SOP Railway Incidentscazzy.net/Cazzy.net/SOPs_files/2013_SOP_Railway... · 1.1 Third rail and...

Introduction Initial Actions Significant Hazards and Control Measures As Incident Develops Closing Stages Relevant References Additional Information

Incident Review Incident Conclusion

Document overview This SOP provides guidance and procedures for the rescue and evacuation of people involved in rail accidents, breakdowns, collisions, derailments and fires.

Ref No: Lead FRS: East Sussex

Date of Issue: Review date:

Version No: Protective Marking: NONE

SOP

Railway Incidents

Railway Incidents

of 27

Aide Memoire En Route � High visibility clothing � Identify safe approach. Re-route oncoming as necessary

Initial Actions � Assess life risk. 3m cordon if no immediate life risk � Where required: stop trains with FRS Control and also with hand/torch signals � Request isolation of power if required � Inform Control if personnel operating on or near track � Agreed evacuation signal � Safety observers in place before operations commence

Risk Information Key Hazards Key Control Measures

� Moving Trains: impact/turbulence � Ground conditions � Visibility � Electricity: track, train � Instability of derailed vehicles � Utilities in line-side ducting � Arduous working conditions � Diesel fuel � Working at height � Objects falling from height � Confined space working � Tunnels � Track points – entrapment � Biohazards � Asbestos � Sharps/glass � Hazardous materials � LPG � Pressurised systems � Fixed installations � Detonators � Smoke, Heat, Fire

� High visibility clothing � 3m from overhead line equipment � 3m track cordon if no life risk � Trains stopped/caution � Traction power off and made safe � Safe route for casualty egress � Safety brief with all agencies � Safety observers, line of sight � Agreed evacuation signal

Incident Information

� Precise location � Access difficulties � Information regarding HazMat loads. Total Operations Processing System (TOPS)

and Consignment List (CONSIST) data

Railway Incidents

of 27

Resources Information

� Request Rail Incident Officer (RIO) � Assess need for off road capability (personnel/equipment) � Assess foam requirements � Assess need for specialist FRS crews � Decontamination requirements � Need for HART

As Incident Develops � CHALETS message � Consider major incident declaration � Liaise with RIO, Police, Ambulance, Local Authority (roads/casualties) � Consider forward command point � Network Rail Look-Outs replacing FRS Safety Observers � Casualty handling area � Prioritise rescues and casualties with Ambulance service � Methodical search, consider Search Co-ordinator � Consider environmental impact/Environment Agency � Scene preservation � Crew welfare � Media management

Railway Incidents

of 27

Flowchart

Other Hazards: • Heated points (LPG/electric) • Physical/verbal abuse • Manual handling • Animals/livestock • Steam (heritage trains) • Semaphore cabling(heritage)

En-route Brief

Closing Stages Withdraw to place of safety. IRS details/Critical Incident

Debriefing. Duty of care with relevant authority

On Arrival

Key Hazards: • Moving Trains: impact/turbulence

• Ground conditions • Visibility • Electricity: track, train. • Instability of derailed vehicles

• Utilities in line-side ducting • Arduous working conditions • Diesel fuel • Working at height • Objects falling from height • Confined Space working • Tunnels • Track points–entrapment • Biohazards • Asbestos • Sharps/glass • Hazardous materials • LPG • Pressurised systems • Fixed installations • Detonators • Smoke, heat, fire

Consider Casualty egress route Off road needs Foam requirements Specialist crews Decontamination HART

Identify safe approach High visibility clothing

Incident Info Precise location Access Difficulties HazMat loads (TOPS/CONSIST) • Assess life risk.

• Re-route oncoming as necessary • Request Rail Incident Officer (RIO)

As Incident Develops • Safe evacuation routes • CHALETS message. • Multi-agency liaison • Network Rail Look-Outs

replacing FRS Safety Observers • Scene preservation

Fire • Consider enhanced water

management • Reconsider foam

requirements • Assess fixed installations

benefits. • Isolate affected carriages

Rescue • Ensure stability. • Casualty handling area. • Prioritise rescues and

casualties with Ambulance service.

• Methodical search, consider Search Co-ordinator.

