Spiegel 2003 - Regional Security and the Levels of Analysis Problem

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Regional security and the levels ofanalysis problemSteven Spiegela Burkle Center for International Relations, UCLAPublished online: 04 Jun 2010.

To cite this article: Steven Spiegel (2003) Regional security and the levels of analysis problem,Journal of Strategic Studies, 26:3, 75-98, DOI: 10.1080/01402390412331303065

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After the war in Iraq and more than two years of violence that hasaccompanied the second Intifada, it may seem inappropriate, if not naive, todiscuss regional security issues in the Middle East. However, the threats ofWeapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), terrorism, social and economicdecline at a time of increasing regional tension demonstrates the urgencywith which these problems must be dealt. Using the level of analysisframework, this contribution will explore the issues involved in creating aregional security regime to mitigate these dangers.

The levels of analysis allow us to identify causal factors of internationalpolitics. This approach disaggregates a states foreign policy into threelevels, which include the systemic level (the interaction between states), thedomestic level (including both societal and bureaucratic factors withincountries), and the individual level (leaders). After identifying the forces thataffect foreign policy at each level, we shall conclude that the best solution forregional security in the Middle East must combine all three levels.

Therefore, since they both complement each other and cancel each otherout, we conclude that the best way to promote regional security in thesedifficult times is to promote Track II, unofficial, informal contacts andnegotiations. We will reach this conclusion by reviewing the levels ofanalysis, suggesting their implications for current Middle East security, andthen through conceptual and instrumental means recommend ways ofdeveloping innovative methods for developing more stable regionalrelations.

The outline of the essay is as follows: (1) the level of analysis questionand regional security regimes; (2) the challenges of the three levels; (3)countering the challenges by conceptual and instrumental means; (4)

5

Regional Security and the Levels of Analysis Problem

STEVEN L. SPIEGEL

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specific conceptual and instrumental steps; (5) a new concept of regionalsecurity for the Middle East.

THE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

SystemicIn the systemic level of international politics, the state is the unit of analysis.This approach posits that states are essentially similar in nature as utilitymaximizers. Indeed, their behavior is partly a result of the systemsstructure.1

The systemic level of analysis is closely associated with the realistschool of international relations. Briefly, (neo) realists assume conflict, notcooperation is the natural relationship among states.2 In this environment ofanarchy, each state is driven by its desire for power and security. Otherfactors that influence state behavior include several major political actors inthe system and their relative strength.3

Another perspective that focuses on the systemic level in internationalpolitics is neo-liberalism. While both neo-liberals and neo-realists share theview that the state is a rational, unitary actor, they differ in their perspectivesabout the nature of states and their interests.4 Neo-liberals believe that statesare driven by their interest in wealth and are concerned with absolute, notrelative, gains.5

Moreover, neo-liberals believe cooperation is possible and will emergewhen states calculate it is in their best interest. Another importantdistinction between the perspectives is that neo-liberals emphasize theimportant role institutions can play in negotiations. While neo-realistsbelieve institutions are just an extension of a states interest, neo-liberalsclaim institutions are important because they lower transaction costs,change preferences, and induce cooperation.6

When we use modern Middle East history to test these systemic theories,neo-realism seems to have the most explanatory power. For example, Arabstates cite much rhetoric about their common heritage but they have oftenbehaved contrary to a pan-Arab agenda, even in the Arab League. Egyptattempted to unify the Arab world under the banner of pan-Arabism in the1950s and 1960s yet it was often at odds with Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and SaudiArabia. We can even find this pattern of conflict going back to the end ofthe colonial era in the 1940s.

Broader arrangements such as the Baghdad Pact and the multilateralprocess in the 1990s did not yield an effective structure or alliance. The

Building Regional Security in the Middle East76

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Baghdad Pact, although an external attempt to organize a regional securitysystem sponsored by Britain with the support of the US, also faltered onregional tensions, particularly the EgyptianIraqi confrontation of the 1950s.

A second example supporting neo-realist claims demonstrates afundamental idea of this theory: balance of power politics and powercalculations. Nasser tried to undermine the legitimacy and destabilize theArab monarchies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia. As a result, these monarchiestried (albeit unsuccessfully) to counterbalance against Egypts drive forregional hegemony. This process of balancing against a revisionist powerexposes the myth of Arab unity and supports neo-realist claims.7

The realist view also downplays the role of verbal and writtenagreements. In a similar manner, realism sees norms (and identity) asepiphenomal. Little is binding in this environment because survival andpower for the state are the ultimate concerns. The following two examplesafter Oslo seem to confirm the realist view. One project was an internationalconference on terrorism in the wake of a terrorist campaign against Israel inFebruary/March 1996. At Sharm-el-Sheik in Egypt, this conference soughtto coordinate efforts to combat international terrorism. States came togetherin the interests of limiting the destabilizing impact terrorism might have onthe region. This meeting, jointly chaired by the US and Egypt, wassupposed to be the first of several. The ensuing meetings were never heldafter Israel retaliated against Lebanon in April 1996 for Hizballah attacksinside its border (Operation Grapes of Wrath).

A second aborted regional effort was a series of annual economicsummits designed to promote business arrangements in the region as well aspolitical dialogue. Beginning in 1994, these meetings were held for fouryears. They were suspended after a disappointing turnout at the meeting inQatar in 1997, ostensibly in protest at Prime Minister BinyaminNetanyahus policies.

In sum, we have seen that neo-realism best explains modern Middle Easthistory. This approach highlights the importance of security, but it focusesmuch more on predicting conflict rather than cooperation. Neo-liberalism,on the other hand, offers the prospect of cooperation through institutions inthe hope that the creation and acceptance of norms will influence stateinterests. Taken together, these approaches emphasize the salience ofanswering security concerns and, at the same time, working to create anenvironment conducive for cooperation.

DomesticThe domestic level of analysis focuses on a variety of forces which can

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influence state behavior. Factors that can impact foreign policy at thedomestic level include regime type (democratic v. authoritarian v.totalitarian), electoral politics, bureaucracy, political culture, public opinion,and interest groups.

