In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 14-3171 ROBERT E. SPIERER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COREY E. ROSSMAN, et al., Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. 1:13-cv-00991 Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge ____________________ ARGUED FEBRUARY 25, 2015 DECIDED AUGUST 14, 2015 ____________________ Before BAUER, FLAUM, and MANION, Circuit Judges. MANION,CircuitJudge.Afteranightofheavydrinking, LaurenSpierer,atwenty-year-oldIndianaUniversity student,lefttheapartmentofaclassmateanddisappeared. Fouryearslater,sheremainsmissing.Laurensparents brought suit against three students who were with Lauren in the hours before her disappearance, alleging negligence and violationsofIndianasDramShopAct.Aftersomeclaims Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 2No. 14-3171 weredismissedbutbeforediscoverywasconducted,the defendantsmovedforsummaryjudgmentonthegrounds thattheplaintiscouldonlyspeculateaboutwhetherthe defendantsweretheproximatecauseofanyinjury sustained.Thedistrictcourtagreedandgrantedsummary judgmentforthedefendants.Theplaintishaveappealed, contestingboththedismissalofclaimsandtheawardof summary judgment for the defendants. We arm.I. BackgroundBecausethedistrictcourtgrantedsummaryjudgment before general discovery was conducted, the facts are limited largelytothosestatedinthecomplaint.Asalleged,the pleadingsatempttoimposeameasureofcohesiononto eventsspanningseveralhoursandlocationsandinvolving variousindividualseachofwhomhadbeendrinking alcohol,insomecasesheavily.Theresult,bynofaultofthe plaintis,isthatmuchofwhatwewouldliketoknowis missing,whilemuchofwhatwedoknowdeesapparent logic.Whatweknowwithcertaintyisthatthiscaseisa tragedy.OnJune2,2011,JasonRosenbaum,astudentat IndianaUniversity,threwapartyathisapartment.Among hisguestswerefellowstudentsLaurenSpierer,Corey Rossman,andMichaelBeth,who,byallappearances,were well-acquaintedwitheachother.Rosenbaumserved alcoholicdrinksathisparty,andLaurenscarcelyvefeet tall and one hundred poundswas among those served.Shewasnotalone.Forhispart,Rossmandrankheavily, and eventually he and Lauren left the party and went to his apartmentwhichwaslocatedinthesamecomplex. Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 No. 14-31713 Rossmansroommate,MichaelBeth,hadbeenat Rosenbaums party and returned to the apartment where he encounteredthetwo.DespitethefactthatLaurenwas visibly intoxicated, Rossman encouraged her to join him at a barnamedKilroysthatwaslocatedafewblocksfromthe apartment. He informed Beth that he wanted to have three more drinks at the bar and then [he would] be feeling good.ApproximatelyonehourafterleavingRosenbaums party,LaurenandRossmanwenttoKilroyswhereLauren was observed stumbling and requiring Rossmans assistance towalk.Disregardingherprecariouscondition,Rossman boughtLaurenseveraldrinks;eventuallyshelosthershoes andmobilephone.TheyremainedatKilroysuntil approximately 2:30 in the morning.AfterleavingKilroys,thepairinitiallyheadedto Laurensapartmentcomplexwheretheyencounteredother students outside the elevator on Laurens oor. Rossman got intoaphysicalaltercationwithoneofthosestudentswho tookissuewithhimforfailingtoassistthevisibly intoxicatedLaurenintoherapartment.Insteadofescorting Laurenfromtheelevatortoherapartmentadistanceless thanahundredyardsthepairsetoforhisapartment whereRossmanwasobservedenroutecarryingLauren slung across his back. At around 3:30 in the morning, Michael Beth (Rossmans roommate)returnedtotheapartmentandwasstartledto ndRossmanandLaurenthere.Atrst,hesuspectedthat theywereburglarsbecausetheapartmenthadbeenthesite ofpreviouscrimes.Instead,heencounteredLauren,who appeared even more intoxicated than she had been earlier in theevening.ThepleadingssuggestthatRossmanwentto Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 4No. 14-3171 sleep at this point and that Beth was left alone with Lauren. Inlightofherconditionshewasslurringherspeech,for