• Cuts and lifts, liaise with RIO

Consider • Major incident

declaration • Forward

command point

• Environmental impact

• Crew welfare • Media

management

Safety Critical Actions • High visibility clothing • 3m track cordon if no life risk • 3m high voltage electricity cordons • Stop trains where required • Power isolation/made safe (if reqd) • Inform Control if personnel on track • Agreed evacuation signal • Liaise with Rail Incident Officer • Safety briefs (all agencies)

Safety Observers • In place before operations start • Line of sight. • Lighting and torches (if necessary)

Railway Incidents

of 27

Supporting Information

1 Introduction 1.1 Third rail and overhead electric traction supply/diesel-electric trains

operate on main-lines while steam trains operate on heritage and some main lines at various locations.

1.2 Rail incidents can have significant direct and indirect societal and economic impacts. Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) intervention must be safe and proportional to the risk whilst appreciating that minimising disruption to everyday life is in the overall best interests of all.

2 Initial Actions 2.1 Utilise SSRI if available.

2.2 Determine life risk. Utilise STEPS protocol as appropriate.

2.3 Determine whether life risk is within 3m of permanent way.

2.4 Determine extent of incident. This may include:

a) Surrounding area due to potential walking wounded.

b) Local road networks to get resources to scene.

2.5 Identify a safe approach, re-routing appliances if necessary.

2.6 Identify hazmat loads using TOPS/CONSIST data and placarding. Utilise hazmat procedures if appropriate.

2.7 Consider foam requirements.

2.8 Inform Control using CHALETS message:

Casualties Approximate number of casualties/fatalities

Hazards Present and potential

Access Best access routes for emergency services and suitable RV Point

Location The exact location of the incident, using railway markings/mile posts/6 figure map references if possible

Emergency Emergency services present and required, consider attendance of hospital medical teams, specialist equipment and specialist services

Type The type of incident with brief details of types and numbers involved

Safety Personal protective clothing and defined safe area

Railway Incidents

of 27

2.9 Consider declaring ‘major incident’.

2.10 Establish liaison with Rail Incident Officer (RIO) as soon as possible and maintain throughout the incident.

2.11 Requests for the control of railway traffic. Network Rail’s procedure for the control of traffic follows the four levels below:

(1) ‘Inform’ Network Rail Control of an occurrence where no damage to the rail line is obvious, but a physical assessment by rail infrastructure specialists would be prudent. This level of control is not appropriate for committing personnel on or near the railway, and the rail system will determine the appropriate level of control over vehicle movement and power systems.

(2) ‘Run at caution’ – Train drivers are informed that there is an incident on or near the railway. The driver reduces speed in the area to ensure they can stop safely. FRS crews will need to be aware that trains running at caution could still proceed at relatively high speed. The caution may be withdrawn subject to there being no other FRS operations in the vicinity that may be affected by the caution.

(3) ‘Trains stopped’ – Trains will be stopped by the rail operator using train signals or radio messages. It may take time to confirm that all trains have been stopped.

(4) ‘Trains stopped and power off’ (For overhead line equipment [OLE] the electrical supply will need to be earthed, in addition to power off, to obtain electrical safety).

2.12 DRA must be carried out prior to committing personnel to risk area.

2.13 All personnel working in the vicinity must wear high visibility clothing.

2.14 Establish and maintain cordons.

2.15 Brief crews regarding lineside hazards such as:

a) Ground conditions on or near the track.

b) Track points.

c) Semaphore signal cables.

d) Lineside ducting.

2.16 No immediate Threat to Life or Network Rail Staff in Attendance. a) Before personnel are committed into the risk area ‘Look-Outs’ need to

be in place.

b) The role of 'Look-Out' will only be performed by Network Rail trained staff who will use warning horns.

Railway Incidents

of 27

c) Network Rail ‘Look-Outs’ may be requested to warn of approaching trains as an addition to issuing a caution or stopping rail traffic.

d) The warning signal given by them will be a blast on the train horn and/or a portable railway horn.

2.17 Immediate Threat to Life in the Absence of Network Rail Staff.

a) Where DRA indicates that immediate action is required in order to preserve life use the following priority message to Fire Control stating:

(1) All trains to be stopped.

(2) Power off (if applicable).

(3) There is an immediate threat to life.

(4) Whether personnel are required to operate on or near the track.

b) FRS Safety Observers must be appointed and must:

(1) Be briefed on the evacuation signal - repeated blasts on Acme Thunderer whistle, which may also be broadcast by radio.

