Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (2012) 383–386

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Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

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Source characteristics and persuasion: The role of self-monitoring in self-validation☆

Abigail T. Evans ⁎, Jason K. ClarkUniversity of Iowa, USA

☆ We thank S. Glenn Baker, Chelsea Gaylord, Laura JaWicks for their assistance with data collection.⁎ Corresponding author.

E-mail address: abigail-evans@uiowa.edu (A.T. Evan

0022-1031/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Inc. Aldoi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.07.002

a b s t r a c t

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 27 May 2011Available online 12 July 2011

Keywords:PersuasionSelf-monitoringSelf-validationSource attractivenessSource expertiseThought confidence

Previous research has shown that both expert and attractive message sources can increase the confidencepeople have in their thoughts about a persuasive appeal. The current research examined how these sourceattributes may elicit different levels of confidence depending on differences in self-monitoring. Afterparticipants read either strong or weak message arguments, the communicator was manipulated to be eitherexpert or attractive. Consistent with a functional matching perspective, self-monitoring was found to interactwith the source manipulation to influence thought confidence and persuasion. Low self-monitors were moreconfident in their thoughts when the source was expert rather than attractive. In contrast, high self-monitorsreported greater confidence when the source was attractive rather than expert. For both low and high self-monitors, increases in thought confidence with a particular source were associated with a greater impact ofmessage argument quality on persuasion.

ckson, John Waldorf, and Tyler

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l rights reserved.

© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Over the past decade, metacognitive perceptions of confidencehave received a considerable amount of attention in persuasionresearch. According to the self-validation hypothesis, the amount ofconfidence an individual has in their thoughts should play a criticalrole—such that thoughts heldwith greater confidence should be reliedupon more when forming attitudes (Petty, Briñol & Tormala, 2002). Agrowing accumulation of research has identified many variables thatcan influence thought confidence (for a review, see Briñol & Petty,2009). In particular, attributes of persuasive message sources aresome of the most notable factors that hold this potential. For instance,learning that a source is expert/credible (Tormala, Briñol & Petty,2006, 2007) or attractive/similar (Petty et al., 2002) has been shownto increase confidence in message-related thoughts and, in turn,recipient attitudes were based more on these cognitions. However, dothese characteristics always produce identical effects? Research hasyet to address relative differences in how these or other factors caninfluence metacognitive confidence. Nevertheless, it is plausible thatexpertise could validate thoughts more than attractiveness in onesituation –while in a different context – the opposite effect may occur.

Both source attributes are considered to validate thoughts due tobeliefs that such sources are likely to present information that istrustworthy and valid (see Briñol & Petty, 2009). Thus, to answer thequestion of expertise over attractiveness and vice-versa, one directionmay be to identify a factor that could influence these validity-relatedperceptions. One such variable may be individual differences in self-monitoring. Self-monitoring is the extent to which people adjust their

behaviors to fit their social environment (Snyder, 1974). People whoare high in self-monitoring tend to be responsive to social cues andactively tailor their behaviors to fit a given context. On the other hand,low self-monitors are less apt to shape actions to meet situationaldemands and tend to behave in ways that are consistent with theirpersonal views and preferences.

These behavioral differences are believed to be driven (in part) bydifferent primary attitude functions (e.g., Katz, 1960). Specifically,researchers have reasoned that attitudes held by low self-monitorstypically serve a value-expressive function—one that emphasizes innervalues, beliefs, and feelings. For high self-monitors, however, theirattitudes typically facilitate identification/affiliation with others or, inother words, serve a social-adjustive function. Past research suggeststhat some persuasion processes might be facilitated by a matchbetween stimulus information and these functional bases (see Snyder& DeBono, 1989). For example, research has shown that low self-monitors prefer advertisements that emphasize the central qualitiesof a product, whereas high self-monitors display stronger preferencestoward ads which center on potential image enhancements (Snyder &DeBono, 1985).

