Special Civil Actions Report

8/12/2019 Special Civil Actions Report

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D E L A S A L L E U N I V ER S I T Y - M A N I L AC O L L E G E O F L A W

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

A.Y.

2012-

2013

Term 1

GO2


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PRELIMINARIES

A civil action may either be ordinary orspecial. Both are governed by the rules for ordinarycivil actions. (Rule 1, Section 3(a))

Since a civil action in general is one by which aparty sues another for the enforcement orprotection of a right, or the prevention or redress ofa wrong (Ibid) a special civil action is generallybrought or filed for the same purpose.

There are certain rules, however, that areapplicable only to specific special civil actions(Ibid).


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INTERPLEADER: DEFINITION

A special civil remedy whereby a person, whohas property in his possession or an obligation toperform, either wholly or partially, but who claims no

interest in the subject, or whose interest in whole orin part, is not disputed by others, goes to court andasks that conflicting claimants to the property orobligation be required to litigate among themselvesin order to determine finally who is entitled to the

same.


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REQUISITES

a.) The plaintiff claims no interest in the subject matter or hisclaim is not disputed

b.) There must be at least two or more conflicting claimants

c.) The parties to be interpleaded must make effective claims

d.) The subject matter must be one and the same


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INTERPLEADER VS. INTERVENTION

Interpleader Intervention

Original Action Ancillary Action

Commenced by the filing of acomplaint

Commenced by a motion tointervene filed in a pending case

Plaintiff has no interest in thesubject matter of the action or hasinterest therein in whole or in partwhich is not disputed by the parties

Proper in any of these situations: Aperson having a 1.) Legal interest inthe matter in litigation 2.) interest inthe success in either of the parties3.) interest against both 4.) Situated

as to be adversely affected by adistribution or other disposition ofproperty in the courts custody

Defendants are sued to interpleadthem

Defendants are original parties tothe pending suits


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COMPLAINT FOR INTERPLEADER

- Filed by the person against whom the conflictingclaims are made

- Should be filed within a reasonable time after a

dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued byeither or the contending claimants. Otherwise, itmay be barred by laches or undue delay

- The court issues an order requiring the conflicting

claimants to interplead


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MOTION TO DISMISS

-Within 15 days provided for filing an answer, eachclaimant may file a motion to dismiss on the followinggrounds:

-Impropriety of the interpleader action-Rule 16

-The period to file the answer shall be tolled and if themotion is denied, the movant may file his answerwithin the remaining period, but not less than 5 daysin any event, reckoned from notice of denial


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ANSWER AND OTHER PLEADINGS

-When a claimant fails to plead within the time fixed, the courtmay on motion, declare him in default and thereof render

judgment barring him from any claim in respect to the subjectmatter

-Counterclaims, crossclaims, third party complaints andresponsive pleadings may be filed by the parties in aninterpleader action


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WACK WACK GOLF VS. WONMARCH 26, 1976

A defendant may file a counterclaim forinterpleader against the plaintiff and a third partyalso claiming thru subject-matter of the suit.

Note: The conflicting claimants, who are co-defendants in the action, must serve copies of theiranswers not only on the plaintiff but also upon theirco-defendants since the controversy actually existsamong the co-defendants.


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DETERMINATION

- The court shall determine the rights and obligationsof the parties and adjudicate their several claim.

- Such rights, obligations and claims could only be

adjudicated if put forward by the aggrieved partyin assertion of his rights

- The court determines WHO HAS THE BETTER RIGHTamong the conflicting claimants


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DOCKET AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES,COST OF LITIGATION AND EXPENSES

- Docket fees, cost and litigation expenses and other lawfulfees paid by the party who filed a complaint under this ruleshall serve as a lien or charge upon the subject matter ofthe action, unless the court shall order otherwise


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RECENT JURISPRUDENCE2011


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STRADCOM CORPORATION VS. HON. DALMACIO-

SANTOSG.R. NO. 197311. AUGUST 23, 2011

EN BANCFacts:

-DOTC entered into a build-own-operate agreement with Stradcom,involving IT facilities to be housed in the LTO main office in Quezon City.Pursuant to an Escrow Agreement, it is the LTO Chief's duty to issue awritten order to the Land Bank of the Philippines to release and payStradcom. However, since November of 2010 until the present date,the LTO under Asec. Virginia Torres) has not approved any paymentdue to Stradcom.

In 2010, Asec. Torres sought an opinion from the OSG, which in its reply

opined that there is an intra-corporate dispute within Stradcom: theQuiambao group (led by President Cezar T. Quiambao), and theSumbilla group (led by Bonficacio Sumbilla). On the other hand,Stradcom claims that the intra-corporate dispute was merelyconcocted so that LTO would have an excuse in refusing paymenteven for obligations due to it.


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EN BANC Stradcom as represented by Quiambao, demanded from LTO the

payment of the outstanding receivable of P662,345,610.47, butinstead of acceding to Stradcom's demand, the LTO, through theOSG, filed a Complaint for Interpleader with the RTC of Quezon City.This complaint did not dispute the outstanding obligation due to

Stradcom nor did it deny that Stradcom is the rightful payee, butalleged that there is an intra-corporate dispute within Stradcom andthat its legitimate representatives should first be determined.

On June 21, 2011, RTC Judge Santos denied Stradcoms motion to

dismiss and directed the LTO to deposit to the RTC the subject currentamount of LTOs contractual obligations to Stradcom.

This led to the filing of this instant petition for certiorari, arguing thatJudge Santos committed grave abuse of discretion when hedirected such deposit with the RTC.


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EN BANCIssue:Was the complaint for interpleader proper? YES

Held:

-Both the Quiambao group and the Sumbilla group lay claim as validrepresentatives of Stradcom. Necessarily, there is a need to resolve theunderlying intra-corporate dispute between the two claimants.

-As the branch of the RTC to which the case was raffled off is not adesignated special commercial court, this Court deems it moreappropriate that the interpleader case be raffled off to any of the

designated special commercial courts in Quezon City RTC for resolutionof the underlying intra-corporate dispute.


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R U L E 6 3

DECLARATORY RELIEF

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REQUISITES

1. There must be a justiciable controversy;

2. The controversy must be between persons whose

interests are adverse;

3. The party seeking the relief must have a legal

interest in the controversy; and

4. That the issue is ripe for judicial determination.


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SUBJECT MATTER IN RULE 63 ISEXCLUSIVE

A deed;

A will

A contract or other written instrument;

A statute

An executive order or regulation;

An ordinance; or

Any other governmental regulation.

Note: Court decisions are not included


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THE COURT IS GIVEN THE DISCRETION TOACT OR NOT TO ACT ON THE PETITION

In declaratory relief, the court, motu proprio orupon motion, may refuse to exercise the power to

declare rights and to construe instruments in anycase where a decision would not terminate theuncertainty or controversy which gave rise to theaction, or in any case where the declaration or

construction is not necessary and proper under thecircumstances.


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TWO GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL

1. Where the decision on the petition would notterminate the uncertainty or controversy whichgave rise to the action, or

2. Where the declaration or construction is notnecessary and proper under the circumstances as

when the instrument or statute has already beenbreached.


