Special Civil Actions Roco

Special Civil Actions Digests Atty. Jorge Melo Roco, B2015

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I. RULE 62: INTERPLEADER CLASS NOTES:

- Plaintiff-in-interpleader is not interested in the subject matter. - Requirements:

o Conflicting claim Must be asserted I think thats my pen not considered a claim Mere suspicion of a claim is not enough. It has to be asserted.

o Same subject matter o Against person who claims no interest

1. Ocampo v. Tirona 455 SCRA 62 (2005) FACTS: Ocampo owns a 500 sqm parcel of land in Pasay City. He bought such property from Rosauro Breton, heir of the lands

registered owner. Even though the TCT is not yet in Ocampos name, the possession and administration of said property was already with Ocampo. On the other hand, Tirona is a lessee occupying a portion of said land. When Ocampo bought the property, he wrote a letter to Tirona informing her of the change of ownership. Thus, in recognition of Ocampos ownership, Tirona paid the monthly rentals due. Later on, however, Ocampo received a letter from Tironas letter which states that Tirona will temporarily stop

paying monthly rentals pursuant to a P.D. which declared the property in question an area for priority development. Consequently, Ocampo wrote a demand letter to Tirona to pay the rentals in arrears (1,200/mo) and to vacate the premises. Nonetheless, Tirona refuses to heed Ocampos demands. Thus, Ocampo filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Tirona before the MTC. In her Answer, Tirona asserted that one Dona Lourdes Yaneza actually owns the land. Then, she was allowed to amend her answer because she filed her first Answer without the assistance of counsel.. In her Amended Answer, she claimed that the actual owner was a certain Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. MTC ruled that Tirona has no reason to stop paying rent. As such, she was ordered to vacate. In the RTC, the MTC ruling was affirmed. In the CA, however, Ocampos complaint was dismissed because, according to the CA, the property in question should have been partitioned first. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT OCAMPO CAN EJECT TIRONA? HELD: YES. ALL REQUISITES OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER ARE PRESENT. SHE SHOULD HAVE FORCED THE CLAIMANTS TO THE PROPERTY TO INTERPLEAD. Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject land. All the elements required for an unlawful detainer case to prosper are present (i.e. fact of lease; expiration or violation of the lease). Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the subject land from Tironas lessor. Tironas continued occupation of the subject land amounted to acquiescence to Ocampos terms.

However, Tirona eventually refused to pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease. INTERPLEADER The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property. The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing.


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The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint. CLASS NOTES:

- Interpleader not proper after complaint has been filed 2. Wack Wack Golf and Country Club v. Won, 70 SCRA 165 (1976) FACTS: Wack Wack filed a complaint for interpleader against defendants Lee E. Won and Bienvenido A. Tan. The complaint was in reference to the questioned Membership Fee Certificate (MFC) 201. It alleged that Won claims ownership of MFC 201 by virtue of a decision rendered in the CFI of Manila. It also alleges that Tan claims ownership of MFC 201 when it was assigned to him by the original owner of said certificate, Swan, Culbertson, and Fritz. Further, Wack Wack claims that it has no interest in said MFC 201 and that it has no means of determining who of the two is the lawful owner thereof. Wack Wack prayed that the defendants be made to litigate to be able to decide who the lawful owner of the MFC 201 is. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judiciata and failure to state a cause of action. CFI dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT WACK WACK PROPERLY AVAILED OF THE REMEDY OF INTERPLEADER. HELD: WACK WACK DID NOT ACT WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE IN INSTITUTING THE COMPLAINT FOR INTERPLEADER The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability. The procedure under the Rules of Court is the same as that under the Code of Civil Procedure, except that under the former the remedy of interpleader is available regardless of the nature of the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the latter an interpleader suit is proper only if the subject-matter of the controversy is personal property or relates to the performance of an obligation. There is no question that the subject-matter of the present controversy, i.e., the membership fee certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader suit. What is here disputed is the propriety and timeliness of the remedy in the light of the facts and circumstances obtaining. A stakeholder should use REASONABLE DILIGENCE to hale the contending claimants to court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he maybe barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred. WACK WACK DID NOT ACT WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE It was aware of the conflicting claims of the appellees with respect to the membership fee certificate 201 long before it filed the present interpleader suit. It had been recognizing Tan as the lawful owner thereof. It was sued by Lee who also claimed the same membership fee certificate. Yet it did not interplead Tan. It preferred to proceed with the litigation (civil case 26044) and to defend itself therein. As a matter of fact, final judgment was rendered against it and said judgment has already been executed. It is now therefore too late for it to invoke the remedy of interpleader.


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It has been held that a stakeholders action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the latter. The Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason why it did not file an application for interpleader in civil case 26044 to compel the appellees herein to litigate between themselves their conflicting claims of ownership. It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered against it that the remedy of interpleader was invoked by it. By then it was too late, because to be entitled to this remedy the applicant must be able to show that he has not been made independently liable to any of the claimants. And since the Corporation is already liable to Lee under a final judgment, the present interpleader suit is clearly improper and unavailing. It is the GENERAL RULE that before a person will be deemed to be in a position to ask for an order of interpleader, he must be prepared to show, among other prerequisites, that he has not become independently liable to any of the claimants. To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court after the latters successful establishment of his rights in civil

case 26044 to the membership fee certificate 201, is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits, which is one of the purposes of an action of interpleader, with the possibility that the latter would lose the benefits of the favorable judgment. This cannot be done because having elected to take its chances of success in said civil case 26044, with full knowledge of all the fact, the Corporation must submit to the consequences of defeat. Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment. In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had already been made independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case. CLASS NOTES:

- Interpleader was filed after final judgment. Not proper. o Amounts to a collateral attack on the judgment; violates rule on immutability of judgments

- Reasonable diligence: as soon as you find out there are conflicting claimants, file interpleader - Compare Ocampo and Wack Wack with Mesina wherein interpleader was allowed even after plaintiff had been sued.

They allowed this because due diligence was exercised in filing the action. 3. Ramos v. Ramos 399 SCRA 43 (2003) FACTS: Petitioners Soledad et al are the children of the late Paulino Chanliongco who co-owned a parcel of land in Tondo. It was co-owned by him, his sister Narcisa, and brothers Mario and Antonio. Through a Special Power of Attorney executed by the co-owners in favor of Narcissa, her daughter, Adoracion C. Mendoza, sold the lot to Respondents. Due to conflict as to the validity of the sale, Respondents filed with the RTC a Complaint for Interpleader to resolve the various ownership claims over the property. RTC upheld the sale as to the share of Narcisa but ruled that Adoracion had no authority to sell the share of the other co-owners because the SPA was only in favor of her mother, Narcisa. On appeal, CA modified the ruling and held that the sale was all valid because Adoracion became a sub-agent of her mother Narcisa, to whom the SPA was executed in favor of. The CA decision became final. Petitioners filed a Motion to Set Aside the CA decision because it allegedly denied their right to due process. They assert that they were not served a copy of the Complaint or the Summons. Nor were they impleaded as parties in the RTC. Said Motion was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WHETHER THE PETITIONERS NEED TO BE IMPLEADED OR SUMMONED.


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HELD: NO. AN ACTION FOR INTERPLEADER COVERING A PARCEL OF LAND IS A REAL ACTION. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law; and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The only exceptions to this rule are the correction of the following:

(1) clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; or (3) void judgments.

