Source texts · 2013. 5. 2. · SOURCE TEXTS FRITS GÅVERTSSON DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, LUND...

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SOURCE TEXTS

FRITS GÅVERTSSON DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, LUND UNIVERSITY

Auxiliary reading material � Course: FPRA21:5, FPRK01:3, FPRM10, FPRM20 e-mail: [email protected]

CONTENTS

Chapter Page

I. Ancient Ethical Theory Herodotus The History of Herodotus Book I: 29-34 1 Aristotle Rhetoric Book I Part 5 4 Cicero De Finibus Book I 11-13, Book V 16-23 7

II. Aristotle

Nicomachean Ethics Book I 1-5, 7-10 9

III. Epicurus Epicurus Letter to Menoeceus 17

IV. Stoics

Cicero De Finibus Book III 16-17, 20-27, 32-39, 42-70 21

The History of Herodotus [420 BCE], tr. G. C. Macaulay [1890]

Book I: 30-34

30. So Solon, having left his native country for this reason1 and for the sake of seeing various lands, came to Amasis in Egypt, and also to Crœsus at Sardis. Having there arrived he was entertained as a guest by Crœsus in the king’s palace; and afterwards, on the third or fourth day, at the bidding of Crœsus his servants led Solon round to see his treasuries; and they showed him all things, how great and magnificent they were: and after he had looked upon them all and examined them as he had occasion, Crœsus asked him as follows: “Athenian guest, much report of thee has come to us, both in regard to thy wisdom and thy wanderings, how that in thy search for wisdom thou hast traversed many lands to see them; now therefore a desire has come upon me to ask thee whether thou hast seen any whom thou deemest to be of all men the most happy.” This he asked supposing that he himself was the happiest of men; but Solon, using no flattery but the truth only, said: “Yes, O king, Tellos the Athenian.” And Crœsus, marvelling at that which he said, asked him earnestly: “In what respect dost thou judge Tellos to be the most happy?” And he said: “Tellos, in the first place, living while his native State was prosperous, had sons fair and good and saw from all of them children begotten and living to grow up; and secondly he had what with us is accounted wealth, and after his life a most glorious end: for when a battle was fought by the Athenians at Eleusis against the neighbouring people, he brought up supports and routed the foe and there died by a most fair death; and the Athenians buried him publicly where he fell, and honoured him greatly.”

31. So when Solon had moved Crœsus to inquire further by the story of Tellos, recounting how many points of happiness he had, the king asked again whom he had seen proper to be placed next after this man, supposing that he himself would certainly obtain at least the second

1 So as not to be tempted to revise any of the laws he had laid down for the Athenians for a ten-year period.

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place; but he replied: “Cleobis and Biton: for these, who were of Argos by race, possessed a sufficiency of wealth and, in addition to this, strength of body such as I shall tell. Both equally had won prizes in the games, and moreover the following tale is told of them—There was a feast of Hera among the Argives and it was by all means necessary that their mother should be borne in a car to the temple. But since their oxen were not brought up in time from the field, the young men, barred from all else by lack of time, submitted themselves to the yoke and drew the wain, their mother being borne by them upon it; and so they brought it on for five-and-forty furlongs, and came to the temple. Then after they had done this and had been seen by the assembled crowd, there came to their life a most excellent ending; and in this the deity declared that it was better for man to die than to continue to live. For the Argive men were standing round and extolling the strength of the young men, while the Argive women were extolling the mother to whose lot it had fallen to have such sons; and the mother being exceedingly rejoiced both by the deed itself and by the report made of it, took her stand in front of the image of the goddess and prayed that she would give to Cleobis and Biton her sons, who had honoured her greatly, that gift which is best for man to receive: and after this prayer, when they had sacrificed and feasted, the young men lay down to sleep within the temple itself, and never rose again, but were held bound in this last end. And the Argives made statues in the likeness of them and dedicated them as offerings at Delphi, thinking that they had proved themselves most excellent.”

32. Thus Solon assigned the second place in respect of happiness to these: and Crœsus was moved to anger and said: “Athenian guest, hast thou then so cast aside our prosperous state as worth nothing, that thou dost prefer to us even men of private station?” And he said: “Crœsus, thou art inquiring about human fortunes of one who well knows that the Deity is altogether envious and apt to disturb our lot. For in the course of long time a man may see many things which he would not desire to see, and suffer also many things which he would not desire to suffer. The limit of life for a man I lay down at seventy years: and these seventy years give twenty-five thousand and two hundred days, not reckoning for any intercalated month. Then if every other one of these years shall be made longer by one month, that the seasons may be caused to come round at the due time of the year, the intercalated months will be in number five-and-thirty besides the seventy years; and of these months the days will be one thousand and fifty. Of all these days, being in number twenty-six thousand two hundred and fifty, which go to the seventy years, one day produces nothing at all which resembles what another brings with it. Thus then, O Crœsus, man is altogether a creature of accident. As for thee, I perceive that thou art both great in wealth and king of many men, but that of which thou didst ask me I cannot call thee yet, until I learn that thou hast brought thy life to a fair ending: for the very rich man is not at all to be accounted more happy than he who has but his subsistence from day to day, unless also the fortune go with him of ending his life well in possession of all things fair. For many very wealthy men are not happy, while many who have but a moderate living are fortunate; and in truth the very rich man who is not happy has two advantages only as compared with the poor man who is fortunate, whereas this latter has many as compared with the rich man who is not happy. The rich man is able better to fulfil his desire, and also to endure a great calamity if it fall upon him; whereas the other has advantage over him in these things which follow:--he is not indeed able equally with the rich man to endure a calamity or to fulfil his desire, but these his good fortune keeps away from him, while he is sound of limb, free from disease, untouched by suffering, the father of fair children and himself of comely form; and if in addition to this he shall end his life well, he is worthy to be called that which thou seekest, namely a happy man; but before he comes to his end it is well to hold back and not to call him yet happy but only fortunate. Now to possess all these things together is impossible for one who is mere man, just as no single land suffices to supply all tings for itself, but one thing it has and another it lacks, and the land that has the greatest number of things is the best: so also in the case of a man, no single person is complete in himself, for one thing he has and another he lacks; but whosoever of men continues to the end in possession of the greatest number of these things and then has a gracious

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ending of his life, he is by me accounted worthy, O king, to receive this name. But we must of every thing examine the end and how it will turn out at the last, for to many God shows but a glimpse of happiness and then plucks them up by the roots and overturns them.”2

2 In the Archaic and Classical periods developments pertaining to the notion of happiness (eudaimonia) can,

somewhat crudely, be said to rest more prominently upon sacral connotations than does later philosophical developments in the Hellenistic era. If the poetic literature is taken into regard it becomes even more evident that eudaimonia is something of a plaything of the gods. In the hands of the poets and playwrights, especially in tragedy, it becomes from the perspective of mortals a state that is dependent upon fortune and change. (Cf. Pindar, Pythian 3. 84-89, Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, 1528-30 Euripides, Medea 1228-1230). There are shifts occurring even in earlier times that pertain to eudaimonia and its cognates and related terms, and we must be aware of the complexities involved in the choice of words. The very ending of Hesiod’s Works and Days, which is the first time it is employed in the extant literature reads:” That man is happy (eudaimon) and lucky (olbios) in them who knows all these things and does his work without offending the deathless gods, who discerns the omens of the birds and avoids transgressions. (Hesiod, Works and Days 826-828, trans. Hugh G. Ewelyn-White, Loeb Classical Library). We can here discern a cluster of closely related terms and that eudaimonia emerges as a central term as early as in the time of Herodotus. From a mortal perspective the workings of divine powers and their emissaries could only appear as random events, something that is expressed through the close links that exists etymologically between happiness and luck in Indo-European languages as they developed in the Middle-ages and early Renaissance: happiness is, in short what happens to us, but we must not forget that we are dealing with source material from primarily poetic expressions subject to their own literary conventions. Happiness must in this context be seen as part of a series of interrelated concepts that features prominently in Athenian tragedy and Archaic Greek poetry organized into a schema: the “tragic formula” (sometimes seen as an archaic Greek predecessor to the Aristotelian notion of tragic reversal (peripeteia)). The formula is comprised of four stages, each signified by a term, that should not be read as a linear series of events but rather as a set of linked states, each implied by the other. The four stages are: i) koros (excess), excessive wealth, power, good fortune, etc. that can breed; ii) hubris (arrogance), errant disregard for another resulting in (violent) action, which comes with; iii) ate (delusion), the delusion that come over the wrongdoer in acting in a way that leads to ruin, and; iv) dike, (justice) the higher order that corrects the wrongdoing, the punishment. The formula is beautifully distilled in the following quote from Solon: For excess (koros) breeds insolence (hubris), whenever great prosperity follows those men who are not sound of mind. (fr. 6, 4-5) In light of this we can see that to portray the ancient understanding of happiness prior to the rise of eudaimonia as a philosophical term of art as a form of luck solely in the hands of erratic divine powers would be a simplification since at least part of what leads to the agent’s ruin is within her control. The reactions to abundance of good fortune, the hubris and the violent and unjustified acts that it gives rise to thus seem to be, in an important sense, up to the agent. The link to the supra-human is still with us here however since the primary virtue that enables the keeping of the happiness (or at least not actively determining the loss thereof) granted by divine powers is reverence (eusebeia) towards the gods. This should not be taken as lacking in ethical significance since eusebeia carries with it, by extension, respect and reverence for elders, rulers, and conventions, as well as responsibility on behalf of the agent since it is also connected, in an important sense, to wisdom (phronesis) and self-constraint (sophrosyne). Even if human action plays a part in happiness it is still subject of the vicissitudes of luck (eutyche). In light of this the most that we can hope for is periods of fleeting prosperity (olbos). True happiness (eudaimonia) can only be ascribed to someone post-mortem, when one is no longer vulnerable to the changes of fortune. It is this line of thought that underlies Solon’s response to Croesus. Thus the bulk of the words denoting happiness in ancient Greek were in general applied to a whole life. This is perhaps most obvious when it comes to eu zên but it goes equally for eudaimonia and makarios. A somewhat simplified conclusion is that that the ancient conception of happiness exhibits three features, namely being a) a condition dependent upon a favourable disposition of a daimon, b) a condition subject to fortune and chance, and c) a condition reliant on good sense on behalf of the agent. The lack of such good sense and the disaster that follows in its wake is a frequent theme of ancient poetry and drama. The exode of Sophocles’ Antigone tells us: Good sense (phronein) is by far the chief part of happiness (eudaimonia); and we must not be impious towards the gods. The great words of boasters are always punished with great blows, and as they grow old teach them wisdom (phronein). (Sophocles, Antigone 1348-53, trans. Hugh Lloyd-Jones). The Antigone has been read as exhibiting in its major conflict the tension between the traditional, pre-Socratic, reverence of the gods, nature and law exhibited by Antigone and Creon’s embrace of Sophistic doctrines such as man’s conquest of nature and its severance from law. While it is nowadays rather uncontroversial to claim that Sophocles, like Pindar, and possibly even Aeschylus, seem to have been rather prone to incorporate new intellectual developments into his work, the precise nature of sophistic as well as pre-Socratic influences upon Sophocles is a matter of continuing debate among scholars. Regardless of the finer points of this debate the Sophists in their discussions of laws and conventions (nomos) and their relation to nature can be seen as the real originators of systematic Greek ethics and the Antigone is thus in position of providing us with valuable insights. Read as such the play becomes important to our understanding of the development of Greek though in general and moral philosophy in particular. The Antigone is also of special interest to our present concerns since it is a play in which, it

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33. Thus saying he refused to gratify Crœsus, who sent him away from his presence holding him in no esteem, and thinking him utterly senseless in that he passed over present good things and bade men look to the end of every matter.