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INSTANCES WHERE NOT PROPER

To obtain judicial declaration of citizenship

Resolve a political issue

Seek relief on moot questions

Where it would not terminate a controversy Filed after a breach of contract or statute

Determination of hereditary rights


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RULE 63 IS APPLICABLE IN:

Reformation of instrument

Quiet title or remove clouds

Consolidation of ownership


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RECENT JURISPRUDENCE

2010-2012


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HONESTO V. FERRER, JR., AND ROMEO E. ESPERA VS. MAYOR SULPICIOS. ROCO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF NAGA CITY,

SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD OF THE CITY OF NAGA, ANDPEAFRANCIA MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION

G.R. NO. 174129 JULY 5, 2010

Facts: Petitioners filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or Injunction with

prayer for TRO questioning Resolutions and Ordinance issued by therespondents, Mayor Sulpicio S. Roco, Jr. and the members of theSangguniang Panglungsod of Naga City.

The resolution states that the application of Mr. Robert L. Obiedo for a

First Class Memorial Park is approved. While the other resolution approvesthe application of Mr. Obejdo for Development Permit (DP) for theirproposed Eternal Gardens Memorial Park.

While, the Ordinance provides that: Noapplication for the establishmentof a private cemetery shall be considered if the proposed privatecemetery site is less than five (5) hectares.

The RTC found that the prayer of petitioners was premature as the

questioned resolutions and ordinance were merely promulgated to pavethe way for the endorsement of the application of the privaterespondent to the HLURB.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the petition is premature, as there can beno issue ripe for judicial determination when the matter is within theprimary jurisdiction of an administrative agency, the HLURB.


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ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONFOR DECLARATORY RELIEF FILED BY THE

PETITIONER IS PREMATURE?

HELD: YES


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HONESTO V. FERRER, JR., AND ROMEO E. ESPERA VS. MAYORSULPICIO S. ROCO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF NAGACITY, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD OF THE CITY OF NAGA,

AND PEAFRANCIA MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION

G.R. NO. 174129 JULY 5, 2010Reason: It is settled that the requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: 1] the

subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or otherwritten instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2]the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful andrequire judicial construction; 3] there must have been no breach of the

documents in question; 4] there must be an actual justiciable controversyor the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests areadverse; 5] the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and6] adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms ofaction or proceeding.

In this case, the issue raised by petitioners is clearly not yet ripe for judicialdetermination. Nowhere in the assailed resolutions and ordinance does itshow that the public respondents acted on private respondentsapplication with finality. What appears therefrom is that the application ofprivate respondent for development permit has been endorsed to theHousing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for appropriate action,the latter being the sole regulatory body for housing and landdevelopment.


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JELBERT B. GALICTO, PETITIONER, VS. H.E. PRESIDENT

BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO IIIG.R. NO. 193978 FEBRUARY 28, 2012

Facts: On September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, which provided for the guiding

principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and positionclassification system for GOCCs and GFIs. EO 7 ordered (1) a moratoriumon the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, exceptsalary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI

employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) asuspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of theBoard of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010.

Jelbert Galicto claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected bythe implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it is null and voidfor lack of legal basis. He asserts that EO7 is unconstitutional for having

been issued beyond the powers of the President. It is contended,however, that the President exercises control over the governing boardsof the GOCCs and GFIs; thus, he can fix their compensation packages inorder to control the grant of excessive salaries, allowances, incentives,etc.

Hence, he filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Applicationfor Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order,

seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of EO7.


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ISSUE: WAS CERTIORARI A PROPERREMEDY?

HELD: NO


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JELBERT B. GALICTO, PETITIONER, VS. H.E.

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO IIIG.R. NO. 193978 FEBRUARY 28, 2012

Reason: No. Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and

Prohibition are availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicialand mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not

judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for

certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead apetition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules ofCourt, filed with the RTC, is the proper recourse to assail thevalidity of EO 7:

Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested undera deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rightsare affected bya statute, executive orderor regulation,ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, beforebreach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriateRegional Trial Court to determine any question of constructionor validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,thereunder.


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R U L E 6 4

REVIEW OF JUDGMENTSR

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PRELIMINARIES

This is a new rule and has as its basis the 1987Constitution:

... Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law,any decision, order or ruling of each commission may bebrought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by theaggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copythereof.(Section 7, Article IX-A)

To implement this provision, the Supreme Courtpromulgated Rule 64. [Riano (2009)]


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...

This mode of review is starkly different from themode applicable to the judgment, final order, or

resolution of the Civil Service Commission. As thelatters judgment cannot be assailed by a petitionfor certiorari to the Supreme Court but by appeali.e., by filing a verified petition for review to theCourt of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43.

(Republic Act No. 7902) [Ibid.]


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NOTES

Under 3 of Rule 64, unlike Certiorariunder Rule 65,

where the period to file the petition is 60 days, thepetition under this Rule shall be filed within 30 daysfrom notice of judgment or final order or resolutionsought to be reviewed. [Herrera (2006)].


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...

General Rule: Failure to file a motion forreconsideration before the issuing Commissionresults in the dismissal of the petition.

Exceptions: To prevent a miscarriage of justice;

When the issue involves the principle of social justice or theprotection of labor;

The decision or resolution is a nullity;

The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is theonly adequate remedy. [ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, G.R. No.133486, January 28, 2000, per Panganiban,J.].


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BASIC REQUIREMENTS

(1) The petition shall be verified and filed in 18copies;

(2) It must be accompanied by clearly legibleduplicate original/certified true copy of the

decision under review; (3) It shall name the aggrieved party as petitioner

and shall join as respondents the Commissionconcerned and the person(s) interested in

sustaining the decision under review; (4) It shall state the facts with certainty, present

clearly the issues involved, set forth the grounds andbrief arguments relied upon for review;


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...

(5) It shall state the specific material dates showingthat it was filed within the period fixed by the Rules;

(6) It shall further be accompanied by proof of

service of a copy thereof on the Commissionconcerned and the adverse party;

(7) It shall contain a sworn certification againstforum shopping; and

(8) It shall pray for judgment annulling or modifyingthe decision under review. [ 5, Rule 64]


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OTHER MATTERS

If the mode of review is a petition for certiorari

under Rule 65, the petitioner must anchor thepetition, on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., that theCommission concerned committed a grave abuseof discretion or acted in excess of jurisdiction in amanner amounting to lack of jurisdiction. [Riano(2009)].


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...

The order to comment, under 6 of Rule 64, in casethe Supreme Court finds the petition sufficient inform and substance is equivalent to summons inordinary civil action. However, the defendant whodid not file his comment cannot be declared indefault.

Under 8 of Rule 64, the petitioner may apply for arestraining order or a preliminary injunction from the

Supreme Court to stay the execution of judgmentor final order or resolution sought to be reviewed.


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RULE 64 VIS--VIS RULE 65

Rule 64 Rule 65

Directed only to the judgments,final orders, or resolutions of theCOMELEC and COA.

Directed to any tribunal, board, orofficer, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Must be filed within 30 days fromnotice of the judgment orresolution.

Must be filed within 60 days fromnotice of the judgment orresolution.

If Motion for Reconsideration isdenied, the aggrieved party mayfile the petition within the

remaining period but which shallnot be less than 5 days.

If Motion for Reconsideration isdenied, the aggrieved party willhave another 60 days counted

from the notice of the denial withinwhich to file the petition.


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2009-2012


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PATES V. COMELEC (2009)

FACTS:The Supreme Court dismissed Patesoriginalpetition under Rule 64 on the ground that it wasfiled beyond the reglementary periodi.e., tackingthe period after receipt of the COMELEC decisionwith the period commencing after receipt of thedenial of his motion for reconsideration. Expectedly,Pates filed a motion for reconsideration, invokingthe fresh period rule enunciated by the SC in a

number of cases beginning 2005. ISSUE: Whether or not the fresh period rule should

apply to Rule 64 petitions?


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...

