Soviet Partisans - 1966

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Soviet PartisansAuthor(s): J. K. ZawodnySource: Soviet Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Jan., 1966), pp. 368-377Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/149211

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SOVIET PARTISANS*'I, a citizen of the Soviet Union, a true son of the heroic Russianpeople, swear

that I will not lay down my weaponsuntil the Fascistserpent n our land hasbeendestroyed.'I commit myselfwithout reservation o carryout the ordersof my commandersand superiorsandto observe strictestmilitary discipline.I swear to work a terrible,mercilessand unrelenting revenge upon the enemy for the burning of our citiesand villages, for the murder of our children, and for the torture and atrocitiescommitted againstour people. Blood for blood! Death for death!'I swear to assist the Red Army by all possible means to destroy the Hitleritedogs without regardfor myself or my life.'I swear that I will die in frightful battle before I will surrendermyself, myfamily, and the entire Russianpeople to the Fascistdeceivers.'If, out of fear, weakness, or personal depravity, I should fail to uphold thisoath and shouldbetraythe interestsof my people, may I die a dishonourabledeathat the handsof my own comrades. The Oathof SovietPartisans

Over half a million men fought bitterly for years under this oath against theGermaninvaders of their country. Their activities varied from carryinga Germangeneral, wrapped in a carpet, from his office to tying up for a time the efforts ofnine divisionsof the enemy.Who were these men? How were they organizedandled? Twenty yearsaftertheend of World War II, researchon Soviet partisansunder the auspicesof the US AirForce has produced a book, Soviet Partisans n World War II,1 which answerscomprehensivelythese and other questions.The findings were based on selected and condensed materialsfrom GermanandSoviet files capturedfrom the Germansby US forces duringWorld War II. Studiesof the original materialwere completed by 1954, but since then new informationfrom official Soviet histories and memoirs has been surveyed, resulting in someminor corrections.Partisanactivities n the following geographicalareaswere studied:Wester Russia, Belorussia,NorthernUkraine,CentralUkraine,andNorth Caucasus.

Three distinctchronologicalperiodsmarkedthe developmentof the Sovietpartisanmovement:I. June-December1941:This was a period of uncoordinated,spontaneousactionsled by Party cadresand others who were idealisticallycommitted to the defence ofthe regime or their homeland. This period was conspicuousfor ineptnessof action

(lack of experience), osses, a considerabledegree of collaborationwith the Germansby the populationand the collapse of territorialorganizationsset up by the Sovietregime. The German advance nside Russiawas too rapidand the impact of collapsewas too overwhelming for the territorialorganizations o solidify and sustainthem-selves.

* The authorgratefullyacknowledgesthe assistancegrantedby the Foreign Policy ResearchInstitute,University of Pennsylvania,which enabledhim to write this article.1Editedby John A. Armstrong,with a foreword by Philip E. Mosely. Madison,Wisconsin:The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964, pp. xviii +792, $I2.50.


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369II. December I94I-Autumn, 1942: The German attack on Moscow collapsed.Themoraleof the populationwas on the upswing. The organizationof the partisanswas

given cohesion and became an efficient tool of the Soviet Government for attackingthe enemy in conjunctionwith the Red Army, for serving as an extension of Sovietauthorityon German-occupied erritory,and for psychologically sustainingthe willof Soviet citizens to resist.III. Autumn I942-Summer,1944:Militaryorganizationof the units was adopted.The Partyratherthanthe Army assumedthe role of the leader of the partisanmove-ment, prodding participantsto activity and rewarding them according to merit.Membershipwas on the increasethroughthe yearsof war:

January 1942 30,000Summer I942 IS0,000Summer 1943 300,000Summer 1944 IS0,000-I75,o002

OrganizationInitially, after the collapse of the territorialorganizations,there seems to havebeen some overlappingof the order-giving, message-receivingsystems in the RedArmy, the Party, and the NKVD. However, in the Spring of I942, the CentralStaff of the Partisan Movement was established. MarshalVoroshilov became the

Commander-in-Chief,with Ponomarenko as Chief of Staff. The departmentsofthe Staff were as follows: Operations, Intelligence, Communications, Personnel,Administrationand Quartermaster, OO' (NKVD), Code, Cartography,Finance,Transportand Propagandaand Press. The Central Staffcontrolled overall strategy,appointmentsof leaders, and formulation of major policies. These were conveyeddown the line throughsubordinateorgans:FrontStaffs;OperativeGroups(attachedto theH.Q. of thearmies nthefield); OperativeCentres(acting n occupiedterritory);and finally, the leadershipof the partisanbrigades.It should be noted that at all theabove-mentioned levels there were in operation 'military councils', with Army,Party, andpartisanmembersplaying an advisoryrole in decisions.

