Sprey quarter century
description
Transcript of Sprey quarter century
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 1
Comparing a QuarterCentury of Fighters
F-100 to F-18
By Pierre M. Sprey
Sponsored bythe Strauss Military Reform Project
of theCenter for Defense Information
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 2
Outline Purpose The fighters to be compared Criteria for comparing fighters Fighter effectiveness estimates Combat and test results Some lessons learned Applying the lessons learned
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 3
Why review old fighters?
“Those who cannot rememberthe past are condemned torepeat it.” G. Santayana
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 4
Which fighters to compare?
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 5
Basis for comparing fighters
Compare combat results, whereavailable
Compare combat-derivedeffectiveness criteria
Use F-86 as the point of reference forall comparisons Combat is the ultimate (and the unkindest)
judge
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 6
Combat-derived effectivenesscriteria in priority order
1. See him first2. Outnumber him3. Outmaneuver ’em to fire4. Kill ’em quick
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 7
1 Criterion
Achieve surprisebounces withoutbeing surprised
Why? From WWI to
Vietnam, 65% to95% of all air-to-air losses wereshot downunaware
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 8
2 Criterion
Outnumber theenemy in the air
Why? 70 vastly superior
Me 262s wereground down by2,000 inferior P-47sand P-51s
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 9
3 Criterion
When surprisefails, out-maneuver theenemy to gainfiring position
Why? Always dominated
by pilot ability &training
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 10
4 Criterion
Achieve reliablekills during anysplit-secondopportunity
Why? The more aircraft
engaged, the morefleeting the firingopportunities &the moredangerous thefiring delays
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 11
Combat-derivedeffectiveness criteria: 1
Angle obscuredRearward visibility
ΔV CruiseSustained speedadvantage in combatarea
Achieve surprisebounces and without
getting bounced
• Presented area• Smoke or no smoke• Electronic emissionsor no emissions
Invisibility
MeasureNecessary
effectivenesscharacteristics
Desired Effect
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 12
Combat-derivedeffectiveness criteria: 2
Outnumber theenemy in the air Sorties per day per
procurement $
• Large force size (inaircraft and skilledpilots) withinavailable budget• High sortie rates
MeasureNecessary
effectivenesscharacteristics
Desired Effect
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 13
Combat-derivedeffectiveness criteria: 3
• Number of accelerations/decelerations available (atvarying H, V, and R)• For rough comparisons,use fuel fraction
• Adequate fuel tocomplete more combattasks (maneuvers) in equalor less time than enemy
Outlast the enemy while outmaneuvering him
• Time to roll 180º and backat max g• Time to pitch from 1g tomax g and back to 1g
• Quick Transients
• CLMAX X Area Weight
• Quick deceleration andhigh instantaneous g (orturn rate)
Outmaneuver enemy to:• Gain firing position• Deny/defeat his firing
• 1g PS (subsonic, transonic)• Quick acceleration orclimb
MeasureNecessary effectivenesscharacteristicsDesired Effect
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 14
Combat-derivedeffectiveness criteria: 4
• Weight/cost of enemy ECM• Penalty of enemy’stactical counters
• Minimum vulnerability tohardware ECM or tacticalcountermeasures
• time from opportunity tobreakaway
• Minimum time fromrecognition opportunity tobreaking away (to attacknew target or to avoidattack)
• Number of on-board kills• Adequate ammo formultiple engagementsObtain a reliable kill during
any split-second firingopportunity from 100 feetto max visual ID range
• Kills/trigger squeeze incombat
• High PK versus close-inmaneuvering targets
MeasureNecessary effectivenesscharacteristicsDesired Effect
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 15
What have the last 25 yearscontributed to effectiveness inair-to-air combat?
LethalityDogfight performanceForce sizeAchieving surprise bounces
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 16
Findings: Surprise
Since the F-86, our aircraft(except F-5 and F-16) havesignificantly decreased in abilityto achieve surprise bounces dueto increases in size, smoke, andemissions
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 17
Findings: force size
Unnecessary increases incomplexity and cost havedecreased the effective force sizeper constant $ by factors of 25 to100 since the F-86
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 18
Findings:maneuvering performance
In dogfight performance, 1g PShas not improved significantlysince the F-104A.
Large deterioration in max g issomewhat reversed by the F-15and F-16
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 19
Findings:transient performance
Standard measures (or flighttests) of transient performanceat high g do not yet exist. Onlythe F-86, F-5, and F-16 haveattained excellent transientperformance
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 20
Findings:combat lethality Combat gun lethality (and range) has
deteriorated since World War II andKorean-era calibre .50 machineguns.
