Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–96–3 August 1996 Vol. 9, No. 3

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

There is much ongoing discussion of therevolution in military affairs and the impactit will have on our military forces and on ourdecisions about how we will wage war.

Certainly, advances in technology willhave profound effects on our operations,effects which we are only partially able toappreciate at this time. Other factors to con-sider are the effects that world politicaldevelopments will have on United Statesinterests and how the U.S. will respond. Thenumerous ongoing and potential changespresent a bewildering array of variables topolicy-makers and military planners.

In this issue, Brian Sullivan compares thecurrent situation to someone moving back-ward into the future, able to see clearly onlywhat has past, incompletely aware of what ishappening, and altogether unable to see intothe future. He suggests that the best one cando is to analyze current trends and drawanalogies from history. Regarding the currentrevolution in military affairs, Sullivan saysthat history contains many RMAs that haveproduced new theories, new weapons and newways of waging war. Although the currentRMA promises to greatly increase command-ers’ awareness, history is also replete withexamples of defeated commanders who werewell-supplied with information that theyfailed to understand.

The articles in this issue of Special Warfarecan increase readers’ understanding of a vari-ety of current issues and potential develop-ments. In addition to discussing the history ofrevolutions in military affairs, Sullivan exam-ines potential RMAs, including economicdevelopments in the Far East that could giverise to a more powerful and more influentialChina. Ambassador David Passage discussesissues in Latin America, such as the growth ofdemocracy and the increasing expectations ofthe lower classes, that could have a dramaticimpact on the U.S. Louis Beres shows howworldwide unrest, coupled with an increasedavailability of nuclear materials, could lead to

a deadlier form of terrorism.Should these developments require some

form of U.S. military operations, typicallythey will involve small-unit training, person-to-person contact, cultural awareness, intel-ligence collection or information dissemina-tion — the specialties that have alwaysmade SOF valuable.

As we anticipate developments and opera-tions, we must ensure that our special-oper-ations doctrine and structure are up-to-date.Steven Cook’s article explains how theARSOF capstone manual, FM 100-25, isbeing revised to include the latest evolutionsin SOF doctrine. But we must also remem-ber that some factors endure revolutions inmilitary affairs. Major Antulio Echevarriaargues that Clausewitz’s theories aredurable and adaptable to a changing envi-ronment. As we move into the future, ourunderstanding of events and the versatilityof SOF will allow us to find new ways ofemploying their unique capabilities.

Major General William P. Tangney

Features2 The Future National Security Environment: Possible

Consequences for Army SOFby Brian R. Sullivan

13 A New Approach to Latin America: The Role of SOFby Ambassador David Passage

22 Preventing Nuclear Terrorism Against the United States:10 Vital Questionsby Louis René Beres

30 A Wake for Clausewitz? Not Yet!by Major Antulio J. Echevarria II

36 Field Manual 100-25: Updating Army SOF Doctrineby Steven E. Cook

38 Logistics for Deployed Army Special Operations Forces: APathway to Supportby Lieutenant Colonel Philip E. Bradford, U.S. Army (ret.); MajorDavid C. Lawson; Chief Warrant Officer 4 John W. Fulcher; andSergeant Major Alvin Lester

Departments45 Letters48 Enlisted Career Notes50 Officer Career Notes52 Foreign SOF54 Update56 Book Reviews

PB 80–96–3 ContentsAugust 1996 Special Warfare Vol. 9, No. 3

Commander & CommandantMajor General William P. Tangney

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorSylvia McCarley

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

Automation ClerkDebra Thomas

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited andshould be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147.Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring privatesubscriptions should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government PrintingOffice, Washington, D.C. 20402.

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Dennis J. ReimerGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. HudsonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

02669

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Predicting the national securityenvironment can be little morethan educated guessing. It is anenvironment influenced by devel-opments abroad, as well as bydomestic politics, the state of theUnited States economy, andchanges in American society. It isdifficult to understand such anenormously complicated set ofinterrelated factors, and to accu-rately predict how they will evolveinto a different state is impossible.About the best anyone can do is toguess which trends will continueand at what rates, to make analo-gies with events from history, andto rely on intuition.

We are taught to think of thefuture as being in front of us andthe past as being behind us, and we

picture ourselves walking into thefuture. But Marine LieutenantGeneral Paul Van Riper recentlypresented a view of the futurewhich may help us conceptualize ita bit better. He said that theancient Greeks thought of thefuture as behind them and pic-tured themselves backing into it.One cannot see directly behind, ofcourse, and the future is unseen.The Greeks imagined the immedi-ate past before them and the rest ofthe past in the background, grow-ing more hazy with increasing dis-tance. They thought of the presentas being around them, and theimmediate future as the vagueshapes perceptible in one’s periph-eral vision. They believed that peo-ple could best predict the future byattempting to ascertain its outlinesin the shapes of present events.What follows are the author’s pre-dictions based on the shapes in thepresent world.

Even though some sovereignstates are growing weaker, themost powerful actors in the futuresecurity environment are going tobe countries, not transnationalforces. Many of these states will beclustered in East Asia and SouthAsia. The economic growth rates ofChina, Korea, Taiwan, some of the

Southeast Asian countries and,most recently, India, are quiteimpressive — some have been inthe double digits for a decade orlonger. While such economicgrowth may eventually slowdown — as it has in Japan — itseems likely that it will continuefor a good number of years forthese “Asian tigers.” Meanwhile,the annual growth of the grossdomestic product, or GDP, of theU.S. has stayed in the 2-3 percentrange for more than 20 years. Inother words, the relative balance ofeconomic power is altering at arapid rate in favor of East Asia andagainst the U.S.

We need to stress the adjectiverapid. In the late 19th and early20th centuries, the U.S. and Ger-many enjoyed higher economicgrowth rates than did Britain. Thosehigher growth rates allowed theGermans to challenge the British fordomination of Europe in World WarI and allowed the U.S. to replaceBritain as the leader of the Westerndemocracies. But the difference inthose growth rates was minusculeby contemporary standards. From1870 to 1914, the British economygrew at a rate of about 2 percentper year, while the American andGerman economies grew at 3 per-

2 Special Warfare

The Future National Security Environment:Possible Consequences for Army SOF

by Brian R. Sullivan

This article is based on the paperpresented by the author at the 1996Special Forces Conference, held atFort Bragg in April 1996. It examinespast and future revolutions in mili-tary affairs and possible roles thatU.S. SOF could fill in the 21st centu-ry. The views expressed in this articleare those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the policies of theUnited States government, theDepartment of Defense or the Nation-al Defense University. — Editor

cent. It was this 1 percent annualdifference, compounded, of course,that enabled the Germans and theAmericans to pull ahead of theBritish.

Our sense of the rate of historicalchange has been shaped by thoseevents. It is difficult for us to com-prehend that the balance of powercould be quickly overturned if thegrowth rate of a major power’seconomy surpassed our economy’sgrowth rate by 6, 7, 8 or 9 percent.But that may be happening. Theeconomy of the People’s Republic ofChina has been growing at 10-12percent per year for the past 15years or so. South Korea and Tai-wan are doing almost as well.Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia andeven Vietnam may soon be doingthe same.

Economic implicationsEven if the Chinese economic

growth rate slows to an averageannual rate of 7-9 percent, the PRCcould challenge the U.S. in econom-ic and military terms, and muchsooner than most of us might imag-ine. True, Chinese wealth would bedivided among more people thanours is — the average Chinese isunlikely to have a standard of liv-ing equal to that of the averageAmerican for a century or more.But what if the PRC economy con-tinues to grow at a rapid rate andBeijing devotes 5 or 6 percent of itsGDP to arms while we continue tospend 3 percent or less on defense?

Nazi Germany and the SovietUnion never had a GDP that wasmore than 40-50 percent of theGDP of the U.S., but by devotinga far larger percentage of theirnational wealth to armaments,they were able to challenge ourvery survival. By 1939, Hitlerwas putting about 25 percent ofthe German economy into warpreparations. In the 1970s and

1980s, the USSR was devoting15-18 percent — perhaps evenmore — to its military.

This is not to say that we aredoomed to an arms race with theChinese. Nor am I predicting thatthe PRC will follow a militaristicpath. The point is that sovereignstates will remain the primaryactors on the world stage andtheir interrelationships willchange at a speed far greater thanthat for which we are psychologi-cally prepared.

Domestic realitiesNot all Americans are attuned

to the security implications ofinternational economics, but themajority are acutely conscious ofeconomic realities at home. Per-haps most important is the grow-ing divide between the richest 20percent of the American popula-tion and the other 80 percent. Thelatter have had a stagnant ordeclining standard of living sincethe early 1970s. For the so-calledworking poor, working class and

lower middle class, life hasbecome increasingly difficult,even grim. Their understandableeconomic discontent is beginningto translate into social and politi-cal difficulties for the entire coun-try. Our political system, ourdomestic racial and ethnic rela-tions, our foreign and national-security policies, and our outlookon the world have been shaped bythe ever-rising prosperity thatmost Americans have enjoyedsince the founding of our republic.There have been exceptions, ofcourse. But even the GreatDepression lasted only 10 years.American history has had noprecedent of a prolonged incomestagnation or reduction stretch-ing more than 25 years.

