IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JULIANA REYES, PAULINA SANTOS DE PARREÑO vs. GREGORIA ARANZANSO, G.R. No. L-27657, August 30, 1992 Facts: Juliana Reyes died intestate. Her substantial estate is still being settled in Special Proceedings No. 34354 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV. The settlement has spawned a number of litigation which has reached this Court and includes not only the instant case but also other cases. The estate had only special administrators until Gregoria Aranzanso who claims to be a first cousin of the decedent asked that she be appointed regular administrator. Her motion provoked counter motions, oppositions, replies, rebuttal and rejoinder which take up 120 pages of the printed record on appeal and which demonstrate the zeal of the various counsel in espousing their clients claims to the estate which as aforesaid is substantial. On January 29, 1966, the Court issued an order appointing Gregoria Aranzanso as regular administrator and relieving Araceli A. Pilapil as special administrator. Motions for reconsideration of the order were filed but the presiding judge held firm "considering that most of the movants have adverse interests against this intestate estate." But the opposition was persistent; it refused to give in. And so on June 20, 1966, the court which incidentally was presided by a different judge issued an order grating the omnibus motion filed by Paulina R. Santos de Parreño. The oppositors Gregorio Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura, Consuelo Pasion and Pacita Pasion were declared to be without any right to intervene in the intestate proceeding and, henceforth they should not be allowed to take part therein. Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura were ordered to return to the estate the sum of P14,000.00 which they received by virtue of the order of this Court dated October 2, 1965. The appointment of Gregoria Aranzanso as regular administratrix pursuant to the order of this Court dated January 29, 1966 was revoked and she was ordered to render a final account of her administration within 10 days from receipt. Paulina R. Santos de Parreno was appointed special administratrix of the intestate estate of the late Juliana Reyes de Santos and upon her filing a bond in the amount of P2,000.00 and the corresponding oath of office, then letters of special administration be issued to her. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied which prompted Gregoria Aranzanso to appeal the order to this Court. Issue: WON lower court was justified in revoking the appointment of Gregoria Aranzanso as the administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. Ruling: No. It stands to reason that the appellant having been appointed regular administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes may be removed from her office but only for a cause or causes provided by law. What is the law on removal? It is found in Rule 82, Section 2, of the Rules of Court which reads as follows: Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal.— If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person. It is obvious that the decision of this Court, cited in the appealed order, that Gregoria Aranzanso, among other persons, is without right to intervene as heir in the settlement of the estate in question is not one of the grounds provided by the Rules of Court. In Paulina Santos, et al. vs. Gregoria Aranzanso, a collateral attack on the adoption of the two girls was not allowed under the following facts: When Juliana Reyes died intestate, Simplicio Santos filed in the Court of First Instance of

Manila a petition for the settlement of her estate. In said petition he stated among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, as surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years of age, respectively. In the same petition, he asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate. Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first cousin to the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator. For her grounds she asserted that Simplicio Santos' marriage to the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and thus void; and that the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was likewise void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents who were then living and had not abandoned them. The CFI ruled that the validity of the adoption in question could not be assailed collaterally in the intestate proceedings. The order was appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the appealed order, finding instead that the adoption was null and void ab initio due to the absence of consent thereto by the natural parents of the minor children, which it deemed a jurisdictional defect still open to collateral attack. Stating that, "The principal issue on the merits in this appeal is whether respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and Ventura, could assail in the settlement proceedings the adoption decree in favor of Paulina and Aurora Santos," this Court gave a negative answer. The decision denied to Gregoria Aranzanso the right to intervene in the settlement proceedings as an heir of Juliana Reyes. But an administrator does not have to be an heir. He can be a stranger to the deceased. In fact, in one of her motions Paulina Santos de Parreno proposed the appointment of the Philippine National Bank as special administrator. SC held that the intervention of Gregoria Aranzanso in the settlement proceedings is not in the capacity of heir although she might be one if her direct attack on the adoption of the two girls should succeed. The order of removing Gregoria Aranzanso as administrator was set aside. She was reinstated as administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. __________________________________________________

SANTERO ET AL VS. COURT OF FIRSTINSTANCE OF CAVITEG.R. No. L-61700, September 14, 1987153 SCRA 728

Petitioners are the children of the late Pablo Santero withFelixberto Pacursa. PRs are 4 of the 7 children of Pablo withAnselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children of Pablo since neither of their mothers, was married to him.Before the SC could act on the instant petition for certiorari,PRs filed a Motion for Allowance to include 3 other siblings of the PRs and praying that the administrator deliver the sum of P6K to each of the 7 children of Anselma as their allowancefrom the estate of Pablo. The CFI granted the motion of thePRs but oppositors (petitioners herein) asked the court toreconsider said Order. An Amended Order was issued by theCFI directing Anselma to submit her explanation as to theadditional 3 children. Anselma in her "Clarification" statedthat in her previous motions, only the last 4 minor children asrepresented by her were included in the motion for support ,and her first 3 children who were then of age should havebeen included since all her children have the right to receiveallowance as advance payment of their shares in theinheritance of Pablo under Art. 188 of the New Civil Code.Petitioners opposed the inclusion of 3 more heirs. AnotherOrder was issued by the CFI directing the administrator to getback the allowance of the 3 additional children of Anselmaapparently based on the oppositors' Motion.