This matching phenomenon should also extend to characteristicsof persuasive message sources (DeBono & Harnish, 1988). For low-selfmonitors, expertise may provide a better functional match thanattractiveness because their attitudes tend to be based primarily onvalues or central qualities (value-expressive function). Thus, learningthat a source is an expert should yield greater confidence in thoughtsabout a message than learning that a source is attractive. In contrast,an opposite relation should be true of high self-monitors. Attractivecommunicators should be a better functional match than experts—because the attitudes of high-self monitors tend to facilitate affiliationwith others (social-adjustive function). Hence, for high self-monitors,

384 A.T. Evans, J.K. Clark / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (2012) 383–386

an attractive communicator should elicit greater thought confidencethan an expert. Moreover, at both levels of self-monitoring, higherconfidence should be associated with greater reliance on message-related thoughts and thus attitudes should better reflect the valenceof these cognitions.

These predictions were tested using similar procedures to pastwork on self-validation and persuasion (e.g., Tormala et al., 2006).Across this body of research, two limiting conditions of metacognitiveconfidence effects have been identified (see Briñol & Petty, 2009). Oneis that individuals must be sufficiently motivated and able to processinformation and thus, must produce message-relevant cognitions.Another limitation concerns the timing of a confidence-inducingfactor. Research has shown that variables (e.g., expertise, attractive-ness) primarily determine thought confidence when they areintroduced after recipients have processed a message. Hence, in thecurrent study, participants learned that the source was either expertor attractive only after exposure to and processing of the persuasivemessage.

Method

Participants and design

One hundred eighty-seven undergraduates participated in ex-change for course credit. Message argument quality (weak, strong)and the message source (attractive, expert) were manipulated,whereas self-monitoring differences were measured.

Procedure

Upon arrival to the lab, participants were asked to pay closeattention to a message regarding phosphate-based detergents (forcomplete instructions, see Tormala, et al., 2006). After the message,participants completed a thought-listing task and were then givenmessage source information. Subsequently, participants rated theirattitudes, thought confidence, and thought valence. After finishing anunrelated experiment, participants completed a self-monitoringinventory.

Independent variables

Argument qualityParticipants received a set of either strong or weak arguments

which advocated phosphate detergents (for complete arguments, seeTormala et al., 2006). For example, one strong argument championedthe effectiveness of phosphate detergents, whereas one weakargument advocated the preferable packaging of these cleaners.

Message sourceFollowing message presentation and the thought-listing, the

source was manipulated (descriptions adapted from DeBono &Harnish, 1988). In expert conditions, the source was “Dr. PaulChambers, an environmental sciences researcher…” In the attractiveconditions, the source was “Mr. Paul Chambers, an honors senior andactive student government member…”

Self-monitoringAfter completing an unrelated experiment, self-monitoring was

measured on a 25-item scale (Snyder, 1974). Statements were pairedwith 5-point scales (not at all characteristic of me–extremelycharacteristic of me; see Petty & Wegener, 1998). Items were scoredsuch that high values corresponded to high levels of self-monitoring(M=73.39, SD=9.61).

Dependent measures

Thought-listingPrior to the source manipulation, participants had up to 3 min to

list a maximum of 8 thoughts that came to mind during messagepresentation (see Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, & Petty, 1995, forinstructions).

AttitudesAfter the source information, attitudes toward phosphate-based

detergents were reported on six 9-point scales. Each scale containedone of the following anchor pairs: negative–positive, bad–good,unfavorable–favorable, against–in favor, harmful–beneficial, and foolish–wise. Responses were averaged into an index (α=.95).

Thought confidenceConfidence in message-related thoughts was reported on four 9-

point scales. These items were taken from previous research (seeBriñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2004) and targeted perceptions of “confi-dence,” “certainty,” and “validity” (e.g., “Overall, how valid would yousay your thoughts are?” [not at all valid–extremely valid]). Responseswere averaged to form a composite (α=.86).

Thought-ratingAfter assessment of thought confidence, participants rated the

valence of their own thoughts (see Clark & Wegener, 2009, forcomplete procedures). Overall favorability of each participant's self-rated thoughts was indexed by subtracting total negative thoughtsfrom total positive thoughts and dividing this difference by the sum ofall listed-thoughts.

Results

Thought favorability

Centered regression analyses were performed on each dependentmeasure (see Aiken & West, 1991). Centered predictors included theself-monitoring composite, the argument quality manipulation, themessage source manipulation, and all interaction terms. Similar topast self-validation research, a regression on thought favorabilityrevealed a main effect of argument quality (Ŷstrong=.47 vs. Ŷweak=−.07), b=.54, t(179)=6.21, pb .001 (all other effects, psN .12). Thesefindings support that substantive message processing occurred andthat such thinking was not influenced by self-monitoring or thesource condition.

