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THUNDER AT LUETZEN

Napoleon's fight for Empire

MAGAZINE

COMPLETE SIMULATION GAME INSIDE

,

1WO NEW BOARDGAME

BY IRON EN I ERPRISES

LONELY MOUNTAlNTM ThIo .,,"v.I.'in' ..... mutti-plltY'" gr' ..... t In Erebar, the Lonely Moun' In, LMr 01 Sm.", the o...,.L EKh pt., ... contlola group of 8dventurws _ they en.mpt to sIMI the Dt-u

In this issue

FEATURES THUNDER AT LUETZEN p. 16 NapoJeon's Fight for Empire Bowen Simmons FoUowing the successful crossing of the Berezina in November 1812, Napoleon returned to France to raise a new army fo r the defense of the French Empire. The Russians, intent upon liber-ating Prussia and Germany, met the new French Army at Luet-zen in the opening battle of the 1813 campaign.

SIMULATION: THUNDER AT LUETZEN p . 25 Bowen Simmons

A LOOK AT THE WINNERS! p. 44 GENCON Convention Miniatures Kim Eastland The prize-winning historical miniatures at last summer's G EN-CON convention are featured in this photo essay. REGULAR FEATURES FOR YOUR INFORMATION . p. 8 A.A. Nofi David Martin looks at the "unlucky" Union XI Corps of the Civil War, and David Isby reports on the fifth anniversary of the Soviet-Moslem war in Afghanistan.

BERG'S REVIEW OF GAMES . p. 50 Richard Berg The Australian Design Group's Empires in Alms'" Game, West End 's Napoleonic l."Irs'" Game and Killer Angels'" Game, and GDW's Battle for Germany'" Game and Southern Front'" Game are featured.

DEPARTMENTS OUTGOING MAIL ....................... p . 4 FORUM .......................... p. 6 BOOKS IN REVIEW p . 46 COMPUTER CONFLICT p. 48 Ian Chadwick

MOVES GAMING SECTION . p. 56 Previews ............................ p. 56 Repla,s: TRAIL OF THE FOX'" Game .................. p. 58 aamlng Classlfleds ....................... p. 60 Feedback ............................ p . 62

Dragon PublishinO. p.o. 90~ 110. UJoe 0..-. WI S3147. (41~) 248 II()U STR&TEGY & 1ACncs., 'egoeIerOl(1lrlder"olArl

Publi.hc!r: Michael Cook Edilorin-Chier: Kim Mohan Manqing Editor: Charles Ramsay Game. Editor: Jon Pickens COQtribulinl: Editon: Richard Berl!. tan Chadwick. David C. Isby. Charle5 T. Kamps. David Martin. A.A. Nofi, John Prados, Richard Rustin Editorial Adi,tant: Patrick L. Price Advertisina; Coordinator: Lee Hein Graphics: David S. laForce, Roger Riupp, Gene Kostiz Layout Desipen: 8m Evert, Colleen 0'""", Production: Roger Raupp, Kim Lindau, Bruce Knutson CircuI,tion: Mellody KnuB STRATEGY" TACTIC~ MapJone ill pubbshed IiJ. limeS' year. One-year IUbscnptio ... , int:Ud. inI six pme iuues aSSN 0730-6S31l are $24 in US hands. Subscnpoon arden should ~ sent to Draaon Publi$lang. P.O. So, 72089, Cbggo, IL _.

STRATEGV It TACTICS Mapnne ill Iviliable ~I hobby and book ItOre!Ilhr'ouJhout the Uniled Smet and CmidI!, and through a limited number of oversea outlets. Su~

~es are $21 US daIar for I oneyear IUbICrip-tiolI to U.S. addressetI: $30, Can_I"" dolin, viii surfIc:e _to CmadI: 13&. US doIars, 'iii surfIce mai to ... ather COIIlItne$. VISA and MaswCard

crowd who made up the bulk of our players (00, for four or live dozen copies of the NAPOLEON AT WAR' Garne (md) so many new RPG garners waiting to be weaned!). Special thanks to Harold Johnson, Bruce Nesmith, and Chuck Ramsay for their much-appreciated support.

This last convention has given us lots of ideas about what to do for the next conven-tion season - we definitely want to increase the number of boardgaming events at GEN CON- XVIII . Anyone interested in helping out should contact us or the GEN CON Department.

Inlerest in the SPI'" line and 5&1"" Magazine was high, and many people had Questions about what 's coming up in the future. My crystal ball tends to be a bit hazy, but J'O try to keep you updated on the latest news in this column.

Bellt Laid Plan8 Dept : Rich Berg's JULIUS CAESAR'" Game, originally sched-uled for February release, has been pushed back to June, due to an extremely tight Product Design Dept. schedule. Fortunately, our alternative, the NAPOLEON'S LAST BATTLES- Game, was available to fill the slol. The game covers the four main battles of '#.Iterloo: Quatre Bras, Ligny, '#.Ivre, and La BeUe Alliance, in a quadrigame that can be played as individual battles or combined into a sing1e combined campaign. OriginaUy published in 1976, the game has received high marks for playability and balance , and has become something of a collector's item. The second edition will incorporate the compiled errata and counter corrections.

The other release for February is the second edition COBRA- Game, which cov-ers the \\brld War II Allied breakout after the Normandy invasion. The new edition features a second map and additional counters, which allow the invasion to be played as weU. The game has been turned over to Product Design. and should be at the printers by the time you read this.

"What About . , . ?" Dept : \\e re-ceive a fair amount of mail asking about the chance of specific titles being reprinted. We do try to answer these on a case-by-case basis, but sometimes this is not always possible. In general, the situation is this: we have been so busy gelting the line underway thaI we have had little time to go back into the files and decide whether or not to redo SpecifIC titles. Good games of medium size thai require little revision or correction tend to go into our backup file s (the NAPO-LEON'S LAST BATTLES- Game). Garnes that need a lot of work go into our deep files. to be pulled out when we have time to worle on them. Our capacity to do "mon-

ster" games is limited. and we've estab-lished a policy not to do boxed versions of magazine games for at least one year after iniWl publication. We 're interested in which games you would like to see again, as weU as any topics you woukl like to see new games on.

Grab 'em Fast Dept: Currently our stocks of the FIREFIGH'" and BATTLES FOR THE ARDENNES- Garnes are de-pleted. The first will not be reprinted. and the second probably will not. We are cur-rently limited in the number of titles we can keep in print (though we're working on this), so we will be rotating specific titles out of the line to make way for new games. II our plans for expansion pan out, we will be able to keep more titles in print. So, if your local hobby outlets don't carry the magazine or game line , ask for them.

Next issue, we'U talk more on the COB RA Game and the NAPOLEON'S LAST BAlTLES Game and try to have something on our June plans. Stay tuned.

Jon Pickens

On Sale

Now! Are you seeking new ideas for your role-playing campaign? Do you enjoy reading the best In science-fiction and fantasy literature? If so, then turn to Amazing-Science Fiction Stories, the f irst in the field since 1926. The January 1985 issue of Amazing Science Fiction Stories includes: * the adventures of a Nobel laureate and an angel. * the mysterious mission of a pilot who crashes near a community of

psychics, * the afterllves of selected victims of the guillotine

during the Reign of Terror, * the terror that strikes foster parents of Martian

children, * an old woman's discovery that the london subway

is more than it seems, * Baird Searles's views on fantasy and science-fiction

film, television, and video releases; and. * poetry by Gene Wolfe and the late Robert E. Howard.

For a copy of the January 1985 issue, just send 52.50 to: Amazing Science Fiction Stories. P.O. Box 110,

lake Geneva WI 53147. Amaz lll9 'ioenc:e Fiction Slori!"s IS ~ rl!gIi'llerOO I~ owned by TSI!, Inc

,

FO Co-ordinate Geometry Hexe. I recently read your article "Programming Boardgames" in Special Edition Nr. 3 of 5&T'" Magazine. and I found it generally to be a very entertaining and thought-provoking piece . There was one section of the article. however, which I thought could have been better approached.

When descnbing your hex range routine you seem to be using a needlessly Bytantine approach which is based on the inappropriate choice of the Pythagorean theorem. A more appropriate mode] is the coordinate geometry equation D v' (X, . xi . (Y, V,)', I shall first write oul the complete program loutine and then delineate it step by step (this uses the grid orientation used in the original article). 10 INPUT 5 20INPUTT 30 X.INT(SIHlO) 40 A.INT(T/ lOO) 50 YoS-(Xx 1 00) 6OB-T-{Axl00) 70 Z-(ABS(XA))l2 80 IF Z.INT Z THEN GOTO 110 90 IF moINT(Xl2) THEN BB-.5 100 IF A/2INT(A/2) THEN VY 5 110 A' (l(AI.(XAIHIYBI.IYB)) 120 A , /lf 130 PRINT A 140 SoINT(R') ISO IF $oR, THEN $oR 160 PRINT S

The Int step done is the input of the ini-tial hex location designated as S and the target hex location designated as T. Next, the X val-ues on the coordinate geometry plane are de-termined for the initial and target hex by isolating the first two numerals in the hex lo-cation. X is this value for the initial hex, and A is this value for the target bex. Now we isolate the last two numerals of the hex designation. For the initial hex this is designated as y, and for the target hex this is designated as B.