Public Opinion and Party Politics. Public attitudes and opinions can exertpressure on leaders by demonstrating the costs they might incur if they takea particular action. In authoritarian regimes, leaders may not have to worryabout the effect of their decisions at the polls, but disapproval may be morecostly than just losing an election.

In much of the Middle East, the Arab street, or the masses, canpose significant challenges to a leaders policy and his legitimacy. MostArab leaders are afraid and often constrained by this domestic force.Many argue that these leaders might pursue the peace process with Israelmore vigorously were it not for the impact of this factor. A recentexample is Yasser Arafats insistence that his people (their potentialcriticism and the popularity of Hamas and Islamic Jihad) prevent himfrom making certain concessions. That was certainly a major argumentused by Palestinians to justify Arafats refusal to negotiate at CampDavid in July 2000. While some analysts argue that claiming my handsare tied is just a bargaining tactic, especially since Arafat has done verylittle recently to stand up to his opponents, others maintain there may justbe some truth to the point.

How a state manages its domestic opposition can affect its credibilityas a peace partner. Certainly, Arafats reluctance to confront terrorists hasdestroyed his credibility in Israel. In fact, some politicians claim thatIsrael could afford to make major concessions in the pursuit of peaceonly when all Arab states become democracies.8 These political claimsare often buttressed by the democratic peace theory, which asserts thatdemocracies rarely, if ever, go to war with each other.9

Complexities of parliamentary politics may further complicatenegotiations. In Israel, for instance, Prime Ministers Rabin, Peres,Netanyahu, and Barak faced great difficulties trying to pursue their ownpolitical agendas. The Labor party was reluctant to confront settlers beforean agreement was reached and therefore delayed restraining the growth ofsettlements. Moreover, leaders of both parties had to simultaneouslynegotiate at two levels, the domestic and the systemic. They had to contendwith intra-party politics, manage coalitions, and mitigate external pressuresfrom the international arena.


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Bureaucratic Politics. This approach challenges the neo-realist assumptionthat the state is a unitary, rational actor.10 The model acknowledges thebargaining between agencies and individuals that may result in a foreignpolicy outcome different from the leaders original intention.11 The phrase,where you stand depends [up]on where you sit is appropriate forexplaining the divisions within governments and how particular agenciescan impede the decision-making process.12

An example of this type of problem occurred during the arms control talksin the 1990s. The leadership of the Egyptians and Israelis were ostensiblycommitted to the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) process, whichwas one of the five regional multilaterals during the early 1990s. However,bureaucratic cultures specific to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry and the IsraeliDefense Ministry, respectively, inhibited efforts to agree on a common set ofprinciples that would serve as the basis for further discussions.13

For instance, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry is dominated by anemphasis on international legal norms and shaped by personal experiencesat the UN. In contrast, decision-making within the Israeli Defense Ministryis characterized by an emphasis on uncompromising self-relianceconcerning arms control issues. The result was that the respective countriesbureaucracies produced policy stances that were difficult to reconcile at theleadership level. These entrenched attitudes continue to inhibit the ability ofthe Egyptians and Israelis to reach common ground on the arms controlissue, constraining the possibility of settlement.

Interest Groups. Some interest groups have played an influential role inobstructing the peace process. The groups most opposed to accommodationrepresent ideological movements such as pan-Arabism, Islamic extremism,and Jewish extreme, right-wing ideologues. Fundamentalist sheiks caneffectively mobilize public sentiment against a government regarding itspolicy toward Israel. In Egypt, both intellectuals and fundamentalistsopposed a normalization of ties with Israel.14 Similarly, unions andfundamentalists have been vociferously opposed to such normalization inJordan.15

In the Jewish State, opposition to the Oslo Accords, expressed throughright-wing political parties, delayed and even blocked Israeli concessions.These compromises could well have eased the way to confidence-buildingmeasures with the Palestinians and might have prevented the outbreak of asecond Intifada. Employing a variety of tactics, these ideologically driveninterest groups in various countries have exacerbated tensions within theregion and hampered the development of a regional security system.


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On the other hand, interest groups can be a source of support for thepeace process, a pattern also witnessed in the 1990s. The business andmilitary communities were generally supportive of diplomatic efforts inJordan, Egypt and Israel. Specifically, individual entrepreneurs and businessleaders defended the peace process and spoke of the benefits for all thecountries involved.16 Business leaders often had access to the leaders of theirrespective countries and sought to convince them of the economic benefitsof peace.

In sum, the domestic level is a critical factor in forming a regionalsecurity framework. On the one hand, many states are reluctant to enter intoregional security arrangements because of pressures within their particularsocieties and governments. On the other hand, there are several potentialdomestic sources of support for international cooperation and betterregional relations.

IndividualThe third level of analysis emphasizes the role played by individual leadersin determining the direction of government policy.17 Scholars whoemphasize this level of analysis remind us that leaders can change domesticsettings. For instance, one thinks of De Gaulles abrupt withdrawal fromAlgeria, Nixons opening to China, Sadats trip to Jerusalem, and thedramatic handshakes between Rabin and Arafat, and Rabin and KingHussein. The individual decisions that stemmed from leaders beliefsdemonstrate the importance of addressing the conflict at the individuallevel.

Leaders can also change their attitudes and policies ahead of theirconstituents, as seen in the case of Sadat, Rabin, and King Hussein. Thedevelopment of personal relations between the heads of state maycontribute to this attitude change. For example, some regard the friendlyrelationship between King Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin as a significant factorcontributing to the IsraeliJordanian peace agreement. It follows that thedeaths of these two leaders may have been critical factors leading to thecollapse of the Oslo process. Similarly, during the current Intifada, there hasbeen much talk about the effect of the extreme animosity between Sharonand Arafat on their respective decision-making. This notion emphasizes therole of unique personalities and their interaction as the key explanatoryfactor for state behavior. Moreover, these examples make a strong case forthe saliency of the individual level of analysis.