NO NEED TO IMPLEAD OR SERVE SUMMONS The rules on the service of summons differ depending on the nature of the action. An ACTION IN PERSONAM is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an ACTION IN REM is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an ACTION QUASI IN REM names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that persons interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an interpleader to determine the ownership of the real property in question. Specifically, it forced persons claiming an interest in the land to settle the dispute among themselves as to which of them owned the property. Essentially, it sought to resolve the ownership of the land and was not directed against the personal liability of any particular person. It was therefore a REAL ACTION, because it affected title to or possession of real property. As such, the Complaint was brought against the deceased registered co-owners: Narcisa, Mario, Paulino and Antonio Chanliongco, as represented by their respective estates. Clearly, petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but represented merely an inchoate interest thereto as heirs of Paulino. They had no standing in court with respect to actions over a property of the estate, because the latter was represented by an executor or administrator. Thus, there was no need to implead them as defendants in the case, inasmuch as the estates of the deceased co-owners had already been made parties. CLASS NOTES:

- Sir said not really an interpleader (hassle). Proper action should have been for Quieting of Title. 4. Beltran v. Peoples Homesite and Housing Corp 29 SCRA 145 (1969) FACTS: PHHC leased housing units at Project 4 to Beltran et al. Years later, PHHC announced that the management, administration, and ownership of Project 4 would be transferred to GSIS in payment of PHHC debts. In the same announcement, PHHC asked the tenants to agree to buy the housing units and agreeing to credit 30% of what they paid as rentals. After the tenants agreed, PHHC announced that all payments by tenants would be considered as amortizations or installment-payments. Thereafter, the agreement to turnover administration and ownership of Project 4 was executed by PHHC in favor of GSIS. Subsequently, however, the new chairman of PHHC, Esmeraldo Eco, refused to recognize all agreements previously entered with GSIS. As a result, Beltran, in their own behalf and in behalf of all Project 4 residents, filed an Interpleader Suit to compel PHHC and GSIS to litigate and interplead between themselves concerning their conflicting claims involving Project 4. Beltran asserts that the conflicting claims of PHHC and GSIS caused them great inconvenience as they did not know to whom they should pay their monthly amortizations. In reply, the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. During the hearing, GSIS expressed conformity that the monthly amortization be paid directly to PHHC. As such, CFI dismissed the Complaint. Beltran filed an MR which was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT BELTRAN PROPERLY INSTITUTED THE COMPLAINT FOR INTERPLEADER.


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HELD: NO. THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS ARE ONLY AGAINST THE CORPORATIONS AND NOT RELATED TO THE PLAINTIFFS Plaintiffs entirely miss the vital element of an action of interpleader. Rule 63, section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court (formerly Rule 14) requires as an indispensable element that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. While the two defendant corporations may have conflicting claims between themselves with regard to the management, administration and ownership of Project 4, such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the plaintiffs. No allegation is made in their complaint that any corporation other than the PHHC which was the only entity privy to their lease-purchase agreement, ever made on them any claim or demand for payment of the rentals or amortization payments. The questions of fact raised in their complaint concerning the enforceability, and recognition or non-enforceability and non-recognition of the turnover agreement of December 21, 1961 between the two defendant corporations are irrelevant to their action of interpleader, for these conflicting claims, loosely so-called, are between the two corporations and not against plaintiffs. Both defendant corporations were in conformity and had no dispute, as pointed out by the trial court that the monthly payments and amortizations should be made directly to the PHHC alone. In fine, the record shows clearly that there were no conflicting claims by defendant corporations as against plaintiff-tenants, which they may properly be compelled in an interpleader suit to interplead and litigate among themselves. Both defendant corporations were agreed that PHHC should continue receiving the tenants' payments, and that such payments would be duly recognized even if the GSIS should eventually take over Project 4 by virtue of their turnover agreement of December 27, 1961. CLASS NOTES:

- See if there are really conflicting claims against the plaintiff-in-interpleader 5. Mesina v. IAC, 145 SCRA 497 (1986) FACTS: Jose Go bought from Associated Bank a Cashiers Check for P800K. However, he left it on the bank managers desk. Said manager entrusted the check for safekeeping to Albert Uy, a bank official. While Uy had a visitor, Alexander Lim, he stepped out to answer a phone call. When he returned to his desk, Lim had already left. When Go asked for his Cashiers Check, it was missing. Upon advice, Go executed a STOP PAYMENT Order and executed an Affidavit of Loss while Uy reported the loss of the checks to the police. Somebody tried to enchash the check at Prudential Bank but Associated Bank dishonored it pursuant to the Stop Payment Order. Thereafter, the Atty. Navarro, representing his then-unnamed client demanded from the Bank that it be paid. But the Bank explained that it belonged to Go. The Bank tried to know who tried to encash the check but to no avail. Since the Bank could not find out who Atty. Navarros client was, the Bank filed an Action for Interpleader against Go and John Doe (unnamed client) on Feb 1984. On the same day, the Bank received a summons to a complaint for damages from petitioner Marcelo Mesina (unnamed client) which was filed earlier than the Interpleader case. Go filed his Answer to the Interpleader case. On the other hand, instead of filing an Answer, Mesina filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Ex Abudante Cautela on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because there was no order to litigate, failure to state cause of action, and lack of personality to sue. Mesinas motion was denied. Failing to file an Answer, upon motion by Go, Mesina was declared in default. Mesina then filed a petition for certiorari with the IAC which was also denied. RTC in the Interpleader case ordered the Bank to replace the check in favor of Go or its cash equivalent. Likewise, the Damages case was dismissed in light of the decision in the Interpleader case. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WHETHER IT WAS CORRECT TO MAINTAIN AN INTERPLEADER SUIT BY A PARTY WHO HAD BEEN SUED EARLIER ON THE SAME CLAIM (OWNERSHIP OF THE CHECK)


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HELD: YES. BANK FILED THE INTERPLEADER WITH NO KNOWLEDGE THAT IT WAS SUED BY ONE OF THE CLAIMANTS NO PROOF THAT MESINA WAS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he is a holder in due course and for consideration or value as shown by the established facts of the case. Admittedly, petitioner became the holder of the cashiers check as endorsed by Alexander Lim who stole the check. He refused to say how and why it was passed to him. He had therefore notice of the defect of his title over the check from the start. The holder of a cashiers check who is not a holder in due course cannot enforce such check against the issuing bank which dishonors the same. If a payee of a cashiers check obtained it from the issuing bank by fraud, or if there is some other reason why the payee is not entitled to collect the check, the respondent bank would, of course, have the right to refuse payment of the check when presented by the payee, since respondent bank was aware of the facts surrounding the loss of the check in question. INTERPLEADER PROPER; BANK NOT AWARE THAT IT HAD EARLIER BEEN SUED Considering the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the Bank merely took the necessary precaution not to make a mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was its proper remedy. It has been shown that the interpleader suit was filed by the Bank because Mesina and Jose Go were both laying their claims on the check, Mesina asking payment thereon and Jose Go as the purchaser or owner. The allegation of Mesina that the Bank had effectively relieved itself of its primary liability under the check by simply filing a complaint for interpleader is belied by the willingness of the Bank to issue a certificate of time deposit in the amount of P800,000 representing the cashiers check in question in the name of the Clerk of Court of Manila to be awarded to whoever will be found by the court as validly entitled to it. Said validity will depend on the strength of the parties respective rights and titles thereto. The Bank filed the interpleader suit not because Mesina sued it but because Mesina is laying claim to the same check that Go is claiming. On the very day that the bank instituted the case in interpleader, it was NOT AWARE of any suit for damages filed by Mesina against it as supported by the fact that the interpleader case was first entitled Associated Bank vs. Jose Go and John Doe, but later on changed to Marcelo A. Mesina for John Doe when his name became known to the Bank. COURT REQUIRING ANSWER FROM DEFENDANTS IS EQUIVALENT TO AN ORDER TO INTERPLEAD Mesina assails the IAC in upholding the trial courts order declaring petitioner in default when there was no proper order for him to plead in the interpleader case. The Order of the trial court requiring the parties to file their answers is to all intents and purposes an order to interplead, substantially and essentially and therefore in compliance with the provisions of Rules. What else is the purpose of a law suit but to litigate? CLASS NOTES:

- Answer equivalent to an order to interplead. If not filed, party will be declared in default. 6. Vda de Camillo v. Arcamo, 3 SCRA 146 (1961) FACTS: Petitioners Petra Vda de Camillo and the Franciscos separately possessed a parcel of public foreshore land in Zamboanga del Sur. Each of them erected adjoining commercial buildings on their respective parcels of land. In Sep. 1957, the 2 buildings burned down. Weeks later, Respondents Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong constructed a building of their own which encroached upon the lands previously occupied by De Camillo and Francisco. As a result, on Dec. 1957, De Camillo filed a Forcible Entry Case against the Ongs with the Justice of the Peace of Malagas. Subsequently, on Aug 1958, Francisco filed a similar case. In effect, there were 2 pending Forcible Entry cases. In their Answer, the Ongs claimed that the land where they constructed the building was leased to them by the Municipality of Malagas.


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Pending trial of the 2 cases, the Ongs filed a Complaint for Interpleader against De Camillo, Francisco, the Mayor, and Treasurer of Malagas. They alleged that the filing of the Forcible Entry Cases indicated that the Defendants had conflicting interests since they all claimed possession over the lot. Petitioners sought to dismiss the Interpleader on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, pending action for the same cause, and failure to state a cause of action. Justice of the Peace denied the Motion to Dismiss and ordered Petitioners to interplead. Consequently, the Petitioners filed a certiorari & mandamus before the CFI of Zamboanga claiming that the Justice of the Peace had no jurisdiction. CFI set aside the order of the Justice of the Peace. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE INTERPLEADER CASE HELD: NO JURISDICTION. DE CAMILLO & FRANCISCO DID NOT HAVE CONFLICTING CLAIMS. THEIR CLAIMS WERE ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE AREA THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED. The Petitioners (De Camillo & Francisco) claimed the possession of the respective portion of the lands belonging to them on which the respondents had erected their house after the fire which destroyed petitioners buildings. This being the case, the contention of Petitioners that the complaint to interplead lacked cause of action, is correct. Section 1, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides

Interpleader when proper. Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person, who claims no interest whatever in the subject-matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.

The Petitioners did not have conflicting claims against the Ongs. Their respective claim was separate and distinct from the other. They claimed possession of two different parcels of land, of different areas, adjoining each other. Furthermore, it is not true that the Ongs did not have any interest in the subject matter. Their interest was the prolongation of their occupancy or possession of the portions encroached upon by them. It is, therefore, evident that the requirements for a complaint of Interpleader do not exist. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE HAD NO JURISDICTION; WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE CFI Even in the supposition that the complaint presented a cause of action for Interpleader, still We hold that the JP had no jurisdiction to take cognizance thereof. The complaint asking the petitioners to interplead, practically took the case out of the jurisdiction of the JP court, because the action would then necessarily involve the title to or possession of real property or any interest therein over which the CFI has original jurisdiction. Then also, the subject matter of the complaint (interpleader) would come under the original jurisdiction of the CFI, because it would not be capable of pecuniary estimation, there having been no showing that rentals were asked by the Petitioners from the Ongs. 7. Makati Development Corporation v. Tanjuatco, 27 SCRA 401 (1969) FACTS: MDC and Pedro Tanjuatco entered into a contract whereby Tanjuatco would construct a reinforced concrete water reservoir, office and pump house, and water main at Forbes Park. Before making the final payment agreed upon, Concrete Aggregates (Supplier of materials) informed MDC that Tanjuatco still had not paid to it the sum of P5,198. As such, MDC asked Tanjuatco if he had already settled his account with the Supplier. Then, the Supplier made a claim against Tanjuatco for said amount. Consequently, with the consent of Tanjuatco, MDC withheld said amount from its final payment. Due to Tanjuatcos failure to settle with the Supplier, MDC filed a Complaint for Interpleader in the RTC against Tanjuatco and Supplier to compel them to interplead their conflicting claims. Tanjuatco moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter considering that the amount was less than P10K. RTC dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal where MDC maintains that the subject matter is not the P5,198 but the right to compel Tanjuatco and Supplier to litigate among themselves to protect MDC against double vexation.


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ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE INTERPLEADER CASE HELD: NONE. There is no question in this case that MDC may compel the defendants to interplead among themselves, concerning the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75. The only issue is who among the defendants is entitled to collect the same. This is the object of the action, which is not within the jurisdiction of the lower court. As a matter of fact, on May 25, 1966, the Supplier sued Tanjuatco in the Municipal Court of Manila, for the recovery of said amount of P5,198.75, and the decision therein will settle the question as to who has a right to the sum withheld by MDC. Rule 63 of the present Rules of Court, prescribing the procedure in cases of interpleading, and section 19 of Rule 5 of said Rules of Court omits the Rules on Interpleading among those made applicable to inferior courts. The jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-matter of justiciable controversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant to which municipal courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy amounts to not more than P10,000. CLASS NOTES:

- Jurisdiction of interpleader action is based on ordinary rules of jurisdiction, i.e. based on the amount of the claim o Capable of pecuniary estimation which is the value of the claim

8. RCBC v. Metro Container Corporation, 365 SCRA 150 (2001) FACTS: LEYCON got a P30M loan from RCBC which was secured by a real estate mortgage over its Valenzuela property. LEYCON failed to pay RCBC thereby prompting the latter to institute extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against it. Foreclosure took place and RCBC was the highest bidder. LEYCON filed an Action for Nullification of Extrajudicial Foreclosure against RCBC. Meanwhile, RCBC consolidated ownership over the Valenzuela property after LEYCON failed to redeem it within the 12-month period. A new TCT was issued in his favor. RCBC then demanded rental payments from METROCAN which was leasing the property from LEYCON. Later, LEYCON filed an Unlawful Detainer case against METROCAN in the MTC. The next day, METROCAN filed a Complaint for Interpleader in the RTC against LEYCON and RCBC to compel them to litigate and interplead their several claims among themselves and determine who among them shall rightfully receive payment of monthly rentals. At the pretrial of the Interpleader case, the RTC ordered the dismissal insofar as METROCAN and LEYCON were concerned in view of an amicable settlement they entered into where METROCAN paid back rentals to LEYCON. Meanwhile, judgment was rendered in the Unlawful Detainer case between METROCAN and LEYCON wherein the MTC ordered METROCAN to pay LEYCON whatever rent due. This decision became final and executor. Later, METROCAN and LEYCON separately sought to dismiss the Interpleader case for having become moot and academic due to the amicable settlement. However, the RTC denied the motions. MRs likewise were denied. Consequently, METROCAN went to the CA on certiorari to nullify the RTC order denying their motion to dismiss the Interpleader case. CA granted the petition and set aside the RTCs orders. As a result, RCBC now files this petition. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FOR INTERPLEADER MUST STILL PROSPER DESPITE THE FINALITY OF THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE. HELD: NO. THERES NO MORE REASON FOR THE INTERPLEADER ACTION IN LIGHT OF THE JUDGMENT ORDERING METROCAN TO PAY LEYCON THE RENTALS DUE