These numbers might be taken as the Y values for the bex locations on a coordinate geometry plane, if it weren't for the fact that in a hex grid every other column is displaced .5 down (or up) with respect to the previous column. This means that in the hex grid sam-ples given, bex 0303 is really hex 0302.5, and hex 0504 is really 0503.5. and and so forth; but the hex grid is not printed in this manner, so the computer needs to compensate for this effect when the columns are separated by an odd number of columns (XI - X2 is odd), re-sulting in an induced vertical displacement. Note that is some computer syntax, this may require more statements such as LET ZXA LET ZABS(Z) LET Z..zJ2. The subsequent two lines of program are only evaluated if a vertical column adjustment is in fact needed. Line 90 determines if the initial hex has an even X

6 lAN(~'EB 1985

COMPUTER BOARDGAMING ROUND TWO

value, and if so. adjusts the Y value (called B) of the target hex accol"dingiy. Line 100 deter-mines the remaining case. when the target hex has an even X value (called A) and adjusts the Y value of the initial hex accordingly. The next line determines that part of the coordi-

. .

as D square root sign.

The square root of this value is now taken, resulting in the exact range value wbich is then printed. If it is desired to round this value up, lines 140 and 150 will accom-plish this. Line 150 covers the case of RS, e.g., the exact range equals the rounded-up range. For moderate range limits it wiD be n0-ticed that S. the rounded-up range. gives the same result as if one had counted the hex range on a hex sheet. There are programs which will give the same result as a manual hex range count at any distance. but I believe that this is a poor approach to the problem for the following reasons. When designing a com-puter wargame, we should sLrive to use the computer's full potential. One such capability is the computer's ability to determine precise ranges and to use this value or its rounded-up version (or rounded off) in subsequent steps. Thus, we should not shackle the computer with the burden of recreating the usual hu-man-manual errors and estimations when it can give exact results.

Matfhew Bashover Houston, TX

I've Got Algorithm I read with interest Lamont \\bod's article on computerization of boardgames. I program as a hobby and have encountered the "hex" problem myself. I have solved it in a some-what different way than Mr. \\bod did. Since I do not program BASIC. I'D present underly-ing algorithms which should be easy for your readers to program.

The first concept I would stress is that each hex is numbered. and each number is not one number, but a set of coordinates. The column number is first, and the ordinal or hex number is second. Th identify this number in

the computer requires two bytes. one for the column number and one for the hex number. Thus, hex 1217 is the seventeenth hex down in column twelve.

The second concept is that while columns are numbered sequentially. the hexes shoukl not be. Hex OlA is not on the same level as OIA or 03A. While column 02 makes a straight path down the map, the A row makes a zig-zag. It makes more sense to me to number the rows alternately. Thus, odd columns have only odd-numbered hexes; even-numbered columns have only even-numbered hexes.

What are the implications of these changes? First. consider Mr. \\bod's "com pass rose:' One need no longer decide if the column is odd or even. How alxrut distance calculations? Let us measure the distance from an origin hex in column Co, hex number Ho (designated Co Ho). to a destination hex Cd Hd. The distance calculation is fairly easy. One needs to know the column displacement. since the distance is at least equal to the column displacement. The column displace-ment is the absolute value of the difference between the numbers of the columns of origin and destination lCd - Col

Since one can change the hex number by one without increasing the distance for each column moved. the extent of ;' free" hex dis-placement is I Cd - Col This number can be subtracted from the hex number displacement (the absolute value of the difference between the hex numbers, i.e., I Hd - H~) to find the excess displacement up or down the map. U the result is zero or less, the distance is ICd Col. If the result is greater than zero. the dis-tance must include additional vertical move ment. Since each hex of movement changes hex number by two. the excess distance is half of the remainder. and the distance is I Cd Col 112 (ICd - col (ICd . Col-I Hd . Holl. This gives an answer which is always an inte ger. which is accurate between any two hexes for shortest distance cakulatkm.

The algorithm is: Ico -Cdl. A.I Ho Hdl. B. B - A C. Is C > 01 IF YES THEN DISTANCE (CI2) . B. IF NO THEN DISTANCE B_

While renumbering the mapboard may seem cumbersome. the results improve com puter comp3l1bility dramatically. The original numbering system was not designed for the computer. The change is not likely to bother the players and eases programming drarnati ","y.

Roger K. /lowe Mt . Shasta, CA

A Computer Wargame

FYI Edited by A.A. Nofi

DID YOU KNOW? WITH THE MOSLEM RESISTANCE IN ~ During the American Ci,j! War. Coofed. AFGHANISTAN. A TIME FO R WAR erate commerce raiders captured or de AND UNLUCKY XI CORPS. strayed only 263 American flag merchant I ._"_';';';';';';;';;';~;';;'~~~~~;' _________ _ vessels (or a total of 105,000 gross tons, no more than 5% of the pre-war US merchant Oeet. However. it was enough to encourage nervous ship owners to transfer to foreign flags nearly 1,000 vessels for a total of about 800,000 gross tons, nearly 40% of the pre-war fleet . It was a blow from which the US Merchant Marine has never since recovered.

~ Among British Army reservists reacti-vated for the Falklands War in 1982 was a \\brkl w.rr II mobile field bakery unit nick-named "Lizzie," recalled from retirement in the Museum of Army Transport . " The most unique "warship" in the world is arguably the Swedish Navy's 250-too Si-grun, the only naval laundry ship of its kind, and undoubtedly the cleanest. .. The Duke of Ykllington was so disinter-ested in food that he once failed to notice that he had eaten a spo~ed egg.

~Thmas Lopez de UUoa, paymaster of the Spanish "Army of Flanders" in the period 1642-1651, was a very able embezzler. He was so good at his craft that it required 50 rears of meticuloos investigation and audit-mgbefore the Spanish government was able to determine that his estate owed 309 325 Dorins to the treasury, a sum suffide~t to have paid an amy of 30,000 men for one day. ,", The Austrian Anny's field regulations of 1769 remained in force until 1806 afterthe Army's defeat by Napoleon, when'the regu-lations were replaced by a new set which

. . .

sUrvived until 1866, after defeats by the Prussian Army. '"' British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery wore "elevator" boots and shoes - footwear with special inserts - so that he could appear taller than he acwaUy was. '"' Defeating France during the French Rev-olutionary and Napoleonic Wars cost the British taxpayers some 700 million pounds sterling, which was the equivalent of

roughl~ 91 years of spending at the pre-war peaceume budget rate. '"' The cost of one nuclear submarine ex-ceeds the combined educational budgets of the 28 poorest countries in the world, which have a total of 160,000,000 school-age chil-dren. 8 JAN/FEB 1935

FOOTNOTES

Promotional Difficulties ON 3 M .... RCH r847 , THE US CONGRESS auth!>ri2:ed the addition of several generals to the US Army for the duration of the Mex-ican-American War. Filling one of the newly-created slots proved surprisingty difficult. One of the major-generalships was offered to the experienced Sam Houston, who turned it down, as he wanted to remain as governor of his beloved Texas. It was then offered to US Senator Thomas J. Rusk of Texas, a seasoned soldier (and ancestor of former Secretary of State Dean Rusk), who also turned it down, preferring to remain in the Senate. President Polk then turned to US Senator Thomas Hart Benton, one of the )eading hawks of the day and the most powerful man in Congress, who was known to covet the post. Remarkably, Benton also turned it down, since it did not include su-p'reme command of the Mexican Expedi-tIOnary Force, a job wisely assigned to the veteran General Winfield Scott. Finally, af-ter three false starts, the slot was offered to and accepted by Gideon Pillow, a man of no military experience. He proved to be an in-adequate commander (as he did at Fort

~nelson in the American Civil War) and a dIsloyal SUbordinate, who just happened to be the President's law partner. K. Jack Bauer, The Mexican War, 1846-

1848.

A Time For War BETWEEN 1840 .... ND 1940 THERE WERE 50 wars (involving one or more of the world's great powers, excluding mioor colonial af-fairs). Of these, 16 (32%) began in the spring; 16 (32%) began in the summer ' 11 (22%) begaoin the autumn; and 7 (14%)'be-gao in the winter. Fully 26 (52%) of the wars began in April, May, June, or July, the four months most favorable to campaigning by ancient tradition.

Geoffrey B/ainey, The Causes of War.

POW:Guard Ratios In World War II

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD W .... R II started its programs for prisoners of war (POW) with the requirement of having one guard for every three Axis POWs incarcer-ated in the US. With a low escape rate (there was no place to escape to) and an in-creasing need for American servicemen overseas, there was a gradual increase in this ratio throughout the war to as high as 1:10 and even 1:15 in some camps during 1944-1945. At the end of the war aU POW fa cilities in the US were manned by less than 47 ,000 American servicemen, who were guarding nearly 450,000 POWs, for an overall ratio of 1:9. During the war the es-cape rate for the POW system was actually less than that experieoced by the US civil penal system for the same time period.

Kennelh I. Roy

DATA FILES The Unlucky XI Corps

WITHOUT DOUBT THE MOST UNLUCKY higher-level Union unit in the American Civil War was the XI Corps of the Anny of the Potomac. The Corps was never much trusted, due to its high proportion of for-eign-born personnel. and ruined its name by its collapse at Chancenorsville and Gettys-burg. HOwever. its bad reputation may not have been totally deserved. Study of the Corps's battles and campaigns instead sug-gests that the "German Corps ," as it was called, may have been (at worst) the victim of bad luck and bad press.