Finally, dramatic shifts in policy often occur when there is a leadershipchange. In Egypt, the transitions between Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak


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divide the history of Middle East politics into different periods. Similarly, inIsrael the tenures of Shamir, Rabin/Peres, Netanyahu, Barak, and Sharonhave brought major changes. It is clear that each leader took his country indifferent directions in the ArabIsraeli peace process.

THE CHALLENGES OF THE THREE LEVELS

A brief review demonstrates how the dynamics at each level may affect thesuccess or failure of a regional security regime. Realists arguing from asystemic level are the most pessimistic. They warn that no regional securitysystem can be developed except through a common calculation of interestand threat perception. Even under these conditions, cooperation or evenalliances should be viewed as marriages of convenience. Neo-liberals,however, provide mechanisms making regional security work.

The individual level stresses the importance of the personalcharacteristics of leaders and their personal relations. Moreover, this levelallows that regional security can be built from the elite level downward,whereas the domestic level claims it is only by gaining popular support thatregional security systems become possible. The domestic level alsoencompasses non-official areas of contact.

The Individual and Domestic Level ChallengesIn building a regional security system, the domestic level presents the mostserious of challenges because one form of the domestic argument basicallyargues for sweeping changes at home as a precursor to building an effectiveregional structure. Obviously, a region of thriving democracies andeconomies, replete with social and economic reform, would make the taskof building a regional security system infinitely easier. Political, economic,and even social reforms are necessary before any kind of stable regionalrelationship could emerge according to this argument. Weak economiesoften translate to political instability.

Borrowing partially from individual level ideas, many agree that theinefficient distribution of goods and services by political leaders leads toeconomic and political instability. From this vantage point, particularleaders such as Saddam Hussein, when he was in power, and MuammarQadaffi are not seen as reliable partners for serious cooperation; nor are theyperceived as credible negotiators to conclude international agreements.

The recent publication of the Arab Human Development Report showsthat shortcomings are deeply rooted in the institutional structures of thestate. The study points out that the combined GDP of Arab economies is


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smaller than Spains and concludes that there is a critical lack of freedom,womens empowerment, and modern education.18 Thus, calls for politicalreform as a solution to these endemic problems have become increasinglywidespread.

In adopting a partial argument from the individual level as well, manyAmerican and Israeli officials have recently maintained that Palestinianpolitical reform would lead to the ouster of Yasser Arafat or at least hisbeing kicked upstairs to the role of a symbolic figure. International anddomestic pressure for internal leadership reform came to fruition with theappointment of Abu Mazen as Prime Minister in Spring 2003. Thisappointment, followed four months later by the selection of a second primeminister, Abu Alla, could mark the beginning of a process of reform andpave the way for a more efficient and equitable distribution of goods andservices.

We certainly have evidence of the applicability of the argument thatreform is necessary for meaningful economic and social growth in theMiddle East. Yet other factors, such as the pressure for globalization fromtechnological and economic developments, have contributed to regionalaccommodation in the Middle East.19 Indeed, the rising business classthroughout the region has pressed for ArabIsraeli accommodation in orderto create a climate for enhanced foreign investment and domestic growth.The crucial point is that domestic growth, resulting from economic activityfocused on the global marketplace, could both be an incentive forintensified regional cooperation in the security arena and a beneficiary of aregional security system.

If social, economic, and political reforms occurred in the region, there isno question that the establishment of a strong regional security systemwould be likely. However, assuming they would work, even with concertedand effective efforts, it would take years for the recommendations of theArab Human Development Report to be realized. Meanwhile, the growingtensions and conflicts in the region continue. So the challenge of thedomestic and individual levels is to take the kind of immediate steps whichmay be possible in the short term to facilitate some of kind of regionalsystem arrangement, even if these measures prove to be only interim effortson the way to more complex structures.

The Security Dilemma: Dealing with Neo-Realist RealitiesThe systemic challenges to regional security are as disheartening as thetasks at the other two levels. As neo-realists emphasize, security concernshave a profound effect and often dictate state behavior in international


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politics. States may internally balance in reaction to a security dilemmawhich may result in an arms race and crisis instability in the region. It is forthis reason that an arms control process is an essential component of aregional security regime. At a minimum, a regional regime must continue towork toward reducing the potential for violent conflict between states.

However, there has been little effort to handle these issues in the MiddleEast. One rare example after the Madrid Conference in October 1991 wasthe aforementioned working group, the ACRS, which dealt directly withissues of high politics or military security. Although it came close toreaching an agreement on principles, the exercise failed because of thepreviously cited IsraeliEgyptian dispute over how to address the nuclearquestion.

Yet even neo-realists themselves recognize that progress is notimpossible. If the pressures are strong enough, a state will deal with almostanyone, claims Kenneth Waltz.20 He continues, alliances are made bystates that have some but not all of their interests in common. The commoninterest is ordinarily a negative one: fear of other states.21 On a systemiclevel, potential common interests in the Middle East encompass the growingthreat of WMD, including nuclear proliferation, and transnational terroristactivity, one or both of which could one day form the basis for progress ina regional security regime.

Nonetheless, progress toward such a regime is extremely difficultwithout adequate domestic support and credible commitments by regionalleaders. For example, NATO could not exist without a strong commoncalculation of interests, a supportive societal infrastructure, and leaders whoare ready to cooperate. In the Middle East, these factors have never existedsimultaneously, and all three have often been missing. They will not beginto exist until there is an end to IsraeliPalestinian violence and movestoward ArabIsraeli diplomatic progress. But the mistake of the neo-realistsis to look only at one level for dealing with the security dilemma. Noconstruction of a regional security regime is possible without taking intoaccount all levels of analysis.