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It is undisputed that METROCAN filed the Interpleader action because it was unsure which between LEYCON and RCBC was entitled to receive the payment of momthly rentals on the subject property. LEYCON was claiming payment of the rentals as lessor of the property while RCBC was making a demand by virtue of the consolidation of the title of the property in its name. It is also undisputed that LEYCON, as lessor of the subject property filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against its lessee METROCAN. The issue said case is limited to the question of physical or material possession of the premises. The issue of ownership is immaterial therein and the outcome of the case could not in any way affect conflicting claims of ownership, in this case between RCBC and LEYCON. Hence, the reason for the interpleader action ceased when the MeTC rendered judgment the Unlawful Detainer case whereby the court directed METROCAN to pay LEYCON whatever rentals due on the subject premises. While RCBC, not being a party to the Unlawful Detainer case, could not be bound by the judgment therein, METROCAN is bound by the MeTC decision. When the decision in the Unlawful Detainer case became final and executory, METROCAN has no other alternative left but to pay the rentals to LEYCON. Precisely because there was already a judicial flat to METROCAN, there was no more reason to continue with the Interpleader Case. Thus, METROCAN moved for the dismissal of the interpleader action not because it is no longer interested but because there is no more need for it to pursue such cause of action.

II. RULE 63: DECLARATORY RELIEF

CLASS NOTES:

- Deed, will, instrument, contract, law, etc. - Justiciable controversy: there must be an assertion of a right and a consequent denial of the same

o Source of conflict; not merely academic o Courts have power to resolve; not trivial

1. Allied Broadcasting Center v. Republic, 190 SCRA 782 (1990) FACTS: Through RA 3001, Allied Broadcasting was granted a franchise as a broadcasting station in the Philippines. It was able to construct, maintain, and operate 10 stations all over the country. RA 3001 provides that Allieds franchise is subject to

amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when public safety so requires. Then, in 1974, PD 576-A (Decree Regulating Ownership and Operation of Radio & TV Stations) was issued. Essentially, PD 576-A limited the number of stations that one can operate which was subject to divestiture in case of excess. Also, it provided that all franchises of radio/TV broadcasting systems shall terminate on Dec. 31, 1981. Such may only operate with the authority of the Board of Communications and Secretary of Public Works and Communications. In compliance therewith, Allied was left with only 3 radio stations located in Iloilo, Bacolod, and Roxas City. As such, Allied filed a Petition for the Declaration of the Unconstitutionality of PD 576-A before the SC. It claimed great and irreparable damage for being divested of its franchise without due process, its right to construct and operate stations in other cities/municipalities, and suffered loss of income. ISSUE: WHETHER THE PETITION TO DECLARE PD 576-A FILED DIRECTLY WITH THE SC IS A PROPER REMEDY. HELD: NO. TREATED AS A DECLARATORY RELIEF, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED WITH THE RTC. The petition seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality and/or nullity of Presidential Decree No. 576-A. As such, it must be treated as one seeking DECLARATORY RELIEF under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such an action should be brought before the Regional Trial Court and not before the Supreme Court. A petition for declaratory relief is not among the petitions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved. NO BONA FIDE CASE OR CONTROVERSY


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Also, there is no actual case or controversy involving the law sought to be annulled. Petitioner does not allege that it has filed an application for a license to operate a radio or television station in excess of the authorized number and that the same is being denied or refused on the basis of the restrictions under Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Petitioner does not also allege that it had been penalized or is being penalized for a violation under said Decree. There is, likewise, no allegation that any of the petitioner's stations had been confiscated or shut down pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the constitutional challenge is not being raised in the context of a specific case or controversy wherein the petitioner has asserted his rights. All that petitioner seeks is the nullification of PD 576-A and the reinstatement of its rights under RA 3001. CLASS NOTES:

- ABC complied with the law that he later assailed as unconstitutional. No controversy was made known by ABC. o No protest; compliance with said law was unqualified o Only realized later on that they wanted to question the law.

2. Salvacion v. Central Bank, 278 SCRA 27 (1997) FACTS: First year HS student Karen Salvacion, 12 years old, was in Makati Cinema Square when an American by the name of Greg Bartelli approached her and induced her to go to his house on the premise that Karen would teach Bartellis niece Filipino. However, Bartelli detained her for 4 days and was able to rape Karen multiple times in the span of said 4 days. Police came when she screamed for help. A criminal case was for Serious Illegal Detention and 4 counts of Rape were filed against Bartelli. Moreover, a civil case for Damages with Preliminary Attachment was filed against Bartelli. Unfortunately, he escaped from jail. Meanwhile, upon payment of the Bond, Writ of Attachment was issued. As such, Notice of Garnishment was served on Chinabank where Bartelli had a dollar account. However, Chinabank invoked 113 of Central Bank Circular 960 which exempted dollar deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other process of any court, legislative body, government agency, or administrative body. In its inquiry with Central Bank, the latter clarified that the cited provision is absolute in its application and does not admit of any exceptions. Its purpose as to encourage dollar accounts in the country to help boost the economy. After summons by publication, Bartelli still failed to file an Answer. As such, after hearing the case ex parte, it rendered judgment awarding damages to Salvacion. In attempting to execute upon Bartellis dollar account in Chinabank, the latter invoked the exemption provision. Thus, Salvacion filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the SC. It prayed that Chinabank be restrained from applying the Circular on the ground that it was unconstitutional (violation of substantive due process; equal protection as it gives undue favor foreigners; it provides a safe haven. ISSUE: WHETHER THE SC CAN ENTERTAIN A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF EVEN IF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION THEREOF LIES WITH THE RTC; PROVISIONS OF THE CIRCULAR HELD INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE HELD: PARTLY MERITORIOUS. Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a Petition for Mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214. This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. However, EXCEPTIONS to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for Mandamus. It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the countrys economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned


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law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us. CLASS NOTES:

- In effect, the Declaratory Relief was granted because the SC construed the CB Circular based on the circumstances of the case

- SC did not rule using strict technicality. It exercised its equity jurisdiction. - Lawyer should have filed a certiorari

3. Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, 90 Phil. 83 (1951) FACTS: Hilarion Tolentino, a CPA, brought an Action for Declaratory Relief before the CFI of Manila, not for his own personal benefit or that his rights have been adversely affected, but rather for the benefit of persons belonging to other professions or callings not parties to the case, for the purpose of questioning the constitutionality of 16-A of Commonwealth Act 342 (Phil. Accountancy Law). The action was addressed against the Board of Accountancy, Robert Ferguson, and Hans Hausamann. It alleged that the provisions of the law violates the equal protect clause as it excludes persons engaged in other professions from adopting or using a trade name in connection with their practice/callings. In other words, it only extends to those engaged in the accountancy profession. It claims that Ferguson and Hausamann practice under the trade name Fleming & Williamson (old trade name of accountants) is unconstitutional for excluding persons engaged in other professions from adopting a trade name. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION TO QUESTION THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PHIL. ACCOUNTANCY LAW HELD: NO. LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION. REQUISITES OF DECLARATORY RELIEF NOT COMPLIED WITH. His main objection centers on the exclusive character of the law which extends its benefits only to those engaged in the profession of accountancy. It is obvious that he seeks the declaratory relief not for his own personal benefit, or because his rights or prerogatives as an accountant, or as an individual, are adversely affected, but rather for the benefit of persons belonging to other professions or callings, who are not parties to this case. He does not claim having suffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his rights or prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the disputed name by the defendants (Ferguson & Haussamann). His complaint is rather addressed against the propriety of the use of said trade name by the defendants because it is misleading and is liable to defraud the public. Plaintiff, therefore, has no actual justiciable controversy against the herein defendants which may give him the right to secure relief by asserting the unconstitutionality of the law in question. This case, therefore, does not properly come under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court which authorizes the institution of an action for declaratory relief. The authorities are unanimous that in order that an ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF may be entertained, it must be predicated on the following REQUISITE facts or conditions:

(1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

These requisite facts are wanting and, therefore, the complaint must fail for lack of sufficient cause of action. NO VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION Granting for the sake of argument that plaintiff has established the requisite facts to entitle him to claim for declaratory relief, we are, however, of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 342 does not offend against the equal protection clause of


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our Constitution on the ground of class legislation, for the reason that said Act applies alike to all persons pursuing the same calling or profession under the same conditions or requirements. Said Act gives the same right or affords the same privileges to all accountants without distinction or discrimination. This benefit is extended to the defendants as well as to the plaintiff. The only requirement is that they should comply with the provisions of Act No. 3883 as to the procedure to be followed relative to the use of the chosen trade name. So long as the law applies to all alike, the requirements of equal protection are met. CLASS NOTES:

- No controversy. Not ripe for adjudication 4. PACU v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806 (1955) FACTS: The Philippine Association of College and Universities request that Act 2706 (An Act Making the Inspection and Recognition of Private Schools and Colleges Obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction) as amended by Act 3075 and Commonwealth Act 180 be declared unconstitutional. Said Act gives the Department of Education supervisory and regulatory power over all private schools. Section 3 thereof provides that before a private school may be opened to the public, it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education. PACU alleges that the Act deprives teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law and deprive parents of their right to rear their children. In its defense, the Government contends that the petition constitutes no justiciable controversy. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PACU PRESENTED AS JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY IN ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF SAID ACT. HELD: NONE. This Court is reluctant to consider petitioner's demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid, specially where, as respondents assert, petitioners suffered no wrong nor allege any from the enforcement of the criticized, statute. As a GENERAL RULE, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. As pointed out by the SolGen, none of petitioners has cause to present this issue because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits. Also, they do not assert that the respondent Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of the law and, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain. Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. An action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem may be. CLASS NOTES:

- The schools complied with the law. Just like in Allied Broadcasting 5. Cutaran v. DENR, 350 SCRA 697 (2001) FACTS: DENR was given by law the power to identify, delineate, and recognize ancestral land claim nationwide. Cutaran were occupants of land within Camp John Hay who filed applications for Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) over said land. However, DENR denied the application on the ground that the tribes they allegedly belong to (Bontoc & Applai) were not among the recognized tribes of Baguio. Thereafter, the Carantes heirs also filed an application for CALC over a parcel of land which overlapped portions of the land occupied by Cutaran.


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While the Carantes application was pending with the DENR, Cutaran filed a Petition for Prohibition in the CA to enjoin DENR from processing the application of the Carantes because, if granted, they might be evicted. CA denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WHETHER THE CUTARAN PRESENTED A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY HELD: The petition was prematurely filed. Under the undisputed facts there is as yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve and the petition should have been dismissed by the CA on this ground. We gather from the allegations of the petition and that of the petitioners memorandum that the alleged application for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the heirs of Carantes under the assailed DENR special orders has not been granted nor the CALC applied for, issued. The DENR is still processing the application of the heirs of Carantes for a certificate of ancestral land claim , which the DENR may or may not grant. It is evident that the adverse legal interests involved in this case are the competing claims of the petitioners and that of the heirs of Carantes to possess a common portion of a piece of land. As the undisputed facts stand there is no justiciable controversy between the petitioners and the respondents as there is no actual or imminent violation of the petitioners asserted right to possess the land by reason of the implementation of the questioned administrative issuances. A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY has been defined as, a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law. Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political questions and as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in cases that has become moot. Subject to certain well-defined exceptions courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity. This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners speculation that the DENR will approve the application of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR. CLASS NOTES:

- Justiciable controversy o Definite and concrete o Touches upon legal relations of parties o Adverse legal interests

6. Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 (1966) FACTS: To promote patronage for its oil products, Caltex devised a promo scheme called Caltex Hooded Pump Context. It calls for participants to estimate the actual liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station. Its participation applies to all (except Caltex employees, dealers, and advertising agency). To join, no fee is required nor purchase of Caltex products. The entry forms are made available upon request at each station. Whoever gets the closest estimate of the actual liters dispensed by the hooded pump gets a price (kerosene burner, thermos bottle, hunter lantern, flashlight). Since Caltex was going to extensively use the mails, it asked postal authorities to clear the contest in advance. However, pursuant to the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law, the Acting Postmaster General ruled that it fell within the anti-lottery provisions and denied clearance. Moreover, he further stated that, even if it was not lottery, the contest still involves a gift enterprise proscribed by the Postal Law. Aggrieved, Caltex sought relief by filing a Petition for Declaratory Relief against the Postmaster praying that it be declared that the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be violative of the Postal Law. RTC ruled in favor of Caltex.


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ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION STATES A SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF. HELD: YES. CALTEX PRESENTED A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, DECLARATORY RELIEF is available to any person whose rights are affected by a statute to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the statute and for declaration of his rights thereunder. In amplification, this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain CONDITIONS SINE QUA NON therefor, to wit:

(1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its products. In contrast, the appellant (Postmaster), as the authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the Caltex laid out plans for the sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it was found expedient to request the Postmaster for an advance clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the Postmaster saw a violation thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request. A point of difference as to the correct construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus reached. Communications in which the parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. The confidence with which Caltex insisted upon its position was matched only by the obstinacy with which the Postmaster stood his ground. And this impasse was climaxed by the Postmasters open warning to Caltex. Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The Caltexs insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the Postmaster of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal tight on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real not a mere theoretical question or issue. The contenders are as real as their interests are substantial. To Caltex, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To the Postmaster, the suppression of Caltexs proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to upholdand enforce is an unavoidable duty. Contrary to the insinuation of the Postmaster, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely Caltexs desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested. QUESTION OF CONSTRUTION Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.