When the war began. large numbers of foreign-born Americans. mainly Germans, did not hesitate to come to the defense of their adopted country. Many had come to America out of frustration and necessity af-ter the unsuccessful German revolutions of 1848, and were grateful to the United States for offering a new home. Many also strongly disagreed with slavery, an institu-tion which, at least in the border states, helped deprive immigrants of needed jobs. At the opening of the war such foreigners, especiaUy officers, were eagerly accepted into the Army because of their European military experience.

It was only natural that foreignborn Americans would join friends of the same nationality when enlisting. In this way were formed such units as New York's "Garibaldi Guards" (39th New York Infantry, under Col. F.G. d'Utassy), and Adolph von Steinwehr's "Astor Rifles" (29th New York). Not so natural was the practice of grouping German regiments into predomi nantly German brigades. Logic suggested that foreignborn troops might fight better under foreignbom officers. In addition, putting foreignborn soldiers into their own brigades might also alleviate language proir lems, at least by creating common language units, though one could imagine the hodge podge of German, Polish, Italian, and French speaking units. Finally, the forma-tion of these units may also have been influ-enced by not-solatent racism. The KnowNothings and other kindred national istic organizations had gained a great deal of political power in the decade before the war, spreading their doctrine of mistrust of for-eigners. Such feelings could have led many Northerners to accept "foreigners" into

the Army, only if they served in separate units. This feeling was directed later in the war much more strongly against blacks, who not only had to serve in separate units but also were not permitted their own offi cers. The practice 01 separate units for some ethnic groups continued through \\Orld War II .

The first brigade of "Germans" formed in the Eastern Theater was put together in June 1861 as part of the 5th Division of Maj. Gen. Irwin McDowell's Department of Northeastern Virginia. It was commanded by Col. Louis Blenker, a German who fled his homeland in 1849; and, it consisted of the 8th, 29th, and 39th New York and the 27th Pennsylvania Regiments. and two ar tillery batteries.

Blenker's Brigade was to be the kernel around which other "German" troops were grouped to make what would eventually be

xxx

come XI Corps. An important step in this evolution occurred in December 1861, when Maj. Gen. George McClellan orga-nized his mushrooming Army of the Poto. mac into divisions and corps. At that time the newly promoted Br. Gen. Blenker was assigned to command a division of three bri-gades composed of largely foreignborn troops. The units assigned to Blenker's command consisted of his old brigade. four German regiments already in the field (41st, 54th, and 68th NY, 75th Pal, and four new regiments (45th and 58th NY, 73rd and 74th Pal, plus two artillery batteries and a cavalry regiment. The three brigades were commanded respectively by Julius Stahel from Hungary, Adolph von Stein wehr from Prussia, and Henry Bohlen from Germany.

The bad luck of the "German Division" began in March 1862. When McClellan or ganized his Army of the Potomac into corps

in preparation for his attack on Richmond, Blenker's Division was assigned to Sum ner 's II Corps. However, Blenker 's men were not cbosen to take part in McClellan's upcoming Peninsula campaign, but were in s tead detached from their Corps in April and reassigned to Gen. Fremont's Moun tain Department.

Ble nker 's march to join Fremont in Ykst Vrrginia is one of the unchronicled mi nor fiascoes of the. war. It seems that no one in the War Department gave Blenker any in structions or even maps on how to get from Manassas to Fremont's area. This caused Blenker to wander at times, consuming nearly six weeks in his trek west. Lack of maps was also responsible for such inci dents as the 15 April disaster on the Shenandoah River, where 40 men and offi-cers drowned while trying to cross. Further aggravation was caused by the lack of any supplies for Blenker's men during the month they were "in transit" between de partments. The division had been ordered to give up its camp tents near Arlington, but was never issued shelter tents. This forced the men to sleep in the open during their whole march. When their available food supplies ran out, the "Germans" had to re sort to foraging and pillaging the country side just to survive. By midApril, when Blenker still had not reached Fremont, the War Department began to worry and sent Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans to fmd him personally. Rosecrans at length found Blenker's men near Harper's Ferry and was appalled by their lack of tents, food, cloth ing, horses, and transport.

After being resupplied and paid, Blenker's Division marched up and down the Shenandoah Valley in pursuit of the elu sive "Stonewall" Jackson: it had no more success than any other Union units in the area had. Its only major action was at Cross Keys on 8 June, when Fremont at last caught up to Jackson, only to be defeated by Ewell. Blenker's failure to overcome the Confederate right at Cross Keys was the first battlefield defeat for the "Germans."

On 26 June, after the close of the Valley campaign, Blenker's Division became the nucleus of the I Corps of Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of Vtrginia. Supplemented by various infantry and cavalry units from Fre-mont's Mountain Department. the Corps had six brigades in three divisions. Robert Schenck's 1st Division consisted of Blenker's original brigade plus Schenck's

STRATEGY & TACTICS 9

FROM THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY "There 's no s iglrr more in."irin, or Iteart, warmimg than ~

man:hing out to battle when you .In " 60ing with them." -George MacDona ld Fraser

Ohio brigade. \bn Steinwehr's 2nd Oivision consisted of his own old brigade plus a small cavalry brigade, while Bohlen 's 3rd Division consisted of his old unit plus an improvised brigade. Also attached to the Corps was Milroy's independent brigade of West Vir-ginian troops and a brigade of cavalry. The Corps had a strong Germanic navor, though Schenck's and Milroy's Brigades and most of the cavalry were not foreign-born. The new Corps was commanded only briefly by Fremont, who resigned on 28 June rather than serve under Pope , whom he out-ranked. Chosen to lead the Corps was a genuine German-American. Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel.

Sigel proved to be no masterful gen-eral. At Second Bull Run, the "German" Corps's next battle. Sigel dissipated his strength in P'e

iments were scattered in garrisons of the Department of the South.

In September 1863, the 2nd and3rd Di visions of Xl Corps, still under Howard, were transferred to the Anny of the Cum berland in the Western Theater, along with Xli Corps. While in Tennessee, a new 1st Division was formed for the Corps from garrison troops at Nashville and Murfrees boro. Contrary to expectations, the Corps fought reasonably weD at Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge near Chattanooga in November.

The Xl Corps retained its identi ty until 14 April 1864, when it was merged with Xli Corps into the reorganized XX Corps. Pe r haps because the XI Corps divisions were no longer trusted, they were broken up and their brigades distnbuted among the divi sions of XX CO'lls: Schimmelfennig's old brigade (the 1st of the 3rd Division of Xl Corps, 13XI) became 3 1XX, Coste r 's old brigade (l 2Xl ) became 22X X, Smith 's old brigade (2-2-XI) beeame 3-3-XX. and Krzyzanowski's old brigade (2-3-xn was dispersed to the other brigades and to various guard stations. Most of the old "German" officers were relieved or else given new assignments. Howard was as signed to the revived IV Corps , and the XX Corps , after three months under Joe Hooker, was Jed by veteran Xli Corps offi -cers.

The men of XI Corps, then. appear to have been maligned by history much more than they deserve. Only once, on the sec-ond day at Gettysburg, did they fail to hold a defensible line. Their bad reputation stems almost entirely from their routs at Chancel-lorsville and the first day of Gettysburg, These disasters, however, were caused more by poor generalship and bad position-ing than by lack of fighting ability. The fact that many of the Corps's men (perhaps hall) were German-born made it easy for the rest of the Army of the Potomac to make the "Gennan Corps" the scapegoats for Chancellorsville and the first day of Gettys-burg. The CO'llS has never been able to clear its name of this bad press, which has been repeated in histories of the war. It might be closer to the truth to observe that the men of the Xl Corps were the victims of poor generalship, bad luck, and a prejudice against foreigners rather than being unpa-triotic or poor soldiers.

Dr. David G. Martin

MODERN NOTES

Resistance In Afghanistan

by David C. Isby

PESHAWAR , PAKISTAN - I was re-cently in the fie ld with the Afghan guerrillas. studying how they have uied to adapt their traditional jihad (holy war) to a modern guerrilla war, I came away full of admiration for the men who are taking on the world's most powerful army with little besides light infantry weapons and, inexplicably, are do-ing so in the absence of much support from the outside world .

- either by large-scale ground operations as in 1980 and 1982, or by intensive bomb-ing, as in 1983 and 1984.

The Soviets have lost about 8,000 to 12.000 men killed in action, with three times that number wounded . Even more have been evacuated suffering from hepati-tis or other diseases. Estimates or Afghan dead range as high as 250,000 to 500,000. Of a pre-war population of about 14 million , more than 3 million are refugees in Pakistan and Iran - the largest refugee population anywhere in the world. Another 500,000 people are internal re fugees.

The Soviets have attempted to take ad-of the divisions within

MU}

people of Afghanistan, the people whose guidance has been sorely missed in recent years. The Afghans have fought the Sovi ets in basically the same way they have fought enemies for centuries. They have won a lot of batUes, ambushes. raids , and skirmishes. but they are not winning the war.