Thought confidence

The predicted Self-Monitoring×Message Source interactionemerged, b=−.07, t(179)=−2.54, p=.012, r=.19 (see Fig. 1). Forrelatively low self-monitors (−1 SD), higher thought confidence wasreported when the source was expert rather than attractive (b=.73,t[179]=1.97, p=.050). However, the opposite pattern emerged forhigh self-monitors (+1 SD)—confidence tended to be higher when thesource was attractive rather than expert (b=−.61, t[179]=−1.64,p=.103). No other effects approached significance (psN .39).

Attitudes

Analysis of attitudes revealed the hypothesized Self-Monitoring×Ar-gument Quality×Message Source interaction, b=−.13, t(179)=−2.85,p=.005, r=.21 (see Fig. 2). For low self-monitors (−1 SD), argumentquality had a greater influence on attitudes when the source was expertrather than attractive, b=1.33, t(179)=2.25, p=.026. In contrast, anopposite relation was found for participants relatively high in self-monitoring (+1 SD). Argument quality tended to have a greater impact

5.4

5.7

6.0

6.3

6.6

Low (-1SD) High (+1SD)

Self-Monitoring

Tho

ught

Con

fiden

ce

Attractive Expert

Fig. 1. Predicted values for thought confidence as a function of self-monitoring andmessage source (collapsed across levels of argument quality).

385A.T. Evans, J.K. Clark / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (2012) 383–386

on attitudes when the source was attractive rather than expert, b=−1.09, t(179)=1.81, p=.073. A main effect of argument quality alsoemerged (b=1.47, t[179]=6.99, pb .001), but no other effectsapproached significance (psN .28).

Mediation analyses

Taken together, the thought confidence and attitude resultssupport differences in metacognitive validation between the twosource characteristics. Low levels of self-monitoring were associatedwith greater confidence elicited by the expert as opposed to theattractive source. In contrast, higher self-monitoring was associated

High Self-Monitors

4.7

5.4

6.1

6.8

7.5

Message Source

Pos

t-M

essa

geA

ttitu

de

Weak Strong

Low Self-Monitors

4.7

5.4

6.1

6.8

7.5

Attractive Expert

Message Source

Pos

t-M

essa

ge A

ttitu

de

Weak Strong

Attractive Expert

Fig. 2. Top panel: Predicted values for attitudes as a function of the argument qualityand message source manipulations when self-monitoring was low (−1 SD). Bottompanel: Predicted values for attitudes as a function of the argument quality and messagesource manipulations when self-monitoring was high (+1 SD).

with enhanced metacognitive confidence when the source wasattractive rather than expert (i.e., Self-Monitoring×Message Sourceinteraction). As discussed previously, greater thought confidenceshould be associated with attitudes that are based more on message-related thinking or – in the context of the current study – moreinfluenced by the argument quality manipulation. The presence of theSelf-Monitoring×Message Source×Argument Quality effect on atti-tudes supports this prediction. For low self-monitors, the quality ofthe arguments had a greater impact on attitudes when the source wasexpert rather than attractive. However, for relatively high self-monitors, argument quality tended to have more impact when thesource was attractive compared to expert. With this in mind—dodifferences in thought confidence account for this interactive effectobserved on attitudes?

To test this prediction, mediated-moderation regression analyses(see Fig. 3) were conducted that followed prescriptions by Muller,Judd and Yzerbyt (2005). In an initial model, attitudes were regressedon centered terms for argument quality, thought confidence, and theirinteraction. The plausibility of thought confidence as a mediator wasenhanced by the emergence of a robust Thought Confidence×Argu-ment Quality interaction, b=.49, t(183)=4.41, pb .001. Consistentwith the self-validation hypothesis, argument quality had a greaterimpact on attitudes at higher levels of thought confidence.

