Spohn's Art of Command - BAR April 1989

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Colonel von Spohn's "Art of Command"By S S Fitz-Gibbon

From BAR issue 91 April 1989.

NATO has in recent years been paying a great deal of attention to two conceptsof "manoeuvre war" based largely upon those of the German Army in World War II,which were the culmination of the developing military philosophy the Wehrmachtinherited from Frederick the Great through Scharnhorst and the elder Moltke andwhich, progressively refined over the years, gave rise to the command concept, nowcalled Auftragstaktik, which made the Blitzkrieg so successful. In the British Army thetrend towards "manoeuvre" thinking and its concomitant, the system of "directivecommand", seems to have begun with General Sir Nigel Bagnall's command of FirstBritish Corps, developing through his term as Chief of the General Staff. The latestevidence of progress is the introduction of mission analysis and the professed belief ofmany officers in the principles of Auftragstaktik.

It has, however, been pointed out in US military circles that American moves towards thepractice of manoeuvre fighting have been greatly hindered by a lack of understanding of thephilosophy underlying the German concept of directive command 1.

The philosophy underlying directive command was described most admirablyby a German colonel named von Spohn in an article of 1907 entitled "'The Art ofCommand". Such an explanation is invaluable to any officer attempting to grasp thetrue meaning of Auftragstaktik, and Spohn's article is considered at length below. First,however, let. us place this command concept in the perspective of the timelessphilosophy of manoeuvre war - a philosophy set down in writing well over 2000 yearsago by Sun Tzu.

Decentralisation and directive command

"If the situation is one of victory but the sovereign has issued orders not toengage, the general may decide to fight. If the situation is such that he cannot win,but the sovereign has issued orders. to engage, he need not do so . . . "

Sun Tzu

What Sun -Tzu wrote about was directive command as it applied between thepolitical leader and his commander-in-chief; directive command really comes into itsown within the, units and formations of the, field army, particularly in a fast-movingwar, when the principle more obviously applies.

Directive command, which may also be described is participatory command, ormore simply, but less descriptively as decentralisation, is the means by which some

1 It is fair to say that the same is unfortunately true in the British Army. The essential point is thatthe doctrine of directive command, which relies heavily upon good officer training and maximum use ofinitiative, is doomed to failure if the environment of genuine encouragement of initiative is not there.




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armies seek to reduce friction in the operations of a military machine. Much friction iscaused by changes in tactical situations which render earlier orders meaningless in theirdetails, or by acquisition of unexpected information during the battle which, had it beenknown beforehand, would frame resulted in different orders being given. Since war,particularly mobile war, is fraught with changes, with uncertainty, and often withchaos, the directive command system seeks to prevent uncertainty or changes frominterfering with detailed orders, by simply not issuing detailed orders. Instead, thegeneral intention of a commander. is explained to his subordinates two tactical levelsbelow him, and they do whatever appears appropriate in the circumstancesimmediately confronting them, bearing in mind the higher intention.

This takes advantage of the fact that the man on the spot has the most up-to-dateknowledge of the engagement as it affects him. and also permits - and indeed requires -all commanders to exercise their creative intellect. Therefore a larger number ofindividuals contribute to the decision-making process - hence the term "participatorycommand", which does not imply democratic decision-making, but simply recognisesthe involvement of more brains in making decisions - and such a command system isnecessarily decentralised.

The Chinese philosophy is worth further consideration. Ho Yen-Hsi explains:

In war there may be one hundred changes in each step. When one sees he can,he advances; when he sees that things are difficult, he retires.

To say that a general must await commands of the sovereign in suchcircumstances is like informing a superior that you wish to put out a fire. Beforethe order to do so arrives the ashes are cold..

This illustrates the need for action on one's own initiative before seekingconfirmation from one's superior.

Another aspect of the Chinese philosophy is that the commander does notmerely delegate responsibility to his subordinates and leave them to their own devices:it is his duty to create favourable situations for them to exploit. In this way, a senior.commander cannot simply pass responsibility on to his subordinates and blame themfor any subsequent failure, any more than they can automatically attributeresponsibility to their superior; each has his own sphere of responsibility 2. Thehigher commander's consists of creating winning situations; if he is subsequently letdown by his subordinates' failure to exploit these, he cannot reasonably be held toblame. Similarly, the subordinate is totally responsible for his part, and should be freefrom interference from above; moreover, if he feels that the task given to him isimpossible or unwise, it is his duty to say so. The duties of superior and subordinatehave been explained thus:'

2 Whether this should be the case at the political level is not at issue here. The principle should begenerally adhered to at all tactical and operational levels of command..