COUNTERING THE CHALLENGES BY CONCEPTUAL ANDINSTRUMENTAL MEANS

Developing a More Informal Concept of a Regional Security RegimeGiven the conditions identified by the challenges, the first step is to devisenew approaches which recognize these problems and move to overcome


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them. Our central assumption for a Middle East security regime is that itdoes not need to have a formal structure. We define a security regime, in thewords of Robert Jervis, as those principles, rules, and norms that permitnations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others willreciprocate.22 Some regimes can have a formal structure, organized forcollective defense against an outside party, such as NATO. A securityregime can also be a collective security organization in which the membersagree that they will respond to an act of aggression by one member againstanother. Led by the UN, the international response to the Iraqi invasion ofKuwait is the clearest case of collective security in action.23

A third type of regional security arrangement is based on the notion ofcooperative security. As Janne Nolan has written, [c]ooperativeengagement is a strategic principle that seeks to accomplish its purposesthrough institutionalized consent rather than through threats of material orphysical coercion.24 According to Nolan, cooperative security concentrateson reassurance rather than deterrence or containment. This model ofsecurity cooperation in Western Europe boasts an arrangement in whichdisputes occur within the limits of agreed-upon norms and establishedprocedures.25 Unlike collective security, which relies on the threat ofmilitary action, cooperative security is designed to ensure that organizedaggression cannot start or be prosecuted on any large scale.26

Not all regional security arrangements entail such explicit or formalsecurity provisions. In fact, the Organization for Security and Cooperationin Europe (OSCE) is composed of 55 states, and functions only as a broadforum for consultation and negotiation among the participating states.27 TheAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) began as an economicarrangement before shifting its focus in the 1990s toward more security-oriented issues.28

The US has led the Organization of American States (OAS) in regionalcoordination despite the institutions existence in the shadow of Americandominance. In its early stages, the predecessor to the African Union, theOrganization of African Unity (OAU), served primarily as a forum forcontact, discussion, and interaction. Indeed, a regional security regime canbe any formal or informal arrangement in which the parties discuss theircommon security needs. This arrangement may be preceded by, or include,unofficial talks.

In some regions, especially subregions, there is a reliance on bilateralrelationships to attempt to solve security issues. These regions areepitomized either by conflict and tension (e.g. South Asia) or by exceptionalpartnership (e.g. USCanada). Though positive bilateral relations are


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usually considered a necessary but not a sufficient condition for region-widemultilateral security, in the Middle East with its tragic history of conflict,even bilateral relations would make a dramatic difference. The problem isthat in a region of conflict like this one it is often impossible to maintain anykind of regular contact vis--vis security issues. The first step in dealingwith this region is to develop an informal, even at times unofficial, structureto maintain ongoing discussions, build confidence, and at a minimumdiscuss disagreements.

Responses to Neo-Realist Critiques: Track II and Confidence BuildingOne way to begin to deal with the neo-realist challenge is to conduct TrackII, academic and unofficial exchanges. The purpose of Track II is to bringelites together from different countries to exchange ideas and establishpersonal relationships. It is hoped that these informal talks will also createa friendlier atmosphere for future peace-making initiatives. For example,the Oslo Agreements grew out of academic exchange between Israelis andPalestinians. The personal contacts established by these meetings wereinvaluable for the secret negotiations that led to the accord. Moreover, theso-called Copenhagen Process, in which intellectuals from Egypt, Jordan,the Palestinians and Israel work together to promote peace, is anotherexample of this positive process.

Track II exchanges also seek to prevent mistakes that might be causedby cultural misunderstandings or misperceptions at the systemic level. Forexample, in early 1978 Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin met withthe Egyptian Foreign Minister in Jerusalem and called him a young man,a derisive term to Egyptians.29 When the statement was translated, it causedsevere problems. The Egyptians walked out of the meeting and returned toEgypt; the process was set back for many months.

Sustained contact between representatives of local societies could serveto alleviate the impact of such missteps. In the spring of 1996, for instance,a series of terrorist attacks waged against civilians disillusioned manyIsraelis with the peace process and led to the election of Prime MinisterNetanyahu, just as the increased violence led to Sharons election in early2001.

Had a variety of Arab intellectuals, particularly the Egyptians, beenengaged in confidence building measures in 1996, the disillusionment ofmany Israelis might have been significantly ameliorated. It would havetaken a much more active effort by Arab parties to raise Israeli confidencein 2001. Indeed, the widespread violence probably made such an effortimpossible unless Arab states had been vociferous in countering terrorism.


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They did not do so for their own reasons, which included their countriesdomestic arenas, but the most important point is that they did not evencomprehend how such a public relations campaign directed at the Israelipublic could bolster their own interests. In sum, the misunderstanding ofcultures on both sides has played an important part in preventing theadvance of the regional security process and has thereby impeded theparties from dealing directly with establishing regional cooperativesecurity.

Thus, contrasting perspectives have severely diminished progress onregional security. The Arabs generally envision a top-down decision-making process in which the leadership imposes policy positions on itsconstituents. The Israelis, given their democratic political culture,anticipate a process from the bottom up. Because the Israelis embrace adomestic level approach and the Arab states adopt an individual levelstrategy, they often end up with the worst of both worlds. The Arab statesdo not understand the importance of the confidence building measureswhich might lead Israel to make greater concessions and move toward thepolicies the Arabs desire. For their part, the Israelis often demonstratelittle understanding of how to influence the peace process from the topdown.

Even Shimon Peres famous vision in a New Middle East backfiredin the early 1990s.30 Peres suggested a new approach to ArabIsraelipolitics where the two sides would aid each other through economicinterchange and personal contacts. Instead, the Arabs, especially theEgyptians, saw his offers as a strategy for Israeli domination of the region.Peres originally intended these steps toward his concept of a Middle Eastas confidence building measures, but their failure ended up doing harm forseveral years.

Both Prime Ministers Netanyahu and Sharon often seemed todemonstrate complete ignorance of the impact of their statements on theArab world. When their confrontational remarks precipitated negativereactions, they merely used them as confirmation that their own analysiswas accurate. On the other hand, Arab commentators frequently makestatements that elicit the kind of behavior for which they criticize theIsraelis. As illustrated by the growing anti-Semitism within the Arabworld, Arabs have little understanding of the deep fears and tragedy ofJewish history. Meanwhile Israelis have not grasped the yearnings amongmany Arabs, especially the Palestinians, for status and internationalrespect.