(2) Remain in line of sight of the incident, for incidents involving tracks that have a curvature.

(3) Be posted in sufficient numbers for the safe evacuation of the incident.

To stop trains in an emergency, FRS Safety Observers should face the on-coming train from outside the 3m cordon and raise both arms above their head.

At night a lamp or torch should be waved vigorously at the approaching train.

c) If there is ANY doubt as to the safety of crews, despite there being saveable life, all personnel must remain outside the 3 metres until qualified ‘Look-Outs’ are in place.

d) Commit the minimum number of personnel for each task who are briefed on:

(1) Evacuation procedure.

(2) Position of safety.

Railway Incidents

of 27

Significant Hazards and Control Measures The table identifies the significant hazards that may be present at a rail incident and the control measures that can be considered. This information supplements the information in the aide memoire and flow chart:

Moving Trains – Impact/ Turbulence Speed and distance difficult to assess. Oncoming trains may be visible at up to 1 mile, in clear straight conditions. High-speed trains: up to 80m/sec. Stopping distance: up to 3 miles. Trains approach from either direction. Fast trains create an area of turbulent low pressure adjacent to the train, causing nearby objects (within 3m), including personnel, to be ‘sucked’ towards the train.

� Safe working distances � Stoppage � High visibility clothing � Safety Observers � Acknowledge a train’s horn signal,

raise one arm in the air, at night use circular motions of a torch

� Network Rail Look-Outs

Ground Conditions – Uneven Terrain Access may be considerable distance from the road. Incident may be above or below ground level with steep embankments, deep cuttings or cross country access. Wet conditions increases risks on surfaces such as sleepers and ballast.

� Avoidance routes � Establish/maintain cordons

Environmental Conditions – Visibility. The weather and time of incident may present hazards due to low light or poor visibility.

� Lighting

Electricity Ground level conductor rail: 750V OLE: up to 25kV AC. Diesel electric locomotives drive generators producing 800 to 1,000V DC Passenger rolling stock has electrical heating systems operating at up to 1000V. There is additional risk of exposed trackside electrics along a

� Treat everything as live unless confirmed safe by RIO

� No personnel or equipment to go above the orange Cant Rail or roof of any carriage/locomotive, until power has been isolated/earthed

� Personnel must not go within 3 metres of OLE unless they have been specifically informed by the on-site RIO that isolation is in place

� Consider shutting down train engines

Railway Incidents

of 27

derailment slide path. in consultation with driver � Ensure that the electric heating supply

is isolated � Do not touch any rail

Instability of Derailed Vehicles Following collision or derailment, the size, weight and position of the rolling stock may result in an unstable work area. Serious injury may occur to personnel working in or near such stock if any uncontrolled movement takes place.

� Establish and maintain cordons � Safety observers � Stabilisation equipment/advice � Specialist equipment � Liaise with RIO

Utilities in Lineside Ducting Utility companies may use the permanent way to transport energy supplies as part of their distribution network. These may be damaged exposing emergency responders to electrocution or flammable atmosphere.

� Electricity procedures � Hazmat procedures � Establish and maintain cordons

Arduous Working Conditions Protracted incidents increases risk that crews suffer physiological stress.

� Crew rotation � Welfare arrangements

Diesel Fuel Diesel locomotives may carry up to 25,000 litres of diesel. The fuel tanks are normally located under the frame.

� Establish and maintain cordons � Containment

Working at Height Accessing incidents from bridges or in cuttings and using ladders to gain access to carriages will increase the risk of falls or impact injuries.

� Work at height procedures � Safety Observers

Struck by Objects Falling from Height

� Establish and maintain cordons

Confined Space Working May be encountered dependent upon the nature of the incident and severity of any impact.

� Confined space procedures � Consider specialist teams

Tunnels If the incident occurs inside a tunnel, the risks are increased by: Poor visibility, poor ventilation, extended travel distances,

� Establish and maintain cordons. � Safety Observers/Network Rail Look-

Outs � Lighting � BA procedures

Railway Incidents

of 27

arduous conditions, slippery conditions (on approach and at the scene), restricted working conditions (confined spaces/limited refuge), poor access to the scene of the operations due to debris etc., restricted communications signal.

� Roll-call procedure � Liaise with RIO � Use of runners (poor communications) � Emergency teams � Ventilation � Consider gas monitoring � Crew welfare/rotation

Track Points (entrapment) Points may be remotely operated resulting in foot entrapment and severe injuries and increased risk of exposure to train impact.