How long can this continue untilsocial and political pathologieseven worse than those we havebeen witnessing begin to convulsethe U.S.? What political formmight the economic and social mis-eries of the majority of Americancitizens assume? Unless the aver-age American soon begins to enjoy

U.S. forces conduct a patrol in Somalia. American economic problems and reduced military budgets couldlead to a policy of isolationism that would make operations such as the one in Somalia less likely.

August 1996 3

Photo by Terry Mitchell

real improvement in his or herstandard of living, the unhappi-ness produced by prolonged eco-nomic stasis or decline will beginto affect our political system inunhealthy ways. We could witnessfar worse demagogues than wehave seen before. And demagogueshave a poor record of keeping thepeace — at home or abroad. Con-versely, we might see the return toisolationism and protectionism asan apparent solution to our eco-nomic problems.

Technology’s effectsTechnology is transforming our

lives at an increasingly rapidrate. Our personal lives have

been improved and disturbed bythe electronic devices that havebecome commonplace in ourhomes. Appliances invented tomake our lives easier and toincrease the pleasure of ourleisure time seem paradoxicallyto be adding to our anxiety. Inparticular, television has come torule our lives in a way that peo-ple in our grandparents’ daywould have found astonishing.Fewer and fewer of us seem toread or to think. Instead, we arepassively bombarded by thefrightening facts and fictionsprojected electronically into ourhomes. Objectively, we are farmore secure since the collapse ofthe Soviet empire, but many of usfeel more vulnerable as we wit-ness turmoil and distress in

much of the world around us.Our fears have been augment-

ed by intensified economic com-petition between domestic busi-nesses and between Americanand foreign companies. Here, too,we have turned to technology forhelp, but the technology that wassupposed to have increased pro-ductivity, incomes and the num-bers of jobs has often done theopposite. This is not meant toread like a diatribe by theUnabomber, but the pressures ofthe unprecedentedly rapidchange caused by technology doappear to be having seriouslynegative influences on Americansociety. Increasing cases of obesi-

ty, alcoholism, drug abuse,depression and hypertension aresome of the results.

Force reductionsThese influences on American

society pose a number of likely con-sequences for our military. Thedangers the U.S. may face in 15-20years are invisible to most Ameri-cans. On the other hand, currentproblems are not. Given the needto reduce the national debt and tolive within our national income,the resulting pressures on socialand welfare programs at a timewhen many Americans are in dis-tress, the absence of a major mili-tary threat, and the sense of mili-tary security brought about by theend of the Cold War and our victo-

ry in the Gulf War, another roundof reductions in defense spendingand force levels — possibly morethan one — is likely.

Already, Americans who canhardly be described as enemies ofthe U.S. armed forces are pri-vately advocating such cuts.Richard Perle has created abipartisan group (includingRichard Cheney, retired AdmiralWilliam Owens and JamesWoolsey) that will soon call for amodest reduction in defensespending and a less modestreduction in the size of thearmed forces. If the group’s rec-ommendations were accepted,the U.S. military would drop to1.2 million men and women —and the U.S. Army to 400,000 orso — over the next five years. Themoney saved as a result of per-sonnel cuts would be devoted toacquiring the fantastic butexpensive equipment associatedwith the so-called Revolution inMilitary Affairs, or RMA, basedon the concept of information-based warfare. Without dis-cussing the details of the propos-al, let’s consider the notion of theRMA and how the concept relatesto our concerns.

Let us, like the Greeks, look infront of us in order to peer intothe past, before we back into thefuture of the RMA. The outlinesof the past — those of centuriesago and those of the last 100years — indicate that the notionthat we are entering an informa-tion-based RMA whose basicconcepts are within the grasp ofthe U.S. military is dangerouslywrong-headed. First, let us con-sider the RMAs that most mili-tary historians agree occurredbetween the end of the MiddleAges and the beginning of the20th century. While there is nocomplete agreement on suchmatters, the following list is

4 Special Warfare

The outlines of the past — those of centuriesago and those of the last 100 years — indicatethat the notion that we are entering an informa-tion-based RMA whose basic concepts are with-in the grasp of the U.S. military is dangerouslywrong-headed.

within the general historicalconsensus.

1350-19001. Mid-14th century to early

15th century: English-Welsh, Swissand Burgundian infantry use longbows, pikes and compact tacticalformations to end the 1,000-yeardominance of armored cavalry. Thishelps bring about the collapse ofthe feudal system.

2. Mid-15th to mid-16th cen-turies: Sail-powered warships withbroadside artillery deployed inline-ahead formations end the2,000-year dominance of galleys.As a result, European explorersand conquerors dominate theworld’s coastal regions.

3. Early-to-mid-16th century:The introduction of the arquebus,field and siege artillery, regimentalinfantry formation and artilleryfortress begins the age of gunpow-der warfare. So armed, Europeanarmies defeat non-Europeanarmies in almost every instance.

4. Early to late 17th century:Linear infantry formations, lighterfield artillery, the socket bayonetand Vauban fortresses lead to mod-ern armies under bureaucratic con-trol and allow creation of the mod-ern sovereign state.

5. Mid-17th to mid-18th cen-turies: Improved navigation, ship-building and naval ordnance allowthe development of world-rangingnaval fleets and mercantile com-merce, and the creation of moderncapitalist colonial empires.

6. Late 18th century: The citizensoldier, levée en masse, mobile oper-ations, skirmisher and column tac-tics, and army corps create modernland war and introduce ideologyinto war. Clausewitz observesthese developments and conceivesof war as the continuation of poli-tics by violent means. Modern waris born.

7. Mid-to-late 19th century: Ri-fled repeating shoulder arms andartillery, shells, machine guns, rail-roads, telegraphy, improved explo-sives, barbed wire and food preser-vation, all based on industrialmass production, make it possibleto create armies of unprecedentedsize and power, creating total war.Civilians again become acceptabletargets of warfare. The defensegains the upper hand.

8. Mid-to-late 19th century:Coal-driven, steam-powered, all-steel armored warships, armedwith turret-mounted, shell-firingrifled cannon; torpedoes and torpe-do boats; reciprocating engines;and screw propellers combine tocreate “the Mahanian revolution”in naval warfare. Europeansacquire complete world dominanceas a result.

Thus, over the course of some550 years, there were eight RMAs.

1905-961. 1905-13: The all-big-gun

dreadnought battleship, employing

indirect fire, gunnery control andranging optics, increased main bat-tery range, wireless communica-tions and oil-burning turbineengines, sets off worldwide naval-armaments race. War between Ger-many and Britain becomes highlylikely.

2. 1910-18, 1935-43: Ocean-goingsubmersibles reintroduce the possi-bility of effective guerre de course.Britain is nearly defeated by suchweapons in both world wars.

3. 1915-18: Indirect artilleryfire, field telephones, wirelessradios, tanks, motor vehicles, poi-son gas, submachine guns, handgrenades, trench mortars, infiltra-tion tactics and new training tech-niques return advantage to theoffensive in land warfare.

4. 1917-44: The development oflong-range, heavy-load-bearing air-craft, incendiary bombs, navigationand aiming devices, aerial radar,combined with the ideas of Douhet,Trenchard and Mitchell, leads toeffective strategic bombing. Attackson cities become routine.

5. 1917-42: Carrier-based naval

August 1996 5

The U.S. involvement in Vietnam was part of the “People’s War” RMA that began in the 1930s and continued into the 1970s.

Courtesy Special Warfare Museum

aviation transforms warfare at sea.The U.S. is able to dominate thePacific and Atlantic oceans.

6. 1925-44: Effective amphibi-ous warfare and assault techniquesallow massive invasions from thesea. As a result, the U.S. rises topre-eminent world military andeconomic power.

7. 1933-43: Using World War Iinfantry tactical and operationalmethods supplemented by tanks,motor vehicles, close air supportand wireless radio, the Germansdevelop the Blitzkrieg. The conceptis adopted and improved by Sovietsand Americans, who add modernartillery and base their systems onmassive industrial production.After the defeat of Germany, U.S.-Soviet confrontation in Europeresults.

8. 1930s-1970s. “People’s War”allows colonial subjects and revolu-tionary forces with mass bases tooverthrow European rule bydefeating conventional armiesthrough guerrilla warfare. Most ofthe Third World regains its inde-pendence, ending 400 years ofEuropean dominance; U.S. isdefeated in Vietnam.

9. 1941-49: The U.S. and theUSSR create nuclear weapons tobe delivered by long-rangebombers. The concept of nucleardeterrence takes a central place inthe Cold War.

10. 1942-1960s: Strategic land-based and sea-based ballistic mis-siles, eventually tipped by nuclearwarheads; high-performance jetaircraft; powerful modern comput-ers; satellite reconnaissance;space-based global communica-tions; and manned space missionslead to the concept of mutualassured destruction. Total warbecomes virtually impossible.