In the conflict's fifth year, Afghans are making some determined efforts to try to transfonn tribal warriors into modem guer-rilla fighters and to keep life going in the 85% of Afghanistan that is outside of Soviet control. Yet. there is stiU 00 unified central Afghan guenilla command or strategy. The seven major Peshawar-based Afghan groups that are fighting the Soviets are largely independent of each other. Not only has the attempt to bring all seven together in a single command not succeeded, but also the two coalitions - one of three "moder-ate" groups and the other of four "funda-mentalist" groups - that have emerged have proved inadequate for unified military planning. The Afghans' war of national ~beration is one of the great popular uprisings of the twentieth century. While the Afghans became a people in anns against the Sovi-ets, they have never become an army, or even a unified guerrilla fighting force.

In contrast to the Peshawar political leaders. the fighting men are used to coop-eration between the forces of different groups. With the exception of some groups of the Hezb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekma-tyar (largely distrusted by other Afghans), the field commanders figh t together against the common enemy.

Even if there were greater unity, long-range planning, efficient allocation, and transfer of resources, participation in inter-national negotiations would be difficult for the gueniJlas, representing as they do a wide range of po~tical and ethnic back-grounds. Many Afghans believe that if the ex-king of Afghanistan returns from exile in Rome. he could provide the required lead-ership.

Gerard Chaliand, a French journalist and writer on guerrilla warfare, wrote in 1981: "The Afghan insurgents know ~tt1e of modem revolutionary warfare: its effi-ciency or organization or careful planning of time and work." It appears that this state of affairs is slowly starting to change, as the Aghans are estab~shing a series of training camps. At least three of the seven major Af-ghan parties have set these up. Other local

12 JAN/FEB 1985

and regional commanders have set up their own facilities, often small and well camou-flaged. The well-known Jamiat-i- Islami regional commander of the Panjsher Valley, Ahmad Shah Massoud, has set up such a series of training camps.

The Panjsher has trained its fighting forces during its one-year respite from Soviet attacks that Massoud's controversial truce provided from the spring of 1983 to the spring of 1984. Massoud has dispatched teams from the Panjsher to train guerrilla groups throughout Afghanistan. Yet Mas-soud Khalili, liaison officer between the Panjsher Valley and Jamiat-i-fslami's Pesha-war headquarters. estimates that by 1984 "probably only 5%, at most 10%" of the Afghans' fighting forces will have had signif-icant training.

In 1985, the Afghans can field large

numbers of captured weapons, but more aid has arrived, including ri fles. RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers, anti-tank mines, and a few SA-7 man-carried heat-seeking sur-face-to-air missiles. These are relatively scarce - the claim that the Afghans capture 80% of their modem weapons may not be too far removed from the truth. Armament is getting heavier as weD as more numer-ous. In 1982, the Panjsher Valley defenders had only 13 heavy machine guns for air defense. Some two years later, they have more than 220. The mujahadeen fighting around Urgun in the winter of 1984 had more than 70 heavy machine guns, plus a few captured 122mrn and 76mm howitzers and T-54 main battle tanks.

The aid actually reaching the Afghans - whose sources, funding, and routes are different for each group, and remain all highly classified - apparently pkked up in late 1982. Better guerrilla armament has had an impact on Soviet tactics. Additional mines and RPG-7s have made the roads even more dangerous for the Soviets.

The Afghans are busy waging what Mao Tse-Thng would have described as a protracted war. But if, as Mao wrote: "the guerrilla moves among the people as the fish swims in the sea," the Soviets have been at work draining the ocean for years, devastating and depopulating areas, either by ground operations or by aerial bombard-ment.

The War in 1984: The Soviets have, starting in 1983, emphasized air operations. These have been conducted both indepen-dently and in conjunction with ground oper-ations larger than the wide-scale operations that characterized their offensives in 1980 and 1982, or the smaller "commando-style" actions of 1981.

Intensive bombing was used in the heavy fighting in the spring or 1983 around Herat and the Panjsher Valley in spring 1984. as weD as elsewhere. One reason for the emergence of an "air war" strategy is that more effective Afghan weaponry and training have already taken their toll on Soviet convoys. Kabul regime bases in the depopulated provinces that border on Paki-stan have had to be supplied by airlift. Smaller outposts in these provinces require parachute drops for resupply.

In 1983, there were reports of the use of chenUc:als in warfare in the country. It would appear, however, that Soviet chemi-ca! weapons use in 1983 has had a lower profile than in the previous few years, pos-sibly indicating a more selective targeting policy.

The difficulties the Soviets faced in coming to grips not only with the Afghans but also with their own limitations. even in the fifth year of the war, were seen in the Panjsher VII offensive, which opened on 21 April 1984. Panjsher forces had been strik-ing outside the vaney in force. Soviet attempts to renew the year-old ceasefire with Ahmad Shah Massoud, head of the Panjsher guerrilla forces, failed in the wake of a devastating ambush of a fuel convoy along the Salang Highway in March, which caused a severe fuel shortage in Kabul and required an emergency airlift. The Soviets then made preparations for the seventh offensive into the Panjsher Valley, their first since 1982.

Reinforcements were flown in: 6,000 troops, including a regiment of the l04th Guards Airborne Division from Kirovabad in the USSR. Th-16 Badgers and Su-24 Fencers of the Soviet Air force were

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deployed to Mary and Tennez in the Soviet Union. Most of the 20.000 Soviet troops committed to Panjsher VU were para-troops. The regiment from the l04th Guards Airbome was committed to battle. as was the 375th Guards Airbome Regi-ment from the now-disbanded 105th Guards Airborne Division; most of the 103rd Guards Airborne Divison. based at Kabul, was also committed.

The Kabul regime added 6,000 troops, of which the soldiers proved unreliable. The 38th Commando Brigade, considered one of the best Kabul regime units, suffered sev-eral hundred desertions before it even entered the Panjsher Valley,

do well. One battalion-sized force was roughly handled, being forced to call for reinforcements and air support.

The Outlook: The Afghans see signs for a Iong-tenn Soviet presence. In 1982. the Soviets finished expanding the air bases at Khandahar and at Shindad in southwest-em Afghanistan, within striking range of the Persian Gulf. In 1983, new fixed-wing air-fields were operational at Ghunan, near Herat in western Afghanistan. and at Bozekhan. in the Pamir Mountains. A POL (petroleum. oil, lubricant) pipeline runs from the USSR to Afghanistan.

In the military. real authority is held not by the Mghan officers . but by the Soviet "advisors" at all levels of command from regiment-level upwards. The Soviets have emphasized the strengthening of the Kabul regime's border troops , a force that has become significantly stronger in 1983, in order to cut off supplies from Pakistan.

The Soviets believe they can succeed in reshaping Afghan society to one consist-ent with a communist government , as was done in Soviet Central Asia and in Mongolia. That took 20 years. The Soviets are proba-bly willing to wait.

And the Soviets are not going to quit eas~y. If the Afghans are to carry on this unequal sUliggie. they must foUow through on improving command. training, and weap-onry. Otherwise. they are doomed to win some battles bUllose the war. Unless they receive support. the strength of the Soviet Union will grind them down , maybe not this year or next, but five or ten years. Then. Soviet weaponry, diplomacy, and bribery can, between them , carve out a future state acceptable to Moscow 's designs .

Actual Soviet performance was disap-

pointing. They failed to capture Massoud or to defeat any sizable Afghan forces . which pulled back before the offensive. Agents inside the Kabul regime's armed forces or Soviet Moslem troops had obviously infonned the Panjs her guerrillas of the offensive, which was noteworthy in itself for its being preceded by high-level carpet bombing by Tu-16 Badgers . However, this was not successful. At least one Badger flew into a mountain and by May, the remainder had retumed to their normal bases at Bobriusk and Thetu. The poor weather also rendered the Su-24 Fencer fighters ineffective. The Soviet air situation was compounded by an Afghan raid on the large Bagram airbase in May: this raid destroyed several MiG-21 Fishbed fighters on the ground.

Sovie t Afghanis tan Order of Battles March-April 1984

The Soviets cleared the valley of the Panjsher, but failed to make any penetrations into any but the largest of the side valleys. Most of the latter are narrow and twisted , making it impossible to maneuver helicop-ters or annored vehides into them. The Soviets repeated their 1982 Panjsher V offensive tactics of using helicopter-inserted "stop groups H forward of their annared spearheads. As in 1982, they did not

V .. it Locarion 40th Anny Termez.

USSR 40Ih Army Forward HO Kabul 103rd Guards Airborne Division Kabul loath Motorized Allie Division Kabul 2018t Motorized Alfie Division Oonduz 511"1 Guards Molortzed Aille Division Shindand 357th Motorized Rifle Division Kushka.

USSA 360th Motorized RIlle Division Termez.

USSA 70th MotoriZed Rifle Brigade Kandahar 66th Motorized Allie Brigade Jalalabad 191st Motorized Aille Regimen! Gh8znl 866th Motorized Aille Regiment Feyzabad 375th Guards Airborne Regiment Bagram Air Assault Brigade Gardez Special Operations Brigade Kandahar Special Opera1ions Brigade Shlndand 40th Airfield Delense Battalion 8agram

Before the Soviet invasKm of Mghanistan in December 1979, the 103rd Guards Air-borne Division was at Vitebsk, Byelorus-sian Military District; the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division was at Kizyi Arvat. Turkestan Military District; and the 201st Motorized Rifle Division was at

Frunze or else Dushanbe, Central Asia M~itary District. The 375th Guards Airborne Regiment was part of the 105th Guards Air-bome Division, now disbanded. which was based in Fergana. Thrkestan Military Dis-trict. The 357th and 360th Motorized Rifle Divisions (whose designations are not cer-tain) may be in their prewar garrison posi-tions in the Thrkestan Military District. or they may have replaced units that deployed into Mghanistan. The l08th Motorized Rifle Division may have been stationed before the conflict at Termez. USSR.