The units which actually fought were commonly designatedas 'brigades'.Each'brigade' was usually a unit of 300 or more men. However, the organizationalnomenclatureadopted was that of the Red Army. The partisanswere organizedinto battalions(300-800 men), companies, platoons and finally the smallest unit,the squad. Battalions and regiments had separatesupply, reconnaissanceand '00'sections. 'Politruks'were political officersassigned to company and higher levels.The disciplinewas proportionatelymore severein the largerunits.In many instances,localconditionsdemandedsomeflexibilityin organizationaltructureas,for example,among the partisansn the North Caucasus.Who Were hePartisans?The researchersmaintain that this was not a 'volunteer organization'and thatin some areasmen between 17 and50 yearsof age andchildlesswomen fit for service2 The decline was due to the Soviet Army's regaining partisan erritory.

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were drafted after screening by, at least in one case, a three-man commission inwhich a doctor and a representativeof the NKVD participated.This impressmentwas appliedparticularly o peasants,who were, incidentally,the largestsocialgrouprepresentedamong partisansabout60%). The next group, numerically,were urbanworkers, seemingly more dedicatedand ideologically sophisticated, ollowed by the'intelligentsia',the professional group and other white collar workers. Then therewere former stragglersand prisoners-of-warwho had escaped (the Germanstook3 million prisoners-of-warduring the first six months of their invasion). Theseformer Red Army men were the most valuableelement of the unitsbecausethey hadgood trainingand, in many instances,battle experience. In 1943, there were somepartisanunitsaveraging40%to 80%of Red Army men. In the firstyears25%to 40%of the partisanswere members of the CommunistParty. This percentagedeclineddue to the non-selectiveinfluxof new members nto thepartisan anks.By 1944,Partymembersformed only approximatelyIo% of the partisans.A separateclass of members consisted of former collaboratorswho, pivotingtoward the source of power, deserted the Germansunder a promise of amnesty(usuallyhonoured)andjoined partisanunits.Finally,the smallestgroupwere women,who served as scouts, intelligence messengers,radio operators, nurses,cooks, etc.;they constituted approximately2% to 5% of the units. The age of partisanswasfrom IS to 60 years.

Although committed to one purpose, inflicting losses upon enemy, and sharingequallyin tasks andhardships, he partisanswere statusconscious and had their owncriteriafor stratification.The greatestprestige and standingwas possessedby thosevolunteers who joined earlyin 1941; next were the Red Army men separated romtheir units in fighting, followed by peasantsdrafted or volunteers after I942, andfinally, former collaborators.The officerscame from four sources:they emergedfrom the movement becauseoftheir personalqualifications; hey were trainedby the Red Army and then were sentto the partisans;regularRed Army officerswere assignedto the partisans;or theywere Red Army officerswho had lost their unitsduringthe fighting, avoidedcapture,andjoined the partisans.Training,Weapons ndLivingConditions

Upon contact with a unit a new member was, as a rule, assignedto menial workand observedwhile the '00' section was checking on his background.If the unithad more or less stable conditions and the new member appearedto be 'safe' hewould then be assignedto a squadandbegin his training.Specializedpersonnel,suchas radio operators, sabotage specialists,etc., were trained, when possible, by theRed Army deep in unthreatened areas of the Soviet Union and subsequentlydespatched o operative partisanunits.

They had infantry weapons, with a strong preponderanceof automaticweaponsfor fast and sustained ire power. Depending on local conditions and the ingenuityof the leader,heavierweaponswere obtained.In several nstances,artilleryand tankswere found to have been operated by the partisans.