11. 1950s-1980s: Nuclear-pow-ered attack submarines, thennuclear-powered ballistic-missilesubmarines, transform naval and

strategic warfare.12. 1970s-1990s: Precision-guided

munitions; improved space systems;improved communications and nav-igation techniques; highly effectivehelicopters; improved artillery andsupport systems; improved air-ground cooperation; computers ofgreat power and reduced size; sili-con chips; new sensor systems; newoperational ground-warfare con-cepts all lead to a “military techni-cal revolution” and suggest a com-ing information and information-based RMA. U.S. achieves domi-nance in conventional warfare andgains world semi-hegemony.

Thus, over the course of the past90 years there have been 12 RMAs.

And yet today, we hear talk of theRMA, meaning the one in point 12.Considering the foregoing list, doesit make sense to expect only one?The pattern of history points not toone but to several RMAs over thenext two or three decades. Geomet-ric increases in the rate of techno-logical innovation, combined withtruly revolutionary social, econom-ic and political changes, may meanthat RMAs will occur not over acentury, as was the case in the lateMiddle Ages and during the

Renaissance, but possibly severaltimes in a generation. Are we pre-pared for such stunning and con-tinual changes in warfare?

Assuming we have the psycho-logical and organizational abilityto deal with such frequent seismicshifts in the way we make war,what might we expect over thenext 20 to 30 years? Also, are theconjectures at all correct withregard to a current RMA based oninformation technologies?

Let’s answer the second questionfirst: The idea of an RMA based oninformation processing is profound-ly wrong-headed. The technologythat has emerged and that isemerging in these fields is and willbe highly useful to the Americanmilitary. We should try to maintainour lead in these areas and take fulladvantage of all the technologicaladvances. But the present worshipof information is mistaken becauseit confuses “information” withknowledge and “knowledge” withunderstanding.

Battlefield awarenessFor example, consider the con-

cept of “dominant battlefieldawareness.” Let us concede, forargument’s sake, that this RMAwill provide the kind of informa-tion that its proponents contendthat it will. Now let us gaze at thepast in front of us and imagine thatthe losers of the battles of Cannae,Austerlitz and Chancellorsvillehad such information. What goodwould it have done them?

At Cannae in 216 B.C., Hannibaland his Carthaginian army of40,000 not only defeated a Romanarmy of 60,000, they annihilated it.Virtually no Romans survived thebattle: It was the greatest defeat inRoman history. Perhaps the mostextraordinary feature of the battleis that the Roman consuls had com-plete information on Hannibal’s

6 Special Warfare

The technology that hasemerged and that is emerg-ing in these fields is andwill be highly useful to theAmerican military. … Butthe present worship ofinformation is mistakenbecause it confuses‘information’ with knowl-edge and ‘knowledge’with understanding.

peculiar convex battle formation.The nature of ancient warfare

required both sides to array on aflat field in full view of eachother. The Roman commandershad time to carefully observeHannibal’s deployment and tonote his strengths and the partic-ular placement of his variousunits. They had what we calldominant battlefield awareness,as well as an army 50 percentlarger and far better armed andequipped than Hannibal’s. Butthe Roman army was slaugh-tered. Why? Because the Romansdid not understand what theysaw. They marched into a trapwith their eyes wide open butwith their minds baffled by thegenius of one of the greatest tac-tical commanders of all time.Dominant battlefield awarenessis useless against an enemy thatknows what you expect and useshis understanding against you.

Let us now look at a part of thepast that lies closer before us: thebattlefield of Austerlitz, where onDec. 2, 1805, Napoleon’s outnum-bered army faced a combinedAustrian-Russian force. Thanksto their telescopes, the Austrianand Russian commanders wereable to observe the French armyeven more carefully than theRoman consuls could observetheir enemies at Cannae. Butwhile the Austrians and Russianshad all the information that onecould gather, they did not under-stand the meaning of Napoleon’sdeployment.

Only when the French Imperi-al Guard smashed through thecenter of their lines did the Aus-trians and Russians begin tounderstand Napoleon’s maneu-ver. At the end of that bitterlycold day, as the defeated emper-ors and their staffs were fleeingover the frozen swamp at theedge of the field, they finally

August 1996 7

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realized what had happened. Butit was too late for the troopsbehind them: As the routed Aus-trian and Russian forces fell backin panic, the French gunnersopened fire on the ice coveringthe swamp, plunging thousandsof men to a miserable death.Even though he fought nearly200 years ago, Bonaparte stillhas a great deal to teach us aboutthe difference between informa-tion and understanding.

Finally, let’s consider theevents of May 1863 at Chancel-lorsville. “Fighting Joe” Hooker,the commander of the Army ofthe Potomac, had a great deal ofinformation about his opponents,the Army of Northern Virginia.Hooker knew that he greatly out-

numbered the Confederates. Healso knew that his forces occu-pied a favorable position. In fact,all of Hooker’s information sug-gested that the only good optionavailable to Robert E. Lee was toretreat. So when Hooker learnedthat Jackson’s corps was passingin front of the Union army on theroad that led to Richmond, hereasonably assumed that theRebels had begun to withdraw.After all, why else would a badlyoutnumbered Lee divide hisforces in the face of a superiorfoe?

Of course, we know that Jack-son was not retreating. He andLee had taken the psychologicalmeasure of Hooker. They guessedcorrectly that Hooker would mis-

understand the information hehad about the Confederates. SoJackson’s corps was in factmarching to strike Hooker’s armyon the flank. When the Confeder-ates came whooping and holler-ing out of the woods, they caughtHooker and his whole army bysurprise. The right flank of theUnion army was driven in, and itwas Hooker who retreated in dis-order. So much for Hooker’s dom-inant battlefield awareness.

Human elementWhile information is essential

to winning battles and wars, it isnot enough. We must always keepin mind the human element —deception, surprise, uncertainty,fear, what Clausewitz calls “fric-tion” and the “fog of war,” and thecultural and psychological factorsthat separate our thinking fromthat of our enemy. Understandingthe human element is what truemilitary intelligence is all about.It is in this area that Army spe-cial-operations forces have anextremely important role to playin the future of war. Their special-ized training, experiences, knowl-edge of foreign languages andcultures, and contacts with for-eign militaries and peoples giveSOF a critical understanding ofthe human element. It is SOF’sresponsibility to provide thatintelligence to those Americancommanders who must trulyunderstand their opponents. Wecannot afford to suffer a Cannaeor an Austerlitz.

The current worship of informa-tion and information-based war-fare will cease only when the harshreality of war shows how mistakenits proponents are. Until then, wemust do our best to provide theunderstanding that informationalone cannot give, and to constant-ly stress that people, not smoothly

8 Special Warfare

Information is essential to warfare, but true military intelligence requires an understanding of thehuman element.

functioning machines, make war.My other question was “What

other RMAs might we expect overthe next 20-30 years?” Efforts toprevent the proliferation ofnuclear weapons and ballistic-missile technologies seem to be adistinct failure. Many mid-sizedpowers may acquire suchweapons in a decade or so, andsuch arms could be widely avail-able in 20-30 years. If this doeshappen, unless and until a trulyimpervious defense against bal-listic missiles is devised, totalwar will be virtually impossible.Such a development would repre-sent a true RMA, even though itwould be based on 40-year-oldtechnology. Any attempt to over-throw a nuclear-armed state —even by the use of purely conven-tional regular forces — would runthe risk of prompting a nuclearexchange. Limited war, perhapsvery limited, would be the onlyviable option for armed conflictbetween states.

SOF advantagesIn such warfare, special-opera-

tions forces could play a major role.Special Forces were created in the1950s to engage Soviet-bloc forcesin limited, unconventional warwhen total war was no longer feasi-ble. In a world of many nuclear pow-ers, Special Forces, along with Psy-chological Operations and CivilAffairs forces, would continue tooffer some of the few safe options forthe U.S. to battle its foes. While SOFcannot win wars on their own, theycan provide a valuable force multi-plier to conventional armed forces.In a security environment in whichthe U.S. may have few choices abouthow to wage war, such an advantagewould be extremely useful.

Information technologies couldproduce an RMA, but one witheffects that its proponents do not

anticipate. One effect might be areturn to an age of defense-domi-nant warfare. If whatever movedcould be observed, targeted, hit anddestroyed, then our variousweapons platforms would becomeobsolete. But without these plat-forms, how could the U.S. projectlarge conventional forces overseas,with acceptable casualty levels?

How might we fight during such aperiod? If we retained our domi-nance in the military applications ofspace, we might be able to strikeopponents from that dimension. Butwho would guide such weapons totheir destinations and report ontheir effects? To some extent, this

could be performed by “nationalmeans of reconnaissance.” But suchwarfare also would present a majorrole for Special Forces. Small SFteams might be inserted overseas,and with their links to precision-strike and space systems, they couldserve as forward observers on astrategic scale. Of course, in an ageof platform vulnerability, we wouldhave to invent new means of insert-ing such teams safely.

Another effect of information-technology developments might bean RMA in psychological warfare.Television is increasingly dominat-ing world consciousness and couldbe used by PSYOP units against anenemy population. New broadcast-ing techniques, combined withadvanced computer-generated videoand audio, might be used to projectblack propaganda on a target audi-ence’s televisions. Such propagandamight show leaders of a hostile gov-

ernment engaging in the most loath-some activities and making remarksabout those foolish enough to fightand die for them. Especially in coun-tries with state-controlled broad-casting, black-propaganda programscould have a devastating effect onmorale.