34. After Solon had departed, a great retribution from God came upon Crœsus, probably because he judged himself to be the happiest of all men. First there came and stood by him a dream, which showed to him the truth of the evils that were about to come to pass in respect of his son. Now Crœsus had two sons, of whom one was deficient, seeing that he was deaf and dumb, while the other far surpassed his companions of the same age in all things: and the name of this last was Atys. As regards this Atys then, the dream signified to Crœsus that he should lose him by the blow of an iron spear-point: and when he rose up from sleep and considered the matter with himself, he was struck with fear on account of the dream; and first he took for his son a wife; and whereas his son had been wont to lead the armies of the Lydians, he now no longer sent him forth anywhere on any such business; and the javelins and lances and all such things which men use for fighting he conveyed out of the men’s apartments and piled them up in the inner bed-chambers, for fear lest something hanging up might fall down upon his son.

Rhetoric, Aristotle [350 BCE], tr. W. Rhys Roberts [1924]

Book I Chapter 5 (1360b-1362a) It may be said that every individual man and all men in common aim at a certain end which determines what they choose and what they avoid. This end, to sum it up briefly, is happiness and its constituents. Let us, then, by way of illustration only, ascertain what is in general the nature of happiness, and what are the elements of its constituent parts. For all advice to do things or not to do them is concerned with happiness and with the things that make for or against it; whatever creates or increases happiness or some part of happiness, we ought to do; whatever destroys or hampers happiness, or gives rise to its opposite, we ought not to do.

We may define happiness (eudaimonia) as prosperity combined with virtue; or as independence of life; or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; or as a good condition of property and body, together with the power of guarding one’s property and body and making use of them. That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well everybody agrees.

From this definition of happiness it follows that its constituent parts are: good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, also such bodily excellences as health, beauty, strength, large stature, athletic powers, together with fame, honour, good luck, and virtue.3 A man cannot fail to be completely independent if he possesses these internal and these external goods; for besides these there are no others to have. (Goods of the soul and of the body are internal. Good birth, friends, money, and honour are external.) Further, we think that he should possess resources and luck, in order to make his life really secure. As we have already ascertained what happiness in general is, so now let us try to ascertain what of these parts of it is.

Now good birth in a race or a state means that its members are indigenous4 or ancient: that its earliest leaders were distinguished men, and that from them have sprung many who were distinguished for qualities that we admire.

The good birth of an individual, which may come either from the male or the female side, implies that both parents are free citizens, and that, as in the case of the state, the founders of the

has been argued, a main theme is practical deliberation and as such it highlights a connection between the ancient conception of happiness with what is to develop into a central idea behind the eudaimonist project: what Julia Annas has called “the entry point of ethical reflection”.

3 Some manuscripts here add a note on the parts of virtue, probably a later addition. 4 Being indigenous (Autokton) was a source of pride for the Athenians.

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line have been notable for virtue or wealth or something else which is highly prized, and that many distinguished persons belong to the family, men and women, young and old.

The phrases ‘possession of good children’ and ‘of many children’ bear a quite clear meaning. Applied to a community, they mean that its young men are numerous and of good a quality: good in regard to bodily excellences, such as stature, beauty, strength, athletic powers; and also in regard to the excellences of the soul, which in a young man are temperance and courage. Applied to an individual, they mean that his own children are numerous and have the good qualities we have described. Both male and female are here included; the excellences of the latter are, in body, beauty and stature; in soul, self-command and an industry that is not sordid. Communities as well as individuals should lack none of these perfections, in their women as well as in their men. Where, as among the Lacedaemonians [Spartans], the state of women is bad, almost half of human life is spoilt.5

The constituents of wealth are: plenty of coined money and territory; the ownership of numerous, large, and beautiful estates; also the ownership of numerous and beautiful implements, livestock, and slaves. All these kinds of property are our own, are secure, gentlemanly, and useful. The useful kinds are those that are productive, the gentlemanly kinds are those that provide enjoyment. By ‘productive’ I mean those from which we get our income; by ‘enjoyable’, those from which we get nothing worth mentioning except the use of them. The criterion of ‘security’ is the ownership of property in such places and under such Conditions that the use of it is in our power; and it is ‘our own’ if it is in our own power to dispose of it or keep it. By ‘disposing of it’ I mean giving it away or selling it. Wealth as a whole consists in using things rather than in owning them; it is really the activity-that is, the use-of property that constitutes wealth.

Fame means being respected by everybody, or having some quality that is desired by all men, or by most, or by the good, or by the wise.

Honour is the token of a man’s being famous for doing good. It is chiefly and most properly paid to those who have already done good; but also to the man who can do good in future. Doing good refers either to the preservation of life and the means of life, or to wealth, or to some other of the good things which it is hard to get either always or at that particular place or time-for many gain honour for things which seem small, but the place and the occasion account for it. The constituents of honour are: sacrifices; commemoration, in verse or prose; privileges; grants of land; front seats at civic celebrations; state burial; statues; public maintenance; among foreigners, obeisances and giving place; and such presents as are among various bodies of men regarded as marks of honour. For a present is not only the bestowal of a piece of property, but also a token of honour; which explains why honour-loving as well as money-loving persons desire it. The present brings to both what they want; it is a piece of property, which is what the lovers of money desire; and it brings honour, which is what the lovers of honour desire.

The excellence of the body is health; that is, a condition which allows us, while keeping free from disease, to have the use of our bodies; for many people are ‘healthy’ as we are told Herodicus6 was; and these no one can congratulate on their ‘health’, for they have to abstain from everything or nearly everything that men do.-Beauty varies with the time of life. In a young man beauty is the possession of a body fit to endure the exertion of running and of contests of strength; which means that he is pleasant to look at; and therefore all-round athletes are the most beautiful, being naturally adapted both for contests of strength and for speed also. For a man in his prime, beauty is fitness for the exertion of warfare, together with a pleasant but at the same time formidable appearance. For an old man, it is to be strong enough for such exertion as is necessary, and to be free from all those deformities of old age which cause pain to others. Strength is the power of moving some one else at will; to do this, you must either pull, push, lift, pin, or grip him; thus you must be strong in all of those ways or at least in some. Excellence in

5 Cf. Pol. 1269b12-25. 6 Legendary physician rumoured to have been one of the teachers of Hippocrates and the designer of his own

dietary and exercise-program. Cf. Rep. 406a-c.

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size is to surpass ordinary people in height, thickness, and breadth by just as much as will not make one’s movements slower in consequence. Athletic excellence of the body consists in size, strength, and swiftness; swiftness implying strength. He who can fling forward his legs in a certain way, and move them fast and far, is good at running; he who can grip and hold down is good at wrestling; he who can drive an adversary from his ground with the right blow is a good boxer: he who can do both the last is a good pancratiast7, while he who can do all is an ‘all-round’ athlete.

Happiness in old age is the coming of old age slowly and painlessly; for a man has not this happiness if he grows old either quickly, or tardily but painfully. It arises both from the excellences of the body and from good luck (eutyche). If a man is not free from disease, or if he is strong, he will not be free from suffering; nor can he continue to live a long and painless life unless he has good luck. There is, indeed, a capacity for long life that is quite independent of health or strength; for many people live long who lack the excellences of the body; but for our present purpose there is no use in going into the details of this.

The terms ‘possession of many friends’ and ‘possession of good friends’ need no explanation; for we define a ‘friend’ as one who will always try, for your sake, to do what he takes to be good for you. The man towards whom many feel thus has many friends; if these are worthy men, he has good friends.8

‘Good luck’9 means the acquisition or possession of all or most, or the most important, of those good things which are due to luck. Some of the things that are due to luck may also be due to artificial contrivance; but many are independent of art, as for example those which are due to nature-though, to be sure, things due to luck may actually be contrary to nature. Thus health may be due to artificial contrivance, but beauty and stature are due to nature. All such good things as excite envy are, as a class, the outcome of good luck. Luck is also the cause of good things that happen contrary to reasonable expectation: as when, for instance, all your brothers are ugly, but you are handsome yourself; or when you find a treasure that everybody else has overlooked; or when a missile hits the next man and misses you; or when you are the only man not to go to a place you have gone to regularly, while the others go there for the first time and are killed. All such things are reckoned pieces of good luck.

As to virtue, it is most closely connected with the subject of Eulogy, and therefore we will wait to define it until we come to discuss that subject.

De finibus bonorum et malorum (On the ends of good and evil), Cicero [45 BCE], tr. H Rackham [1931]

Book I 11-12

11. Those again who would rather have me write on other subjects may fairly be indulgent to one who has written much already—in fact no one of our nation more—and who perhaps will write still more if his life be prolonged. And even were it not so, anyone who has been a careful

7 Brutal combination of boxing and wrestling (similar to modern mixed martial arts) part of the Olympic games. 8 Friendship (philia, a term covering a broader class than the English term friendship in that it is not restricted to

voluntary relationships) is the topic of two whole books (books 8 and 9) of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle provides a taxoniomy covering three kinds of friendship based on whether the relationship stems from (i) usefulness, (ii) pleasantness, or (iii) goodness of character (moral virtue). The primary aim of Aristotle’s discussion of friendship is to show its close connection to virtuous activity. Two individuals who recognize the good character of the other spend time together in a way that exercise their virtues, and, when they are equally virtuous their friendship is perfect. A genuine friend is someone who loves the other for the sake of that person, wanting what is good for that person (that is having goodwill (eunoia) towards that person). Friendship is thus defined as reciprocal goodwill.

9 In his focus on, and treatment of, luck Aristotle comes close to, and draws upon, an earlier poetic tradition. See n2 above.

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student of my philosophical writings will pronounce that none of them are better worth reading than the present treatise.

For what problem does life offer so important as all the topics of philosophy, and especially the questions raised in these volumes—What is the End, the final and ultimate aim, which gives the standard for all principles of well-being and of right conduct? What does Nature pursue as the thing supremely desirable, what does she avoid as the ultimate evil? It is a subject on which the most learned philosophers disagree profoundly10; who then can think it derogatory to such esteem as each may assign to me, to investigate what is the highest good and the truest rule in every relationship of life?

12. Are we to have our leading statesmen debating such topics as whether the offspring of a female slave is to be considered as belonging to the party who has hired her, Publius Scaevola and Manius Manilius upholding one opinion and Marcus Brutus the contrary (not but what such discussions raise nice points of law, as well as being of practical importance for the business of life; and we read and shall continue to read with pleasure the treatises in question and others of the same nature); and shall these questions which cover the entire range of conduct be neglected? Legal subjects are no doubt more popular, but philosophy is unquestionably richer in interest.11 However, this is a point that may be left to the reader to decide. In the present work we believe we have given a more or less exhaustive exposition of the whole subject of the Ends of Goods and Evils. The book is intended to contain so far as possible a complete account, not only of the views that we ourselves accept, but also of the doctrines enunciated by all the different schools of philosophy.12

De finibus bonorum et malorum (On the ends of good and evil),

Cicero [45 BCE], tr. H Rackham [1931]

Book V 16-23 16. […] “Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good.13 Let

10 Cicero is right in claiming that the different schools ”disagree profoundly”, but note that they all agree to this way

of posing the basic problems in ethics: they all hold that the telos (final end), or summum bonum (highest good), of human life and conduct is eudaimonia (happiness) and that the achievement of this goal is closely linked to the acquisition and exercise of moral virtue(s). This approach, which constitutes the paradigm of ethical theory in ancient ethics thus assumes as intelligible and important both the question of the nature of the summum bonum and agreement on the second-order question of what it is meant to regard eudaimonia as the summum bonum as well as commitment to two further theses: (i) that human life and conduct is somehow determined by a unified teleological structure, and (ii) that this ultimate good is the agent’s own good. Eudaimonistic ethical theories are thus to a large extent determined by, on the one hand, their specification of the final end which functions as a central conceptual link between parts of the theory, and on the other a number of shared abstract structural features.

11 This defence of the need and benefits of studying the finer points of Greek philosophy is made necessary in part by the patron-system governing roman education, which given its reliance on private funding tended to have practical appeal and usage for the Roman patrons. We should, thought the Roman aristocracy, ”study philosophy, but in moderation” (Roman playwright Ennius, quoted in De re publica I 28.30) Written in Latin, de finibus is meant to be a popularizing text in the manner of Posidonius and Varro.