HELD: No. 3, Art. IX-C of the Constitution expresslyrequires that the COMELECs rules of procedureshould expedite the disposition of election cases.

The reason is constitutionally-based and is noless than the importance our Constitution accordsto the prompt determination of election results. Thisreason far outweighs convenience and uniformity.


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LOKIN, JR. V. COMELEC (2012)

FACTS: After the COMELEC expunged theirCertificate of Nomination as CIBAC party-listcandidates, Lokin, Jr. and Planas filed a petition forcertiorari, under 2 of Rule 64 in conjunction withRule 65, before the Supreme Court. This petition,however, was filed beyond the reglementary periodprovided for in 3 of Rule 64.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be

entertained because 2 of Rule 64 should beconstrued to refer to Rule 65?


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...

HELD: No. While Rule 64 refers to the same remedyof certiorari as the general rule in Rule 65, theycannot be equated, as they provide for differentreglementary periods. Rule 65 provides for a periodof 60 days from notice of judgment sought to beassailed in the Supreme Court, while 3 of Rule 64expressly provides for only 30 days.


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R U L E 6 5 , S E C T I O N 1

CERTIORARIC

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DEFINITION

writ issued from a superior court to any inferior court,board or officer, exercising judicial or quasi-judicialfunctions whereby the record of a particular case isordered to be elevated up for review andcorrection the matters of law (Herrera, 260)


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REQUISITES

a) directed against a tribunal board or officerexercising judicial or quasi-judicial function

b) such tribunal board or officer has acted without orin excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction

c) no appeal or plain, speedy and adequateremedy is available in the ordinary course of law

[Maritime Company of the Philippines vs. Paredes 19 SCRA 804 (1993);Philnabank Employees Association vs. Estanislao, 227 SCRA 804(1993)]


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REQUISITES

Adequate remedymeans remedy which isequally beneficial, speedy and sufficientwhich will promptly relieve the petitioner

from the injurious effects of that judgmentand the acts of the inferior court or tribunal(Silvestre vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 885, 11 C.J., p.113)


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DISTINGUISHED FROM RULE 45

RULE 65 RULE 45Petition for Certiorari Petition for review on

Certiorari/ Appeal by certiorari

Original Action; may be

directed to an interlocutory

order or a final judgment

Based on prior action and

directed on the review of

judgment, award or final order

on the merits

Issue is as to whether the lowercourt acted without or in

excess of jurisdiction or in

grave abuse of discretion;

questions of facts and law

Based on questions of law


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DISTINGUISHED FROM RULE 45

RULE 65 RULE 45Parties are the aggrieved party

as against the lower court or

quasi judicial agency

Parties are the original parties to

the action, lower court is not

impleaded

Motion for reconsideration is a

condition precedent subject to

exceptions

Motion for reconsideration is not

required as a prior action

Appellate court is in exercise of

its appellate jurisdiction andpower of review

Higher court is in exercise of its

original jurisdiction under itspower of control and supervision

of lower courts


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DISTINGUISHED FROM PROHIBITION

CERTIORARI PROHIBITIONParties are the aggrieved party

as against the lower court or

quasi judicial agency

Parties are the original parties to

the action, lower court is not

impleaded

Motion for reconsideration is a

condition precedent subject to

exceptions

Motion for reconsideration is not

required as a prior action

Appellate court is in exercise of

its appellate jurisdiction andpower of review

Higher court is in exercise of its

original jurisdiction under itspower of control and supervision

of lower courts


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2 0 1 0 - 2 0 1 2



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RUDOLFO I. BELUSO, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ANDGABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY

JUNE 22, 2010

GABRIELA filed a Complaint against Atty. NellyAbao-Lee, Rudolfo I. Beluso, et al. for violation of Section27 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as TheElectoral Reforms Law of 1987. COMELEC dismissed theComplaint for lack of probable cause to charge

respondents, including petitioner Beluso. However, it foundrespondents errors to be arising from "sheer grossnegligence," especially on the part of the three membersof the PBOC of Capiz. It, thus, declared respondents to beperpetually barred from serving, in any capacity, in anycanvassing board of the COMELEC in any future election.

Beluso filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Heargued that he is not negligent; hence, the penalty ofperpetual disqualification from serving in any canvassingboard of the COMELEC was too harsh and unreasonable.COMELEC denied his motion for lack of merit. Thus, theinstant petition for certiorari.

Is the petition for Certiorari proper?


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NO

A special civil action for certiorari, under Rule 65, isan independent action based on the specificgrounds therein provided and will lie only if there isno appeal or any other plain, speedy, andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A petition for certiorari will prosper only if graveabuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist.

Notably, the apparent thrust of Belusos petition isthe alleged error on the part of the COMELEC indrawing its conclusions based on its findings andinvestigation.

HELD


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Beluso alleged grave abuse of discretion on thepart of the COMELEC in perpetually disqualifyinghim to serve in any canvassing board, yet failed toprove where the abuse existed.

Thus, in reality, what Beluso was questioning is theCOMELECsappreciation of evidence. At this point,however, it is not this Courtsfunction to re-evaluatethe findings of fact of the COMELEC, given its limited

scope of its review power, which is properlyconfined only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuseof discretion.

HELD


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SPOUSES DAVID BERGONIA AND LUZVIMINDACASTILLOVS. COURT OF APPEALS (4TH DIVISION)

AND AMADO BRAVO, JR.

G.R. NO. 189151. JANUARY 25, 2012

SPOUSES DAVID BERGONIA AND LUZVIMINDA CASTILLOVS


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SPOUSES DAVID BERGONIA AND LUZVIMINDA CASTILLOVS.COURT OF APPEALS (4TH DIVISION) AND AMADO BRAVO, JR.

JANUARY 25, 2012

The Law Firm of Lapea & Associates filed with the CA itsformal entry of appearance as counsel for the petitioners, inview of the withdrawal of the former counsel, Atty. PanfiloSoriano.

The CA issued a Resolution on January 30, 2009 requiring the

filing of the Appellants Brief within 45 days from receipt. OnApril 8, 2009, respondent Amado Bravo, Jr. (the defendant-appellee therein), filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated April2, 2009 stating that the petitioners failed to file their AppellantsBrief within the 45-day period granted to them by the CA in

the Resolution dated January 30, 2009. Citing Section 1 (e),Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, respondent prayed for thedismissal of the petitionersappeal.

Undaunted, the petitioners instituted the instant petition forcertiorari.

Is this action proper?


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NO

The extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only ifthere is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequateremedy in the ordinary course of law. On the other hand,Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states that an appealmay be taken from a judgment or final order that completelydisposes of the case or a particular matter therein.

Concomitant to the foregoing, the remedy of a party againstan adverse disposition of the CA would depend on whetherthe same is a final order or merely an interlocutory order. If theOrder or Resolution issued by the CA is in the nature of a finalorder, the remedy of the aggrieved party would be to file apetition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules ofCourt. Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to file apetition for certiorari under Rule 65.

HELD


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PALMA VS. GALVEZMARCH 10, 2010

Petitioner Leah Palma filed with the RTC an action fordamages against the Philippine Heart Center (PHC) andothers, alleging that they committed professional fault,negligence and omission for having removed her right ovaryagainst her will, and losing the same and the tissues extracted

from her during the surgery; and that although the specimenswere subsequently found, petitioner was doubtful anduncertain that the same was hers as the label thereinpertained that of somebody else.

Private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground

that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her as she wasnot properly served with summons, since she was temporarilyout of the country. Petitioner filed her Opposition to the motionto dismiss.