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A skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it ofhis subordinates ... He selects his men and they exploit the situation. "

Sun Tzu

"Experts in war depend especially on opportunity and expediency. They do notplace the burden of accomplishment on their men alone. "

Ch'en Hao

The ancient Chinese manoeuvre philosophy is more than academically interesting;it demonstrates the timelessness of this aspect of the art of war. We find it rejuvenatedin the Prussian-German military mind some two thousand years after Sun Tzu. Aremarkably similar philosophy to the Chinese was set down by Colonel von Spohn ofthe Imperial German Army in his article entitled "The Art of Command". Because thisrepresents a most excellent explanation of the directive command concept, von Spohnmust be considered at length.

"Every order places the subordinate to whom it is given in a position ofconstraint, to which he willingly submits without any question he recognises thenecessity for it - in such a case obedience is not a servile submission, but the freegift of a free man; but he complies with an order unwillingly if it is dictatedmerely by the pleasure of giving orders, or by the desire to magnify one's ownimportance. "

The first point of note here is that, for Spohn, an order is not simply a means ofdirecting a subordinate to his task, but is actually a constraint on him. This is a paradoxonly to the authoritarian commander, who does not realise that the detail he includes inhis orders becomes a constraint on the subordinate's ability to carry out the task as thecircumstances dictate.

The objection to a form of obedience based upon “servile submission" - orunthinking discipline - would not be raised by the authoritarian. Von Spohn continues:

"We soldiers ... want in the army a cheery and willing, not a slavish servileobedience. It is the first alone which conduces to happiness in the service,ensures a firm unshaken discipline, and inspires men to heroic deeds in actionwhen bullets are whistling around. It is the first kind of obedience alone whichacts educationally and forms the character."

The Colonel is here describing the difference between internal and externaldiscipline. A soldier or officer must be educated to use his initiative, and to be self-disciplined. Otherwise, if his "discipline" rests on external enforcement and habitformation, he will be lost without external leadership, and will not use his initiative forfear of making mistakes and being reprimanded.

Spohn next addresses the question of detailed orders and over-regulation:

"Another serious drawback involved in a mania for giving orders (whether itarises from a spirit of domineering, or is only a result of that anxious care which




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conceives that nothing goes on without an order), is that all independence, allinitiative, and all love of responsibility on the part of subordinates are killed.And yet - as...... the introduction Of our German training manuals clearly saysmodern fighting requires thoughtful leaders trained to be independent, and self-restrained men, capable from devotion to their officers and to their country ofproviding their firm will to conquer even when their leaders have fallen. "

It is no wonder that authoritarian commanders suffer from that anxious care whichconceives that nothing goes on without an order; the external enforcement of disciplineinculcates the habit in their men of only acting when ordered to. Thoughtful leaders"trained to be independent" can be expected to be of a critical kind, unaccustomed tomere acceptance of orders from which they see no good reason. Compare this withMajor-General JFC Fuller's description in 1935 of the British Army in his time:

No criticism is allowed for it might seem to belittle the Army in the eyes of acynical public. ... This fear of the truth creates a discipline the aim of which is notto foster originality, but a universal damping-down and standardisation, whichends in creating an all pervading mediocrity of spirit, in which genius and talentare the demons to be exorcised. "

Liddell Hart also criticised British Army authoritarianism during that period, writing of"the military view that minor mistakes were cardinal sins and capital offences."

Von Spohn continues:

"Such leaders and such men are not produced by orders, superfluous inthemselves, and beside the mark; but we undoubtedly do get them if we give nomore orders than are absolutely essential, and if we praise every independentaction, even if it be not altogether apt or appropriate. In such a case what iswrong must be reproved, but not severely, not sharply, not in the form ofcensure, but only in the way of kindly instruction. "

This requirement for initiative at even the lowest levels is markedly differentfrom what would have been found in the contemporary British Army, and it must beremembered that even with the new doctrine of mission analysis and its increasedemphasis on individual initiative no British Army doctrine exists even today whichspeaks in such terms.