Track II exchanges can begin to address these misperceptions by


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allowing parties to begin to understand their differences. As neo-liberalsoften claim, empirical evidence suggests that these security arrangementscan take many forms and that formal structures are not necessary.31 Itfollows that unofficial talks or Track II meetings and discussions can be anascent form of regional security discussion permitting dialogue andplanning which would otherwise not be possible. They may also encouragethe parties to begin to understand their differences.

Track II discussions underscore the idea that activity is more importantthan a formal structure. They show how dialogue about security issues cantake place in the absence of a formal organization. Furthermore, the actualprocess of Track II is extremely important because it establishes afoundation upon which to conduct negotiations if Track I fails to produce anagreement. These activities can also precede the onset of formal Track Inegotiations or support ongoing, official negotiations.

SPECIFIC CONCEPTUAL AND INSTRUMENTAL STEPS

The following section suggests specific steps to conceptually reorientregional actors to promote this loose idea of a regional security regime. Inaddition, the instrumental steps that follow are practical measures to guidethe search for productive ways of thinking and acting.

The ConceptualThe first three of the following concepts outline steps for an informalregional security system and draw from the systemic level. The fourthconcept is rooted in the domestic level.

1. Learning from the experiences of actors in other regions. While theMiddle East has unique characteristics, states in the area are fully capableof emulating other regions and learning new, more cooperative patterns ofinteraction from them. Thus, European nationalism had an impact on, anddirectly influenced, the development of both Zionism and Arabnationalism.32 In the 1930s, an extremely ideological period historicallyrepresented by such trends as fascism, liberal democracy, communism, andsocialism, similar examples of emulation occurred in the region.33

Within the Arab world, for example, Woodrow Wilson a proponent ofliberal democracy and national self-determination was popular in Egyptafter World War I.34 Fascism was admired in Iraq in the late 1930s. Duringthe Cold War, as in other regions, the ArabIsraeli conflict was fueled by thesuperpower rivalry. Following the conflict-ridden pattern dominant in


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international politics at the time, the two sides engaged in bitter disputes,prolonged arms races, and sporadic outbreaks of warfare.

In the post-Cold War era, by contrast, there is a basic contradiction inworld politics between the processes of globalization and confrontation.On the one hand, there is increased interdependence and internationalcooperation. On the other hand, the destructive consequences ofinternational fragmentation demonstrated its potential on September 11,2001. The Middle Easts struggle to accommodate these global trends hascontributed to the halt of accommodation on the ArabIsraeli front.Indeed, the collapse of the ArabIsraeli peace process paralleled thedeterioration of the early post-Cold War optimism. New dangerssuggested by the potential development of WMD by such states as Iranand Iraq (until the overthrow of Saddam Hussein) combined with internalconflicts over fundamentalism and the growing threat of transnationalterrorism.

The major lesson of these historical experiences is that the Middle Eaststates are capable of learning from the great powers and even from otherregional powers as well. Indeed, it is entirely possible that Middle Easternstates can learn from regions such as Southeast Asia and Latin Americawhere more pacific patterns of international interaction have emerged aftercenturies of bitter rivalry.

2. Great Power Cooperation. The ability of Middle Eastern states to learnfrom the international system, especially the great powers, also means thatthe major states themselves can influence how local states conduct theirrelations. One study argues for the importance of a type of Concert ofEurope as existed after the Napoleonic Wars in the early nineteenthcentury. This encompassing coalition of great powers would mean thatthere would be a higher level of cooperation between the US, Russia, China,Europe and Japan on a wide variety of issues than has so far been the caseduring the post-Cold War era.35

The study suggests that one of the ancillary benefits of such a coalitionwould be that the great powers would be setting an invaluable example ofcooperative relations for the other states in the system. Despite the obviouscontinuing disagreements among them, increased cooperation on the war onterrorism engendered by the events of 9/11 suggest a possible new patternof collaboration, as does the formation of the so-called Quartet (US, EU,UN and Russia) for dealing with the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. The impactof these developments not only affects the policies of great powers towardthe region, but also the behavior of local states toward each other and


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toward the global environment. Therefore, great power relations can have apositive impact on the region from the systemic level.

3. Coordinating a common vision for the Middle East with focal points.Middle East states currently suffer from an absence of focal points tocoordinate choices that could guarantee mutual gains.36 If we think of theMiddle East in terms of an n-person prisoners dilemma game, we often seethat states continue to choose to defect because there is no focal point toguide them to a cooperate-cooperate outcome. This deficiency impedes thedevelopment of a regional security approach. To overcome this problemthere must be a common vision so all parties involved choose to cooperate.A regional security regime or structure cannot exist without sharedobjectives and a mutual understanding of the nature of the region and itssecurity concerns.

In the early decades of the conflict, the Arabs sought to deny thelegitimacy of the state of Israel and the Jewish state sought recognition.Today, the situation is more disparate and complex. Coordinating mutuallybeneficial outcomes is difficult because there are numerous issues andmultiple games being played. For example, Middle East states must beconcerned with such issues as the future nature of regional relations, aPalestinian states identity and foreign policy orientation, and the meaningand consequences of a possible normalization of relations with Israel.

Yet there have been some recent positive developments. In particular,the Saudi peace plan (2002), however vague and inadequately developed,offered some promise of moving toward a regional framework. An Arabsummit in March of the same year endorsed a version of the Saudi initiativethat was less agreeable to the Israelis. Although it was not explored, the planis significant because it alluded to a common vision in which there wouldbe normalization of IsraeliArab relations.

An additional problem with this coordination game is that it is just thefirst round in a series of iterations. In the Middle East, however, the Arabsand Israelis focus on final status agreements as the first round but have verylittle understanding of life after peace. They tend to assume that after afinal settlement, one has relations comparable to those of the US andCanada or Sweden and Norway. This view ignores the long process ofpeace-making that involves more rounds and continues many years afterhostilities are terminated. The US and Canada still have controversies, butthe key to their harmonious relationship is that disputes are handled withinthe context of common understandings and accepted structures for contactand resolution. These mechanisms, however, are not built overnight and


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require a significant degree of dialogue to establish a commonexperience.

