agent. ThiS prOVided the proper Jeverage for AH to Win oul Oh well Tom, JUSI wall untlt softball season .No Oate yet on when Ava\on HIli Will be publishing DUfI6. They are currently looking over an oul5!de design

Avalon HIli is working on their f,rSI fanlasy game which IS being done by RIChard Hamblen. II might even be feady fOf ORIGINS

- HOW1f1BsflJSCh

ORIGINS 78 FOURTH ANNUAL NATIONAL WARGAMING CONVENTION

JULY 14, 15, 16, 1978 UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN • NORTH CAMPUS • ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN

SPONSORED BY METRO DETROIT GAMERS For more Information or our pre-registration nyer (available April 15). send SASE to:

M ETRO DETROIT GAMERS, <Ia AL SLiSINGER, 12.5.54 DRESDEN. DETROIT, MI 4820.5

FOR YOUR EVES ONLY Ed;'''' b'JlmO""~';;'~ J oseph Ba!koskl, and David lib'(

An Open Intelligence Summaryaf Current Military Affairs

RUMORS:

S.viel \'S. AlltHkaa N.v. 1 EkocltOllks

A Sign IS pOSted In the O"1a! of SOViet Ad­m!!al and naval Commander-in-Chief Sergei GOfshkov tha t sta tes. "BetlBr IS the enemy 01 good enough" This statement seems to Illustrate the SOV181theoty of ship deSIgn and technology In

recen! years RUSSian electronICS at sea ~ally lag years betllfld Western technology-although thau systems are Simpler. cheaper. and eaSier \0 ma,nta,n RUSSJ8n shipboard computers afB ap­parently JUst beginning \0 enter 5eNICe, whereas Ihe Amencan "NTDS" system has been in OpElra !IOn since 1962. OUf de ... elopment of three­dimenSional radar lit sea was also apPloKlmately 10vearsahead of Similar Soviet technology_ Sonar IS an 8r!WI tn whICh the US Navy has usua1tV excell­ed, and egam II IS obvIOUS that the SOVtets have nOt vel caught up 10 us in thIS field. Scannmg sonar IIrSI enlered S8fV1Ce In lhe USN In 1948, although It IS likely tl'l8lth,s search mechanism did nOI enler service 10 the Soviet Fleet until al least 1958. (However, both the US and the USSR developed lhe use of bow·mounled sonar at ap· proximately Ihe same tIme.) Sovtet naval elec· IronIC equlpmenl IS both much larger and much heavlf/r then NATO models (usually !WICeas heavy and about:n.40'lf, larger). This design lendency leads to a lack 01 shipboard space for certalO crmcal military functions, such as Wilapons reloads, fuel tanks, and crew space As a result, Soviet ships tend to have shorter crulslOg radii and less capacity 10 withstand prolonged naval acuon on the high seas. It IS urlCenaln whether Admiral GOfShkov's wall,statement IS correct, but II eer talOly appears true thaI NATO possesses the "bet· lef" and the SOVlEtt Unton the "good enough " WhICh ollhese twO theories of stup design wlllwlO out In the end IS not known. IU.S. N8va/lnstitute PfOC66dmgs, 21781

Ptrv DI:wppolnttd Wltll SU·U

It " reporled that the Peruvian All FOIC8 IS dl5llppainle(l with the aVIOnICS fllted on thelf Su-22's. The allCl'alt are Atoll-equIpped and carry the I-band HlQh F,x rangmg radar , whICh IS thought to be standard on aU the Su-!7, Su-2O, and Su-22 family The I-band High F,x IS constdefed IOfOfIOf to the Aida II set whICh IS carned by POfuvlan Air Force Mirage 5Ps, The IFF !Identification. Friend or Fool equipment which IS fitted to the Su-22 is atso repouedJy Incompatlb~ With RUSSian sup· phed SA·3 SAMs; also they are not inlOf-operable WIth current Peruv",n All Force commUnicatIons equipment. In adelmon. navtgatlOflllI aides on lhe PeruVI8n Su-22s are reported to be Virtually non­e~lStent A further source 01 dlS8PPolOtment to Peru was the fact tha t the Su-22s do not carry the Silena III radar wllrnlng receiver Ian omnldllec­lIonal UOlt htted to the Iale91 gef'lOration 01 Soviet allcralt) wllh whICh lhey had e~pected II to be eqUIPped (Fllghr IntefTllJllOM/, 1114/78)

US Army ElKtro"k w.rf.~ TninJDI

11 IS stated In the latest US Army Fteld Manual Ihat electronic warfare IS one 01 the most Vital areas 01 tralnmg thaI units can receive. However, It appears as if thiS IS not the case In Ihe Army to­day Highly technical and very advanced Amellean EW equipment Is generally very

unrell(lble, poorly operated, and badly mamtalned One sp8C",Iist, who commented that EW UOits "are at the bonom 01 the totem pole ," claims that IlImmlOg eqUIpment woos about one lime In 91~ To make maners worse, It IS rumOled that low­~vel Army combat unit9 are in no shape to receive EW treatment from the RUSSians. OUrlng some maneuvers In 1976, an AN/TlO-17 jammer was directed agamst some "aggressor" lorcos. At the end of the maneuver9, the aggressor CO dallT'led that this individual 18m prevented two &nitre bat­talions Irom recetvlng command and control In a 91mllar e~ample In 19n, a 18mmor W85 dll8Cted ag,lInSt a talkallve caplam controlling hiS company from two miles behind hIS forward e~ments. AI jU9t Ihe right momont, the J8m worked. The cap­tain was as useless to his men as if he had been a thousand m.les away; as a result, the company was desltoyed, a hole created, and the battalion HO eradicated Some have said thaI SovlEtt EW potOl1tl(l1 IS 20 umes greater lhan ours lallhough lhell equipment IS not as technrcally .mpresslve) As a result. the Russl8ns may Willi deny NATO lorces tactical Inter-communrcatlons.

Sovit lJ I nCrtlW Logluic Bsw

SOViet UOits .n East Germany now hold am­munl\lon for 37 days and luel for 16 days lighlmg WIthout having to draw on strategIC stocks 10 East GOfmany rtself . (Defence, 121m

ConctntntJon of Forcu

The Soviet Army, can, if reQulled, mass up to 24 battalions in a selected 10 km front lor a strategIC breakthrough, backed up by 70 \0 looar­tillery lUbes per km. To reduce the SovlOt anack to 3·1 odds, a US dIVISIOn With 11 maneuver bal tahons would have to move BIght of lhem directly opposite the SOViet breakthrough, leaVing the rest 01 the divisional fronta98 covered by only three maneuver battalions, the armored cavalry squadron, and attached anack helicopter com­panlOs to cover Ihe flanks lAir ForctJ, 2178)

Flvt Msn Tsnk CI'!'W

Tho US Army Tank FOIcos Management Sludy Group has recommended a fifth crew member for US tanks, This new man would be cross-uained in all crew Iunctlons as well as In mamtenance. The chl6ladvanlages of such an ed­d,tion would be the assl9tence the fifth man could give In maintenance, and his avaIlability as a pre­trained replacemenl wllh,n the tank unit who would not reqUIre any "breakIng in" to the Unit While US tanks would continue to have POSItionS only 101 four men, the fifth man Will ensure that they are all Med

Surprist AUl eII

There IS a divergence 01 opmlon In US Delense plannmg as to how much warning 01 a Soviet assault NATO could elCpeCt Some analysts, such as Ger'lOral Holhngswonh, belMWO a 54-dIVISion aSS8ult - mclud,ng 27 Soviet d,vl ­Slons - could be madew.th 00148 hours warning The current Defense Department sceMno envI­Sions a OO-d,vlSlon assaUlt, whICh would requlle:l) days to prepare. If a~lted alter a week of this preparallon, NATO would stili have 23 days to prepare IAviation & M8nne, 148)

1916 So~let T.CIIatI Aln:nft P roduction

According to the Defense Department, the Soviets produced the !ollowlng QUant,tlllS 01 1aC­ItCaI Slrcralt dUring 1976, Su-15 Flagon: 35-50; Su-17 Fltter-B 15().111l; Su-19 Fencer. 50-70; MiG-21 Frshbed 150·170; MIG -23 Flogger 450-550; MIG-25 Fo_bat 8)-100; Yak-36 Forger 25-40 !A.-etlon Week, 2f6/78)

Aln:nf' O~nlinl C 05lJ

The costs 01 operallng SlrClait are often JUSI as Important 85 the cost 01 ollglnal purchase. The follOWing are hourly costs 10 operate several a,r­craft, IncludlOg luel, depot maintenance, base­level maintenance, labor, end replenlshmenl of spare partse T-3BA $469. F-4D' $2232; F-4E: $2098; A·7D $1410; F- 15: $2098, IA.-iarion Week, 216/78)

Soviet SubmsrilM' Construction

The much·publlCIZed Hughe$ GlomBr Ex· p/onIr recovery vessel went searchIng 10 the PacifiC Ocean for a destroyed SOVlOt Golf-class nuclear submaflnB In 1974 and found 1\ When pert 01 1\ was ra.sed and e~emined, some surprISing details 01 Sovlel submanne technolog'{ were dIscovered. The baSIC welding of the hull was very poorly performed- unusually uneven and varying in thickness (especl8lly halch covers and vatvesi, Some compartments Wilre bUIll by plOClng together some wooden two-by-four planks, a pract.ce that ce-rtalnly does not render great strength to a navel vessel. Underwater hull and compartment strenglh is one of the most Impor­tant charactefiStlCS 01 any sub-surlace vessel

SAM Mbsl," for Sub.,

As 10 lhe Second World War, lhe most deadly enemy to lace the SUbmaflf'lO l.:>day IS theallplane, An IOIOfmal alClom among ASW e_perts IS lhat once a suitably ermed aircraft has spotted a submerged submanne, the chances that the sub will be destroyed is high (a lthough, it must be ad mitted, It IS QUlle diffiCul t for the allcralt to spot the sub In the Illst place) Today, there IS no known defense onboard a submanne agalnsl an allClalt that has spotted thesubsubmerged ASW helicopters can hovor 8t Will 0Y8f 9polled subs, regardless of the sub's complex array oltorpeOos, SOI1<Ir, and crUIse mISSIles. Th,s IS troublIng to the Department 01 Defense, especlllily wllh lhe recent davelopment of the Sov>ot "May" patrol plane lor ocean surveillance and ASW work A Delense research agency IS al1empllng to remedy IhlS defi· ciency, how_ The problem faced by an all­hunled sub .s two-loId: firsl, lhe sub must be capable of detecting and \Jaclung hoslile 8trcrait; second, the sub must possess a mISSile that may be launched underwater ago lOSt the enemy planes The Illst pl oblem has been weil-Oigh solv­ed and uses no more equipment than Is already deployed on all USN subs. It fellOS s.mply on the sub's paSSIve SOMI array, plclung up the sound "signatures" thaI en aircraft In the viCinity would make In lhe nearby waters The conluSion caused by Slrcrall at varying fanges and ailitudes can be solved by compultlfiled SIgnal processors which Identify sound data as Il lS receIVed by a sub, ThIS syslem has already been successfully tested In lhe Pacific, but 1119 questionable whether its range is sulfictenl to pick up an approachIng alfcraft before the sub is sPOtted Itself ThIS agency has aoo

21

22

develops<! II Sell-lnltlBllIlg Anti ·alrcraft MIssile (SIAM), which can be launched Irom II submerged sub and gUided to nearby enemy Blrcraft - only if these aircraft are beIng tracked by the sub's paSSive sonar By 1980, thiS program will be out of the hands of the agency and IOta the hands of Ihe Navy fOf development 8S an operational weapon­system . Such" capability for submarmes is stili very much in the design sta{j6. however; IllS stili ques\Jonable whether the relatIVely slow-mOVing submarine can cope With highly maneuverable ASW aircraft and their lang-range deIectors and weapons-wlthorWllhouta SIAM system Atany rate. the backbone 01 NATO ASW is also the airplane and helicopter. and we can be sure Ihal the RuSSians BfB workmg on a Similar system, as It would benefit them more than It does the Western powers INs/ionsl DefenS6, 11-121771

e ln the RUMI.lIs J i m the Ocun?

One 01 the more fascinating possibilities in the event of futura war IS that of "Jamming" the ocean. The key to antl -submannewarfare is sound search, and the cornerstone of contemporary sound search IS "passive" (listening) sonar. The safest and surest way to spot enemy submarines is to listen for them under the sea by various means. Listening for nOises underwllter, however, IS more difficult than It appears Natural ocean sounds and the increasmg nOise of ocean·going freighters and tankers are making passive sonar less and less ef­fective. The heavlDr the traffic in a water area, the more difficult 1\ Will be to iOentlfy and track qUlDt. submerged submarines. II IS certainly possible to Jam an ocean by artilicially placmg exaggerated ship noises underwater. It IS also possible tocreate lalse submarine noises m areas where there are no subs. Can sonar work under such conditions? It may well end up being Simply a battle of signal pro­cessors, TI'le more sophisticated a signal pro­cessor is, the more accurate Its paSSive identifica· tlon Will be. On the other hand, an extremely sophisllcated artificial noise-creator may well be able to fool even the most advanced Idenllilcation systems ThiS IS Just another m the long line of In­dicators that electronic warfare has grown to almost pnmary Importance m modern war. It is said that artificial noise-creators In world oceans Will be extremely harmful to marine lifa. However. so are deplh charges and tmpedos, and IllS doubt­ful that an ecological argument Will affect the development of thiS system (NlJl1onaIDefense, 11 -12/77)

Over.the_Homol! Ikt~Uon I. Su

Presenlly, naval tactics are in a state of fluK. The recent development of sophis\lcaled Ship­board shlp-to-ship mISSiles (soch as the American Harpoon and the RUSSian Styx) has brought about the decline of the traditional naval gun. The capabilities of these new missiles (particularly their long ranges) have Indicated that any future naval actions may well be fought at ranges never before thought possible. In lact, most of these ship-to­ship miSSIles have ranges longer than a man can see at sea. so it is clearly possible for a slflli.e to be (aunched agamst an enemy vessel at oVilr-the­hOrizon (OTH) ranges. The only prob~m relaung to this theory is that these weapons are so advanc­ed that lirlng OTH far exceeds the current capabilities of surface radar and submarine sonars. As such, it would be impoSSible to initiata an attack at OTH, thus negating one of the most valuable aspects 01 these weapons. The US Navy is attempting to I8medy this problem. A current program entitled Ocean Surface Survell(ance MIS­Sion is trying to create Viable tie-Ins between ships carrying these types of miSSiles and a variety of surveillance sensors. The most important of these

sensors would be land-based radars (havmg a longar range than most shlpbome radars) and moored sonar systems placed at vanous strategic locations in the world's oceans (like the USN·s SOSUSL Orbiting satellites are also likely to be used in this role Recently, a system en!Jtled Sub­manne Satellite Information Exchange prOVIded OTH target information to the attack subm;;rine Richard 8. Russell in the Mediterranean Sea Employmg a very complex computer tle-m system between the satellite, the submarine, patrolling aircraft, and a USN Command Center 10 Naples, a R!Jsslan ship was successfUlly spotted and tracked at over 100 miles range. However, in order for the submarine to recelva and portray such informa­tJon, it must display ItS antenna above the surface of the water. This is not an advisable tactiC in a body 01 watar that is being 1000ght over by the navlDs of the \WO superpowers. INarionsl Defense, 1-2178)

Nt'''' US Anny OJvlsloa T esl5

In late 19n andeartv 1978. the US Armycon· ducted elaborate and sophisticated tests in order 10 determine the applicability of newly-organized combat diVisions to modern warfare These leSl5 constItuted Without a doubt the most complex peacetime military wargame ever attempted . Laser and computer technology were employed in order to assure that the games would resemble real combat conditions (see FYEO 166 lor a descnptlon 01 lasers as training devices tn the US Army!. The general aIm of these tastS was to create a leaner combat formation that packed more firepower than the old dlviSlon_ All sopport elements (cooli;s, clerks, etc.1 are to be centralized In thiS new formalton-all fronHme companies are to be fil~ entirely wtth combat troops. Both the basic infantry and tank platoon will be reduced somewhat 10 strength, although the diVISIon should expand from roughly nme battalions to 15 battalions lalbeit smaller ones). In addition, a Nuclear, Bi~oglcal , and ChemICal Defense Com· pany will beadded to the division It seems as if the uflilthat conducted these tests- the 1st Cavalry Divisl on - has achieved lavorable results, although there is some controvllfSY in Army circles over the re-structuring 01 the basic fighting pla­toons. With at least one more year needed lor evaluation of the new divisions, it will probably be at least 1961 before the new organizational scheme will be undertaken throughout the Ar­my - provided, of course, this plan is adopted. INarionsl Defense, 1-2178)

Tbe Ne'" Sol'lt'l A TGM

On the 60th Anniversary of the October Revolution, the SOVlDtS unveiled a Q8W ATGM (Anti-Tank GUided Missile!. It is believed thiS new weapon will rep(ace the Swatler and Segger ATGMs currently in service The new Soviet ATGM IS thought to be very Similar to the Euro· pean MillJn . Considenng the quant;ty and quality of security leaks from West Germany, and the RuSSian willmgness to copy a good thing, it may well be identical to the Milan . Like the Milan, the new Soviet ATGM can be used on vehicles or In a dismounted role. Range is thought to be 2 km With a speed of 150-200 meters per second, giVing a maximum llight time 01 13 seconds_ It can penetrate 50 to 60 cm of armor If these estimates are correct, the new Soviet ATGM would be markedly sop&lIm to the US Oregon ATGM. (International Defense Review, 117S)

So¥le t IFF e ooe Broken

Japanese technicians c(alm to have broken the Soviet Air Force's IFF Transponder radar code. which allows Soviet radars to dIstingUish friendly from enemy aircraft. While the code has obviously been changad since the defection of a

MIG-25 Foxbatto Japan in 1976- the source 01 the IFF (ldentlfica!Jon Fnend or Foel devIce studied by the Japanese- it wi!) 9till provide a lead as 10 how the Soviets WI!! use such equipment IFlight Int 'I .• 3/ 11 /78)

Tht' Frt.~h Navy

TI'le French Navy has been somewhat Of a hard-luck orgamzatlon for much 01 its long and eventful history. Today, things are not looking much better. By 1985, the combined French naval tonnage WIll have dropped \0 167.<XXJ ton9 -of which more than one-half Will be more than twen­ty years old. At that time. thera will be fewer than 84 ships In the fleet, apprOKlmateiy 47 fewer than at the present time. Clearly, lhe French Navy IS caught in a crunch between the biock­obsolescence of many 01 Its warships (most of which wElfe conS\fuCted In the 1950's with heavy US subsidies), and the high COSt of building and running them. In Nelson's day, It was said that the British sailors drank fI.Im while the French Stuck to port. There are indications that thiS has not chang­ed today. Last year, French warships spent an average of only 85 days at sea lalthough the government hopes 10 raIse thiS to 100 in the near luture) . The French Navy 81so lacks loglslic sop­port comparable 10 fleets such as the USN and the Royal Navy By 1965, the French Navywlli have no more than one-sixth of the logistics shIps and sup­ply tankers than that 01 the already pitifully reduc­ed Royal Navy. Indeed. il present trends conllnue, the French floot Will be only ona-half the size 01 the Royal Navy by thiS dllte. Another limit on the French Navy is the Gaullist theory 01 an Indepen­dent nuclear deterrent, even though the French have indefinitely postponed the construC!lon of a Sixth PolariS- type nuclear submarine . This philosophy slIl1 claims 32% of the Flanch $14 bllhon defense budget fOI 1978

SDFT\NARE:

UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE Order of Battle

7th UN/TED STATES ARMY /HO: Heidelbelgl Army-Level Units: 56th FieW Artillery Brtgade: 1/ 41 Arty IPershing

missile). 1181 Arty IPershlng). 3/84 Arty (Per· shing). 2/41nf

32nd Army Air Defense Command: 10th Air Defense Anillllry Group: 111 ADA (Hawk missile), 2/2 ADA (Hawk). 3/59 ADA (Hawk), 2/62 AOA (Hawk) 69th Air Delense Anillf!ry Group: 317 ADA (Hawk), 6/52 ADA (Hawk), 2/57 ADA (Hawkl. 3/60 ADA (Hawk) 94th Air Defense ArlI11f!ry Group: 211 AOA INike-Hercu!eS), 5/6 ADA /Nike·Herculesl. 21 56 ADA INike-Hercules), 3171 ADA INike­Hercules) Attached: 6/56 AOA /Vulcan / Chaparral) , 2f60 ADA IVulcanl, 2167 ADA (Vulcan)

Berlin Bngade: 1/ 6Inl, 3161nl. 4/ 61nf, Company F 40th Armor, Sattery C 94th Arty, Special Forces Detachment Bmlin {company sizel

Special Forces Oetachment Europe (Airborne) Airborne Combat Team: lf509 Inf (stallOned In

Italy) 1st Support Brigade 7th Signal Bflgade 15th Military Police Brigade 4th Transportation Brigade Theater Army Support Command

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Wargame I)esl,n 9,95 Thf Hislory, Production and U~ of Connict Simuilition Games by tht Staff of Str6tegy & T6Ctics Mag6zine The history and scope of the hobby. together with insights into the complexities of game design and development and a comprehensive listing of .... ar· games in print.

FREE GAME FOLIOS Now, if you make any purchase amounting 10 520 or more (in actual post-discount cash) , you can receive the Folios -without games - of all eight Folio-sized games that have been published in Slrotegy & Toctics. These s\iff, 9- x 12" folders feature colorful illustrations and an inside "sleeve" Ihat will keep your components clean and safely together. Fo lios are available under this offer for Ihe following games:

• Bailie for Germany • World War I

• 011 War • The Punic Wars

• Dixie • Breitenfeld

• Revolt in the East • Road 10 Richmond

To receive your complele set of eight Folios, simply send in Ihe Special Order Form in this issue- together with your order fo r 520 or more. Or, if you do not wish 10 take advantage of this free offer, you can send 56 and the Special Order Form for your complete set of eight (complete SCI only).

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Save 20%

War in the West • The largest game ever produced! • Three-coior map in nine 22" x 34" sections: over 46 sq. ft .

• 2,000 land, air and naval unit counters . • 300-Tum Campaign Game and five Scenarios.

&ptem/)er 1st, 1939: German troops attack across Ihe borders of Poland. Within a few days, France and Britain declare war in Poland's support. These events mark the beginning of the largest and most destructive war in human his­tory. Within a month Poland surrenders. crushed by Ihe German armed forces. France and Britain maintain a defensive policy, hoping Ihat their economic block­ade will produce a bloodless victory. They arc mistaken, fOr in the Spring of 1940, the German blilzkreig strikes again, over­running France and the Low Countries, driving the British from Ihe Continent, and fordng a French capitulation. Five long, hard years of total war will [ollow, as both sides struggle for mastery of land, sea and air across the length and breadth of Europe.

War In the Wert is a corps/ division level simulation designed to recreate these massive battles. The basic mechanics of the game are identical to those of SPI's popu lar War in the East. However, many clarifications and additions have been made to improve an already successful game system. The nine 22" x 34" map sec­tions (46 square feet of map) cover an area from the top o[ the North Cape: of Nor­way to the Libyan desert and the Middle East, and from the British Isles to the city of Stalingrad. Each hex represents 33 kilometers of actual distance and each Game-Turn represcnts one week of actual time (the same game scale as War in the East). 2000 die-cut counters, prinled frOnl and back, representing the armed forces of over 20 nations, are provided, as well as numerous other components to aid in the play of the game.

