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Malka LebovicDr. RynholdThe Early Modern Period: Spinoza and MendelssohnFall 2014The Prophetic Vision: An Examination of the Role of Prophecy in the Thought of Maimonides and Spinoza Scripture is replete with instances of divine revelation in the form of prophecy. Perhaps, the Bible can even be categorized as a chronicled account of the prophetic experience; the narrative of the interaction between man and God. Therefore, understanding the prophet and the role of prophecy is essential to properly interpreting our biblical history. In this paper I explore Maimonides and Spinozas descriptions of the prophet in the hopes of better understanding the role of prophecy and what, if any, its relevance is for us today.In Maimonides Introduction to Perek Helek, he identifies thirteen principles upon which our religion is based. [footnoteRef:1] The sixth fundamental principle is prophecy.[footnoteRef:2] Maimonides writes, Among men are found certain individuals so gifted and perfected that they can receive pure intellectual form. Their human intellect clings to the Active Intellect, whither it is gloriously raised. These men are the prophets; this is what prophecy is.[footnoteRef:3] Here Maimonides describes men with intellects of such a high caliber that they are capable of understanding truths unreachable by the average man. This process of clinging to the Active Intellect to receive prophecy has been explained by some using the imagery of a radio.[footnoteRef:4] The radio is perpetually transmitting signals, but only men with perfected intellects can tune into the correct station and tap into the divine via the Active Intellect. Understood in this way, prophecy does not cause any change in God (which would present certain philosophical problems to Gods perfection), rather, it reflects a progression, a development within man. By perfecting himself, man can broaden the reception of his spiritual antenna.[footnoteRef:5] The Active Intellect is constantly overflowing, or emanating, from the divine. While the Acquired Intellect is the knowledge that man embodies, his human intellect. When the Acquired Intellect clings to the Active Intellect it transforms from potentiality into actuality. Since abstract contemplation is universally true, when the Acquired Intellect develops it can share the exact same knowledge as the Active Intellect. This is how the two can become one and the same. Therefore, an enhanced and developed understanding of fundamental truths and the workings of the world, namely, a perfection of the rational faculty allows the human intellect to achieve union with the Active Intellect.[footnoteRef:6] [1: This view of prophecy is not exclusive to Maimonides Introduction to Perek Helek. A similar definition is given in his Commentary on the Mishnah and Shmonei Perakim. I am using Perek Helek as representative of this view.] [2: The discussion of prophecy in this paper is limited to regular instances of prophecy and not the exceptional case of Mosaic prophecy which according to Maimonides thirteen principles is its own independent principle (the seventh fundamental principle). ] [3: Isadore Twersky, A Maimonides Reader (New York: Behrman House, 1972), pgs. 418-419] [4: Rav Eli Hadad in his sixth shiur on prophecy (available online through the Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash) successfully explains the Active Intellect in laymens terms: According to the medieval understanding of existence, which Maimonides fully ascribed to, between God and the material world there are matter-less intellectual beings...each one influencing in some way the natural order of the material world. The active intellect refers to the lowest intellectual being that influences our sublunar world. This entity may be viewed as the supreme law of nature in our world.] [5: Rabbi Marc D. Angel, Maimonides Essential Teachings on Jewish Faith and Ethics: the Book of Knowledge and the Thirteen Principles of Faith (Woodstock, VT: SkyLight Paths, 2012), pg. 156] [6: Alvin J. Reines, Maimonides Concept of Mosaic Prophecy (Hebrew Union College Jewish Institute of Cincinatti) pg. 327]

When Maimonides constructed the thirteen principles of faith, he intended these principles to be available to the masses. Unlike some of his more esoteric writings, these principles are fundamental and must be internalized by every Jew. Maimonides principles have become so essential to Jewish life they appear in the siddur and songs and prayers have been written about them. It is interesting to note Maimonides intended audience particularly in contradistinction to that of the Guide to the Perplexed which was written for a specific student with a clear stipulation to safeguard its truths from those people who may be incapable of comprehending them and therefore could distort the true meaning of his work. Maimonides employs many tactics, in the Guide, to preserve its esotericism such as intentional contradictions, obscure language, difficult content, and some have even argued that the views Maimonides blatantly puts forth are not the ones he agrees with, rather, those least spoken about contain the most truth.[footnoteRef:7] Bearing these distinctions in mind, it is quite noteworthy that Maimonides definition of prophecy in his Introduction to Perek Helek fails to mention a seemingly essential element of prophecy and quality of the prophet that is described at length in the Guide. This, of course, is the imaginative component. [7: Maimonides, Shlomo Pines, the Guide of the Perplexed (University of Chicago Press, 1963) Introduction pgs.5-20]