The U.S. is party to treatiesthat ban such interference in for-eign broadcasting, and U.S.statutes prohibit our governmentfrom engaging in some forms ofinformation distortion, but war-time necessity could override suchconsiderations. However, we couldnot broadcast invasive programswithout first removing regular

enemy broadcasts from the air.Eliminating that enemy potentialcould be a task for Special Forces,in conjunction with PSYOPteams.

Ideological RMAsSo far we have discussed RMAs in

the context of technological innova-tion. But an RMA is not necessarilydependent upon technology. “Peo-ple’s War,” one of the most impor-tant RMAs in the 20th century, wasbased on ideas, not on technology. Itis not coincidental that two Chinesethinkers, Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, played a major role in devel-oping that new form of warfare.

The French Revolution alsounleashed an RMA based entirelyon ideology. By replacing the ideathat the French were subjects of theking with the idea that they werecitizens, the revolution created the

August 1996 9

While SOF cannot win wars on their own, they canprovide a valuable force multiplier to conventionalarmed forces. In a security environment in whichthe U.S. may have few choices about how to wagewar, such an advantage would be extremely useful.

concept of the citizen soldier. The cit-izen soldier did not fight as anunwilling conscript or as a merce-nary. He went into combat as apoliticized volunteer defending hishomeland and his new rights, andspreading the revolution to his fel-low Europeans enslaved by theirtyrant kings.

The French government tookadvantage of these new ideas and ofthe huge population of France, thenthe largest country in Europe, with25 million people. France built hugearmies that totaled more than 1 mil-lion men. With large forces motivat-ed by revolutionary zeal, Frenchcommanders could afford to use newtactics and to conduct new types ofoperations. From this came theRMA of the late 18th century, whichwe described previously as the birthof modern war.

Without fear of desertions, Frencharmies could march or fight at night,deploy skirmishers and snipers, andsend out scouts. French command-ers, certain that their men wouldreturn after the enemy was routed,could send out their cavalry andlight infantry in pursuit of fleeingenemies. French generals could hurlhuge battering-ram columns againstan enemy line without regard forcasualties and with a full reliance onthe élan of the assaulting infantry.These revolutionary warriors actu-ally chanted “La Marsaillaise” or“Ça Ira” as they marched intoenemy fire.

This RMA, especially when wield-ed by Napoleon, broke the armies ofthe old regimes and conquered all ofEurope. Only when the enemies ofimperial France adopted similarmethods of raising, motivating anddeploying armies was Napoleondefeated.

Democratic ChinaWe might see another non-tech-

nological RMA in our lifetime,

and it could come from China.There are those who believe thatif China does become a democrat-ic country, it might also become apeaceful nation. A democraticChina might prove instead to be adanger to its neighbors and evento the U.S. It would take a revolu-tion for China to become a democ-racy, and out of that revolutionaryupheaval a great military powermight be born. A rich, militarilypowerful and democratic Chinawould not necessarily be peaceful.

How might China behave if theChinese people were finally themasters of their own destinies andfilled with a sense of immensepride at what they had accom-plished? Already, observers note atremendous increase in nationalistfeeling among the mainlanders.Indeed, even those threatened bythe upsurge in the power of thePRC (for example, the residents ofTaiwan and Hong Kong) displayenormous satisfaction with thereturn of China to the role of agreat power.

For all Chinese, the last 150

years seem a shameful parenthe-sis in their nation’s history. Butthat brief period in the 2,000-yearhistory of united China has ended.The Chinese will no longer endurethe humiliations or insults of thepast. Today’s Chinese, whetherthey live in Beijing, Taipei or Sin-gapore, consider Tibet, Mongoliaand all the countries on the bor-ders of China to lie within therightful Chinese sphere of influ-ence. If these Chinese attitudesendure, a clash between Chineseinterests and the interests of theJapanese, the Russians, theIndonesians and even the Ameri-cans may be inevitable.

The Chinese people could evenpressure their own governmentinto war to defend what they con-sider their rights or to advancetheir interests, as the Americanpeople pressured President JamesMadison in 1812. Some of theissues over which the Chinesecontinue to nurture resentmentsor feel injured pride includereunification with Taiwan; accessto oil in the South China Sea;

10 Special Warfare

Many Chinese believe the countries that border China lie within its sphere of influence. A democratic andpowerful China could prove to be a threat to its neighbors and to the U.S.

Photo copyright American Databankers Corp.

political predominance inIndochina or Korea; showing theIndians who is the real master inAsia; and taking back from Russiathe territories the Czars extortedfrom the Chinese emperors in the19th century. (We, too, wouldsense deep national outrage if wehad been subjected to the kinds ofinjustices suffered by the Chinesepeople over the last 200 years.)

Dynamic forceIn any case, a country of 1.2 to

1.4 billion people, enriched by amodern economy and strength-ened by access to the latest tech-nology — and we may very wellsee such a China in 20 years orless — might prove as dynamic aforce as the France of the 1790s.Such a China might draw upon thegenius of its people to devise revo-lutionary tactical and operationalapproaches to war. Such a Chinacould build armed forces largeenough to endure casualties ofenormous magnitude by Americanstandards. It is doubtful that Rus-sia, Japan, India or Indonesia couldstand up to such a power, and anyof these countries might turn to theU.S. for protection. If we sensed ourinterests threatened, we might findourselves in a confrontation, per-haps a war, with a democratic butvery aggressive China.

In such a case, the U.S. SpecialForces might be called upon to fos-ter insurgency in Tibet, Sinkiangor Inner Mongolia; to train guer-rilla resistance fighters in South-east Asia (again), Central Asia orSiberia; to gather intelligenceinside China; or to conduct sabo-tage against Chinese forcesthroughout Eurasia. There arefew precedents for such operationsby U.S. forces. (The U.S. Office ofStrategic Services operated fairlysuccessfully in China against theJapanese in World War II. The

CIA carried out insurgency opera-tions in Tibet in the 1950s, butwith very little success. It mightbe wise to study and learn asmuch as we can from these experi-ences.) Such operations take placein extremely forbidding terrain;they would also require knowl-edge of languages quite remote tous. We should begin studyingNepali, Mongolian and Mandarinnow — not when a crisis breaks in10-15 years.

Another motivation for study-ing the attitudes, languages andhistory of East Asia is that Amer-icans have a poor record of antici-pating strategic events in that

region. Consider Pearl Harbor, theNorth Korean invasion of SouthKorea, the crossing of the Yalu bythe Chinese People’s LiberationArmy, the Sino-Soviet split, theTet offensive and a host of small-er shocks. We cannot afford tocontinue being taken by surprisein East Asia. Reorienting SOF toconcentrate on that region couldhelp us anticipate events there.

Even if these apocalyptic scenar-ios never take place, it seems rea-sonable that East Asia will be thefocus of American security con-cerns over the next few decades.Knowledge of its languages andcultures will likely be essential forSOF success. It also seems wise forthe Army to recruit Americans ofethnic East Asian extraction into

special operations. As we havelearned from our experiences inKorea and in Vietnam, it is quitedifficult for European Americansor African Americans to go unno-ticed in East Asia. The presence oflarger numbers of Asian Americansin SOF could prove a valuablenational asset in coming decades.

Popular supportWe have discussed the possible

consequences of different RMAs,but let’s return to the question ofspecific RMAs that may or maynot emerge in light of Americandomestic concerns. Whatever

valid reasons exist for us to pur-sue radically new methods of con-ducting war, we will not be able todo so without the support of theAmerican people. They will haveto pay the taxes to support thecost of such developments. Butbefore they will be willing to doso, they will have to be convincedthat a threat exists.

Furthermore, the nation’sleadership will have to formu-late a strategy for dealing withthe threat. And finally, the mili-tary will have to develop thestrategy and the operationalconcepts to put the products ofan RMA to effective use. Thereis no reason to believe that all ofthese steps will occur. Propo-

August 1996 11

We could see as many as three or four RMAs overthe next several decades, but they may be pro-duced by other countries. … In many ways, theycould offer SOF even greater challenges than U.S.-developed RMAs would: Waging war from a posi-tion of technological inferiority requires a greateremphasis on the human element in war. Thathuman emphasis is a SOF forte.

nents of what is called the RMAseem to think that technologicalfeasibility alone will lead to theRMA’s development, but theyoverlook the fact that an RMAwill require a political and astrategic basis. Whether boththese elements will fall intoplace remains to be seen.

We could see as many as threeor four RMAs over the next sev-eral decades, but they may beproduced by other countries.Obviously, as was the case withthe German development of theBlitzkrieg, the early Russianlead in space or the Maoist chal-lenge of “People’s War,” theseRMAs could present the U.S.with enormous dangers. In manyways, they could offer SOF evengreater challenges than U.S.-developed RMAs would: Wagingwar from a position of technolog-ical inferiority requires a greateremphasis on the human elementin war. That human emphasis isa SOF forte.