The most strikin& physical feature of the game is the map. The nine three-color map sections, depicting the entirt Euro­pean continent allow the owners of War in the East to use the counters and rules from that game to play on these revised and updated maps, and even inlegrate the componenls of both games to simulate the entire European War.

German production is another fea­ture of the game. When playing any of the campaign scenarios, the German Player has the ability to choose which units to build. Production is handled in fou r·week segmenls and units are produced by allo­cating Production Points which are re-

ceived each Production Segment. The number of Points received varies to re­flect changes in the German economy and the battlefield situation. Oil is the crucial limiting factor, since the Germans never have enough. The German Player must decide whether it is better 10 build costly "strategic" weapons, such as U-Boats and Air Points (in hopes of delaying Allied reinforcements), or cede the Allies control of the sea and air while concen­trating on ground combat units. Even among the ground combat units them­sclves there are choices to be made: whether to build fewer, very valuable units (mechanized, airborne or SS) or less valuable units in grealer quamity (Stan­dard infantry and static divisions). Provi­sions are also made in the system for the use of conquered countries' industry and for the capture of certain gcographical objectives, such as th(' oilfields of the Middle East. Production can also b(' af­fecled by the Allied bomber offensive, with rules provid('d to determine the spe­cific type of larget hit, as well as the ef­fects of these attacks.

To a great extent, the outcome of the War in the West depended on such strate­gic air and naval operations. These are represented in the game by a simple Air Point system and extensive Sea Move-

menl Rules. Also provided are rules [or Allied Naval Gunfire and Fleet Interdic­tion, as well as rules for the effect of enemy air units on sea movement.

Supply rules have also been expand­ed, with different supply sources for the di fferent nat ionalities of units. Multiple Weather Zones are outlined on the map, with a variety of effects to represent the problems of warfare under normal. mud and snow conditions over widely scattered areas. To help govern the actions of various neutrals and belligerents under th(' shifting fortunes of war, a compkte set of Poli tical Rules is also provided.

Th('re are five scenarios: Poland. France 1940, North Africa, Italy and Franc(' 1944. There is also a Campaign game of over 300 Game-Turns in length. Each scenario is provided with the histori­cal placement of the units involved, as well as provisions for free: deployment. In addition, the scenarios can b(' used as a starting point for a Campaign game covering the remainder of the war. The Campaign game allows the players to "correct" the mistakes of history and fol· Iowan endless number of alternate strategies.

Now you can have War in the West for only 52 4, by ordering on the Special Qrd('r form in this issue.

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SWORDS AND SORCERY Quest and Conquest in the Age of Magic • Illustrated in Detail by Award-Winning Artist Tim Kirk

• Quest Legend and Role-Playing Version • Two Games in One - Army and Quest

Swords and Sorcery is the game of fantastic and magical combat in the Valley of the Great Sword, located in a world in a far-off trinary sun system. Many different races inhabit the Valley, and all strive to become the ru ler of the vast ly valuable lands. To this end, armies ma rch to war , led by heroes with shining blades and wizards with fearsome spells. But it is the Em­pire of Man that is most feared. for it has the most troops at its disposal and its share of brave righters. The advantage the nations of the Valley possess is the vast ex­perience in dealing with all manners of arcane "magicks" which the men of the Empire can never hope

Therugond the Mage

to equal. But the Valley states have nursed ancient hatreds against each ot her, and so the lithe Elves, the sturdy Dwarrows, the sage Dragons, the powerful Spiders, the cruel Orcs, and the myriad of other denizens ("':; of the Valley war amongst themselves as much as they do

• • Gygax Dragonlord

Loki Hellsson

with the Empire, and this proved their eventual downfall. Swords and Sorcery may be played in two ver­sions - an Army or a Quest Game. In the Army version, up to seven Players represent different forces as they at­tempt to wrest territorial objectives from each other and eliminate as many of the enemy as possible. The Quest Game deals with all quests standard to the fantasy genre, but Swords and Sorcery allows the Player to achieve them. The game comes with fifty-six lavishly illustrated cards, including Characters, and allows for role-playing aficionados devising their own Characters.

Swords and Sorcery will sell for $13. Available 16 June 1978 .

GiUlh The Polodin Glode

/<O<4,.-WIII / ft1III _ 111

V CORPS (HO Frankfunl V Corps ArtIllery

47s/ F/lJk1 AniJ/ery Group' 215 Arty 1175mml, 1132 Arty Ilance miSSIle! . 2/75 Arty 18-'. 2/83 Arty (S-I . Sanery 8 1126 Am IT AS)

42nd FftJki Aml/6ry Group: 6/9 Arty, !175mml, 3/ 79 Atty. Ilance mISSile!. 2/92 Arty (S-I, 1/33 Arty Ilancel . Banery A 1/26 Ally IT AB)

130th Engineer Brigade 3rd Corps Support Command 3fd ArrTlOfed D,VIS,on tHO Frankfunl

lSI 8ngadtl (HO Klfchgoens)- 2/ '32 Armor, 2/ 33 ArrTlOf , 3/ 33 Armor, 2136 Inl (Meehl, 3/36 Inl tMeehl 2nd 8rig.td6(HO: GelnhausenJ: 1/ 33 Armor, 11 48 Inl tMeehl. 2148 In! (Meehl , 3112 cav, 31 61 ADA (Chaparral/Vulcanl 3rrJ 8ngadtl IHO Fnedberg) 1/ 32 Armor, 31 32 Armor, 1/36lnltMechl Aflill6ry 2/3 Arty, 216 Arty, 2/27 Arty, 1/40 Any

8th Mechanized Infantry OIVISlon tHO: Bad Kreuz­~hI

lSI 8ngadtl tHO MamzL 4/ 69 Armor, 2/ 28 InltMeehl, 2/87 tnf (Meehl. 1/59 ADA tChap­arralfllulcanl 2nd 8rig6dfJ tHO Baumholc\er) : 1/ 68 ArrTlOf . 2168 ArmOf. 1113 Inl (Meehl, lI39lnflMeehl, 1187 Inl (Meehl 3rrJ8ng1KJetHO Mannhe1ml : 3/68 Armor. 5/68 Armor. 21131nl iMechl. 3/S Cay Artillery ' 3/16 Arty, 1/2 Any, 2/81 Arty, 1183 A'~

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment HO: Fuldal \/11 Cav, 2/11 Cav, 3/11 Cav, one All Cav !foop

4th Mechanized Infantry DIVISion, detachment (HO Welsbadenl 41h 8ngade 1/ 70 Armor, 21121nIIMeehl. one mlantry battalion (deSignatron unknownl, 2/ 20 Arty •• l Troop 1110 Cav

VII CORPS IHO Stuttgart)

VII CorDS Anillery: 7200 FftJki Anillery Group: 6/10 Arty, 3/35 Arly,

2/42 Arty. 1/75 Arty. 1180 Arty, 3/17 Arly 210th FHIId Artillery Group: 1/ 18 Arty, 1130 Arty, 1136 Arty, 3/37 Any, 2177 Arty, 211B Arty

7th EngmtNJr 8riglJdtI 2nd Corps Support Command lst Armored 01V1SIOfI IHQ. Ansbachl

lsr 8ngscJe tHO IIleshelml. 1113 Armor, 1/ 37 Armor, 1/ 6 Inl tMeeh), 1I511nliMeehl 2nd Bngadtl !HO Erlangenl 1/35 Armor, 2/ 37 Armor. 2/S1 Armor, 1/46lnltMeehl 3rrJ 811f}lJfM (HO· Bamberg)· 3/35 Armor, 1/ 52 InltMeeh), 1/54lnl (Meehl AmI/tHY, 6/14 Arty. 1122 Arty, 2178 Any, 1/94 Arty 60151 Combat AVlallon 8attallon

3rd Meehanlzed Infantry Division tHO: Wurzburgl 1st Brigade (HO Schwllinfurll 2/64 Armor,

HARO\I\IARE:

NAVAL TACTICAL SURFACE-TO-SURF ACE MISSILES

On 22 October 1967, the Israeli destroyer EIIBI was hit and sunk by Egypllan SSN -2 Surface-to­Surface MIssiles ISSMsl while on patrol In the Mediterranean The Egyplian missile boats launched lhe SSMs Irom OV81 twenty miles away

3/64 Armor. 1130 InllMeehl. 2130 Inl (Meehl 2nd 8rigade (HO. K,lllngen) _ 1/ 64 Armor. 1/ 15 IniIMeehl. 2/ 1 InllMeehl 3frJ 8rigade tHO Aschaflenburgl 4 / 64 Armor, 1/ 41n11Meehl. Il7lnllMeehl Anil/6ry: 1/ 10 Arty. 2139 Atty. 2/ 41 Arty. 1176 Arty. 3/ 67 ADA (ChaparrallVulcanl Arrscheci: 317 Cav, 3rd Combat AViation Bat­talion

2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment tHO Nuremberg) : 112 Cav, 212 cav, 3/2 Cay, one Air Cay troop

1St Meehanlzed Inlantry DiVISIOn. detaChment tHO Goppmgen) 3rd 8rigade. 3163 Armor. 4 /73 Armor, 1/ 16 tnt tMeehl. 1/ 26 Inf tMeehl. 1/ 33 Arty, Troop C 1/4 Cav

2nd Armored DivISIOn, detachmenl (HO. Garlstadt be! Bremenl

TRENDS:

TH E TEMPO OF MODERN AIR COMBAT

Today's combat aircraft Will ,nfliCt tand 18Celvel much more damage In much less time than those of WoOd War II The whole spectrum 01 modern weaponry all -Io-alr, HIt-to·ground, sUlface--to-8If - MS become much mOfe IICCllrate and ellectlveSlnc8 1944 Yet the vulnerabllllY of alt or ground targets has not decleased As a result, modern air combat IS very much a game of the

3tri8f1f}Mie 2/66ArmOf, 1/41InJ!Mechl, 1/14 Any, Troop C VI Cav

[Thanks 10 Tom Dtnackus; any addItIOns or cor· rectlons \0 thIS OB wIll be approcloilled.J

Ex~narlOl1

23

In the US Army. IndIVidual battalions of all 81m! lira deSIgnated by battalion numbef / reglmental af fl118uon IWlth arms type] In effect. the regImental designation IS ffi8IInmgless. As cen be sean, bal tahons of the same regimen t rarely have common aSSIgnments las lhay did In WWII and Koreal Thus, the conoepl o f a regiment in the US Army today IS nothIng more than a historical and Ired, llOnal one The desognallon 3/ 36 Ii'll should be read " 3rd Batlallon, 36th Inlantry Regiment ..

AbblfJVJ8flOflS. Any .. ArtIllery; Ii'll - Infenlry, ADA .. AI! Defense Arliliery , M6Ch .. MechaOlz ad Infantry; rAB .. Target AcqUISition Battery. Cav .. Cavalry Squadron

qUick and tho dead - an enVironmentlllied With SAMs, AAA, and enemy eltcraft allows few second chances, In a luturewar, It IS thought thai 50% 01 thearrClaft commlued to air combat WIU be destroyed In seven days, while 60% 01 those who must run the 98untlet of SAMs and AAA to stllke ground targets WIU be lost WIthin flItle days Win or lose, an Hif waf In Europe WIll resull rn the loss 0/ many alrcral! and lhelt crews very qUICkly, and unlls Will burn themselves out much more qUICkly than they did even In the mOSllnt6nS8 aenal actJon 01 World War Il (AlrUmversltyRfJlllf)W,I'-12Jn)

T .. po .r M ...... AIr CoIIIbo' ".. ,..,..

Size of friendly !Ofce 100 alc 100 alc

PI~ of dMlcting eed'I -- 0 .. ... Probability of engaging each detected

enemy aircraft D.' D.' Pn:IbIibIII, of hitting eed'I engeged -- 0.1 D. Time to hit 100 enemy aircraft B,Omo 2.25 days

SortieIper IIircratt per .. 0.1 2 .• losses p8f sortie 0.002 0.04

TirM to -.., IriIndIy IIircratt tI.Omo, 7,0 "

T_ 01 M ..... AJr.Groo"'~'

Size of friendly force V_ ... -SOfties pet aircraft per day

Time to hi!: 111OO..mt YINdaI losses per sortie

TirM to -.., IriIndIy -..rt

and were n011l"V9fl engaged. The EilBtwas the flrsl warship to fall VlClim to a weapon lhat has greatly shaped modern naval UlChCS - the SSM

Since the E~r, the loIlowlng warshrps have been hit by SSMs: 5 lJfJcfJmbfJr, 19n PaklSlanl 00 Kllybefsunk, 00 ShahJahanposslblydamag­ad by Indian SSN-ls, Xl M8Y, 1973: Israeli fLINT trawler Oni; four Egypllan SSN-2s flfed, two near mIsses, Sunk, 6-7 October, 1973' One Synan mlflasweeper. twO mISSile boats sunk by Israeli

,.,. ,.,.. 100 alc 100 ./c ... 3.0

'0.6 2.' .. - U~

0.005 0 .03

. ,Omo, ... -Gabriel SSMs. IJ..S Ocfober, 1973 __ Two Egyptl8n miSSile boats sunk by ISfael, Gab"el SSMs 10- 1 I October, 1973. Two Syrl8n mISSIle boats sunk by ISfaeir Gabriel SSMs. 21 22 October: Two Egyp­tl8n radar pICkel boats sunk, possibly bv Gatltlel SSMs, posslblV by gun/ire_ J8f1uary. 1974· Paracel Islands flghtlflg Sou lh Vietnamese minesweeper Nhu( T80 sunk by two Chinese SSN-2 hilS l i its t hit le ft her dead in the wat8l1 Destrover Escort Ttan Khanh Dull probably hit by one SSN -2 and SUNIV·

24 ed. Other AVN warships possibly hil as well In ad­dition. some neutral merchantmen gal in the way In both the 1971 Indla - Pa~lst8n and 1973 Arab­Israeli wars lind were sunk .

The accuracy ollhe SSM has varied widely, filing II[ "Silting" destroyer-sizB targets, the Egyp­tians and Indians have realized 70% - 90% ac­curacy with the primitive SSN-2. Yet In the 1973 Waf, the Afabs fired more than 55 SSN-2s ilnd did not score a single hit. The Israelis scored about 44% accuracy with their Gabriels, but It is thought that this would be higher were It not lor lhe fect tha t the first Gabrllli hit usually blew the largel 10 splinters, leaVing nOlhlng for subsequent rounds to home In on .

The SSM's theorellcally high accuracy - with II mBiumum of about 70% hits lor earlier weapons to 90% lor the latter ones - can be reduced by Ihe larget ship uSing ECM toiem the SSM , by evading It, or by shooting It down. The Israelis used all Ihree techniques in the 1973 War. An SSM or the radar of the lirlng ship can be jammed, although thiS also has limitations. The jamming ship muSI radiate electrOniC energy, and i t IS reported that many Soviet SSMs have an ActivefPassive "home on lamming" feature. An SSM is also dif­ficult to Shoot down, al though the IsraeliS did down twO of them using 76mm shells With prox­imity fusas The US Navy is countrng on the Phalanx automatic 20mm gun system to shoot down incoming SSMs. Some navies Intend to usa 40mm shells With proximity lusas. Other navles ­Such as the Royal Navy - do not primarily rely on " hard kill" weapons end trUSt \0 the ship's ECM deviCes. The Brrtish Seawolf Surface-ta-Alr Mis­sle ISAM), however. is capable of destroying in· coming SSMs. and is the lirSI true tactical anti ­missile missile . The most effec t ive countermeasure. however. is 10 destroy the enemy's SSMs and their ships before they are launched

The best SSM guidance systems are those that are least vulnerable to jamming . That is why Radio Controlled Guidence is not used in the more modern SSMs. Pre-launch programmed inenial gUidance is least vulnerable to jamming, as It is completely internal, but it requires the firing ship's computers to prad..:t where the target Will be when the miSSile comes within range of its t9l­minal homing guidance. Otherwise. their terminal guidance will never lind the target. Radar homing is usually ACllve Iwilh the missile Itself locking-on to the lergell or Semi-Active IWlth the missile picking UP and heading for lhe lock-on obtained by a ship or aircraft!. All radar gUldllnce IS sublect to lamming. however.

One advantage of some SSM, is in being "surlace skimmers." These miSSiles stay al low altitude In llighl. ThiS allows them to sliP in under radar cover. makes them less vulnerable to enemy weapons and, probably most Irnportantly, II means they will probably stfl~e Iheir target near the waterline rather than in the superstructure. Waterline hits will let water InlO 0 ship. Super­structure hilS Wilt let air in

Many SAMs also have a secondary surface­to-surface capabilily. but they are not as effective as SSMs. This is due 10 their fhght IrajeclOry, which wovld result in them striking the superstruc­ture 01 the larget, rather than Ihe hull . The warheads on SAMs are opumized to destroy rela\IVely fragile aircral t with proximity fusas. and so will not be most effective in having 10 secure dlfect hilS on warships, although the light w9!ght superstructure of modern wer5hips and their Vital electronics would be vulnerable to SUCh a hit. Nevertheless, a SAM travels 81 supersonic speed and the shock 01 the impact alone will probably cause a great deal of damage. and whatever fuel remains in the SAM will add 10 the e~ploslon . The

us Standard and, probably. the SO'Jiet SAMs come closest \0 being dual-purpose mISSiles

While the requirements lor an elfoctJ\l9 SAM and SSM are to an e~lenl mutually exclusive, the Soviet ship-launched SSN-l0/ 14 and SSN-15/ 16 weapons systems are ASW weapons that also possess II significant anti -ship capability, and they may be SWitched between ship and sub targets while In their launch tubes. The SSN-l0/ 14 rEI-

qUires the use of nuclear warheads for maximum effectiveness,

Sources: Defence Magazine Navy ImernIJlionlJl Magaz!ne Jane's Weapons Systems, 1977 Jane's Fighting Ships. 1977-78 U S. Navallnsllw/8 Proceedings.

NAVAL TACTICAL SURFACE-TO-SURF ACE MISSILES (SSM) WESTERN NAVAL SSMs

y- Typo R."", W",,-, S_ a_ 66 Penguin 1 11.0+ 264/HE 0.7 Initial program, lerminallR

7U SeaK .... 2 25.0 1Mf HE 10.91 RCG, bMm riding

72 Gabriel 1 12.5 165IHE to.7) SAH

72 ""'"'" , ... 400I HE 0 .7..Q.9 I,.,.. progrMI, IfInTINI ...... -73 Exocet MM38 20.0 330fHE 1.0 Initial program, terminal

radar guidance, SS

74 """"', 1 32.0 . / HE 0 .• lni'dIIf progrMI, ee1MI ,.." TSS

76 Harpoon 00.0 U HE or N 10.9) Initial program, tarminal active radar

SOVIET NAVAL SSMt y- T,po ..... w_ Spwd G~

59 SSN-' 150.0 _900' (0.7) RCG·MCR, IR tMminal large HE .. SSN-2 25.0 U N or HE 0 .• AP or RCG, IR or

RAH_

62 SSN-3 300.0+ UN or HE I., RCG-MCR, RAH original, RAH terminal .. ...... 100.0 - U N or HE 1.0+ AP or RCG with MCR

150.0

70 SSN-7 ".0 UN or HE I., Initial progrem, IIctivef passive terminal

7. 5S ... 11 30.0 U N, HE, DC 11 .51 AcM/~MrnIIMI

1 SSN- 12 1250.01 UN or HE 11.5) Activa/ passive terminal ,. SS""3 300.0 U .... N 1 '-"" SOVIET DUEAL PURPOSE ASW SVSTEMS 11by". W«I ~ Mipsl

y- T,.. ..... w_ S_ a_ 68 SSN-l0 25.0 ?IN, DC RCG, MCR possible .. SSN· 14 ,0.0 1/HT 1 RCG, MCR~

74 SSN-15 25.0 UN, DC 1 Rocket powered , SS ... lI ,5.0 1/HT

NOTES: Year: Yeer entered saNice; Range: max­imum range of SSM. In the case of Soviet SSMs. it may require mid-course guidance to reach this range, expressed in nautical miles; Warhead: weight of warhead (in pounds)/typa of detonating charge: HE .. high explosive, nuclear, DC =

depth charge (can detonate on surface). HT '"' homing forpedo, N "" nuclear; Speed - speed 01 SSM, meaSlJred in mach numbers. Mach 1 .. 665 knolS at sea level; Guidance: Initial Program '"' missile programmed before launch. then uses iner­tial guidance to tollow program; RCG _ radio command guidance; MCR _ mid-course correc­tion (by radiol rllQuired; SAH '"' semi-active redar homing; AP '"' Autopilot; RAH _ Radar active homing; IR .. inlre·rad Iheatseelling); SS .. Sur­face Skimmer; TSS .. Terminal Surface Skim­mer; 7 ., unknown. Data in parenthesis is estimated.

USE: SSN-l: was used on Kildny and Kfupny DDs. now out of seNice; SSN-2: "Styx" used on

1 , osoand KomarMissila Boats - being replacad on USSR units; SSN·3 Echo, Juliet SSB, (must sur­face to launchl, Kynda. Kres/a I CLs; SSN-7: Charlie and Papa class SSNs - can launch submerged from target data from passive sonar; SSN-9: NanUlchke class corvettes - requires mid-course correction from aircraft to exceed 40 nautical mile range; SSN-l1: SSN-2 replacement; SSN-12: SSN-3 replacement, also on KieV; SSN-13: On Yankee SSBNs - anti-task IOfce ballistic missile with no guidance after launch - may have ASW role; SSN-l0f14: on K/Jra, Kresla 1/ CLs. Krivak DDs, Moskva and KieV CVa. SSN-15f16: on Ch/Jrlie, Victor. T/Jngo SSN, perhaps No~ember, Echo. and Brevo classes as well. Western Missiles shown by nations used (nation of design in Italic). Exocet: Fnnce, UK, S. Afriea many S. American navies; Gabriel 1: Israel; Gabriel 2: Israel. Taiwan, S. Africa, Singapore; Penguin: Norway, Turkey, Greece, Sweden; Har­poon: US, UK, S. Korea, W. Germany, others. Sea Killer: Italy, Iran; Dtomat: Italy.