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RTC issued its assailed Order granting private respondent'smotion to dismiss. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,which the RTC denied. Hence, petitioner filed a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 contesting the decision of the RTCbefore the Supreme Court.

Is the remedy taken by the petitioner correct?


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YES

A petition for certiorari is proper when any tribunal, board orofficer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has actedwithout or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction andthere is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequateremedy at law. There is "grave abuse of discretion" whenpublic respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner inthe exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack ofjurisdiction.

HELD


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RTC Order granting the motion to dismiss filed byprivate respondent is a final order because itterminates the proceedings against her, but it fallswithin exception (g) of the Rule since the case

involves several defendants, and the complaint fordamages against these defendants is still pending.Since there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, andadequate remedy in law, the remedy of a special

civil action for certiorari is proper as there is a needto promptly relieve the aggrieved party from theinjurious effects of the acts of an inferior court ortribunal.

HELD


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R U L E 6 5 , S E C T I O N 2

PROHIBITION

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DEFINITION

It is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal,corporation, board or person, whether exercising

judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial, to desist fromfurther proceedings.

The writ may not issue for acts alreadyaccomplished as a general rule.


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EXCEPTION OF ACTS FAIT ACCOMPLI

As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin actsalready done. However, as an exception to the rule onmootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot ifit is capable of repetition yet evading review. (Funa vs.

Ermita, GR No. 184740. Feb. 11, 2010)

Prohibition will lie to prevent the unlawful creation of anew province by those in the corridors of power whocould avoid judicial intervention and review by merelyspeedily and stealthily completing the commission ofsuch illegality. (Tan v. Comelec, GR No. 73155, July 11,1986)


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REQUISITES OF PROHIBITION

1. It must be directed against a tribunal, board,corporation, officer or person exercising judicial,quasi-judicial or ministerial;

2. That it has acted without or in excess of itsjurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

3. There is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.


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DISTINGUISHED FROM INJUNCTION

Prohibition Injunction

Directed against a court, tribunalor a person exercising judicial,quasi-judicial or ministerialfunctions.

Directed against a party in theaction.

Based on the ground that the courtagainst whom the writ is soughthad acted without or in excess ofjurisdiction.

It does not involve jurisdiction ofthe court.

Always the main action. It may be the main action itself or

just a provisional remedy.


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DISTINGUISHED FROM CERTIORARI

Prohibition Certiorari

It is directed not only to judicial orquasi-judicial but even toministerial acts.

It seeks to annul a judicial or quasi-judicial act.

It is directed to the court itself to

restrain it from further proceedingwith the case.

It is directed to the action of the

court which is sought to beannulled.

The purpose is to command therespondent to desist from furtherproceedings.

The purpose is to annul or modifythe judgment, order, resolution orproceedings of the public

respondent.


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DISTINGUISHED FROM MANDAMUS

Prohibition Mandamus

It is a negative remedy whichforbids the doing of certain thingswhich ought not to be done.

It is an affirmative remedycommanding certain things to bedone.

The object is to prevent one from

executing an act.

The object is to compel

compliance with a function whichthe law prescribes as a dutyresulting from an office, trust orstation.


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2010-2012


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Private respondent filed an Urgent Petition for Prohibitionagainst petitioner SAMELCO II

In the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Calbiga, Samar. The RTCjudge sustained the jurisdiction of the court over the petitionfor prohibition and barred the enforcing of the Resolution.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the samewas denied by the RTC.

Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA via a special civilaction for certiorari. CA rendered its Decision dismissingpetitioners petition for certiorari and affirming the assailed

Orders of the RTC. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied

by the CA.

Whether the availability of an administrative remedy precludesthe filing of a petition for prohibition?


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HELD:

The Court agrees with petitioners contention that the

availability of an administrative remedy via a complaintfiled before the NEA precludes respondent from filing apetition for prohibition before the court.

It is settled that one of the requisites for a writ ofprohibition to issue is that there is no plain, speedy andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In order that prohibition will lie, the petitioner must firstexhaust all administrative remedies.

Thus, respondents failure to file a complaint before the

NEA prevents him from filing a petition for prohibitionbefore the RTC.

SPOUSES YUSAY VS CA


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SPOUSES YUSAY VS. CAAPRIL 6, 2011

The petitioners owned a parcel of land. Half of their land theyused to rent out and is their only source of income.

The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adoptedResolution to authorizing to take the necessary legal steps for theexpropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose ofdeveloping it for low cost housing.

The petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorariand prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment ofResolution.

The RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition However, the RTC, acting upon the petitioners motion for

reconsideration, set aside its decision and declared that

Resolution No. 552 was null and void. The CA concluded that the reversal of the decision by the RTC

was not justified because the resolution deserved to beaccorded the benefit of the presumption of regularity andvalidity absent any sufficient showing to the contrary;

Whether the petition for prohibition will prosper in this case?


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HELD

The Supreme Court denied the petition ruling that certiorariand prohibition were not available to the petitioners under thecircumstances.

Prohibition does not lie against expropriation. The function of

prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exerciseof legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderlyadministration of justice.

Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminentdomain, the power of judicial review becomes limited inscope, and the courts will be left to determine the appropriateamount of just compensation to be paid to the affectedlandowners.


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HELD

Only when the landowners are not given their justcompensation for the taking of their property or when therehas been no agreement on the amount of just compensationmay the remedy of prohibition become available.

Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not called for,

considering that only a resolution expressing the desire of theSangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitionersproperty was issued. As of then, it was premature for thepetitioners to mount any judicial challenge

Before the City as the expropriating authority filed suchverified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be saidto exist. Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not alsobe deprived of their property under the power of eminentdomain.

FUNA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY


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FUNA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARYFEBRUARY 11, 2010

President Arroyo appointed respondent Bautista asUndersecretary of the DOTC.

Following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Bautistawas designated as OIC, Office of the Administrator, MARINA, inconcurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.

Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer,

filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality ofBautistas appointment/designation, which is proscribed by theprohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of theCabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any otheroffice or employment.

Respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not

present in this case. In fact, there no longer exists an actualcontroversy that needs to be resolved in view of the appointmentof respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator and therelinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary

Should the petition for prohibition be dismissed on the ground that itis moot and academic?


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HELD

No, as a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie toenjoin acts already done. However, as anexception to the rule on mootness, courts willdecide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of

repetition yet evading review.

In the present case, the mootness of the petitiondoes not bar its resolution. The question of theconstitutionality of the Presidents appointment or

designation of a Department Undersecretary asofficer-in-charge of an attached agency will arise inevery such appointment.


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R U L E 6 5 , S E C T I O N 3

MANDAMUSH

A

U

L

O


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DEFINITION

Is a writ issued in the name of the State, to aninferior tribunal, a corporation, board or person,commanding the performance of an act which thelaw enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or

station. (Herrera)


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TWO PERTINENT PRINCIPLES

1. Mandamus would lie only to compel a tribunal,board or office to comply with a purely ministerialduty.

2. Petitioner must establish a clear rightto the reliefsought and it is an imperative duty on the part ofthe respondent.

MINISTERIAL DISTINGUISHED FROM


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MINISTERIAL DISTINGUISHED FROMDISCRETIONARY

Ministerial Duty Is that which is so clear and specific as to leave no

room for the exercise of discretion in its

performance. Are acts to be performed in a given state of facts,

in a prescribed manner, in obedience to themandate of legal authority without regard to the

exercise of his own judgment.

MINISTERIAL DISTINGUISHED FROM


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MINISTERIAL DISTINGUISHED FROMDISCRETIONARY

Discretionary Duty Is that which by its nature requires exercise ofjudgment.