� Do not touch any rail � Keep evacuees away � Liaise with RIO

Biohazards Risk of blood-borne infection through contact with body fluids from casualties and the presence of discharged human waste on the line from the toilets of older rolling stock. Leptospirosis is also endemic on railway lines due to the high population of rats.

� Avoid contact � Hygiene procedures � Decontamination procedures

(clothing) � FRS post incident welfare

arrangements

Asbestos May still be present in barrier wagons for hazardous loads (between locomotive and load). Charter rail and heritage railway stock may still contain it. Majority of asbestos now removed from national network rolling stock. No danger of release of asbestos unless there is major failure, or disruption to the construction of the carriage due to impact damage or by procedures implemented by the FRS to gain access.

� Asbestos procedures � Use of water sprays � Consider HMEPA advice � Advice from RIO regarding presence

Sharps/Glass The structure of carriages may be damaged as a result of impact or through crews creating access; this may lead to sharp metal and broken glass with the potential to inflict cuts/lacerations.

� Sharps protection � Glass management

Hazardous Materials All classes of hazardous materials may be present.

� Use of TOPS (total operations processing system)

� Hazmat procedures

Railway Incidents

of 27

LPG Cylinders Found in catering and sleeper cars, cylinders will present a hazard if leaking or involved in fire.

� Isolation/removal � BA procedures � Cylinder procedures � Cooling jet � Consider HMEPA guidance � Liaise with RIO

Pressurised Systems Various systems containing gas or liquids under pressure can fail causing injuries.

� Isolation � Establish and maintain cordons

Fixed Installations (irrespirable atmospheres) Some parts of a train with sensitive electrical equipment may be covered by an inert gas fixed installation. Warning signs should be present outside. If actuated, the gases exclude oxygen leading to asphyxiation risk.

� Adherence to warning signs � Isolation � BA procedures

Detonators Detonators are carried on locomotive units and are strapped to rails to warn train crews of dangers ahead. Three detonators are placed 20m apart on the track and are detonated by a train passing over them, with the risk of blast injuries.

� Eye protection � If in use: stand 30m from and facing

away if trains approach

Smoke, Heat & Fire May affect crews on scene and create poor visibility on the permanent way. Risks of OLE arcing and radiated heat.

� Establish and maintain cordons � Firefighting media � BA procedures � Respiratory protection

Heated Points (LPG/Electrical) Points may be heated by LPG cylinder(s) located at the point(s) or by an electrical supply with the risk of burns/electrocution.

� Avoidance � Advice from RIO

Physical/Verbal Abuse Officers attending incidents have been subjected to verbal and physical abuse especially when it has been implied that the FRS are unable to offer assistance.

� FRS violence and aggression procedures

� Consider Police assistance

Railway Incidents

of 27

Manual Handling Movement of equipment/ casualties over uneven terrain will increase potential for physical injury.

� Consider TILE (task, individual, load, environment)

� Safety Observers

Animals/Livestock The presence of livestock or domestic animals may pose a risk to emergency responders and the public.

� Avoidance � Arrange for containment/removal as

required � Liaise with landowner � Consider vet/RSPCA attendance

Steam Heritage line rolling stock may release steam under pressure with no warning, causing risk of steam burns to those in the vicinity.

� Establish and maintain cordons

Semaphore Signal Cabling Some signals, especially on heritage lines may be remotely operated resulting in a tripping hazard as the cables run along the cess on pulleys.

� Avoidance routes

Dealing with Casualties/ Fatalities The presence of large numbers of casualties with serious injuries may prove to be traumatic for those attending.

� Minimise exposure � Monitoring of crews � Post incident welfare

Railway Incidents

of 27

3 As Incident Develops Actions 3.1 Identify potential sectors of operational activity. Individual

coaches/wagons may form natural sectors.