The TriumQh of Archery over Armor, 25 October 1415

by Albert A. Nofi It was St . Crispin's Day. The sun had risen at 0643 on this chill, damp morning. By then, the King

had already been about for hours, donning his armor, hearing Mass, consulting with his officers, passing among his men. For days the English had striven to avoid battle. Finding this impossible, a time and a place had been

arranged with the French . In the distance the French host could be seen untangling itself. This might yet prove a hot day for the tiny English army. For this St . Crispin's Day - 25 October 1415 - was the

apPointed time. and the fields near the village of Agincourt the appointed place .

r

25

26

0643: Deplo)'menl

Had Henry V 01 England tried. he probably could not have pocked 8 held much bel1l!f SUited to make a stand with his weary. hungry lillie Brmy than lhal lIm"s! upon him by Fate Bnd the French It was a roughly rectangular patch 01 muddy. lea lureless larm land some 900 \0 1100 yards Wide end about 1200 yards deep On the left was the forest of Agmcourl and on the ught that 01 Trame court At the nofth end were the French in Ihell lens al thousands. Over allhe south end were the English, barely&XXl all together. The lleld nrcely til the needs of the unv English army With the flanks well covered by the forests, the French could not employ their numbers 10 m'lXJmum advsnlsge The tack 01 ObstaCles between the armlfls greatly ISlIored the use 01 the bow, WhICh const,tuted the principal eml8m8nl 0185% of the KIng's men, and the muddy ground would grve the advanlage to whomever stood In defense For KII19 Henry in­tended to do Just th81. stand on the defenSive, emploYing tectlCS which had proven sound since the days of his great-grendfatner

Henry had approximately 5000 light Inlentry­men armed with longbow end sword or ex, plus ellOthe/ I:KX) or so men-at-arms, heavily armed and armored men trained In the Ell9hsh lasrlloo to fight either 8S cavalry Of heavy ,nfantry By ludlClously milling dismounted men-et-arms wIth bowmen, Henry would create e watt against which the French would beat In vain, In the centet 01 hiS hoe the King placed e "bauahon" 01 some XIO diS-

Map A

(f)

mounted men-at-arms III a 10rm8tlOn aboul 75 men wide by four deep, roughly B5 yards by SiX or etght yards On either side of IhlS was a "biIl­lal,on" of 500 bowmen III tnangular lormauon on a fronl of aboul B5 yards and up 10 seven ranks deep On the OUler Side 01 the two "battahOllS" of archers was another mass 01 XIO heavy ,nfantry deployed In a manner similar to the cenler "bat­talion," And belween these ouler "battahons" of heavy fOOl and the lorests on either flank the King deployed huge blockS of aboul lBC() alchers, thrUSting them slightly forward o f the main line as they approached the covellng woods

To further strengthen the poSition, Henry had each man Implant In the ground belore him a Stout wooden stake about SIX feel long, angled loward the French so as to catch a charging horse square­ly In the chest , ThiS created a loose belt 01 ob­stacles perhaps 20 yards deep, In whICh a lightly armed man could move With ease, bUI which would Impede the movement of a heavily armed one and prohibit tha t o f mounted troops, More­over, as the obstacles covered Virtually the entlfe English line, only three narrow cOllldors, each 8bout B5 yards wide, rem81ned uncovered, severe­ly Ilmnlllg the rou te which an anack could take These arrangementS le ft the King With no more than 500 bowmen to spare About 200 were sent all Into the woods on SIttler Hank to bum the Villages of Aglncourt end Tremecoun and then to Infiltrate the woods al the edges of the field end deliver flanking Ille on the FrellCh The remaining bowmen were d,smbuted as baggage guards and

body gU8fds, The left flank "banellOn" 01 heavy Infentry the King placed In charge of hiS stOOl, middle aged uncle, the Duke of Yorl!;, wh.le that on lhe light went 10 the elderly, war-wl$9 beron Lord CamOIS The King himself assumed com­mand of lhe cenlral "battalion" By 0700 the Enghsh were ready Not so the French, however

The French had been having some dllllCulty gett ing into poSitron, The only really experienced soldiers among them - the Constable o f France, the Marshal, and the Admilal-alilacked suffiCient rank to Impose untty of command on the horde of Ou~es, Counts, Barons, and KnrghtS whICh had come 10 the lreld An angry councIlor war dUllng the night had given grudgmg assent to Constable d' Albert's general plan lor the battle, but had failed 10 establiSh a cham 01 command M8IIn­while. many of lhe men had spent the flight dnnk­mg and gambling. while others had stood around, nOI wanting 10 get then armOl, banners, 01 sur­coats Stained Wi th mud So many were suffeflflQ Ihe after effec ts 01 theIr nOCturnal aCtlvll18S Nor had thetr days-long approach march helP&CI therr Slamlna On tOP of that, each one WiShed 10 be In the Ilrst rank, as demanded by honor and where the greatest glory would be found As the armV­some 2O,<XXl men-at-arms, 10CXl crossbowmen, 2\XX) short bowmen, and one Of two gl8llt bom­bards - began to deploy, everyone began Shaul­Ing at once ebout then "rtght" to be on the lore­front of lhe fight Even belore dawn the tumul l had begun Hours were spent arguing aver tNerY­one's ancestry and deeds Eventually, WIth muCt'

ENGLISH

argument, a lew challenges, and 8 great deal of counting of armorral Quarterrngs, the order of bat­tle was SOrted OUI The French would deploy In threa main "battles" plus a few odd bits here and there_ But no one would be In overall authoruy

The flf!t "banle" or dMslon consisted of be­twean 6CXX) and 0000 dismounted men·at·arms with Lances shoflened to seNe 85 pikes These were undef the command of the Duke of Bourbon, the Constable of France, Marshal BOUCICBUt, the Duke of Orleans, and the Count of Eu, all of whom InSISled on being in the 'ustlme The formation, a rough rectangle perhaps lOCO yards Wide and &lght or 10 yards deep, was packed rather tightly, and lhe men crowded together In groot confUSion while trying to keep their Imp!'ovlsed pikes out of each other's way As thIS was a difficult task even for well trained plkemen, the "bailie" greatly resembled an undiSCiplined mob - which. of course, to a great e_tent It was A few yards be· hind this first "battle" was anothel, 0 1 appro_I mately the same number of dismounted men-at· alms In apprO_lmately the same forma tion and condl llon, under the Du kes of Alencon and Bar Behind this, again by but & few yards, were some 4OCO men-at-arms, some mounted and some ap­parently on loot, under the CountS 0 1 Dammartln. Marie, and FauQuembourg, among others

Slightly forward and to either !lank of the flfst "bailie" were twO troops of 500 mOUnted men·at­arms each, the leh under the AdmIral of France and the light under the Count of Vendome The JOOO or SO crossbowmen and shonbowmen were

Map B

SQueezed some between the first and second "battles" and some were placed over on Ihe right, to the rear of the Count of Vendome's troop, together wllh some bombards 01 course, such a deployment did not favor the use 01 miSSile weapons If tile French archers or artillery loosed any rounds, they were far more likely to hit other Frenchmen than any Englishmen. The French had not deployed to their besl advantage, but then, lhey did nOI e_peet to attack Remarkably, Con· Stable d' Albert had conVinced the counCIl 01 war that the French should let the English do the at tack,ng So when they completed their deploy­ment - some lime after Ihe English were ready -they wal led And walledl

0130: Wailing Both the English and the FrenCh completed

deploying by about 073), and, as each had planned to conduCI a defenSive aCI IOn, nothing happened Each army ras ted on its arms, e_peel ­Ing the other Side to attack momentarily Time passed Soon an hour had gone by, then two The men beg<!fl to rela_ . The French host soon resem­bled a gang of picnickers rather then sn army Men milled about. speak,ng w'th old friends, drrnkrng Wine, thrOWing dice on cloaks spread over the muddy ground Several arguments occurred, and duels were arranged for latel settlement What 111-tie diSCipline or 5errousness Ihat might have ex­ISted evaporated The English relaxed too, but nOl so much. They were ured, lhey were hungry; many suffered from dysentery Their Sltuallon was

........ [3J .. 11l .... 2 .... .... ....

[X] [X] ..... .... ....

~[X]

~ ~----

[X] [X] [. J

~[X] [X] .... .... ~

... .... .... ...

FRENCH

desperate, and they knew It So they stayed tense and determ,ned The wa,"ng continued. Krng Henry began to wOlry

The English were In a grrm posmon Hunger, Cold. and disease could do the worlo; of the French withOUt a blow being slruck. All tile French had to do was wall The English could nOI Withdraw wllhOUt e_po!lIlg themselves to a masSMI attack on unlavOI'able ground Nor could they allack, Since tllelr lac tICS were unsu,ted to an olfensrve action T,me was wOl'klng 101' the French . And It looked as though they preferred It that way So Henry decided to try 10 force Ihe Issue

Shortly before 1100, the Kong began kICking hiS army ,nto pos't,on again Under the superviSion of Sir Thomas Erprngham-a war WISe veteran who apparently was chl8f of archers-the bow­men upped thel! stakes. When lhey were ready, Sir Thomas tosse<! hiS baton of command rn to the air and the King ordered an advance

1 tOO: Advance "Banners Advancel" rang out across the

field A lmost as one every men knelt. crossed himself. and k,ssed the cold, muddy ground, tak­Ing a bit of SOi l Into his mouth in symbolIC acceP­tance of Ihe Inevltabihty of death Then they were up and, With trumpet blasts and banners waving, they stepped off slowly The movement was good lor morale Indeed, though the men had accepted the probablhty 01 death In the l ield, they were gflmly determrned Befole they began 10 advance, and while thev marched, the King had allowed the

Agincourt Battle Maps

MAP A: Deplo)'menl and Operations throug h c. t 13S 1 .. Initial positions, c. 0730; 2 .. English ad­vance, c. 1100; 3 _ English arrow sllike, c . 1125-1130; 4 _ French cavalry charge, c. 1130; 5 - FrenCh l irst " battle" advance, c, 1135. NOle that, for Ihe sake of clarlw, iden­tification of the various contingents has been om!lted from the map. Reier to the main te_t of the article for this information.

MAP 8: Operations. c. 1140 through c. 1215 1 _ French first " battla" in melee with English men-al-arms. c_ 1140; 2 _ English bowmen begin to harass French fugitives, c. 1200; 3 _ Personnel of French second and third " bet­tles" begin to drift away, beginning c. 1200; 4 .. French second " bailie" advances, c. 1215 . trO t') :

rJJ;. = Mounted men-aI-arms

.><. = Dismounted men·at-arms

= Long bowmen

<r- = Cross bowmen

,,-... = Short bowmen

--+ =Advance

_-+ =Retreal

:.::. :: ,=Stakes

~Wood& _ = Road

27

28

rumor to spread that the French would sever lhe right hand of each archer laken. They might die, but all alike were determined to avoid mutila\lon. And as they walked across the fietd thelf physical condition Improved somewhat Although hungry, the exercise was Stimul"l1ing after standing about ,n the chili for hours

They moved slowly, Wi:lry of the French and hampered by Ihe muddy ground. TWice in their ten-minute walk they halted 10 dress ranks. AI aboul1110 they halted, havong covered some ~ yan~s The French were now 001300 yards in fronl -8 long bow shot. Themen-at-arms look up thelt positions again, the archers went about Ihe bUSiness of implanting thell Slakes anew, roughly sharpening the ends as they worked.

As the English advanced, the French had whllt was probably Iheff best chance to desuoy them. A swift attack by cavalry againSt the moving English might sweep them away before they could reset their sta~es or loose more than a couple of volleys_ ButthQ French were, il anything, less pre­pared to deliver an attack at Ih,s time than Ihe English Vitlre to receive one. They probably no­tiCed that the English were ge"lng ready to move about the lime the bowmen began to pull up their stakes. By that time the French ranks were a mass of confUSion. Many had wandered far Irom their appointed pJaces. Others had Imbibed too much wine In the carnival-like atmosphere of the pasl few hours_ So time was wasted getting back Into forma lion. As the English began to reset their stakes in their new pOSition, Ihe FrenCh had scarcely begun 10 shape up. And there was stili conSiderable con fUSion in the ranks when the English were finished. The French needed more time. King Henry did nOI intend 10 give it to lhem, AI 1124 the King passed the word to Erplngham. SII Thomas tossed his baton high in to the air.

1125: BaUle As Sir Thomas' baton rose In the all 11.1114500

shahs were loosed. A second valley followed li:lose upon the hlst. At such e~treme range-3:Xl yards - no serious wounds were Inflicted. None, save that to FrenCh pnde, Stil l but panially re­formed, the French attacked , The first "battle" stepped forward. And the mounted men-at-arms an its flanks put spurs to horse.

No more than half the 1<XXJ cavalry assigned to the lIanking troopS were available for the charge across the muddy fields, but Ihose tha t were came on with determination. The English poured volley aher volley into them . With each, the number of wounded and panicked horses grew, Horses crashed to the ground. and others stumbled over Ihem, Riders went down w ith shanered arms or legs or backs. Ye t stili they came. The firs t 200 yards or so were covered in about twa minutes as the mud slowed the horses, The remaining 100 yards or so took tess than a mlnule as the horses went flat out Into the charge. All along the English front the archers had advanced somewhat beyond the caver of their stakes Now they fell back upon them in the lace of the maSSive potential o f the charging men and horses. Some archers moved too slowly and were caught in the open to De rid­den down. Then the Slakes loomed. On the Eng­lish light the Count of Vendome's horse turned aSide in time. But over on their le f t. Ihe Admiral's men-al -arms were not so lucky, Unable to turn aSide, some horses ran full in to the stakes, Impal­ing lhemselves. Quickly their riders were pulled to the ground and taken prisoner or killed with knrfe thrusts In joints or face or by a mallet blow to the head Some few fortuna te ones managed to turn aSide and floo. From I,rst bow stnke to the shaner-109 of the charge, barely Ihree minutes had

"""".

Now the surviving men-at-arms had to reach safety, with the lerrible volleys still rarnrng down on them, across a field littered With broken men and horses-a field on whiCh, even now, thell own infantry was advanCing. With no alternallve, the remnantS of the French cavalry plunged into their infantry, rnfhcting further disorder on the already disorganized ranks which were slfugghng across the muddy ground . Shaken, the French foot doggedly pressed on, as it too began 10 re ­ceive thousands of shafts With each passrng minu te.

1140: Melee The confused, crowded ranks of French

rnfantry grew even more disorganized as they ad­vanced. The mUd, churned almost liqUid by the passrng of the cavalry, caused men to lase their footing. Others feil wounded by the thousands of arrows showerrng upon them. Still others fell under the hooves of their awn cavalry as It tried desperately to escape. And as each man went down, he caused others to stumble in to the mud as well. Yet stili they came on. There being little honor - and no profit - in fighting base-born ar ­chers. the eagerly advancing French sought King Henry's three tiny "battalions" of men-at-arms, As they did so, their front narrowed from 1<XXJ yards to but 250 rn three columns, one confronting eaCh of the English "battalions," The crowding grew worse as the men on the flanks pressed toward the middle and those In the rear pressed toward Ihe front

As the French came on, the English readied for batt le. The King, standing Wi th hiS bodyguard In Ihe Interval betwoon the second and third lines of the central "battalion," gave his final orders The French drew nearer. When they came within 20 yards they Increased their pace. thrusting their ImprOVised pikes aut and charg ing headlong against the English. At the moment of imminent Impact. the Engl ish stepped back I

The King, timing hiS move Wisely, chose the Instant before Ihe French would smash Into his fron t to fall back ten or twelve foot. The sudden move broke the momentum of the French charge. They halted, confused, some yards rn f ront of their foes. Then, eager for batt le and glory, and pushed forward by their comrades to Ihe rear, they pressed on.

Soon Frenchmen and Englishmen were hack­Ing, Slabbing, chopping, and smashing at each ather. Men began 10 go down all along the fronlS 01 the Ihroo English "battalions." But more of the FrenCh were falling than of the English. The loose formation adopted by the King enabled the first two ranks 01 English heavy Inlantry 10 take par1 In the battle. The French, crowded together, often could barely wield sward or lance before being fell­ed by a mighty blow from sword or a~ or warham­mer or before being hooked and dragged down by bill or halberd . Many indeed, fell w ithout seeing their slayers as the relentless pressure from the rear thrust the men in the lront on the very swords of the English. As men fell on the muddy ground, they caused those behind to lose their footing, making sllil more difficult the task of staying alive. The nOise grew intense as men screamed and shouted and prayed and crred and as sword rang an sword or smashed against armor. And the slaughter grew .

Amid the chaos, great feats of arms occurred. The Constable of France, d' Albert, fough t With frantic fury that belied his 46 years before lalling to English swords. The youthful Duke of Orleans per­formed what one contemporary called "prodigres of valo(' be fote being stunned and taken for ran­som, And King Henry seemed everywhere at once. having determined thaI death would be pre-

ferable to saddlrng England With a huge ransom for his capture.

Two French knrghts, Brunelete de Ma~n­

quehen and Garnot de Bournonville led a band of 16 others, all sworn to stnke Henry's crown from hiS head or die In the attempt. Attacking the King w ith suicidal fury, one of them-forever to remain anonymous-struck a golden fleuron from the royal war crown and severely dented the royal helmet. But Henry and his bodyguards and the men-at-arms around him beat the attackers off, killing them all. Their bodies jOined the growing numbers 1i11ering the ground In Iront 01 the English posItions. There lhey further hampered the French attackers, who had to try to advance over their prostrate fellows, while avoiding English blows and trYing to deal blows of their own.

1200: Crisis As the savage melee between French and

English heavy ,nfantry ran Its course, the Enghsh bowmen kept up their lire, belaboring lhe flanks of the crowded French columns, but by noon the vol ­leys had became ragged. Many of the bowmen, in action for aver half an hour now, had run ou ! of shafts, Same of them began to drllt over the field In l ront 01 the English line, picking up some or the thousands of spent but undamaged arrows which httered the ground . As they did so, many noticed stragglers from Ihe French attacks wandering across the fields wounded, confused. lost. or merelv afraid. Many archers began 10 seek these unfortunales out, abandoning lhe shelter of the stakes and leaving their now useless bows behind . Soon some hundreds of archers were scallered across the l ield. s\luggling twO or three to one againSt stray French men-at-arms.

Though unable to stand up to a man-at-arms singlv. the archers could gang up on Wi th With relative Impunrty - one man to dlstracl the man to one side, another to run around behind him and deal a blow With sword or a~ or mallet to his back or knees, and dawn he WOuld go. A quick dagger Ihrust rn visor or grOin or 10lnt would sellie the fellow then and Ihere il he wasn't worth a goodly ransom. In this fashion some hundreds perished or were laken pllsoner and led to Ine rear . And as the archers worked, Ihe French attack began to falter .

Mast of the pnncipal magnates-the Con­stable, the Marshal, the RoVal Dukes, the Counts - had already fallen dead or been taken prisoner when the yeomen began Iheir deadly work . The bailIe, l or those who could see, was rapidly be­coming no place for a nobly-born man-at-arms to wrn glory. Men an the fringes of the French col ­umns began to dll ft toward the rear, dodging the roving gangs of alchers as they went. Some men seem to have panicked, running aimlessly aboul untillhey blundered rnto some 01 the death·deal­rng bowmen, But the heads of the columns were firmly fi~ed agarnStthe Iroms of the Ihree "battal­ions" of English heavy foot, kept there by the ter­rible pressure of the thousands of men 10 their rear who sllil eagerly pushed forward, hoprng to get a chance at Ihe glo/V, and as yet ignorant of the Im­minent disaster which loomed aver the French ar­ray. The killing went on, and the French fell in in­creasingly disproportionate numbers.

1215: Reinforcement By now the French first "banle" had been

engaged for nearly an hour . During thiS time their second "bailie" had been standing in readiness some hundreds of yards to the rear, awaltrng ilS chance to bid for honor and glary with litt le notion of the course 01 eventS on the battle line It IS dlf· flcullto Judge the stale 01 morale in this "bailie" al Ihis time. Many of the men seem to have been emotionally worn out just from haVing stood about waiting lor well aver four hours. Others seem 10

have boon very keyed up and quite wlllmg to go m­to action when ordered. Then the I'rst panic­stricken fugitives from the slaughter appeared, and two thmgs happened very quickly. Some men, apparently in fair numbers, became inlected Wi th the pamc and themselves lied the field. and others determined to advance at once m order to save the day . Among Ihls latter group were Ihe Dukes of Alencon and Bar, mOle or less in com­mand ollhe "battle." At their order, that porllon of Ihe second "bait Ie" which had nOI already abandoned Ihe held stepped lorward The first "battle" would be remloread with some thou­sands of fresh troops Which was precisely what was not needed II Ihe growing disaster at the front was to be averled.

1230: Disaster The fresh men 01 the French second "battle"

ran enthUSiastically imo the rearmost ranks of their lirst "baule," aggravating the Situation of the men actually in contact wllh the English . More men were pushed lorward onto the English weapons; mora man became Jammed together, unable to Wie ld a sword or all; and more man went down in the press to be trampled underfoot. The failure of the remforcement became eVident in minutes. Panic, hllherto confined to the men 01 Ihe Iflnges of the messlve column and to those 01 the second "battle" as had chosen to flee, now began 10 in­fect those in the center as well, and even some of the men of the third "battle" were touched by it. Something temble was happenmg to the French army, and somethmg desperate wou ld have to be done to save it. The only problem was /lnding someone to do II By now all of the ranking per­sons 01 the first "battle" were long gone and Ihe Duke of Bar, haVing somehow shoved hiS way to the front 01 the tightly packed French troops, fell almost Immediately . The only Frenchman of ranK lelt was the Duke of Alencon.

Slipping from the melee, Alencon found and mounted a stray horse, one 01 hundreds wander­mg about the field , Ridmg back and forth across the ballielield, Alencon tned to rally the men. It was to noavall , He was rebuffed by all and sundry the small knots of fugitives collecllng to the rear; some elements of his own "bailie" which had failed to advance; and even the uncommitted men of the third "battle." FrenCh morale had broken. The only Ihing he could do was die gallanlly

Alencon rode back to the melee, dismounted, and joined the few thousands Slill fighllng. Per­sonally leadmg a desperate attack on the English center, he became involved Irl a combat With the Duke 01 Gloucester, King Henry's younger broth­er. The young Duke received a dagger in the belly The l ighllng around him grew fierce, The King and his bodyguard came up, beallng ofl the French Alencon, S88lrlg that all was lost. shouted hiS sur­render . Henry shouted back his acceptance. The heat of battle was upon everyone An English man·at-arms struck Alencon down The last Frenchman of rank had fallen .

1245: Plnic With the death of Alencon, the few thousand

Fl8nch shll slfuggling with the English men-at­arms gave up There was no one lel t to give orders. There was no one willing to obey them anyway Panic tOOk hold, and the French fled as best they could across the muddy, corpse-littered ground, with King Henry's archers in hot pursuit. Some scores of FrenCh lell now, and stili hundreds more ware dragged 011 as prisoners Withlrl min­utes It was over, With the shattered and p'llful rem­nants of the two proud "battles" shel tering in the v!elrll ty of the fast dlmlrllshmg men-at-arms of the French third "bailie." From the look of th lrlgs. the bailie was over

The King unquestionably welcomed the col· lapse 01 the French_ Though hiS forces had suf­lered relatively few casualt ies, the army was Irl no fit condllion to figh t on , Many hundreds - perhaps thousands - of men had gone off to escort priS­oners or loot corpses. Most of his archers were very short on arrows, despite the fact that many had been recovered from the ground_ And what men as sull remained in the ranks were tired, stili hungry, and Irl many cases stili siCk The magni­tude 01 the victory was stili probably unclear The French had the third "bal1le" which might yet make things difficult. Henry thought It beSt to keep hiS men-at-arms and avallab~ archers wellirl hand. to wal t on developmentS, The battle might seem to be over, but one never knew. The Klrlg was righ t. For the battle had ye t to run Its lull cou rse

1300: Beau geste As the lasts learful SUrviVorS of the French

foot reached the salety of their third "bailie:' the young, Impetuous Duke 01 Brabant arflved on the scene With a smal l escor\. Full of chivalrous Ideals, Antoine of Brabant had IIdden hard and long to lake part m the bailie, even defYing hiS brother­Ihe powerful Duke of Burgundy - to do so. In hiS eagerness he had outstripped the bulk of hiS con­tingent Indeed, so intent was the Duke on amvlrlg 'n time lor the balt le that he had ~It behind hiS ar· mar and standards_ Nonetheless, seelrlg the d,sas­lfOUS outcome of the !ightlrlg, he sought to save the day

In borrowed armor, and using a stray banner as an improvised surcoat, Brabant led hiS small band on a thundenng cavalry charge. If supported by the French third "banle" - which stili compos­ed some thousandS of uncommined men-at-arms - Brabant's attack might pOSSibly have reversed the deciSIon reached by the mfantry Sweeping across Ihe lield, the French could have swept up hundreds of Englishmen, slaughtering them Without arrows, Klrlg Henry's archers would not have boon able to stop the charge But the third "bailie" did not move And as Brabant's Iiltle band charged, the lew bowmen With arrows ~It let fly In a mlrlute or two it was over, the horses roiling in the mud, the men-at-arms and the Du ke himself taken It had boon gallant and noble and chivalrous, but 11 had notlrlfluenced the course of the bailie a bll. Nor would the Duke be rewarded for hiS courage.