IR missile lethality in combat was 1/2of gun lethality.
Radar missile lethality was 1/2 that ofIR missiles—despite continuousmissile R&D since 1948.
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 21
1952-78 fighter era
Did the 1952-78 era produce anyfighters as great as the P-51 andF-86?
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 22
Five “almost great” fighters
Obsessive emphasison Mach 2 burstspeed ruined anotherwise brilliantdesign
With 25% more wing,low tail, andtransonic inlet, couldbeat F-14, F-15, andmatch F-16.
F-104A (J79-19)
Only twin-engineever to become afirst rate fighter
With 20% lessweight, could havedominated any U.S.or foreign fighter upthrough F-14
F-5E
CommentShortcomingsType
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 23
Five “almost great” fighters
Showed that asingle, fixed inletF100 engine designcan havesignificantly longerrange, highersupersonicacceleration andbetter transientperformance than atwin with movableinlets
Addition of 3,000pounds and $3million per unit tothe F-16 changed agreat fighter to an“almost great”
F-16
CommentShortcomingsType
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 24
Five “almost great” fighters
• First double delta• First highperformance delta• OutmaneuversMirage III and F-106
With J79 engine,would have beenbest fighter of the1960-1976 era
J-35 Draken
Same performanceas F-106 at one-halfthe size
With J79 engine,would have beenbest fighter of the1960-1976 era
Mirage III
CommentShortcomingsType
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 25
How much progress in combateffectiveness since F-86?
Combat results Korea (1950-52) F-86 produced 14:1
kill-loss ratio against MiG-15 North Vietnam (1967-72)
• F-4 obtained between 1:1 and 2:1 against MiG-21
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 26
How much progress in combateffectiveness since F-86?
Combat results (continued) Israeli (1967 & 1973) Mirage III
achieved better than 20:1 againstMiG-21 (preferred by Israelis over F-4)
Indo-Pakistani War (1965)• F-86 Mk VI (bought for $100,000) attained better
than 6:1 against Indian MiG-21, Su-7, and Hunter.• 90 F-86s + 75 others achieved air superiority in 7
days against force of 700
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 27
How much progress in combateffectiveness since F-86?
Test Results 1965 Operation Featherduster air-to-air tests.
• F-86 had exchange ratio advantage over F-100, F-4, F-104, and F-105• Matched 1:1 against F-5
1977 AIMVAL/ACEVAL test.• F-14 and F-15 could not achieve significant exchange ratio advantage
over the F-5
After 30 years and 12 new fighterprograms, have we yet designed a fighterclearly superior to the F-86?
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 28
Progress:surprise bounces
Visual size
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 29
Progress:surprise bounces
Rearward visibility
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 30
Progress:surprise bounces
Cruising speed
All Others
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 31
Progress:effective force size
Unit program cost@750 a/c in FY $79
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 32
Progress: performanceFuel Fraction
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 33
Progress:dogfight performanceAcceleration—Ps @ 1g or maximum rate of climb
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 34
Progress:dogfight performanceInstantaneous turn CL MAX (S/W) @Mach 0.5
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 35
Progress: lethality
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 36
Some lessons
We have not been able to convertlarge U.S. advantages in engine,structural, aerodynamic, andmicroelectronic technologies intoa fighter radically superior to allits predecessors and foreigncompetitors
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 37
Some lessons
Some reasons Lack of clear understanding of the critical
components of fighter combat effectiveness Inability to enforce design discipline upon
service and industrial bureaucracies Addition of heavy air-to-ground (and/or
interceptor) compromises to every fightersince 1950—persistence of the World War IIfighter-bomber mentality
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 38
Some lessons
Some reasons Failure to improve engine thrust-to-weight
since the J85-21, due to misoptimization forexcessive bypass, pressure, and temperature(and specification inflation)
Refusal to recognize that Vietnam combatdemonstrated the ineffectiveness of airintercept radars and radar missiles (forreasons that R&D cannot eliminate)
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 39
Applying the lessons learned
A new air-to-air fighter to dominateall existing fighters would need toemphasize 20 minutes combat cruise above Mach 1.2 Subsonic maximum g and transients near
F-16 level Primary dependence on passive avionics/
anti-radiation missile
April 2006 © Pierre M. Sprey 2006 40
Applying the lessons learned
Radical elimination of specificationsand equipment
Size smaller than F-5 Cost below $4 million (in FY79 dollars) More lethal gun (higher V0, smaller
caliber) More reliable snap-shoot IR missile
(head on unnecessary)