exampleBethtriedtoconvinceLaurentosleeponthe couch in the apartment. Lauren, however, wanted to go back toherapartment.Forreasonsthatarenotclear,insteadof escorting Lauren back to her apartment, Beth brought her to Rosenbaumsapartment,whichhadbeenthesiteofthe party earlier that evening.RosenbaumalsogrewconcernedwhenhesawLaurens condition. He atempted to contact several of her friends for thepurposeofarrangingaridebacktoherapartmentbut wasunabletoarrangetransport.Atthispoint,Bethlefthis apartment.Shortlyafterwards,atapproximately4:30a.m., RosenbaumallowedLaurentoleavehisresidenceonher own and briey observed her walking in the direction of her apartment.HewasthelastknownpersontoseeLauren alive. A security camera located along Laurens return route did not capture any images of her walking home.Despitefouryearsofextensivesearching,thereisno credibleinformationaboutwhathappenedtoLaurenafter sheleftRosenbaumsapartment.Takingmatersintotheir ownhands,Laurensparentsledthissuit,allegingthat Rossman,Rosenbaum,andBethwerenegligent,bothat common law and by Indiana statute, for failing to fulll their dutytocareforLaureninherincapacitatedcondition. Additionally,theplaintisbroughtaDramShopclaim againstRossmanandRosenbaumforfurnishingLauren with alcohol despite knowing that she was intoxicated at the time.Thedefendantseachledmotionstodismissand discoverywasstayedpendingtheirresolution.Thedistrict Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 No. 14-31715 court granted Beths motion and dismissed all claims against him.Also,itdismissedtheclaimsforcommonlaw negligenceagainstRossmanandRosenbaumbutdenied their respective motions to dismiss the other claims.Aftertheresolutionofthemotionstodismiss,the plaintiscastawidenetondiscovery.Tothatend,they soughttoconductupwardsoffourteendepositions,twelve of them of non-parties, in multiple locations, including New York,Boston,Detroit,andChicago;theyalsoissued subpoenas for an array of academic, disciplinary, telephone, and other records from various individuals.Afterthestayofdiscoverywasliftedbutbeforethe parties exchanged initial disclosures, Rosenbaum moved for summaryjudgment(andwaslaterjoinedbyRossman)on the grounds that the plaintis were unable to oer proof that thedefendantsweretheproximatecauseofanyveriable injurytoLaurendisappearance,byitself,isnotlegally deemedaninjury,soproofofsomeinjurywasrequiredto supporttheirclaims.Thedefendantsalsomovedtoquash thenon-partysubpoenasandtolimitdiscoverytotheissue of proximate cause, that is, to address only evidence related towhetherthedefendantsactionscausedsevereinjuryor death to Lauren.A series of back-and-forth lings ensued that culminated withthedistrictcourtupholdingthemagistratejudges decisiontolimitdiscoverytotheissueofproximate causation.Additionally,becausetheplaintishad respondedtodefendantssummaryjudgmentmotions, thosemotionsweredeemedripeforadjudicationandthe districtcourtgrantedsummaryjudgmentinfavorofthe defendants.Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 6No. 14-3171 Onappeal,theplaintischallengethreerulings:the decision to limit discovery, the grant of summary judgment, andthedismissalofthecommonlawnegligenceclaims. Theyarguethatthesummaryjudgmentmotionswere prematureandthatthedefendantsfailedtomeettheir burdentodemonstratetheabsenceofmaterialfact regardingcausation.Additionally,theplaintisappealthe districtcourtsdismissalofthecommonlawnegligence claims, contesting its reading of Indiana law that no duty of careexistedandthatLaurendidnotconstituteachildto supportacommonlawclaimforlossofservicesofachild. We review these arguments.II. Analysis At the outset, we analyze two related issues that overlap due to some unique features of this litigation. The rst is the decision by the magistrate judge (and adopted by the district judge)tosuspenddiscoverypendingtheresolutionofthe summaryjudgmentmotions.Thisisaproceduralissuethat implicatesthescopeofalitigantsrighttoconduct