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Living conditions were similar to those of guerrillafighters everywhere-hard.Supplies of food were irregular, shortagesof fats, salt and sugarwere severe. Thefare was whatever the country and local populationwould provide. Horsemeat andpotatoeswere the privilegeof the lucky. Giventhe systematicrobberyand devastationinflictedupon the Russian countryside by the Germanauthorities,the plight of theSoviet partisanwas particularly difficult. During the winter months, and whenconditions allowed, the partisanswould build sets of undergrounddugouts inter-connected by ditches and offeringmutual fire-support.There was a general lack ofmedical suppliesand insecurity of existence. In one unit, Io men and two womencontractedsyphilis.They were executedsince'itwasimpossible o carefor them underthe circumstances'.Rheumatism, scurvy, pellagra and intestinal maladies werecommon.The hardshipswere augmented by a general policy of sending the units awayfrom localitiesin which they had ties. This was to prevent apprehensionon the partof the units that their activities would bring reprisals o their families,which couldhamper partisanactions. But a great amelioratingfactor was the assistanceof theRed Air Force.TheAir Forceof the RedArmyandthePartisansThe support extended by the Air Force was extremely useful to the partisans.Not only could suppliesbe delivered, instructorsand leadersprovided, but planesalso assisted the central authoritiesin controlling the units by inspections, linkingthe unitstogetherandgiving thepartisanshe feeling that,althoughbehind the enemylines, they were not forgotten by 'Moscow'.

By 1944, 'probablyhalf of the total armamentof the partisanshad been broughtin by airor had been carriedby personnelflown in'. In fact, not only smallarms,butartillery(45 and 75 mm.) were delivered by planes. To illustrate the importanceofair supplies, on the night of I9 June 1944, in one synchronizedoperation, Sovietpartisansplaced9,600 mines in the sectorof the GermanArmy GroupCentre alone.This quantityof mines could have been deliveredto widely scatteredunits only byplanes. Food was also suppliedat least in one areain the North Caucasus,where itwas deliveredregularlyfor two years to partisanswho, before the food drops, hadbeen eatingputrefiedhorsemeat,but who had refusedto surrender.In addition to spare parts, radios, maps, compasses,winter clothing and boots,medals and sweets to boost moralewere sometimes delivered.To scatteredunits thesplutteringof a smallone-engine planeas a rule meant contact with the part of theircountry which was free. The plane could bring and take mail, if nothing else.Planes either landed or dropped supplies.AmericanC-47's were extensively usedby Soviet pilots in these operations.Another source indicatesthat in January1944,Soviet planesflew 2I7 flights to assistpartisans; n March of that year, 917; and inMay, 922.Therewere also instanceswhere the Red Air Force rendered direct tacticalsupportat the requestof unitsby strafingandbombing indicatedtargets.

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German forces were aware of the importanceof the Soviet Air Force assistance opartisansand tried to interceptthe planes or to lure them to land on German-heldterritories.Three instancesarecited when their effortswere successful.One Germanregiment succeededfor four nights in luring Soviet supply drops, but on the fifthnight bombs droppedinstead.

Morale,Incentives ndDisciplineAs in any group understress,adaptiveand environmentalcircumstanceshad great

impacton morale,which was in turnreflected in the intensity of pressuresupon theleader of the group. He was subjected to expectations quite often contradictory.On the one hand his subordinateswanted him to minimize risks, which meant aminimum of action; whereas on the other hand,his superiorsexpected him to exerthis units to the utmost in fighting the Germansby all available means. 'Almostinvariablythe commandersrespondedto the pressures rom below.' They falsifiedreports, selected safer missions and re-interpretedorders in a manner guaranteeingsurvival.Thishelpedmaintain he moraleof the unitsbut didnot eliminatethe tensionswithin them, the sources of which were many.A partisanunit, being a conglomeration of volunteer-idealists,army stragglers,compulsory draftees,and former collaborators,all having joined at differenttimesand with many levels of sophistication,was inevitably subject to tensions. Yet,comparedwith other undergroundmovements, the Soviet leadershipon the highestlevel revealed considerablethoughtfulnessand sensitivity, removing the tensions,rewarding and alleviating the partisans'plight when possible. Public appreciation,decorations and the glorification of partisansby means of mass communicationwere greatmorale-builders. t was not unusual or a particularly ffectivecommanderto receive personal gifts from the highest members of the Soviet hierarchy.Thepartisanshad ranks and pay privilegessimilar to those of the Red Army; however,rest and leave periods,under the circumstances,were extremely hardto obtain.