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Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate resolution. If Caltex cannot obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. CLASS NOTES:

- Ripe for adjudication 7. Mirando v. Wellington, 81 SCRA 506 (1978) FACTS: Shortly after the Liberation, Mirando et al occupied and lived within the premises of Arellano University from 1945-1950. To solve the problem posed by squatters to public health and sanitation and to meet the needs to the University, Manila Mayor de La Fuente secured approval of Quezon City Mayor Diaz to relocate the squatters to a certain parcel of land which was formerly owned by a Japanese. But because the latter was an enemy alien, the Phil. Alien Property Custodian (Phil. Board of Liquidators) took possession of those lots. During Mirandos occupancy, they built shit on thereon and were charged nominal

rates by the PBL. In 1953, PBL, with the approval of the President, bartered the land in question with another piece of property owned by one Carmen Planas. Later, in 1964, the Administrator of the Planas Estate sold the lots to Wellington Ty & Bros. Inc. TCT was issued in favor of the latter. Then, Wellington demanded for Mirando et al to vacate. The latter refused. An ejectment case was filed in QC. As a result, Mirando et al filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief for Cancellation of Title and/or Reconveyance anchoring their claim on the allegation that they were bona fide occupants and that they were deprived of the preferential right to purchase the lots. CFI ruled that Mirando et al had no rights over the land and that it was not able to show that the PBL had no authority to sell the land to Planas and then to Wellington. CA upheld. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT REQUISITES FOR FILING AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS PRESENT. HELD: NO. Under the Rules of Court, declaratory relief is an action which any person interested under a deed, will, contract, or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance, may, before breach or violation thereof, bring to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder. Petitioners-appellants brought this action with a claim that they were deprived of their preferential right to buy the disputed lots by virtue of a CONTRACT OF SALE involving said lots executed between the administrator of the estate of the late Carmen Planas and respondent Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc But it is evident from the records that from the date of their relocation to the disputed lots in 1950 to the date of the filing of this petition for declaratory relief, at no time did the petitioners-appellants acquire any interest whatsoever in the parcels of land subject of the aforementioned contract of sale. They ENJOYED NO RIGHTS which were violated, or at the least, affected, by the exchange of properties between the national government and the late Carmen Planas, and eventually, by the above contract of sale between the administrator of the estate of Carmen Planas and the respondent-appellee Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc. The authorities are unanimous that in order that an action for declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be predicated on the following REQUISITE facts or conditions: (1) there must be a justifiable controversy; (2) the controversy must be


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between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. All these requisite facts are not present; the complaint must, therefore, fail for lack of sufficient cause of action. CLASS NOTES:

- Legal interest: squatters aint got none - No right of preference to purchase land

8. Delumen v. Republic, 94 Phil. 287 (1954) FACTS: Antonio, Juan, and Julito Delumen filed a petition in the CFI of Samar alleging that they are legitimate children of a Filipino woman and a man declared adjudged to be a Filipino citizen. They prayed that the court determine whether they are Filipino citizens and declare their corresponding rights and duties. In response, the SolGen filed an Answer contending that the petition states no cause of action since there is no adverse party against whom the petitioners have an actual or justiciable controversy. After the hearing, CFI declared that Delumens were Filipino citizens by birth and blood. As such, SolGen appealed. Delumen argued that by virtue of the Answer filed by the SolGen, a justiciable controversy arose. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION HAD A SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION HELD: NO JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY. A justiciable controversy is one involving an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical question or issue. Since there is nothing in the petition which even intimates that the alleged status of the appellees as Filipino citizens had in any instance been questioned or denied by any specific person or authority. Indeed, the petition alleges that the appellees have considered themselves and were considered by their friends and neighbors as Filipino citizens, voted in the general elections of 1946 and 1947, and were registered voters for the elections of 1951, and it is not pretended that on any of said occasions their citizenship was controverted. It is not accurate to say, as appellees do, that an actual controversy arose after the filing by the Solicitor General of an opposition to the petition, for the reason that the cause of action must be made out by the allegations of the complaint or petition, without the aid of the answer. As a matter of fact, the answer herein alleges that the petition states no cause of action. In essence, the appellees merely wanted to remove all doubts in their minds as to their citizenship, but an action for declaratory judgment cannot be invoked solely to determine or try issues or to determine a moot, abstract or theoretical question, or to decide claims which are uncertain or hypothetical. 9. Lim v. Republic, 37 SCRA 783 (1971) FACTS: Felisa Lim filed n Petition before the CFI of Zamboanga praying that she be permitted to take the oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen and be repatriated. She avers that she was formerly a Philippine citizen who lost her citizenship by reason of marriage to a Chinese national. Now that her husband died, it was her intention to reacquire Philippine citizenship. Despite the Governments opposition, the CFI declared Lim to have all the qualifications required by law and allowed her to take the oath. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MATTERS OF CITIZENSHIP CAN BE PRESENTED IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF. HELD: NO. The procedure for the repatriation of a female citizen of the Philippines, who has lost her citizenship by reason of marriage to an alien, is as simple as it can possibly be. All that is required of her, upon termination of her marital status, is for her to take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register said oath in the proper civil registry. In fact,


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the allegations and, particularly, the prayer in the petition of appellee herein suggest that she is aware of the pertinent legal provisions. It is, moreover, apparent that her objective is to settle her political status prior to marriage. In other words, thru her petition herein, she hopes to establish that she was a citizen of the Philippines before she contracted marriage. As a consequence, her petition is, in effect, one for a DECLARATORY RELIEF, which this Court has repeatedly held to be inapplicable to the political status of natural persons. Declaratory relief in this jurisdiction is a special civil action which may lie only when any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by statute or ordinance, demands construction thereof for a declaration of his rights thereunder. None of the above circumstances exists in the case under consideration. And this Court has already held that there is no proceeding established by law or the rules by which any person claiming to be a citizen may get a declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in regard to his citizenship. CLASS NOTES:

- Declaratory relief cannot be used for citizenship stuff 10. Dela Llana v. COMELEC, 80 SCRA 525 (1977); I dont even understand why the fuck this case was assigned. FACTS: On Dec. 17, 1977, COMELEC, pursuant to PD 1229, initiated a referendum with the question: Do you vote that Pres. Marcos continue as President and be Prime Minister after the organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided by Amendment 3 of the 1976 Amendments to the Constitution? Dela Llana filed a Petition for Prohibition or Declaratory Relief against the COMELEC. He claimed that said question was in the nature and form of an amendment to the constitution. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS AN AMENDMENT. HELD: NO. PETITION DISMISSED. The holding of the referendum will not result in an indirect amendment to Amendment No. 3 to the Constitution. PD 1229 cannot therefore be said to suffer from any constitutional infirmity. If the people vote yes, Amendment No. 3 will merely be reaffirmed and reinforced. If the people vote no, the incumbent

President, heeding the will of the people, will as he has categorically announced resign; in such situation, he will be merely exercising the prerogative, inherent in all public officials, to resign. In either case the Constitution, as it now reads, will remain unaltered. Moreover, it is a political and non-justiciable question because the power to determine when a referendum should be called and what matter is important for referral to the people, resides in the political branch of the Government. Lastly, the call for the referendum is explicitly authorized by Amendment No. 7 of the Constitution. If, pursuant to this grant of power, the President decides, as he has decided, to consult with the people and submit himself to a vote of confidence in a referendum because he deems it important to do so, he cannot be constitutionally faulted. It is clear from the above that the petition does not pose any question of sufficient importance or significance to warrant the further attention of the Court. 11. Ollada v. Central Bank, 5 SCRA 297 (1962) FACTS: Felipe Ollada was a CPA whose name was placed in the rolls of CPAs authorized and accredited to practice accountancy in the Office of the Central Bank. In 1955, the Import-Export Department thereof issued a requirement that CPAs submit to an accreditation under oath before they could certify as financial statements of their clients applying for import dollar allocations. Having not complied with this, Olladas accreditation was nullified.