A power or right conferred upon them by law ofacting officially, under certain circumstances,according to the dictates of their own judgments orconscience of others.


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MANDAMUS VS. INJUNCTION

Mandamus Injunction

Special Civil Action Ordinary Civil Action

Directed against a tribunal,corporation, board or officer

Directed against a litigant

Purpose is for the tribunal,corporation, board or officer toperform a ministerial duty

Purpose is for the defendant eitherto refrain from an act or to performnot necessarily a ministerial duty.

A A S S Q O WA A O


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MANDAMUS VS. QUO WARRANTO

Mandamus Quo Warranto

The suit is brought against theperson who is responsible forexcluding the petitioner from theoffice.

The suit is brought against theholder of the office, who is theperson claiming the office asagainst the petitioner.

Mandamus only lies to enforceclear legal duties, not to trydisputed titles,

Quo warranto is the remedy to trythe right to an office or franchiseand to oust the holder from itsenjoyment. (Lota vs. CA, G.R. No.

L-14803)


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2 0 1 0 - 2 0 1 2


DE CASTRO VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR


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DE CASTRO VS. JUDICIAL AND BARCOUNCIL (2010)

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that hasarisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of ChiefJustice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after thepresidential election.

Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) filed a special

civil action for mandamus to compel the JBC to submit its listof nominees for the position of Chief Justice to be vacated byChief Justice Puno upon his retirement, because theincumbent President is not covered by the prohibition thatapplies only to appointments in the Executive Department. Buta strong opposition alleged that the incumbent President is

already prohibited under Section 15, Article VII from makingany appointments, including those to the Judiciary, starting onMay 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010

May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees to thePresident?

HELD


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The Supreme Court find no sufficient grounds to grant thepetitions for mandamus and to issue a writ of mandamusagainst the JBC.

The actions for that purpose are premature, because it is clearthat the JBC still has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within

which to submit the list of nominees to the President to fill thevacancy created by the compulsory retirement of ChiefJustice Puno.

HELD

HELD


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Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit tothe President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in theSupreme Court to enable the President to appoint one ofthem within the 90-day period from the occurrence of thevacancy. But its selection of the candidates who will be in the

list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion ofthe JBC.

The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should onlyrefer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees,because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there

must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty.For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should

be an unexplained delay on its part in recommendingnominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to thePresident.

HELD


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FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION V.REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY


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REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY(2011)

G.P. Sarmiento Trucking (GPS) agreed to transport 30 units ofrefrigerators from the plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc.(CII). On a collision, it caused damage to the appliances.

FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), the insurer of the damagedrefrigerators, paid CII, the insured. FGU, in turn, as subrogee,

sought reimbursement of the amount it paid from GPS.

FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract ofcarriage against GPS. RTC ruled in favor of GPS and the Courtof Appeals affirmed its decision. However, On August 6, 2002,the Supreme Court rendered a decision agreeing with the

lower courts that GPS was not a common carrier butnevertheless held it liable under the doctrine of culpacontractual.


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FGU filed a motion for execution with the RTC praying that awrit of execution be issued to enforce the August 6, 2002

judgment. GPS filed its Opposition to Motion for Executionbecause it discovered that FGU sold the appliance to thirdparties thereby receiving the proceeds of the sale. GPS thinks

that FGU should not be allowed to "doubly recover".FGU filed this petition for mandamus directly with Supreme

Court. FGU argues that the decision is already final andexecutory. Thus, a writ of execution should issue. The lowercourt should not be allowed to hear the matter of turnover of

the refrigerators to FGU because it was not an issue raised inthe Answer of GPS.

Whether FGU can compel the court to issue a writ of executionvia mandamus for a case that has already attained final andexecutor status but pending the issue on actual turnover of the

subject refrigerators .


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SPOUSES CACHOPERO VS. CELESTIAL


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(2012)

Rachel Celestial filed an ejectment case against the spousesJesse and Bema Cachopero before the MTC. Celestialclaimed she decided demolish the old house, however, thespouses refused to vacate the premises. This was settled with aCompromise Agreement.

A portion of the house beyond Celestials lot was notdemolished, thus, Celestial filed a Motion for the Issuance ofan Alias Writ of Execution, with a prayer to cite the DeputySheriff in Contempt for not executing the Writ of Execution.MTC denied the motion.

Celestial filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC prayingthat the MTC be ordered to issue an Alias Writ of Execution inthe ejectment case and that the Sheriff be directed toenforce such Alias Writ of Execution.


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Meanwhile Jesse had already instituted a petition forcertiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, assailing the orders ofthe DENR, which denied his Miscellaneous Sales Applicationover a portion of the subject land.

The RTC rendered a Resolution, dismissing Celestials petition

for mandamus, on the ground that the issuance of an AliasWrit of Execution depended on the outcome of Special CivilCase No. 070, which involved the subject land that JesseCachopero had applied for. The RTC said that the foregoingcircumstanceis a supervening cause necessitating refusal to

issue an alias writ of execution.Will Mandamus lie to compel the Regional Trial Court to issue analias Writ of Execution to execute a compromise agreementdespite the separate pending special civil action filed by JesseeCachopero assailing the orders of the DENR?

HELD


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Yes. Mandamus applies as a remedy when the petitionersright is founded clearly in law and is not doubtful.

Celestials petition for mandamus is anchored on her rightsemanating from the Compromise Agreement she executedwith the spouses. The terms of the agreement involved are

clear. The spouses agreed to vacate Celestials lot andtransfer the old house to the land at the back of Celestialslot.

Unless the spouses can show that there is a supervening event,which occurred after the judgment of the MTC, and whichbrought about a material change in their situation vis--vis

that of Celestial, the latter has the right to have theagreement executed, according to its terms.

HELD


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R U L E 6 6

QUO WARRANTOI

N

T

A

L

U

Y

QUO WARRANTO


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QUO WARRANTO

It literally means BYWHAT AUTHORITY

It is a prerogative proceeding or writ issued by thecourt to determine the right to the use or exercise ofan public office, position or franchise and to oustthe person holding or exercising such public office,position or franchise if his right is unfounded or if hehad forfeited.

The action must be brought within 1 year after thecause of such ouster or the right of the petitioner tohold such office or position arose.

AGAINST WHOM MAY THE ACTION BE


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BROUGHT

A person who usurps a public office, position orfranchise

A public officer who performs an act constitutingforfeiture of a public office

An association which acts as a corporation withinthe Philippines without being legally incorporated orwithout lawful authority so to act.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN QUO


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WARRANTO AND MANDAMUS

QUO WARRANTO MANDAMUS (2NDGROUND)

Design to try the right or

title to the office, if theright or title to the officeitself is disputed.

Does not lie to try

disputed titles but only toenforce legal duties.

Brought against theholder of the office, not

necessarily the one whoexcludes the petitioner.

Brought against theperson who is responsible

for excluding thepetitioner from office.


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QUO WARRANTO UNDER THE


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OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE

Any voter contesting the election of any member ofCongress, regional, provincial or city officer within 10days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

If brought against a municipal official, the petition for

quo warranto must be brought in the appropriateRegional Trial Court (Section 1 , Rule 26 Comelec Rules ofProcedure)

If brought against any barangay official, the petitionmust be broguht before the appropriate Metropolitan

Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit TrialCourt ( Section 1, Rule 38, Comelec Rules of procedurel.)


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QUO WARRANTO IN AN ELECTIVE QUO WARRANTO IN APPOINTIVE


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OFFICE OFFICE

The governing law is the election

law

Provisions on Rules of Court

Grounds:Eligibility of the person elected.