discovery. The second issue involves the actual resolution of thesummaryjudgmentmotions andtherespectiveburdens carriedbythelitigants.Inshort,whetherapartycanmove forsummaryjudgmentpriortodiscoveryandwhethera partycansupportitsburdenabsentsuchdiscoveryare separateinquiriesthatruntogetherduetoparticularitiesof this case.Wereviewrstwhetherthedistrictcourtabusedits discretion by failing to provide plaintis additional time for discovery.Davisv.G.N.Mortg.Corp.,396F.3d869,885(7th Cir. 2005). In the absence of a local rule or court order stating otherwise,Rule56(b)allowsapartytomoveforsummary Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 No. 14-31717 judgmentatanytimeuntil30daysafterthecloseof discovery.Nosuchruleororderexistshere,sothe defendantsactedwithintheirrightstomoveforsummary judgmenteventhoughsubstantialdiscoveryhadnot occurred. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). But moving for pre-discovery summaryjudgmentdoesnotautomaticallymeanthata court has to entertain the motion. Rule 56(d) allows the non-movingpartytosubmitanadavitordeclaration requestingthecourttodeferordenyjudgmentinorderto allow for appropriate discovery to address maters raised by the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Here, the plaintis took an unusualcourseofaction:theyrespondedtothemotionand ledadeclarationunderRule56(d)thatincludeda boilerplate request for discovery without identifying specic evidenceneededtorespondtodefendantsmotion.The magistratejudgefoundthedeclarationdecientbecauseit wastoogeneraltonotifythecourtofanyactualevidence needed to respond to the motion. Still more problematic, the declaration,ascomposed,didnotserveasamotionunder Rule56(d)foradditionaltimetorespondtothesummary judgment motion.Themagistratejudgeheldahearingonwhetherto extend discovery and asked plaintis what type of discovery theyneeded.Plaintiscounselresponded:Werenotasking foranythingtorespondtosummaryjudgment.Wethinkthatwe aregoingtowinonthebasisthat[thedefendants]havent met their burden. (Tr. at 24.) Further driving this point home, theplaintisarguedthattheyneededextendeddiscovery nottorespondtodefendantsmotions,butinordertole theirownmotionforsummaryjudgment.(Court:Butyou alreadytoldmethatyoudontneedanydiscoverytorespondto Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 8No. 14-3171 theirsummaryjudgmentmotions?PlaintisCounsel:ButI needdiscovery,Judge,tolemyownsummaryjudgment motion.) (Tr. at 70.)District courts have broad discretion in directing pretrial discoveryandtherulingsherewerewellwithinthis discretion.Spieglav.Hull,371F.3d928,944(7thCir.2004). The only relevant discovery at issue here is that which might havebeenavailabletoplaintistorespondtothesummary judgmentmotions.Theplaintisclaimednottoneedany andwetakethemattheirword.Whateverothertypesof discoverytheplaintismighthavewantedisnotatissue here.The more pressing issue on appeal is whether the award ofsummaryjudgmenttodefendantswasproperaruling thatwereviewdenovo.Ballv.Koter,723F.3d813,821(7th Cir.2013).Thestandardforsummaryjudgmentiswell established: with the court drawing all inferences in the light mostfavorabletothenon-movingparty,themovingparty mustdischargeitsburdenofshowingthatthereareno genuinequestionsofmaterialfactandthatheisentitledto judgmentasamateroflaw.Chaibv.Indiana,744F.3d974, 981(7thCir.2014).Ifthemovingpartyhasproperly supportedhismotion,theburdenshiftstothenon-moving party to come forward with specic facts showing that there isagenuineissuefortrial.CincinnatiLifeIns.Co.v.Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 951 (7th Cir. 2013). Relyingsolelyoncitationstofactsallegedinthe complaint,thedefendantsbroughttheirmotionswithno additionalevidence.Theplaintisareofthebeliefthat summaryjudgmentisimpossibleunlessthemovingparty rstsubmitsevidencetomeettheirburdenofproduction. Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 No. 14-31719 No such evidence having been produced, they claim that the award of summary judgment was wrong as a mater of law. Plaintisargumentisalmostidenticaltotheonethatthe SupremeCourtrejectedinCelotexCorp.v.Catret,477U.S. 317(1986),theseminalcaseoutliningtherespective obligationsofthepartiesinsummaryjudgmentmotions. Likehere,thepartiestothatdisputecontestedwhether, underRule56,thepartyseekingsummaryjudgmentwas requiredtobringevidenceintheformofadavitsorother materials to demonstrate the absence of a question about an issueofmaterialfact.Id.TheCourtheldthatthemoving party had no such burden because there existed no express orimpliedrequirementinRule56thatthemovingparty supportitsmotionwithadavitsorothersimilarmaterials negatingtheopponentsclaim.Id.at323(emphasisin original).Intheirbriefs,theplaintisreferrepeatedlytothe burdenofproductionbornebythemovingpartyandwe suspectthisphraseliesattheheartoftheirconfusion.This phraseisusedtosignifytherespectiveallocationsof evidencethatpartiesmustpresentatagivenstageof litigation.See,e.g.,St.MarysHonorCenterv.Hicks,509U.S. 502,506(1993)(citingMcDonnellDouglasCorp.v.Green,411 U.S.792(1973));Director,OcerofWorkersCompensation Programs,Dept.ofLaborv.GreenwichCollieries,512U.S.267, 272(1994)(deningtheburdenofproductionunderthe AdministrativeProceduresActasapartysobligationto come forward with evidence to support its claim.).In Celotex, the Court surveyed Rule 56 and found nothing in that rule requiring the moving party to produce evidence. Ofcourse,therecanbenoburdenofproductionabsenta Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 10No. 14-3171 mandatetoproduceevidence.Theactualrequirementin Rule56islessspecic:themovingpartyneedonlyinform thecourtofthebasisforthemotionandidentifysupporting materials.Celotex,477U.S.at323([A]partyseeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informingthedistrictcourtofthebasisofitsmotion,and identifyingthoseportionsofthepleadings,depositions, answerstointerrogatories,andadmissionsonle,together with the adavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absenceofagenuineissueofmaterialfact.)(citingFed.R. Civ.P.56).Thatthemovingpartyneednotproduce evidencedoesnotgivethemaneasypathtosummary judgment,itonlymeansthattheirburdenisoneof demonstration rather than production.ThetextofRule56hasbeensubjecttovarious amendments(in1987,2009,and2010)sincetheCelotex decisionwashandeddownbutnoneoftheseconictswith thesubstanceoftherulinginthatcase.Contraryto plaintisarguments,theonlyburdenofproduction recognized in Rule 56 falls upon the nonmoving party once a basisforsummaryjudgmenthasbeenestablished(andthis canbeinitiatedsuaspontebyacourtunderRule56(f)with propernotice).TheAdvisoryCommiteeNotestothe2010 Amendmentsstatethat:[s]ubdivision(c)(1)(B)[ofRule56] recognizesthatapartyneednotalwayspointtospecic record materials And a party who does not have the trial burdenofproductionmayrelyonashowingthataparty whodoeshavethetrialburdencannotproduceadmissible evidencetocarryitsburdenastothefact.Seealso,Ricciv. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) ([W]here the nonmoving partywillbeartheburdenofproofattrialonadispositive Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 No. 14-317111 issue,thenonmovingpartybearstheburdenofproduction underRule56todesignatespecicfactsshowingthatthere isagenuineissuefortrial.)(internalquotationmarks omited).Tobesure,itisararecaseinwhichamovingpartycan establishabasisforsummaryjudgmentwithoutputing forthsomeevidence.Butsuchcasesexist,asevidencedby theonehere.Thedefendantscitedtothepleadingsto contendthattheplaintiswouldnotbeabletomeettheir burdenofproductionattrialtodemonstrateaveriable injurytoLaurenthatwascausedbythedefendantsactions and not other intervening factors. Given this set of facts, that was sucient to meet their burden for summary judgment. Dram Shop Act and Negligence Per SeTobeliableundertheIndianaDramShop Act,aperson must:(1)furnishalcoholtoanotherperson;(2)haveactual knowledgethatthepersontowhomthealcoholicbeverage