1310: Raid While the Duke 01 Brabant was makmg hiS

Irultless charge, another Frenchman was beStir ­ling himsell lsambard, Lord of Aglrlcourt, the local baron, apparently had observed the battle from alar Eventually the thought occurred that he might Irlilict some damage on the English by at­taCking them in the rear, whilst their atlentlon was Ii~ed in front. Wi th two other men·at-arms and a gang of some hundreds of peasants armed wllh agricul tural implements, lsambard fell upon Kmg Henry's baggage train. The men-al-arms and bowmen assigned to guard the wagons had long slrlce dnlled off to jOin the battle, 01 were oc­cupied guarding prosoners some hundreds 01 yards away. All that remained in the camp were some 30 pliests, a !lock of servants, and some laborers.

The rClid caused a panic among the English camp followers_ lsambard's armed rabble gallantly slit some priestly throats, tortured a lew stable boys, and made off wrth the King's spare crown and some other regalia. Then, satisfied that he had fulfilled hiS duty to France, the Lord of Aglrlcourl and his mob fled like the thieves they were. But by then, King Henry believed there might be a major French threat 10 his rear

1320: Debilt gest" The Duke 01 Brabant's gallant but frUitleSS

charge stirred the ~aders ollhe French third "bat­tle" as nothing had done so far Still some thou­sands strong, their men had stood Idly around through the entlle batt le, Ignoring even Alencon's ImpaSSioned efforts to get them movlrlg Then came Brabant's ellort. Some of the leaders 01 the third "banle" were touched by hiS courage The Counts 01 Marie and Fauquembourg tried to col · lect their men for a charge. Some hundreds re­sponded But most. Includll"lg even the Count of Dammarun, refused No matter, the two counts and their small band put spurs to horse. Wllhm minutes It was over, as a lew hundred arrows­quite pOSSibly the very last 11"1 Ihe belts of the Eng­Iish - shanered the feeble effort It might just as well have not taken place Indeed, it might have been beller il the whole thing had not taken place. For Just as Marie and Fauquembourg rode to their deaths, King Henry learned of lsambard's raid on the baggage It seemed that the English were be­sellrom IranI and rear both. And the King made a temble deslclon

1330: Atrocily

29

By now the banle had lasted four hours In that time the English had taken some thousands of prisoners, Includll"lg a pride of dukes, a flOCk of counts, a herd of barons, and a hOSt of lesser nobility. All had surrendered on their word, With no more than a tOken removal of helmet and weapons to coniine them, There were far too many pnsoners to guard properly, or indeed even to bind. They milled about in their thousands some yards Irom the batt~lield , a held by now littered With thousands of discarded weapons The attack of Brabant, the feeble efforts 01 the French third "bailie," and then the raid by lsambard of AglI"I­court on the English rear allll"ldicatoo lhat the day might not yet be over The Kll"lg was Waffled. The poSSibility of rescue could turn the pflsoners Irom a listless mass 01 dejected humamty mto a major threat to the sa fety 01 hiS tired l!ltle army Some· thll"lg would have to be done. Henry ordered the prisoners slain,

The men-at·arms gualdmg the Dflsoners balk­ed . Humanitarian conSiderations aSide, the prisoners represented a conslderabla limmclal In­vestmen\. Ransoms could run to the thousands of pounds, and one did not lightly throw that sor t of money away. To stille the protest -and e~ecute the grisly task, the King sent 200 archers under a squire.

There IS a problem here, mvolvmg Henry's 11"1-

tent ions, On the one hand he might seriously have mtended to slaughter al l the prisoners On the other, he might have meant hiS order pnmarily to cow them stil l further intO submiSSion , Certamly even 200 men without scruples would find the sheer phySical task of killing five or ten times their number difficult, particu larly given the weaponry available WhiCheVer the case, It IS unquestioned that some hundreds were slain, and someonesven put to the torch several huts m which wounded prisoners had boon placed. Certainly these men of· fered no threat, even should rescue have oc· curred. But blood lust was upon the English , And In such Circumstances even the Geneva Conven­tion tolerates such an atrOCi ty

How many were slain is unknown Certainly many were, but few among the great nob~s. The e~ceptlon here IS the Duke 01 Brabant: his Impro­vised equipment made him look like a poor coun­try knigh t, and belore anyone Knew It, some yeo­man had sli t hiS thfoat. The total of the sialn can not have boon more than a few hundred. Within mmutes of Issuing the order, the King rescinded lI. The threats m fron t and to the rear had evaporated.

30

1400: Victory By mid-afternoon, the remaining French had

given up and fled the field In httle more than three hours tnelr host had been reduced from 25JXXl \0 nO tt1lr1g. Over 6(X)(} of their number were dead, including Ihe Constable, an Arch­bishop (I), three dukes, five coon\s. 90 barons. lind 1500 ~nlghls A fur ther 2000 or SO were prisoners ' among them were the Marshal, two dukes. 111 least five counts, some scores of barons, and hundreds of knights, And the fest -all lied On the balance, Ihe English had suffered lightly; the Duke of York dead of II stroke; the youthful Earl of Salisbury mortally stricken by a French blow; II dozen other men'lIt-arms killed; and a few score yeomen lost for II \Olal of perhaps 100. It was II tremendous victory for the English, cheaply won

THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR: 1337-1453

Arguably the longest war in history, the Hundred Vears War was actually a series of wars between the Kings 01 England and the Kings of France stretching over a period of a bit more then 115 years. Its origins were rather complex, but by no means unusual for the Feudal Age. These may be briefly summarized as follows:

_A distant claim 01 tha Kings of England to the throne of France.

- The fact that the King of England was a vassel of the King of France as well as sovereign in his own right.

- Franco-English commercial rivalry over the Flemish wool and lulturies trade.

- French assistance to Scotland in its ceaseless wars with England.

- Depredations of English and French pirates on each other's shores and ships.

The war is generally divided into eight phases or periods which are generally known afte' the event or person which dominated them.

Tht Sluys Puiod, 1337·1343. King Philippe VI of France declared the fiefs of Ed· ward III of England forfeit and proceeded to in· vade them. Edward sent raiding parties into ac· tion and proclaimed himself King of France so that he might gain support from other French lords dissatisfied with Philippe. The war pro· ceeded at a leisurely pace until 24 June 1340. when the English seized command of the seas in the naval Battle of Sluys. Thereafter every· one lost interest and a truce was proclaimed.

Tht Cruy Pt riod, 1345· 1347. A civil war in the Duchy of Brittany gave a pro-English faction the advantage, and Edward outfitted an expedition to take advantage of the situa· tion. The French promptly invaded Gascony. Edward's principal fief in France. and laid siege to vanous castles. To relieve the pressure on Gascony. Edward took his army to Normandy and marched inland. After various adventures his 20,000 men- men·at·arms, archers. and light troops- met a considerable French force at Crecy (26 August, 13461 and. employing the tactics later used at Agincourt. soundly de· feated them. Edward than marched north-

Reprise Agillcourl IS a difficult battle to explain. Every

batlie must have a viClor and a vanquished. Bu t It is somelJmes dlfflcull to determine who conln· buted more to the outcome. Such IS the case al Aglncourt. To be sure. Henry V - Shakespeare's "Hal" - empioyed hiS lIule army In such fashion as to galll the grealllSt advantage from its unique combination of longbowmen and heavy infantry BUI In a very real sense Ihe French losl Ihe battle far more decisively Ihan Henry won II. AI no lime did any of the French moves do more than contn­bute to thelf destruction. Indeed. the very facllhal the battle occurred is because the French w ished It , Given Henry's situation, there was no need lor a general engagement. Isolated In Ihe heart 0 1 France, surrounded by enormous armies, the Eng· IIsh would have surrendered from starvation wlth-

wards to Calais, besieged and took it, A 101'lQ truce fOllowed as each side readied itself for a renewal of the struggle and coped with the Black Death, which sw~pt Europe Irom 1348.

T ht Poitltr'5 Period. 1355-1360. Having failed to negotiate s real peace, Edward III in­vaded France again. aided by his able sons, Ed­ward the Black Prince and John 01 Gaunt, Beginnil'lQ in 1356 the Black Prince several times raided deeply into Central France. Usual­ly he was pursoed by a large French army. On 19 September 1356, a battle was fought at Poitiers in which the decision of Crecy was reconfirmed, save thaI this time the French were on foot . The King of France and scores of his nobles were taken. After Poitiers. the Black Prince withdrew 10 the English base at Bordeaull, and the war ran on as a series of raids. On 24 October 1360, the Peace of Bretigny was concluded. Edward III received some additional lands. but agreed to give up his claim to Normandy and to recognize Jean II - Philippe had died in 1350- as King of France, thereby technically yielding any right he might have had to that throne. But Jean's ransom was so great it was never paid. He died in England in 13641 A long truce followed in which the English end French backed par· ticular factions in the ongoing Breton civil war and various adventures in Spain.

T he Uu Gu~Un Period, 1368-1396. A revolt against Edward III by some Gascon nobles prompted a ranewal of the war and of Edward's claim to the French throne. Bertrand Du Guesclin, Constable of France, injecled some sensibility into French operations. Avoiding pitched banles. making use of sieges, artillery and even such "unknightly" things as night attacks. Du Guesclin slowly pushed the English out of most of their ter· ritories, save only the fortress-cities of Bordeault, Bayonne, Brest. Calais, and Cher­bourg. By his death in 13110, the reconquest had been almost completed. Meanwhile both Edward III and his sons had died. Thus, both sides were relatively leaderless, as the replace­ments were uninspired, Desultory warfare broken by fraquent truces lasted for some 16 years more. but nothing decisive occurred. Then in 1396 a JO-years truce was signed. Both countries were beset by internal disorder and a collapse of royal authority. England promptly

In days. Only thelf ViCtOry at Agillcourt saved them.

Consider br~!lv the French eflors: lack 01 a chain of command lack 01 a clear plan of batlie. failure 10 employ thalf archers Failure to coordlnale their at tacks. ExceSSive zeal ExceSSive Chivalrous Idealism.

Ultimately. the French fai led because they could not Will . An army IS no bener than the socie­ty which pu ts It 10 the field Sunken In feudalism. Late Medieval France could not but l ield an army which rellected Its ideals. And such an army could nOI cope with the raahnes of warfare. So, given Ihat it had to occur, there could be no other out­come than Ihal the English would Will at Agln­court.

revived, but France fell into 8 long civil war be­tween pro- and anli-Orleanist factiorHl known respectively as Burgundians and Armangacs. And through it all intermittent warfare con· tinued.

Tht Allincourl Period. 140·1428. The throne of England passed 10 Henry V in 1413, who promptly renewed the war, aiming again at the French throne. His first campaign almost ended in disaster but the French, having for· gotten Du Guesclin, saved him by giving vic­tory at Agincourt on 25 October 1415. In tha following years, Henry conquered or received the cooperation of most of Northern France in· cluding thai of Ihe Burgundian faction. Finally he got the French king to designate him as his heir. On his death in 1422, Henry's infant son Henry VI was proclaimed King of England. The King of France died shortly thereafter and lillie Henry was likewise proclaimed King of France. Meanwhile the "rightful" heir proclaimed himself Charles VII . As the war continued. the English seemed likely to soon conquer all of Frence. During 1428 the English laid siege to Orleans. the last important French stronghold.

Tht Junnt d'Art Ptrlod , 142'.1444. The peasant girl from Champagne who had visions of saints was somehow given command of the French armies by Charles VII. Wilhin a ShOM time she had driven the English from Orleans and went on to win a series of remarkable victories. Betrayed to the English in 1430. she was burned as a wilCh. Butshe acted as a catalyst, inspiring French resistance, and in the next live years the military situation was more or less completely reversed. Subse­quently, the French gradually eroded the English position until, in 1444. a five·year truce was concluded 8t Tours.

The Fl'fnch Triumph. 1449· 1453. The French spent the truce reorganizing their army and turning it into a prolessional force, The end of the Burgundian·Armagnac civil war more or less foretold the end of English inter· lerence in France, as the French could now concentrate their entire energies against the English. Within lour years of the expiration of the truce in 1449, the war was over. Using ar· tiBery to telling effect, the French were able to beat the English bow tactics. On 19 October 1453 Bordeaux fell , leaving England only the port of Calais from the vast Empire enjoyed by Edward III and Henry V.

POUNDS, SHI LLINGS, PENCE, and FARTHINGS

Money is, of course. one of the crasser realities. Throughout history it has con­stituted-or rather it's absence has can· stituted-a significant problem for the OV8r­

whelming majority of humanity. And for just as long, war has been seen 8S 8 viable alternative to starvation and 8S II shortcut to great wealth.

At the time of Agincourt the pound was II fairly standard measure of money throughout Europe. 01 course the exact value en<! com­pO$ilion of Iha pound varied from country 10 country and even from city to city in the same country. The English pound (about $300.00 in 1978 termsl was actually based on 8 standard set by merchanls from Flanders- "Sterling" is cognate with "Eesterling" - though the actual minting had long been in the hands of the King. The French had rwo official pounds at this time, thatol Paris and that 01 Tournai . This was actually a vast improvamant on their earlier situation, whiCh had seen 30 different standards, including that of the King and a couple of dozen nobles and towns. Eventually the livre tournais (about S67.(0) was to become the official standard for all of France. The pound was, of course, broken down into smaller denominations, to facilitata trade, business, and taxation. The English, and all other pounds, broke down thus: Pound - 20 Shillings; Shilling " 12 Pence; and Pence .. 4 Farthings !literally "a fourth"). This was, of course, the break-down used in the Sterling area until very recently, when Britain finally decimalized the pound. The other surviving pounds- Italian, Israeli, and Turkish-had long since been decimalized. They have also all-including the English-lost any real can· nection to their original value or standard. For originally the pound, regardless of type, was a literal pound of silver, with value difference due primarily to the lack of a standardized system of weights and to debasement of the coinage. And when the pound was closer to its origins than it is now it was 8 truly poweMul coinage.

Changes in purchasing power and stan· dard of Jiving make conversion of antique moneys into modern terms misleading. Never­theless, soma idea of the true power of King Henry V's coinage may be obtained. Aoughly Henry's coin worked out:

Pound $300.00 Shilling(.s) Pence (d)

Farthing (n

15.00 1.25 .32"

In terms of purchasing power, two far­things could get you one scrawny chicken­we're not talking about the quality of Medieval merchandise here-or a dozen eggs, which were relatively dearer at that time than now. This doesn't sound too bad, of course. But in order to make the purchases one had to have the money. Which was why a lot of people chose war as an occupation.

As the table clearly shows the profession of arms was a bit more profitable than any other at the time. Incidently, French wages seem to have been somewhat lower than English at this tima. The rigidity of the social scale is also

demonstrated, of course. However that was so inherent in the system that no one ever really questioned it overmuch. But wages we,en't the only way a soldier-regardless of rank ­could turn a profit. For he could supplement his pay with loot- though Henry V frowned on it - and, more importantly, with ransom. A man who took a prisoner could demand ran­som . And. depending on the rank of the per­son taken, ransoms could be enormous.

DAY WAGES England, c. 1415

CiVilians , d , = $1978 M aster Carpenter 3 3.75 Master Mason 4 5.00 Carpenter 2 2.50 Mason 2 1.95 Aeaper 34 3.75-5.00 Thresher 1.25

Soldier.s Archer 6 7.50 Man-at-arms 15.00

Knight 2 30.00 Baron 4 60.00 E,' 6 8 99.00 Duke 13 4 200.00

SOME AGINCOURT RANSOMS

Item Amount Plidro 1 M. de Corpe $107,005.00 2 men·at-

arms + 1 archer

2 Men·at-arms 4, 000. 00 Sir Aobert Laurence

1 Man-at-Irms 3,000. 00 unknown

I Man-at-Irms 1,500.00 I man-at-arms

1 Man-at-Irms 325.00 an archer

I Unknown 180.00 an archer

Now obviously these are randomly selected eKamples. But the ransom for the Seigneur de COIPO was not unheard of. Some ransoms were so high they might beggar a man and his family for years. Indeed. Henry V swore to die rather than be taken because he feared his ran­som would break England for generations. The ransom fOf the Duke 01 Orleans was so high it was never paid. The duke spent 30 years as a "guest" of the Kings of England. Apparently the best ransoms were paid to the higher rank ­ing captors. Lower ranking guys were very like· Iy to get skinned. Even so archers obviously were able to get a piece of the action. The yeomen who took the two bottom·most prisonen; on the table still managed to make a nice profit: $325.00 (21s Sd) represented 2)1, months wages. One wonders whether any of the great landed fortunes of England are traceable to a little ransom picked up at Agin­court by an enterprising bowman. Certainly the common people thought it peMectly possi­ble. Which is why they were quite willing to go off to war. The profits were better and the danger about the same as staying home and starving.

,,'oolno le: English ProW and l oss a t Agincourl

War is a form of industry in which one invests capital and labor in the hope of realizing a pro·

fi!, victory. But in Medieyaltimes it could yield not merely victory, but excellent monetary benefits as well. Consider what might be term­ed a profit and loss statement for Agincoort .

Expendiwres (debit! Manpower $52.471 .00 Munitions 37,500.00 Total $89,971.00

Incomefcredit! Ransoms Total

$30, 000.000. 00 $30.000,000.00

Grand Total $29,910,029.00 profit

Obviously Henry V appears to have turned a neat profit at Agincourt . But things are not always what they seem and the table needs some clarification.

Mllnpuw~ r . The then current day wages have been used to calculate Henry's expen­ditures here, based on an army which included as combaMnts two dukes, foor earls, five barons, about 890 miscellaneous men-at­arms. and some 5000 archers. This therefore excludes some hundreds of non-combatants who were also on the payroll, including a bishop and 31 priests - one for every 178 men; a physician and 20 surgeons - one for every 200 men; a flock of engineers and stone masons; and all types of courtly officials, such as heralds, stewards, and chamberlains.

Munitions. Only arrows have been counted, at 3d, Of $3.75 per sheaf of 24. The king sup' plied these to the troops at his eKpense. On the other hand he did not feed them, as their pay was considered sufficient for them to obtain their own yictuals. The king did, however, let contrlcts or permissions to specific merchants allowing them to supply the army Ind waiving any eKcise on their goods. This could be con­strued as a net loss to the king, But no one was eating at Agincourt enyway.

Ransoms. The figures represent approx­imately 2000 prisoners, including the Marshal, two dukes, l iye counts, SCOles of barons, and hundreds of other men-at-arms, pro rlted on the basis of the average 01 known ransoms. But actually this enormous sum was not fully realized. When the English reached Calais on 29 October they discovered that there was little surplus food in the town and that prices were high. As I result many prisoners were rlnsom­ed at a discount, representing a considerable loss to many indiyiduals. Only about 700 of the prisoners ever got to England. And even then many were never ransomed. The Duke of Orleans managed to spend 30 years IS an English "guest," emerging in 1445 It 56 years of age with little to show for his life but a reputation as a minor French poet. His raf150m was n8V9r paid. It could not heve been without beggaring his family for generations.

Pront. Eyen assuming only 1 % of the total of ransoms were actually collected, England still made a t remendous prof it for one day's work at Agincourt, Indeed, the total must have gone a long way towards defraying the costs of the entire war.

31

32

MAN AND HORSE AND STEEL

The mounted, heavilV armored knight im­mediately recalls the Middle Ages. With lance and shield he thunders across the centuries, sweeping all before him. But, beginning in the Thirteenth Century, he commenced 8 long. ,low decline in Iha fece of increasinglV effec­tive infantry. By Agincourt, he had already been several l imes defeated in encounters with Swiss, Italians, Scots, or Dutch srmed with the pike and, of course, by Englishmen IIrmed with the longbow. Nevertheless, in 1415 he was 51ill considered the premier arbiter of bat­tle.