Disciplinewas harsh,as in all unitsof this type in any army.The penalty of death,on the order of the brigade commanders,was imposed for looting, drunkenness,sleeping on duty, mistreatmentof the local population.Lesserpenaltieswere repri-mands, confinement, food curtailment,public confession followed by a publicly-statedpromiseof improvement.There were some indicationsthat in many instancesmen condemnedfor graveoffenceswere not informedof the chargesagainst hem orthe sentence,but shot duringaction againstGermans.

Significantly,the officers,even from the NKVD, seemed to have very strongidentification with their units. The political officer was responsible or the disciplineof the unit.

ControllingnstrumentsndOrgansIt should be clearly stated that the partisanswere not the only representativesofSoviet zuthority on the territoriesoccupied by the Germans. The Party, NKVD,

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the Intelligence agencies and State administration,each had its own networks andindependentmeansof communication with the higher echelonsof the Soviet leader-ship. It appears hat in such a set-up, the partisans,although numericallystrongest,were, probablyfor thisvery reason,subject o controlof the above-mentionedorgans.The instrumentsof control were ordersandsupervisionby radio,specialemissariesbrought by planes, and periodic conferences with and reports from the partisancommanders.(Forexample,in August 1942,there was a majorconference n Moscowof the leadersof partisanunits.)The Communist Party and Komsomol members maintainedseparatesystems ofcells among the populationand within the partisanunits themselves.When possiblethe Party establisheda clandestineself-government(the 'Troika'system), in whichthe Party, NKVD, and State Administrationwere represented.In such instances,the partisanswere agentsfor enforcementof the system.Each brigade had its own Party and Komsomol organization.Members wereexpected to be the embodiment of social consciousnessand vigilance and theirbehaviour to be exemplary and supervisory.Although the institution of politicalcommissar was abolishedin the Red Army in October 1942, partisanshad politicalcommissars rom the companylevel up until the end of the war. These men, respon-sible for disciplinewithin the units,wielded power not only in the unit but alsowiththe higherauthorities, o which they had directaccess.On at leastone occasion,whenthe Party observerreporteddissatisfactionwith the commanderof the brigade, thecommanderwas removed from his post on the next day. Prerogativesof the Partywere wide andPartychannelswere most effectivein establishingpubliclywho was inauthority.The organs of the NKVD also had one network among the population andanother within partisanunits on all levels, through their '00' sections.As with theParty, they hadtheir own chainof command. Theirtaskswere to watch the allegianceof the troops, 'defenceagainstspies', to gatherintelligence and to maintainsecurityand politicalcontrol within the unit. The '00' sectionhad its own platoonswithinthe units. It was their functionto execute traitors ound among partisansand amongthe population.PartisanOperationsndTheirEffectiveness

Partisanoperationscan be broadly classifiedas those using violence directly andindirectly againstthe enemy, psychologicalwarfare and intelligence gathering andthe maintenanceandextensionof the authorityof the SovietGovernment n territoriesoccupied by the GermanArmy.In applyingviolencethe actionsrangedfrom smallsabotageaimingat the disruptionof communication lines to the seizure of an area in which I2,000 to 20,000 partisanscould concentrate.Large units were called to render tacticalassistance o the RedArmy. The fighting was bitter and unforgiving. The Germanswould not as a ruleaccord soldiers' status to partisans,and the partisansreciprocatedin ferocity; for

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example,one of the Soviet orders o partisansnstructs: It is not enough to be satisfiedwith tracks and derailing ocomotives or partsof the train: it is absolutely necessaryto destroythe crew'.Psychologicalwarfare was applied by the partisans n several directions-withintheir own units, among the Russianpopulation,againstthe Germanoccupants,and