In the Guide Maimonides outlines three different views of prophecy that of the Pagans (the masses), the Philosophers, and Jewish Law.[footnoteRef:8] The Pagans believe that God miraculously selects a man and turns him into a prophet. There is nothing man can do on his own to receive prophecy. God can choose a wise man or a foolish man, an old man or a young man. The Philosophers have an equally extreme view yet with the focus on man. They maintain that prophecy is a natural result of a certain intellectual and moral perfection. If man reaches this high stature, he will become aware of certain truths previously unknown and thereby prophecy will be bestowed upon him. God does not choose, in effect, God plays no role in who receives prophecy. According to this position, it is not possible for a man to be worthy of prophecy and not receive it, being fit for prophecy and receiving prophecy are one in the same. The final view that of Jewish Law is synonymous with the Philosophers position except for one caveat. God can, by an act of divine will, prevent an otherwise fit individual from receiving a prophetic vision.[footnoteRef:9] In both the second opinion and the third the imaginative faculty plays an essential role: his imaginative faculty is in its most perfect statehe will necessarily become a prophet,[footnoteRef:10] the true reality and quiddity of prophecy consists in its being an overflowof the Active Intellect, toward the rational faculty in the first place and thereafter toward the imaginative facultythis state is the ultimate term of perfection for the imaginative faculty.[footnoteRef:11] It is interesting that such an integral part of the prophetic experience is completely left out in Maimonides account of prophecy in Perek Helek. [8: Ibid, Secton II, Chapter 32 pgs. 360-363.] [9: The line between the philosophic position and Maimonides position becomes complicated when you try to define divine will. It seems that Maimonides very naturalistic understanding of divine will could conflate the distinction between these two positions. Some scholars have argued that the more esoteric and therefore correct reading of Maimonides is the philosophic understanding of prophecy while others have preserved the distinction between the opinions of the philosophers and Jewish Law. ] [10: The Guide, II:32 361] [11: Ibid, II:36 369]

The imaginative element is what separates the prophet from the philosopher. A philosopher could possess the same wisdom as a prophet, however the imaginative faculty is what enables the prophet to be a political leader. Both receive an influx of knowledge from the Active Intellect on to the rational faculty (knowledge of philosophical truths, basic concepts, and the like) but the prophet also receives the influx on his imaginative faculty granting him political prowess. The statesman only has the political expertise without the rational guidance that clarifies and instructs.[footnoteRef:12] This discussion of these three different types of influential people further identifies the importance of the imaginative faculty.[footnoteRef:13] The imagination element is not simply a subsidiary component; rather it is the distinguishing characteristic between the philosopher and the prophet. [12: S. Daniel Breslauer, Philosophy and Imagination: The Politics of Prophecy in the View of Moses Maimonides (The Jewish Quarterly Review, New Series, Vol. 70, No. 3 (Jan., 1980), pp. 153-171), pg. 155] [13: The Guide II: 37, pg. 374]

Taking the role of the prophet into consideration, it is clear why a perfected imagination is essential to the job description. Often times the prophet is called upon to relay a message to the masses who do not have perfect rational faculties. Therefore, the prophet must use various imaginative tools to make the prophecy intelligible to the masses through methods such as parables, signs and symbols.[footnoteRef:14] Pines in his book Maimonides and Philosophy describes this political function of the prophet, [the prophet] helps to restore virtuous action and communal order within a particular communitythis use of signs and wonders points to the exercise of the imaginative faculty by the prophet, who thereby is able to influence the masses to gain wisdom or act in accordance with the divine will.[footnoteRef:15]While the philosopher can perpetually reside in the proverbial ivory tower and fuel his intellect, the prophet cannot accomplish his prophetic duties disengaged from the community he inspires and therefore must have a perfect imagination to fulfill the statesman elements of his divine task. [14: Shlomo Pines, Maimonides and Philosophy (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Netherlands, 1986) pg. 193] [15: Ibid, 194]