Th~ Mln.lt-Arm~. The custom is to app1v the word "knight" to any of the armored cavalrymen of the Feudal Age. This is nOI ac­curate by any means. Actually the knight was one, albeit the most honored and ranking one, of a class of such warriONl known as men·at· IIfrm;. Anyone with the armor, the horse, and the training could qualify as a man-at-arms. But only a few would be knights. The knight, almost always of "noble birth, " qualified for his position through various arduous ceHlmonials and essentially belonged to a sort of ley religious brotherhood with strong mysticlIl characteristics. Below him in rank were several degrees of less prestigious men­at-arms: squires, serjeants, Villers de guerre, and even pages. The heirarchy of men-at-arms below the rank of knight tended to get somewhat com pie •. A squire, for example, could be a flObly born youth getting some on the job training from a proper knight or could be lin independent gentleman of some means or even II hired outrider for a proper knight. A se~eant was usuaUy the hired outrider or the undeNltudy for an independent squire. The vlller dB gUtlrrB was a youthful, or not so youthful, servant of a knight or SQuire. Now, in battla, all of these would be equipped pretty much in the SlIme fashion, though the knight or wealthier independent squire would pro­bably have the most el(pensive and modern equipment and the best mount. The lower ranking men-aI-arms had to make do with older stuff, often very old, and less splendid mounts. In battle the lesser ranking types ohen ended up in tha rear. Indeed, there is some suggestion that the French third " battle" at Agincoun WIIS composed of such: poorly equipped fellows afoot or on old nags, who had jusl seen the flower of the men-at-arms go down under the English arrows and bills. NOI the sort of thing Ihat was good for morale. Finally came the pages, who were really jusl unarmed boys of 16 or less, in training_ There was al$o a higher rank than knight, the "ban­nerel", or slandard bearer, who was usually an experienced man-at -lIrms-not always a knight - who could be trusted 10 lead a squadron of his fellows in battle_

Armor_ Armor was perhaps Ihe principal characleristic of Ihe man-at-arms. By the time of Agincoun - the early Fifteenth Century ­armor was just completing a transition from chain mail 10 plate. A proper suit of plate, with associated underarmor and padding, ran to a weight of between 40 and 100 pounds, de­pending upon the degree of protection desired and the stature of the man wearing it. It was actually lighter than chainmail, which required vary extensive Illyers of padding to be eHec-

tive. The suit was made in literally dozens of separate pieces, all having a special name, specific function, and panicular maintenance requirements. The pieces fitted together in a pre$Cribed fashion, thus enhancing the protec­tion afforded_ The man-et-arms would first don some light padding, then a vest of chain­mail designed as a sort of last ditch defense against punctures, Then the feet would be en­cased in steel, followed by the legs, the arms, the back, tha chest, the hands and the head. Each piece fitted over the preceading in such a way as to provide e.tra protection at the junc­tures. Now, some joints could not be protected by plate and resort was made to the less effec­tive chainmaiL As much as possible, all plate surfaces were curved and free of decoration so as to permit blows to glance off_ By heavily strengthening the left side, and paniculariy the left arm, a shield could be dispensed with, thus lightening the man's load considerably and permitting him to use two hands in battle. When all fitted together, the suit of armor was a flel(ible, well-articulated covering, if not over­ly comfortable in el(treme weather. A man-al­arms in full armor could do pretty much what he could do without it, The notion that a man so equipped was vinually helpless is hardly ac­curate, as borne out by el(periments con­ducted with actual suits from various periods, Even Ferry de Lorraine, a French man-at-arms who fell at Agincoun, could get around pretty well in his 90 pound suit of armor. Cenainly his load was better distributed than that of his many times great-grandsons in the World Wars_ A modern infantryman's load has often approached 90 pounds in combat and much of it rested squarely between his SMulders_ At Agincourt not everyone wore a proper full suit of plate armor. Armor was e.pensive_ Even lor a high ranking noble it represented a con­siderable investment. Recently a major inter­national corporation offered tailor made suits of armor to its customers at the remarkable price of S2,OOO, about the price in 1415, Con­sidering that steel is cheaper nowadays than in 1415, one can get the general idea. So many men wore older equipment and some probably even wore full chain mail outfits, which were only about a generation out of date, These people in p;:!rticular must have been highly vulnerable to the English bodkin point, which was especially designed to pierce chainmail. Of course, armor is essentially defensive. To win battles the man-at-arms had to have offensive equipment,

Weapon f)' , The existence of armor greatly restricted the types of weapons which could be used by the man-at-arms, Although the sword was an object of almost mystical veneration, it was not normally the main combat arm. Sur­viving el(amples are between five and ten pounds, ohen very tapered and having a very sharp, needle-like point, so that it could be thrust through chainmail and other weak por­tions of one's armor_ Of course against a man properly armored and armed, such a lucky blow would be unlikely. Sosmashing weapons were more imponant than thrusting ones. And a considerable variety of smashers e.isted, in­cluding swords, a.es, maces, and hammen;. These could be relied upon to smash plate and break the bones beneath it_ Indeed, a blow to the head, even if it did not smash the helmet, would very likely cause a concussion, render­ing the luckless victim incapacitated. Since the

man-at -arms was technically a cavalryman he usually also was armed with a lance of some 18 feet in length for use in the charge. AI Agin­court, of course, the men-at-arms on both sides fought dismounted, in what had become a custom of sons. As a resuh, the French found their lances too long and broke oH a couple of feet at the bUll to make them more manageable, This probably still left them somewhat unwieldy. The English did not have this problem_ Their standard lance was shorter, designed soma time before for either mounled or foot use as circumstances dic­tated, Moreover, many of the English men-at­arms do not seem to have carried lances, but rather bills or halbards. These weapons were about eight feet long and resembled nothing less than gigantic can openers, which was more or less what they were. The halbard, for e.ample, had a blO/ld Il(e blade, a spear point, and a hook. Thus the man wielding it could chop, $lab, or hook his opponent as needed. At Agincourt, the English second line in each "battalion" seems to have used bills and halbards primarily as hooking weapons: reaching over their fellows in tha first line, they would hook an unsuspecting French man-at­arms and drag him forward and to Ihe ground, where he could be disposed of in more tradi­tional fashion, Finally, of course, everyone car­ried a dagger, which was often large enough to quallfy as a short sword .

HorsH. The man-at-arms was, above all, a cavalryman, 50 his mount was an essential part of his arms and equipment. It was, accor­dingly, often cos tly, running 100 10200 pounds at times ($30,000-$60,000), Surprisingly, the typical horse for a man-at-arms was not a huge Clydesdale or Percheron type truck horse. Rather it was a largish animal similar to the English hunler or American quaner horse. The point is Ihat the charger did not have nearly the load which is customarily assumed, at least in the period when the mounted man-at-arms was an effective battlefield combination. (Later, in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Cen­turies grossly overweight armor, and even el(­tensive horse-armor, was introduced, making It almost impossible for the man-aI-arms or his mount to do anything_ But bv then Ihe system was already long since obsolete,) The total weight to be carried was usually no more than 250 pounds- man-at-arms, armor, weapons, and SIIddle altogether. Horses, at this time, carried little protection, Of course, this made them highty vulnerable to arrows. IxIt it did keep things light. A Napoleonic cuirussier tip­ped the scales at about the SlIme weight as a Fifteenth Century man-It-arms. Many mounts were trained to aid in the fight with hooves and teeth. But no horse, however well-trained, was willing to run itself up against a row of spear points. So once steady infantry evolved, beginning in the Thirteenth Century, mounted combat began to go out of style_ The man and horse combination which had dominated the battlefield for some 600 yeaNl became ob­solete.

Tralnln&. Fora nobly born person, or even a person of gantle binh, training was a matter of Ilfe, From his youth, the potential man-al­arms engaged in hunts, jousts, and games, all of which helped ready him for battle, There was a lot to learn: riding; mounted combat with lance, sword, axe, mace, and whatnot; dismounted combat; and the rules of chivalry

and heraldry. Men often started as pages and learoed on the job, worlr;ing their way up in rank . 11 is by no means certain, however, that the man-III-srms was panicularly skillful. Most of his worle was pretty simple; swordplay. for example, was essentially B matter 01 cut-and­thrust, rather than anything resembling fenc­ing, which evolved in Italy in the SiKteenlh Century. But however well-ltained, eventually he had to go into banle.

Ort_nln tlon. The man-al-8rms did not go off to war in a vast disorganized mass. A regular system of organization existed. though one which might give a modem staff officer nightmares. Basically. ell men-at-arms in an ar­my were organized into "lances." A lance was a combat team of three to Shl men, thoogh in exceptional cases it consisted of more. Typically it would be headed by a knight or in­dependent squire, supported by one or two squires or serjeants, a valet de gue,rre or page or both, and perhaps even one or two bowmen, Normally this would be the retinue of a single Individual, consisting of himself and the men he was obliged, by contract or feudal oath, to supply in time of war. Five or ten lances would form a troop or "post" usually under the senior knight or squire, Several such troops would form a squadron or "benner" under a still more senior man, perhaps a baron or other lord , Eventually a separate rank was evolved, banneret, to designate the man qualified to lead a banner. A great lord, such as a duke or count or earl, would of course be like­ly to bring a considerable number of lances with him, And his own personal "lance" ­everyone wore twO or mora hats in this primitive TO&E - might consist of a fairly large number of men-at-arms, who comprised his bodyguard and personal retinue, In battle. groups 01 banners would lorm the various lines or "battalions" or "bettles" which the army would be divided into. Rank, 01 course, rather than practical military experience, olten deter­mined who would receive the post 01 greatest responsibility,

Tacllcs Ind Erfectlnness, The ultimate, indeed the only, tactic 01 the mounted man-at­arms was the charge, This was surprisingly short. Ahhough Hollywood would have us believe that cavalry can charge for hours, the horse is actually a less durable runner than man. So most charges lasted no more than lour or live minutes, Usually this was mostly accomplished at the trot, perhaps three to five miles per hour. But when the enemy was within 50 yards or so, the attacker would pick up speed to about 12 to 15 miles per hour. This is actually less than a horse's maximum speed, but it preserves his wind. Althe moment of im­pact, the kinetic energy was enormous: an 1800 pound man and horse charging at 15 miles per hour possesses nearly 2,000,000 foot pounds 01 kinetic energyl Small wonder that it took centuries to evolve inlantry steady enough to face up to the charge of the mounted man-et-arms. But. of course, such infantry was evolved: the Swiss, the Ilalians, the Scots, and the Dutch all developing sturdy pikemen who could stand against the mailed ranks presenting unwavering rows of spear points for the horses to impale themselves upon. As the horses were usually more con­scious of their survival than were their riders, it became increasingly difficult to drive home II charge against such a foe. So dismounted

combat began to develop. The EngliSh were the first to be successful with it. The man-al­arms was essentially a spearman on horse­back, so they began taking him off from time to time in the face of particular problems: superior numbers 01 enemy men·at-arms; stur­dy enemy inlantry: ground ill·suited to cavalry; and so on. And the man-at-arms became an i"n. lantryman. The English rapidly understood that this was a reasonabla option . Apparently tha French considered it somewhat less than desirable. Of course the English used the system defensively. well supported by natural features and by their excellent longbowmen. The French had to use it most ohen offensive­ly, unsupported by effective missile t roops. From the evidence, it appears that the system was ideal for defense. Certainly the lew occa-

Armor at the time of Agincourt (horse armor of a laler era). This sketCh gives some idea of the more up-to-date patterns of armor worn at Agincourt. Only the principal pieces have been named: a panoply this ex tensive may have had over 100 separate parts. The use 01 relatively less effective chainmail i5 fairly widespread, demonstrating that this outfit falls toward the

sions when the French were able to employ it in that marmer worked for them. At Formigny, 15 April 1450, an English army of 4500 men-at· arms and archers encountered a French army of 5000 men-at-arms wirh two light cannon, The English deploved in their traditional fashion. The French dismounted, lined up. and let the cannon work over the English JUSt out of longbow range. After a few enfilading rounds, the English broke ranks, charged, and were wiped off the field by a counter-charge of the French men·at-arms acting as infantry. In essence, the French had done to the English what Henry V did to them at Agincourt : pro­voked an attack. At Agincourt the French oughl to have stood on the defensive. Once Henry lorced them 10 attack, they wele doom· od.

____ Upper Arm

_--ElbOW Cap

Horse Housing or Trappings

end of the transition from full chain mail armor to complete plata coverage. The charge. is protected only about the head and neck, leav· ing a considerable area of the body exposed to arrows. Later, of course, armor, lor both man and horse, was to become conaldarab-ly more extensive. But by then itwas already becoming obsolete.

33

34

"WITH CLOTH YARDSHAIT . ..

Celebrated in song lind story, the yeomen archer with his longbow stands 85 the most uniquely English contribution to the art of war. Surprisingly, our knowledge of this man, of his weapon, Bnd of their function in baltle is poor. In its day the longbow was so common an 0b­ject that everyone must have understood something of its construction, US8, and capabilities. As it went Qut of style, fewer and fewer people shared thel knowledge. And eventually, there was no oniliell. So loday we must rely on a very small bit of firsthand evidence, supplemllflled by our knowledge of the modern sporting bow, end with the gaps filled in by $Orne well· reasoned conclusions based on Inherent military probability.

Equlpmtnl. Based on the thr911 admitted­ly incomplete. but genuine bows which have come down to us, the typical English longbow seems to have been between 6' and 6' 4- long, about 4- around the grip, and weighing perhaps six to eight pounds. The best bows were rn.ade of Mediterranean vew, which is springier and sturdier than that grown in the cold damps 01 England . Oiling with wax or fat helped preserve the bow and its linen string from the elements. Arrows were 3r long - the famous cloth yard- with a plain, unbarbed steel head - the famous bodkin point. Fletch· ing, preferably of peacock, was more normally of !;:heaper duck or goose feathers and occa­sionally of parchment. Twenty-four arrows constituted a sheaf, of which six were long­range flight arrows, whilst the balance were or­dinary man-killers, or sheaf arrows. Each arrow weighed two to three oyncas so a sheaf ran to about four pounds. Some archers carried their shafts in a belt Quiver, but it was not unusual for a man to just jam them into his belt. The normal combat kit for an archer ran to his bow, one or two sheaves - w ith or without Quiver - and an lilia, sword or leadened rn.allet . This was supplemented with a Quilted surcoat over his nonnal rags, plus a belt to jam all his gear into, aOO some sort of footgear. A few men wore halmets, mOlt juSI a boiled leather cap. So John Yeoman went to war light, with no more than 25 pounds of anns and not half of

Organization of Men-at-Arms

Ihat in other gear. The king supplied a nag for him to ride, but otherwise the bowman was re­Quired to supply most of his equipment himself, OYt of his princely six pence a day salary. And it was princely: a mason of the dey made only fOYr pencel So war was profitable. For the survivors.

TTlil ielnl_ The yeoman was required to maintain and practice wilh the bow by England's ancient militia laws. Indeed, anyac­tivity axcept Church and practice was pro­hibited on Sundays and holy days. These prac­tice sessions were social, as well as military af­fairs. And there were pecuniary and social rewards lor accuracy, as well as military onll!! . Mandatory practice might nol rn.ake everyone a Robin Hood, but it did produce a pool of ef­fective, trained bowmen. Nor did the king necessarily want a host of Robin Hoods. He did want men who could deliver fast, accurate, disciplined fire at need. So practice stressed mass fi re at area targets. Each parish had its Captain of Archers, usually a professional soldier in the employ of the local squire. This worthy supervised what was known as clout (i.e., cloth) shooting. A large piece of cloth was spread on the ground oron a frame set ata Slight angle. The Captain would then drill his men to lire into the cloth from various ranges. Norrn.al practice was conducted at about 200 yards - ten score paces. As the men were not stupid, a series of simple commands was easily learned which enabled the Captain to regulate fire. All of this would, of course, pay off in bat­tle.

Orx_nlzation. When war came, the king usually contracted with various nobles, barons, knigh ts, and other magnates for vary­ing numbers of soldiers. These men would hire - or press-bowmen. Most of the bow­men would be grouped not with their technical employer's entourage lor further pra!;:tice, but rather with the bowmen from other hoyseholds, so as to be better organized lor battle. Over ea!;:h twenty men an old soldier, or vinrenBf ("twentier"), was placed. Five such commands were grouped under a moynted squire, or centenar ("hundreder"1. These, in turn, were subject to an overel! commander of archers, such as SiT Thomas Erpingham was at A gincourt. The system reeks of efficiency. The

(somefimes)

Valet de Guerra Page

vin/enars and cen/enars commanded what were, In effect, platoons and companies, The 5imilarity to modern infantry ueage is striking, And modern infantry ueage is based on the number of men that can be directlV command­ed in battle by one man.

Oeploymul. There were apparently about 46CX) bowmen on 660 yards of front in the ET11Jliah array at Agincourt . This approx­imates seven men per yard of front . As each man had an anti-cavalry stake implanted in the ground in front of him, the depth of the Iront must have been about 14 yards. If arranged in checkerboard fashion, the individual bowman would have had about two yards between him and the next man in any direction. Vimenafs would have been at the head of their com­mands, which would have occupied three yards of front. The cemenars must have stood mounted some yards in front of their men, who would have occupied ahoot15 yards 01 f ront. So a mass of 500 archers, as at Agincourt, would have occupied about 8J yards of front, 14 yards deep, and muSI have looked much like an infantry battalion in Napoleonic times, with horsed officers to the fore and NCOs at the heads of their platoons, all presenting a neat, symmetri!;:al appearance. Bul neatness was not the object.

Firt Control. To weigh in the scales of bailie, the archers had 10 deliver fire when needed, where needed, and in the volume needed. This required a system of fire control to tell them when, where, and how mu!;:h to shoot, From available evidence, Sir Thomas Erpingham, in addition to being in charge of marshalling the bowmen, was also accorded the honor of conveying the order to loose at Agincourt. This was probablv done by trumpet blast orthe waving of Sir Thomas' banner. The centenBrs relayed the !;:ommand to the vintenars, and they to the men, who would loose. The whole process must have greatly resembled what happens when a well-drilled bilttalion is put thrOYgh its paces by the sergeant major: commands echoing end a rip­ple of execution passing through the ranks almost before he has finished . Once the overall command 10 shoot was given, the regulation of range and rete of fire must have been in the hands of the centenars, the noise and conl u-

Organization of Archers

1 Centenar 5 Vintena~ 100 Bowmen

1 Vinlenar 20 Bowmen

1 Centenar 1-2 Pages

lion baing 100 great IOf quick reference to higher authority. Simple commands, based Ofl

practice Itandards-"SevlIn scote pacesl Sill ICOre and ten''' - I'T'HJ.t have been used, al'ld the men were probably briefed befOfehand anyway (cl, l.inly the CSf/tllll"! Ind vin renafl'musl hIve beenllO fscilit&te regula · tion of une of fire lind poa.sible movements during baltle. The net result is Ihal the king had his firepower when he needed it, wl'lere he needed ii, end In the amount. he needed.

Effecllunns. This, of course, wal the IIIIItnCe 01 the malter. No matter how well treined, weN OfQ3nized, and well equipped, if the Iroopl could not inflict damage on the IlW!my they may lI5 well have stayed home. The problem it to define effectiveness. To be effective, the Iongbowmen had to reach tile enemy before the enemy reached the bowmen. Allhi, they were quile good, though nOI nearly so good 8S legend and Hollywood lugges t. While m8llimum range waB in exelN of 300 yardl, the object WIIS killing, not world distance record • . A flight arrow could kill an unarmored men or hof'5e at about 250 yards. If it could hit him. Accuracy at this renoe, or in· deed much O\i1Ir 120 yards, was primarily a mettar of lUCk. Moreover, tha target. unless a h0fS8, was not likely to be unarmored, but tathe!' encesed in verious lay~ 01 plate and chein armor. A dirllet impect Ii.e .. at gool by a shealarrow with bodkin point was supposedly C8peble of piercing \4. plate at 120 yards. This did not, of course, mean instant death to the wearer. as he wa.likely to have a light chain mail shin and some quitted padding under his plate. Moreover, the plate wes curved so as to prevent dirllel impect: the arrows would thus glance off. This is aupported by modern e.· perimentation. II seems fairly certain thai ar· mored men were tarely killad outright by the cloth yard shah. Certainly the mathemalics of the situation must lead us to this conclusion. At Agincoun the English shot between 120,000 and 240,000 shalts. but the French auff8fed only ebout 6000 dead and perhaps a further 2!XXl wounded. So it required between 15 and 30 arrows 10 Inflict injury on one man, even ignoring the work 01 the English men·at· arms. This is hardly deadly fire. The r"llmpect of the arrows must therefore have been to harass the attackelll, disorganizing them for tha hand ' lo-hand fighting which was to come. Now this Is not to say thet men were not kUIed by the longbow. Large portions of the men·at· arms' body was not protected by plate armor. The }Dints, the neck. the eyes, the groifl were all either unprOlected or covered with chain mall alone. And all were highly vulnerable. Of course to hit these by means of eimed fire would heve been difficult . Moreover, aimed fira would have had to have been of low volume. In a block of 500 bowmen. only about 2S,*, might be able to employ aimed fire. The rest would be acreened by their comrades to the Iront. So volume of fire must have been more Important than aimed tire . A large number of shalls reaching an aree target - which was what clout shooting was all aboul - would result In a fair number of hilS in places of high vulnerability, plus e considetable amount of disorder. As long as the volume was kepI up, the accutacy and effectiveness of the individual shah were not Important. And volume it truly was. A single volley by the English at Agincourt - perhap5 4600 shalll -

W1Iighed some 72S pounOsl In contemporary terms this would be equal to the W1Iight of 22 howitz8f shens 005mm), albeit lacking the e.· plosive content. At the theoretical me.imum 01 si. shafts per minute. lhe English would be delivering a projectile mass equal to that of almost four batteries 01 150s. Assuming each Englishman e.pended just 48 shafts at Agin· court - his "basic load" plus whatever he could pick up from the field averaged to· gether- the lotal weight delivered would have been upwards of 16 tons. all In the form of some 2OO,(X)Q..odd arows. Of course to main· tain this volume, certain conditions had to be met. To begin with , the bowmen had to be protected from unfriendly swords, a ... , and whatnot. This was done through the useof the stakes. But more importantly, the range had to be sufficienl to permit the rear· rank men to employ relatively high angle fire . OthelWise. as the range decreased, so 100 would the volume of fire. and thus the fate of useful hits. Ap· parently the most effectiva range- and there· fore Ihe maximum "killing zone" - was bet· ween 100 and 150 yardl . At Agincoun. the French cooperaled by placing themselves deliberately in that zone. And the result was a French disaSler .

Footnote: Shorlbows and Crossbows The French had JOOO or 4000 bowmen at

Agincourt, about two·thirds of whom W8fe armed with Ihe shonbow. while the rest car· ried lhe crossbow. Having been placed behind the first "battle" and over on the French right behind the cavalry, these archers played no pert in lhe battle as far as can be datlrmined. allhough there is I suggestion that they at· tempted to follow behind the charging cavalry at about 1125. only to be beaten off by the longbow volleys which decimated the cavalry.

The shortbow was a rather leeble affair . In every way it was inferior to the longbow: range, accuracy, effectiveness. Impact . The

French had some tens of thousands of m~itia armed with this threeorfour foot weapon. One of their kings, lmarting under the impact of English arrows, had tried to estabHsh a national bow·armed yeomenry such as the English had enjoyed. But he picked the wrong bow. The c rOll!lbow, however, was another matter .

In the EngHah ·speaking world Iha crossbow Is usually given shon shrift. being considered generally Inferior to the long bow. Some of Ihis attilucle derives Irom social or moral considerations: crOll!lbowmen wera usually mercenaries. And much of it II undentandable ethnocentrism. But not a little of it most derive from the fact thaI the two weapons were never testad against each other in battle. For each has certain advantages and disadvantages which might have made for an interesting outcome.

The croubow has three principal dis· aclvantag ... 11 has a somewhat shorter range than the longbow, no more than 250 yalds or so. though the effective ranges seem to have been similar, 100 10 150 yards. The rate offire is rather low, no more than two lhotl per minute. but this was probably reduced to one in practical terms. Most importantly. however, the crossbow was a complex piece of machinery, liable to break or become damaged easily. Now. on the other sideol the argument, the crossbow has cenain clear advantages. It is more accurate than the longbow up 10 its me.· imum range. And it is far mora effective. There exist numerous e.ampl .. of plate armor pierc, ed by crossbow boili. but few. If any, pierced by longbow shafts.

So whit would the outcome have been in a stand up fight7 One can never know. Pro-­bably the aup8rlor ma.imum range of the long· bow would have been the decisive element: crossbowmen were armed and equipped like Iongbowmen. Without armor the crossbow· men might have been massacrad before com· ing into effective range. But one wonden.

THE LONGBOW COMPARED Weapon WI PWI

Longbow 6-8.0 • 000

Crossbow 10.0 . "" Arquebus 15.0 700

"Brown Bess" 10.7 500

Minie Rifle 9,' , .. Mauser '98 9,0 15'

M' 9,' "" M16 ' ,3 110

This table compares the English longbow and the conlemporary crossbow with other famous infanlry small 8rma: Ihe early Six· leenth Cenlury ArquebuI; Ihe English "old Brown Bess" Tower Muskel , In use from Ihe early 1700s through the l000s; the American Model 1842 Rifle-Musket widely used in the mid· l000s; the German Infentry Rifle '98 used e.tensive!y since 1898; the American Ml Garand Semi-automatic rille; and the ament American M16 rille . The important data in lhe table is the IKE. or initial kinetic energy: 1M energy possessed by the projectile as It leaves the weapon. This helpa delermine bolh range and effecliveness. The higher Ihis figure. the better bolh will be. A kinetic energy of aboul

MV IKE RPM Range ... 1312 612 .50 ... ,... 2/1 '50

H'" .000 .," 75

',200 50,400 '13 H'" 950 .7,381 613 350

2,500 " ,750 20/ 10 800

2,700 76,545 2."2 800 .. .." 8.748 650 /650 450

75 fOOl pounda is required to pierce humen skin. bulat least 150 fOOl pounds is necesssry to inflict severe Injury. Thus. bolh the longbow and the crOlllbow were superior to lirearms through 1M Sixteenth CBfltUry.