wasfurnishedwasvisiblyintoxicatedatthetime;and,(3) theintoxicationofthepersontowhomthealcoholic beveragewasfurnishedmustbetheproximatecauseofthe death, injury, or damage alleged in the complaint. I.C. 7.1-5-10-15.5.Negligenceperse(sometimescalledlegalnegligence) occurs when a violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligenceasamateroflaw.Erwinv.Roe,928N.E.2d609, 616(Ind.Ct.App.2010)(anunexcusedviolationofa statutorydutyconstitutesnegligenceperseifthestatuteor ordinance is intended to protect the class of persons in which the plainti is included and to protect against the risk of the type of harm which has occurred as a result of its violation. Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 12No. 14-3171 (quotingKhov.Pennington,875N.E.2d208,212(Ind.2007)). Persenegligencecanbedistinguishedfromcommonlaw negligencebecausetheformerrequires proof of violation of a statute or ordinance while the later does not.Thedistrictcourtrstreviewedtheseclaimsonthe motionstodismisswhicharguedthattheclaimsfailed becausetheplaintiscouldnotprovethatLaurenwas injuredordeceased.Personsarepresumedaliveunder Indianalawforsevenyearsaftertheirdisappearance whereuponapresumptionofdeathmightarisefroman unexplainedabsence.SeeRobertsv.WabashLifeIns.Co.,410 N.E.2d1377,1382(Ind.Ct. App.1980);PrudentialIns.Co.of Am. v. Moore, 149 N.E. 718, 721 (Ind. 1925). The district court recognized this presumption but noted that a second avenue of proof was available to the plaintis: they could use direct orcircumstantialevidencetoshowthatthemissingperson was,infact,deceased.Signicantly,thedistrictcourtruled fortheplaintisforonesimplereasonduringthe pleadingsstageoflitigation,thecourtwasboundtoaccept the factual assertion that Lauren had died. The judge noted: itwouldbeinappropriatefortheCourttomakea ndingasamateroflawthatLaurenispresumedtobe alive.TheSpierersshouldbeaordedtheopportunityto presentcircumstantialevidenceinordertoprovethat Laurenisdeceased.App.Ex.at3031.Thislanguage should have signaled to plaintis that they were not likely to survivelaterstagesoflitigationmerelyonthestrengthof theirallegations;soonerorlatertheywouldhavetoput forthevidence,whetherdirectorcircumstantial, demonstrating a discrete injury to Lauren resulting from the actions of the defendants.Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 No. 14-317113 Unsurprisingly,thedefendantsmovedimmediatelyfor summaryjudgmentinordertorevisitthesameissuethis time under the more stringent summary judgment standard. Theycitedtothepleadingstoarguethattherewasno genuineissueoffact that Laurenwasmissingandtherefore therewasnoevidencetoallowajurytodeterminewhat happenedtoher.Becauseofthis,theyclaimedthatthe plaintiscouldnotdemonstrateproximatecauseandtheir claims must fail.Insteadofrequestingdiscoverytoaddressproximate cause,theplaintisarguedthattheyhadnoburdento producecountervailingevidencebecausetheearlierruling thatLaurenwouldnotbepresumedalivehadapreclusive eect.(Tr.at1314.)Theydidsubmitanadavitfroma pharmacologistdemonstratingthatLaurensueredthat nightfromdiminishedmentalandphysicalcapacityasa resultofheralcoholconsumption,butthesematerialsdid notaddressthemorerelevantquestionofwhetherLauren hadsueredaveriableinjurysucienttosupportthe claims.Plaintispreclusionargumentfailsbecausethedistrict court did not issue a ruling about whether Lauren was alive ornot;itmerelystatedthatittreatedallofthefactsinthe complaintastruebecauseitwasrequiredtodosoona motiontodismiss.Oncethepleadingsphaseended,the plaintisfactsarenolongertakenastruebutmustbe substantiatedbyevidenceifchallenged.Thepleadingsin thiscaseareclearenoughLaurenhasbeenmissingsince leavingRosenbaumsapartmentthatnight.Thedefendants hadtodolitlemorethancitetothepleadingstoestablish this fact. At that point, the burden shifted to the plaintis to Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 14No. 14-3171 providesomeevidencethatLaurensustainedadistinct