The war ih the northern provinces of Afghanistan is conducted by the divisions based inside the Soviet Union. In addition. many of the air and servke support forces used in the fighting are based in the USSR.

Total Soviet troop strength: 110,000 Army troops in Afghanistan; 40,000 troops fighting in Afghanistan, based in the USSR; 10,000 Air Force personnel in Afghanistan and the USSR; 50.000 support troops in the. USSR; and 2.000 advisor.; to Kabul regime forces . In addition, there are substantial MVD and KGB forces involved, plus sev-eral thousand civ~ian advisors.

00

STRATEGY & TACTICS 15

,

The Retreat to the Vistuia

As OF 29 NOVEMBER, THE ARMIES OF THE opposing sides were disposed as follows: No rt h : On the Baltic coast at Riga , the French had 35,000 men under Marshal Macdonald, most of whom were Pruss ian troops under General Yorck. Opposing them were approximately 10.000 Russian troops unde r Gen. Paulucci . Center: On the upper Berezina, where Napoleon personally commanded, the French numbered about 30,000 eflectives and that many again in disorganized refu -gees. They were opposed by several Rus-sian armies under Generals Wittgenslein, Tshitshagov, and Kutusov; the combined stre ngth was approximately 100,000 troops. Sou th: Moving away from Minsk, Austrian General Schwarzcnberg had about 40,000 men under his command, more than half of whom we re Austrian. They faced 25,000 Russians under Gen. Sacken.

Although the French still had rough parity with their opponents in terms of raw numbers, in numbers of combat effectives things were very different. T he Austrians and Prussians were so politicaJly unreliable that they would prove more of a hindrance than a help even in the short term. In the end, they were as much the enemy as the Russians. Furthermore, the bulk of the French were in the center, their numbers dwindling rapidly.

The late November thaw that melted the ice on the Berezina gave way to storms and sub-zero temperatures. During the next two weeks, the retreating French cen-ter lost 20,000 more men, with the Rus-sians losing twice that many. In these conditions, Napoleon ordered the center units to march on Vilna, more than 100 miles due west, where a vast supply depot had been established.

The rear guard combat during the re-treat depleted Marshal Ney's and then Mar-shal VICtor's Corps, ultimately leaving Ney to resume rear-guard duty with what troops he could find from the other units. For their part, the Russian regulars were also finding operations difficult. The active role in the purs uit fe ll to Gen. Chaplitz's Corps of Tshitshagov's command and to the omni-present Cossack hordes that swirled around the retreating French. Wiugenstein paralleled the French line of retreat. his ob-ject being to cut off the French northern flank forces.

On the morning of 5 December, Napo-leon summoned his marshals to a confer ence, where he announced his intention to return to Paris. He gave as reasons the need to restore public confidence and to su-pervise the bu~ding of a new French Army.

Napoleon stated that he had stayed with the Army long enough to see it past the worst of the dange r and that command could now be delegated to someone e lse . He named Murat, the King of Naples, as the new com-mander, a controversial choice. Murat was not popular among his peers nor among the soldiers, and proved temperamentally in-adequate to the chaJlenge that followed.

Napoleon left that evening. with Mural assuming command. The situation contin-ued to deteriorate. The Army reached V~na on 8 December, but the soldiers were in such a desperate state that they fell to riot-ing and looting in their haste to get food and drink. Murat was so appalled by the general destruction and by the continued harass-ment by the Cossacks that on the night of 9 December he ordered the re treat to re-sume, in spite of Napoleon's instructions to allow eight days' rest in the city.

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The Russian advance guard under Cha-piitz reached the city several days later: and the main body, when it arrived, gratefully settled into quarters west of Vilna, its strength reduced to less than 40,000 men. They did not leave camp until 16 January 1813. in the south , 100 miles from Vilna, the Russian left wing under Saeken had been defeated by Schwarzenberg, and was being pursued to the east. General Milora dovich was dispatched from the main body to move to Saeken 's re lief. Wittgenstein was left to continue his movements toward the Baltic coast, his strength reduced to 15,000 men.

The French center continued its re-treat and dissolution ; by 10 December, only 7,000 men were reported to be under arms, with probably 15,000 unarmed refugees ac-companying the m. On 11 December, the French center reached the Russian border at Kovno, took what they could from the de-pots there. and passed over the Niemen River. Out of Russia, the French force halted at Koenigsberg on 19 December.

To the south, Schwarzenberg was hav-

ing ~ttle trouble with Sacken and began his own retreat on 14 December, his orders be-ing to retire on Kalisch, some 300 miles to the west. He had originally moved south to the relief of General Reynier and had since been joined by Prince Poniatowski and his 8,000 Poles. On the arrival of M~oradovich, Schwarzenberg came to a covert under-standing with his Russian opponents and was permitted to retire to Cracow without pursuit. Poniatowski was compelled to ac-company him. Reynier, left to his own de-vices, eventually found his way to Kalisch.

In the north, Macdonald was almost forgouen, receiving no orde rs to retreat until 18 December, by which time the ad-vance of Wittgenstein had made hisposition perilous. He left in two columns, followed at a respectful distance by Paulucci's lO,()()() Russian troops. In the process of retreat-ing, Vorck slowed to allow himself to be in

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tercepted by Witlgenstein's advance guard. Russians and Prussians faced off for several days wh~e negotiations took place. In the e nd, on 30 December, the Convention of Tauroggen was concluded, in which Yorek's Prussians declared themselves " neutral-ized" in the conflict. Macdonald, who had doubled back to relieve YOTek, had to tum back again in a desperate e ffort to escape.

On hearing of Yorck 's defection, Murat became desperate . The French com-mander put the best of his available forces - some 30,000 men (new arrivals and the troops in Macdonald's Corps) - under General Rapp and ordered them into Dan-zig, where they were soon masked by the advancing Wittge nstein. Murat renewed the retreat wi th the rest of his (orces, drop-ping off additional static garrisons along the way. The object of Murat 's retreat was Po-sen, 80 miles beyond the Vistula. He reached this city on 16 January, where he promptly resigned his command in favor of Prince Eugene , the Viceroy of Italy and Na-poleon's stepson, leaving the Army to re-turn to his Kingdom of Naples.

STRATEGY & 1ACTICS 17

Defense of the Elbe ON 16 JANUARY, THE STRENGTHS OF THE opposing armies was as follows: North: General Rapp was bottled up in Danzig with 30,000 French troops. Wiu-genstein, his Russian opponent, had only 30.000 men himself. so the bulk of his strength was stationed to mask Danzig and the other French garrisons on the Vistula. The remainder of his troops, some 5,000 men (mostly Cossacks), were organized into small " free corps" of 1.500 men each and sent far west to raise the country. Center: The main French concentration was Prince Eugene's 14 ,000 men at Posen, halfway between Berlin and Warsaw. A sec-ond concentration of 10,000 men , under

Marshal St. Cyr, watched Berlin and was to have been reinforced in a week by 18,000 men moving up from Italy. There were per-haps 40,000 additional troops in garrison along the Vistula and Oder Rivers. but these were of almost no quality, the best men having been stripped out to form cadres for the troops forming up on the Elbe. The Russian center under Kutusov, some 40,000 troops, was far away at Vilna. South: Schwarzenbe rg was still Slowly moving south toward Cracow, taking Po-niatowski with him. The only French troops still taking orders were Reynie r's 12,000 men at Kalisch, between the Vitula and Oder. Watching Schwarzenberg's move-ments was Sacken with 20,000 men, while to the east of Warsaw stood MiJoradovich with 15,000 men. Prussians: At this stage, Prussia was not actively in the war against France, as it was still largely occupied; however, mobilization was in progress. At Koenigsberg, in the north, Yorck was actively recruiting to bring his strength up to 20,000 troops. In the cen-ter, at Colberg on the Baltic coast , Beulow was organizing his 12,000 men . In the south, at Breslau in Silesia. Bluecher com-manded the best of the Prussian forces, some 25,000 men.

The Russians made the opening move of the second stage of the campaign. On 16 January, the main Russian force under Ku-tusov broke camp at Vtlna and began to ad-vance southwest. A few days late r, Wittgenstein's Cossacks left the vicinity of Danzig and moved rapidly west. Eugene,

18 JAN/FEB 1985

for his part, was resting his men and at-tempting to organize a credible defense force. In particular, he was waiting for the arrival of 18,000 reinforcements from Italy, who only began to reach Berlin on 20-25 January.

On 28 January, Kutusov's advance guard under Tshitshagov reached the Vis-tula at Thorn as the main body angled south-wards. Meanwhile, the Cossacks unleashed by Wi.tgenstein were disrupting French communications, creating confusion, and occasionally even pamcking local French garrison commanders into abandoning their positions (Cossacks even entered Berlin briefly on 20 February). On 8 February, Ku-tUSQV'S main body reached the Vistula at Plock, and Miloradovich finally

entered Warsaw. A few days later, Tshit-shagov began to apply pressure on Eugene, prompting him to fall back to Frankfurt , which he reached on 18 February. Mean-while, Kutu sov caught Reynier and de-feated him. forcing him to retreat to the Oder at Glogau.