3.2 Consider ongoing FRS resource needs for short and medium term.

3.3 Consider prevailing weather and ground conditions and incorporate into tactical planning.

3.4 Conducting rescues

a) Ensure stability of derailed rolling stock before crews are committed.

b) If access through doors/windows is not possible, gain access using emergency break-in points. Be aware of live cables through chassis and take advice from RIO where possible.

c) Prioritise rescues and casualties with Ambulance personnel.

d) Establish casualty handling area.

e) Identify a safe route for casualty and bystander egress.

f) Instigate a methodical search and means of identifying cleared carriages; consider appointing a search co-ordinator.

g) FRS staff must not lift rolling stock without RIO permission.

h) Specialist lifting equipment/working platforms may be required; consider USAR.

i) Liaise with RIO/USAR for provision of specialist lighting equipment.

j) Consider other agencies including local authority and victim support.

3.5 Fire

a) Consider attendance of enhanced water management/high volume pump

b) In the absence of a RIO, Network Rail Control must be informed via Fire Control if large quantities of fire water run-off are affecting the railway.

c) Reconsider foam requirements as appropriate.

d) If possible isolate affected carriages/wagons.

e) Assess use and impact of fixed firefighting installations in locomotive units.

3.6 Management of Fatalities on the Railways

a) British Transport Police and the RIO will manage an incident involving the death of a person on the line, whether accidental or deliberate. FRS involvement will be as requested and in liaison with the RIO.

Railway Incidents

of 27

3.7 Scene Preservation

Ensure scene preservation for British Transport Police and Rail Accident Investigation Board.

3.8 Environmental impact a) Utilise information gathered.

b) Isolate/contain leaks.

c) IC must take all appropriate measures to minimize the impact of fire water run-off and liaise with the Environment Agency & RIO.

Considerations 3.9 Off road vehicles.

3.10 Major incident declaration.

3.11 Forward command point.

3.12 Casualty handling area.

3.13 Crew welfare.

3.14 Media management.

3.15 HMEPA advice.

3.16 USAR attendance/advice.

4 Closing Stages 4.1 Once operational activity is completed, all personnel and equipment must

be withdrawn to a place of safety.

4.2 Collect information for IRS.

4.3 The incident should be handed over to the RIO who will take responsibility for re-instating train movements.

4.4 Ensure that a critical incident debrief is undertaken as soon as possible for incidents involving mass casualties/trauma.

Railway Incidents

of 27

5 Relevant References This document is potentially linked to the following operational procedures documents: Document Name Status

Rail Embankment Fire SOP

Electrical Installations SOP

Haz Mat Major SOP

Asbestos SIP

Evacuation of People SIP

Fatal Fires SIP

6 Additional Information 6.1 Total Operations Processing System (TOPS)

a) All rail freight is tracked by TOPS and any rail control office can provide Fire control with information on any freight train, individual wagon and cargo.

b) A Consignment List (CONSIST) should be available from the driver or guard of a freight train. The CONSIST will list the wagons, in order and their contents.

6.2 Railway Terminology The glossary below lists some of the more common terms used by railway staff. FRS personnel should be conversant with these terms, although it is not normally desirable to use them in radio messages unless their meaning is obvious.

Ballast Shoulder The graded edge of the ballast either side of a pair of rails.

Berne-Key A common key used by most European railways.

Bi-Directional Line A line on which the signaling allows for trains running in both directions.

Bogies The wheeled, supporting structures on which a train runs. Each one has a pivotal centre plate to enable the train to negotiate bends and fluctuations in the track.

Railway Incidents

of 27

Boundary Fence The fencing or wall which borders the lineside and separates railway property from other public or private property.

Cab Signaling A signalling system where the movement instructions are given to the driver by in-cab displays.

Cable Trough Covered metal or concrete ducting containing cables for signalling equipment and traction current usually running alongside the rails in the cess but sometimes found in the six-foot.

Cant Rail An orange safety line marked around the upper section of the entire train and represents the minimum safe distance from the OLE. If any part of the body does go beyond this line there is a risk of electrocution from the high voltage electrical supply. FRSs should note that this line is normally only found on passenger vehicles and locomotives, freight vehicles are not marked.

Cautioning

An oral warning to a train driver, of operations on or near the line ahead. They should proceed with caution, but their speed will depend on circumstances and will not necessarily be very slow.

Cess The area immediately outside the ballast shoulder but not between tracks.

Competent Person A person who has been passed as being qualified and having the required knowledge and skills to carry out a particular rule, regulation, instruction or procedure.

Conductor Rail A third or fourth rail carrying live traction current at 750V DC.

Consist This term was devised from the phrase ‘consignment list’ and is found in the form of a computer printout from TOPS, carried by the driver and/or guard of a freight train, giving a list of the wagons in order and a list of their contents.