ISSUE:1. Are the private respondents entitled toallowance?2. Was it proper for the court a quo to grantthe motion for allowance without hearing?

RULING:Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfullyemployed, or married should not be regardedas the determining factor to their right toallowance under Articles 290 and 188 of theNew Civil Code.Records show that a hearing was made.Moreover, what the said court did was just tofollow the precedent of the court whichgranted previous allowance and that thepetitioners and private respondents onlyreceived Php 1,500.00 each depending on theavailability of funds.

ADVINCULA V. TEODORO (1956)

Short summary: brothers of the deceased wanted to oust surviving spouse/brother in law as administrator of their sister's estate, after ss/bil already appointed as such and after intestate proceedings already commenced, by showing will allegedly appointing one of them as executor. Court held that until the will is probated, the provision in the will making one of them the executor of the estate is not effective.

Advincula vs. Teodoro R 82 1 99 phil 413Emilio Advincula was appointed special administrator, thenlater regular administrator of his deceased wife’s estate. Afterhe qualified as administrator, his brothers-in-law submitted adocument purporting to be the deceased’d will. Emilioo p p o s e d t h e p r o b a t e o f t h e w i l l o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e signature was not his wife’s and even if it was, the same wasp r o c u r e d b y f r a u d . O n e o f t h e b r o t h e r s - i n - l a w , E n r i q u e Lacson, prayed that he (Enrique) be appointed administratorin lieu of Emilio. During the hearing, it was alleged thatEmilio was incompetent, incapable and unsuitable to act asadministrator because Emilio is foreign to the estate”. Thecourt ruled in favor of Enrique’s motion. Emilio filed an MR butthe same was denied so he instituted the present action forcertiorari to annul the lower court’s order.ISSUE:WON the lower court acted with GADLEJ in grantingLacson’s motionHELD:Yes. The appointment of Lacson as administrator inlieu of Advincula is predicated on the fact that Lacson wasnamed executor of the deceased’d will. This provision,however cannot be enforced until the said will is admitted toprobate. The discovery of a will of the deceased does not ipso facton u l l i f y l e t t e r s o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a l r e a d y i s s u e d o r e v e n authorize the revocation thereof until the alleged will is“proved and allowed by the court”.Furthermore, the lower court appears to have followed theargument of the respondents that Emilio, being foreign to thedeceased’s estate is incapable of being an administrator.  This argument is untenable because from the viewpoint of  logic and experience, a stranger may be competent, capableand fit to be administrator of the estate in the same way thata family member can be incompetent, incapable and unfit todo so. Besides, Emilio as the surviving spouse if a forced heirof the deceased. He is entitled to ½ of all property apart fromhis share of the other half thereof as heir of the deceasedsince “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong tothe conjugal partnership”-

_______________________________________________ De Bautista v. De GuzmanFacts:Numenario Bautista, husband and father of plaintiffs-appellees, sustained physical injuries while inside apassenger jeep driven by Medrano (convicted of homicidethrough reckless imprudence); and owned and operated byRosendo de GuzmanWrit of execution was issued against the driver butremained unsatisfied. After which, De Guzman died. Plaintiff-appellees then prayed that heirs of De Guzman pay the sumsas well as the costs of suit. The heirs of de Guzman refused. In support of thismotion, they maintained that the suit was for a money claimagainst the supposed debtor who was already dead and assuch it should be filed in testate or intestate proceedings, orin the absence of such proceedings, after the lapse of 30days, the creditors should initiate such proceedings, that theheirs could not be held liable therefore since there was noallegation that they assumed the alleged obligation.

Issue:Whether or not the heirs of Bautista can claim from the heirsof De GuzmanHeld:

Bautista heirs can no longer recover because of negligence and a failure to observe mandatory provisions of the law and the Rules. They overlooked the fact that theywere no longer suing de Guzman who died shortly after

theaccident but his heirs. Section 5, Rule 86 makes it mandatoryto inform the executor or administrator of the claims againstit, thus enabling him to examine each claim and determinewhether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The termination of intestate proceedings and thedistribution of the estate to the heirs did not alter the factthat plaintiff-appellees claim was a money claim which shouldhave been presented before a probate court. The onlyinstance wherein a creditor can file an action against adistribute of the debtor’s asset is under Section 5, Rule 88.Even under this rule, the contingent claims must first havebeen established and allowed in the probate court before thecreditors can file an action directly against the distributees.