On reaching Frankfurt, Eugene met St. Cyr, who had come up from Berlin, giving the French main body a strength of 30,000 troops. French strength was also increased by Gen. Lauriston's Corps, which was now forming up at Magdeburg on the Elbe Rive r. As Eugene's army arrived at Frankfurt, Wittgenstein was approaching the Oder from the east. At this point. Marshal Berthier, the Army Chief of Staff, collapsed from overwork and illness. leaving the post to Marshal Augerau. Augerau was con-cerned about the possibility of insurrection in Berlin and counseled withdrawal to the west of the city. Taking Augerau's advice into account (along with his own estimate of the situation), Eugene decided to continue the retreat and left Frankfurt on 22 Febru-ary, leaving a rear guard of 6,000 men in two static garrisons along the Oder.

This course of action mightily dis-pleased Napoleon. In a scathing letter, he attacked Eugene's dispositions. arguing that the retreat was entirely unnecessary and that it had inflicted serious political and military harm to the French cause. Specifi-cally, Napoleon expressed the view that had Eugene taken up a position on the right bank of the Oder near Kuestrin (or at least in front of Berlin), the enemy would have

been compelled to assemble before attack-ing, a process that would have taken until mid-March. St. Cyr, who later wrote that he agreed with Napoleon that the Oder could have been defended, was too ill at the time to present his case forcefully.

Eugene 's retreat con tinued past Berlin , leaving the city undefended, and it was soon taken by Wittgenstein's advance guard on 4 March. Nine days later, on 13 March, Prussia declared war on France.

The Allies THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRUSS]AN and Russian forces up to that time had been curious. Frederick William, the king of Prussia . had insisted on postponing any declaration of hostilities until Berlin was se-

The strength was rising quickly, as Viaor's II Corps also assembled.

curely taken; on the other hand. Kutusov refused to advance strongly until the Prus-sians were in support. A compromise was arranged: the Prussian Army would shadow the Russian advance, but would not engage in combat until Berlin was no longer in French hands.

Through mid-March the "Allied" ad-vance featured Wittgenstein on the right, advancing on an axis from Danzig toward Berlin with roughly 20,000 men; his ad-vance was shadowed by Yorck's Corps (20,000 men). which was joined in progress by Gen. Buelow's 10,000 men. In the cen-ler, moving from the middle Vistula around Warsaw, Miloradovich and Kutusov advanced together, with Winzengerode as their advance guard (lhe three forces to-taled about 45,000 men.) Finally, on the left came Bluecher out of Silesia with 25,000 Prussians.

On 10 March , Eugene began to con-struct a cordon defense on the Elbe with the reinforced strength now at his disposal. Lauriston, with his newly-fonned V Corps, would form the 35,000-man left wing at Magdeburg. In the center at Wittenberg. Xl Corps would soon have 18,000 men posted. To the right, on the upper Elbe at Dresden, Marshal Davout would have 17,000 men formed from VlI Corps and from assorted other troops. In the rear, at Leipzig, Eugene proposed a reserve of 3,000 men, with himself in command.

News of these plans brought more an-gry correspondence from Napoleon . The orders were over a front too wide and too

dispersed to suit him. What Napoleon wished Eugene to do (indeed, what he had been urging all along) was to take up a posi-tion where Eugene could threaten offensive action, not merely set up a passive defense. He sent Eugene a set of instructions to re-vise his dispositions so as to concentrate a main body of 50,000 men in front of Magde-burg, with only small forces along the upper Elbe to block the passage of light troops. If the enemy attempted to pass along the river to the south, he was to respond by driving on Berlin, thereby compelling the Allies to pull back to cover the Prussian cap-ital. Napoleon further indicated the impor-tance o f protecting the lower Elbe . Napoleon wished for Davout to be sent to Hamburg and for a secure line of communi-cations to be established back to Wesel on the lower Rhine. If Eugene was attacked di-rectly and forced to fall back. Napoleon wanted him to retreat to the west, not the southwest. Above all. Napoleon did not want the enemy to be drawn directly onto his army forming at Mainz.

Although Eugene received these in-structions on 9 March, he did not begin to act on them until 18 March. Meanwhile, Carra St. Cyr (not to be confused with Gou-vion 51. Cyr. commander of XI Corps). the garrison commander at Hamburg, aban-doned the city to one of the Cossack forces, losing in the process 2,000 men on their way to reinforce him. The city was not re-taken until Davout's arrival weeks later.

While Eugene was re-arranging his forces, the Allies were far from agreement as to what their own deployment should be. The Prussians wished to move more ag-gressively, while Kutusov was more cau-tious, in part because of a lack of confidence in the Prussians. He felt that an advance on Leipzig by Wittgenstein and Bluecher was in order, with the remaining troops held back. Wittgenstein offered an amended ver-sion of Kutusov's plan, in which his forces would form a shoulder to Bluecher's ad-vance, principally covering Berlin. It was essentially this plan that was in force in late March. Wittgenstein's troops began to move southwest from Berlin while Blue-cher's forces took Dresden and crossed the Elbe.

Eugene learned of the enemy move-ment on 31 March and, in pursuance of his orders, began an offensive toward Berlin. His movement was halfhearted at best, however, as he neither understood Napo-leon's plan nor agreed with it. Instead of at tempting a strong offensive to force the Allies to abandon the ir move across the Elbe, Eugene attacked with only a fraction of the 50,000 men he had available, using excessive numbers of troops for rear-area security. The battle of Moeckem, which re-

suIted when Eugene's forces encountered Wittgenstein's, was a sprawling, confused affair which lasted from 3 April to 5 April. In the end, Eugene's forces were repulsed by a mere portion of Wittgenstein's strength, which gave Allied propaganda efforts an un-expected boon. On 7 April, the next stage of the campaign began as Kutusov's main body resumed its march west.

Napoleon's Return ON 15 APRIL, NAPOLEON LEFT PARIS TO join the army he had created along the Main River in Germany. The strengths and dispo-sitions of the opposing sides at the time were as follows: North: On the lower Elbe near Hamburg, the French forces were centered around the 12.000 troops of Davout's I Corps, which were opposed by 7,000 Russian ir-regulars of the free corps. Center : Near Magdeburg was Eugene 's newly-named Army of the Elbe . He had some 50.000 men at his disposal; this force was built around Lauriston's V Corps (22,000 men) and Macdonald 's XI Corps (22,000 men). The strength of the French around Magdeburg was rising quickly in this period as Victor's II Corps (projected strength of 20.000 men) also assembled here. Opposing Eugene were Buelow 's 17,000 Prussians, whose duties included covering Berlin. South: Along the Main River, Napoleon was fonning his new army, now called the Army of the Main. This force was created primarily from two sources: the new French troops coming up from the interior of France, and the German and Italian allied troops moving up from the south . The group moving from the French interior to the front included Ney's III Corps (40,000 men) at Wuerzburg, Marshal Marmont's VI Corps (25,000 men) at Hanau. and the Im-

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perial Guard (15.000 men) at Mainz. The second group (from the south) included: Marshal Oudinot's XlI Corps (25,000 men) , of which elements were not yet concen-trated, and General Bertrand's IV Corps (30,000 men), in an extended march column with its head at Bamberg. The Allied forces opposing the French already had their lead elements west of the Elbe, along the Saale River: in the lead (from north to south) were Wittgenstein's troops, composed of Yorck's and Gen. von Kleist's Prussians (8,000 and 6,000 men, respectively), and Gen. von Berg's 8,000 Russians; toward the south were Bluecher's 25,000 Prus-sians and Winzengerode's 15,000 Russians. Moving up from the Allied rear was the main body under Kutusov. 25.000 men strong after detachments. East: In the Allied rear, some 70,000 French scattered in fortresses along the Vistula and Oder (the major concentration was at Danzig) were besieged by roughly 25,000 Russians, the most important con-centration being General Barclay de Tolly's group of 14 ,000 men (de Tolly had replaced Tshitshagov). Augmenting Allied rear-area strength was the developing Prussian mobi-lization, which had already put some 50,000 men into position around the French garri-sons, releasing Russians for active duty. An additional factor was the presence on the Baltic coast of some 30,000 Swedish troops under Karl lohann (better known as ex-Marshal of France Bemadotte), who had secretly agreed to enter the war on the Al-lied side.

On 17 April, Napoleon arrived at Mainz . He had 140,000 men assembling there under his own command (the Army of the Main) and 80,000 men assembling on the Elbe under Eugene (the Army of the Elbe). Against these numbers he estimated that the Allies would have only 70,000

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STRATEGY & TACTICS 19

troops available immediately for offensive operations. With that strength differential in mind. Napoleon felt quite secure about his ability to defend himself in the short term, as well as his capability to carry out offen-sive operations once his preparations were complete. If the Allies for some reason lost their heads and attacked one of the French armies . Napoleon planned for the other French army to attack the Allied rear. with the aim of surrounding and annihilating the outnumbered Allied Army. With his super-iority in numbers and himself in command. Napoleon felt that such an Allied blunder should end with the Allied Army destroyed.