ImplicationsIn summary, what are the implica-

tions for SOF? In the short run, sayin the next 10 years or so, we mayhave to place more emphasis on peo-ple-to-people activities; training forlow-intensity-conflicts; and dealingwith humanitarian emergencies inLatin America, Africa, South Asia,Central Asia and possibly the PacificIslands. But during this same period,we must not lose sight of a dangerlooming beyond: possible confronta-tion with a peer competitor begin-ning about 2010. If such a threatshould arise, it might be in the formof a powerful, expansionist China.

SOF must begin now to stress thelearning of east- and central-Asianlanguages, preparing to operate insuch miserable terrain as that ofthe Gobi Desert, the TibetanPlateau, the Pamirs and the

Burmese jungle. Because of theincreasing urbanization of theworld population, SOF should pre-pare for extensive urban combatand non-combat operations, both forthe near term and for the long term.

We must seriously consider thatwe might have to fight from a posi-tion of technological inferiority, atleast in regard to some aspects ofwarfare. We should study the cir-cumstances under which forceswith low levels of military technolo-gy have defeated technologicallysuperior forces. We could learnmuch by analyzing the war in Viet-nam from the enemy’s perspective.But, above all, we should realizethat such an approach to warfareruns counter to our military her-itage and cannot be mastered quick-ly by Americans — it is a processthat requires decades of study,training and experience. Neverthe-less, it is clearly a type of warfare atwhich Special Forces might excel.

PSYOP units should be preparedfor the possibility of Americanforces becoming targets of sophisti-cated PSYOP. Although we are usedto engaging in such warfare, we arenot so well-prepared to counterPSYOP when it is aimed at our ownforces.

Finally, a few parting warnings:• Prepare for change that takes

place at unprecedented speed —the economic growth of othercountries, the emergence of apeer competitor, technologicaldevelopments;

• Emphasize thinking, imagina-tion and creativity as well asSOF’s traditional excellence in combat skills and physicalfitness;

• Expect to deal with an ongoingseries of RMAs;

• Study China, learn its strengthsand weaknesses. Hope for thebest, prepare for the worst.As Americans, we hold the view

that we are the best, the most pow-

erful and the richest. But the Chi-nese have also enjoyed all thoseattributes — and for more than1,000 years. China was a civilizedcountry when all of our European,African and Middle Eastern ances-tors were wholly illiterate. The Chi-nese believe that a hierarchicalrelationship between China andother countries is the natural orderof things. They expect a return tothat order. But when Americansand Chinese think of themselves asrightfully number one, we canexpect a collision. Let us do our bestto be prepared.

Brian R. Sullivan isa senior research pro-fessor at the Institutefor National StrategicStudies, NationalDefense University. Heserved as a Marineofficer in Vietnam, where he wasawarded the Silver Star and the Pur-ple Heart. After receiving a Ph.D.from Columbia University, he taughtmilitary history at Yale University,and strategy at the Naval War Col-lege. During the Gulf crisis and War,he was an adviser to the AssistantSecretary of Defense for SpecialOperations and Low-Intensity Con-flict. At INSS, Dr. Sullivan analyzesand writes documents on issues per-taining to U.S. defense strategy. He isalso the author of numerous articlesabout military history and nationalsecurity.

12 Special Warfare

The end of the East-West con-frontation — the defining charac-teristic of the Cold War — hasparticular meaning for the rela-tionship between the UnitedStates and its neighbors in theWestern Hemisphere.

In Europe, in the southern-tiercountries of the Middle East andsouth Asia, in Southeast Asia andin the northwest Pacific, the chal-lenge posed by an expansionistSoviet Union and its former ally,the People’s Republic of China,was sufficient to warrant a seriesof regional mutual securityarrangements. Hence, the cre-

ation of NATO; the Baghdad Pact(renamed the Central TreatyOrganization, or CENTO, in1956); the Southeast Asia TreatyOrganization, or SEATO; thebilateral security agreementsthat the U.S. has with Taiwan,South Korea and Japan; and theAustralia-New Zealand-UnitedStates Treaty, or ANZUS.

NATO, the strongest of these,bound its members to regard “anattack on one [as] an attack onall.” In the event of an attack onone member, the other memberswere pledged, by treaty, torespond. The CENTO and SEATOtreaties required “consultation”and agreement on appropriateresponses; the bilateral arrange-ments with Taiwan, South Koreaand Japan varied, but the guidingprinciple was that the U.S. andeach of the other signatoriesregarded the Soviet and commu-nist Chinese menace to be suffi-ciently direct and grave as toalmost certainly require anarmed response.

In the Western Hemisphere,the Rio Treaty, signed in Rio deJaneiro in 1947, addressed thesame issues. However, the likeli-hood of a direct military con-frontation between the Soviet

Union and countries in the West-ern Hemisphere south of the U.S.seemed sufficiently remote so asnot to require the organizationalapparatus of the other mutualsecurity agreements. Consulta-tions, accompanied by steps thatmembers could take in concertwith each other (to the extentthat individual national interestsso dictated), were agreed to besufficient.

Although the Rio Treaty’s con-sultative processes were exer-cised from time to time inresponse to various perceivedthreats, Cuba was the only coun-try in the Western Hemisphere tofall under Moscow’s sway. Howev-er, Cuba’s alignment with theSoviet Union occurred under cir-cumstances that didn’t lendthemselves to the consultativeand reactive processes envisionedby the Rio Treaty.

For unlike Eastern Europeancountries that fell to a combina-tion of political, economic andmilitary pressure from the USSR,Caribbean, Central and SouthAmerican countries did notreceive direct external militarypressure from the Soviet Union.The greatest threat to stability inthis hemisphere was internal

August 1996 13

A New Approach to Latin America:The Role of SOF

by Ambassador David Passage

This article discusses issues inLatin America and possible SOFroles in protecting U.S. interests.Views expressed are those of theauthor and do not reflect policies ofthe U.S. government, the Departmentof State or the Department ofDefense. The article was originallypresented at a conference hosted byTufts University’s Fletcher School ofLaw and Diplomacy. Papers fromthat conference have been collectedand published by the Fletcher Schooland USSOCOM as Roles and Mis-sions of Special Operations Forces inthe Aftermath of the Cold War. —Editor

upheaval: popular reactionsagainst self-centered ruling oli-garchies that had no interest inimproving the economic condi-tions and political participationof the campesinos and the work-ing classes. Revolutionary pres-sures in this hemisphere wereoccasionally aided and abetted bythe Soviet Union and its alliesand proxies. But the conclusiondrawn from any objective reviewof the past 50 years in the West-ern Hemisphere would be thatthe Soviet Union did not instigatea successful communist revolu-tion anywhere in this region(including Cuba). In fact, every

upheaval in the Western Hemi-sphere has been an unmistakableand undeniable reaction to home-grown causes.

Prevailing circumstancesWith the end of the Cold War,

what circumstances prevail asthe troubled countries of LatinAmerica approach the dawn ofthe next century?

First, no credible externalthreat exists to regional peace.Whatever Cuba may be or mighthave been, it is not now a threatthat necessitates conventionalsecurity or military measures.Furthermore, it is not likely tobecome one in the future.

Second, we have a hemispherewithout the threat of seriousarmed conflict between statescapable of upsetting the wider

peace (although numerous bilat-eral irritants and border squab-bles remain). Rivalries betweenthe larger regional powers aresubsiding rather than growing,and traditional historical ten-sions and problems between someof the smaller countries are beingdealt with through diplomaticmeans. Even armed clashes alongdisputed borders (e.g., the cur-rent spat between Ecuador andPeru) seldom last more than afew weeks before the partiesbegin negotiations. Particularlyimportant for stability in thesouthern-cone countries is themovement by Argentina and

Brazil to dismantle their nuclear-weapons development programs.

And third, the Western Hemi-sphere is populated by democrat-ically elected, civilian-run gov-ernments, void of military dicta-torships (except for Cuba).

If all of these observations areencouraging, we need to lookagain. Although the specter of anexternally supported militarythreat is absent, and democraticgovernments are theoretically incharge in every country in thehemisphere but one, many of theunderlying factors that fomentinstability (including bloody, vio-lent, revolutionary upheavals)are not only still with us, theyare increasing. Moreover, theresponses of the democratic civil-ian governments to these prob-lems are not encouraging. Atbest, they are inadequate; at

worst, they offer palliatives withno apparent intention of imple-menting the serious, even radi-cal, changes that are needed inpolitical, economic and socialgovernance.

And while the potential targetsof these upheavals are LatinAmerica’s reactionary (albeitcivilian and ostensibly “democra-tic”) governments, the ultimatelikely victim is the U.S., to whomthe dispossessed in Latin Ameri-ca turn for support or, ultimately,for refuge.

That is why the U.S. had nochoice but to intervene in Haiti.The U.S. has no intrinsic strate-gic, economic or political interestin that tortured country. Butwhen internal circumstances sothreaten our southern neighborsthat a significant percentage oftheir people feel their only alter-native is to try to reach ourshores, the U.S. has no option butto act.