"No man likes to be severely found fault with, but everybody is willing to acceptinstructions, and does better another time. The man who has cause to fear faultfinding, forswears initiative, and says to himself.. 'If I am going to be blamed Ihad better keep in the background, very likely I shall not be noticed then'. "

The drawbacks inherent in an officer career system of authoritarian command,with its implications of getting on by not making mistakes, are obvious and are notnew. Suffice it to say that under a directive command system, fear of failure andresulting inactivity, both in peace and in war, are far less likely to take effect.

Von Spohn next considers the nature of orders in a directive command system:




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"According to the German 'Field Service Regulations'. . . an order should containall that the subordinate must know in order to be able to act on his ownresponsibility for the attainment of the object in view, and no more.Consequently the order must be brief, clear, and definite, and it must also besuited to the recipient's range of view. Orders, during the transmission of whichthe situation may become changed, or those which may have to be carried outunder circumstances which cannot be foreseen, must abstain especially fromdetails. 'Instructions', then, take the place of “Orders”. These must indicate theobject in view, but must leave the method of attaining that object alone .......(Infantry Training Regulations state that) "The higher commanders should giveonly such orders as are unavoidable. They must abstain from any interference inmatters of detail, and must leave the choice of means to their subordinates. "'

Note that commanders are not merely given recommendations about how muchdetail they include in their orders, and they are not just advised of the superiority ofdirective command and above all they are not merely encouraged to give as few ordersas possible. They are forbidden to give detailed orders and are clearly. told not tointerfere in the job of their subordinates. And, most important, far from being urged tocontrol the action, they are told not to give orders unless it is unavoidable!

The tendency in the authoritarian system is for higher commanders - perhaps, atleast in peacetime, because their career is at stake, and they wish to make sure that theirsubordinates get everything right - to pay too close attention to what their subordinatesare doing. Von Spohn warns against this:

"These are wise regulations, but are they taken to heart by all commandersand on all occasions? Does not a lack of faith in the capabilities of a subordinate,or a wish to see the order carried out exactly in the way conceived by himself,end in many a commander transgressing against this very definite andoutspoken regulation?

Would that everyone would lay his hand on his heart and examine hisconscience.

This much is certain, that we can only bring up and train subordinate leaders tohave independence, initiative, and fondness of responsibility, we do not crib,cabin, and confine them, but rather give them freedom of action, within theirallotted sphere. "

Perhaps the greatest difference in approach to command between the directive(typically German) and authoritarian (typically French, American or British) commandsystems is exemplified in Spohn's next paragraph:

“...to deprive the subordinate commander of the independence to which he isentitled, means robbing him of the pleasure of service and the pleasure of action,and, at the very least, diminishing his interest in his work, and with it the germof all active endeavour.”

How well would most of today's senior British officers take the suggestion thattheir subordinate officers are entitled to independence and to be free of interference?




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Von Spohn summarises the German doctrine on directive command and simpleorders:

"Even if we may confidently assume ... that no competent officer will adhere tothe letter of an order in action, but will pursue the object in view with a properwillingness to accept responsibility- still this fact does not absolve superiors fromthe duty of never ordering more than it is necessary or possible to order.

We have, thank, God, no model, no normal form of action, and therefore nosuperior ought to fall into the mistake of wishing to direct, the course of anengagement upon lines of is own choosing.

Troops once engaged are beyond the control of the higher commander, andinterference on his part is therefore impossible on active service ...

We, learn most from mistakes and misunderstandings, and it is therefore well tolet them run their course. Untimely interference, repeated orders, and suchlike, produce instead of trustworthiness, independence, and initiative whichshould be our aim, a feeling of insecurity and uncertainty which destroys anywillingness to accept responsibility.