With such a contingency plan in mind. Napoleon felt that there was no need for him to hurry to the Elbe, so he remained at Mainz for a week to oversee the final stages of the Army of the Main's creation and de-ployment. In his plans for the coming cam-paign, Napoleon intended to take the offensive in late April by moving the Army of the Main northeast and the Army of the Elbe south, with the two forces uniting at Leipzig. With regard to the Allies, Napoleon hoped that they would keep in mind the Jena campaign of 1806, which had crushed the Prussians. and that they would watch for a French attempt to outflank them from the south. What he planned instead was to swing to the north of the Allies, pin them against the Austrian border, and cut them off from Prussia.

While Napoleon was formulating these plans, Allied life was being complicated by the fact that the conunander of their armies, Kutusov. had fallen mortally ill. He had taken to his death bed and was no longer competent to command. The firs t problem the Allies faced, then. was the appointment of a replacement. The Czar considered the matter and ultimately settled on Wittgen-stein. who had commanded the northern wing of the Allied Ar my. As a candidate,

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Wittgenstein had several points in his favor: he was young (age 44). energetic, aggres-sive, and he had good relations with the Prussians. Most importantly. he was liked by the Czar. His age, however, was an issue - Wittgenstein was junior not only to Blue-cher of the Prussian Army but also to Tor-massov and Miloradovich of the Russian Army. Bluecher, for his part, agreed to take orders from Wittgenstein, his relations with his Russian commander remaining impecca-ble throughout the latter's tenure. Wittgen-stein's countrymen were far more difficult. Tormassov and Miloradovich simply refused to serve Wittgenstein, which forced the Czar to take personal command of them, while Wiltgenstein led the rest of the army.

As a practical maUer, that arrangement virtually placed the Czar in command of the enti re Allied Army. Howeve r much the Czar might insist that he was merely WiU-genstein's intermediary, in fact it was im-possible for Wittgenstein to compel his Em-peror's obedience or to refuse any instruction originating [rom him. The inher-ent weakness of this arrangement became increasingly apparent over time, as the Czar became increasingly prone to giving orders without consulting \Vittgenstein.

Miloradovich's force reached the Elbe at Dresden on 16 April; a week later. Tor-maSsov arrived with the Russian Guard. T he Allies' movement was not overly rapid; they believed they had until mid-May before Napoleon could advance. However, on 25 April, it was reported that Napoleon was on the move; the report was correct. Napo-leon had left Mainz on 24 April, with his plans well advanced . T he French m Corps had reached Erfurt, 70 miles west of leip-zig, with the Guard and VI Corps close be-hind. The TV Corps was 50 miles to the south and moving north. The lead forma-tions of the Army of the Elbe had marched

30 miles south of Magdeburg. and were now 40 miles north of Leipzig. Napoleon caught up with Ney's III Corps on 25 April.

For the Allies, this was a time of uncer-tainty and disagreement. They were agreed in principal that defending Napoleon's ex-pected offensive was logical. but were di-vided on how to achieve this. The contours of the argument concerned whether to at-tack Napoleon before or after he reached Leipzig and where exactly the Allied Army should concentrate. (It did not help the de-cision-making process that the Czar was ab-sent (rom headquarters visiting his sister on 25 April.) The Allied plan, as it eventually formed. was to concentrate to the south of Leipzig between Pegau and Z)Yenkau. using the difficult terrain there to mask Allied movements from the French. As the French passed by, the Allies meant to at-tack them from the nank before they reached Leipzig.

The French. for their part. were con-tinuing their march forward. Their major problem was the lack of light cavalry. The French columns were harassed by the Al-lied horse and were unable to strike back. At the same time, a constant stream of in-formation about French movements was flowing back to the Allied camp while Napo-leon's army was forced to fee l its way for-ward as it went. This double problem was not one to which Napoleon was accus-tomed; in past campaigns , he generally pos-sessed cavalry and intelligence superiority.

On 1 May, the lead elements of the Army of the Main and the Anny of the Elhe came within a few miles of each other, the heads of each column at Weissenfels and Merseburg. respectively. At noon, Ney's III Corps ran into some resistance when it encounter ed a detachment of Win-zengerode's cavalry at the crossing of the Rippach River. In that minor engagement (which the French won) . Marshal Bes-sieres, the commander of the Imperial Guard. was killed. Marshal Mortier took over in his stead.

The BaHle of Luetzen IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON OF I MAY, THE opposing armies were deployed in the vicin-ity of Leipzig: Northwest : Some 2,000 French troops from V Corps were at Halle, facing 7,000 Prussians under Buelow. Leipzig: Kleist's 6,000 Prussians were de-ployed in the city. their job being to screen Leipzig and create the illusion that it con-tained the main Allied concentnltion. West : The French Army of the Elbe (45,000 men) was moving from this direc-tion. The lead units were from Lauriston's V Corps (21,000 men). followed by Mac-donald's XI Corps (22,000 men) and by

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Gen. Latour-Maubourg's I Cavalry Corps (2.000 men). Southwest: The French Army of the Main (115,000 men) was moving from this direc-tion. The lead elements were from Ney's III Corps (45,000 men), with the Guard under Mortier (15,000 men) , Marmont 's VI Corps (25,000 men), and Bertrand's IV Corps (30,000 men) echeloned behind. Re treating from the advancing French was Gen. Lanskoi's cavalry force (2.000 men) that had unsuccessfully contested the Rip--pach crossing. South : The main Allied concentra tion (73,000 men) was located in this area and consisted of Yorck's Corps (9,000 men), Berg's Corps (8,000 men), Wmzengerocle's Corps (14.000 men), Bluecher's Corps (25,000 men) , and Tormassov's Corps (17,000 men). Southeast: Miloradovich's Corps (13,000 men). Miloradovich was not moving to the general concentration area. but rather to the south of it. to cover the Allied left.

Napoleon had achieved his assembly of both armies on 1 May, then had assumed command of both. After the small fight at the Rippach, he considered his JX)sition. He had reached the Allied forward area, as the increased tempo of resistance indicated, but precise Allied strengths, dispositions, and intentions were still unknown. It was not until that evening that an enemy con-centration was reported near Zwenkau; un-til then, the French acted in ignorance . ,

Napoleon's orders for the day were for

Lauriston to reach Markranstadt , six miles southwest of Leipzig. with Macdonald and Latour-Maubourg three miles behind him and to the north of Guenthersdorf. Ney was to move to Luetzen, with a portion of his strength deployed to the south of the city. Thus situated, Ney's forces constituted a flank guard for the Army. Napoleon himself was in Luellen with the Guard cavalry. Still further to the southwest was Marmont's VI Corps, the Guard infantry, and the ex tended march column of Bertrand's IV Corps.

The Allies were actively using their cavalry to observe the French movements throughout the afternoon of 1 May. The pa-trols reported that the French Army was in a long. thin column along the highway to Leipzig, with a small (2,000 men) flank guard at Kaja. southeast of Luetzen. The optimistic cavalry reports were one of the prime contributors to Wittgenstein's belief that all was well. [n fact, the Allied recon-naissance did not accurately gauge the size of the French force near Kaja. which was five times the reported strength. Further-more, the very activity of the cavalry sug-gested to Napoleon where the Allied Army was, so their movements gave intelligence information to the French as well as to the Allies.

The French Army reached its assigned positions by nightfall with little difficulty. What happened next has since been a mat-ter of controversy among military histo-rians: was NapoJeon surprised by the

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subsequent Allied attack? Napoleon wrote afterward that he had indeed been sur-prised, but since Napoleon's statements are not always to be taken as simple truthful statements, thal has not settled matters.

One thing is clear: whether or not Na-JX)leon was expecting an attack. the French Army certainly was not. Orders from Napo-leon to Ney, Lauriston. and Marmont to carry out a strong reconnaissance to the southeast were ignored. On all fairness, Napoleon did not issue those orders until 4 A.M.) For that malter. Napoleon. who might have been expected to carry out a personal reconnaissance had he been seriously ex-pecting an attack. did not do so. All in all, it seems fair to conclude that while Napoleon regarded an Allied attack on 2 Mayas possi-ble, he did not take the prospect too seri-ously, and that his subordinates from corps level on down were completely surprised.

The Allie~ spent the night of 1 May-2 May in confusion. Wittgenstein's prelimi-nary orders for the coming battle were is-sued on the evening of 1 May, with the fonnal orders following at midnight. Essen-tially, they called for an Allied attack on the French right wing on 2 May at 7 A.M. The orders were long and detailed on trivial mat-ters (how many guns and battalions -twelve and three respec tively - Win-zengerode was to leave along the Elster), but vague on important matters (the order in which the corps were to pass over the bridges). Consequently. Allied movements would have been snarled even if the march

STRATEGY & TACTICS 21

had been carried out at noon on the bright-est day of the year. Carried out as they were in the middle of the night , they were a disaster.

More problems lay in the lack of orders for Buelow and orders for Miloradovich , who was sent out as a flank guard to Zeitz, more than 12 miles south of the battlefield and 100 far south to affect the outcome. In the event. the French and Allied planning errors acted in part to balance each other. The French completely failed to detect the slow-moving Allies. who were still crossing the Elster when dawn broke . With no re ports to the contrary from his corps com-manders , Napoleon assumed the best and, in the morning, issued his orders for the day. He directed Lauriston to drive on Leip. zig, with Macdonald in support. Ney was to remain in place. while Marmont was to move on Pegau to fix in place the Allied force reported to be there, and Bertrand was to relocate behind Ney.