Spinoza, like Maimonides in the Guide, emphasizes the importance of the prophets imaginative faculty. However, in doing so, he rejects the primary role of the rational faculty arguing that the rational and imaginative faculties have a type of inverse relationship: the greater the imagination, the weaker the intellect and the greater the intellect the more controlled and more modest power of imagination. [footnoteRef:16] The prophets vivid imagination is at the expense of a perfected rational faculty. For Maimonides, the prophet receives rational information and is skilled enough to break it down to the imagination in a way that the masses will understand it. For Spinoza, the prophet receives the imaginative component and turns it into something rational and understandable. [16: Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise (Cambridge University Press, New York: 2007) pg. 27]

In his Theological-Political Treatise (TTP), Spinoza defines a prophet as someone who interprets things revealed by God to those who cannot themselves achieve certain knowledge of them and can therefore only grasp by simple faith what has been revealed.[footnoteRef:17]This definition of the role of the prophet indicates the important relationship the prophet has with the community at large. It is the prophets duty to enlighten the masses who are incapable of their own enlightenment. Already through Spinozas understanding of the role of the prophet it is clear that the imaginative property must play an essential role as the prophets duties revolve around his ability to coherently transmit higher level information to the more simple minded. Indeed Spinoza highlights the significance of the prophets vivid imagination over a developed intellect. As he writes, therefore prophecy does not require a more perfect mind but a more vivid imagination.[footnoteRef:18] [17: Ibid, pg. 13] [18: Ibid, pg. 20]

Even though prophecy resides in the realm of the imagination it is not made-up, prophets deal with truth. However, the truth they relay is specifically moral truths. Spinoza describes the three requirements for prophetic certainty thereby acknowledging the importance of an objective means by which to ascertain whether a said revelation is indeed prophetic.[footnoteRef:19] This type of external criteria to determine reality is only necessary if something can be right or wrong, correct or incorrect. Prophecy, for Spinoza, is accountable to truth and must be real. Spinoza qualifies the spectrum of prophetic truth, the certainty the prophets derived from signs was not mathematical certaintybut only moral certainty.[footnoteRef:20] Even if a particular prophet had a false perception of God, God still revealed Himself to the prophet in that false way because the form of prophecy is not nearly as important as the goal it achieves in inspiring and encouraging the people. For example, Adam believed God was confined to a particular space and therefore God hid Himself from Adam and was revealed to Adam as if God was unaware of Adams sin. Similarly Noah, who believed nobody resided outside of Palestine believed God destroyed the entire human race with the flood.[footnoteRef:21] A prophet can be ignorant of philosophical and mathematical truths as long as they are of excellent moral character and inspire the public to do good thus creating a more peaceful and moral community. [19: It is not objective in the sense that it is similarly true for all, as Spinoza admits that what may convince one prophet would not convince a different prophet (TTP, 30). Rather, it is objective in that although prophecy is presented to the imaginative faculty, certainty is achieved by appealing to the prophets reason which takes it out of the subjective realm of his mind and into the more objective sphere of logical reasoning despite the fact that this type of logic is still subjective to the prophets particular convictions and temperament.] [20: TTP pg. 30] [21: Ibid pg. 35]

Spinoza draws on the Scriptural accounts of prophecy for support. Biblical characters who did not possess developed intellects received prophecy (ex: Hagar), prophecy and miracles adapted to fit the philosophical views of the receiving prophet (ex: Joshua and the sun), prophecy encouraged repentance and moral acts (ex: Isaiahs exhortation of the people to pursue social justice), and due to the changing nature of imagination prophecy was rare and even among the prophets (for the most part) occurred occasionally and fleetingly (ex: Balaam). For Spinoza, prophecy can be understood as a lower level alternative to philosophy as opposed to Maimonides view where the prophet has all the skills of the philosopher plus the additional quality of the imagination. In an ideal world where everyone has perfectly developed intellects there would be no need for Spinozas prophet, however, Maimonides prophet would have as important a role as ever. Norman Brown in his article, Philosophy and Prophecy: Spinozas Hermeneutics draws a comparison between Kants definition of tutelage as mans inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another and Spinozas definition of prophecy as someone who interprets for those who are incapable on their own. Prophecy is below self sufficiency, below what Kant terms enlightenment, namely the ability to achieve unaided understanding.[footnoteRef:22] [22: Norman Brown, Philosophy and Prophecy: Spinoza's Hermeneutics (Sage Publications inc. Political Theory, Vol. 14, No. 2. May, 1986) Pg. 197-198]