This much is certain, that superior officers who give their subordinates –in action and everywhere else where it is possible to do so - the independencewhich is their due, and even demand such power of initiative from them, willnever be left in the lurch.. They will find their troops, down to the smallestdetachment, always in the right place throughout the battle and after itsconclusion. "

The command doctrine described by Colonel von Spohn - although departedfrom in the attritionist period, which resulted from complacency over the strength ofGerman arms after 187 1; which produced the Schlieffen Plan and with which theGermans began the Great War - was nevertheless sufficiently strong in the minds ofGerman officers that when the uncharacteristic positional/attritionist methods failed,the German Army reverted to its former philosophy.

It was almost definitely, this tradition of manoeuvre-style command which permittedthe Germans. in the middle of a more intense war than they had perhaps ever imagined,and when apparently constrained by the positional deadlock, to revive manoeuvremethods; and it was almost certainly the absence of a comparable philosophy in theBritish Army which prevented the British from adapting to individualised tactics.After Passchendaele, it seems, the British attempted to copy the proven German tactics,but with less success, owing to the different form of discipline.

The lesson to be learned .

March 1918 saw the British 5th Army shattered in double time, by Germansrelying on their renewed manoeuvre philosophy and directive command ideas*,although, due to the intensity of the war with rather less training for this than VonSpohn would have prescribed. But the renewal came too late to prevent the Germans




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being overwhelmed by the numerical, economic and industrial might of three greatpowers, one of them fresh into the fray.

Again, in World War 11, the German directive command philosophy saw theWehrmacht repeatedly demonstrate its superior military efficiency, usually againstgreat numerical odds. And again the principal deciding factor was the great materialsuperiority of the Allies.

At last, in recent years, the US and British Armies have quite correctly realisedthat in a future European war of such intensity the material superiority necessary tofight a protracted war of attrition would be both unavailable and inappropriate, andthat methods must be sought to enhance our ability to win quickly and decisively. Thishas begun a new and extensive interest in the Prussian-German military philosophy,but unfortunately, due to a considerable amount of misunderstanding of the Germansystem, the US and now British attempts to practise Auftragstaktik have been deniedtheir full potential success. It is submitted that explanations of the art of directivecommand, like that by von Spohn, are invaluable if we are fully to understand andimplement what has proven itself to be a superior concept of command.The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Michael Elliott Bateman, Head of Military Studies, Universityof Manchester for his help in the development of these ideas; and also Colonel Mike Dewar, Colonel Defence Studies,Staff College Camberley, and the Staff College librarians, for their invaluable assistance with his research.)

REFERENCES

1. Lt Col (GS) Hans-Joachim Belde, "Forward Defence 83: Reorganisation and re-thitikirig in the 1st British Corps". Translated by Richard Simpkin ,BAR No.81,December 1985.

2. See Daniel ' I Hughes, "The Abuses of German Military History" in MilitaryReview, USA), December 1986.

3 See Major R A D Applegate and others, "Problems of developing a manoeuvrearmy", Staff College Camberley 1987; Captain F A Kerkemayer, "Auftragstaktik" inInfantry (US Army) November-December 1987, Vol 77, No. 6; Lt-Col P BergmannRACT, "Auftragstaktik or Leading with a Mission" in Defence Force Journal (Australia)No. 63, March-April 1987.

4. Sun Tzu, -The Art of War, translated by Brig-Gen S B Griffith, OUP 1971, p, 128.

5. See Hughes op. cit.

6. Sun Tzu, p. 83.

7. Ibid. p. 93.

8. Colonel von Spohn, "The Art of Command", originally in the Jahrbucher für dieDeutsche Armee und Marine, October 1907; translated for the British General Staff,published by, HMSO. All emphases in quotes from Spohn are mine.

9. J F C Fuller, 7he Army in My Time,, Manchester University, extract, p.4.

10. B H Liddell Hart, The Tanks Vol 1, pp. 120. 1, cit. J. Lus,aas, The education of anarmy: British military thought 1918.1940, Cassell, London 1965, p. 343.




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11. See '1'. Wintringham, New Ways of War 1940, pp. 20-26; X57. Lind, "Paper Forthe New York Militia Association Convention 1980" pp. 7-8.

12. See Hughes; Kerkemayer; Michael Elliott-Bateman and Jonathan Moore,"Language: the First Problem of Reform" in Defence Analysis (1988); S S Fitz-Gibbon,"Vocabulary: the second problem of Military Reform". forthcoming.

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