Grounds:Legality of appointment

Petition is filed within the 10 days

after the proclamation of theresults of the election

It is brought within 1 year from the

time the cause of ouster or theright of the petitioner to hold theoffice or position, arose

The petition is brought in the

COMELEC, RTC, or MTC

SC,CA ,or RTC

Petitioner may be any voter evenif he is not entitled

Petitioner is the person entitled tothe person.

It will declare the candidate-elect

as inelligible

Declare the petitioner entitled to

the office

WHO MAY COMMENCE


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WHO MAY COMMENCE...

Government through Solicitor General

Public prosecutor

Individual claiming to be entitled to the office orposition usurped or unlawfully held or exercised byanother.

CONTENTS OF PETITION AGAINST


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USURPATION

Name of person who claim to be entitled ; Averment of his right to office, position, or franchise; and Allegation that the respondent is unlawfully in possession thereof.

- All persons who claim to be entitled to the public office, position,or franchise may be made as RESPONDENTS

NOTE: the petitioner must show that he is entitled to the office heldby respondent, not merely that he has a preferential right to beappointed.

- If the petitioners right to file the compliant is not proven, it isunnecessary for the court to pass upon the right of the defendantwho has the perfect right to the undisturbed possession of hisoffice.


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MORO V. DEL CASTILLOG R NO 184980 MARCH 30 2011


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G.R. NO. 184980. MARCH 30, 2011

The Ombudsman charged respondent GenerosoReyes Del Castillo, Jr. (Del Castillo), then ChiefAccountant of the General Headquarters (GHQ)

Accounting Center of the Armed Forces of thePhilippines (AFP), with dishonesty, grave misconductand conduct prejudicial to the best interest of theservice. GHQ reassigned Del Castillo to the

Philippine Air Force (PAF) Accounting Center byvirtue of GHQ AFP Special Order 91 (SO 91).


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The court said that in quo warranto, the petitionerwho files the action in his name must prove that heis entitled to the subject public office. Otherwise,the person who holds the same has a right to

undisturbed possession and the action for quowarranto may be dismissed.


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Here, Del Castillo brought the action for quowarranto in his name on April 4, 2007, months afterthe Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from serviceon February 5, 2007. As explained above, that

dismissal order was immediately executory evenpending appeal. Consequently, he has no right topursue the action for quo warranto or reassume theposition of Chief Accountant of the GHQ

Accounting Center.


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After the retirement of de la Cuesta, petitioner tookover the position of principal of PNS. Subsequently,an order was issued by DepEd, directing that saidschools be under the supervision of the

superintendent of the division. The designation ofpetitioner was also withdrawn and Brillanted wasmade to replace her position.


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The court said that petitioner failed to presentsufficient evidence that she is entitled to thecontested position. In quo warranto, the petitionerwho files the action in his name must prove that he

is entitled to the subject public office. The privateperson suing must show a clear right to thecontested position. Otherwise, the person whoholds the same has a right to undisturbed possession

and the action for quo warranto may be dismissed.It is not even necessary to pass upon the right of thedefendant who, by virtue of his appointment,continues in the undisturbed possession of his office.

MENDOZA V. VILLASG R NO 187256 FEBRUARY 23 2011


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G.R. NO. 187256. FEBRUARY 23, 2011.

In the 2007 barangay elections, ConstancioMendoza obtained the highest votes for theposition of Punong Barangay of BarangayBalatasan, Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro.

Consequently, the Commission on Elections(COMELEC) proclaimed Mendoza as the duly-elected Punong Barangay.


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Thus, the losing candidate, Thomas Pajanel, filed apetition for quo warranto with the Municipal TrialCourt (MTC). Eventually, the MTC disqualifiedMendoza and declared that Liwanag Herato, who

obtained the highest number of votes for theposition of Barangay Kagawad, was entitled tosucceed him as Punong Barangay. Mendozaappealed the decision to the COMELEC.


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A DILG Undersecretary informed Villas thatMendoza should occupy the post of PunongBarangay as there was no Writ of Execution PendingAppeal of the MTC Decision. Nevertheless,

Municipal Administrator Edezer Aceron issued aletter to Marlon de Castro, the local branchmanager of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP),requesting that transactions entered into by

Mendoza in behalf of Barangay Balatasan shouldnot be honored


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Thereafter, Mendoza and the SangguniangBarangay of Balatasan filed a Petition forMandamus with Damages and Prayer for the Writ ofPreliminary Mandatory Injunction with a Regional

Trial Court (RTC). They prayed that the LBP bedirected to release the funds of BarangayBalatasan to them in order to render necessary,basic public services to the inhabitants of the

barangay.


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R U L E 6 7

EXPRORIATIONCH

A

V

E

Z

DEFINITION


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This is the procedure to be observed in the exerciseof the right of eminent domain.

Eminent domain is the ultimate right of sovereignpower to appropriate, not only public, but [even]

the private property of all citizens within theterritorial sovereignty to public purposes.

(Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, US 1837)

DEFINITION


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Elements of the exercise of the power of eminentdomain:

There is taking of private property; E.g. The right of way easement perpetually deprives defendants

of their proprietary rights. (NPC v. Spouses Misericordia, G.R.

No. 60077, 18 January 1991)

The taking must be for public use; E.g. Exproriation for the construction of irrigation systems to make

water available for farmers

There must be just compensation. The value must be that the date of taking, or the complaint for

expropriation, whichever came first. (Section 4, Rule 67).

(Bernas, 2006, p.102)


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2 STAGES IN EXPROPRIATIONPROCEEDINGS


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PROCEEDINGS

2ndSTAGE:Determination of just compensation

This is done with the assistance of not more than three(3) commissioners. The order fixing just compensation isalso final and appealable. (Ibid).

The Court may wholly or partially accept or reject thereport of the commissioners, securing the rights of bothparties in either case.

Just compensation is to be determined as of the date ofthe taking of the propriety or the filing of the complaint,whichever comes first.



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PROCEEDINGS

Just compensation means not only the correctdetermination of the amount to be paid to theowner, but also payment within reasonable timeafter taking. Without prompt payment,

compensation cannot be considered just.

(Republic v. Lim, June 29, 2005)



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PROCEEDINGS

FORMULA FOR DETERMINATION OF JUSTCOMPENSATION

JC = FMV + CDCB

If CB is MORE than CD then,

JC = FMV

Just Compensation, Fair Market Value, ConsequentialDamages, Consequential Benefits

JURISDICTION OF EXPROPRIATIONPROCEEDINGS


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PROCEEDINGS

An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniaryestimation. Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdictionof RTCs, regardless of the value of the subjectproperty.

(Bardillon v. Bgy. Masili, 2003)

ENTRY OF PLAINTIFF UPON PROPERTY


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The plaintiff shall have the right to take or enterupon the possession of the real property involvedupon:

1. Filing of complaint for expropriation

2. Service of notice to the defendant

3. Deposit with the authorized governmentdepositary an amount equivalent to theassessed value of the property for purposes of

taxation to be held by such bank subject to theorders of the court.

ENTRY OF PLAINTIFF UPON PROPERTY


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After deposit, the court shall order the sheriff orother proper officer to place the plaintiff inpossession of the property and promptly submit areport thereof to the court with service of copies to

the parties. If personal propertyProvisionally ascertained by

the Court

(Rule 67, Section 2)


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REPUBLIC ACT 8974


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Rep. Act No. 8974 inescapably applies in instances whenthe national government expropriates property fornational government infrastructure projects.

This requires that the Government make a directpayment to the property owner before the writ ofpossession may issue.