One way to create a common vision to coordinate these focal points isto focus on issues upon which all parties can agree. WMD, terrorism, sharedeconomic woes, and humanitarian suffering are potential building blocks,any one of which could become the foundation for constructing a regionalsecurity conception. In particular, many states fear the continued spread andproliferation of WMD and technologies to rogue states and non-stategroups. It is possible that Middle East states could one day focus on this fearas a lowest-common-denominator as a common vision. This would enablestates to escape the prisoners dilemma with a cooperate-cooperateoutcome.

4. State identity must be compatible with regional goals of cooperation. Astates struggle to define its political identity at the domestic level mayaffect its ability to define its proper regional role. The identity a statechooses can constrain or permit certain types of foreign policies. Forinstance, could Egypt have made peace with Israel waving the flag ofNassers pan-Arabism? Which identity must Iran promote to move towardregional cooperation: Is it the exporter of a Shiite, Islamic revolution or thedeveloper of a new, moderate and democratic Islamic states or would afuture regime represent the revival of ancient Persia? Who will speak for thePalestinians: Sheikh Yassin, Yasser Arafat, or Abu Alla? Which Israeliidentity is more amenable to international cooperation: secular or religiousZionism; nationalist or socialist Zionism?

Instrumental StepsThe three mechanisms that follow are all designed to begin the task ofdeveloping a common vision and compatible state identities. All are rootedin the domestic level, and focus on the need to train key leaders, officials,and experts to work together toward regional goals.

1. Cultivation of Elite Personnel for Regional Interaction. We havealready discussed Track II as a basic mechanism for developing a regionalsecurity system. Here it is used as a basis for preparing officialsintellectually for the regional tasks they are likely to confront. Citing theneed for this preparation is designed to counter the widespread belief thatofficials can enter into negotiations without the fundamental preparationand interactions provided by Track II. Indeed, the problems can becompounded if parties move into a Track I arena without having


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adequately prepared the underpinning political support and intellectualframework.

For example, Track I in the 1990s rested on an inadequate intellectualfoundation whereby the pursuit of the so-called multilaterals on armscontrol, economics, refugees, environment, and water was experimental andeven half-hearted. It would have been wiser to develop the process on anunofficial Track II level, awaiting progress in the bilateral arena. In anycase, the multilaterals suffered from insufficient exposure to Track IIactivity after the Oslo Agreement.

2. Allocation of Adequate Resources to Sustain Engagement. During the1990s, even when the multilaterals were in their prime, the co-sponsors ofthe process often accepted the argument that they could only flower once allbilateral peace agreements had been reached. By not devoting sufficientpersonnel, funds, and effort to promote the multilateral process, theinvolved parties ensured that it languished whenever crises in the bilateraltalks occurred.

The US could not have single-handedly prevented the problems thatarose in the mid-1990s. Yet once terrorist attacks on Israel attempted todestroy the peace process and the Israeli public reacted with disillusionmentand revulsion, it was clear that the Americans lacked a coherent concept ofa viable regional security regime which deserved attention in its own right.Instead, all major US efforts were directed exclusively at achieving bilateralagreements. When their diplomatic activities failed in 2000, diplomats hadno other track on which to rely. The confidence building measures, whichmight have temporarily ameliorated tensions, had not been prepared and thesituation spiraled out of control.

While it may have been impossible to sustain the formal multilateralsonce the process declined precipitously, informal avenues were still crucial.One lesson to be learned from these experiences is that the US must remainengaged in this process and devote sufficient resources to sustain Track IIactivities during times of crisis as one means of developing alternativeroutes to progress.

3. Establishment of a Regional Security Institute. A first step toward thedevelopment of a regional regime would be the establishment of a non-official regional institution. A regional security study center would besimilar to an IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies), regionalRAND Corporation, or a EuroMesco (Euro-Mediterranean StudyCommission). Ideally, parties would come together to meet, share views,


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and develop concepts at the institute. If the idea of a permanent site for theinstitute is not feasible, local strategic centers could work in unison to createthe foundations of a regional security system. The international communityshould take an active role in co-sponsoring the establishment of such aninstitute.

A NEW CONCEPT OF REGIONAL SECURITY

This discussion has been designed to lead us in the direction of producing anew approach to regional security, at least in the short term. The followingsection will show how the Middle East can implement informal Track IIprocesses to build a potential system for the future.

A Model From Southeast Asia Our model here is Southeast Asia, where informal regional Track IIactivities have been organized as CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperationin the Asia-Pacific). CSCAP, established in 1993, is designed to provide astructured process for regional confidence building and security cooperationamong countries and territories in the Asia-Pacific region through thelinkage of regional security-oriented institutes.37

One of CSCAPs particular functions is to provide back-up support forthe ASEAN Regional Forum which brings together the foreign ministersfrom 22 countries to discuss regional security issues. In addition, CSCAPpursues other Track II efforts. However, a regional CSCAP-typearrangement in the Middle East need not lead to a particular officialorganization, at least not in the short term. Instead, it could serve as acontinuing forum for discussion at a level lower than official contacts. Itmay also serve as a stepping stone for parties not ready to join the formalprocess.

CSCAP links regional security-oriented institutes and through them ithas broad-based member committees (security clubs, we might call them),which are composed of academics, security specialists, and former andcurrent foreign ministry and defense officials. CSCAP member committeeshave been established in an astonishingly wide variety of countriesthroughout the region, and also include the US and the EU. Both South andNorth Korea have committees, as do China and Russia. Taiwanese scholarsand security specialists participate in working group meetings in theirprivate capacities and an Indian Institute has joined as an associate member.