12 Here Cicero marks his adherence to the doxographic tradition, but the is also driven into this enterprise since he is influenced by the epistemological doctrines of the sceptical Academy, believing that probability is the best we can hope for in philosophical matters, and consequently that the best way of approximating truth is trough the critical scrutinizing of past opinion.

13 Note that, strictly speaking, this is not a classification of ethical theories. It is a classification of ethical ends, ethical theories being individuated by their final ends. The classification is striking in that (i) some of the positions covered are unattended by any school or individual philosopher, the classification cover “not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold” and is thus best seen as a theoretically based framework; (ii) some of the positions defended are done so by very obscure figures (Calliphon, Deinomachus, Diodorus, and Heironimus are known primarily for their appearance in this classification), (iii) these obscure individuals hold central positions whereas the Stoa and Epicurus are more problematic to place.

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us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades14, which our teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as of that Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can supply its own starting-point; its subject-matter must always lie outside it. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must have something as its base and point of departure.

17 Now practically all have agreed that the subject with which Prudence is occupied and the end which it desires to attain is bound to be something intimately adapted to our nature; it must be capable of directly arousing and awakening an impulse of desire, what in Greek is called hormē.15 But what it is that at the first moment of our existence excites in our nature this impulse of desire — as to this there is no agreement. It is at this point that all the difference of opinion among students of the ethical problem arises. Of the whole inquiry into the Ends of Goods and Evils and the question which among them is ultimate and final, the fountain-head is to be found in the earliest instincts of nature; discover these and you have the source of the stream, the starting-point of the debate as to the Chief Good and Evil.

18 ”One school holds that our earliest desire is for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; another thinks that freedom from pain is the earliest thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided16; others again start from what they term the primary objects in accordance with nature, among which they reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which are the primary intellectual excellences which are the sparks and seeds of the virtues.17 Now it must be one or other of these three sets of things which first excites our nature to feel desire or repulsion; nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three things. It follows therefore that every right act of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these objects, and that consequently one of these three must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we spoke of as the art of life; from one of the three Prudence derives the initial motive of the whole of conduct.

19 ”Now, from whichever Prudence decides to be the object of the primary natural impulses, will arise a theory of right and of Moral Worth which may correspond with one or other of the three objects aforesaid. Thus Morality will consist either in aiming all our actions at pleasure, even though one may not succeeded in attaining it; or at absence of pain, even though one is unable to secure it; or at getting the things in accordance with nature, even though one does not attain any of them. Hence there is a divergence between the different conceptions of the Ends of Goods and Evils, precisely equivalent to the difference of opinion as to the primary natural objects. — Others again starting from the same primary objects will make the sole standard of right action the actual attainment of pleasure, freedom from pain, or the primary things in accordance with nature, respectively.

20 ”Thus we have now set forth six views as to the Chief Good. The leading upholders of the latter three are: of pleasure, Aristippus; of freedom from pain, Hieronymus; of the enjoyment of what we have called the primary things in accordance with nature, Carneades, — that is, he did not originate this view but he upheld it for purposes of argument. The three former were possible views, but only one of them has been actually maintained, though that with great vigour. 14 This text is our fullest source to this classification, and the only one where it is explicitly attributed to Carneades

(214-129/8 BCE), Scholarch of the Academy during its sceptical phase. 15 Note that it is here taken as a given that we appeal to nature to find the starting point of ethical development. Cf.

23 below. 16 Note that since this classification distinguishes between ‘pleasure’ and ‘freedom from pain’ as separate ends the

Epicurean position is bound to come out as confused. 17 That the prima secundum naturam (primary natural advantages) includes “the sparks and seeds of the virtues” paves

the way for a theory like Antiochus’ but contrasts with the Stoics, who limit them to pre-rational goods.

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No one has asserted pleasure to be the sole aim of action in the sense that the mere intention of attaining pleasure, although unsuccessful, is in itself desirable and moral and the only good. Nor yet has anyone held that the effort to avoid pain is in itself a thing desirable, without one’s being able actually to avoid it. On the other hand, that morality consists in using every endeavour to obtain the things in accordance with nature, and that this endeavour even though unsuccessful is itself the sole thing desirable and the sole good, is actually maintained by the Stoics.

21 ”These then are the six simple views about the End of Goods and Evils; two of them without a champion, and four actually upheld. Of composite or dualistic definitions of the Supreme Good there have been three in all; nor were more than three possible, if you examine the nature of the case closely.11 There is the combination of Morality with pleasure, adopted by Callipho and Dinomachus; with freedom from pain, by Diodorus; or with the primary objects of nature, the view of the ancients, as we entitle both the Academics and the Peripatetics.

“But it is impossible to set forth the whole of our position at once; so for the present we need only notice that pleasure must be discarded, on the ground that, as will be shown later, we are intended by nature for greater things. Freedom from pain is open to practically the same objections as pleasure. 22 Nor need we look for other arguments to refute the opinion of Carneades; for any conceivable account of the Chief Good which does not include the factor of Moral Worth gives a system under which there is no room either for duty, virtue or friendship. Moreover the combination with Moral Worth either of pleasure or of freedom from pain debases the very morality that it aims at supporting. For to uphold two standards of conduct jointly, one of which declares freedom from evil to be the Supreme Good, while the other is a thing concerned with the most frivolous part of our nature, is to dim, if not to defile, all the radiance of Moral Worth. There remain the Stoics, who took over their whole system from the Peripatetics and the Academics, adopting the same ideas under other names.18

“The best way to deal with these different schools would be to refute each separately; but for the present we must keep to the business in hand; we will discuss these other schools at our leisure.

23 ”The calmness or tranquillity of mind which is the Chief Good of Democritus, euthumia as he calls it, has had to be excluded from this discussion, because this mental tranquillity is in itself the happiness in question; and we are inquiring not what happiness is, but what produces it. Again, the discredited and abandoned theories of Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus19 cannot be brought within the circle we have drawn and so we have not been concerned to consider them at all. For the whole of this inquiry into the Ends or, so to speak, the limits of Goods and Evils must begin from that which we have spoken of as adapted and suited to nature and which is the earliest object of desire for its own sake; now this is entirely done away with by those who maintain that, in the sphere of things which contain no element of Moral Worth or baseness, there is no reason why any one thing should be preferred to any other, and who consider these things to be absolutely indifferent; and Erillus also, if he actually held that there is nothing good but knowledge, destroyed every motive of rational action and every clue to right conduct.[…]

Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle [350 BCE], tr. W. D. Ross [1925]

Book I Chapters 1-5, 7-10 (1094a1-1098b9)

18 Here Cicero voices a common criticism of Stoic philosophy: that it is only a thinly veiled neologistic repetition of

earlier insights (primarily drawn from Aristotle). This accusation is treated at length in the beginning of Book III of de finibus, where Cato, Cicero’s Stoic spokesperson apologizes for the novel terminology before launching into the exposition that is given below.

19 What follows here is a justification for why Pyrrho, Ariston and Erillus are not taken seriously (this happens in other sources also): they deny (i) that we any basis for discriminating between objects which are not morally good or bad, and (ii) even a weak form of naturalistic assumption that was taken as given at the outset: that there are primary objects of our natural attraction and repulsion.

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1 Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to20 aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity- as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others- in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.

2 If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good.21 Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art.22 And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that term.23

3 Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, admit of much variety 20Aristotle here points out that he is starting out from appearances (phainomena) in accordance with his general

methodology, to be presented later: “As in the other cases we must set out the appearances (phainomena), and first of all go through the puzzles (diaproēsantas). In this way we must prove the common beliefs (ta endoxa) about these ways of being affected – ideally, all the common beliefs, but if not all, most of them, and the most important (kurion). For if the objections are solved, and the common beliefs (endoxa) are left, it will be an adequate proof.” (NE1145b1-7). Aristotle’s method appeals to endoxa (common opinions; the reputable views), and thus assumes that substantial philosophical theorizing can proceed directly from some kind of ‘data’ gathered by our, in principle, and for the most part, dependable, cognitive and perceptual faculties. The degree to which Aristotle sees himself as committed to retaining the endoxa and phainomena he initially sets out from is a matter of debate but it is clear that a given set of endoxa will oftentimes generate inconsistencies (often as a direct consequence of the phenomena generating aporiai) that warrants re-interpretation, possible (partial) rejection, and systematization in order to generate a revised coherent subset of the most (or most important) of the original endoxa.

21 If this passage is supposed to provide an argument for the existence of a chief good it appears, at least under one common interpretation, to be invalid. If we only take Aristotle to be exploring the consequences of the postulation of a chief good this problem disappears. See (Annas, 1993:31ff).

22 That is: (P1) The highest good is the all-inclusive end. (P2) The all-inclusive end is the end of political science. Therefore; (C) the highest good is the end of political science.

23 By “one sense of that term” Aristotle presumably wants to convey a distinction between (i) the kind of investigation carried out in the NE, concerned with the basic principles of politics rather than (ii) investigations concerned with constitutions and other more narrow political questions. (ii) is the subject of Pol.

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and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also give rise to a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their courage.24 We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better.25 In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.

Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire and act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such matters will be of great benefit.26

These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be expected, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.

4 Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit27 aims at some good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement28 say that it is happiness (eudaimonia), and identify living well (eu zên) and doing well (eu prattein) with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour; they differ, however, from one another- and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension. Now some thought that apart from these many goods there is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as 24 The point concerning goods is probably a sort of counter-argument to the conventionalist: while bravery isn’t

always good, its goodness, when it is, is not a matter of convention. 25 Ethics is an inexact science, a techne rather than an episteme. 26 Two reasons are given for excluding young people (neos) from lectures on ethics: (i) they are not what Aristotle

would consider educated (which requires (a) moral education which in turn requires the right sort of nature trained by habituation which requires tendencies to feel the right kind of emotive responses, a precondition for virtue, (b) training in political science (c) cultivation (in the sense of having the tastes and outlook of the civilized) (d) the proper understanding of science in general to understand the right demands to be placed on ethics (ii) they are not experienced enough to understand the practical aim of ethics. With regards to (i) Cf. discussion on the three lives below.

27 The list of four items from §1 above have now, for some reason, been reduced to two. 28 Surveying the opinions of “the many” and of “the educated” are two ways (almost always used in tandem) for

Aristotle to get at endoxa. The Proper translation of ta endoxa is a matter of dispute: some believe Aristotle to include all manner of pre-existing opinions on a subject while others take him to include only a subset thereof consisting of the most reputable (such as the opinions of other philosophers). Often Aristotle uses ta endoxa to refer to these common opinions, opinions that are accepted “by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable of them” (Topics 100b22-23). Endoxa are—in contrast to (mere) doxa rejected by Plato as indicative of truth—opinions that Aristotle sees as tested in some way (either by prior philosophical and scientific scrutiny or by being dialectically scrutinized in the public sphere) and thus taken by Aristotle to be truth indicative (at least when subjected to the proper methodological treatment of the endoxic method).

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well. To examine all the opinions that have been held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be arguable.

Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between arguments from and those to the first principles. For Plato, too, was right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, ‘are we on the way from or to the first principles?’ There is a difference, as there is in a race-course between the course from the judges to the turning-point and the way back.29 For, while we must begin with what is known, things are objects of knowledge in two senses- some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, we must begin with things known to us. Hence any one who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just, and generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the fact is the starting-point, and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will not at the start need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting points. And as for him who neither has nor can get them, let him hear the words of Hesiod: Far best is he who knows all things himself; Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right; But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart Another’s wisdom, is a useless wight.

5 Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which we digressed. To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominent types of life- that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative life. Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get some ground for their view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus.30 A consideration of the prominent types of life shows that people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness with honour; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since it is thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and not easily taken from him.31 Further, men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honoured, and among those who know them, and on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is better. And perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather than honour, the end of the political life. But even this appears somewhat incomplete; for possession of virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all costs.32 But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated even in the current discussions. Third comes the contemplative life, which we shall consider later.33

29 In a Greek stadium the midpoint of the race would be at the end farthest from the starting line. 30 Assyrian king (669-626 BCE) who lived a notoriously luxurious life. 31 That is, it must be an intrinsic feature. Aristotle understands honour (time) as a reflection of other people’s

judgments of someone’s worth. 32 Aristotle denies that virtue alone is sufficient for happiness (he only commits himself to the thesis that a life of

virtue makes a person happier than any alternative lifestyle, he still requires external goods). He seems to be suggesting here that the Socrates of the Gorg. and his (self-professed) followers the Cynics are stubborn and value the coherence of a philosophical system over being in touch with reality. The Stoics would later receive the same criticism from Aristotle’s followers.