The historical reality of the Hebrews following their Exodus from Egypt required prophetic guidance. The Hebrews were primitive and reduced to the most abject slavery therefore, it is fitting that Moses did not teach them anything besides a way of life, and that not as a philosopher, so that they might eventually live well, from liberty of mind, but as a legislator obliging them to live well by command of the lawworship and love of God was more servitude to them than true liberty.[footnoteRef:23] Prophecy is distinct from philosophy in that it does not encourage free thinking. Heidi Ravven in an article discussing Spinoza as a response to Maimonidean philosophy notes this point, he writes we can turn to Spinoza who articulates a relevant principle Reason promotes autonomy whereas imagination, servitude.[footnoteRef:24] For Spinoza, prophecy resides in the realm of imagination which is perfectly befitting its goal of servitude and obedience particularly in moral matters. Prophecy viewed in this way can be understood as a stepping stone for the, indeed, more developed state of being philosophy. Brown writes, Philosophic freedom emerges as humanity outgrows the need for authority; philosophy itself is a new and more enlightened chapter in the history of prophecy[footnoteRef:25] For Spinoza, philosophy is a perfected form of prophecy.[footnoteRef:26] This is drastically different than Maimonides understanding of the relationship between prophecy and philosophy. [23: TTP, pg. 38-39] [24: Heidi M Ravven, Some thoughts on what Spinoza learned from Maimonides about the prophetic imagination part 1. Maimonides on Prophecy and the imagination (Johns Hopkins University Press, Journal of the History of Philosophy Vol. 39, Issue 2, Baltimore April 2001) pgs. 193-214] [25: Brown, pg. 198] [26: Ibid, pg. 201]

For Maimonides, prophecy is the highest level of enlightenment a human being can achieve. In order to receive divine revelation, the prophet must already have the qualities of an excellent philosopher and a prolific statesman. Prophecy is the pinnacle of human perfection. Indeed, Maimonides maintained that Moses, whose revelation surpassed that of the ordinary prophet, was superior in attaining the knowledge of God to any other person who ever lived or ever will live. He surpassed the normal human condition and attained the angelic, thereby acknowledging that the most enlightened man is the prophet, and the most enlightened prophet is Moses. [footnoteRef:27] Prophecy, for Maimonides, is not a stepping-stone for a more elevated state of existence, rather prophecy itself is the culmination of human achievement. Although Maimonides, like Spinoza, stresses the importance of the imaginative faculty on prophecy, it is Maimonides incorporation of the perfected rational faculty as well that prevents philosophy from superseding prophecy. [27: Maimonides, Introduction to Perek Helek. The 7th fundamental principle. ]

The Maimonidean and Spinozan divide regarding the proper place for prophecy in the hierarchical scheme of human intellectual development affects their respective understandings of the importance of biblical prophecy. Spinozas view lends itself to make prophecy obsolete. Indeed, Spinoza argues:We are not required to believe the prophets in anything beyond what constitutes the end and substance of revelationfor example, the revelation of Cain only teaches us that God admonished Cain to lead a true lifealthough the words and reasonings of that admonition very clearly entail freedom of the will, we are nevertheless permitted to adopt a contrary opinion, since those words and reasons were merely adapted to Cains understanding.[footnoteRef:28] [28: TTP, pg. 40-41]

The idea being that while we can look to the prophetic narratives in scripture for moral inspiration if we so desire, they do not have the force of law and are not necessarily universally applicable. Just as Spinoza understands the ritual laws given to the Hebrews as particular and applicable only to the political reality of the Jews at that time and nowadays hold no special merit, so too Spinoza understands prophecy as befitting only the particular prophet and receiving community of the time. That is not to say we cannot learn things from internalizing past prophecies, however, their essential importance is gravely diminished. As remarked earlier, even at the time, prophecy was essential for those who were incapable of achieving moral truths on their own; however, for those who did live a good life, prophecy was unnecessary for them. Therefore, prophecy is almost a short-cut for the needy at a particular point in time. This perspective certainly undermines the traditional lofty and reverent perception of prophecy belittling its essence to a pragmatic function for the unenlightened multitudes particularly in the wake of their transition from slaves to freemen (and earlier as nomadic simpletons).