Danger Zone The area adjacent to the Safe Zone, 2.75m from the nearest rail, within which you cannot enter unless train movements are stopped.

Detonator A small explosive device clipped to a running rail by a railway employee to warn a train driver of a hazard ahead.

Railway Incidents

of 27

Electrified Line A line which is electrified either by the 25 kV AC overhead line system or the 750V DC conductor rail system or both.

EMMIS Controller The person who is responsible for the control of electricity supplies to the OLE, carrying out switching operations at the feeder stations and imposing isolations.

ERS Emergency Replacement Switch. A switch at the line side which when operated by a Berne key, closes the associated Block Section Markers.

EZP Engineering Zone Protections – a defined area of track, which can be protected by the signalling system in order to create a protected area.

Four-Foot The space between the running rails of one line.

Hook Switch A switch operated by trained railway staff only and which is found at the side of the conductor rail bridging the gap between the two adjacent sections. Its purpose is to enable the isolation of a smaller area of track than would be done remotely by an electrical control.

Isolation of traction current

The disconnection of electrical supply from a section of line. Note: the line is not blocked. Diesel trains can still run and electric trains can coast for considerable distances.

Line Blocked All trains are stopped with no traffic passing over that section of line.

Lineside Within the boundary fence to a distance no closer than 3 metres to the nearest line.

Locomotive A unit designed solely for the purpose of propelling a train.

Look-Out A person whose sole duty is to watch for approaching trains and warn those working on or near the line. (Network Rail/contracted trained staff only).

Marker Light A light provided at the front of a traction unit, which makes the unit visible to persons on the track or drivers of other trains.

Railway Incidents

of 27

Multiple Unit A train made up of one or two motor units and a number of carriages.

Network Rail The controller of most of the railway network throughout the UK. Owner and operator of the track, power supply, signaling and structures.

Network Rail Control

Zonal control rooms organising the Network Rail response to an incident. Responsible for requests for rail traffic control.

NPOS Nominated Person On Site. A person certified as competent to carry out local switching, live line testing and earthing, to issue and cancel line permits and to registered as such with the EMMIS.

On or Near the Line A position, within three metres of or near enough to the line for a person, appliance or equipment to be at risk of being hit or sucked under by a passing train.

Operational Railway The area between the innermost boundary fence on one side of the line and innermost boundary fence on the other side of the line. It comprises both safe and danger zones.

OTM On-Track Machine. An engineering machine capable of carrying out engineering functions having the characteristics of a train but is self propelled.

OTP On-Track Plant. An engineering machine, capable of carrying out engineering functions which does not have the characteristics of a train but is self propelled.

Overhead Line Equipment (OLE)

The equipment suspended over the railway line for supplying electricity to electric trains, and includes the overhead wires, insulators and any associated equipment.

PICEE Person In Charge of Electrical Emergency.

Pick-Up Shoe A sprung device enabling a train to pick up electrical current from a conductor rail. This should be regarded as live whether on a conductor rail or not.

Point Rodding A system of rods running alongside, or transversely under, the track to connect points, either with levers in the signal box or with operating motors adjacent to the points. Note: this constitutes a potential entrapment or crush hazard.

Railway Incidents

of 27

Proceed on Sight Driver must proceed cautiously through the section ahead and regulate the speed of the train in order to ensure the train can be stopped short of any obstruction. The driver must not exceed 30km/h.

Protected Area A portion or a running line, protected by the signalling system for one or more EZP’s, within which a safe area can be created for engineering work or staff protection.

Rail Incident Officer (RIO)

Network Rail Officer who may respond to an incident to co-ordinate the railway response. The principal contact point for the emergency services and train operating companies to advise on safe systems of work.

Refuge A space, set back from the trackside where personnel can shelter from passing trains.

Requests for the control of traffic

Network Rail’s procedure for the control of traffic follows the four levels below:

1. ‘Inform’ Network Rail Control of an occurrence (for example a lorry wedged under a rail bridge) where no damage to the rail line is obvious, but a physical assessment by rail infrastructure specialists would be prudent. This level of control is not appropriate for committing personnel on or near the railway, and the rail system will determine the appropriate level of control over vehicle movement and power systems.