injury and that the defendants actions were the cause of this injury.Theplaintisdeclinedtoproduceevidencetooerany plausible account of what happened to Lauren after she was last seen. For this reason, the district court correctly granted summary judgment because the plaintis carried the burden ofprovingthatthedefendants(andnotothercauses)were the proximate cause of any injury to Lauren, and speculation cannotsupportandingofproximatecause.Here,the specterofcriminalactionsbythirdpartieshoversoverthis tragiccase,andthisispreciselythetypeofcircumstance which breaks the causal chain under Indiana law. See Johnson v. Jacobs, 970 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (A willful, maliciouscriminalactisaninterveningactthatbreaksthe causalchainbetweentheallegednegligenceandthe resulting harm.).Onamotionforsummaryjudgment,factsmustbe viewedinthelightmostfavorabletothenonmovingparty only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts. Scot v. Harris,550U.S.372,380(2007).Asitstands,thereareno facts to present to a jury to determine the nature of the injury sueredbyLauren.Stillmoreproblematic,itremainspure speculationwhetheranyinjurywascausedbythe defendantsactionsorthecriminalinterventionofathird party.Forthisreason,thedistrictcourtcorrectlygranted summaryjudgment.Wheretherecordtakenasawhole couldnotleadarationaltrieroffacttondforthe nonmovingparty,thereisnogenuineissuefortrial. MatsushitaElec.IndustrialCo.v.ZenithRadioCorp.,475U.S. 574, 587 (1986).Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 No. 14-317115 Common Law Negligence Thedistrictcourtalsodismissedthecommonlaw negligence claims against all defendants for failing to state a claimcapableofrelief.Wereviewtheserulingsdenovo. AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). To surviveamotiontodismissunderRule12(b)(6),aplainti must state enough facts that, when accepted as true, state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.Twombly,550U.S.544,570(2007)(discussingFed.R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintis must allege factsthatshowthatthedefendants:(1)owedadutyto Lauren;(2)thattheybreachedthatduty;and,(3)that Laurensdeathwasproximatelycausedbythebreach. WitmatDev.Corp.v.Dickerson,907N.E.2d170,173(Ind.Ct. App. 2009). Indiana courts use a three-part balancing test to determinewhetheradutyexistswhenithasnotbeen declaredorotherwisearticulated.NorthernIndianaPublic ServiceCo.v.Sharp,790N.E.2d462,465(Ind.2003). Specically,courtsconsider:therelationshipbetweenthe parties,theforeseeabilityoftheoccurrence,andpublic policyconcerns.SeeWebbv.Jarvis,575N.E.2d992,995(Ind. 1991).Opposingthemotiontodismiss,theplaintisasserted four bases for a duty of care, none of which the district court accepted.Onappeal,theynarrowtheirfocustoarguethat thedefendantsowedadutyofcaretoLaurenoncethey voluntarilyundertooktoassistheratvariouspointsinthe evening.Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 16No. 14-3171 Indianalawrecognizesacommonlawdutyofcare where one party assumes such a duty either gratuitously or voluntarily. The assumption of such a duty creates a special relationshipbetweenthepartiesandacorrespondingduty to act in the manner of a reasonably prudent person. Yost v. WabashCollege,3N.E.3d509,517(Ind.2014)(quotation omited).Althoughtheexistenceandextentofanassumed dutyisgenerallyaquestionoffactforthejury,itmaybe resolvedasamateroflawifthedesignatedevidenceis insucienttoestablishaninjury.SeeTeitgev.RemyConst. Co. Inc., 526 N.E.2d 1008, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).Here,theallegationsestablishthateachdefendanttried toassistLaureninsomewayandthathisassistancewas foundwanting.Thecriticalquestiontheniswhether,as alleged, the assistance provided by the defendants created a legaldutytocareforLauren.Indianacourtshavehadfew occasionstoconsiderthisquestionasthevastmajorityof assumption-of-dutycasesrelatetoocialorbusiness obligations rather than the purely