In stark opposition, Maimonides view enables the significance of prophecy to prosper with the passing of time as opposed to diminish in importance. The prophet has the ability to gain access to essential divine truths as he taps into the overflow of divinity in the form of the Active Intellect. As prophecy has all but disappeared in our current times it is even more essential that we cling to the teachings and knowledge of the prophets who achieved the peak of human perfection. Through understanding Maimonides position it is apparent why prophecy makes it into the thirteen principles of faith. The prophet relays objective (and often universal) truths regarding a wide array of knowledge (moral, philosophical, spiritual, mathematic, etc.). To reject belief in the prophet is to reject the truth of his prophecy. A prophet is revealed to be authentic or false based on the content of his prophecy thereby blending the distinction between the prophet and that which he prophesizes. For it is the prophecy that makes the prophet and the belief in the prophet, required as a principle of faith, that confirms the importance of his revelation. Interestingly, the point that makes prophecy relevant and important is that it contains eternal truths. It is the prophets perfection of his rational faculty that enables him to receive rational knowledge that transcends the confines of time and space. This difference in the content of prophecy for Spinoza and Maimonides, resulting in a varying hierarchical order of the statesman, prophet, and philosopher, is the only element of prophecy stipulated in the thirteen principles of faith. Despite Maimonides emphasis on the imaginative faculty (highlighted in the Guide), when it comes to demanding unequivocal faith in prophecy, it is only the rational faculty that is mentioned as it is specifically this component that grants prophecy its eternal significance and worthy place in the thirteen principles of faith. For both Maimonides and Spinoza, prophecy is a universal human experience not specific to Jews,[footnoteRef:29] prophecy is a natural phenomenon,[footnoteRef:30] and prophecy relies heavily on the imaginative faculty.[footnoteRef:31] However, for Maimonides in order to receive prophecy the prophet must have a certain level of wisdom and moral character[footnoteRef:32], while for Spinoza prophecy is exclusive to moral perfection.[footnoteRef:33] The intellect is stressed over the imagination for Maimonides, while Spinoza does not attribute a significant role to the intellect. However, in doing so Spinoza is not belittling the imagination, in fact, he makes it very clear that since the prophets perceived the things revealed by God through their imaginations, there is no doubt that they may have grasped much beyond the limits of the intellect. For far more ideas can be formed from words and images than from the principles and concepts alone...[footnoteRef:34] The imagination, understood in this way, occupies an elevated status. Additionally, according to Spinoza, natural knowledge is divine but it is not prophecy because although natural reason depends on knowledge of God it is accessible to all and therefore, other men may discern and embrace what they teach with as much certainty and entitlement as they do themselves. They do not just accept it on faith.[footnoteRef:35] Spinoza still considers natural reason and philosophic truths important (perhaps even more so than prophecy) but they cannot be constituted as prophecy, while for Maimonides, natural knowledge can be part of the greater canon of prophecy. [29: Maimonides, Yesodei Hatorah 7:1; Maimonides Epistle to Yemen; Spinoza, TTP, Chapter 3 in general, but more directly in Ch. 3 Section 8 pg. 49.] [30: I Samuel 10:6; the Guide II:32; TTP pg. 43-44] [31: See earlier in the paper for specific quotes supporting this claim] [32: Maimonides, Yesodei Hatorah 7:1;the Guide II:32] [33: TTP, pg. 23] [34: Ibid, pg. 26] [35: Ibid, pgs. 14-15]