Abbreviations: WI .. W1Iight in pounds 01 the weapon; PWI .. weight in grams of the projectile; MV _ muzzle velocity, the speed at which the PlotectHe leaves the weapon, in leel per second; IKE . initial kinetic efMIfgy. the energy 01 the projectile as it leaves the W1Iapon, a factor of projectile weighl and mUl· zle velocity. expressed in foot pounds; RPM _ rounds per minute. with the maximum given li~I , then the normal; Range .. the effective range, in yards.

35

36

AGINCOURT AND OTHER MEDIEVAL MYSTERIES

We know a grllat deal about the Battle of Agincoun. lndeed, we know a great de'll about the Middle Ages in general. But there is much that we do not know. and what we do nOI know is frequently of critical imponance. The principallll8son that we lack accurate informa­tion on manvasp!lCts of Medieval lifa is nOI duo to any tack of interest: Medieval studies con­stitute a remarkably vibrant branch of History. Nor is there any lack of resources; documenta­tion on Ihe period is voluminous. Rather thll problem sIems Irom the lac t that people usual ­ly do not write down for posterity what theV consider common knowledge. Future archae­ologists digging into the ruins of OilS Moines o r New York may well be hard pressed to 8)(plain the purpose of certain peculiar small loops 01 motDI whiCh we produced in great profusion: documentary references to beer can pull tabs are likely to be rare. This module is designed to point out some of the things we do not know about warfare in late Medieval times - with particular reference to Agincourt - and to ex­plain how Wi! have attempted to fill in the gaps where nece$Sllry.

The principal tool used in helping us re­construct what we know is something called Inherent Militllry Probebility, or IMP for short. IMP is the application of common sense and basic military knowledge to any situation in which we lind the SOIJrces to be of little help. In effeCt, we inler from available information and certain fundamentally unchanging data, the probably original circumstances. These facts are things like march fates, food consumption, common practice of the times, and so forth. Nor is an occasional bil 01 practical experimen· tation unwelcome. While the use 01 this tech­nique can only establish a probability, rather than a certainty, it is nevertheless a highly reliable probability and a particularly useful tool.

We have nearly a dozen eye-witness ac­counts of the Battle of Agincourt. All of the ac­counlll, whether of French or English proven­ance, are in general agreement as to the general course of events. But all of them are woefully inadequate and contradictory when it comes to details. What follows is a series of brief discuuions concerning some of the many points which could stand clarification.

Numbfn. Medieval use of numbers was remarkably casual. Frequently we find reference to armies running Into the hundreds 01 thou$lnds, carelessness with casualty figures, and an incredible lack of accuracy in accounting. For Agincourt the English Ire­quently claimed that the French numbered up­wards of 100,000, while the French often gave the English two or three times their probable strength. Aside Irom the practical impossibility of feeding such hordes, the size of the belUe­field alone would indicate the impossibility of such numbers. As noted in our discussion of the battle, the field was just wide enough for the English army to lit comfortably, and justa little too narrow for the French. Moreover, careful examination of admittedly fragmentary muster rolls for the English army show tllat our estimate olsomethirtg near 6000 is not far Irom the truth. No such documenlll appear to sur-

vive for the French, but the entourages of cer­tain of the magnates in their army are known with some degree of accuracy, enabling us to make a reasonable estimate of their numbers as well. Casualty figuresBrealso a problem and the English frequently put in claims of upwards of 50,000 French dead. But, aside from some few hundred men buried in local church yards, all their dead were interred in a vast excavation by the Bishop of Cambrai, who totalled them to 6000, which in itself is probably as accurate a figure as we will ever see. English casualties have been stated as anything between 12 and 100. As the names of at least 26 men killed are known- all knights or other gentlemen- it is probable that the laner figure is closer to the truth. Certainly such revised figures would in no way detract from the magnitude of King Harry's victory.

0rt_nb_l lon. S1rictly speaking we know virtually nothing about the internal organiza­tion of either the French or the English armies. However, the English system of vinten8rs and centenars had been in use since the time of Ed· ward IJI a century earlier, and there is occa­sional reference to men holding these rank!;, so the inferance is on firm ground. Edward III had also elCperimented with groupings of 1000 bowmen, called ml1litlfds. But these had been employed only briefly and then apparently abandoned, thus they were elCciuded from our discussion. It is highly probable that the French crossbowmen and shortbowmen were organ­ized in very much tha same fashion - there was remarkably little variation in military prac­tice from country to country in this period - but this is something for which we have no ellidence. The grouping of men-ai-arms into lances. po!lts, and bannen; is by no means clear for this battle, but the practice was very common and Ilas been assumed.

Dfployment. We know surprisingly few details about the deployment of the French. There were, to be sure, three divisions of men­at-arms, plus their bowmen and a couple of bombards. It is certain that the two divisions of men-at-arms which actually participated in the battle were dismounted . And it is clear that at least a pan of their third division was mounted, but by no means certain that all of it was, parti­cularly if, as has been assumed, this "battle" was composed primarily of valers de guerre and pages. There is some difficulty concerning the deployment of the French bowmen since they are reported as being squeezed between the first and second "battles, " but with some also over on their right . Several accounts of the battle place some bowmen on the French left as well, but this is by no means clear. French bombards - however many there were - are variously reported as being all on the right, split between tha two flanks, or, in one case, allan their left. The first option has been adopted. !Incidentally the effectiveness of these guns is difficult to determine. Only one Englishman was killed by gunfire, but that was probably due to the fac t Ihal the advanc­ing infantry rapidly masked the pie<:es.l The situation for the English is somewhat better known. Nevertheless, there are several hazy areas. The most important of these is that some accounts have King Hal sending a strong detachment of archers in the forest of Trame­court to provide enfilading fire. Not all ac-

counts are in agrooment with this, and it is possible that such troops as were in this wood had infiltr.ted from the large right flank block of bowmen. A very interesting question is how the area between the archer blocks and the men-at-arms was arranged: was Ihere some sort of a gap between each group or did the outside archer rub shoulders with the outer­most man-at-arms?

Comm.ad. This is perhaps the most dif­ficult area. Bluntly Wi! have no idea how either army was commanded. We know who was technically in command, but we are unable to e~plain the process by which they conveyed orders once the show began. All of the ranking personnel in both armies were Involved In tha hand-to-hand combet and clearly unable to take matters in hand . Erplngham, for elCample, was almost certainly King Henry's marshal with direct responsibility for the bowmen. But during the battle he stood with the king in the central "battalion" taking part in the melee. So who regulated the rate of fire? Was everything left up to the judgment 01 the individual centenars and vintenars? Or was there a " lire plan" agreed upon in advance? For this, and other command questions, we aralikely never to halle an answer.

F..qulpmfnt. Superfk:ially it would appear that this area would present tha fawest pro­blems. In fact, In Its way it presents fully as many difficulties as some Olher aspects of the battla, for wa can not be sure what type of ar­mor was being used by most of the men-at­arms involved. Unquestionably the magnates - the King, the Dukes, the Earls, the Counts ­wore the most up-to-date, stylish equipment. But armor was elCtremely elCpensive. A rela­tively cheap iron outfit ran around one pound sterling . For superior steel it ()(luld go as high as four pounds, roughly $1200. Many of the lesser nobility were not remarkable fOf their wealth. And the ordinary man-at-arms, the squire, the serjeant, the valer de guerre were often relatively impoverished. Tiley often had to make rio with their overlords' hand-me­down!; or odds and ends of loot. So there is a very high probability that many of the men·at· arms et Agincourt were wearing outdated ar­mor. Indeed, it would seem that an army in this period, particularly if it was a f8l.ldellevy such ' as the French at Agincourt, was something of a mobile museum of military fashion. with some men ancased in the mOSt stylish steel plate, whilst others got along in CentlJry·o/d chain mail. Hardly the image one conjures when thinking of the word " knighthood. "

Thf Hnllds. Thera is an interesting question concerning the heralds at Agincoun. Heralds wefe originally officials charged with supervising coats-ol-arms and protocol. As time went on they were also used for communications between rival armies. At Aoincourt the English and French heralds had arranged for the battle to taka place where It did. During the battle they are $lid to halle stood together viewing the action Irom someplace on the field . At the end of the battle the French heralds conceded that tha English had won and offered "Agincourt" as a conve­nient name for the figh t. The problem is: Where did the heralds stand? The battlefield was very narrow, with woods on either side so they had to have been standing on it while tha

fight raged all around Ihem. Hardly a comfor­table siluation. NO!' one likely to be particularly 58fe.

Tlmf SfilutnCt. It Is fairly cenain Ihal the ermies deployed about dawn and lhat tl'le bat­tle itlelf began somewhat before noon and a nded IOfTletime in ttle aarty aft&moon. UntOf­lunatety, it iI unclear just how long Itle aClion ac tually lasted. The times india ned in this arti­cle are based on an estimata of Ihe minimum tima necessary for Iha events to unfold in view of our knowledge about march rates. rate of aHOW fire , II'Ie nature of the teHllin, and tl'le minimum time necessary to do in one' . fellow man whilst he is trying to do you in. If any­Ihing. ttle times gMln may be 5%-10% 100 k>w.

Thf C .... lr)' AClion . There is some dispyle as to the number of mounted men-al ­arm, the French had alf1lllable for the opening cavalry charge, and il has been suggesled that only their right llank horle look part . In our ac­counl we heve assumed an attac k from both flank l, but with less than Itle mal(imum avail­able oomber of men because there is evidence that the English archers on both flank, were engaged. Ttle general description relied heavi­ly on the known capabilities and practices of cavalry.

Tht Hrst Dh-ision Alllck. The discus­sion relies on the question of the physical space required lor a given gtoop of men to light properly, plus the fact that all accounts agree that lhe French rllnks were very crowd­ed. Ttle Engli5h fallback has sometimes been amibuted to the impac t of the French onslaught, but is more probably deliberate, so that the French would lose momentum. The tactic's use is recorded elsewhere. The prC)­blem. created by the corpses which quickly began to litter the front ale el(amined in some detail by John Keegan in The FlIce of 8l1ttle. Cenainly they interfered with lhe IIction. but there is no reason to believe they quickly piled up Into small mountain •.

Tilt Arc lltfS' hUt,""tntlon . We know Ihat tha English bowman began attacking stray French men-et-a rms shortly after the action began. Our account presumes they did so when ttleir Irrow supply was nearly el(haustoo. tooghly half-an-hour after they began to shoot assuming a minimal nile of fill . The general details culled 'rom all accounts tend to agree as 10 this leries of events.

Tht Srcond D1~1510n AtI.tk. It is clear that a considerable time passed before the French second "battle" intervened. It is nOI clear why they did not do IKl earlier. The Duke of Alen c on's adventures are largely reconstructed. His difficultiel in getting ttle third " battle" to move would indicate that ttle chaln-of-command had brolcen, it one ever el( ­isted. French casualties up to this point afe very difficult to assess. but it is highly probable that a great many men were running away, perhaps more than were actually engaged in fighting .

Tilt Sukldt SqUId. Most accounts of the banle agree thai thil group of knights reallyel(­illed and IIctually made a suicidal Ittack on King Henry, only to be wiped out 10 a man. None, however, place this attack relative 10ltle larger framework. of the battle. We haye aDumed it occurred during lhe first French at-

tack. It may justal well haye come during the second attack - if iI happened at all.

l ·ht I)ukt of O".bant. There is general agreemenl lhat the Duke arrived without hi' equipment or retinue. We know he borrowed some almOf- unimpressive stuff at that - and mUlt Issume he " borrowed" some men from the third " battle" in order 10 make hilattack. a, it does seem 10 have been made mounted.

.·l rrqufmboufI ·5 Anack. This Iction is by no meanl clear. Beyond the bare facttnat it occurred, we have virtually no information. It il probably that only a small portion of the third " battle" took part in th is mounted charge. Most likely ttle attack was broken up by the last few volleys available to ttle English as there is no evidence of any English casualties resulting fro m this movement.

Tht Slluglltrr o f lilt Prhontrs. There iI no ques tion but that King Henry did order the prilKlners killed. Just how many were so treated, however, il conjectural. Ttle stated purpose, thaI the King leared they would Iflaten weapons from ttle field and fall on his army from the reer, can only hold water it we assume the English had advanced during ttle battle, which i. unl ikely since available eyidence tends 10 suggest that they fell back lomewhat. (All accounta mention the French as haying trouble with corpses underfoot. not the English. Such a lituation would be impos­s ible if the English were slowly advancing duro ing ttle battle.! The suggestion thaI the move was intended to cow the prisonen is I reason· able one.

CIU5 Solidull). All the Iccounts of the battle suggest that both sides fought with greet courege. This seems to have been IKlme· what less than accurate. Indeed, it is almost certain that many Frenchmen must have run away from the field . The total number of French troops committed to combat was per­ha"" 16.000 to 18.000. These suffered up.. wards of 7000 deed on the outside, plus petha"" 2000 taken prisoner. We are therelore left to account for something between 7000 and 9000 additional men who were commilted to aClion but whose late we cannot be certain of. As only a small number are supposed to haye fallen back wtlen the Fre nch broke off combat, there can be but one conclusion: a greal many men took off on their own. pro­bably in panic. That this panic is not recorded by Iny of ttle eyewitnesses is undrmtandable given that the upper class of both sides felt more ekin to each other than to their less for­tunate fellow-countrymen . AIIKl. who would admit he lost a battle due to panic in the ranks or gained as Yictory because the enemy fan away?

The foregoing discunion by no means ex­hausts the unanswered questions concerning Agincourt. We could go on. But there is so much more that the task would soon fill the en­tire megadne. These el(ampies serve to illus· trite what we know, what we don't know. and what we can conjectule with some certainty. As in these cases, we have Ittempted 10 deel with all s imilar cases In a like fashion .

DESCENT ON CRETE S&T66 Article Errata COMMONWEALTH Order of Battle Module

The 234th Mediterra nean Ba tterv should be the 2341h Medium Battery.

The 2nd and 4th Auslralran Infantry Bat talion should be the 2/4 Australl8n Infanlry BattalIon

The 2nd Argyll and Sutherlanders were In BUlma at the tIme 01 the banle for Crete Ttle lS I Argyll and Sutherlanders were pm'sant at Crete

All leference5 to "!fanspofl " should be read as "!lOOP"

All re lelences to "Royal AlmV" should be read as " Royal ArtIllery"

All re ferences to "Royal Antl-Arrcraft" should be read as "Royal Australian Artillery"

GERMAN Order of Battle Module

All references to "PanzerJagel" shoold be read as "Jager". and VlCe-yersa

A reade r pOInted ou t to me that thele IS a con­trad,ctiOn between the books tha t I used lor my 500rce meterial and The Ultra Secret. TM Vlrra Secret sta tes INII Freyberg knew IMt the assault would occtJr on May 20th, while all othef sources IndICate thet tle was rnformed that the attack would occur on May 17th . Whatever the case, Freyberg's BCIlOn! of the Ilf51 day show thet I'Ie either dId not possess the necessary InformatIon or chose \0 completely Ignore it While I lInd 1\

hard to behave that Freyberg was that incompe· te n t. I must bow to the WIsdom of the authOf of The Ultal Secret. who researched the matter thoroughly Mea culpa [riC Goldberg

STONEWALL S& T 61 Game Errata

The following corrections and clarificltio ns hayt been made \0 Iht S&T67 issues gamt. SlOneWQII.

[1.71[ (udditiorr) A unit may eilllef be plaetd in restIVe' s tatus or bt laken oul of rtSC'""C' $lalUS durin. a Friendl)' Movemt nt Phast. Tht unit may Rot do both in the same Friendly Movemtnt Pha~.

[11.0) (c:larifir:alion) Genera l Rult: Mounted cavalry un its do not have a Zonc of Control.

11l.2] (omUsionJ The s«ond sentcnce should read: Furthermo re , it must be able to moyt into tht dtfending unit's Itu t"raux" Orllt oj IhIt tlt_ ItlckinX unit's fro ntal husidrs.

113.171 (additionJ Artillery units defcnd In mdec combat with I strcngth of 1. rcgardlrss of the cur­rent strength of tht lIun crew.

If ,.011 _\'ft'1 Jd ........

Me· ...... ,. .......... ,.

IItlJtI«W lit tIw All'. eM'" 0rcMuI( .. III Po .. I'oIIdI2 • A """",,,,,,,... ItM SIIIt

.IMI • -',.,. fMwa Wb)" IlOt satIIcrilIe .." WI .., • 'et • year (6 ....... , . .............. tarS2.SO each. Set order , __ ..... , .. SPI .........

37

Mine Warfare

Ever SInce thell f,rst widespread use In war­IsrB, minos have posed a ve~11'IQ problem 10 those who have had \0 sweep them . In the presenlSlale of the arl, the conleet mme has y.elded pnmacy \0 the "Influence" mille whICh , planted directly on the sea bottom, explodes when one Of II comblna­lion of a ship's ctun3CterlS!ICS ,oUuances liS trig­gering mechanism Moreover. CUH8nl1echnologv ell0W5 8n In"uenee ffill'\8 10 leap 110m the sea bol tom and home In on 8 largel

MagnetIC m'nesexoloclewhen a metal obf6C1, such as the hull of 8 warship, passes overhead Acousuc mines are sel off bv the sound 01 B ship's engine Pressure mmes, regarded Bven today as being almost unsweepeble. BfB exploded by io­creased water pressure Stlfred up by the hull of an approaching ship

The deadlv gamecan be played," many vaoa I,ons and comb'n&uons Certam mmes can be pro­grammed to explode only aller detecting the sound of an approachmg ship, Its magnetic held, Increased water pressore, and then ils sound again Some can dillerentoale be!Weeen the $(lund of fnendly and enemy vessels. Mines can be built uSing the "lallef" COfIcepl, explodmg only after a certain number of shIps go by ThiS Increases Ihe chances of bemg bypassed by a mlneswaeplng fleet In lavor of capilal ShiPS, Of the escorts 01 a carner task torce In laVQl' of the IlBnap Itself Whe1l used, for Instance, as a politico-military weapon, they can be set to aCllvate al a certain future time and looeacllvale or self-destrucllBle!, as were the !!(XX) magnetIC and acousllc mines sown by the U S In HaIphong halboi" m 1972

Essentially, II mine 15 a sobmerged bomb, so the larger the payload, the more damage II can do and the bl99fll the targel II IS capable of damagmg or destrOYing Indeed. mUles lire often nothIng more Ihan aerial bombs togged out w!lh sophlSu­CoiItBO OOtOll1ltlng deVICB5 The general range o f e.· ploslve charges used IS 200 to 2(XXJ pounds, and a commonly used rule of thumb putS a mine's de­structive range at one foot lOr each pound of e.­ploslve used

Quantltallvely, mining reached Its zenith dur­Ing WWlI, when a tOlal of about a half mIllion mines were laid by all Sides, and intluence types were used on a broad scale In the European theater. the Allies laid more than 260,{XX) mines, about 70% 01 them sown defenSively In such places as the Nonh Sea and Ihe approaches to British naval bases But It was ollenSlve mines, planted In the Hehgoland Bight, the KIB! canal. lhe BaltIC Sea, end off Norway that did the most damage. accounting for some la;o AXIS ships sunkand540damaged

Unlll reclOlly, the US has neglected Its min· ing capability, the Haiphong operallon not· Withstanding Recent testImony belore Congress disclosed that lhe US mme StOCkPIle, numbering In lhe tloS of thousands, IS pflmaflly of WWll Vln· tage But WIth the numerICal balance of sea power now tiPped heaVIly In favor of the SOVlBtS, the US IS recognlzmg !hat oflenslVB mine warfare can help slQnlhcantly to redress lhe tmbalance. CUllently the US IS develOping II lout-member famtly 01 modern mmes. and IS reqUlflng that each sorface, air, and undersea combal unll have mlnelaY-lng capabIlity. However, Ihe new lamlly 5111115 largely unborn; only one ot the lour IS In active service -the Captor anllsubmallne mlfle

Mil'lB Countermeasures IMCML The key to mine countermeasures. bener known as mlflesweeping, !S locating the minefield. Hopeful· Iy, thIS can be accomplished technologically-, via

DATA FILE 004

sonar or underwater TV. rather than empirically, by havmg one of yOU! shIps blown to bits. Wllh the prospect that pi"BSSure mines, Vlftually­unsweepable as they are, Will be WIdely used In any future major connlCt. much of the old MCM doctllne is changing radically, allhough illS sllillar from obsolete Old and new doctnflBS are descllb­ed below to put each In contexl

SweePing Inlluence mines IS Ilicky, because lhe mlfle IS Iflhmlely smarter lhan liS primItive predecessor. the contacl mlne_ The SW9BPBf has to fool 100 mine Into detonating by SImulating the passage of a ship while staYIng far enough away- 10 aVOid damage to Itself The PIiOOple IS 10 magnify­Simulations so that the mine Will be set off at a safe distance.