In order to pit the proposed mediator (Thought Confidence×Ar-gument Quality) against the distal predictor (Self-Monitoring×Mes-sage Source×Argument Quality), we ran a model that included maineffects and interactions corresponding to self-monitoring, source, andargument quality. Importantly, a thought confidencemain effect and aThought Confidence×Argument Quality interaction term were alsoincluded. Results showed that both the distal Self-Monitoring×Mes-sage Source×Argument Quality effect (b=−.09, t[177]=−2.32,p=.021) and the proposed Thought Confidence×Argument Qualitymediator (b=.43, t[177]=3.85, pb .001) were significant predictors

Attitudes-.10*

Self-MonitoringX

Message SourceX

Argument Quality

.43***

Thought ConfidenceX

Argument Quality

-.06*

-.13**

Self-MonitoringX

Message SourceX

Argument Quality

Attitudes

Attitudes .47*** Thought Confidence

XArgument Quality

Fig. 3. Regression analyses on relations among the Self-Monitoring×MessageSource×Argument Quality interaction and the Thought Confidence×Argument Qualityinteraction on attitudes (*pb .05; **pb .01; ***pb .001).

386 A.T. Evans, J.K. Clark / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (2012) 383–386

of attitudes. Bootstrapping procedures were used to estimate theindirect effect (by randomly drawing 5000 samples of equal size, withreplacement) and the associated bias corrected confidence interval(see Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Results showed that this mediationalpattern was statistically significant, estimated mean indirect ef-fect=.03, BC CI 97: .0019, .0760. Hence, the interactive effect onattitudes appears to be due in part to differences in thoughtconfidence that varied as a function of self-monitoring and themessage source.

Discussion

Previous research has shown that both expert and attractivesources increase confidence in thoughts and produce attitudes basedmore on thoughts (e.g., Petty et al., 2002; Tormala et al., 2006).However, the current findings suggest that these characteristics donot always yield identical, confidence-inducing effects. Consistentwith a functional matching perspective, low self-monitors were foundto be more confident when they learned that the source of a messagewas expert rather than attractive. On the other hand, high self-monitors tended to feel more confident in their thoughts when thesource was attractive as opposed to expert. Moreover, differences inconfidence were associated with critical differences in persuasion—with higher confidence linked to attitudes that weremore reflective ofthe quality of the arguments that were processed.

Past research has shown that self-validation effects are notcontingent on the order of the thought confidence and attitudemeasures (e.g., Petty et al., 2002). Yet, some readersmay be concernedthat attitude differences likely occurred before differences in thoughtconfidence—given the correlational nature of our study and use of aconfidence manipulation that had close ties to the persuasivemessage. Other studies have used manipulations that are plausiblymore direct and more independent from the advocacy. For example,thought confidence has been manipulated by writing with one'sdominant/non-dominant hand (Briñol & Petty, 2003), reflecting uponpast life experiences (Briñol, Petty, & Barden, 2007), and role playingin a supposedly unrelated experiment (Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker &Becerra, 2007). In each of these cases, greater manipulated confidencewas associated with attitudes that were based more on the quality ofthe message arguments (as in the present study). Hence, it wouldseem unlikely that our findings were contingent on the ties ourmanipulation had to the persuasive appeal.

Supplementary mediation analyses also failed to support thenotion of a reverse association between thought confidence andattitudes. First, we examined whether the Self-Monitoring×MessageSource effect on thought confidence could be accounted for byattitudes. Bootstrapping procedures which treated attitude as themediator (and controlled for all previously described terms) showedthat the indirect effect of attitude did not approach significance,estimated mean indirect effect=.003, BC CI 50: −.0010, .0069. Wealso tested a reverse model for the primary mediated-moderationfinding on persuasion. In this case, thought confidence served as thedependent measure and attitude replaced confidence in all relevantterms of this prior primary analysis. Results of this test also failed tosupport the notion of attitudes leading to confidence, estimated meanindirect effect=.009, BC CI 60: −.0009, .0357. Taken together, theseanalyses further bolster the conceptualization that differences inthought confidence elicited differences in attitudes.

This research should present several avenues for future inquiry.Perhaps most notably, this work contributes to our understanding of

how attitude function and self-schema matching can influenceresponses to social information (see Petty, Wheeler & Bizer, 2000).When a match between aspects of a message and the self occurs,research has shown enhanced attention and scrutiny of informationassociated with several individual differences (e.g., self-monitoring:DeBono & Harnish, 1988; introversion–extroversion:Wheeler, Petty &Bizer, 2005). However, the current research represents the firstevidence that functional matching can also influence self-validationprocesses. It stands to reason that similar metacognitive matchingeffects might also occur with other factors (e.g., introversion–extroversion) and may be elicited by certain aspects of the persuasionsetting. We look forward to examining these possibilities in futureresearch.

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