Spirakis Open Data and Evolutionary Games

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OPEN DATA AND EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY Paul G. Spirakis Computer Technology Institute & Press “DIOPHANTUS” Thessaloniki, April 6, 2012

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Prof. Spirakis Paul G. (Director of Computer Technology Institute and Press "Diophantus", Steering Committee OKFN Greece). Open Data and Evolutionary Games

Transcript of Spirakis Open Data and Evolutionary Games

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OPEN DATA AND

EVOLUTIONARY GAME

THEORY

Paul G. Spirakis

Computer Technology Institute & Press

“DIOPHANTUS”

Thessaloniki, April 6, 2012

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COMPLEXITY

• Complex Social, Biological and Socio-Technical Systems

• Must understand them “as a whole” (interactions, Networks)

• How to control? Improve?

• We need

(a) Good Models

(b) Data!

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• To understand Complex Systems it is essential to explore large real datasets with ground-truth information about structure and events.

(MULTIPLEX)

How available are such datasets?

Exist, but

• Fragmented (per Government, Professional

Society etc)

• Not free

• Not clean

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TWO EXAMPLES FROM

(EVOLUTIONARY) GAME THEORY

• Lotka-Volterra

(where it all started)

• Reporting A Crime

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I. Lotka-Volterra equations

• After World War I, the amount of predatory fish in the Adriatic was found to be considerably higher than in the years before.

• Hostility between Austria – Italy had disrupted fishery.

• Why was this more favourable to predators than to their prey?

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a, b, c, d >0

IV F

I

II III

x

y F = (𝑥 , 𝑦 )

𝑥 = 𝑐

𝑑

𝑦 = a𝑏

Phase portrait

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II. Reporting a Crime

A crime is observed by n people.

Each observer would like the police to be informed but prefers that someone else phone-calls.

Each person attaches v to police being informed v>0.

Bears cost c > 0 if she calls (v>>c)

Actions per player = {Call, Don’t Call}

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Social Psychology

“38 people witnessed the brutal number of Catherine Genovese over ½ hour un NYC in March 1964.

No one significantly responded to her screams for help.

No one even called the police!”

Indifference?

Apathy?

Audience inhibition?

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An n players game

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“In an equilibrium, each person must be

indifferent between intervening and

not intervening”

(People are expected – utility maximizers)

This “dogma” of Game Theory is verified by Data.

Is it?

Not many such data are free.

Usually police collects them.

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• So, raw, accurate, meaningful data are crucial.

But how can one get access?

• Governments collect data.

• In France, UK and Netherland they are available to the public via the Web.

• In other EU Members they are not.

This may soon change!

(EU’s Open Data Initiative)

Neelie Kroes the EU digital agenda commissioner.

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Modelling Ethnic Conflict

(March 2012)

• New England Complex Systems Institute

(NESCI)

data + model

Data from Switzerland

Note: Switzerland has a history of Social Stability

and economic prosperity.

however

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Data + Model “reveal”:

• One Swiss area with increased violence (northwest

region) where the Jura mountains form a weak

boundary between French and German speaking

communities.

(Violence data during 1970’s released now in detail)

Model’s conclusion: Stability among ethnic groups

does not depend on integrated co-existence but on

well-defined topographical and political boundaries

separating the different groups!

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NESCI model

“it is possible to mitigate ethnic conflict using

within-country borders that provide local

autonomy”!

Is this true?

Records on recent ethnic violence e.g in Africa,

Serbia, parts of the East, are not open.

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In contrast

(CACM, March 2012)

(same issue)

“to function as a team, robots must learn to negotiate

decision-making processes … will they ever learn to

get along?”

(The Social Life of Robots)

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So, we need open data

[Kroes] “Taxpayers have already paid for info

collected … the least we can do is to give it back

to those who want to use it in new ways, that

help people and create jobs and growth”.

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Thank you !!