The intervention in Haiti wasnot a course of action from whichthe U.S. should have shrunk (asit did for almost two years whileour economic embargo increas-ingly impoverished an already-crippled people and their econo-my). Nor should the U.S. feeldefensive about having inter-vened, with or without U.N. Secu-rity Council resolutions or “otherflags” willing to join us. The U.S.should, in fact, emphasize in itspolicy pronouncements what itrepresents: As Latin Americaheads toward the next century,the U.S. should place LatinAmerican governments and theruling structures of Latin Ameri-can countries on notice that iftheir refusal to confront the needfor change in their own societiesresults in their problems arriv-ing on our shores, the U.S. mayconclude that it has to intervene.In fact, public pressure in the

14 Special Warfare

Although the specter of an externally supportedmilitary threat is absent, and democratic govern-ments are theoretically in charge in every countryin the hemisphere but one, many of the underlyingfactors that foment instability … are not only stillwith us, they are increasing.

U.S. would likely force any Amer-ican administration to do so.

Root of the problemAlthough all countries in the

Western Hemisphere, includingthe U.S., can be described asbeing governed by “elites” (even apopulist like the late Huey Longor a determined democrat likePresident Harry Truman is still,by definition, part of an elite rul-

ing stratum), the segment of soci-ety that controls governments inmost countries in the developingworld is far narrower than thatsame segment of society in indus-trialized democracies. Indeed,many of the countries in thishemisphere to the south of the U.S.have very small ruling elites —ones that have historically been,and largely remain, resistant topressures for change emanatingfrom the dispossessed withintheir own societies.

A simple survey of the hemi-sphere — from the wake-up call

that burst into open flame in Chi-apas only two years ago, to theSendero Luminoso insurgency inPeru, to internal insurrections ofvarious sizes and dimensions inGuatemala, Colombia andBolivia, and potential problemsin other countries — is enoughfor us to conclude that truedemocracy and economic prosper-ity haven’t yet gained a foothold.When we proudly note that every

country in the hemisphere(except, of course, our permanentbête noire) is a “democracy,” whatwe see is a paper-thin veneer cre-ated by the semblance of a popu-larly elected government chosenthrough elections contested forthe most part by traditionalentrenched elites from a narrowspectrum within the body politic.Elections alone do not democra-cies make; we ignore this dictumat our peril.

And while in recent years onecould plausibly have dismissedthese discrepancies between factand fiction, along with the resul-

tant popular protests againstthem, denial will be insufficientto get us through the next sever-al decades.

The information revolutionthat has taken TV into theremotest village in the Andes(and even into the valleys of cen-tral Haiti) means that MarshallMcLuhan’s “global village” isupon us. The campesino (howeverhe is defined, whatever he iscalled) knows, as he never didbefore, what he and his familyare missing. Although the streetsof Los Angeles, Miami, New York,or Washington, D.C., may be morestrewn with garbage than pavedwith gold, try explaining that tothe campesino who has given uphope for meaningful change in hisown government and society. Hisdespair will ultimately lead to hisdeparture.

Virtually uniformly within theWestern Hemisphere, campesinosand laborers are aware that theU.S. is unwilling or unable toenforce its own immigrationlaws — a circumstance that isexpected to persist for the fore-seeable future. If the dispos-sessed are given the followingchoices — to continue to enduredeprivations and indignities; toexperience violent revolution; orto seek to remove oneself andone’s family from an unsatisfac-tory environment — they willquite likely select the thirdoption. (INS, please take note.)

Democratic phenomenonDemocracy, notwithstanding

American expressions of belief tothe contrary, is not for everyone:It is mostly a middle-class phe-nomenon; its principal beneficia-ry is the middle class.

Democracy is not for the rich.Typically, the rich are asked tobear the cost of social and eco-

August 1996 15

The refusal of Latin American countries to confront the need for change in their own societies can resultin their problems arriving on U.S. shores.

Photo by Alexander C. Hicks Jr.

nomic programs for the poor, whoseek to dethrone the rich.

Nor is democracy, as a political,social and economic system, espe-cially attractive to the poor. Thepeople at the bottom of the socio-economic stratum frequently seedemocracy as a diversion perpe-trated against them by othersseeking to perpetuate the statusquo — in other words, a distrac-tion from their real needs, whichare food for their families, jobs,housing, education and medicalcare.

When one lives at the bare sub-sistence level yet sees how theupper classes live, one’s interestscan be easily attracted to revolu-tionary efforts to seize power —not because of any attraction tothe principles of democracy, butsimply because of the chance toradically alter the status quo.

Democracy will appeal to thepoor only when it demonstratesthe likelihood of improving theirwretched conditions — and with-in a reasonable length of time.But even in the best-case sce-

nario, democracy offers hope forbetterment only in the long term.Democracy may be a viable polit-ical process, provided thecampesinos and the laborer class-es haven’t yet given up on theircountries. But once internal eco-nomic, social and political condi-tions have reached the boilingpoint, democracy isn’t particular-ly attractive.

Consider the situation in Haiti:Even under the best of circum-stances, Haiti will still be thepoorest country in the WesternHemisphere 20 years from now. Itwill still have the lowest per capi-ta income, the greatest spreadbetween the rich and the poor, thefewest number of telephones perhead, the fewest number of pavedroads per square kilometer, thesmallest daily caloric intake perhead, and so on. So what does“democracy” mean to the commonpeople of Haiti? We know that thereturn of Aristide meant a greatdeal to the Haitians, and many ofthem felt that his return to lead-ership would end the bestiality

inflicted upon them by the formerthugs in charge of the militaryand police forces. However, Aris-tide had the task of providing themore tangible fruits of democra-cy: jobs, housing, education, andmedical care. Will Haitians waitfor the supposed fruits of democ-racy to catch up with their reali-ty? My intent here is not to belit-tle democracy. It is simply to saythat democratization is a long-term process, with only long-termpractical prospects.

Guilt by associationThe unfortunate reality in the

Western Hemisphere is thatwhile the U.S. may representhope to those aspiring to reap thebenefits of democracy and eco-nomic development, we remain,in their eyes, largely associatedwith the ruling elites who haveresolutely prevented the poorfrom making progress towardtheir sought-after goals.

The reasons are historical. Atthe political level, elites have tra-ditionally controlled governmentsand politics in their own coun-tries (especially where we havehelped install them). Thus theyare the ones with whom we havealways dealt.

At the economic and commer-cial levels, we have always con-ducted business with the elites.They have the franchises and thedistributorships for U.S. goodsand services. They speak English;they take their vacations in theU.S.; they shop here; they sendtheir children here to be educat-ed; they keep their money in U.S.banks; and they purchase retire-ment condos here. They think andtalk the language of capitalism.And for the benefit of U.S. compa-nies that conduct business withthem, their governments haveenacted few of the curbs,

16 Special Warfare

Haitians at a garbage dump in Port-au-Prince. Even under the best of circumstances, Haiti will still be thepoorest country in the Western Hemisphere 20 years from now.

Photo by Alejandro Cabello

restraints, regulatory legislationsand other restrictions that havecluttered the economic and com-mercial landscape in the U.S. andWestern Europe. These elites,however, don’t think much ofdemocracy, especially if it threat-ens their lifestyle and their vastwealth and land holdings.

For the past two centuries, thethreat to the U.S. from countriessouth of its borders has been per-ceived by Americans as being“extra-hemispheric encroach-ment,” or trouble-making fromwithout. For the next quartercentury, the problem the U.S. willface is the disparity betweenwhat the populations living to thesouth of us perceive they can gainby coming here, and what theythink they may have to endure ifthey remain in their own coun-tries. The challenge for the U.S. isto help these countries effect thedesperately needed changes(especially economic progress) intime to stave off violent revolu-tion or massive migratory move-ments toward our borders.

SOF rolesMuch more could be said about

social, economic and politicalreform, but this article is not apolitical, social or economicanalysis. It is an attempt to iden-tify some areas where U.S. SOFmight be useful in helping oursouthern neighbors bring aboutchange in their own societies,including their military institu-tions. The foregoing analysis isintended to clarify fundamentalissues and to set the stage for adiscussion of possible courses ofaction.

If one had to identify the mostimportant near-term need forcontinued development of democ-racy and economic progress southof the Rio Grande, the response

would have to be honest govern-ment, as free as possible of graftand corruption. Citizens, particu-larly those from the lower class-es, expect their authorities toaddress the economic problems oftheir societies. They also expectto be treated with a modicum ofdecency and respect for theirhuman, civil and political rights.

Without replowing alreadywell-furrowed ground, we mightpoint out one incontestable factregarding the U.S. effort to bol-ster a South Vietnamese govern-ment in the 1960s and early

1970s: Of the many governmentsin Saigon during that epoch, notone could honestly have been saidto enjoy the active support of themajority of its own people. Thesame could be said about theimperial government of the lateShah of Iran as well as other gov-ernments the U.S. has supported.A sine qua non for the defense ofany government is that it mustgarner the active support of themajority of its people.

This is where SOF can be par-ticularly useful, for in additionto the broader processes of inter-

nal change, there are severalspecific areas in which SOF cancontribute:

• Training police forces to becompetent, respectable andrespected. In the countries andislands of Central and SouthAmerica and the Caribbean,there is, arguably, no greaterneed than for honest and compe-tent law enforcement and govern-ment administration.