Moreover, such payment is based on the zonal valuationof the BIR in the case of land, the value of theimprovements or structures under the replacement costmethod, or if no such valuation is available and in casesof utmost urgency, the proffered value of the property to

be seized.

(Republic v. Ginogoyon, 2005)

ORDER OF EXPRORIATION


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It is issued by the court in which the complaint forexpropriation is filed when:

1. Objections or defenses of the defendant havebeen overruled; or

2. The defendant raised no such defense orobjection; or

3. No party appears to defend.


JUDGMENT IN EXPROPRIATIONPROCEEDINGS


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PROCEEDINGS

The judgment entered in expropriation proceedingsshall state definitely, by an adequate description,the particular property or interest thereinexpropriated, and the nature of the public use orpurpose for which it is expropriated.

When real estate is expropriated, a certified copy ofsuch judgment shall be recorded in the registry ofdeeds of the place in which the property is situated,and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff the title

to the real estate so described for such public useor purpose.



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HACIENDA LUISITA VS. PARC (2012)


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On July 5, 2011, the SC denied the petition forreview filed by HLI and affirmed the assailed PARCResolutions with the modification that the original 6,296qualified farmworker-beneficiaries of Hacienda Luisita

(FWBs) shall have the option to remain as stockholders ofHLI.

On November 22, 2011, the SC recalled and setaside the option thus granted to the original FWBs toremain as stockholders of HLI, while maintaining that all

the benefits and homelots received by all the FWBs shallbe respected with no obligation to refund or returnthem.


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On just compensation:

Considering that the issue on just compensation hasalready been passed upon and denied by the

Court in its November 22, 2011 Nonetheless, even ifwe entertain said motion and examine thearguments raised by HLI and Mallari, et al. one lasttime, the result will be the same.


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On the reckoning period for just compensation

Taking also occurs when agricultural lands arevoluntarily offered by a landowner and approved byPARC for CARP coverage through the stock distribution

scheme, as in the instant case. It was the PARCapproval of HLIs stock option plan which should beconsidered as the effective date of taking as it wasonly during this time that the government officiallyconfirmed the CARP coverage of these lands.[e]ven if it is the government which will pay the just

compensation to HLI, this will also affect the FWBs as theywill be paying higher amortizations to the government ifthe taking will be considered to have taken place onlyon January 2, 2006.


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On who should determine just compensation:

Even though the compensation due to HLI will stillbe preliminarily determined by DAR and LBP,

subject to review by the RTC acting as a SAC, thefact that the reckoning point of taking is alreadyfixed at a certain date should already hasten theproceedings and not further cause undue hardship

on the parties, especially the qualified FWBs.

REPUBLIC VS. RURAL BANK OFKABACAN (2012)


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KABACAN (2012)

NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose ofconstructing the Malitubog-Marigadao Irrigation Project.Consequently, it filed with a Regional Trial Court aComplaint for the expropriation of a portion of 3 parcelsof land. Among the affected parcels of land was Lot No.3080 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-61963 and registered under the Rural Bank of Kabacan(RBK). After due process, the RTC granted the complaintand ordered NIA, among others, to forward thepayments intended for RBK to Tabaoda and Portia whohave already acquired ownership over Lot No. 3080. Onappeal, the Court of Appeals (CA), affirmed the RTCsdecision.


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The records show that the trial court dutifully followed theprocedure under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedurewhen it formed a committee that was tasked to determine the

just compensation for the expropriated properties.

The first set of committee members made an ocular inspectionof the properties, subject of the expropriation. They alsodetermined the exact areas affected, as well as the kinds andthe number of improvements on the properties. When themembers were unable to agree on the valuation of the land

and the improvements thereon, the trial court selectedanother batch of disinterested members to carry out the taskof determining the value of the land and the improvements.The members of the new committee even made a secondocular inspection of the expropriated areas.


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They also obtained data from the BIR to determine thezonal valuation of the expropriated properties,interviewed the adjacent property owners, andconsidered other factors such as distance from thehighway and the nearby town center. Further, thecommittee members also considered ProvincialOrdinance No. 173, which was promulgated by theProvince of Cotabato on 15 June 1999, and whichprovides the value of the properties and theimprovements for taxation purposes. The committeemembers based their recommendations on reliable dataand considered various factors that affected the valueof the land and the improvements.


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R U L E 6 8 & A C T 3 1 3 5

FORECLOSURE

M

E

N

D

O

Z

A

E

SP

I

N

O

S

A

H

E

R

N

A

N

D

E

Z

KINDS


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Judicial foreclosure, which is governed by Rule 68 ofthe Rules of Court.

Extrajudicial foreclosure, governed by Act 3135.

JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE


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Rule 68 only applies to judicial foreclosure.

For purposes of venue, foreclosure is a real actionbecause it is an action affecting interest in realproperty.

Since it is a real action, the venue for such action isthe place where the property is situated.


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EQUITY OF REDEMPTION


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Period mentioned in the judgmentwithin which the mortgagor may startexercising his right to extinguish the

mortgage and retain ownership of theproperty by paying the debt.


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SALE OF THE MORTGAGED PROPERTY


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If the mortgagor fails to pay the sum due within theperiod (90-120 days), the mortgagee may file amotion for the sale of the mortgaged property.

The motion for the sale of the mortgaged property may bemade ex parte.

SALE OF THE MORTGAGED PROPERTY


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Statutory provisions regarding the publication ofnotice of the mortgage foreclosure must be strictlycomplied with.

The purpose of the notice is to inform the public as to the

condition of the property and to secure bidders.

EQUITY OF REDEMPTION VS. RIGHT OFREDEMPTION


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Equity of Redemption Right of Redemption

Right of the mortgagor toextinguish the mortgage and retainownership of the property bypaying the debt within 90-120 days

after the entry of judgment or evenafter the foreclosure sale but priorto confirmation

Right of the debtor, his successor ininterest or any judicial creditor orjudgment creditor of said debtor orany person having a lien on the

property subsequent to themortgage or deed of trust underwhich the property is sold toredeem the property within 1 yearfrom registration of the Sheriffscertificate of foreclosure sale

EQUITY OF REDEMPTION VS. RIGHT OFREDEMPTION


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Equity of Redemption Right of Redemption

Period is 90-120 days after entry ofjudgment or even after foreclosurebut prior to confirmation; but ifmortgagee is a bank, the

mortgagor may exercise a right ofredemption

Period is 1 year from date ofregistration of certificate of sale;but juridical persons shall have theright to redeem the property until,

but not after, the registration of thecertificate of foreclosure sale withthe applicable Register of Deedswhich in no case shall be morethan 3 months after foreclosure,whichever is earlier

CONFIRMATION OF THE SALE


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After the foreclosure sale has been effected, themortgagee should file a motion for confirmation ofthe sale.

This requires both notice and hearing.

After the hearing, the court if it finds valid groundsfor its confirmation shall issue and order confirmingthe foreclosure sale.

CONFIRMATION OF THE SALE


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Effects It shall divest the rights in the property of all the parties to

the action and shall vest their rights in the purchaser,subject to right of redemption if allowed.

Title vests in the purchaser upon a valid confirmation of thesale and retroacts to the date of the sale.

Party entitled may secure a writ of possession, this shall beissued upon motion.

The order of confirmation is appealable. The order will be finalif there is failure to appeal within the period for appeal.

REGISTRATION


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The buyer acquires title upon the finality of theconfirmation of the sale.

The certificate of sale cannot be registered without

a final order confirming the sale.

JUDICIAL VS. EXTRAJUDICIAL


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Judicial Extrajudicial

Governed by the Rules of Court Governed by Act 3135

Involves filing of an independentaction

No court intervention necessary.