While the above similarities and distinctions are apparent between Maimonides and Spinozas perspectives on prophecy, Maimonides view still retains an element of esotericism given the differing accounts presented in the Guide and his introduction to Perek Helek. Perhaps Maimonides Mishnah Torah can bridge the gap between his two views. In the Mishnah Torah, Maimonides outlines two different tasks of the prophet: personal and communal. In Yesodei Hatorah, Maimonides describes these two tasks, it is possible that the prophets prophecy will be for himself alone to broaden his mind and to increase his knowledge, so that he will come to know what he previously had not known concerning the above mentioned great matters.[footnoteRef:36] In this instance, the prophets task is personal and this revelation exclusively requires his rational faculty as it focuses on broadening his knowledge of physics and metaphysics. This description of prophecy, which makes no mention of the imaginative faculty, is compatible with the account of prophecy written in the Introduction to Perek Helek and Maimonides Commentary on the Mishna.[footnoteRef:37] The prophetic account in Yesodei Hatorah continues, thereby elucidating the second role of the prophet his communal tasks. It is also possible that the prophet will be sent to a particular people to give them wisdom or to announce to them what they must do or to prevent them from doing the evil actions in which they are engaged. And when he is sent he is given a sign or wonder so that the people will know that God, in truth, has sent him.[footnoteRef:38] This second description of prophecy requires the imaginative and rational faculties of the prophet and is compatible with the view purported in the Guide. Therefore, it is possible to reconcile the two different accounts of prophecy, in light of the dual description in the Mishnah Torah, not as two contradictory explanations, rather as putting forth two distinct tasks of the prophet both of which are equally authentic[footnoteRef:39]. While this clears up the confusion of potential contradiction, it does not resolve the more relevant question of why Maimonides chose to compartmentalize the tasks of the prophet, describing the communal without any mention of the personal in the Guide, and the personal, without any indication of the communal in his Introduction to Perek Helek. [36: Maimonides, Yesodei Hatorah 7:6 ] [37: Pines, pg. 193] [38: Maimonides, Yesodei Hatorah 7:6 ] [39: This method of resolving contradictions is in line with the fourth cause out of seven causes of contrary statements delineated by Maimonides in his introduction to the Guide. ]

A possible answer surfaces when understanding the greater contexts and goals of Maimonides different works. As mentioned earlier, The Commentary on the Mishna and his Introduction to Perek Helek, were written and made available for the masses. The thirteen principles of faith are eternal dictums required by all Jews regardless of intellectual ability. In sharp contrast, the Guide was written for a particular student of stellar mental ability and is extremely complex and intentionally rigorous. While you can learn from the biblical prophetic narratives, the prophets communal tasks were relevant to a specific time and place, for example, Jonahs prophecy to convince the people of Nineveh to repent. There is an abundance of lessons one can take away from the story, but the content itself does not contain eternal truths essential to future generations. Therefore, in outlining the thirteen principles of faith, it is particularly the personal prophetic experience that makes an appearance. For the acknowledgment of the existence of prophecy is a cornerstone to our faith in Gods ability and interaction with man and the content of the personal component of the prophet contain truths whose significance and relevance will never cease. On the other hand, the discussion of prophecy in the Guide has a particular focus on interpreting the scriptural accounts of prophecy, comparing the Jewish view of prophecy to that of the masses and the philosopher, and comparing ordinary prophecy to Mosaic prophecy. All these goals require a focus on the communal element of the prophet: in interpreting scripture it is important to understand the biblical narratives in the context in which they occurred (most of these narratives involve a prophet fulfilling his communal duties), the pagan and philosophic prophet occupies a role of statesmanship so that component of the Jewish prophet is most relevant to the discussion, and one of the major distinctions between Mosaic and ordinary prophecy was that Mosaic prophecy was completely rational without any need for interpretation using the imaginative faculty. Therefore, in showing the contrast between ordinary prophecy and Mosaic prophecy it is essential to discuss ordinary prophecy that involves the imaginative faculty (in addition to the rational) which appears with the prophets communal tasks. This interpretation also helps to shed light onto Spinozas focus on the imaginative faculty at the exclusion of the rational. The imaginative component which corresponds to the prophets communal tasks is the only element of significance to Spinoza. Spinoza identifies the communal as being important because there is no significance to personal religion for him. With his pantheistic view of God, Spinozas religion focuses on living a life in correspondence with nature and natural reason (which is outside the realm of prophecy). The prophet is only important because he can help create the ideal society to enable people to further develop their intellects free from distraction and chaos. The prophet qua statesman is the only prophet of value. Additionally, Spinoza has a very untraditional interpretation of scripture. The Bible, according to him, is not written by God and is only relevant to future generations in its ability to inspire people to become more moral individuals. [footnoteRef:40] [40: Steven Nadler, Baruch Spinoza and the Naturalization of Judaism, (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007) ]