33 NE X 6-8.

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[…]34 7 Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can be. It seems different in

different actions and arts; it is different in medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere something else, and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and if there are more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action.35

So the argument has by a different course reached the same point36; but we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are evidently more than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final37 ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking.38 Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else.

Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for self and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.

From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship. But some limit must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and friends’ friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us examine this question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others- if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.39

34 In chapter 6 Aristotle discusses, criticizes, and dismisses, the Platonic doctrine of a universal and separated Form

of the good. The discussion is important for Aristotle’s criticism of Plato (Cf. Met. I 9) but less important for ethics since Aristotle is primarily interested in arguing against the view that goodness is a single property (Cf. Rep. 508-9, 517c, 534b-c) and does so in a cryptic way that requires knowledge of some of his major metaphysical doctrines to be fully graspable.

35 The fact that it is possible to allow for the possibility of multiple goods constituting the end explains why the beginning of 2 above was expressed in conditional form.

36 Presumably a reference back to 2 above. 37 ’final’ here renders the Greek teleion, cognate with telos. Other translations have ’complete’ or ’perfect’, perhaps

more suitable in the context as Aristotle here presents the first of his formal requirements of the summum bonum. 38 This can be given at least two readings, either we are looking for (i) an exclusive answer—we are looking for the

one end that is most complete, or (ii) an inclusive end that includes the other ends as proper parts—an ordered set of ends that is the whole formed by the others (properly arranged). On (i) it is hard to see how the conclusion follows. Cf. (Annas, 1993:30ff; 654ff).

39 Here Aristotle gives us a set of formal constraints, or requirements, for the telos: (i) completeness (Cf. n38 above), (ii) self-sufficiency (non-dependence upon external conditions), and (iii) incapable of increase by addition of any other good (it is the ultimate end for the sake of which all other things are done as well as both final in the sense of

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Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man.40 For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought. And, as ‘life of the rational element’ also has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say ‘so-and-so-and ‘a good so-and-so’ have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being added to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.

But we must add ‘in a complete life.’ For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy.41

Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably first sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would seem that any one is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been well outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or partner in such a work; to which facts the advances of the arts are due; for any one can add what is lacking. And we must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the right angle in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth. We must act in the same way, then, in all other matters as well, that our main task may not be subordinated to minor questions. Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike; it is enough in some cases that the fact be well established, as in the case of the first principles; the fact is the primary thing or first principle. Now of first principles we see some by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation, and others too in other ways. But each set of principles we must try to investigate in the natural way, and we must take pains to state them definitely, since they have a great influence on what follows. For the beginning is thought to be more than half of the whole, and many of the questions we ask are cleared up by it.

8 We must consider it, however, in the light not only of our conclusion and our premisses, but

being chosen for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, complete and self-sufficient). The highest good is the ultimate end acheiveable in action (NE1097a24).

40 Here begins the infamous “function argument”. The function (ergon) is the characteristic activity that is essential to a human being. (cf. Annas, 1993: 144). The ergon argument, beginning at NE1097b22, is hugely complex and subject to an extensive debate.

41 Cf. Herodotus above.

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also of what is commonly said about it; for with a true view all the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon clash.42 Now goods have been divided into three classes, and some are described as external, others as relating to soul or to body; we call those that relate to soul most properly and truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we class as relating to soul. Therefore our account must be sound, at least according to this view, which is an old one and agreed on by philosophers. It is correct also in that we identify the end with certain actions and activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among external goods. Another belief which harmonizes with our account is that the happy man lives well and does well; for we have practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. The characteristics that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have defined happiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity. Now some of these views have been held by many men and men of old, others by a few eminent persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even in most respects.

With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life.

Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their life, therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said, the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes; his judgement is such as we have described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at Delos- Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health; But pleasantest is it to win what we love. For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or one- the best- of these, we identify with happiness.

Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment.43 In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very ugly in appearance or 42 Cf. the discussion of the endoxic method above. 43 Here enters a demand on external goods. A major point of debate with the Stoics concerns this issue.

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ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death. As we said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition; for which reason some identify happiness with good fortune, though others identify it with virtue.

9 For this reason also the question is asked, whether happiness is to be acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of training, or comes in virtue of some divine providence or again by chance. Now if there is any gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness should be god-given, and most surely god-given of all human things inasmuch as it is the best. But this question would perhaps be more appropriate to another inquiry; happiness seems, however, even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or training, to be among the most godlike things; for that which is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the best thing in the world, and something godlike and blessed.

It will also on this view be very generally shared; for all who are not maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win it by a certain kind of study and care. But if it is better to be happy thus than by chance, it is reasonable that the facts should be so, since everything that depends on the action of nature is by nature as good as it can be, and similarly everything that depends on art or any rational cause, and especially if it depends on the best of all causes. To entrust to chance what is greatest and most noble would be a very defective arrangement.

The answer to the question we are asking is plain also from the definition of happiness; for it has been said to be a virtuous activity of soul, of a certain kind. Of the remaining goods, some must necessarily pre-exist as conditions of happiness, and others are naturally co-operative and useful as instruments. And this will be found to agree with what we said at the outset; for we stated the end of political science to be the best end, and political science spends most of its pains on making the citizens to be of a certain character, viz. good and capable of noble acts.

It is natural, then, that we call neither ox nor horse nor any other of the animals happy; for none of them is capable of sharing in such activity. For this reason also a boy is not happy; for he is not yet capable of such acts, owing to his age; and boys who are called happy are being congratulated by reason of the hopes we have for them. For there is required, as we said, not only complete virtue but also a complete life, since many changes occur in life, and all manner of chances, and the most prosperous may fall into great misfortunes in old age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan Cycle; and one who has experienced such chances and has ended wretchedly no one calls happy.

10 Must no one at all, then, be called happy while he lives; must we, as Solon says, see the end? Even if we are to lay down this doctrine, is it also the case that a man is happy when he is dead? Or is not this quite absurd, especially for us who say that happiness is an activity? But if we do not call the dead man happy, and if Solon does not mean this, but that one can then safely call a man blessed as being at last beyond evils and misfortunes, this also affords matter for discussion; for both evil and good are thought to exist for a dead man, as much as for one who is alive but not aware of them; e.g. honours and dishonours and the good or bad fortunes of children and in general of descendants. And this also presents a problem; for though a man has lived happily up to old age and has had a death worthy of his life, many reverses may befall his descendants- some of them may be good and attain the life they deserve, while with others the opposite may be the case; and clearly too the degrees of relationship between them and their ancestors may vary indefinitely. It would be odd, then, if the dead man were to share in these changes and become at one time happy, at another wretched; while it would also be odd if the fortunes of the descendants did not for some time have some effect on the happiness of their ancestors.

But we must return to our first difficulty; for perhaps by a consideration of it our present problem might be solved. Now if we must see the end and only then call a man happy, not as being happy but as having been so before, surely this is a paradox, that when he is happy the attribute that belongs to him is not to be truly predicated of him because we do not wish to call

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living men happy, on account of the changes that may befall them, and because we have assumed happiness to be something permanent and by no means easily changed, while a single man may suffer many turns of fortune’s wheel. For clearly if we were to keep pace with his fortunes, we should often call the same man happy and again wretched, making the happy man out to be chameleon and insecurely based. Or is this keeping pace with his fortunes quite wrong? Success or failure in life does not depend on these, but human life, as we said, needs these as mere additions, while virtuous activities or their opposites are what constitute happiness or the reverse.

The question we have now discussed confirms our definition. For no function of man has so much permanence as virtuous activities (these are thought to be more durable even than knowledge of the sciences), and of these themselves the most valuable are more durable because those who are happy spend their life most readily and most continuously in these; for this seems to be the reason why we do not forget them. The attribute in question, then, will belong to the happy man, and he will be happy throughout his life; for always, or by preference to everything else, he will be engaged in virtuous action and contemplation, and he will bear the chances of life most nobly and altogether decorously, if he is ‘truly good’ and ‘foursquare beyond reproach’.

Now many events happen by chance, and events differing in importance; small pieces of good fortune or of its opposite clearly do not weigh down the scales of life one way or the other, but a multitude of great events if they turn out well will make life happier (for not only are they themselves such as to add beauty to life, but the way a man deals with them may be noble and good), while if they turn out ill they crush and maim happiness; for they both bring pain with them and hinder many activities. Yet even in these nobility shines through, when a man bears with resignation many great misfortunes, not through insensibility to pain but through nobility and greatness of soul.

If activities are, as we said, what gives life its character, no happy man can become miserable; for he will never do the acts that are hateful and mean. For the man who is truly good and wise, we think, bears all the chances life becomingly and always makes the best of circumstances, as a good general makes the best military use of the army at his command and a good shoemaker makes the best shoes out of the hides that are given him; and so with all other craftsmen. And if this is the case, the happy man can never become miserable; though he will not reach blessedness, if he meet with fortunes like those of Priam.

Nor, again, is he many-coloured and changeable; for neither will he be moved from his happy state easily or by any ordinary misadventures, but only by many great ones, nor, if he has had many great misadventures, will he recover his happiness in a short time, but if at all, only in a long and complete one in which he has attained many splendid successes.

When then should we not say that he is happy who is active in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some chance period but throughout a complete life? Or must we add ‘and who is destined to live thus and die as befits his life’? Certainly the future is obscure to us, while happiness, we claim, is an end and something in every way final. If so, we shall call happy those among living men in whom these conditions are, and are to be, fulfilled- but happy men. So much for these questions.

Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus [341–270 BCE], tr. Robert Drew Hicks [1910] Epicurus to Menoeceus: Greetings.44

44 This text, a brief treatment of Epicurus’ ethical doctrines, comes down to us from the 10th and final book, devoted

to Epicureanism, of Diogenes Laërtius’ Lives and opinions of the Eminent Philosophers (a work of narrow doxography that is striking in its shallow grasp of philosophical issues, but therefore also reliable in that there seems to be little reason for an author so uninterested in his subject matter to be bothered to falsify or distort quotations), which preserves three of Epicurus’ letters to his disciples. In these letters Epicurus presents his basic views in a shorthand manner. The Letter to Herodotus summarizes his physical theory, the Letter to Menoeceus his ethical theory, and the Letter to Pythocles treats astronomical and meteorological matters. (The latter of these is possibly by a follower, rather than Epicurus himself). Epicurus’ theoretical and practical aims seem very unified: his atomism and hedonism are

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Let no one be slow to seek wisdom45 when he is young46 nor weary in the search thereof when he is grown old. For no age is too early or too late for the health of the soul. And to say that the season for studying philosophy has not yet come, or that it is past and gone, is like saying that the season for happiness (eudaimonia) is not yet or that it is now no more.47 Therefore, both old and young ought to seek wisdom, the former in order that, as age comes over him, he may be young in good things because of the grace of what has been, and the latter in order that, while he is young, he may at the same time be old, because he has no fear of the things which are to come.