There is an equity of redemptionbut no right of redemption.

Right of redemption exists

There could be a deficiencyjudgment rendered by the court.

There is no deficiency judgmentbecause there is no judicial

proceeding in the first place. But,recovery of deficiency is allowed.

Recovery of deficiency may bedone by mere motion.

Recovery of deficiency is throughan independent action.


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TECKLO V. RURAL BANK OF PAMPLONA, INC.G.R. NO. 171201. JUNE 18, 2010.

CARPIO, J.


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, J

Facts: On 20 January 1994, spouses Co obtained from Rural Bank ofPamplona, Inc. a P100,000.00 loan due in three months or on 20 April 1994.The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage on a 262-square meterresidential lot owned by spouses Co located in San Felipe, Naga City andcovered by TCT). The mortgage was registered in the Register of Deeds ofNaga City on 21 January 1994 and duly annotated on the TCT of the

mortgaged property.

One of the stipulations in the mortgage contract was that the mortgagedproperty would also answer for the future loans of the mortgagor. Pursuantto this provision, spouses Co obtained on 4 March 1994 a second loan fromRural Bank of Pamplona in the amount of P150,000.00 due in three months

or on 2 June 1994.

Spouses Tecklo, meanwhile instituted an action for collection of sum ofmoney against spouses Co. In the said case, spouses Tecklo obtained a writof attachment on the mortgaged property of spouses Co. The notice ofattachment was annotated on the TCT of the mortgaged property.


CARPIO, J.


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, J

When the two loans remained unpaid after becoming due anddemandable, Rural Bank of Pamplona instituted extrajudicialforeclosure proceedings. In its petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, RuralBank of Pamplona sought the satisfaction solely of the first loanalthough the second loan had also become due. At the public auctionscheduled on 19 December 1994, Rural Bank of Pamplona offered the

winning bid of P142,000.00, which did not include the second loan. Theprovisional certificate of sale to respondent bank was annotated onthe TCT of the mortgaged property.

Spouses Tecklo then exercised the right of redemption as successors-in-

interest of the judgment debtor. Stepping into the shoes of spouses Co,spouses Tecklo tendered on 9 August 1995 the amount of P155,769.50,based on the computation made by the Office of the Provincial Sheriff.Rural Bank of Pamplona objected to the non-inclusion of the secondloan.


CARPIO, J.


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J

Issue: Does the redemption amount include the second loan in the amountof P150,000.00 even if it was not included in Rural Bank of Pamplonasapplication for extrajudicial foreclosure?

Held: No. Where the mortgagee failed to include the second loan in itsapplication for extrajudicial foreclosure as well as in its bid at the public

auction sale, it is deemed to have waived is lien on the mortgagedproperty with respect to the second loan. After the foreclosure of themortgaged property, the mortgage is extinguished and the purchase atauction sale acquires the property free from such mortgageanydeficiency amount after foreclosure cannot constitute a continuing lien onthe foreclosed property, but must be collected by the mortgagee-creditor

in an ordinary action for collection.


CARPIO, J.


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In order to effect redemption, the judgment debtoror his successor -in-interest need only pay thepurchaser at the public auction sale the redemptionamount composed of (1) the price which the

purchaser at the public auction sale paid for theproperty and (2) the amount of any assessment ortaxes which the purchaser may have paid on theproperty after the purchase, plus the applicableinterest

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. NG

G.R. NO. 187556. MAY 5, 2010

FIRST DIVISION; PONENTE, J. CARPIO-MORALES


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Facts: On various occasions in 1997, James Ng and his brother Anthonyobtained loans from petitioner amounting to Twenty Five Million Pesos(P25,000,000.00) to secure which they mortgaged two parcels of landsituated in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. Respondents failed tosettle their loan obligation, hence, petitioner instituted extrajudicialforeclosure of the mortgage before a notary public. The Notice of Auction

Sale scheduled the sale of the properties covered by the mortgage waspublished in Metro Profile, a newspaper of general circulation. The highestbidder at the auction sale was petitioner to which was issued a Certificateof Sale that was registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Asrespondents failed to redeem the mortgage within one year, petitioner filedon June 26, 2001, an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of

possession.


G.R. NO. 187556. MAY 5, 2010



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Respondents instituted an action for Annulment of Certificate of Sale,Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage, a writ of preliminary injunctionrestraining petitioner from consolidating its title to the properties andcommitting any act of dispossession that would defeat respondents rightof ownership was issued. RTC then denied the issuance of writ ofpossession on the ground that there is no proof of notice of sale made for

not less than twenty (20) days in at least three (3) public places. There isalso no proof that Notary Public Atty. Stephen Z. Taala, who conductedthe sale at public auction of the subject properties, collected filing feesand issued the corresponding official receipt, in addition to his expenses.


G.R. NO. 187556. MAY 5, 2010



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Issue: Should writ of possession be issued to petitioner?

Held: Yes. It is settled that questions regarding the validity of a mortgage orits foreclosure as well as the sale of the property covered by the mortgagecannot be raised as ground to deny the issuance of a writ of possession.Any such questions must be determined in a subsequent proceeding as in

fact, herein respondents commenced an action for Annulment ofCertificate of Sale, Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage. Sincerespondents failed to redeem the mortgage within the reglementaryperiod, entitlement to the writ of possession becomes a matter of right andthe issuance thereof is merely a ministerial function.

The defaulting mortgagor is not without any expedient remedy, however.For under Section 8 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, it can file withthe court which issues the writ of possession a petition for cancellation ofthe writ within 30 days after the purchaser-mortgagee was givenpossession.


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R U L E 6 9

PARTITIONA

N

G

B

A

T

ON

G

H

I

N

OG

Complaint for Partition

Trial

Appointment of 3 Commissioners

Oath Filed In CourtNO


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Order for Partition

Partition by Agreement

Order of Confirmation of Partition

Notice to PartiesView, Examine

Real EstateHearing

Assign to a partyWiling to take some,& to pay the othersThe amount deemed

equitable

Partition-If mostAdvantageousAnd equitable

To all

Order forSale atPublic

Auction

Report of Proceedings

Objections, if any

Hearing

Accept Report in partAnd reject in part

Recommit to CommissionersFor further Report of Facts

Set Aside Report and AppointNew Commissioners

Accept Report andOrder Judgment

Judgment

Recording & RegistrationIn the Registry of Deeds

YES OR

OR

Final order andaccounting

Appeal

WHAT IS PARTITION


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It is the process of dividing and assigning propertyowned in common among the various co-ownersthereof in proportion to their respective interests insaid property.

It is a judicial controversy between persons whobeing co- owners thereof, seek to secure a divisionfor themselves of the common property giving toeach one of them the part corresponding to each.


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ORIGIN OF THE RULE ALLOWINGPARTITION


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Instances when a co-owner may not demandpartition at any time Art. 494 (2)There is an agreement among the co-owners

to keep the property undivided for a certain period of timebut not exceeding 10 years

Art. 494 (3)/1083When partition is prohibited by the donoror testator for a period not exceeding 20 years

Art. 494 (4)When partition is prohibited by law

Art. 495When the property is not subject to a physicaldivision and to do so would render it unserviceable for the

use for which it is intended Art. 1084When the condition imposed upon voluntary

heirs before they can demand partition has not yet beenfulfilled.

OBJECTIVE


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To enable those who own property in common toput an end to the common ownership so as to vestin each a sole estate specific property or anallotment of land or tenements.

NATURE


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Quasi in rem One which is directed against particular perso

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