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Ollada thus assailed such accreditation requirement on the ground that it was an unlawful invasion of the jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy, in excess of the CBs powers, and that it unlawful restrained his legitimate pursuit of his trade. He thus filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief in the CFI of Manila to nullify said requirements. In said Petition, Ollada stated that he sufficiently alleged ultimate facts which violated his right as a duly qualified CPA, and in addition, he also alleged that by virtue of the violation of his right and that of numerous CPAs, he has suffered serious injury. CB filed a MTD on the ground that Ollada had no cause of action considering that CB had power to issue such rules and regulations. Thereafter, Ollada sought to enjoin CB from enforcing such requirements via Writ of Preliminary Injunction. CB submitted a memorandum saying that it was willing to delete a paragraph from the Issuance which required CPAs to follow strictly the rules and regulations promulgated. Having done so, the Petition for Preliminary Injunction was denied. However, Ollada filed an MR because it alleged that CB was still enforcing said requirement. Thus, the CFI granted the Injunction. On MR by CB, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was set aside. Later, CFI resolved the MTD filed by CB and dismissed the complaint by Ollado. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT, BASED ON THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE PETITION, THE CFI CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE CASE. HELD: YES. The complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a contract, statute or right has been breached or violated. In the present case such is precisely the situation arising from the facts alleged in the petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner himself, Central Bank had already invaded or violated his right and caused him injury all these giving him a complete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate ordinary civil action or proceeding. The dismissal of the action was, therefore, proper in the light of our ruling in De Borja vs. Villadolid and Samson vs. Andal where we held that an action for declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of a contract, statutes or right, and that it is sufficient to bar such action, that there had been a breach which would constitute actionable violation. The rule is that an action for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the means of other existing forms of action or proceeding. CLASS NOTES:

- Do not ask for damages - Violation of right

12. Sarmiento v. Capapas, 4 SCRA 816 (1962) FACTS: In May 1958, shipments of tobacco were imported by Philippine Tobacco FlueCuring and Redrying Corporation (PTFRC) under Barter Permit No. 1380. The Collector of Customs thereafter authorized the release of said imported goods. Said shipments of tobacco are due to arrive at the Port of Manila under the same Barter Permit which will earn an aggregate sum of $4.9M. However, certain interested parties objected to the importation of said tobacco allegedly because the Barter Permits were issued in violation of the provisions of existing laws. As such, Sarmiento et al filed an Action for Injunction against Capapas, Commissioner of Customs, to prohibit them from releasing importations made under the Barter Permit No. 1380 in the name of PTFRC and to order Collector of Customs to institute seizure proceedings and confiscation proceedings of the importations of tobacco under the same Barter Permit. Later, however, Sarmiento filed a Motion to be Permitted to File A New Petition for Declaratory Relief. With Preliminary Injunction. It asked the court to determine whether the Barter Permit is valid.


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Capapas et al raised the defense that the petition does not state a cause of action for declaratory relief. CFI of Ilocos Norte declared the Barter Permit was against the law and thus void. As such, it ordered the forfeiture to the Government of said importations. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER CONSIDERING THAT THERE HAS BEEN A BREACH OF THE LAW. HELD: NO. IT VIOLATES THE RULE ON MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS. If an action for declaratory relief were to be allowed in this case, after a breach of the statute, the decision of the court in the action for declaratory relief would prejudge the action for violation of the barter law. The institution of an action for declaratory relief after a breach of contract or statute, is objectionable on various grounds, among which is that it violates the rule on multiplicity of suits. If the case at bar were allowed for a declaratory relief, the judgment therein notwithstanding, another action would still lie against the importer respondent for violation of the barter law. So, instead of one case only before the courts in which all issues would be decided, two cases will be allowed, one being the present action for declaratory relief and a subsequent one for the confiscation of the importations as a consequence of the breach of the barter law. The impropriety of allowing an action for declaratory relief, after a breach of the law, can be seen in the very decision of the court itself, which is now subject of the appeal. Whereas the case at bar was purported to bring about a simple declaration of the rights of the parties to the action, the judgment goes further than said declaration and decrees that the importation by the respondent corporation violates the law, and further directs that the legal importation be confiscated under the provisions of the law. This condition directed by the court lies clearly beyond the scope and nature of an action for declaratory relief, as the judgment of confiscation goes beyond the issues expressly raised, and to that extent it is null and void. That the proper remedy under the circumstances was an action for injunction, and not one for declaratory relief, is evident from the fact that the original petition was for injunction; petitioner herein only changed the nature of the action into one for declaratory relief when, as they explain, they found out that they did not have funds for the writ of preliminary injunction. As a final reason for dismissing the present action, we have the undeniable fact that as of this date (March, 1962) the permit had expired two years before (its life extended to January 21, 1960 only), and all the shipments under the permit had already been delivered to the consignee and used in the manufacture of tobacco. Under the circumstances and at present, of what use will a declaration of the rights of the parties under the barter law be? In fact as of the date of this decision the issues have become moot and academic and the court can do no other than declare the action to be so and of no practical use or value. 13. Edades v. Edades, 99 Phil. 676 (1956) FACTS: Juan Edades is an illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades. Emigdio had 8 other legitimate children. He filed an action seeking Declaratory Judgment on his hereditary rights in the property of his father and also recognition of his status as an illegitimate son of Emigdio. He claims that, as an illegitimate child, he is entitled to share in the inheritance of his father under the law. Also, to prevent a costly litigation, he files this action because his fathers other legitimate children will deny his right to inherit. Severino Edades and other legitimate heirs filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial court granted the motion and ruled that an Action for Declaratory Relief cannot be availed of to compel recognition of hereditary rights. As such, Juan Edades appealed. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER. HELD: NO. REQUISITES OF A DECLARATORY RELIEF WERE NOT MET.


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Under the law, an action for declaratory relief is proper when any person is interested "under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance" in order to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute, or to declare his rights or duties thereunder (section 1, Rule 66). Moreover, the action should be predicated on the following conditions:

(1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripened for judicial determination.