voluntary actions of social peers.Thedistrictcourtfoundtheclosestanaloguesinthe casesofLatherv.Berg,519N.E.2d755(Ind.Ct.App.1988), andHawnv.Padget,598N.E.2d630(Ind.Ct.App.1992), whichaddresswhetherpersonscanbeheldliableforfailed atempts to prevent others from driving while drunk.InLather,agroupofteenagefriendsgotdrunktogether beforeoneannouncedhisintentiontodrivehome.The friends atempted to intervene to the point of taking his keys butrelentedwhentheprospectivedriverbecame increasinglybelligerent;eventuallytheykickedhimoutof thehouseandthrewthekeysathim.Whiledrivinghome, thedriverengagedpoliceinahigh-speedchasebefore Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 No. 14-317117 crashingintoapatrolcarandkillingapoliceocer.The IndianaCourtofAppealsupheldagrantofsummary judgmentforthedefendantonthegroundsthataperson does not undertake to perform a legal duty owed to another unless he does so on behalf of and in lieu of that person. Lather, 519N.E.2dat766.Liabilitydoesnotariseinthesituation when one undertakes to perform functions coordinate toor even duplicative ofactivities imposed by another by a legal duty, but rather the situation in which one actually undertakes toperformfortheotherthelegaldutyitself.Id.(emphasisin originalbutinternalquotationomited).Asimpler formulationofthisistosaythatIndianacourtsdonot recognizeliabilityunlesstheactor,byassumingthisduty, eectivelydisplacestheotherfromperformingthesame action.Becausetheprospectivedriverneverceased atemptingtoregainpossessionofhiskeys,thedefendant could not be deemed to act on behalf of or in lieu of the driver.Hawninvolvedsimilarfacts.Agroupoffriendsdrank alcohol together at a campsite until late in the evening when oneofthemsoughttoleaveinhistrucktobuycigaretes. Thedefendants,twofemaleacquaintances,tookhiskeysto preventhimfromdriving.Aftertheywerethreatenedand physically accosted by the prospective driver, the defendants threw his keys out of their tent. Shortly thereafter, the driver crashed into a tree, killing a passenger who had fallen asleep inthebedofthetruck.RecognizingthatIndianacourts have shown great reluctance to require an individual to take anyactiontocontrolathirdpartywhenthereisnospecial relationshipbetweenthem,theIndianaCourtofAppeals held that the defendants were not negligent as there was no Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 18No. 14-3171 special relationship between the parties. Hawn 598 N.E.2d at 634. The plaintis counter with the case of Buchanan v. Vowell, 926N.E.2d515,52021(Ind.Ct.App.2010),whichalso involved drunk driving but with a distinct twist: rather than tryingtopreventadrunkpersonfromdriving,the defendantinthatcasesoughttoaidthedrunkenpersonin herdriving,withpredictablytragicconsequences.Inthis case,amotheranddaughterdrankalcoholtogetherata workeventtosuchextentthatthedaughterwaslegally intoxicated.Insteadofcallingacab,thetwohatchedaplan wherebyeachdroveherowncarhome,butwiththe daughter in a lead car and the mother trailing behind as the twospoketoeachotherontheircellphones.Ontheway home,thedaughterstruckapedestrian,causingsevere injuries.The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed and held that the mother had assumed a duty of care to prevent the daughter frominjuringotherswhensheenteredintoanagreement withhertomakesureshedrovehomesuccessfully.Inso holding,theCourtdistinguishedbothLatherandBerg because the defendants in those cases sought to intervene to preventtortiousbehaviorwhilethemotheractivelysought to encourage it.Whilerecognizingthedissimilaritiesbetweenthefact paternsandtheonepresentedhere,theanalysisinthose casesleaveslitledoubtthatIndianacourtswouldnot recognizeanassumptionofdutyinthiscase.Thecourtin Hawnoeredthemostspecicformulationofwhenaduty ofcarearisesbasedononesvoluntaryactions.Citingto Sports Inc. v. Gilbert, 431 N.E.2d 534, 538 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 No. 14-317119 itrecognizedthreefactorsthatfrequentlyaccompanyan