MagnetIC mines are swept by slreammg a long, rubber·coated " tall" afl of the sweeper The tall emits a strong electromagnetic current which Simulates the "SIgnature" of a StOOl-hulled vessel Because the sweeper hrst has 10 pass over the mine, MCM vessels nowaday-s /Ire made 01 wood and carry- as httle magnetIC eQu lpmenl aboard as necessary Even the ashuays are made of a non magnetic metal alloy

AcoustiC mines lire swepl by streamlflg a sub· merged nOlsemakmg "hammerbox" alongSide the vessel The deVice projects the magnlhed sound 01 a ship's engmes well ahead of the sweeper Moored, magnetIC. an<! !"COUStlC sweeps can be made simultaneously by the same ship

Helicopters can carry and Slream Ihel! own moored and acOUStIC gear, allhough \hey reQulle an amphibIOUS support shiP to carry and IIg the magnetIC tall. They also lack a powtlrful eleel/o­generaltng capacity. and thuS can sweep only the mOSI unsophlsucaled magnetic mInes, such as those lhal were dropped al Haiphong

No surefire way has been found to sweep lhe pressure mine, and there have beEtn preciOUS few ways to escape It One way IS to steam al low speed (4 knols or lessl. assuming one knows It'S Ihereand isn'l 10 a hurry ObViously-, those precon· dltlons aren't always gOlflg to apply. Hence, II ma­Jor change In doctflne - tomlnehuntmg - Isevol· Vlng, With the BIIIISh, French. and Wesl Germans 10 the van. The doctnne Involves locating lind identifYing mines WIth underwater TV and im· proved sonar and then aVOIding the field where pOSSible or destrOYing the mines by remo te. controlled, unmanned sweepers or by underwater charges placed by divers or small drone subs

Howev8l, none of Ihe new hun ling syslems appear to be foolproof agamSt pressure mmes, which can be laid at depthS beyond which divers and remo te-controlled subs can operate More over. although new woes of BritIsh and French sonal ale highly accurate. they can be hobbled when mines are laid on muddy- 01 sandy- bottoms whICh CoiIn quickly hide the mine from detecuon About hall the North Sea and 65~ of the BaltIC have such chalact8llstlcs

If the Ben Rings. Given the current awareness of West8ln and Eastem blocs as 10 lheadvantages of mine warfare, large-scale mlfllng of both SIdes' ports. Choke points, and sob uansn-Ianescould be expected In lhe evenl of a maJOf war But, because of Ihe current MCM unpreparedness 01 the US and the Wesl's greater reliance on lhe sea, the SOViet bloc probably could achl8Ve a greater strategIc advantage at the OUlset ThiS could be deciSive

To be sure. the West could probably stifle the SOVtet submallne effort by mmlflg sub tranSlI­routes m the Not'W{lglan S\l8llS, the BaltIC. the Black Sea, the Bellng Sea. the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Sea o f Japan. But the SOVI815 are capable of mmmg key- areas along both US seacoaslS, the sea approaches to Japan and Weslern Europs, and the StraIts of Gibraltar Such an ellort could cllpple US re inforcement 01 any- threatened over-

DATA FILE 004

seas area and transform a land war 10 Westem Europe Into II relatively qUICk SOVIBI vlClory­Should MIddle Eastern harboi"S used by SOpef tankers be mined. the US OIJ supply would be gravely threatened allIS source

01'lB Man'" Mine Family. Of the four members of the US prOfBCted fam.1y of mmes. only the Cap· tor IS In servICe The submarme-iaonched mobole rmne (SlMMII5 beIng lested. whIle lhe olhef!WO mines are tn the developmental stage FoIlowtng are details of the four

CAPTOR. or enc8psulated rolpedo, IS an adaptation of the Navy's Mark 46 antJsub hormng torpedo WelQhlng 570 pounds. II IS filled wnh an acOUStIC Utggellng device that can recognize the somc Slgnatu,e of an eoomy sub It can be planted by ancrait 10 deplhs of 2500 feet. Once aCllvated the torpedo seeks OU\ IlS target and Iscapableol at least one ,e-at tack 10 case 01 a mIss. About 1200 have been produced However, despite a cutoff deVIce whICh supposedly- preventS the Captor Irom atlac~mg vessels on or near the surface. thele IS eVidence that Ihe weapon has had trouble dlfleren\taung belween an enemy sub and a sur­face vessel, which could be unfortunate for r"end­Iy ships passmg above. It!s designed to deactIvate Itself Sl. months alter being planted

PRAM, or propelled aSCenl mtne, when put In service, IS de5igned 10 aaack both subs and sur­lace craft from depths of up to 500 leel The mIne, weighing about 2000 pounds, would be propelled StraIght upward by a rocket Apparently- 11 would have magnetIC, aCOUSl1C andlor pressure 1I1QgB1

mgdev+ees OUICKSTRIKE IS a shallow-wal&!, \)OlIom

mine 10 be adaPled from the Mark-8l senes of 8Bf­

lSI bombs, whICh lange In weight from 250 to 2(XXJ pounds It IS designed to be tnggered by either subs or surface shIps

SLMM, IstheNavy'sobsolescent Ma!k37an· tlsub torpedo converted to an Intluence mille The weapon, wtth tiS 3l:)·pound explosive payload, can be launched flom a sub's tOfPedo tubes 10 Ihe general duectlOn o f a shallow·watel ship passage There II woutd 511 untli actIValed by a paSIMg sub or ShiP, whereupon It would home In on Its target

Oick Rustin

MINE COUNTERMEASURE VESSELS OF PRIN CIPAL NAVIES

"""" MH Msti Mst WESltItN NAVIES:

UU a .11 ~ ". U .• n., D ..... 13·15 • • •. """"" 12. B ,

" ,. "." " 111

EASmIN NAVIS::

U ..... 1 ,,~ tl I5 - I 12 " ''''' ,

"" ". KEY:

MSB

11

• D

• ~

11

"' M H .. M inehunters laM typeS); MSO -M inesweepers (ocean-going); MSC M llWISWBBpefS (coasta l); MSB • Minesweepers (inshore!. StrengthS include bol h &cl ive and reservel vessels. Figure IIhe, .. +" indicates ships building or planned. Sou'c~: Combst fleets of the WOfld, Annapolis: N~val Inst itute Press, 1976. "Olher" Western navies: Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Oenmarit., Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Italy, Australia. Japan. " Other" EaSlern navies: East Germany-, Poland,

--------------

ROMMEL IN NORMANDY

Friedrich Ruge

In the months beroTe the Invasion, Admiral Ruge assisted Fil'ld Mar­shal Rommel on his lours of the French coast. and sen'ed as his friend and confidant. Through Ruge's eyes. Rommel is seen as a dignified, courageous man ; a man to be respected for his personal qualIties as well as his military exploils.

288 p .... s.lUust.awd 6" 11 9"

S'2.9!)clmh

PANZER ARMY AFRICA

James Lucas

Here, for the first time in the En· glish language, is the desert war from the German Viewpoint. The author has made exte nsive use of material from original Gemlan sources and interviews with many men who took part in the campaign,

211 P".~" Ilh .. tr.t~d 6" 11 9"

ORDER FORM

S 12.00 cloth

o ROMMI::!. IN NORMAND\'

o SUMMONS OF THE TRUMPET

o PANZER ARMY A~' RICA

o IIITU: R'S GENERALS

o MOUNTING THE TIIREAT

THE SUMMONS OF

THE TRUMPET: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective

Dave Richard Palmer

", .. no publication that I havl' r{'ad more accurately addresses the corn· plex and controversial issues in· volved in our most visible but least understood war."

William C. Westmoreland General, U.S. Army, Retin'd

from the adviSOry stage to with· drawal, hl-'rI' is thl-' complete story of our military involvement in Viet· nam - why we entered. what we did , and how we left. If there an' to be no more Vil!tnams' we need to un· derstand and apply th .. lessons of Summons of the Trumpe/ .

SI2 .9~ d"lh

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[II Sf:ND TITU:S c la: c "",: o TO:

MOUNTING THE THREAT: The Battle of

Bourguebus Ridge

John J. T. Sweet

"One of the better additions to World War II literature .. . this very readable book deserves a place in every reference library and on the family bookshelf. "

Ed~ar O'Baliance

Sweet provides an Incisive analysis of the controversy su rrounding GI-'nerat Montgomery and Operation Goodwood - lhe breakout from Normandy following D·day.

142 P~K~'. ,UuJlrll~d

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HITLER'S GENERALS

Richard Brett·Smi/h

" .. recommended highly to both the genl-'rnl reader and the enthusiast."

Soldier

An intimate look at 82 of Hitler's gent'rals. re\'ealing them as soldiers lirst and Nazis second. and always among the greatest soldil-'rs in history.

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39

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a __ -In 1 II , 41 .- • "" 11 U I U 1 " D. fI9II '" W. I " • 11 " 11. - ..... II au n_ '" w. • " • .. 51 a_ ., .. I L5 15 " U 111...-, ... '" I 11 • " -_ ... ., "" 5 " • " L5 .. - ., , .. , 1I • U U " ... - • "" " U I • • •

KEY TO ABBREV1 ... TlOtlS: 4H _ Il_ H.; Bl . a.ItIIOIino; 6 51, e ... , IS AM ISPI 5 51. OAGC lS1'1 5 51. y.., 01 ,n. RallSI'I CGC _ Com'Ict U- Co.; EG _ beolitn a.n-; FBI_~ 551, Fo,bo, & P,,"nlom IS PI5.~I. WI\( . ' SM IAH 5 51 . F,.,..,o-

SPI BESTSELLER LIST Jan/ Feb '18 Buff..,; GOW _ 0..- o.oIgMtI WO<Ic-'-; IG _ ~ a.n-; Pru .... n W", ISI'15 . ~I; l"""io;II51'1 5.51; lI ,fIIt & SMl<tI (51'1 5.51. MGC _ ~ ~ SPI . SIrnuIMionI 1'_, Ma'", 151'1 5,51. W",*_ ~ 151'1 551. Helm! Dee!> The fist shows the top ten SPI games in terms of lne.; TC _ Tho c-...; TSM _ TKtIeoI 5 ...... Au .... AUOI'L IF &F 5.51. I'uno<: W.n ISI'I 5 41; WoII"";;' ISI'I 5. 41. O·Day IAH R.IirIjr . ,,,,, __ "_~."' '''r-dioIN __ 5 4). L ... MOYeS r-IOIthlSI'15 41. SSN IGOW5 41 . 1,1""' ........... 151'1 unit sales over the previous four month reporting oI ___ ~IN_withlnthe"'I"_, 5 41.~ 17!i9IGTG5 41. N..cIBarDM'ru<:IIonIFB5 41. Coomoc period (calculated a s a moving average). COIYtP'-~ &fing" the ... tIv. """""".;,yol IN_on. ocMoI Eneoo nter (EI' 5,41. Sw LOI" IFe 641; Oil War 151'1 53). altl'· 1 (.....,....)10 9. 1)0,,,.... (51'1 5 31; DOgln" 01 WW tllAH 5.31. Bul Aun 151'1 5 31; Prell. Times

TheYlMl MGC 5,31. SOIJIIIAI'oeoISI'15 U. "",","I '" theEasllSPI Rank Tirle Rank on Lis! LOWER RATED GAMES 5 II. EI Alameon 151'15.11. c..r.dion CM!w., 151'15.11. 0 .... 151'1

491, Ge'lV$IJu,.. (AH 4]f; F .. 01 AomelSI'14 51; Los' Bo,u..ISI'I 1. Middle Earth 4 T""~ ISP1591. 9.,110 01 tile lIu~ IAH 5.91. ~---"ISI'I 5.91, 4 51, Combo""" Ar"." ISPI 441; Tac' ics II IAH 441. ScrIlrl<MQl Moscow Carncaogn ISI'I 5 91; S" .'egV 1151'15 91. 1918151'15.91 , ISPI3.61.~r~IAH35) 2. Obiective: Moscow N_ A"";"'" R ........ bOn ISI'I 5.91, ~ ISP I 5,91. Solomons

GAMES PLAYED BY LESS THAN FIVE PERCENT 3. Drive on Stalingrad 2 ~ lSI" 5.91. 8. 1110 101 Mo<Iway IGOW 591. Cor .. s... 3 IGOWS 91. 0b,0c1Mt A!Ion1ll1Bl5.91; S"'9lIF&F5.91, N.poIw>n Scl>utz,ruppe IJB 6,31. I'~ IGOwa 21; U,tIo Big HOIn ITSR

4. StarForce 3 22 .,W.,1tIoo 131'15,8). MoIw..,.IAH 5 BI. Red SW/Whll<t S! .. IS~I 611; SUpof hnl; I ISAT 5.91 . Thol EM, f ,on,ITCB 591. Thol 5.61. Wattllloa IAH5.al. ~_ISpI5.81. 0~r""'.ISI'15.8); Lev'e AlriconC.omp 12nd EdllTSR 5.BI. M ......... IGOW5,91. lOO15AO 5. Descent on Crete N,w 1 ISPI 5 81. TUrNng PoonllSPI 5 BI. II ... ~OIJ! & Pur.,,! (SPI 5 al. nSf! 5.81 . Napoleon (GZ 5 8) , o..cinro & F .. (WG 5,81. BIttle of I!~ 151'15.8); IIjjUJ:r'"'ll M<>duiloISPI5 81 . Co<IO No",. Sec- f .... A ........ ILOR 571. FtUlll ., In. S~_ IlSI! 571; 80ltle of 6. Up Scope! 4 3 101 IPe 5.81, SPlI"'" ISI'I 581. 1812 151'1 5.BI. C-,'I Legjono Sari',*, lOG 5.71. [agio OIV IHG 571. Godslinl IMGC 581, IAH 5 81. Alion Spoa ILZ 5 81. Bu""," IGOW 5.81. ChItco mow CUOIe<'.lMt SI...-.;I 18L 5.61. E~ lEG 5,61, Turow. 1943 lEG 7. T o the Green Fields 5.81. S-ct. & o."ovISPl5.81. e.r'tleofR~ IGOWS 91; Y.1u 5 61; Troy ITC 5.51; Sf8\lO 01 POI' Anh", ISf 5.51 ; B.o,,* 01 T obru~

Bevond N,w IBL 5 at. a-.!ion 0Iy"""" ISPI 5 11. 8~UJ:ri<P; IAH 5.71. lull· IBG 5,51. A!Ionlll IGG 5 ,41. 0I1lOO AD IHO 5,21. Arlt Tr"",* lAW wolle IAH 5.71; WotId Witi' III ISPI 5 1); A"*"",,, CNii w .. 151'1 511; CreutIEG5.11. E"OIishCMIWarIlG5 .11. FOI~'IIIAW B. Air War 5 5 571. K_'Pllntflf ISI'15.n. 18!2"(51'151); A~_ 'he Grea' 5 II; Stalk·l Ic·e 511; v __ DMlIlICtio!I lEG 5.11; A,IIIn ... IAH 5.11. ~ ICGC 5 71. Alrrkl K_ IAH 5 61. S~'" lEG 5 ,01. fly"'lj T'II"'S ILZ 5,01. ChlcI".m.'gI IF8 5,01, M,'" IAH 5.81; Hili''''''' FOIM' ISI'I 561; Gr_ ISI'I 5.61, Super Cr .... lAW 4. 91 . A_, oIln. r-IOIm ITG 4 91 , RomtnoII IlS 4.at.

9. R&d Sun Rising 10 2 cllargot 151'1 561; Gettysburg 77 IAH 561; CI,.n<:eIIorwiIIo IAH Bu~ & Burr"""" IfGU 4 71. \/",. IF8 4. 41. 71~ Ca.aIty IAIW 10. Crimean War Quad N,w 5.61 . E""""OI ot Chino lOG 561. 11'''00 01 IImam ILZ 5.61; 4.21. IIhfonbu'll IAW ' .01; W,r of Sta, S"""", lAW J 91. I'llion LonU,,,,,,, ITSR 5 61. V",dun ICGC 5 61. 1'101 to A-';""", 151'1 IIIGll71

42

Feedback Questions S&T nr. 88, pubilihed M • ., / Jun 1978

How /0 use rile FfttldbBck Re&pOfIStI CIJrd: Alter you've finlSJled reading 1M issue of S&T, please read !he Feed­back QlJesbons below, and 9've us vour BfISW8(S bV wnt· ing the aoswer'f1umbefs 0f1 the card in the response boxes whICh COflespond 10 each Queslloo number See cef1!erlold for card. Ple8se be sure to allSWel' 1111 questIons Ibu! 00 not wms anythIng ,n the 00. fOf question-num­bers labeled "no Question"l Incompletely lillad-out cards canno! be prOOttSSed.

WhIll rfle nurrlblNs mtMfI: WIlOO IrlSWfInng QU8S!fOns, "(1' always mfIlIns NO OPINION Of NOT APPLICABLE When!he Question is 8 "yes or 00" QUesuon, "I" mea,,! YES and "2" means NO When the questIon IS 8 1!llIng QlJ95lion, "I" 1$ the WORST la /mg. "9" IS the BEST r8-tlng, "5" is an AVERAGE 181m9, and 1111 numbefs In be­twe&n &xprass various shades 01 aPPlo~al or disapproval.

1.3. No Question

The folowing q~DoIV NIt you to nile' rheflrricie! in this iuutl ona suM of ' (IJ(KN) rhrou9h 9 (flJI~ntl: 0 • no opin;on.

•. Kh/I,kov !{lBmal

5. NOQuesl1Ofl

6. Kharkov lefllclel

T. Agir.cour1 t . Oulgo;ng M8il

9. For Your Eyes Only ... Briefings ... Data FiJe: Mine W~da.e

U. No question ... No Question ... This issue o"ll'ell

15. Was this ISWe better than thelastonel

16. Assume that you doIl't subscribe to S&T Would the quality 01 th" issuealone mot,llate you to SUbscribe?

11. For haw IT\oIIny Issues ha"ll you had ~ COntinuous sub­scription to $&17 0 _ I don't subSCfibe. I _ ThiS 1$ my firs t Issue; 2 _ ThiS hi my secol'>d or third issue: 3 .. This "my fourth or !.hh issua. 4 _ This is my Sixth issue. 5 -This 15 my seventh ISSUe; 6 - Thl$ IS my eoghth through twelfth Issue: 7 - Th" is mV thirteen th through 81gh· toonih !$SUa: 8 _ ThtS tS mv nmaleenlh or subseQuen t issue: 9 _ I am a LifellfnB Sub.saiber to S& r !regardless of numbef of ISSues r9Cl!!ll9d1

II. Dod you seod In lhe feedback card for you, last lossue ofs&r?

19. You. ag&: 1_ 13 years old or voungar; 2 .. 14-17: 3 _ IB·21. 4 _ 22-27. 5_28-35: 6 .. 36orolder

10. Yourse~ l_MaJe.2 _ Famale

11 . EdU<;auon: 1 _ 11 VIIiI'S or less. 2 _ 12 vears: 3 _ 13·15 I'tllIrs. 4 _ 1;).-15 vears al'>d stili in 5C~: 5 _ 16 vears: 6_17vearsormore

11. Haw long ha"'" YOU boon plavlng conflict 51mulalion gameslO - 1ess !han II vea.; 1 - I year: 2 - 2year5 8- 8 year!l. 9 _ 90r moreyear5

U . What is the a\l8fage number of hours you spend plaV­ing S'mulaTlOn games ea<:h mon lhlO _ m,lM; 1 _ 1 hour or less: 2 - 2·5 hour,; 3 _ 6-9 hours; 4 _ 10-15 hour!l; 5 - 16-20 I\o<Jrs: 6 _ 21 ·25; 7 _26-D. 8 _ 31-40. g .. 4Q Ot more hours

2-4. How IT\oIInv SImulation games lof all publishefsl do YOU pOSSeSSl 1_110; 2 .. 11·20: 3 _ 21 ·3): 4 _31·«>. 5_ 41 ·00; 6_ 51-00: 7 _61_70. 6_ 71-00: 9_81 or mora .

lS. Whal level 01 comPJexily do you prafer In gamasl Rale your pmfereoce on a 1·9 seaJe. with hogher numbers indrcatlng incl"/:lilsed Compla~lty Use the follawing gamas as gUIdelines. 1_ SrrikeForce. 4·5 .. Cfllck!lmeuflll. 7 _ Perroll; 9 _ Ai, We'

26. Pick lhe onearoo abou l whrch you would mas! liku to see games and anJCle$ done' l _ Anclam (Rome. G.ae\<. Biblic!ll. XOO BC - 6CKlAOI. 2 .. 0ar~ Agus and Ranals, SBI1C8 16CKl AD - 10Cl'J AOI; 3 _D Vears War and pI'&o Napoleonic 116CKl AO-17'90I: 4 - NapOloonrc (1790 -

lB:J:ll : 5 - Civil War/19th Cunlury (1m - 1!D)1. 6 - World Wa, I (1!D) - 19:1)1. 7 .. World Wat 11119:1)-194!i1: a _ modern 094!i-preserlll. 9~fantilsy and SClel1C8 Ficllon

11. OveI'ali. whrch of the follawlng leatur85 in the past faw ISsues 01 S&Tare most in ~ of chang.e Ito maku thi:lm bell&r through changes;n qua lity. Quan~ty. lormal , Btcl . D_don't change anything. I _ the game. 2 - 100 lead arliCle fon lhe samesubjocl6S lhe gamel. 3 _ lhe se­cond malOl arlrcJe: 4 _0u lgoing Mall; 5_Briefings. 6 _ For Your Eyes Only. 7_Gamas Rating Cha,t. a_ Foodbad; 9 _ somu other aspect of lhe magazine lhal bugsvou. 11. Appeanng in th" !$Sue 01 S&TlSa Dam·File. In lorlh­coming !$Sues o f ShT. wu inlend to run _al DaIJJ­Files on a vatlety of toplCSasa tegular fOOlUru. On a 1 t09 seaJe. ra tu the concept of the DataFile as a concenuatud and (f"IOpufullyllucld examination of topics 100 limllud 10 warrant full-size articles 19. If a month has passed sll1C8 you lasl orderud som&­

Ihlng from SPI, please answer the following quesllon about theservrce 1 .. 1 orderedagamelsl and recaill<ld my order complele w, th,n throo weu\(s 01 send'ng ,t in: 2_1 ordered a gamu and rllOOlll6d my order compielU W1lhin Ih,oo wueks 01 sending il in . bul with a game parllsl miss­ing from one 01 the games; 3-1 orde,ed a game al'>d ,/:IO&iVed my ord&r wi thin Ihtoo weeO:s, but one of the games was the wrong gamu: 4.1 didn' t rllC8ll18 my order Within thrlMlweu\(s. but didrocuiVf! an OUI of , tock notic/:l. 5 _1 ordered a pr&opublic!ltlon sale game and didn' l ex· pect 10 soo il lor a whiJe: 6 - Ol/ll'f Thf98 W1leks MII8 pass· ed. al'>d I have Slill rocerVlld no game or notification; 7 _ MV last order was for a subsc.iption. a. My last order was for a non·subscnp tlOll. non·game Item and was handll:ld all right; 9 _ My last ord&r wes for a non­subscriplion. non·game ilum and I consider SE!f\lICfJ 10 hall8 bI:Ien unjuslJfiably slaw 0/ otherw!se unsatl!lfact~

The following refer. only to non·S& T SPI ga .... publish­ed In the last 12 months fllal 'r'OU haIIe played .