Unlike the U.S., whose judicialsystem was founded upon Anglo-Saxon common law, most of thecountries of Latin America(though not of the English-speak-ing Caribbean) base their legalsystems on “code law,” stemmingfrom the Napoleonic era. A corol-lary is that virtually all LatinAmerican countries have nation-al police forces who are typicallyunder the direction of (and some-times under the control of) mili-tary officers who often are underthe authority of defense min-istries. Even when the policeanswer to a minister of the interi-or, the latter is not infrequently amilitary officer.

The U.S., on the other hand,does not have a national policeforce or a national police system(nor does it permit its militaryforces to perform domestic law-enforcement functions). There arestrong and deliberate, althoughpossibly archaic, legislative pro-hibitions against U.S. militarypersonnel training foreign policeforces. U.S. civilian agencies, suchas the Agency for InternationalDevelopment, are also underlegal proscriptions against help-ing to train Latin Americanpolice forces. But while the U.S. islegislatively incapable of assist-ing its southern neighbors inbuilding responsive and civillyresponsible national law-enforce-ment services, the U.S. militaryhas legislative authority to train

August 1996 17

For the next quartercentury, the problemthe U.S. will face isthe disparity betweenwhat the populationsliving to the south ofus perceive they cangain by coming here,and what they thinkthey may have toendure if they remainin their own countries.

Latin American militaries in tac-tics and techniques that they canemploy in their own countries.Our government would never per-mit U.S. military forces to employthe same tactics and techniquesin this country. It is time to askwhether the U.S. should continueto encourage the use of LatinAmerican military forces asdomestic internal law-enforce-ment agents, to the exclusion orthe diminution of civil policeforces.

If the U.S. hopes to help itssouthern neighbors acceleratethe process of democratic internalreform, it should make a vastly

greater effort to help Latin Amer-ican countries conduct trainingprograms aimed at raising theirpolice forces’ minimal standardsof honesty, decency and compe-tence. To accomplish this, the U.S.should remove the legislativeprohibitions and other restraintsthat prevent it from helpingLatin American democraciesimprove their police forces.

U.S. SOF would make excellenttrainers for Latin Americanpolice forces. The U.S. Army’sSpecial Forces, having beenselected through a rigorousscreening process, extensivelyexposed to and trained to dealwith foreign cultures, required tolearn foreign languages, andindoctrinated to respect humanand civil rights, are ideally

equipped to provide police train-ing, something no other U.S.national governmental institu-tion is capable of doing. The rela-tively recently established Inter-national Criminal InvestigativeTraining Assistance Program,composed largely of short-termcontract personnel who have nopermanent corporate memory orcompetence, is simply an ad hocmeans of offering assistance tospecific countries that U.S. policy-makers have determined meritsuch help.

The fundamental skills, tech-niques and principles that SOFcould teach the police forces are

precisely the ones so lacking inthe Latin American countries:collection and assessment ofinformation; valid and acceptableinterrogation techniques de-signed to elicit information fromhuman sources; methods of per-suading citizens to cooperate byconvincing them that their owninterests lie in helping the policeto bring criminal elements undercontrol; and proper respect forhuman and civil rights.

• Border protection/counteringsmuggling. Latin American bor-ders are truly permeable; no oneis hemmed in who doesn’t wish tobe. The illegal cross-border activ-ity of greatest concern to LatinAmerica is the smuggling ofarms, ammunition, contrabandand narcotics. Virtually every

study of Latin American policeand military forces points up theabsence of proactive patrolling aswell as the need for better equip-ment and training. SOF are profi-cient in teaching the specializedtechniques necessary for a nationto control its own borders and toprevent encroachments: nightoperations, the use of stealth,small-unit patrols, close-quarterscombat, and the use of technical-ly sophisticated equipment suchas night-vision devices andappropriate intelligence-gather-ing equipment.

• Riverine and coastal patrol.The U.S. should encourage LatinAmerica to forgo blue-waternavies and to seek effectivecoastal and riverine patrol forces.The Argentine navy’s heavycruiser, Almirante Belgrano,which was sunk during the Falk-lands War, was World War I vin-tage. Had Argentina not had ablue-water navy with heavy sur-face and undersea combatants, itmight not have been tempted todeal with the Falklands/Malvinasissue by force, to its regret.

In most South American coun-tries, naval forces are ill-equipped for the threats theyface. In a world of unconstrainedresources, aircraft carriers mightbe a valuable asset to SouthAmerica’s maritime nations. Butresources aren’t unconstrained,and issues of national pride andnaval tradition often handicapattempts to acquire more practi-cal forces. The U.S. is planning toreplace its Vietnam-era riverinecraft with newer and more mod-ern rigid-hull inflatable craft.These craft, powered by inexpen-sive and easy-to-maintain out-board motors, and durably con-structed for use in shallow riversand estuaries, would be ideal forthe anti-smuggling patrols thatLatin American countries should

18 Special Warfare

The U.S. Army’s Special Forces, having beenselected through a rigorous screening process,extensively exposed to and trained to deal withforeign cultures, required to learn foreign lan-guages, and indoctrinated to respect human andcivil rights, are ideally equipped to providepolice training.

be conducting to protect theirborders. SOF are ideally trainedand equipped to help our neigh-bors in this effort.

• Aviation. In much the sameway that they have insufficientlyequipped their navies, LatinAmerican countries have tradi-tionally laden their air forceswith second-hand, visibly agingand, frequently, only marginallyairworthy fighter and bomber air-craft whose purchase price theycan ill afford and whose operationand maintenance they cannotsustain. These aircraft are usefulmainly for independence-day fly-pasts. In conjunctionwith developing morefunctional police andmilitary forces targetedat legitimate objectives,such as performing bor-der patrols and combat-ing smuggling and nar-cotics traffickers, LatinAmerican countriesshould focus on acquir-ing mobility and trans-port aircraft that can beused in nation-building,in civil-engineering proj-ects and in borderpatrols. Helicopters,light observation air-craft and utility trans-ports would prove moreuseful than the squad-rons of elderly Bucca-neers, Skyhawks, Mir-age IIIs, F-5s and otheraircraft of similar vin-tage that Latin Ameri-can countries are usingto counter the threatsthey face.

• Civil Affairs, civilengineering and infor-mation activities. IfLatin American militaryforces hope to changethe image they evoke inthe minds of their own

citizens, they will have to beginby proving their relevance to theneeds of their own societies.There is much these militaryforces could do by way of nation-building that would help themestablish rapport with the people,whom they urgently need to sup-port military and police counter-smuggling efforts and, potential-ly, to combat insurgencies. Mili-tary forces could also form orenhance engineering brigades toconstruct or maintain secondaryroads; to build rudimentary cul-verts, drainage systems andsmall bridges; to dig wells; to con-

struct or improve sanitation sys-tems; to erect village clinics andother civil and civic facilities andinfrastructure. If these efforts aresuccessful, the Latin Americanmilitary forces could improvetheir standing with the peopleand perhaps form the basis forcooperation in strengtheningnational security. SOF forces arewell-equipped to train LatinAmerican military forces innation-building skills, includingvital information-disseminationactivities.

• Counternarcotics activities.No discussion of contemporary

U.S. relations with LatinAmerica would be com-plete without touchingon the issue of coun-ternarcotics activities,the “war against drugs,”because it plays such aprominent, if unfortu-nate, role in the overallrelationship.

At the outset, let thisauthor say that he con-siders the policy ofattempting to choke offthe flow of drugs intothe U.S. from the pro-ducer countries to be anutter and undiluted fail-ure, and that any sucheffort is doomed to fail.

The vegetation thatforms the starting pointfor cocaine and heroincan now be grown at vir-tually all elevations andin many climatic andtopographic regionshitherto impossible.Given the relative easeof cultivation, produc-tion and transshipment,any effort to curb orsqueeze production inone area leads more orless immediately toanother area’s picking

August 1996 19

Honduran soldiers learn small-unit tactics under the guidance of Special Forcesinstructors.

Photo copyright Hans Halberstadt

up the effort.The test of the efficacy of the U.S.

effort is not how many hectares ofvegetation have been destroyed,how many barrels of chemicalshave been poured into tributaries ofthe Amazon, how many kingpinshave been arrested, how manyfinancial transactions have beendisrupted, or how many laborato-ries have been destroyed. The onlyvalid test of a counterdrug strategyis its impact at the street-cornerlevel in the U.S. And by any test orstandard, drugs of choice havenever been more freely available,cheaper in price, or purer andstronger in quality on that streetcorner. Daily, weekly, monthly oryearly variations in consumption inthe U.S. are clearly and exclusivelybased on changes in consumertastes and preferences, not onchanges in supply and availability.

However, the U.S. remains offi-cially committed to combatingillicit narcotics production andtrafficking. The point of this arti-cle is not to argue for a sensiblenational drug policy, but to sug-gest a potential SOF contributionto the execution of our chosenpolicy.