againstcollaborators.The ways andinstrumentsof thiswarfarerangedfrom selectiveassassinationo the distributionof leaflets,planting false information,etc. (For onereasonor another,by the spring of 1943,collaboratorswere desertingthe Germansin suchlargenumbersthatthe Soviet authorities stablishedspecialrecruitmentofficesfor them.) The underlyingaim of allthe propagandawas to widen as much aspossiblethe gulf between the Germansandthe Russianpopulation.These conclusions were drawn: 'The drain on German controlled manpoweravailable o the frontroughly equalledthe drainon Soviet manpower',andabove all,that the partisans maintainedthe Soviet presencein the occupied territory'. Thelatterpoint deservesparticularattention.The partisansndeed servedas the forceful extensionof Soviet authority.Whenever

possible, they assumedsome role in creatingandassistingocal government(althoughat the firstsign of stability,the Party,throughits 'troika'system,would systematicallyundertake histask).They served asjudiciary-quite oftenbeing thejudge andexecu-tioner at the same time. The measureswere harsh-a man was executed 'becausehemadegarrisoncapsfor Germans'.They were the scourgeof collaborators.Wheneverpossible the partisanswould help to establisha 'home guard', a village-recruitedarmedmilitia,to maintainorder n partisan-held reas.Partisansecruited,requisitioned(receiptswere given), took careof Statepropertyand, in some instances,at the orderof the Party,divided Statepropertyamong the peasants.They were the long armofthe Soviet authority, inducing and applying sanctions when necessary,renderingassistancewhen possibleto the local populationand operativesof other stateagenciesin occupied territory.One other function wasperformedby the partisans-collectingmoney and encouragingthe underwritingof Stateloans.The measuresappliedby these men were extreme. Here is an excerpt from thediary of a Soviet partisan: Woke up in a good mood. Drove ... to fetch bread-without success.We shot a traitor .. . In the evening I went to do the same to hiswife. We are sorry that she leaves three children behind. . . . Toward traitors,anyhumane consideration s misplaced'.The book includes five casestudies of partisanactivities-(I) the Yelnya-Dorogo-buzh areaof SmolenskOblast,(2) the Bryanskarea,(3) the Polotsk Lowland,(4) theNorth Caucasus,and (5) the Dnepr Bend area. These are followed by an Appendixcontainingselected Soviet sourcesconcerningthe World War II partisanmovement,judged to be authentic Soviet documents captured by the German Army. Theywere selectedon the basisof their importance,representativenessnd special nterest.(Materialfrom case studies and the Appendix has been included in the precedingpages.) A list of sources, glossaryand a key to abbreviations,selected bibliographyand index complete the book.

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Appraisal ndCommentsn theStudyThis is a very importantstudy, sheddinglight on a relatively unknown aspectofthe efforts of Soviet citizens in their war againstNazi Germany.The dataare mostunusualand revealing.Their treatmentby the authors s cautious and dispassionate,and non-communist studentsof this type of warfare can gain considerableinsightfrom the book; communistsshould treat t with respectasa studyfree from politicalconsiderations,aimed at discerningthe facts.This reviewer has no adverse comments on the scholarship, ormat and substanceofthe book. However,he differs romthe authorsn theirinterpretation fmotivationalfactors.Particularlydeservingof furtherevaluationarejudgmentsrelated o motivations for

joining the partisanmovement. Soviet 'intelligentsia'who joined the partisans,n spiteof the fact that the highly probableresultwould be their deathsor thoseof theirfami-lies,appear,n theevaluationof one of the contributors, o bemen whojoined 'becausethey fared better under the Soviet regime than they did under Germans'.The samecontributor finds the Russian peasants 'practical-mindedopportunists,willing totoleratethe Germanregime if they could extracteconomic advantagefrom it'.These statementswould appearto be oversimplifications.Values such as duty,honour, service to society and country cannot be totally dismissed.Many of theSoviet citizens,particularlyunderconditionsof the Germanoccupation,were proneto take definitive stands which did not necessarilyreflect their own self-interest.What their perceptionsand conscious andsub-consciousmotivationswere it is trulydifficult to assess. Generalizationsof this sort as to the motivational factors of thepartisans,particularlywhen studying a group of approximatelyhalf a million menfrom anotherculture and after20 years, areapt to be misleading.One point of extremeimportanceto the moraleof partisanswas not discussedandinterpretedby the authors. In the diary of a Soviet politruk of a reconnaissancecompany, the following statement(page 753)was noted: 'We went to our woundedand sent them by plane behind the Soviet front. In the beginning there were two,then threeand,finally,fourplanes.Eachmadetwo flightsand took alongtwo woundedevery time. On the returnflights,they broughtus ammunition'.There was nothing,but nothing, as importantto guerrillas ighting the GermanArmy, as the awarenessthat they would be taken careof when wounded. To be wounded and capturedbyGerman unitsusuallymeanta very slow death,but certainlydeath.It was preferableto commit suicide. The evacuation of wounded partisansby plane may indicateinsightinto thepsychology of partisansby the Sovietcommandor concernfor humansuffering,or both.Hereand there n theassembledSovietdocumentsgemsof compassionandhumanitysparkle hroughthe grime of struggleto a degreenot often associatedwith the Sovietregime. The same politruk cited above reports (pp. 752-753): 'Vaskawas supposedto be shot on ordersof the brigadecommander or the murderof awoman, but whenthe entire detachmentpleadedfor Vaskaon the groundsthat he was afterall only achild, the brigadecommanderforgave him'.