assumption of duty over a third person. They are: (1) where one person is in need of supervision or protection (such as a child,intoxicatedperson,orbusinessinvitee);(2)from someonewhoisina superior position to provide it (parent, supplierofalcohol,businessowner,hospital)and(3)that personhasarighttointerveneorcontroltheactionsofthe other person. See Hawn, 598 N.E.2d at 634. Lauren was in a vulnerable state and therefore in need of protection and the plaintis easily satisfy the rst factor.But thesecondfactorfailsbecausedefendantswereclassmates ofLaurenandnotinpositionsofsuperiority.Whileone couldarguethat,byprovidingLaurenwithalcohol, RossmanandRosenbaumassumedsuchresponsibility,the courtsinLatherandHawndeclinedtoimposeliabilityin thosecaseswhereagroupofsocialpeersprovidedeach otherwithalcohol.(Thiscontrastswiththeholdingof Buchanan,whichrecognizedthepositionofsuperiorityofa mothertoherdaughter.)Additionally,eachofthethree defendants was apart from Lauren during important parts of theevening;RossmanwasnotpresentwhenLauren returnedtoRosenbaumsapartment,whileRosenbaumand BethhadbothpartedwayswithLaurenhoursearlierwith noindicationthattheywouldseeheragainthatevening. Thattheyexpresssurprise(Beth)andconcern(Rosenbaum) whentheyseehershowsthattheywerenotexpectingto encounterheratthatlatehour,stilllessinthatcondition. ThereissimplynocasewhereIndianacourtshave recognizedresponsibilityonthepartofapersontoensure thesafetyofintoxicatedpersonswithwhomtheyhave unexpectedlycomeintocontact.Torecognizeaspecial Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 20No. 14-3171 relationship based only on these factors would be to greatly expandtheclassofrelationshipssubjecttospecialduties under Indiana law. Thethirdfactoralsofavorsthedefendants.Despite Laurensvisibleintoxication,thefactsdonotestablishthat defendantshadtheright or ability to control her movement tosuchdegreeastoforcehertoremaininacertainplace. Rossman escorted Lauren to her oor before bringing her to his apartment for reasons that are not clear. From there, Beth atemptedtogetLaurentosleeponthecouchbutwas unabletodosoforreasonsthatarealsonotknown. RosenbaumatemptedtoarrangetransportforLauren,and itwasonlyafterhewasunabletodosothatLauren departed.ThereisnoindicationthatRosenbaumcompelled orevenencouragedhertoleavehisapartment.Despiteher diminished capacity, the pleadings demonstrate that Lauren left Rosenbaums apartment under her own volition and was not encouraged to leave. BecausehewaswithLaurenthemajorityoftheevening andboughtdrinksforher,Rossmanwasnearestto assuming a duty to care for her. But he also appears to have been intoxicatedso much so that it is questionable whether hecouldeectivelytakecareofhimself,stilllessanother person.Indianacourtshaveshowngreatreluctanceto requireanindividualtotakeanyactiontocontrolathird partywhenthereisnospecialrelationshipbetweenthem. Hawn, 598 N.E.2d at 633. We have found no decisions under Indiana law where persons were held liable for the actions of their social peers, absent additional factors not present here. Toholdotherwisewouldbetoextendthereachof negligencefarbeyondspecialrelationshipsandinto Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21 No. 14-317121 virtuallyallsocialrelationshipsandsituationswherearisk of danger might be present.Forthesereasons,weagreewiththedistrictcourtthat theplaintishavefailedtostateaplausibleclaimunder Indianalawforcommonlawnegligence.Becausewearm thedismissal,weneednotconsidertheplaintisclaim underIndianasChildWrongfulDeathStatuteasthattype ofclaimisfunctionallyidenticaltooneforcommonlaw negligenceandwouldfailforthesamereasons.SeeEd. WiersmaTruckingCo.v.Pfa,643N.E.2d909,911(Ind.Ct. App. 1994). Likewise, we need not review the district courts rulingthatLaurensageprecludedreliefforthelossof services of a child under Indiana law.III. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Case: 14-3171Document: 41Filed: 08/14/2015Pages: 21