2. ‘Run at caution’ – Train drivers are informed that there is an incident on or near the railway. The driver reduces speed in the area to ensure they can stop safely. FRS crews will need to be aware that trains running at caution could still proceed at relatively high speed. The caution may be withdrawn subject to there being no other FRS operations in the vicinity that may be affected by the caution.

3. ‘Trains stopped’ – Trains will be stopped by the rail operator using train signals or radio messages. It may take time to confirm that all trains have been stopped.

4. ‘Trains stopped and power off’ (for OLE the electrical supply will need to be earthed, in addition to power off, to obtain electrical safety).

RPOS The Responsible Person On Site, in charge of a protected area. (This person is equivalent to a Network Rail RIO).

Railway Incidents

of 27

Running Rails The non-electrified rails on which trains actually run, on electrified line areas these rails are used as traction current return rails.

Safe Area The area within a protected area, which is protected by the signalling system to allow the creation of worksites.

Safe Zone The area between the boundary fence and 2.75m from the nearest rail within which persons are safe from passing trains.

Safety Fence An approved fence at least one metre high, which may be permanent or temporary.

Sighting Distance The distance at which a Look-Out can first sight a train or a train driver can sight a signal.

Signaller Person responsible for the control of trains on the running lines by the signalling system.

Single Line The only line available that can be used by trains in both directions.

Site Warden A person whose sole duties are the safeguarding of staff working in a worksite when a physical barrier next to the danger zone cannot be provided.

Six Foot The space between rails of adjacent lines.

Tail Light A red light provided at the rear of a train to indicate the rear vehicle of the train.

Thermite A magnesium based powder used to fusion weld lengths of track together.

TOPS (Total Operations Processing System)

A rail industry computer system able to identify the location and contents of trains and individual wagons or containers.

Track/Track area The area between the ballast shoulders of a single, double, or multi running line railway.

Train Operating Company

An organisation licensed to operate trains over the railway network.

Train Operating Liaison Officer (TOLO)

Responsible for welfare of passengers on affected train and reports to RIO.

Railway Incidents

of 27

TS Task Supervisor. The person in responsible for the setting up of a worksite and controlling train movements within a worksite.

Up/Down Terms used to distinguish the direction or traffic on a line. (Note: there is no hard and fast rule on their use by railway staff and the traffic flow on a particular line must be established locally).

Walkway A path alongside the railway within the safe zone.

Worksite A defined area on a running line which is protected by the creation of a safe area and within which the normal operation of trains is suspended in order to carry out engineering activities.

Railway Incidents

of 27

Incident Review: Incident Specific Generic

Key Control Measures � High visibility clothing � 3m from OLE � 3m track cordon if no life risk � Trains stopped/caution � Traction power off and made safe � Safe casualty egress route � Safety brief with all agencies � Safety observers, line of sight � Agreed evacuation signal

� Spans of Control � Adequate resources � Risk Assessment

Incident Specific Generic Notes Operational Considerations

En Route � High visibility clothing � SSRI

� Safe access/egress/RVP/ marshalling areas

� Risk Assessment � Identify water supplies

On Arrival � Assess life risk � Control rail traffic � Control electrics � Inform Control of actions

Incident Information � TOPS/CONSIST info � Confirm what’s happening

� Dynamic or static? � Extent of incident � Immediate risks � Confirm location � Wind direction � Terrain � Access/egress routes � RVP/marshalling areas � STEPS protocol

Railway Incidents

of 27

Incident Specific Generic Notes Resources Information

� Request RIO � Off road capability � Foam requirements

� SSRI/Plans � On-site knowledge � MDT ops guidance � Current resources � Agencies on scene � Agencies required � Future FRS needs

Hazard & Safety Information � Moving trains – impact/

turbulence � Instability of derailed

vehicles � Utilities in line-side

ducting � Steam (heritage) � Diesel fuel � Tunnels � Track points/entrapment � Signal cabling � Sharps/glass � Casualties/fatalities � Fixed installations � Detonators

� Consider risk versus benefit

� Fire/smoke � Hazardous materials � Gas (toxic, flammable,

asphyxiant) � Biohazards � Falls from height � Objects falling from height � Cylinders (LPG) � Asbestos � Confined spaces � Dust (explosion, irritant) � Electricity � Access/egress � Animals � Violence � Environmental � Pressurised systems � Arduous working conditions � Manual handling � Visibility � Ground conditions