So we must exercise ourselves in the things which bring happiness, since, if that be present, we have everything48, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed toward attaining it.49

Those things which without ceasing I have declared to you, those do, and exercise yourself in those, holding them to be the elements of right life. First believe that God is a living being immortal and happy, according to the notion of a god indicated by the common sense of humankind50; and so of him anything that is at agrees not with about him whatever may uphold both his happiness and his immortality. For truly there are gods, and knowledge of them is evident; but they are not such as the multitude believe, seeing that people do not steadfastly maintain the notions they form respecting them. Not the person who denies the gods worshipped by the multitude, but he who affirms of the gods what the multitude believes about them is truly impious. For the utterances of the multitude about the gods are not true preconceptions but false assumptions; hence it is that the greatest evils happen to the wicked and the greatest blessings happen to the good from the hand of the gods, seeing that they are always favorable to their own good qualities and take pleasure in people like to themselves, but reject as alien whatever is not of their kind.51

Accustom yourself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply awareness, and death is the privation of all awareness; therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life an unlimited time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality. For life has no terror; for those who thoroughly apprehend that there are no terrors for them in ceasing to live.52 Foolish, therefore, is the person who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect. Whatever causes no annoyance when it is present, causes only a groundless pain in the expectation. Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no longer. But in the world, at one time people shun death as the greatest of all evils, and at another time choose it as a respite from the evils in life. The wise person does not deprecate life nor does he fear the cessation of life. The

both supported by his empiricist epistemology while his atomist physics secures peace of mid and rids us of anxiety (via its denial of life after death) and ought therefore be accepted on hedonist grounds.

45 Literally 'to philosophize’. 46 This is, of course, in sharp contrast to Aristotle’s opinion. Cf. n26 above. 47 Epicurus, although a hedonist, is, in contrast to the Cyrenaics, also an eudaimonist. 48 Epicurus here abides by Aristotle’s formal requirements in praising self-sufficiency, finality, and completeness. (cf.

Annas, 1993: 42). 49 That is, eudaimonia is the ultimate object of desire, again in accordance with Aristotle’s formal requirements. 50 When it comes to methodology Epicurus agrees with Aristotle in that inquiry, ethical or other, ought to start from

appearances but has a different view of what the relevant appearances are. Aristotle includes reflective judgments and common beliefs (see n20). Epicurus believes that immediate impressions are the only appropriate source of evidence.

51 ”seeing that…of their kind” is a puzzling sentence. Some translators take it as applying to ”the gods” whereas others take it as applying to ”the multitude”. Epicurus here seems to be arguing that the belief that the gods punish the wicked and reward the good generates fear of death which in turn makes us attached to unnecessary (and demanding) desires and pleasures.

52 Fear is, for Epicurus the most prominent negative mental state and chief among these is fear of unreal dangers such as death. If one is afraid of the unreal danger and empty name of death this will be with us throughout our lives creating perturbation (tarakhê) which is worse than physical pain. Absence of tarakhê together with freedom from pain is the (or at least one) substantial specification of eudaimonia.

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thought of life is no offense to him, nor is the cessation of life regarded as an evil. And even as people choose of food not merely and simply the larger portion, but the more pleasant, so the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant53 and not merely that which is longest. And he who admonishes the young to live well and the old to make a good end speaks foolishly, not merely because of the desirability of life, but because the same exercise at once teaches to live well and to die well. Much worse is he who says that it were good not to be born, but when once one is born to pass with all speed through the gates of Hades. For if he truly believes this, why does he not depart from life? It were easy for him to do so, if once he were firmly convinced. If he speaks only in mockery, his words are foolishness, for those who hear believe him not.

We must remember that the future is neither wholly ours nor wholly not ours, so that neither must we count upon it as quite certain to come nor despair of it as quite certain not to come.54

We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only.55 And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a happy life.56 For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure. For this reason we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a happy life.57 Pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing.58 And since pleasure is our first and native good, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatever, but often pass over many

53 Epicurus, it appears, uses the terms pleasure and pain (hêdonê, algêdôn) strictly in reference to physical sensations or

pathê experienced via the non-rational soul (which resides throughout the body). 54 Epicurean physics is indeterministic (Epicurus rejects both compatibilism and determinism about free will).

Plutarch On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1050bc, trans. Brad Ingwood: “And yet Epicurus somehow twists about and exercises his ingenuity (1050c) in contriving to free and liberate voluntary action from [the necessity] eternal motion, in order not to leave vice immune to blame.”

55 Epicurus here offers a classification of desires into three types: some are natural, others are empty; and natural desires are of two sorts, those that are necessary and those that are merely natural. Natural and necessary desires are connected to eudaimonia, physical well-being, or life itself (LM 127). Unnecessary but natural desires are for pleasant things, such as good food or leisure activities. Empty desires are those that have as their objects things designated by what Epicurus calls “empty sounds” (LH 379, somewhat crudely put singular terms lacking a referent)—like immortality—which do not correspond to any genuine need and therefore cannot be satisfied. Such desires—and their corresponding fears such as fear of death—cannot be satisfied or alleviated since they lack a genuine referent. Such empty beliefs (kenodoxia) are the main source of pain in civilized life (which lacks more elementary dangers). See Annas 1993: 86; ch VII. In one manuscript of Diogenes Laërtius we get an added note to Principal Doctrine 29 that reads “Epicurus thinks that natural and necessary are those that rid us of pains, for example drinking when thirsty; natural and not necessary are those that only provide variations of pleasure and do not remove the feeling of pain, for example luxurious foods; neither natural nor necessary are, for example, crowns and dedications of statues” (trans. John M Cooper).

56 Epicurus is here giving us his substantial specification of eudaimonia: “’living pleasantly’[…]”, that is “living constantly, securely, and uninterruptedly in a condition of the highest pleasure, which itself is explained as the pleasure that one experiences when one is completely without pain in the body (or, equivalently sometimes, when one is in a state of bodily health) and without suffering any mental disturbance.” (Cooper, John M. Reason and Emotion, Princeton University Press, 1999: 494-495.

57 As clear a statement of hedonism as ever there was. 58 Some commentators have taken this statement as an embrace, on Epicurus’ behalf, of psychological hedonism. For a

thorough, and to my mind utterly convincing, treatment that argues against this view see Cooper, John M., ”Pleasure and Desire in Epicurus”, 485-514 in Cooper, John M. Reason and Emotion, Princeton University Press, 1999.

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pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them.59 And often we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure. While therefore all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good, not all pleasure is worthy of choice, just as all pain is an evil and yet not all pain is to be shunned. It is, however, by measuring one against another, and by looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, teat all these matters must be judged. Sometimes we treat the good as an evil, and the evil, on the contrary, as a good. Again, we regard independence60 of outward things as a great good, not so as in all cases to use little, but so as to be contented with little if we have not much, being honestly persuaded that they have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury who stand least in need of it, and that whatever is natural is easily procured and only the vain and worthless hard to win. Plain fare gives as much pleasure as a costly diet, when one the pain of want has been removed, while bread an water confer the highest possible pleasure when they are brought to hungry lips. To habituate one’s self therefore, to simple and inexpensive diet supplies all that is needful for health, and enables a person to meet the necessary requirements of life without shrinking and it places us in a better condition when we approach at intervals a costly fare and renders us fearless of fortune.61

When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or willful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of merrymaking, not sexual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest disturbances take possession of the soul.62 Of all this the end is prudence. For this reason prudence is a more precious thing even than the other virtues, for ad a life of pleasure which is not also a life of prudence, honor, and justice; nor lead a life of prudence, honor, and justice, which is not also a life of pleasure. For the virtues have grown into one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them.63

Who, then, is superior in your judgment to such a person? He holds a holy belief concerning the gods, and is altogether free from the fear of death. He has diligently considered the end fixed by nature, and understands how easily the limit of good things can be reached and attained, and how either the duration or the intensity of evils is but slight. Destiny which some introduce as sovereign over all things, he laughs to scorn, affirming rather that some things happen of necessity, others by chance, others through our own agency. For he sees that necessity destroys responsibility and that chance or fortune is inconstant; whereas our own actions are free, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach. It were better, indeed, to accept the legends of the gods than to bow beneath destiny which the natural philosophers have imposed. The one holds out some faint hope that we may escape if we honor the gods, while the necessity of the naturalists is deaf to all entreaties. Nor does he hold chance to be a god, as the world in general

59 Here Epicurus deviates from the hedonistic theory championed by the Cyrenaics who uphold an unqualified

hedonism of the present, claiming that happiness is constituted by a collection of pleasures and worth pursuing only for the sake of the momentary pleasures that compose it. By arguing against such a position Epicurus also denies that hedonism and the moral virtues are incompatible.

60 Again, Epicurus here stresses self-sufficiency. 61 Note that this is an adaptive conception of happiness. 62 Eudaimonia is a form of pleasure in its own right—what Epicurus called catastematic (static) as opposed to “kinetic”

pleasure. There exists a substantial debate concerning this distinction, but kinetic pleasures seem to involve the return to a stable or healthy state (such as the elimination of thirst: when this need is met the pleasure of drinking goes away), catastematic pleasure, by contrast, is taken in a state (wellbeing) rather than a process.

63 This argument for the recognition of the importance of the virtues, albeit brief, stands some chance of success. The virtues are often seen as effective means to secure other goods reliably and so could be argued for within a hedonist framework. Temperence seems like a case in point here, although it seems harder for bravery. Note that for Epicurus the virtues are what we could call instrumentally necessary, if they fail to deliver the good (pleasure) we should “say goodbye to them” (Atheneaeus 546f=LS 21M). This ignores one aspect of the common conception of virtue and its value and invites Stoic criticism Cf. de finibus II 69-71.

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does, for in the acts of a god there is no disorder; nor to be a cause, though an uncertain one, for he believes that no good or evil is dispensed by chance to people so as to make life happy, though it supplies the starting-point of great good and great evil. He believes that the misfortune of the wise is better than the prosperity of the fool. It is better, in short, that what is well judged in action should not owe its successful issue to the aid of chance.

Exercise yourself in these and kindred precepts day and night, both by yourself and with him who is like to you; then never, either in waking or in dream, will you be disturbed, but will live as a god among people. For people lose all appearance of mortality by living in the midst of immortal blessings.

De finibus bonorum et malorum (On the ends of good and evil), Cicero [45 BCE], tr. C. D. Yonge [1875]

Book III 16-17, 20-27, 32-39, 42-70)

16. […]64 Those philosophers, said he65, whose system I approve of [i.e. the Stoics], consider that as soon as an animal is born, (for this is where we must begin66,) he is instinctively induced and excited to preserve himself and his existing condition, and to feel attachment to those things which have a tendency to preserve that condition; and to feel an abhorrence of dissolution, and of those circumstances which appear to be pregnant with dissolution.67 And they prove that this is the case, because, before either pleasure or pain has affected it, even while it is very little, it seeks what is salutary, and shuns the contrary: and this would not be the case if they were not fond of their condition, and afraid of dissolution; and it would not be possible for them to seek any particular thing if they had not some sense of themselves, and if that did not influence them

64 When we enter the discussion questions have been raised concerning the Stoic tendency towards neologistic

constructions and with the resemblance that holds between Stoic philosophy and the theories of Aristotle, Aristo, and Phyrro.

65 Marcus Cato, Cicero’s Stoic spokesperson in Books 3 and 4 of de finibus. The setting of the dialogue is a library in Tuscany where Cicero has ventured on his vacation in order to get hold on some commentaries on Aristotle. By happenstance he meets Cato in the library and they strike up a conversation in which Cato tries to convince Cicero of the superiority of the Stoic system.

66 When it comes to presentation Cicero and Diogenes converge in that they both begin their expositions of Stoic ethics with an account of the Stoic theory of oikeiosis and primary impulses and there is at least some reason to accept this as more or less common practice (It might be that the passage in Arius Didymus 5b3 is meant to satisfy readers familiar to the usual way of presenting Stoic ethics) even though we have textual evidence of other approaches. In fact, it seems to me, the multitude of orderings (regarding the division of philosophy into logic, ethics and physics) and pedagogical approaches that can be found in the ancient sources is in itself evidence of two things. Firstly, that this was subject to discussion in the ancient world, and, secondly, that the issue of the ordering of the parts of philosophy and what we choose as the starting-point of exposition of these parts effected doctrinal issues and was not just a matter of simple pedagogical efficiency or stylistic preference. This debate carries over to modern Hellenistic scholarship in the sense that different interpretations focus more or less on different aspects of Stoic philosophy. Annas’ reading, for instance, emphasises their eudaimonism but downplays the connection to Stoic physics (on this see Cooper, 1995).

