Sovereign Risk Chapter 15 © 2008 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved....
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Transcript of Sovereign Risk Chapter 15 © 2008 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved....
![Page 1: Sovereign Risk Chapter 15 © 2008 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin.](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649e2f5503460f94b1fd7f/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Sovereign RiskSovereign Risk
Chapter 15
© 2008 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved.McGraw-Hill/Irwin
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15-2
Introduction
In 1970s: Expansion of loans to Eastern bloc, Latin
America and other LDCs. Beginning of 1980s:
Debt moratoria announced by Brazil and Mexico.
Increased loan loss reserves Citicorp set aside additional $3 billion in
reserves for example
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15-3
Introduction (continued)
Late 1980s and early 1990s: Expanding investments in emerging markets. Peso devaluation and subsequent restructuring
U.S. loan guarantees under Clinton Administration More recently:
Asian and Russian crises. Turkey and Argentina
Argentina’s focus on fiscal surplus • Economic growth in the 2000s and reduction in external
debt.
MYRAs Brady Bonds
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15-4
Were Lessons Learned?
U.S. FIs limited exposure to in Asia during mid and late 1990s Not all: Chase Manhattan Corp. emerging
market losses $150 million to $200 million range Poor earnings by J.P. Morgan.
Losses in Russia with payoffs of 5 cents on the dollar
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15-5
Credit Risk versus Sovereign Risk
Governments can impose restrictions on debt repayments to outside creditors. Loan may be forced into default even though
borrower had a strong credit rating at origination of loan.
Legal remedies are very limited. Need to assess credit quality and sovereign
risk
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15-6
Sovereign Risk
Debt repudiation Since WW II, only China, Cuba and North Korea
have repudiated debt. Recent steps to forgive debts of most severe
cases conditional on reforms targeted to improve poverty problems
Rescheduling Most common form of sovereign risk. South Korea, 1998 Argentina, 2001
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15-7
Debt Rescheduling
More likely with international loan financing rather than bond financing
Loan syndicates often comprised of same group of FIs versus large numbers of bondholders facilitates rescheduling
Cross-default provisions Specialness of banks argues for
rescheduling but, creates incentives to default again if bailouts are automatic
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15-8
Country Risk Evaluation
Outside evaluation models: The Euromoney Index The Economist Intelligence Unit ratings
Highest risk in countries such as Iraq, Zimbabwe and Myanmar.
Institutional Investor Index 2006 placed Switzerland at least chance of default
and Liberia as highest. U.S. not the lowest risk.
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15-9
To learn more about the Economist Intelligence Unit’s country ratings, visit:
The Economist www.economist.com
Web Resources
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15-10
Country Risk Evaluation
Internal Evaluation Models Statistical models:
Country risk-scoring models based on primarily economic ratios.
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15-11
Statistical Models
Commonly used economic ratios: Debt service ratio: (Interest + amortization on
debt)/Exports Import ratio: Total imports / Total FX reserves Investment ratio: Real investment / GNP Variance of export revenue Domestic money supply growth
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15-12
Problems with Statistical CRA Models
Measurements of key variables. Population groups
Finer distinction than reschedulers and nonreschedulers may be required.
Political risk factors may not be captured Strikes, corruption, elections, revolution. Corruption Perceptions Index
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15-13Problems with Statistical CRA Models (continued) Portfolio aspects
Many large FIs with LDC exposures diversify across countries
Diversification of risks not necessarily captured in CRA models
Incentive aspects of rescheduling: Borrowers and Lenders:
Benefits Costs
Stability Model likely to require frequent updating.
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15-14
Using Market Data to Measure Risk
Secondary market for LDC debt: Sellers and buyers
Market segments Brady Bonds Sovereign Bonds Performing LDC loans Nonperforming LDC loans
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15-15
Key Variables Affecting LDC Loan Prices
Most significant variables: Debt service ratios Import ratio Accumulated debt arrears Amount of loan loss provisions
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15-16
Pertinent Websites
BIS www.bis.org
Heritage Foundation www.heritage.org
Institutional Investor www.institutionalinvestor.com
IMF www.imf.org
The Economist www.economist.com
Transparency International www.transparency.org
World Bank www.worldbank.org
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15-17*Mechanisms for Dealing with Sovereign Risk Exposure
Debt-equity swaps Example:
Citibank sells $100 million Chilean loan to Merrill Lynch for $91 million.
Merrill Lynch (market maker) sells to IBM at $93 million.
Chilean government allows IBM to convert the $100 million face value loan into pesos at a discounted rate to finance investments in Chile.
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15-18
*MYRAs
Aspects of MYRAs: Fee charged by bank for restructuring Interest rate charged Grace period Maturity of loan Option features
Concessionality
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15-19
*Other Mechanisms
Loan Sales Bond for Loan Swaps (Brady bonds)
Transform LDC loan into marketable liquid instrument.
Usually senior to remaining loans of that country.