Prioritise Objectives � Clear, Defined

� Cordon control � Firefighting � Search � Rescue � Secure water supply � Protect environment � Prevent escalation � Scene preservation � Crew welfare

Railway Incidents

of 27

Incident Specific Generic Notes Tactical Plan

� Achievable � Acceptable risk levels � Address conflicting priorities � Allocation of tasks � Safe systems of work � Identified stages � Defined control measures. � Plan resourced � Complements other agency

plans � Plan B identified � Flexibility

Communicate � Media management � Relevant, Accurate,

Timely � Tactical mode � Tactical plan � Risk information � Messages, CHALETS � Other agencies � Radio channels � Brief senior personnel � Correct medium � Confirmation of receipt � Regular updates

Control � Major Incident? � Search co-ordinator � Casualty handling area

� Clear briefing � Sectors (ops and functions) � Command support � Spans of control � Clear lines of

communication/control � Review plan, objectives,

progress � Adjust resources/

requirements as necessary � Mentoring (as appropriate)

Railway Incidents

of 27

Incident Conclusion Equipment � Inventory check � Clean/decontaminate equipment

Hygiene � Personal cleaning � PPE cleaning/bagging � Further cleaning on return

Debrief � Hot debrief � Other agencies � SSRI information

Records � Decision logs, contemporaneous notes � Paperwork from incident � Incident recording system � Performance monitoring records � Structured debriefing � Photographs procedures � Safety events � Equipment usage recording

Handover � Handover to responsible person/authority � Incident handover form, if applicable

Welfare � Post incident welfare � Critical incident debriefing � Occupational health referral

Railway Incidents

of 27

7 Technical References ♦ Railways Act 2005.

♦ Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.

♦ The Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2004.

♦ Network Rail document RT/CM/SO/P/302 Railway Safety for the Emergency Services.

♦ Network Rail document RT/CM/SO/P/303 Management of Fatalities on the Railway.

♦ Network Rail document RT/CM/SO/P/305 Emergency Services Rail Incident Protocol.

♦ Network Rail document RT/CM/SO/P/306 Dangerous Goods on the Railway.

♦ Fire service Circular 20-2004 Carriage of Dangerous Goods.

♦ DCOL 10/81 3/84/ 3/83 8/91.

♦ Statistics from the Rail Safety & Standards Board.

♦ Network Rail ‘Rail Safety First’ DVD – change to safety instructions (2012).

Document Control Document Control

R14_01_SOP_Railway_Incident Version Date Author Role Status Changes V0.1 28/12/2009 I.Ritchie Procedures Created None V0.2 22/03/2010 B.Beard Procedures Amended Various V0.3 26/03/2010 B.Beard Procedures Amended Various V0.4 29/08/2010 B.Beard Procedures Amended Various V0.5 15/05/2011 D.Carson SM OpsP&P Amended Various V0.6 25/11/2011 D Carson SM Ops

P&P Amended Various

V0.8 14/02/2012 D. Carson

Hub C Amended Various

V0.9 13/03/2012 D. Carson

Hub C Amended Various

V0.10 19/04/2012 D. Carson

Hub C Amended Following OPAP mtg

V0.11 15/05/2012 D.Carson Hub C Amended Alignment to cover fire and accident

V0.12 26/07/2012 D.Carson Hub C Amended Following OPAP meeting

v1.01 1 May 2013 Lincoln Ball

Lead Policy Developer

Redraft Aligned to draft hybrid template.

V1.02 2 Jun 2013 Lincoln Ball


Redraft Amended to revised draft hybrid template. Flow chart created. Reviewed against

Railway Incidents

of 27

implementation issues thread.

V1.03 27 Jun 2013

Lincoln Ball


Redraft Amended to slightly revised draft hybrid template.

V1.04 27 Jun 2013

Lincoln Ball


Redraft Slight amendment.

v1.05 3 Jul 2013 Lincoln Ball


Redraft Minor grammatical amendments only.

v1.06 3 Jul 2013 Lincoln Ball


Redraft Aide memoire, flowchart and checklist font size increased, revised ‘buttons’ added.

SOP Railway Incidentscazzy.net/Cazzy.net/SOPs_files/2013_SOP_Railway... · 1.1 Third rail and...

Documents

Transcript of SOP Railway Incidentscazzy.net/Cazzy.net/SOPs_files/2013_SOP_Railway... · 1.1 Third rail and...