67 Stoics and Epicureans, together with Antiochus of Ascalon, all differ from Aristotle (Fin. 5.55) in their employment of what is today refereed to as cradle arguments—a form of argument that attempts to locate our original and natural impulses, attachments, and aversions by observing the behaviour of infants (that are supposedly unaffected and uncorrupted by society). These arguments are put to use in appealing to a naturalistic conception of the human good (and thus, it appears, fills the same function as the ergon argument does in Aristotelian ethics). Epicureans claim that infants are naturally impelled towards pleasure and thus supports their hedonism by appeal to their version of the cradle argument. The Stoics claim that our first natural impulse is towards natural advantages (health, strength, well functioning senses, etc.) but they are less straightforward in their employment than Epicureans for they claim that these natural advantages were preferred indifferents (the subject matter of rational selection that is virtue) rather than constituents of the good. If all goes well human beings undergo radical transformation until they realize that the only proper good is virtue (and virtuous activity). This manoeuvre makes virtue (both necessary and) sufficient for happiness.

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to love themselves and what belongs to them. 17. From which it ought to be understood that it is from the animal itself that the principle of

self-love in it is derived. But among these natural principles of self-love most of the Stoics do not admit that pleasure ought to be classed; and I entirely agree with them, to avoid the many discreditable things which must ensue if nature should appear to have placed pleasure among those things which are the first objects of desire.68 But it appears to be proof enough why we naturally love those things which are by nature placed in the first rank, that there is no one, who, when either alternative is equally in his power, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body in a suitable and entire condition, rather than impaired by use, or in any particular distorted or depraved.

But as for the knowledge of things—or if you do not so much approve of this word cognitio, or find it less intelligible, we will call it κατάληψις [katalepsis; comprehension, a technical term in Stoic epistemology]—that we think is naturally to be acquired for its own sake, because it contains something which has, as it were, embraced and seized upon truth. And this is perceptible even in infants; whom we see amused if they have succeeded in finding out anything themselves by reason, even though it may be of no service whatever to them. […]

20. Let us then proceed, said he, since we have digressed from these first principles of nature, which everything which follows ought to be in harmony with. But this is the first division of the subject. A thing is said to be estimable: for so we may, I think, call that which is either itself in accordance with nature, or else which is the efficient cause of something of such a character that it is worthy of being selected because it has in it some weight worth appreciating, which he calls ἀχία (axia; value); and, on the other hand, something not estimable, which is the contrary of the preceding. The first principles, therefore, being laid down, that those things which are according to nature are to be chosen for their own sakes, and those which are contrary to it are in like manner to be rejected; the first duty69 (for that is how I translate the word καθῆκον) is, for a man to preserve himself in his natural condition; next to that, to maintain those things which are in accordance with nature, and reject what is opposite to it; and when this principle of selection and rejection has been discovered, then follows selection in accordance with duty; and then that third kind, which is perpetual, and consistent to the end, and corresponding to nature, in which there first begins to be a proper understanding of what there is which can be truly called good. For the first attraction of man is to those things which are according to nature.

21. But as soon as he has received that intelligence, or perhaps I should say, notion, which they call ἔννοια (ennoia), and has seen the order and, if I may so say, the harmony in which things are to be done, he then estimates it at a higher value than all the things which he loved at first; and by this knowledge, and by reasoning, he comes to such a conclusion that he decides that the chief good of man, which deserves to be praised and desired for its own sake, is placed in what the Stoics call ὁµολογία (homologia), and we agreement, if you approve of this translation of the term; as therefore it is in this that that good is placed to which all things [which are done honourably] are to be referred, and honour itself, which is reckoned among the goods, although it is only produced subsequently, still this alone deserves to be sought for on account of its intrinsic power and worth; but of those things which are the principal natural goods there is not one which is to be sought for its own sake.

22. But as those things which I have called duties proceed from the first principles of nature, 68 This is, of course, intended as an attack on Epicurean cradle arguments. 69 It is perhaps more fitting to use deontic language to describe the Stoic system than what it is the other systems in

antiquity. However, one can wonder, does not the identification of a life of virtue with the happy life pose a problem for the Stoic understanding of duty? Duty, we tend to think, requires self-sacrifice, that is, some kind of tension between virtue/duty and happiness. Is such a conflict even possible within the Stoic system? Firstly, it is obvious that even a Stoic (if not perhaps, a Stoic sage) can experience moments of conflict, moments when what they in a calm hour realize is the best conflicts with what they for the moment most lust for. Secondly, even a sage experience virtue as, at least in part, an external requirement posed on them by Zeus and their own nature (or Nature) as rational (it is commanded by universal reason) that requires discipline in the face of circumstance.

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they must necessarily be referred to them; so that it may be fairly said that all duties are referred to this end, of arriving at the principles of nature; not, however, that this is the highest of all goods, because there is no such thing as honourable action in the first attractions of nature; for that is what follows, and arises subsequently, as I have said before. But still it is according to nature, and encourages us to desire itself much more than all those things which have been previously mentioned. But, first of all, we must remove a mistake, that no one may think that it follows that there are two supreme goods. For as, if it were the purpose of any one to direct an arrow or a spear straight at any object, just as we have said that there is an especial point to be aimed at in goods,—the archer ought to do all in his power to aim straight at the target, and the other man ought also to do his endeavour to hit the mark, and gain the end which he has proposed to himself: let this then which we call the chief good in life be, as it were, his mark; and his endeavour to hit it must be furthered by careful selection, not by mere desire.70

23. But as all duties proceed from the first principles of nature, it follows inevitably that wisdom itself must proceed from the same source.

But as it often happens, that he who has been recommended to any one considers him to whom he has been recommended of more importance than him who recommended him; so it is not at all strange that in the first instance we are recommended to wisdom by the principles of nature, but that subsequently wisdom herself becomes dearer to us than the starting place from which we arrive at it. And as limbs have been given to us in such a way that it is plain they have been given for some purpose of life; so that appetite of the mind which in Greek is called ὁρµὴ, appears to have been given to us, not for any particular kind of life, but rather for some especial manner of living: and so too is system and perfect method.

24. For as an actor employs gestures, and a dancer motions, not practising any random movement, but a regular systematic action; so life must be passed according to a certain fixed kind, and not any promiscuous way, and that certain kind we call a suitable and harmonious one. Nor do we think wisdom similar to the art of navigation or medicine, but rather to that kind of action which I have spoken of, and to dancing; I mean, inasmuch as the ultimate point, that is to say, the production of the art, lies in the art itself, and is not sought for from foreign sources. And yet there are other points in which there is a difference between wisdom and those arts; because in those arts those things which are done properly do nevertheless not comprise all the parts of the arts of which they consist. But the things which we call right, or rightly done, if you will allow the expression, and which they call κατορθώµατα (kathorthomata), contain in them the whole completeness of virtue. For wisdom is the only thing which is contained wholly in itself; and this is not the case with the other arts.

25. And it is only out of ignorance that the object of the art of medicine or navigation is compared with the object of wisdom; for wisdom embraces greatness of mind and justice, and judges all the accidents which befall mankind beneath itself: and this too is not the case in the other arts. But no one will be able to maintain those very virtues of which I have just made mention, unless he lays down a rule that there is nothing which is of any importance, nothing which differs from anything else, except what is honourable or disgraceful.

26. Let us see now how admirably these rules follow from those principles which I have already laid down. For as this is the ultimate (extremum) point, (for you have noticed, I dare say, that I translate what the Greek philosopher calls τέλος (telos), sometimes by the word extremum, sometimes by ultimum, and sometimes by summum, and instead of extremum or ultimum, I may also use the word finis,)—as, then, this is the ultimate point, to live in a manner suitable to and harmonising with nature; it follows of necessity that all wise men do always live happily, perfectly, and fortunately; that they are hindered by nothing, embarrassed by nothing; that they are in want of nothing. And that which holds together not more that school of which I am speaking than our lives and fortunes, that is to say, the principle of accounting what is honourable to be the sole

70 Note that a similar archery metaphor is employed by Aristotle above.

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good, may indeed easily be embellished and enlarged upon at great length, with great richness of illustration, with great variety of carefully chosen expressions, and with the most pompous sentiments in a rhetorical manner; but I prefer the brief, acute, conclusive arguments of the Stoics.

27. Now their conclusions are arrived at in this manner: “Everything which is good is praiseworthy; but everything which is praiseworthy is honourable;—therefore, everything which is good is honourable.” Does not this appear properly deduced? Undoubtedly;—for the result which was obtained from the two premises which were assumed, you see was contained in them. But of the two premises from which the conclusion was inferred it is only the major one which can be contradicted—if you say that it is not the case, that everything which is good is praiseworthy: for it is granted that whatever is praiseworthy is honourable. But it is utterly absurd to say, that there is anything good which is not to be sought for; or, that there is anything which ought to be sought for which is not pleasing; or, that if it is pleasing it ought not likewise to be loved. Then it ought also to be approved of. Then it is praiseworthy. But what is praiseworthy is honourable. And so the result is, that whatever is good is also honourable. […]

32. But in other arts, when anything is said to have been done according to the rules of art, there is something to be considered which is subsequent and follows upon such compliance; which they call ἐπιγεννηµατικόν (epigennematikon). But when we say in any matter that a thing has been done wisely, that same thing is from the first said also to have been done most properly; for whatever proceeds from a wise man must at once be perfect in all its parts: for in him is placed that quality which we say is to be desired.

For as it is a sin to betray one’s country, to injure one’s parents, to plunder temples, which are all sins of commission; so it is likewise a sin to be afraid, to grieve, to be under the dominion of lust, even if no overt act follows these feelings. But, as these are sins, not in their later periods and consequences, but at once from the first moment; so those actions which proceed from virtue are to be considered right at the first moment that they are undertaken, and not only when they are accomplished.

33. But it may be as well to give an explanation and definition of the word good, which, has been so often employed in this discourse. But the definitions of those philosophers differ a good deal from one another, and yet have all reference to the same facts. I myself agree with Diogenes, who has defined good to be that which in its nature is perfect. But that which follows, that which is profitable (for so we may translate his ὼφέληµα), he considered to be a motion, or a state, arising out of the nature of the perfect. And as the notions of things arise in the mind, if anything has become known either by practice, or by combination, or by similitude, or by the comparison of reason; then by this fourth means, which I have placed last, the knowledge of good is arrived at. For when, by a comparison of the reason, the mind ascends from those things which are according to reason, then it arrives at a notion of good.71

34. And this good we are speaking of, we both feel to be and call good, not because of any addition made to it, nor from its growth, nor from comparing it with other things, but because of

71 The early heads of the Stoa all give different, and equally puzzling, characterisations of the good: Zeno

characterises it as “a good flow of life” (Arius Didymus, 63A) or “living in agreement,” and Cleanthes clarified the latter with “living in agreement with nature” (Arius Didymus, 63B). Chrysippus gave several (stronger) formulations such as“living in accordance with experience of what happens by nature”. It should be noted that formulations such as these, via Stoic psychology, tie the end closely to the doctrine of preferred indifferents. The Stoics claim, in line with Aristotle’s formal requirements, that the good must benefit its possessor at all times and under all circumstances. Thus, “external goods” are simply not good, in contrast to common opinion, they are ‘indifferents’ (DL, 58A)—i.e., neither good nor bad. The only things that are good are the virtues of human beings. These are the first two of the ‘Stoic paradoxes’ discussed by Cicero (in his Stoic Paradoxes): only what is noble (kalon) is good, and that virtue is both necessary and sufficient for happiness. My choosing relative wealth over poverty is, however, not groundless: the Stoics distinguish between the good and that which have value (axia). Some indifferent things, like health or wealth, have value and therefore are to be preferred, even if they are not good, because they are typically appropriate, fitting or suitable (oikeion) for us.

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its own proper power. For as honey, although it is very sweet, is still perceived to be sweet by its own peculiar kind of taste, and not by comparison with other things; so this good, which we are now treating of, is indeed to be esteemed of great value; but that valuation depends on kind and not on magnitude. For as estimation, which is called ἀξί, is not reckoned among goods, nor, on the other hand, among evils, whatever you add to it will remain in its kind. There is, therefore, another kind of estimation proper to virtue, which is of weight from its character, and not because of its increasing.