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Partisans n their activities run through the whole spectrum of innate humancapacities, rom magnanimous forgivenessextended to the former collaboratorto aruthless extermination of Polish underground fighters, who acted in their ownterritoryunder ordersof the Polish Government-in-Exile,and in cooperationwiththe SupremeAllied HQ.There appears o have been a number of differencesbetween other anti-Germanunderground movements-French, Italian, and Polish-and the Soviet partisans.Only the Russians used draftees n these units. Also, the Soviet Union was able toput into the field the largestnumber of partisans. The numbersof Soviet partisanscited here and in the volume reviewed do not include guerrillasstruggling for theindependenceof theirnation,suchasthe Ukrainians,who fought Germanand Sovietauthoritiesalike.Therewere also bandsunrelated o any organizationwhose motiva-tion wassurvivaland,quiteoften,banditry.Weareconcernedherewith unconventionalfighters acting under the unified command of Soviet authorities and operatingwithin the structureof the establishedorganization.)Soviet partisanswere also the most rigidly controlled before, during and afterthe battles.This control securedgreater stabilityin the ebb and flow of membershipin the unitsthan the otherEuropeanmovementspossessed.In thisvein, a commanderof resistance n Milanonce stated,when commenting aboutthe strengthof his forces,that he had '6ooif thingsaredifficult,6,ooo if thingsare not so difficult,and60,000ifthings areeasy'.It should be remembered,however, that they were the shortest time in the field,sincethe Soviet Union was a Nazi ally untilJune 194I. By this time, the other under-ground movements in German-occupiedEuropewere alreadybled white by theirfighting. Then, by the summer of 1944 Soviet territorywas free from the enemy,while other undergrounds ought into the springof I945.On a percentagebasis, the Soviet partisansappearto have been most recognizedwith militaryawards and honours duringand after the war.Another differencewas in the quality of equipment. The Soviet guerrillaswereon the whole much better equipped, particularly n the automaticweapons dear topartisans'hearts, than the other movements. This was primarily because of theproximity of their own armed forces. (The other European movements had torely on assistance rom Britainor, subsequently, rom Britishbasesin Italy.) Sovietplaneswere makinghundredsof landingsmonthly behindthe enemy's lines, assistingthe partisanswhile, for example, in the Polish Underground Movement, only twiceduring the four years of fighting did Allied planes actuallyland (one each time) inPoland. The total commitmentof Sovietauthoritieswasnot hamperedby competitionamong and within undergroundmovements; further, they controlled their ownair force, and the relativeproximity of their own front lines enabled fuller supportto be given.It would have been interesting o learnwhether there was any relationshipbetweenthe size of the partisanunits and the frequencyof action. As a rule, in the Europeanmovements, the largerthe unit, the less frequentthe action.

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PAR TISANS 377Partisans(guerrillas)have been andwill be a tool of social andpoliticalchange,andtheiractivitieswill probably nviteincreasingly ophisticated nquiry nto thedynamicsof groupsengagedin violence. It is hoped that in seekingthe answerto the question,why anindividualjoins sucha group,socialscientistsmay come close to answering heultimatequestion:Why does man rely on violence to solve his problems?

J. K. ZAWODNYUniversity f PennsylvaniaPhiladelphia, enna., USA.

Soviet Partisans - 1966

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