Although CSCAP continues to focus its efforts on providing directsupport to the official ASEAN regional forum, several CSCAP issue-


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oriented working groups have been organized. These include thefollowing:

1. Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs).2. Comprehensive and Cooperative Security.3. Transnational Crime.4. Maritime Security Cooperation.5. A North Pacific Working Group (NPWG) focused on the establishment

of frameworks for Northeast Asia security cooperation.6. Preventive Diplomacy.

CSCAP discussions cover a wide range of issues from conventional andnuclear warfare issues, to a generic outline for defense policy papers (whitepapers) and the refining of other transparency measures. The main lessonthat has emerged from CSCAP activities is that the parties cannot beimpatient and they must be satisfied with a go-slow approach. As RalphCossa, one of the American leaders of CSCAP has put it, they should:

start small; take a gradual, incremental, building block approach;recognize that European models are generally not transferable toAsia and that sub-regional differences exist within the Asia-Pacific;apply individual measures only where they fit; do not over-formalize the process; and do not neglect the importance ofunilateral and bilateral measures as stepping stones towardmultilateral confidence building. In other words, proceed slowly andcarefully, but definitely proceed.37

The underlying question for a regional security system in the Middle East iswhether a CSCAP-type process (admittedly without an official body likeASEAN) could be implemented. Regular dialogues between representativesof a variety of institutes in the area could serve to broaden the mechanismsfor dialogue that currently exist. Admittedly, this instrument will not solvethe many disputes in the Middle East. It may well be, however, that aninformal multilateral process involving academics, security specialists,economists, and official representatives in their private capacities whereconvenient and appropriate could serve as a long-term approach fordiscussing controversial ideas.

A Middle East CSCAP could also become an incubator for new ideasand agreements that could later be furthered in an official context. Thisapproach would at least serve as a broad-based alternative mechanism tomove the region out of its current state of despair toward peace. It is neither


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a panacea nor a simplistic problem solver, but it is a different model thanthat which has been previously employed.

Establishment of a Code of Conduct: The Neo-Liberal SolutionA Middle East CSCAP could develop ideas which would then be spreadthroughout the region. Based on consensual agreement among regionalparticipants, Track II activity could, for example, create a code of conductthat would outline the modes of behavior that encourage cooperativeendeavors rather than concentrating on mutual conflicts of interest. TheMiddle East lacks such established standards of behavior, which inhibitsprogress toward an accepted pattern of regional norms. The inability todevelop such a code explains why neo-realism has been a more adequatetheory to depict the region then neo-liberalism. In the effort to change thiscondition, if we begin with a code, what might it look like? What types ofpolicies might regional leaders be encouraged to adopt and what types ofactions to take?

(1) An agreement to settle disputes without the threat of violence.(2) An attempt to control and even convince antagonistic members ofsocieties to take a different approach. Moderates would attempt topersuade educators, unionists, journalists, intellectuals, religious leaderswho speak against the other society to reconsider their position.Government leaders may not be able to suppress or change antagonisticlanguage altogether, but they can engage in educational activities andthey can set standards that they expect others in the society to adopt.Government leaders can set a tone in which vituperative opposition isunacceptable and they can make positive statements when accusationsare obviously false.(3) Each state could agree to consider the consequences of its actions onother societies and governments before taking steps which may causedifficulties for the other side.(4) Each could agree to do its utmost to restrain provocative statements bygovernment officials toward others in the region.(5) Each side could acquiesce in regular consultations among key officialsin major countries to limit the damage caused by ongoing disputes orstatements to their relations.(6) Each state could agree not to go to international forums to addressbilateral disputes without the consent of its adversary. This provision wouldalso include that neither side attempt to generate international criticismagainst the other party.


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(7) Each side could agree to encourage gatherings between individuals fromtheir respective societies to promote interaction and understanding.(8) A general agreement could be reached not to refuse to meet with othergovernment officials if they seek sessions to clear the air. Even in the EUthere are often disagreements, statements which are disliked, elections andreferenda which other parties find disappointing. Because there is amechanism for exchange, however, potential disputes are controlled. If acode of conduct were to be implemented in the Middle East, it mightcontribute to a new atmosphere encouraging moves toward regionalsecurity. Even if all steps cited here were not implemented, the very act ofagreeing on such an approach would be a highly beneficial and productivestep. A Track II instrument would be doing a great service byrecommending them. (9) The psychologist Charles Osgood once suggested an approach calledGRIT (Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction) toindicate the beneficial, trust-building impact of unilateral gestures.38 Wehave several positive unilateral moves from recent history, including thestrategy of the Russians in reaching the Austrian peace treaty in 1955,Nixons overtures to China in the early 1970s, and the actions of MikhailGorbachev in the late 1980s. The Middle East itself has seen animpressive number of unilateral gestures, including the famous Sadatinitiative toward Israel in the late 1970s, as well as various actions takenby such figures as Prime Minister Rabin and King Hussein in the 1990s.Clearly, unilateral gestures can make a significant difference in bringingleaders together and gaining the acceptance of a new type of regionalregime.

CONCLUSION

This contribution has presented a variety of conceptual and instrumentaltools which could be used to confront the huge obstacles to a regionalsecurity system in the Middle East raised by the three levels of analysis: theindividual, domestic, and systemic. We have tried to show that just as eachlevel presents enormous hurdles to be overcome, each in its own way alsosuggests paths for addressing the dilemmas presented so clearly in neo-realistic systemic analysis.

On a day-to-day basis the task may seem hopeless. Yet, through thinkingfrom a variety of perspectives encouraged by the levels it may be possibleto move in a more limited, informal fashion to alter the mindset which hasplagued the region for so long. There are no immediate cures here; only


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directives to arrest, remedy, and ameliorate an unstable and deterioratingcondition. Previous treatments have not worked; it is time to move forwardon an informal concept of a Middle East regional security system.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author would like to thank Lawrence Rubin for his research assistance.

NOTES

1. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill 1979) p.73.2. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge UP 1981); John

J. Mearsheimer, Offensive Realism, paper presented at the annual meeting of theAmerican Political Science Association (Atlanta, 25 Sept. 1999); Hans J. Morgenthau,Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf 1973); Kenneth Waltz (note 1).