35. Nor, indeed, are the perturbations of the mind, which make the lives of the unwise bitter and miserable, and which the Greeks call πάθη, (I might translate the word itself by the Latin morbi, but it would not suit all the meanings of the Greek word; for who ever calls pity, or even anger, a disease—morbus)? but the Greeks do call such a feeling πάθος (pathos). Let us then translate it perturbation72, which is by its very name pointed out to be something vicious. Nor are these perturbations, I say, excited by any natural force; and they are altogether in kind four, but as to their divisions they are more numerous. There is melancholy, fear, lust, and that feeling which the Stoics call by the common name which they apply to both mind and body, ἡδονὴ (hedone), and which I prefer translating joy (lætitia), rather than a pleasurable elation of an exulting mind. But perturbations are not excited by any force of nature; and all those feelings are judgments and opinions proceeding from light-mindedness; and, therefore, the wise man will always be free from them.73

36. But that everything which is honourable is to be sought for its own sake, is an opinion common to us with many other schools of philosophers. For, except the three sects which exclude virtue from the chief good, this opinion must be maintained by all philosophers, and above all by us, who do not rank anything whatever among goods except what is honourable. But the defence of this opinion is very easy and simple indeed; for who is there, or who ever was there, of such violent avarice, or of such unbridled desires as not infinitely to prefer that anything which he wishes to acquire, even at the expense of any conceivable wickedness, should come into his power without crime, (even though he had a prospect of perfect impunity,) than through crime?

37. And what utility, or what personal advantage do we hope for, when we are anxious to know whether those bodies are moving whose movements are concealed from us, and owing to what causes they revolve through the heavens? And who is there that lives according to such clownish maxims, or who has so rigorously hardened himself against the study of nature, as to be averse to things worthy of being understood, and to be indifferent to and disregard such knowledge, merely because there is no exact usefulness or pleasure likely to result from it? or, who is there who—when he comes to know the exploits, and sayings, and wise counsels of our forefathers, of the Africani, or of that ancestor of mine whom you are always talking of, and of other brave men, and citizens of pre-eminent virtue—does not feel his mind affected with pleasure?

38. And who that has been brought up in a respectable family, and educated as becomes a freeman, is not offended with baseness as such, though it may not be likely to injure him personally? Who can keep his equanimity while looking on a man who, he thinks, lives in an 72 Usually translated as ’emotion’. 73 The Stoic account of the emotions, or the passions (pathê), distinguishes between passions—things that we passively undergo—and actions. Given this contrast, to be ‘apathetic,’ is not lack of caring, but rather freedom from manipulation. The apathetic man is in command of his reactions and responses, in a state of complete self-sufficiency. The Stoics distinguish two primary passions: appetite and fear, related to what appear good and bad. Related to these are pleasure and distress, which result from contact with the objects of the first two passions. These, unlike normal impulses, are “excessive impulses which are disobedient to reason” (Arius Didymus, 65A). Given the doctrines of the supreme value of virtue and of preferred indifferents one should only assent to such impulses (which represent value) when one’s virtue is concerned. Thus all passions involve an element of false value-judgement. The Stoic sage instead experiences good feelings (eupatheiai) which are well reasoned rather than excessive.

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impure and wicked manner? Who does not hate sordid, fickle, unstable, worthless men? But what shall we be able to say, (if we do not lay it down that baseness is to be avoided for its

own sake), is the reason why men do not seek darkness and solitude, and then give the rein to every possible infamy, except that baseness of itself detects them by reason of its own intrinsic foulness? Innumerable arguments may be brought forward to support this opinion; but it is needless, for there is nothing which can be less a matter of doubt than that what is honourable ought to be sought for its own sake; and, in the same manner, what is disgraceful ought to be avoided.

39. But after that point is established, which we have previously mentioned, that what is honourable is the sole good; it must unavoidably be understood that that which is honourable, is to be valued more highly than those intermediate goods which we derive from it. But when we say that folly, and rashness, and injustice, and intemperance are to be avoided on account of those things which result from them, we do not speak in such a manner that our language is at all inconsistent with the position which has been laid down, that that alone is evil which is dishonourable.

Because those things are not referred to any inconvenience of the body, but to dishonourable actions, which arise out of vicious propensities (vitia). For what the Greeks call κακία I prefer translating by vitium rather than by malitia.[…]74

42. But can anything be more certain than that, according to the principles of those men who rank pain among the evils, a wise man cannot be happy when he is tormented on the rack? While the principles of those who do not consider pain among the evils, certainly compels us to allow that a happy life is preserved to a wise man among all torments. In truth, if those men endure pain with greater fortitude who suffer it in the cause of their country, than those who do so for any slighter object; then it is plain that it is opinion, and not nature, which makes the force of pain greater or less.

43. Even that opinion of the Peripatetics is more than I can agree to, that, as there are three kinds of goods, as they say, each individual is the happier in proportion as he is richer in the goods of the body or external goods, so that we must be forced also to approve of this doctrine, that that man is happier who has a greater quantity of those things which are accounted of great value as affecting the body. For they think that a happy life is made complete by bodily advantages; but there is nothing which our philosophers can so little agree to. For, as our opinion is that life is not even made in the least more happy by an abundance of those goods which we call goods of nature, nor more desirable, nor deserving of being more highly valued, then certainly a multitude of bodily advantages can have still less effect on making life happy.

44. In truth, if to be wise be a desirable thing, and to be well be so too, then both together must be more desirable than wisdom by itself; but it does not follow, if each quality deserves to be esteemed, that therefore, the two taken together deserve to be esteemed more highly than wisdom does by itself. For we who consider good health worthy of any esteem, and yet do not rank it among the goods, think, at the same time, that the esteem to which it is entitled is by no means such as that it ought to be preferred to virtue. But this is not the doctrine of the Peripatetics; and they ought to tell us, that that which is an honourable action and unaccompanied by pain, is more to be desired than the same action would be if it were attended with pain. We think not: whether we are right or wrong may be discussed hereafter; but can there possibly be a greater disagreement respecting facts and principles?

45. For as the light of a candle is obscured and put out by the light of the sun; and as a drop of brine is lost in the magnitude of the Ægæan sea; or an addition of a penny amid the riches of Crœsus; or as one step is of no account in a march from here to India; so, if that is the chief good which the Stoics affirm is so, then, all the goods which depend on the body must inevitably be

74 When we resume Cato argues that the debate between Stoics and Peripatetics is substantial and not merely verbal. He proceeds to give two points of contrast: the debate over whether virtue is sufficient for happiness, and whether happiness admits of degrees.

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obscured and overwhelmed by, and come to nothing when placed by the side of the splendour and importance of virtue.75 And since opportunity, (for that is how we may translate εὐκαιρία,) is not made greater by extending the time, (for whatever is said to be opportune has its own peculiar limit;) so a right action, (for that is how I translate κατόρθωσις, and a right deed I call κατόρθωµα,)—a right action, I say, and suitableness, and, in short, the good itself, which depends on the fact of its being in accordance with nature, has no possibility of receiving any addition or growth.

46. For as that opportunity is not made greater by the extension of time, so neither are these things which I have mentioned. And, on that account, a happy life does not seem to the Stoics more desirable or more deserving of being sought after, if it is long than if it is short; and they prove this by a simile:—As the praise of a buskin is to fit the foot exactly, and as many buskins are not considered to fit better than few, and large ones are not thought better than small ones; so, in the case of those the whole good of which depends upon its suitableness and fitness; many are not preferred to few, nor what is durable to what is short-lived.

47. Nor do they exhibit sufficient acuteness when they say, if good health is more to be esteemed when it lasts long than when it lasts only a short time, then the longest possible enjoyment of wisdom must clearly be of the greatest value. They do not understand that the estimate of good health is formed expressly with reference to its duration; of virtue with reference to its fitness of time; so that men who argue in this manner, seem as if they would speak of a good death, or a good labour, and call one which lasted long, better than a short one. They do not perceive that some things are reckoned of more value in proportion to their brevity; and some in proportion to their length.

48. Therefore, it is quite consistent with what has been said, that according to the principles of those who think that that end of goods which we call the extreme or chief good, is susceptible of growth, they may also think that one man can be wiser than another; and, in like manner then, one man may sin more, or act more rightly than another. But such an assertion is not allowable to us, who do not think the end of goods susceptible of growth. For as men who have been submerged under the water, cannot breathe any more because they are at no great depth below the surface, (though they may on this account be able at times to emerge,) than if they were at the bottom, nor can the puppy who is nearly old enough to see, as yet see any more than one who is but this moment born; so the man who has made some progress towards the approach to virtue, is no less in a state of misery than he who has made no such advance at all.

I am aware that all this seems very strange. But as unquestionably theprevious propositions are true and uncontrovertible, and as these others are in harmony with, and are the direct consequences of them; we cannot question their truth also. But although some people deny that either virtues or vices are susceptible of growth, still they believe that each of them is in some degree diffused, and as it were extended.

49. But Diogenes thinks that riches have not only such power, that they are, as it were, guides to pleasure and to good health, but that they even contain them: but that they have not the same power with regard to virtue, or to the other arts to which money may indeed be a guide, but which it cannot contain. Therefore, if pleasure or if good health be among the goods, riches also must be classed among the goods; but if wisdom be a good, it does not follow that we are also to call riches a good; nor can that which is classed among the goods be contained by anything which is not placed in the same classification. And on that account, because the knowledge and comprehension of those things by which arts are produced, excite a desire for them, as riches are not among the goods, therefore no art can be contained in riches.

50. But if we grant this to be true with respect to arts, still it is not to follow that the same rule holds good with respect to virtue; because virtue requires a great deal of meditation and practice, and this is not always the case with arts; and also because virtue embraces the stability, firmness,

75 On this passage see (Annas, 1993: 122).

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and consistency of the entire life; and we do not see that the same is the case with arts. After this, we come to explain the differences between things. And if we were to say that there

is none, then all life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo. Nor could any office or work be found for wisdom, if there were actually no difference between one thing and another, and if there were no power of selection at all requisite to be exerted. Therefore, after it had been sufficiently established that that alone was good which was honourable, and that alone evil which was disgraceful, they asserted that there were some particulars in which those things which had no influence on the misery or happiness of life, differed from one another, so that some of them deserved to be esteemed, some to be despised, and others were indifferent.

51. But as to those things which deserved to be esteemed, some of them had in themselves sufficient reason for being preferred to others, as good health, soundness of the senses, freedom from pain, glory, riches, and similar things. But others were not of this kind. And in like manner, as to those things which were worthy of no esteem at all, some had cause enough in themselves why they should be rejected, such as pain, disease, loss of senses, poverty, ignominy, and things like them, and some had not. And thus, from this distinction, came what Zeno called προηγµένον (proegmena), and on the other hand what he called ἀποπροηγµένον (apoproegmena), as though writing in so copious a language, he chose to employ new terms of his own invention; a license which is not allowed to us in this barren language of ours; although you often insist that it is richer than the Greek. But it is not foreign to our present subject, in order that the meaning of the word may be more easily understood, to explain the principle on which Zeno invented these terms.

52. For as, says he, no one in a king’s palace says that the king is, as it were, led forward towards his dignity (for that is the real meaning of the word προηγµένον, but the term is applied to those who are of some rank whose order comes next to his, so as to be second to the kingly dignity); so in life too, it is not those things which are in the first rank, but those which are in the second which are called προηγµένα, or led forward. And we may translate the Greek by productum (this will be a strictly literal translation), or we may call it and its opposite promotum and remotum, or as we have said before, we may call προηγµένον, præpositum or præcipuum, and its opposite rejectum. For when the thing is understood, we ought to be very ductile as to the words which we employ.

53. But since we say that everything which is good holds the first rank, it follows inevitably that this which we call præcipuum or præpositum, must be neither good nor bad. And therefore we define it as something indifferent, attended with a moderate esteem. For that which they call ἀδιάφορον (adiaphoron), it occurs to me to translate indifferens. Nor, indeed, was it at all possible that there should be nothing left intermediate, which was either according to nature or contrary to it; nor, when that was left, that there should be nothing ranked in this class which was tolerably estimable; nor, if this position were once established, that there should not be some things which are preferred.