 Sebial vs. Sebial (1975)On R83.1: The 3-month period provided is not mandatory and the court retains jurisdiction even if the inventory is filed after said period, but such delay, if not satisfactorily explained, may be a ground for the removal of the administrator under R82.2Short summary: child from decedent's second family filed for settlement of estate of her dad and prayed that she be made the administratrix 17 years after death of dad. Child from 1st marriage opposed, saying that the estate was already partitioned among heirs and that they had already disposed of the said properties in favor of 3P and that the estate's value was small that it can be settled amicably. CFI ruled in favor of the petitioner 2nd family child making her the administratrix, even ordering that the 3P and the children of the 1st marriage to deliver the property to the administratrix appointed. Court held that 1st, even if the appointed administratrix filed the inventory more than 3 months from appointment, the court still had jurisdiction. 2nd, it ruled that the trial court should first determine the value of the estate, receiving evidence for it, and the ownership of the said properties covered by the estate, it being argued that 3P already own it. It being unsure of WON the properties still belonged to the heirs of the decedent, it was improper for the TC to order the delivery of said properties to the administratrix.

Heirs of Lorilla vs. CA

Section 21 of Rule 3 provides that upon the defendant’s death, the action "shall be dismissed to be presented in the manner especially provided in these rules." Petitioners argue that this manner is provided for in Sections 5 and 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.1 As contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, the action has to be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff thereafter presenting his claim as a money claim in the settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant.2 The claim becomes a mere incident in the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased where the whole matter may be fully terminated jointly with the settlement and distribution of the estate.3 Supremeä

In the present case, however, the records do not show if any notice of death was filed by Atty. Alfredo Concepcion, counsel of record of Elias Lorilla in Civil Case No. 5262 before the Makati Court. Thus, neither the Makati Court nor PENTACAPITAL were made aware of the death of Elias Lorilla. The trial court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of Lorilla, absent such notice. Neither could the petitioners have been made aware of the trial court’s judgment adverse to their father, for all notices and orders of the court were sent to Lorilla’s counsel of record, who did not bother to inform the parties concerned of Elias Lorilla’s death. Apparently, Lorilla’s counsel failed in his duty to promptly inform the court of the death of his client, as the Rules require.4

Torres vs. CaPetitioners contend that the decisions of the SEC and the Court of Appeals are null and void for being rendered without the necessary substitution of parties (for the deceased petitioner Manuel A. Torres, Jr.) as mandated by Sec. 17, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides as follows:

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Sec. 17. Death of party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.Petitioners insist that the SEC en banc should have granted the motions to suspend they filed based as they were on the ground that the Regional Trial Court of Makati, where the probate of the late Judge Torres’ will was pending, had yet to appoint an administrator or legal representative of his estate.We are not unaware of the principle underlying the aforequoted provision:It has been held that when a party dies in an action that survives, and no order is issued by the Court for the appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, and as a matter of fact no such substitution has ever been effected, the trial held by the court without such legal representative or heirs, and the judgment rendered after such trial, are null and void because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representative or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the judgment are not binding. 16

As early as 8 April 1988, Judge Torres instituted Special Proceedings No. M-1768 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the ante-mortem probate of his holographic will which he had executed on 31 October 1986. Testifying in the said proceedings, Judge Torres confirmed his appointment of petitioner Edgardo D. Pabalan as the sole executor of his will and administrator of his estate. The proceedings, however, were opposed by the same parties, herein private respondents Antonio P. Torres, Jr., Ma. Luisa T. Morales and Ma. Cristina T. Carlos, 17 who are nephew and nieces of Judge Torres, being the children of his late brother Antonio A. Torres.It can readily be observed therefore that the parties involved in the present controversy are virtually the same parties fighting over the representation of the late Judge Torres’ estate. It should be recalled that the purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is the protection of the right of every party to due process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. In the present case, this purpose has been substantially fulfilled (despite the lack of formal substitution) in view of the peculiar fact that both proceedings involve practically the same parties. Both parties have been fiercely fighting in the probate proceedings of Judge Torres’ holographic will for appointment as legal representative of his estate. Since both parties claim interests over the estate, the rights of the estate were expected to be fully protected in the proceedings before the SEC en banc and the Court of Appeals. In either case, whoever shall be appointed legal representative of Judge Torres’ estate (petitioner Pabalan or private respondents) would no longer be a stranger to the present case, the said parties having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the SEC and the Court of Appeals and having thoroughly participated in the proceedings.