Although neither U.S. nor LatinAmerican counternarcotics ef-forts have had any statisticallysignificant impact on the avail-ability of illicit narcotics in theU.S., these efforts have had somespillover effects that make themof limited value. We must expandour efforts to teach Latin Americathe importance of activelypatrolling its countryside andnational frontiers, the impor-tance of intelligence-gathering(developing human sources andbuilding technical systems forcollecting and assessing informa-tion), and the importance ofacquiring skills in the use ofadvanced technical equipmentsuch as night-vision devices and

other monitoring and communi-cations equipment.

Latin American nations clearlyare not in control of their ownborders, of the airstrips withinthem, or of the aircraft in theirnational registry. Improving themonitoring of their airspace anddeveloping a means of challeng-ing aircraft which fly through itare some of the activities thatLatin American countries shouldundertake in the name of theirown national sovereignty. SOFforces could make a powerful con-tribution to these efforts, particu-larly in the training of LatinAmerican law-enforcement, intel-ligence and military personnel inmore effective information-gath-ering, assimilation, assessmentand dissemination procedures.

Challenges, opportunitiesDespite a veneer of technologi-

cal sophistication at top levels(both political and commercial) inmany capitals throughout LatinAmerica, many of this region’s

societies, economies and politicalpractices lie deeply mired in thesemi-feudal attitudes of a centuryago. At the level of popular con-sciousness, more Latin Ameri-cans are now aware of whatthey’re missing; they are alsoaware that there are alternativesto the monotonous sameness andunresponsiveness of their govern-ments. The fundamental issueincreasingly at stake is that ofthe legitimacy of national govern-ments in the region.

This would be a nice theoreticalproblem if not for the fact that ifthe U.S. does not increasinglypress for economic, political andsocial change among our south-ern neighbors, increasing num-bers of Latin American citizenswill simply opt to vote with theirfeet. And by now, there should beno doubt as to which directiontheir feet will be pointed.

In the quest for those changes,American policy-makers possessa unique tool in U.S. SOF. Morethan a simple substitute fordiminishing economic assistance,

20 Special Warfare

The participation of U.S. forces in nation-building efforts, such as road-construction projects, helps coun-tries in Latin America to improve their standard of living.

Photo by Mike Edrington

SOF can bolster a country’snation-building efforts using thecountry’s own military forces,thereby salving the host coun-try’s national pride. This militarycooperation is a symbiotic proc-ess that can benefit Latin Ameri-can countries and provide atraining spin-off for U.S. SOF.That training spin-off can beinvaluable when the U.S. mili-tary is called upon to execute anational contingency (such as theintervention in Haiti) or to con-tribute to a multinational orinternational peacekeeping effort(such as that along the Ecuador-Peru border).

As the U.S. moves into the 21stcentury, one of its foremost chal-lenges will be to assist its LatinAmerican neighbors in breakingout of the political and socialenvironment of the 18th. SOFwill be an increasingly valuableresource in helping to meet thatchallenge.

Ambassador DavidPassage is the formerpolitical adviser tothe commander inchief, U.S. SpecialOperations Com-mand, MacDill AFB,Fla. A career Foreign Service offi-cer, he has served overseas tours inEurope, Asia and Africa, as well asEcuador and El Salvador in theWestern Hemisphere. He wasdeputy chief of mission/chargéd’affaires at the U.S. Embassy inSan Salvador from 1984 to 1986,during the most intense period ofthat country’s civil war. Among hisWashington assignments were spe-cial assistant to Secretary of StateHenry Kissinger (1975-76), StateDepartment spokesman (1979-81),and director for Africa on theNational Security Council staff atthe White House (1988-89). He

holds a bachelor’s degree from theUniversity of Denver and a master’sdegree from Georgetown Universi-ty; he is also a graduate of theNational War College. AmbassadorPassage is a frequent guest speakerand guest lecturer at U.S. militaryschools, including command andstaff colleges and senior service warcolleges.

August 1996 21

Despite the steadily expanding litera-ture on counterterrorism, little of realvalue has been produced for the benefit ofpolicy-makers who must create the founda-tions of a strategy for dealing with nuclearterrorism.1

Like all other adversarial groups, terror-ists acquire a repertoire of behavior accord-ing to the particular contingencies of rein-forcement to which they are exposed. Thetask for policy-makers now is to under-stand this repertoire and to use it to informpertinent preventive action.

In preparing for their task, policy-mak-ers must understand that terror has animpact beyond its incidence. Terror has adistinct quality, a potentially decisive com-bination of venue and destructiveness, thatmust be analyzed and anticipated. Linkedto a particular species of fear, this qualityof terror represents a crucial variable inconceptualizing the war against terrorism.

Writing about the fear that arises fromtragedy, Aristotle emphasized that suchfear “demands a person who suffers unde-servedly” and that the suffering must befelt by “one of ourselves.” This fear has lit-tle or nothing to do with our concern for animpending misfortune to others, but ratherwith our perceived resemblance to the vic-

tim: We feel terror on our own behalf.Terror, in other words, is fear referred

back to ourselves. Therefore, the quality ofterror is at its highest point when fear isespecially acute and when acute sufferingis especially likely. What could possibly cre-ate more acute fear of probable victimiza-tion than the threat of nuclear terrorism?

Let us consider, in this connection, thequalitative difference between the bomb-ing that occurred in Oklahoma City andthe potential lethal irradiation of tens ofthousands of Oklahomans, either by“small” nuclear explosions or by radiologi-cal contamination. Although it is certainlyconceivable that higher-order nucleardestruction could prove to be counterpro-ductive to the aims of the terrorists whowould employ it, this does not necessarilysuggest a corresponding reluctance ontheir part to undertake such an escalation.After all, if terrorists are strictly logical,they might not foresee such counterpro-ductiveness, and if they are strictly “pas-sionate,” they might not care.

The pain occasioned by terrorism, a painthat confers power upon the terrorist,begins within the private body and spillsout into the body politic. Wanting the tworealms to become indistinguishable, theterrorist generally understands that it isnot enough that the victims feel pain.Rather, the pain must also be felt, vicari-ously but palpably, by all those who mightstill become victims in the future. The

22 Special Warfare

Preventing Nuclear Terrorism Against the United States: 10 Vital Questions

by Louis René Beres

Opinions expressed in this article arethose of the author and do not necessarilyreflect policies of the Department of theArmy or of the Department of Defense.

intent of terrorism is to change a prospec-tive victim’s general awareness that “Allpersons must die” to a more specific aware-ness that “I must die — and maybe soon.”Resorting to more destructive forms of ter-rorism can increase the quality of terrorand hasten this change. When the pain hasits origins in nuclear explosives or radioac-tivity, it is apt to be “felt” with specialintensity. Such a prospect should be takenvery seriously in the United States.

To undertake acts of nuclear terror,insurgent groups would require access tonuclear weapons, nuclear power plants, ornuclear waste-storage facilities. Shouldsuch groups seek to manufacture their ownnuclear weapons, they would requirestrategic special nuclear materials and theexpertise to convert these materials intobombs or radiological weapons. Bothrequirements are well within the reach ofcertain terrorist organizations, especiallysince the breakup of the Soviet Union.

10 vital questionsEffective strategies for prevention of

nuclear terror must be extrapolated frommore generic strategies of counterterror-ism. The development of these more gener-al strategies is itself contingent upon awillingness and a capacity to ask the rightquestions.

Until we can understand the particular

terrorist stance on situational risk-takingand the vital differences between terroristgroups on this stance, we will not be able toidentify a policy for the prevention andcontrol of nuclear terrorism, nor will we beable to fashion an effective U.S. strategy tocounter nuclear terrorism.2 By asking 10vital questions, scholars and policy-makerscan achieve a fuller understanding of therisk calculations made by terrorist organi-zations and the factors most likely to affectthose calculations.

1. Is there a particular ordering of pref-erences common to many or to all terroristgroups, or is there significant variationfrom one group to another? If it can bedetermined that many or all terroristgroups actually share a basic hierarchy ofpreferences, we can begin to shape a gen-eral strategy of operations to counternuclear terrorism. Alternatively, if signifi-cant variations in preference orderings canbe detected between terrorist groups, wewill have to identify myriad strategies ofan individually tailored nature, includingthe use of proactive measures, known inlaw as expressions of anticipatory self-defense.3

2. Are there particular preferencesthat tend to occupy the highest positionsin the preference hierarchies of terroristgroups, and how might these preferencesbe effectively obstructed? In this connec-tion, it is especially important to exam-

August 1996 23

ine the widely held assumption that ter-rorists, like states and countries, aremost anxious to avoid negative physicalsanctions. In fact, large amounts ofsophisticated conceptual analysis andexperimental evidence now indicate thatin certain circumstances, such sanctionsare apt to be ineffective and may evenprove counterproductive.

3. Would the obstruction of terrorist-group preferences prove offensive to someof our principal national values? We mustbe concerned about the possibility thateffective measures to counter nuclear ter-rorism might be starkly injurious to socialjustice and civil liberties. The U.S. govern-ment and the American people mustdecide whether the anticipated benefits ofantiterrorist legislation or activity wouldbe great enough to outweigh the prospec-tive costs.4

4. Would the implementation of effectivemeasures to counter nuclear terrorismrequire special patterns of internationalcooperation,5 and how might such patternsbe created? In principle, the s