54. This distinction, then, has been made with perfect propriety, and this simile is employed by them to make the truth more easily seen. For as, say they, if we were to suppose this to be, as it were, the end and greatest of goods, to throw a die in such a manner that it should stand upright, then the die which is thrown in such a manner as to fall upright, will have some particular thing preferred as its end, and vice versâ. And yet that preference of the die will have no reference to the end of which I have been speaking. So those things which have been preferred are referred indeed to the end, but have no referenceat all to its force or nature.

55. Next comes that division, that of goods some have reference to that end (for so I express those which they call τελικὰ, for we must here, as we have said before, endure to express in many words, what we cannot express by one so as to be thoroughly intelligible,) some are efficient causes, and some are both together. But of those which have reference to that end, nothing is good except honourable actions; of those which are efficient causes, nothing is good except a friend. But they assert that wisdom is both a referential and an efficient good. For,

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because wisdom is suitable action, it is of that referential character which I have mentioned; but inasmuch as it brings and causes honourable actions, it may be so far called efficient.

56. Now these things which we have spoken of as preferred, are preferred some for their own sake, some because they effect something else, and some for both reasons. Some are preferred for their own sake, such as some particular appearance or expression of countenance, some particular kind of gait, or motion, in which there are some things which may well be preferred, and some which may be rejected. Others are said to be preferred because they produce something, as money; and others for a combination of both reasons, as soundness of the senses, or good health.

57. But respecting good reputation, (for what they call εὐδοξία (eudoxia) is more properly called, in this place, good reputation than glory,) Chrysippus and Diogenes denied its whole utility, and used to say that one ought not even to put forth a finger for the sake of it, with whom I entirely and heartily agree. But those who came after them, being unable to withstand the arguments of Carneades, said that this good reputation, as I call it, was preferred for its own sake, and ought to be chosen for its own sake, and that it was natural for a man of good family, who had been properly brought up, to wish to be praised by his parents, his relations, and by good men in general, and that too for the sake of the praise itself, and not of any advantage which might ensue from it. And they say, too, that as we wish to provide for our children, even for such as may be posthumous children, for their own sake, so we ought also to show a regard for posthumous fame after our death, for its own sake, without any thought of gain or advantage.

58. But as we assert that what is honourable is the only good, still it is consistent with this assertion to discharge one’s duty, though we do not class duty among either the goods or the evils. For there is in these things some likelihood, and that of such a nature that reasons can be alleged for there being such; and therefore of such a nature, that probable reasons may be adduced for adopting such a line of conduct. From which it follows that duty is a sort of neutral thing, which is not to be classed either among the goods or among the opposites of goods. And since, in those things which are neither ranked among the virtues nor among the vices, there is still something which may be of use; that is not to be destroyed. For there is a certain action of that sort, and that too of such a character that reason requires one to do and perform it. But that which is done in obedience to reason we call duty; duty, then, is a thing of that sort, that it must not be ranked either among the goods or among the opposites of goods.

59. And this also is evident, that in these natural things the wise man is not altogether inactive. He therefore, when he acts, judges that that is his duty; and because he is never deceived in forming his judgment, duty must be classed among neutral things; and this is proved also by this conclusion of reason. For since we see that there is something which we pronounce to have been rightly done (for that is duty when accomplished), there must also be something which is rightly begun: as, if to restore what has been justly deposited belongs to the class of right actions, then it must be classed among the duties to restore a deposit; and the addition of the word “justly” makes the duty to be rightly performed: but the mere fact of restoring is classed as a duty. And since it is not doubtful, that in those things which we call intermediate or neutral, some ought to be chosen and others rejected, whatever is done or said in this manner comes under the head of ordinary duty. And from this it is understood, since allmen naturally love themselves, that a fool is as sure as a wise man to choose what is in accordance with nature, and to reject what is contrary to it; and so there is one duty in common both to wise men and to fools; from which it follows that duty is conversant about those things which we call neutral. But since all duties proceed from these things, it is not without reason that it is said that all our thoughts are referred to these things, and among them our departure from life, and our remaining in life.

60. For he in whom there are many things which are in accordance with nature, his duty it is to remain in life; but as to the man in whom there either is or appears likely to be a preponderance of things contrary to nature, that man’s duty is to depart from life. From which consideration it is evident, that it is sometimes the duty of a wise man to depart from life when

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he is happy, and sometimes the duty of a fool to remain in life though he is miserable. 61. For that good and that evil, as has been often said, comes afterwards. But those principal

natural goods, and those which hold the second rank, and those things which are opposite to them, all come under the decision of, and are matters for the reflection of the wise man; and are, as it were, the subject matter of wisdom. Therefore the question of remaining in life, or of emigrating from it, is to be measured by all those circumstances which I have mentioned above; for death is not to be sought for by those men who are retained in life by virtue, nor by those who are destitute of virtue. But it is often the duty of a wise man to depart from life, when he is thoroughly happy, if it is in his power to do so opportunely; and that is living in a manner suitable to nature, for their maxim is, that living happily depends upon opportunity. Therefore a rule is laid down by wisdom, that if it be necessary a wise man is even to leave her herself.

Wherefore, as vice has not such power as to afford a justifying cause for voluntary death, it is evident that it is the duty even of fools, and of those too who are miserable, to remain in life, if they are surrounded by a preponderance of those things which we call according to nature. And since such a man is equally miserable, whether departing from life, or abiding in it, and since the duration of misery is not any the more a cause for fleeing from life, therefore it is not a causeless assertion, that those men who have the power of enjoying the greatest number of natural goods, ought to abide in life.

62. But they think it is very important with reference to this subject, that it should be understood that it is the work of nature, that children are beloved by their parents; and that this is the first principle from which we may trace the whole progress of the common society of the human race. And that this may be inferred, in the first place, from the figure and members of the body, which of themselves declare that a due regard for everything connected with generation has been exhibited by nature; nor can these two things possibly be consistent with one another, that nature should desire that offspring should be propagated, and yet take no care that what is propagated should be loved. But even in beasts the power of nature may be discerned; for when we see such labour bestowed upon the bringing forth and bearing of their offspring, we seem to be hearing the voice of nature herself. Wherefore, as it is evident that we are by nature averse to pain; so also it is clear that we are impelled by nature herself to love those whose existence we have caused.

63. And from this it arises that there is such a recommendation by nature of one man to another, that one man ought never to appear unfriendly to another, for the simple reason that he is a man.

For as among the limbs some appear to be created for themselves as it were, as the eyes and ears; others assist the rest of the limbs, as the legs and hands; so there are some monstrous beasts born for themselves alone: but that fish which floats in an open shell and is called the pinna, and that other which swims out of the shell, and, because it is a guard to the other, is called the pinnoteres, and when it has withdrawn within the shell again, is shut up in it, so that it appears that it has given it warning to be on its guard; and also ants, and bees, and storks, do something for the sake of others. Much more is this the case with reference to the union of men. And therefore we are by nature adapted for companionship, for taking counsel together, for forming states.

64. But they think that this world is regulated by the wisdom of the gods, and that it is, as it were, a common city and state of men and gods, and that every individual of us is a part of the world.76 From which that appears to follow by nature, that we should prefer the general advantage to our own. For as the laws prefer the general safety to that of individuals, so a good and wise man, and one who obeys the laws and who is not ignorant of his duty as a citizen, consults the general advantage rather than that of any particular individual, or even than his own. Nor is a betrayer of his country more to be blamed, than one who deserts the general advantage 76 Here the cosmopolitan nature of Stoicism becomes evident. Notice also how much this train of thought resembles the Kantian notion of the ”kingdom of ends”.

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or the general safety on account of his own private advantage or safety. From which it also follows, that that man deserves to be praised who encounters death voluntarily for the sake of the republic, because it is right that the republic should be dearer to us than ourselves. And since it is said to be a wicked thing, and contrary to human nature, for a man to say that he would not care if, after his own death, a general conflagration of the whole world were to happen, which is often uttered in a Greek(47) verse; so it is certainly true that we ought to consult the interests of those who are to come after us, for the sake of the love which we bear them.

65. It is in this disposition of mind that wills, and the recommendations of dying persons, have originated. And because no one would like to pass his life in solitude, not even if surrounded with an infinite abundance of pleasures, it is easily perceived that we are born for communion and fellowship with man, and for natural associations. But we are impelled by nature to wish to benefit as many persons as possible, especially by instructing them and delivering them precepts of prudence.

66. Therefore, it is not easy to find a man who does not communicate to some other what he knows himself; so prone are we not only to learn, but also to teach. And as the principle is by nature implanted in bulls to fight in behalf of their calves with the greatest vigour and earnestness, even against lions; so those who are rich or powerful, and are able to do so, are excited by nature to preserve the race of mankind, as we have heard by tradition was the case with Hercules and Libera. And also when we call Jupiter all-powerful and all-good, and likewise when we speak of him as the salutary god, the hospitable god, or as Stator, we mean it to be understood that the safety of men is under his protection. But it is very inconsistent, when we are disregarded and despised by one another, to entreat, that we may be dear to and beloved by the immortal gods. As, therefore, we make use of our limbs before we have learnt the exact advantage with a view to which we are endowed with them, so also we are united and associated by nature in a community of fellow-citizens. And if this were not the case, there would be no room for either justice or benevolence.

67. And as men think that there are bonds of right which connect man with man, so also there is no law which connects man with the beasts. For well did Chrysippus say, that all other animals have been born for the sake of men and of the gods; but that men and gods have been born only for the sake of their own mutual communion and society, so that men might be able to use beasts for their own advantage without any violation of law or right. And since the nature of man is such that he has, as it were, a sort of right of citizenship connecting him with the whole human race, a man who maintains that right is just, and he who departs from it is unjust.

But as, although a theatre is publicly open, still it may be fairly said that the place which each individual has occupied belongs to him; so in a city, or in the world, which is likewise common to all, there is no principle of right which hinders each individual from having his own private property.

68. But since we see that man has been born for the purpose of defending and preserving men, so it is consistent with this nature that a wise man should wish to manage and regulate the republic; and, in order to live in compliance with nature, to marry a wife and beget children. Nor do philosophers think virtuous love inconsistent with a wise man. But others say that the principles and life of the Cynics are more suited to a wise man; if, indeed, any chance should befal him which might compel him to act in such a manner; while others wholly deny it.

69. But in order that the society, and union, and affection between man and man may be completely preserved, they have laid it down that all benefits and injuries, which they call ὠφελήµατα (ophelemata) and βλάµµατα (blammata), are likewise common; of which the former are advantageous, and the latter injurious. Nor have they been contented with calling them common, but they have also asserted their equality. But as for disadvantages and advantages, (by which words I translate εὐχρηστήµατα (euchrestemata) and δυσχρηστήµατα, (ducshrestemata)) those they assert to be common, but they deny that they are equal. For those things which profit or which injure are either good or evil; and they must necessarily be equal. But advantages and

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disadvantages are of that kind which we have already called things preferred or rejected; and they cannot be equal. But advantages are said to be common; but things done rightly, and sins, are not considered common.

70. But they think that friendship is to be cultivated because it is one of that class of things which is profitable. But although, in friendship, some people assert that the interest of a man’s friend is as dear to him as his own; others, on the other hand, contend that every man has a greater regard for his own. Yet these latter confess that it is inconsistent with justice, for which we seem to be born, to take anything from another for the purpose of appropriating it to oneself. But philosophers of this school which I am speaking of, never approve of either friendship or justice being exercised or sanctioned for the sake of its usefulness: for they say that the same principles of usefulness may, at times, undermine or overturn them. In truth, neither justice nor friendship can have any existence at all, unless they be sought for their own sake.

Source texts · 2013. 5. 2. · SOURCE TEXTS FRITS GÅVERTSSON DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, LUND...

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Transcript of Source texts · 2013. 5. 2. · SOURCE TEXTS FRITS GÅVERTSSON DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, LUND...