The present case does not come within the purview of the law authorizing an action for declaratory relief for it neither concerns a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, nor does it affect a statute or ordinance, the construction or validity of which is involved. Nor is it predicated on any justiciable controversy for admittedly the alleged rights of inheritance which plaintiff desires to assert against the defendants as basis of the relief he is seeking for have not yet accrued for the simple reason that his alleged father Emigdio Edades has not yet died. In fact, he is one of the herein defendants. And the law is clear that "the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent" (Article 777, new Civil Code). Up to that moment, the right to succession is merely speculative for, in the meantime, the law may change, the will of the testator may vary, or the circumstances may be modified to such an extent that he who expects to receive property may be deprived of it. Indeed, the moment of death is the determining point when an heir acquires a definite right to the inheritance. This action therefore cannot be maintained if considered strictly as one for declaratory relief. But the present action, though captioned as one for declaratory relief, is not merely aimed at determining the hereditary right of the plaintiff to eventually preserve his right to the property of his alleged father, but rather to establish his status as illegitimate child in order that, should his father die, his right to inherit may, not be disputed, as at present, by the other defendants who are the legitimate children of his father. It is true that there is no express provision in the new Civil Code which prescribe the step that may be taken to establish such status as in case of a natural child who can bring an action for recognition but this silence notwithstanding, we declare that a similar action may be brought under similar circumstances considering that an illegitimate child other than natural is now given successional rights and there is need to establish his status before such rights can be asserted and enforced. Considering that the rules of procedure shall be liberally construed to promote their object and avoid an expensive litigation we hold that the present action may be maintained in the light of the view herein expressed. Thc case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in connection with the determination of the alleged status of the plaintiff as an illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades, without pronouncements as to costs. 14. Degala v. Reyes, 87 Phil. 649 (1950) FACTS: While the will of Placida Mina was being probated, Santiago Degala, one of the legal heirs, filed an action for Declaratory Judgment praying that the provisions of said will and testament creating a trust be declared null and void because, as alleged, there was no cestui que trust named therein. The only persons made party-defendants in the Petition were Cecilia Reyes (Petitioner of the Probate of the Will), Valentin Umipig (special administrator of the estate of the Placida Mina), and Leona Leones and Cipriana Alcantara (named trustees under the will). After the hearing, CFI ruled that in view of the unanimous desire of the parties, the will creating the trust was declared void. Reyes, et al appealed. They contend that since the will left properties for the repair and maintenance of the church, it created a charitable and religious trust in favor for the church.


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ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE INTERESTED PARTIES HAVE BEEN IMPLEADED IN THE ACTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. HELD: NO. It is obvious, that the Roman Catholic Church or its legal representative the Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia, has interest in defending the validity of the trust created in the will and its interest would be affected by the declaration of nullity of the trust. Section 3, Rule 66, of the Rules of Court provides that "when declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in these rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action." The non-joinder of necessary parties would deprive the declaration of that final and pacifying function it is calculated to subserve, as they would not be bound by the declaration and may raise the identical issue. And the absence of a defendant with such adverse interest is a jurisdictional defect, and no declaratory judgment can be rendered. But the Roman Catholic Church, or its legal representative was not included as party defendant in the present case. In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from in so far as it declares the trust under consideration null and void, is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs. CLASS NOTES:

- Church was an indispensible party. So, absence thereof is a jurisdictional defect 15. Baguio Citizens Action v. City Council, 121 SCRA 368 (1983) FACTS: The City Council of Baguio City passed Ordinance 386 which essentially considered all squatters of public land in Baguio as bona fide occupants of their respective lots. The purpose of said Ordinance was supposedly to extend a helping hand to the numerous landless city residents/squatters. As a result, Baguio Citizens Action (BCA) filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief in the CFI of Baguio against the City Council and the Mayor and prayed for a judgment declaring the Ordinance invalid and illegal ab initio. The City Council filed a Motion to Dismiss but was denied. Nonetheless, the CFI rendered a decision dismissing the Petition on the ground that the squatters who have come within the protection of the Ordinance were not made parties to the Petition and thus held that non-joinder of such parties is a jurisdictional defect. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SQUATTERS HAVE TO BE IMPLEADED IN ORDER FOR THE DECLARATORY RELIEF TO PROSPER. HELD: NO. The non-inclusion of the squatters mentioned in the Ordinance in question as party defendants in this case cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the CFI of Baguio. There is nothing in Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which says that the non-joinder of persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration is a jurisdictional defect. Said section merely states that All persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration; and no declaration shall, except or otherwise provided in these rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action. This section contemplates a situation where there are other persons who would be affected by the declaration, but were not impleaded as necessary parties, in which case the declaration shall not prejudice them. If at all, the case may be dismissed not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but for the reason stated in Section 5 of the same Rule stating that the Court may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper at the time under all circumstances. It must be noted that the reason for the law requiring the joinder of all necessary parties is that failure to do so would deprive the declaration of the final and pacifying function the action for declaratory relief is calculated to subserve, as they would not be bound by the declaration and may raise the identical issue. In the case at bar, although it is true that any declaration by the court would affect the squatters, the latter are not necessary parties because the question


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involved is the power of the Municipal Council to enact the Ordinances in question. Whether or not they are impleaded, any determination of the controversy would be binding upon the squatters. A different situation obtains in the case of Degala v. Reyes cited in the decision under review. The Degala case involves the validity of the trust created in the will of the testator. In the said case, the Roman Catholic Church which was a necessary party, being the one which would be most vitally affected by the declaration of the nullity of the will was not brought in as party. The Court therefore, refused to make any declaratory judgment on ground of jurisdictional defect, for there can be no final judgment that could be rendered and the Roman Catholic not being bound by such judgment might raise the identical issue, making therefore the declaration a mere exercise in futility. This is not true in the instant case. A declaration on the nullity of the ordinance, would give the squatters no right which they are entitled to protect. The party most interested to sustain and defend the legality of the Ordinance is the body that passed it, the City Council, and together with the City Mayor, is already a party in these proceedings. CLASS NOTES:

- Necessary parties not impleaded are not prejudiced; not a jurisdictional defect

III. RULE 64: REVIEW OF COMELEC/COA JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS

CLASS NOTES:

- Talks about final orders only (en banc) - Mode of Review: Certiorari

o Errors in jurisdiction o Lack of jurisdiction o Grave abuse of discretion

Rule 64 Rule 65

30 days 60 days

If your file an MR, only balance left from receipt of denial. If you file MR, fresh period of 60 days from receipt of denial.

Attach certified true copies of all annexes Certified true copies of order, decisions, etc.

1. Aratuc v. COMELEC, 88 251 (1979) FACTS: Aratuc and Mandangan bring separate petitions to assail the COMELEC resolution of January 13, 1979 which declared as final the result of the canvass of the election in Region XII for representatives to the IBP held in April 7, 1978. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SC CAN TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITIONS ASSAILING THE RESOLUTION OF COMELEC HELD: YES. CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IS THE PROPER REMEDY Now before discussing the merits of the foregoing contentions, it is necessary to clarify first the nature and extent of the Supreme Courts power of review in the premises. The ARATUC PETITION is expressly predicated on the ground that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in eight specifications. On the other hand, the MANDANGAN PETITION raises pure questions of law and jurisdiction. In other words, both petitions invoked the Courts certiorari jurisdiction, not its appellate authority of review. This is as it should be. While under the Constitution of 1935, the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court (Sec. 2, first paragraph, Article X) and pursuant to the Rules of Court, the petition for certiorari or review shall be on the ground that the Commission has decided a question of substance not theretofore

determined by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a way not in accord with law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court (Sec. 3, Rule 43), and such provisions refer not only to election contests but even to pre-proclamation proceedings, the 1973 Constitution provides somewhat differently thus: Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be


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brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof (Section 11, Article XII c), even as it ordains that the Commission shall be the sole judge of all

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