3. Analysts generally employ such indicators as military strength, nuclear and conventionaldeterrence, and gross domestic product to determine the relative strength of each state.

4. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books 1984); Robert O.Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy(Princeton: Princeton UP 1984); Charles Lipson, International Cooperation in EconomicSecurity Affairs, World Politics 37/1 (Oct. 1984) pp.123.

5. See David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate(New York: Columbia UP 1993); Charles Lipson and Benjamin J. Cohen (eds.), Theory andStructure in International Political Economy: An International Organization Reader(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1999).

6. For the neo-realist perspective on the role of institutions see John Mearsheimer, The FalsePromise of International Institutions, International Security 19/3 (1994/1995) pp.549.

7. See Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1987). He argues that inter-Arab political struggles used the language of Arabism and Islam to legitimate their gamesof power politics. Similarly, Telhami argues that a shift in regional and international balanceof power best explains the recalculation of policies of Middle Eastern states. ShibleyTelhami, Power and Leadership in International Bargaining (New York: Columbia UP1990).

8. Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among the Nations: Israel and the World (New York:Bantam 1993) pp.33940; Yedidya Atlas, Israeli Prime Minister Calls for Free Market,Insight on the News, 30 Sept. 1996.

9. For discussions of democratic peace theory, see Michael Doyle, Liberalism and WorldPolitics, American Political Science Review 80/4 (Dec. 1986) pp.1569; Bruce M. Russett,Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton UP 1993).

10. Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some PolicyImplications, World Politics 24 (Spring 1972) p.42.

11. Graham Allison discusses government behavior as a result of the hierarchical bargaininggame. See his Model III in Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown,1971) p.144.

12. Allison (note 11) p.178.13. On how the organizational culture of bureaucracies shapes state preferences and

international outcomes, see Jeffrey W. Legro, Culture and Preferences in the International


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Cooperation Two-Step, APSR (March 1996). 14. On the opposition of intellectuals, artists, journalists, etc. to normalization with Israel just

before the Copenhagen conference, see the news report, Anti-Copenhagen Conference inCairo: http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/990706/1999070623.html.

15. Jordanian anti normalization activities: http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/010208/2001020816.html.

16. Dinah Shiloh, Peace Dividend Across River Jordan, Times, 9 April 1999. See alsoEconomic Gulf Divides Israel and Neighbors, Los Angeles Times, 27 Aug. 2000.

17. Political scientists who specialize in political psychology study belief systems, behaviorpatterns, psychological profiles, methods of information processing, decision-making, andperception and misperception, to explain state behavior. Examples of individual levelanalysis include: Alexander L. George, The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach tothe Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making, International Studies Quarterly 13/2(June 1969); Alexander George, Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy: TheEffective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, CO: Westview 1980); Robert Jervis,Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton UP 1976);Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (PrincetonUP 1985); Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York: McGraw-Hill1951); Peter Suedfeld and Philip Tetlock, Integrative Complexity of Communications inInternational Crises, Journal of Conflict Resolution 21 (March 1977) pp.16984.

18. Arab Human Development Report 2002, United Nations Development Programme. 19. Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux

1999); Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State, Foreign Affairs 75/4 (July/Aug.1996) pp.4561.

20. Waltz (note 1) p.166.21. Ibid.22. Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, International Organization 36/2 (Spring 1982) p.357.23. Steven L. Spiegel, World Politics in a New Era (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace 1995)

pp.61920.24. Janne E. Nolan, Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century

(Washington DC: Brookings 1994) p.4.25. Nolan (note 24) p.5.26. Ibid.27. .28. Michael Leifer writes that Security was uppermost in their minds [the founders] but not

conspicuously addressed. He states ASEAN has declared primary goals of promotingeconomic growth, social progress and cultural development through regionaldevelopment ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge 1989) p.vii.

29. Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making Americas Middle East Policy,from Truman to Reagan (University of Chicago Press 1985) p.344.

30. Shimon Peres with Arye Naor, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt 1993).31. For the influence of Track II activity on Track I security deliberations in the Asia-Pacific

domain see Sheldon Simon, Evaluating Track II Approaches to Security Diplomacy in theAsia-Pacific: The CSCAP Experience, The Pacific Review (2002). Simon argues that TrackII approaches are playing a significant role.

32. On the origins of Zionism see Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism (New York:Basic Books 1981); David Vital, The Origins of Zionism (Oxford: Oxford UP 1975); ArthurHertzberg, The Zionist Idea (New York: Harper & Row 1959) introduction.; GideonShimoni, The Zionist Ideology (Hanover: Brandeis UP 1994). For Arab nationalism, seeAlbert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (Cambridge UP 1983); and Sylvia Haim(ed.), Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley: University of California Press).

33. The Zionist movement actually split over political strategies as a means to achieve


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ideological goals (the revisionists vs. Labor Zionists). 34. Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, A Short History of Modern Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge UP

1985) p.80.35. Richard Rosecrance, A New Concert of Powers, Foreign Affairs 71/2 (Spring 1992)

pp.6485; Richard Rosecrance (ed.), The New Great Power Coalition (New York: Rowman& Littlefield 2001).

36. See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard UP 1960).37. Ralph A. Cossa, East Asia Multilateral Security Cooperation: Track 1 and 2, Paper

prepared for delivery at the UCLA/Monash University Conference on Asian Examples forMiddle East Regional Security, Melbourne, Australia (Aug. 1999) p.2.

38. Charles E. Osgood, Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press 1962)pp.85134; idem, Suggestions for Winning the Real War with Communism, Journal ofConflict Resolution 3 (1959) pp.295325; idem, The GRIT Strategy, Bulletin of AtomicScientists (May 1980) pp.5860. See also Deborah Welch Larson, Crisis Prevention and theAustrian State Treaty, International Organization 41/1 (Winter 1987) pp.2760; idem,Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1997)pp.2732.


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Spiegel 2003 - Regional Security and the Levels of Analysis Problem

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