These orders caused Lauriston to en-gage Kleis t in front of Lindenau at about 10 A.M. Outnumbered and somewhat confused (Kleist had been told that the French would be attacked at dawn), Kleis t retired across the causeway and abandoned Leipzig. While this action was taking place, the Allied Army finally assembled its attack force. Bluecher was on the right. with Yorck in the cente r and the le ft composed of cavalry drawn from the various corps. In reserve, the Allies had Berg and Winzengerode, with the Russian Guard still trying to cross the Elster back at Pegau. The long march had fatigued the Army: it rested in place for an hour before beginning the attack al about 11 :45 A.M.

That the French had not noticed any-thing amiss up to that point is incredible. They had allowed the Allied Army of more than 70,000 men to approach within 1.000 yards of their position , rest there for an hour, and still remain comple te ly unde-tected. The first warning the French had that the All ies were in the area was when Bluecher 's infantry attacked the French le ft at Gross Goerschen and the Allied cavalry attacked the French right at Starsiedel . The attack on Gross Goerschen came to a halt when the Prussians reali zed that the French there were much s tronger than had been reported. Instead of an immediate in-fantry assault, the Prussians opened with a half-hour artillery bombardment. Mean-while. on the French right at Starsiedel, the situation was much the same. Surprise was achieved, but the Allied attack turned into an artillery bombardment when the forces also realized the extent of the Frenc h strength.

The tre mendous thunder that erupted south of Lueuen served immediate notice

22 JAN/FEB 1985

to the French command that the Allies were attacking. Ney rushed his reserves to the south; Napoleon recalled the XI and V Corps, and issued urgent orders for IV and VI Corps to hurry fo rward . Napoleon planned to have Ney hold the center, with the Guard in reserve. while V and Xl Corps attacked the Allied right and IV and VI Corps the Allied left. All in all, Napoleon hoped to achieve a two-to-one numerical superiority within a matter of hours.

The Allies were s till committing them-selves in a tentative fa shion. Only half of Bluecher 's Corps was forward. and only some cavalry and artillery were forward from the other Allied corps. Nonetheless, the Prussian infantry was lighting well. Al-though outnumbered, the Prussians of ZietllCn's and Kluex 's brigades drove the French before them, capturing Gross

Bravest af the Brave rear guard In the reI/eat to the Berellll3. HIS III COfPS suffered at Luetzen Goerschen. Klein Gloerschen. and Rahna , and taking large numbers of prisoners in the bargain.

However, reinforcements were keep-ing the French in the fight. Marmont's lead e lements had relieved Girard on the French right, and Ney's three additional divisions were arriving behind the French center, led by the Marshal in person. On seeing the ex-tent of the damage done in the center. Ney rallied the two French divisions already for-ward. and added Bre nnie r's division to make a counter-attacking force. This attack overwhelmed the now-disorganized Prus-sians. being repulsed o nly when Bluecher added another Prussian brigade to the cen-ter of the Allied line.

The situation for the Fre nch was now grave. They had heavily committed their forces, had taken more losses than they had

inflicted, and were in .danger of losing the key to their position , the village of Kaja . It was this state of affairs that confronted Na-poleon when he arrived on the field at 2:30 P.M. At that time, the flanking forces that Napoleon had counted so heavily upon were proving slow to deveJop. Marmont had ar-rived. but rather than providing help. was instead requesting it. Bertrand had arrived with part of his force , but was not active and was under surveillance by Allied cavalry. On the left, Lauris ton had not even moved to-ward the field, and Macdonald was s till marching.

Napoleon analyzed the situation. He felt that the key to the battle was in the cen-ter, but that it was much too'early to commit the Guard. Ney's III Corps must , there-fore , be rallied immediately, and any help must come from increased pressure on the flanks. Marmont's request for help was summarily turned down, Bertrand was or-dered to press forward, and Macdonald was told to move into position.

Realizing that III Corps must be rallied, Napoleon committed himself personally to the task. Riding into the mass of disorgan-ized soldiers. he was a galvanizing force. or-dering the artillerists to form a grand battery, moving Ricard's division forward , and inspiring his young soldiers to great e f-forts. (Marmont later remarked that of all Napoleon's battles, the French Emperor was at the greatest personal risk at Luet-zen.) Sometime after 3 P.M Napoleon led a new attack into the center with Ricard 's Di-vision and with whatever else of 111 Corps 's infantry that could still be formed. The at-tack drove once more into the area between Kaja and Gross Goerschen, the site of most of the previous fighting of the battle.

"La Garde au Feul" AT ABOlJT 4 P.M., THE RUSSIAN GUARD HAD finally arrived (its advance had been delayed by the Czar's wish to lead the final , winning charge of the battle in person), and Wiugen-stein at last felt he could release Yorck's Corps. Into the center Yorck went. turning the tide in favor of the Allies once again. To restore the position, Napoleon was forced to send one of the Young Guards brigades forward where. with the help of fragments of III Corps, the Prussians we re again drive n back. Once again, the Allies rallied and rolled the French back one final time.

By this point it was 5:30 P.M. The losses in the battle had been horrific; in the fields between Kaja and Gross Goerschen lay the bodies of more than 15.000 men. Fires bumed in the villages while gunpow-der smoke darkened the air. Both amties s tood and faced each other, too exhausted to attack, too s tubborn to retreat. Napoleon now judged the battle ripe. On the Fre nch

left, Macdonald had finally arrived; on the right, Bertrand had finally begun to launch a serious attack. Napoleon ordered his artil-lery to commence a new bombardment in the center and formed up his Guard to at tack, with the support of loose elements from Ney's and Marmont's Corps.

At 6:30 P.M., the Guard went forward. The Allies were again swept back, this time for good. The attack stopped only at Gross Goerschen, effectively ending the battle. The Allied Anny had fought bitterly, but its fianks were under pressure and its original plan a shambles. Sometime after 7 P.M., the Allies began to retreat. In all that time, the Russian Guard Corps had seen almost no action. As darkness fell, pursuit of the retir-ing Allied Anny was almost non-existent. The French Anny had little cavalry, and in any case the French had taken as great a beating as the Allies. Only Marmont applied any real pressure, but after the French 21 st Division was broken by a Pruss ian cavalry charge at 9 P.M., even Marmont's Corps gave up pursuit. On the northern and south-ern flanks of the engagement, Buelow had driven the French from Halle while Milora-dovich occupied Zeitz without opposition. Both retreated east when they learned of the outcome at Luetzen.

Losses at Luetzen have never been precisely established. The French suffered more than 20,000 casualties , although how much more is uncertain. T he Allies proba-bly suffered no less than 12,000 casualties, bu t possibly as many as 20,000 dead, wounded, and missing. Thai the French

The losses in the battle had been horrific; in

the fields lay the bodies of 15,000 men.

won the battle is clear in spite of the differ-ential in losses. The Allies had been com-pelled to re treat, and Napoleon could now move in any direction he chose without im-mediate opposition from the Allies.

On 3 May, Napoleon gave his first or-ders after the battle: pursue the Allied Anny to the east. Napoleon still hoped to

avoid a long war and inflict the knockout blow that he had not been able to deliver at Luelzen. In the weeks to follow, he was not able to achieve that victory; the hoped-for lightning campaign turned into a long strug-gle that would not end until the French Em-peror was forced into exile in 1814.

Selected Bibliography Chandler, D. G .. The Campaigns of Napoleon. (New York: (976). Clausewitz. K. von, \Om KM8, (Princeton transla-tion. On liar. Prinl,:eton: (976). Davis. F .. l\ellington s VK:I01)~ (New York: (976). Esposito. Br. Gen. VJ .. and Elting. Col. J.R .. A Military llistory and Alias of the Napoleonic lfurs. (New York: 1964). Friedrich, Maj. R . Geschic:hle der Be-freiungskriege 1813-1815. (4 vols.; Berlin: 19(4).' Hughes. Maj. Gen. B.P .. Firepower, \leapons Ef-

fecti~'eness on rhe Batllcfield 163Q-185(). (New York: 1976). Keegan. J .. The Face of Battle. (New York: 1976). Petre. F.l .. Napoleon's us! Campaign in Germany - 1813, (New furk: 1974). Quimby, R.S., The Background of the Napoleonic lfurfare, (New York: 1957). *This work is required for any serious work on lhe 1813 campaign. This is particularly true for orders of battle.

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STRATEGY & TACTICS 23

Possibilities and Realities of the Luetzen Campaign

BETWEEN THE TIME THE FRENCH ARMY CROSSED THE BEREZINA IN late November 1812, miraculously saved from destruction, and the end of the battle of Luetzen in early May 1813, a great military campaign had taken place. In reviewing the history of that cam-paign. there are six major "break" points, major events that made the Lueuencampaign what it was: Napoleon's decision to return to France after the crossing of the Berczina, the subsequent French inability to defend the Vistula. the Russian southern strategy of the German campaign. the French failure to attempt a defense of Berlin, Napoleon's plan of campaign for his return to Germany, and the Allied defense of Leipzig.