30. Old you na"ll any p'oblems wllh lhi:Ise games' .ulesl O_Oid not play uny non-S&T SPf games in the l81ill2 months; 1_ No problems wi lh gamas p~yad. 2 .. A faw problems. but not unough to pr_nt my plaYing Ihe game, al'>d I was abJe to handle thi:lm myseil; 3_A few p.oblems. wtOIU 10 SPI fot a clanficallon and tecewad 8

teplv Within a month: 4 ... A lew problems. wrole 10 SPI for a clarilicallon and roceived a reply O\l8f a month laler; 5 - A lew probl&ms. wtote 10 SPI for a clarrfication but f\8\I8I' recetll8d an answer; 6 _ Had ser,ous probJems With the 'u~ that plUllenled play. wroleto SPI forclarrlocallon and reoeill1!d reply Within a month; 7_ HIId seriOUS pro· blems With the rules that prlt\lentud play, wrOle 10 SPI for clanfrcat lon and received reply more lhan a mon lh let&r: B_ Had se,ious pfoblems With the rules that p,_nled play. wrotu to SPllor clarr lrcalJon but OIM!I' recetlled a reply ~ 9 _ Had pr'oblams Wllh the tules and called SPI for cianlrcallon

31 . Ouesllon n. 93 or The S&Tre Feedback p,opooud the producuon of lhe game C8w GtIId 111 mighl be ad· vlsabJe to ,el .... 10 thu lu,t o r Ihat quesllon. reptrnted In "Bog Tsommis' In OGM Ihls Issue). and the respor>5e In· drcatlld lnal 1111le game was dOM. many peopJe would buy il. Ofl/:lof theedllorS. hOWf!ll8l". 100~ lhePOSltlon that lhe Ptoposed game wes a base appeal to faSCist fantaslZ' Ing al'>des 5uchconSlllwed a glorilica\lon of fhe Nazi,. Ha SlfongJvslated Iha l he did nOI WISh SPI todo lhegameon mo.al grounds. The other edltor51a lthough nol 8\lrOOlng With hIS objUClions to thu gamel agreed flOl 10 do lhe game. WO'd like to haIIi! your r68C\lon 10 thiscourse olae· lion 1 _ I approve of the editor la~ I ng a stand against "Case Geld" on mor~ grounds (even though I don't r>fIC:fISMritv agree Wl1h hiS objuctlonsl; 2_1 disapprove of the ed,lor I18lorng "Case Geld" (8IItKI though I moghl or mIght not parwnalJv agrue Wllh hiS moral reserval>onsl

32. Alter ra·roodlnglho Cass Geld p'Qp<ISlII . ,nd icate lhe OM response you most agree WIth. 1 _I feel tMI the premise 01 the game dlSlorts hlSI~ 10 lhe poinT wlleru II conS1I1Ules fanlBSy. ralher Ihan a reasonable hlStorrcel alt8l'nal .... u; 2_1 foo( tllat tho ptemlSe is farfetched: 3 . 1 consider The premisu 10 be a legitimate hiStorical aile<· nallvu. 4 _ I feellhe premISe 10 be a IlkefV hlst04'ical alter· natl"'"

ll . I considar 911'me5 such as CMS Geld. Objeclive: Moscow, /nvasiofl: AmeriaJ. and Dilliu 10 be scrence fic­tion/fantasy. and to ha"ll lillie or no legitimacy from a serious hlSlorrcal pp< nI of 'iH1W. l _ sltongly 8IIrOO; 2 - 8IIroo; 3 _ disagroo: 4 _ st ronglV dlsagroo, 5 ", olhar (pluese comment!.

oM. SP\ should not publish such lilies es Case Geld. Ob­jeclive: Moscow. /n~asion ." Amenee. and Dillie l _ slfongly IIQtoo; 2 _ agree: 3 _ d,sagree. 4 .suongly d'sagree. 5 _ 1 BgI"8tI. but C(lS8 Geld IS a $PeCII'I1 casu. and ought 10 be published. 6 - 1 di$llgme. bul CaS(! Geld is a special case and oughl fIOl to be publ,shed

Please tate the followirlg gam. 0f1 a , to 9 8Cll1e with "I" indic!lting a pe,rtlcularfy .Irang d'-lik' lo< I gBn1fIand ''9'' an eBfl8CIally favorable opinion. PIaese ,ete only those ga .... which 'r'OU have played tagainsl an opponent or soIitai.el al IaBsl once in the laS! llix months. If YOU have not played !he game In the last st. monlhl. do not rate it (please respond "0" in the space!. AU gamBI lilted are S PI-publisiled ga ..... unless oThBlWiae apeclfi8d.

35. Ba,1eY ICGC)

36. Mach War n 31. C'tadelIGOWI

31. Oclob&r Waf

39. Chir.ase Farm

40. Sinai

41. MukdEtn

41 . Woehl am Rhern

43 . War in the West

44 . War In lhe east (2nd edi tionl

45 . DNOIUnantsch,eOen (GDW)

46. Narvlk IGOWI

41 . Wooden Sh,ps & Iron Men IAHI

41. Chodcamauga

ff. Napoleon al War Quad

SO. Cflmea (GOW)

SI. Wag.am

51. Bluu & Gray Qued I

53. Marungo

54. Antl!llam

55. Sallie of Nalions

56. Shiloh

51. Fngate

51. Jena·Auerstadt

59 . Shenandoah (BLI

60. Road to Richmol'>d ... COflStant inopJe ... Stonewall .,. Desc/:ln t on Ctelu ... Ob)I:ICtl"'" Moscow

". Cnmean War Ouad ... ,,~ ". Balakla~a ... Inkerman ... Tcharnava R,I/Il'f

". Aif Assaull on CrU!l:l (AH)

The "GrBltt Banies of HiltOf'(' _ieI has bMn ptopOMd in _al issue.. and the resullll have been go<>d, buT not g'At. Thil reception has forced uS to r&-8IIIIluatu the pric. ing lUuctUte in otder 10 proc-' wiTh the .. ries. We heve also d!K:ided 10 be more eI3borala. wl>ere tile game per. mits. In the uM 01 lour colo, maps. count ..... etc. As mentioned pl'evious.iy. !he gernes would oon1lMn an ""Tun, .... S& T type article covering the banle, the Ieeder.. the I,miel, lhe tactics. tile Irt of wariate at that time. plus a module describing the course of the blinle In game terms. Indillldually the gerr. would sell 10< $14.00: thtough subscriptionllhey would $811 101' $59.95 per $8T 01 ..... SUbscriptions would be hal'>dled in Ihroo paymenlll.

71 . Would you b/:I Interested in the "G r6B1 Butties of History"? 1 "' Would defrnrtely SUbscr ib/:l to the first sel16 games) of the _085. 2 _ Would dellniTaly subscr,be 10 mom lhan one set of thu semes: 3 ... Would possibly subscllb/:l to thu series. 4 . NOI inleresled in SUbscrlbong. bul would definrteiV buy s.ell!(:tlld ti tles. 5 - NOI Interesled In subscflbon9. but would possiblv buy selected lliles. 6 a Not Sur8 I'8t (would h~a 10 see the 11151 gamel. 7 _ D<lfrnlteiy nOI onteresled BIther way in lhe SIl'1IIS

Please rate the following game proposaia on a IClIe of 1 to 9 with " 1" indicatingll8lY If11lIIlndination to buy the geme if pu blished. up Through "9" . il'>di(:3I'ng a definilR int&n' lion to purchase it.

71 . The Sea Dogs: A Gan"l/:l of ShIP' to-ship combat on the Age of hplotatlon DepICting sniPS hom fN8f'I sea-fa"ng nallon of the day. The S6B Dogs would p,OI/iOOscenllrIOS

ranging from the BatHe 01 lepanto 10 pllvate&r du~s. Irom the Anglo-Dutch Wars 10 Veneta. Tur~ish sea bal-11$5 Wi th 4(X) cO<.Jn ters and ~ geomorphIC map. TSO would prOVide 8 delailed , in depth study 01 a subject rI!MIf prev,ously covered on a warg&me

Given the auccesa and ramarkable acceptability 01 TlNTibie Swift Sword - andltsyounger"~", S1On-'l­we are inte<ested In _ng if SPI galTllll'S would likato_ aoothe< CMI War Baltle _ P'8fh8~ a seriea 01 bani"" covering all lheImponanl lIfl989IIIll8Ou 01 the war - at lhelevallncorpofaled in lhe two games abo ..... Size 01 the ga ...... would depend on lhe battle, bul mool would t.a"" 3-4 gam&-rna~ tsome would hava ooly twol, and prices would renge lrom .15 10 .25, depeoding 00 Ihe simula­tion. PleaSfl ans_ lhe following qU8llions:

73. Would you like to see more games on the CIVil War uSing the TSS/STonewal1 SYSHlml

'4. What S4ze game would YOU prefer? 1 Kooe game­map. 2- 2 game-maps, 3- 3-4 game·maps; 4 _ don't care. as loog as the SObjectlS a08Qualely COV!Ifed

Rale!he 100Iowing beltlet:

75 . Ch;ckamauga

76. Shiloh

77. FilSt Bul l Run

1'. Second Bull Run

79. ChanoellOfSvil1e

110. Anu!'I1am

11. In 1864 Sne.man· , VICIOfI!lS around Atlanta ITIIIde POSsJble h" famous "March 10 the Sea." As Sherman ad­vanced on Atlanla the Conledefl'lle armies under Johnston (later Hoodl made sharp loca l coun ter'aua<;h in an e l!Oftto deleat Sherman's army in deta,1 Ballles for A,I/Infll depo<;tS the Confederate altempl to Stop Sher­man A senes of games would cover the Bailie lor K9f1 -nesaw Mountain V June 1864, Bailie of P8I!tChtroo Creel< 20July 1864. Battie Ie< Atlama 22 July 1984. and The Ba t­t'" of Ezra ChUfch 28July 1864 Ba(11as for Atlllnrllw,1I use tile TSSIStor>flVt'al1 system. and wil l be saki arther lIS a SuperOuad or It!I separate g.a.rnes . The SuperOuad will havalink rules for the four bal!les Bllllles forAlilInfll will sell lor $23

12. Nev vs. Wellington MeelJng allh6 Crossr01JdS. The B9tt'" of Oualre Bras. The F'8I'ICh II corps and Cavalry CorpS lace one lone Dutch Belg.an DIVISIon wa<tmg fOf Bliush Aeinlo<oemontS 10 IIrrivg Cavalry charge and counter-charge take and r"UI~e the vttal oossroadS leadtng to Waterloo A man&ge8ble Grand Tact'C!lI1)8me usins II mod,lied W~linglon's Victory System. One map 400 counters . $10.

Il. Ebb Tide; Allied Invasions of Tums;' and Sicily; The Germafl!l. hugely tied down In Russ'll, wureclearly on the sllateglC del9flSl\'8 in the Med. but the sltualIOO had not '(fI1 deteriofated to the pornt wherechoocewllS so limlled The Tunisoan game will COV&!' 8 C!lmpBlgn In wh,ch the Germans struggled 10 rel8ln a loothold In AIrica. Special I\lllls wllll8ke into IICCOUnl Allied 8" superiority and con­trol ollhe SIIII . The Qllme on the Invasion 01 SICily will In ­dude thOSllIlSPOCIS. IISwell SPIIC'III prO\f1srons IOf linking the two games will allow fOf the e><ammanon of SU<,;h pro­'IOC!It ..... mil itary Questions as what il the Germans had abandoned Tunis to the All .. and fa lkln beck to deland SlClly&(lequalely; or what il the Aile had merelyconl8ln ­ed the Isolated AKIS troops in Africa and oPted for an ,m­mediate mo\I9 on Srcilv1 A $15 TWIn-Pack game. 811ltiIJ for Fra~; From Norml/ndy ro riHI WestwaN_ A lour mapgIImecovering u.. AHied Invasion 01 France_ the ... blequant raot!l acroa Frence and Belgium. and lhe breaching of !he W8I\WaH. Two separl'tB double map ga ...... would be inclllded _ ThtllnvllSion of Europe 1944 covering the Allied Invasion options from Normandy 10 Holland; and Sm.shing IhtI WIISrwaf' covering the Allied advan<:e to and breaching 01 the W_II defending Ger­many. BOlh gil ...... would be available separl'leIy 81 well at to{llllher in the lour map Birtle for FrlnCfl, covering the entiftl ClImpeign Irom June 1944 to MI~h 1946 In weakly w .... , The Alii«! n.eed not Invade In Normandy, and units InvoMld In the battle of the Bulge may be u.:! defensive­ly by the German 10 "rengthen the W_aH. 5 kilomrtt ... 10 the he>!, Ragimef1t-S rigade leva!, Umiled intelligence. AltpOWe' and P.,lIdr~. FuH Scale Amphibloul Opera­tiona. and ltatl of tile an WWII regimental game mechanics_

PIeTlle IlIte each MIPI''''' game package: .... BIlII/e for Fra~; From N()ml8i1dy ro rfIB Was/Wal/ would ir'ldude lour lull-S4led maps and 12(X1 COUnters.

""

85. Thelnvasron of Europe 1944 Two-map game lor $12

86_ Smeshmg lhe WfIS/W1l1i Two-map game lor $12

81. Orbnill. The war lor the control 01 earth 's upper at· mosphere Setiess than a genera tion in the future. Orbilltl will deal WIth banies between Sp/JC8 salellites of the United States. RUS$III and other na tions The objecwe is to control Ofbita l space lor lhe PUlpose of recon­naissance. weaTher control. destroying ICBM'S aOO, b8sic8l1y. control of the earth ilsell. A wide variety of sat~ l ltes will be used in the gama (50mIl ot which already e~,sll There w,11 be Batliestabons lsem,-automated space 518tions equ ipped w'th small", Auto1ighler satelhtes 101 clafanse and off9f1se as well as elactronic sealch and communications eQu ipment and olher weaponsl , Sen tonals !plepOSI\loned maneuverable satellites to be aclova ted when enemy samMes come Within rangel, and many other$ . Weapons w,1I 'nciucla homong missiles and charged partida beam and taSilf can­non. as well as conventional automatic 40mm cannon I,, · ing maneuverable P'Of!ICliles . In addilloo to destrOYing enemy satel lites and pu lli ng your own uP. each Side Will 1111empt to capture "nemy sa t~lites l!he bal1er to com­promIse therr lechnologyf Also InvoMKl WIll be earth snd moon bases. Players W111 start the game wllh preselected mlK of satellites and bases and. WIth hourly lor somewhat longerl turnS anemptto use superior orbital ta<;IICS and sllal9QY to Win A $12 gama with StrIlI9Q'C, \8Ctrcal . and soilt8lfe VllfS>ons .

sa_ OfilCUllI: An unusual game based on one of the most famous novels of 1111 time . US4ng a game-map coverong an a rBS 01 london, the DrllOJta player uses h,s mght turns 10 seek out victims and tum them in lO vamprres. returning during dav turns to one 01 the collons he has hidden In vallous locanons. The Van Helsing Pla)'8r seeks to find the coffins and/Of DrllOJla In an effort to hall the spread of the "disease 01 vamplnsm" A chaso game with elements of hidden movement and much use of random events and surPl'so. Fa'thfully based on the Bram Sto«er novel, using actual maps 01 the locatIons. One map. 100 counters. pta)'81 cards, boxed; $12

89. The Dragon MIIstfml. Based on Jack Vance's Hugo­winnIng story o f the same name. th,s ta<;ticlol representa­lion Of man and monster comba t on a planet many lighl· years removed hom Ealth would take In all !he major a:;pects 01 the BanOOck-Carcoio war The game would center on the conlllCt betwoon units made UP of such monsters liS Juggers. Fiends. and S tflders. Combet would be waged In extremelv rough ter,ain (for oxample. the mountainous Banbeck Vlllel, and malntaln'ng morale and army Ofganilat,on would be extremelv Important. The game would include 400 counters. extenSive play eids. and one or two maps and would sell lor $12 to 515

90_ The Dymg ElIrth. In an age fa' in the lutu,e. Earth's Sun 1$ slowly going out. Many 01 the people who love ,n

43

the Cltles choose to end tller r e",stenctl by wallOWing In Decadence. But II I!!W 01 the more resourcelul men and women will live OU I therr liVes as fullV as pOSSIble To thIS 9f1d. they bend the natural lOfC8S 10 therr ends. CIealing magIcs thai have long S4noB been thoughtlOfgollan To aid on thIS renaossanoB of the arts ITII'Igrcal. bold adven­turers seek to go to IOSI c,ues and alternate realitlllS in search o f hidden sacrats But many dangers lurk in the tmests and l1,nterlandsol this WOfJd Thtl OVing ElIrthw,1j use a system looselv ba5tl!l on the Swords lind Sorcery game-system. bu t will be slighlly less stra,ghdorwa.d, as many 01 the various lands Will be unknown to the PIII\'9f', charact~ It WIll incorporate all spell, memlO/led In Jack VDIlCO!'S SIOry of thesama name. plus a !!!Wadded twistS To sell for S15.

A great nUmbel 01 the "old" SPt ga ...... - aspeciaUy!he old iIIua ga ...... - hava been bypassed by the State 01 the An. HOW8IIeI, !he I-Ubjacts aftl ,6H good~ . .a WI are asking you ~o rll'" !he loIIowing "bjecllr, III previoul­Iy CO'o'8fed by old SPIISbT ga ...... 1111 to whelher you wouJd like to see a brand new trNtment of the topic, complete with fuK-size map and 200-400 countlll'l; all in the $9-tO range.

91. PlnltlrArmt/6Afn'kll. Using !til the Inlo<manon ~lean­ed I,om the CllfnP/Jign for North Africll. a tull map , bngade-Iave! coverag.a of the war In AI,ICiI, w'lh Simp'" rules for logIstics. the air war. and commanders . Com­ple .. ty range would be modera te

92. Kursk The claSSIC tank battle 01 the Russ'lln Cam­pa'gn. With a system based on PlInltNgruppt/ Gud6rilJn but advanced to take in the spec'lli usa 01 armor. as WIll i lIS 811 rules. Iog,stics lind command Plobktm1l

93. The FntllC(}-PruS$iIJn War Ona o f ~he lirs! modern wars (lB701 Ul!.rng a system completely d,lier9f11 from the ollglllal, )'81 rel8lning the flavor of un~nown strengths More emphasis on the operaHonal aspects 01 the war (supplv and ieadfl<shlpf than before. WIth soma pohtrcal ram,f,catlons thrown In

94 . FilII 01 Rome A lull-mao game on the tnals and tflbul8tions o f the Empore. uS4ng r8C9f1t studies on Roman poli tics lind m,litary stralegy , Actual legions in a<;lUal loca tions as well as actual Emperors. emp< re POlitICS and personal,ues. multi-player as w~1 as two -player

9S. War pf (he Workis. The dass;c H.G Wells no~ rendered as II "charftCter/advenlure" type game in which the plavers assume the rotes of vanous people In amain lit the lime o f the Martian ,nvaS4OO with the matn obJ8CtMi bemg escape and evasion unlll (as we an know) the Mar ­toans bile the dust due w earth ly Infto::llOO Played on a map evocat ..... ot tu rn 01 the century Sussex. using ""Ids and counter! to lepresent the PIa\'9fS lind an au toma tic semI-random MarMn movement system DesIgned as a game that call ba used to draw In non-wargartl8fs to the hobby of SllflOU5 gam<ng. $12 to $15

96. No Quest,on

Penn Con 78 June 23-25, 1978

Widener College MacMorland Center

Chester. Pennsylvania Tournaments • General Gaming · Exhibits • Auctions · Seminars

Movies • Miniatures • Boardgames • Fantasy • Science Fiction

The East Coast Con! Contact: Jay Hadley (SASE)

C/o Strategy and Fantasy World Valley Forge Shopping Center

King of Prussia. Pen nsylvan ia 19406

THE NEXT WAR Combat in Europe During the Late 1970s

• Detailed supply rules • Extensive air game • Emphasis on rear-area security

l/is March30 (Moscow) The SOYIEII Union yesterday

announced tha i Its annual SPflng Army m8neu~ in EilSI Germany would lake place March 31 through Apnl 10 American obser­vers have beef1 inVited by SOViet Defense Ministry offICials to wa tch the 8l(8rclSII under a provISion 01 the HelSinki Accords

ISonnl German olficl8ls here said there was "nOthIng new" in the latest round ol anll ­German propaganda Irom the Soviet press

lSchwBrnfur\ Army Bases Wookly Trumperl Advertisement: American Gr! welcome 81 the Cafe Casablanca Speclel show 81 mIdnight Saturday MarCh 31 starring Fraulein IIseZKllen. All you can drink for $5

)Pentagon Report, Summaryl SOViet depots have shown ill conSIderable ,ocr8SS81n ac\JV1ty ollete Many 50 ... 181 second line diVI­SIOns 818 on starld-by readiness. The conch.l­Slon 01 this rsport IS that this IS due to the up· coming SPring maneuvers

In rhe Kromlln: The Field MarShal. dressed in 8 Ireshly-pressed Ileid unilorm, stepped to the lectern and looked around 91 hiS slaff in the Defense Ministry con farence room "Comrades. this is ,I Today wo leave for lhe Urals. Let every man do hiS duty The Motherland expects much of us. The Ministry expects much 01 us They Will not be d.sap­POinted The roeXI Mav Day parade shall be held In Parlsr· He lurned and w.lhOUllooking back left IheconfllfOnce room

Sunday was Apnl Fools Day; II was also the hrsldayoftheNoJ/f Waf

The Next War IS SPl's new operatIOnal level game dealing With a hypotheucal conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the late 7O·s. The rules have been lavered, so that players can play the fasl game which keeps play Quick and clean. Then players may at then optIOn plug in the variOUS optional rules allOWing fOf a much more complex game

Combat. The combat system is new and Innovailve Combat IS a functJOO 01 move ment Units expend movement pOInts to por­form varIOUS types of IIssaults 1/ a combal unit IS successful In one attack, ,t can con­tinue to move and perform another attack nils allows fOf extremely mobile situa tIOns In addi tion. when a unl l ,s lorced to retr98l. a breakthrough marker is placed on the map to show Ihe Droach In tho enemy hnes. Friendly umts can explOit the breach and move in10 delicate roar areas destroying headQuaflers and SAM Sites

Flit/guo. Combat unllS can exceed then baSIC movement allowance by omplOYlng " FatlQue Movement.'· The more movement pOInts a unll moves In excess of Its baSIC movement allowance. the greater the chance of "fahgue," whICh Impairs the unit's ability to move and partiCIpate In combat

Cadro Ratings Each nationality has a Cadre Rating As units partiCipate In combat. they become bellor due to combat expenonce or worse due 10 OXceSSlve casualties The ralJngs are chan-geable \0 show dlffOfent OOSSlbtlltleS

Organic Sum. In add,llOn to the regular traclng·a·supply path rules, there oro optloool rules allOWing players 10 move away from their supply lines and explOi t breaches In the enemy lines. Unlls Iha1 move OUI 01 general supply expend fuel to move and ammuni tIOn 10 partiCipate in combat Organic supply is kept track of With markers IIml\mg the record k.eepmg Plavars can recreate deep penetra· tlons l(1tO the enemy rear areas, but" the fol· low-up UfIII,s do not penetrate, a unll can hnd Itsell Without fuel and ammunlt.on deep In hostile temtory

Detailed Air Game. Aif unl\S represent SpecIfIC types of allcraft wl\h raungs lakIng In­to accounl all supenOflly Ihlgh levell, inter­ception (low levell. and ground suppor t Each all Unit represents one squadron. All units I ,rsl fighl over the map uSing a unique air·IO· air system. Then, asa resul t 01 all-to·air com· bat, certain ground support air units Will penelrate to the bau lelield 10 perlorm tactical ground support. The land game also con tains a very detailed SAM Order o f Bailie. All UMS

that penetrate to the batt leheld must contend With the ground-to-8It fire that could abort lhe mlSSlOO or eliminate the planes. In addition, helICOpters are rated by type and function asa cross betwe811land and all Units

AI' Drops Both sKIes possess alfmoblle and allborne un.ts II a plaY81 can 981n alf supenorl tv In an air sec tor, he may be able to drop aorborne unllS onto the map If a player is careless with his rear area dispositIon. he may lind enemy paratroopers conl rolling a vl lal air IleldorClty

SpecllJl Forces. Both Sides command special forces or commando Units. Players plot mISSions whereby Sj')8(:1B1 fOfC9s umts try to knock out airfield and portS in an effOfI to harass the enemy If the mission IS mlS-lIfned or POOIIy planned. thespeclillforces units can be eliminated

Naval Game. The entlle BaltIC naval situallon 15 portrayed, Irom Baltyslt; It he malor RUSSian base In the BaltiC) to Denmark Rus­sian naval units al1empl to pass Ihrough one of the three narrow straits In an effort to OXlt the Baluc and commence raider operations The game also features ex tenSive minelaying and mmesweeping rules. The NeJ/t W"r comes With three maps, 2400 coun ters, 1 rules booklet and an artICle on the current SIlUltlOn m Europe.

Sovie t troops dillfnOunt from II B TR-IiOPB.

Available at Origins '78 Convention, 15 July 1978. Orders received on or before 16 July 1978 will be honored at $22. After 16 July 1978, the price of The Next Wsr will increase to reflect rising costs_