There is another possible explanation for the sharp divide between Maimonides and Spinoza and the internal focus shifts within Maimonides different works that does not require an appeal to distinct tasks of the prophet, rather, Maimonides in the Guide and Maimonides in Perek Helek are discussing the same role of the prophet. Yet, Maimonides intentionally left out the imaginative component in the thirteen principles. Maimonides was particularly wary of misinterpretation and therefore purposefully created the Guide so that only those capable of comprehending the most significant truths would be able to unearth them to begin with. Maimonides cautious behavior allowed him to become one of the most read and respected Jewish figures. While at times Maimonides does challenge certain notions of traditional Judaism he has been branded within the corpus of accepted traditional religious views. Spinoza on the other hand received an extremely harsh writ of herem for his wholly untraditional and arguably heretical opinions. While Spinoza cared to an extent how he was received as indicated in his initial attempt to conceal his identity by only authoring his TTP with his initials[footnoteRef:41], for the most part Spinoza was very blunt and unabashedly shared his views despite the controversy they consequently stirred. This is relevant to our discussion of prophecy as the imaginative element is a dangerous component to insist upon. Since the acknowledgment of the role of the imagination on prophecy admits that at least an element of prophecy is adjusted by man and thereby based on the prophets subjective interpretation, it is difficult to understand how this element is compatible with the more traditional conception of prophecy as a pure divine revelation. Certainly, imagination can be reconciled with traditional Judaism, however it can also be misunderstood and lead to more heretical conclusions. Maimonides, therefore, stayed away from mentioning it when speaking to the masses who could likely misinterpret its implications but, made sure to explain it in the Guide since it is an essential component to understanding prophecy. Spinoza, who did not mind purporting untraditional or dangerous views, overemphasized it. Perhaps Spinozas treatment of prophecy is a direct response to what he may categorize as Maimonides intentional neutralization of prophecy as to placate the masses. [41: Seymour Feldman, Introduction to Spinozas Ethics (Hackett Publishing Company ,Indiana 1992) pg. 4]

While Spinoza and Maimonides do contain many similarities in their description and understanding of prophecy as delineated above, their few differences cannot be overlooked. In fact, Spinozas point of departure from Maimonides completely undermines the assertion that prophecy is the pinnacle of human achievement and their different positions on the content of prophecy affects the relevance (or lack thereof) of prophecy on our current lives.

Works CitedAngel Rabbi Marc D., Maimonides Essential Teachings on Jewish Faith and Ethics: the Book of Knowledge and the Thirteen Principles of Faith. Woodstock, VT: SkyLight Paths, 2012

Breslauer S. Daniel, Philosophy and Imagination: The Politics of Prophecy in the View of Moses Maimonides. The Jewish Quarterly Review, New Series, Vol. 70, No. 3. Jan., 1980 Brown Norman, Philosophy and Prophecy: Spinoza's Hermeneutics. Sage Publications inc. Political Theory, Vol. 14, No. 2. May, 1986

Feldman Seymour, Introduction to Spinozas Ethics. Hackett Publishing Company ,Indiana 1992

Maimonides, Shlomo Pines the Guide of the Perplexed. University of Chicago Press, 1963

Nadler Steven, Baruch Spinoza and the Naturalization of Judaism. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007

Pines Shlomo, Maimonides and Philosophy. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Netherlands, 1986Ravven Heidi M, Some thoughts on what Spinoza learned from Maimonides about the prophetic imagination part 1. Maimonides on Prophecy and the imagination. Johns Hopkins University Press, Journal of the History of Philosophy Vol. 39, Issue 2, Baltimore April 2001

Reines Alvin J., Maimonides Concept of Mosaic Prophecy. Hebrew Union College Jewish Institute of Cincinnati

Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise. Cambridge University Press, New York: 2007

Twersky Isadore, A Maimonides Reader. New York: Behrman House, 1972