Sonoma Co Respondents' Opposition Brief; 11-24-15

1

No. A145573

(Sonoma County Superior Ct. No. SCV-255694)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION 1

________________________

COASTAL HILLS RURAL PRESERVATION

Petitioner and Appellant

v.

COUNTY OF SONOMA, SONOMA COUNTY BOARD OF

SUPERVISORS, SONOMA COUNTY PERMIT AND RESOURCE

MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT

Respondents

and

JACK PETRANKER and THE HEAD LAMA OF

THE TIBETAN NYINGMA MEDITATION CENTER,

Real Parties in Interest

_________________________

Appeal from Judgment of the Superior Court for the County of Sonoma

(Honorable Elliot Lee Daum, Presiding)

________________________________________________________

RESPONDENTS OPPOSITION BRIEF _________________________________________________________

BRUCE D. GOLDSTEIN, State Bar No. 135970

County Counsel

VERNE BALL, State Bar No. 244014

Deputy County Counsel

Office of Sonoma County Counsel

575 Administration Drive, Room 105A

Santa Rosa, CA 95403

Tel. (707) 565-2421/Fax (707) 565-2624

Email: [email protected]

Attorneys for Respondents

2

No. A145573

(Sonoma County Superior Ct. No. SCV-255694)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION 1

________________________

COASTAL HILLS RURAL PRESERVATION

Petitioner and Appellant

v.

COUNTY OF SONOMA, SONOMA COUNTY BOARD OF

SUPERVISORS, SONOMA COUNTY PERMIT AND RESOURCE

MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT

Respondents

and

JACK PETRANKER and THE HEAD LAMA OF

THE TIBETAN NYINGMA MEDITATION CENTER,

Real Parties in Interest

_________________________

Appeal from Judgment of the Superior Court for the County of Sonoma

(Honorable Elliot Lee Daum, Presiding)

________________________________________________________

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

_________________________________________________________

BRUCE D. GOLDSTEIN, State Bar No. 135970

County Counsel

VERNE BALL, State Bar No. 244014


Office of Sonoma County Counsel

575 Administration Drive, Room 105A


Tel. (707) 565-2421/Fax (707) 565-2624



3

Pursuant to Rule 8.208 of the California Rules of Court,

Respondents County of Sonoma, Sonoma County Board of Supervisors,

and the Permit and Resources Management Department, to the best of their

knowledge hereby identify the following interested entities or persons in

regard to this appeal:

1. Sonoma County;

2. Sonoma County Board of Supervisors;

3. The Permit and Resources Management Department, which is not a

separate legal entity from Sonoma County.

DATED: November 24, 2015 BRUCE D. GOLDSTEIN

County Counsel

By: /s/ Verne Ball

VERNE BALL


Attorneys for Respondents,

County of Sonoma, Sonoma

County Board of Supervisors,

Sonoma County Permit and

Resource Management

Department

4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATE OF INETERESTED PARTIES ......................................... 8

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 10

II. JOINDER IN BRIEF OF REAL PARTIES ..................................... 10

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................... 10

IV. ARGUMENT ................................................................................... 10

A. The Board Properly Found That The Project Complies With

General Plan 2020 And The Countys Zoning Ordinance ......... 11

1. CHRPs General Plan And Zoning Consistency

Challenges Are Time-Barred. .................................... 12

2. The Boards General Plan Consistency Findings Were

Appropriate And Are Entitled To Deference ............. 14

3. The Board Properly Confirmed That Under The

Countys Zoning Ordinance The Printing And Printing

Storage Remain Accessory To The Retreat Use. ....... 19

4. An Accessory Use Determination Is Not An

Exemption To County Code Requirements .............. 22

5. CHRPs Zoning Argument Regarding Commercial

Uses Is A Red Herring ............................................... 24

6. The County Did Not Exempt The Project From

Building Code Requirements ..................................... 25

7. The Project Did Not Involve A Change In Zoning,

And Accordingly Did Not Involve Spot Zoning ........ 26

5

B. The Countys Action Approving The Master Use Permit Raises

No First Amendment Or Establishment Clause Issue ................ 27

1. The County Had A Secular Purpose When It Applied Its

Facially Neutral Zoning Ordinance, Approved The

Project, And Confirmed That The Presses Are Still An

Accessory Use. ........................................................... 28

2. Approval Of The Master Use Permit Neither Advances

Nor Inhibits Religion.................................................. 30

3. Approval Of A Use Specific To The Applicant Is Not

Excessive Entanglement............................................. 32

C. The County Did Not Afford An Unconstitutional Preference To

Religion When It Approved The Project .................................... 34

D. The County Complied With The No Aid Clause When It

Approved The Project ................................................................. 36

V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 37

6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

A Local and Regional Monitor (ALARM) v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 630 ...................................................................... 14

Avenida San Juan Partnership v. City of San Clemente

(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1256 .................................................................. 26

California Native Plant Society v. City of Rancho Cordova

(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 603 .................................................................... 13

Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ

Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, (1987) 483 US 327 ............................... 28, 29

East Bay Asian Local Development Corp. v. State of California

(2000) 24 Cal.4th 693 ....................................................................... passim

Fairfield v. Superior Court of Solano County (1975) 14 Cal.3d 768.......... 36

Foothill Communities Coalition v. County of Orange

(2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1302 .................................................................. 25

Friends of Lagoon Valley v. City of Vacaville

(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 807 .............................................................. 13, 14

Goat Hill Tavern v. City of Costa Mesa (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1519......... 12

Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602 ............................................ passim

Lucas Valley Homeowners Assn. v. County of Marin

(1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 130 ......................................................... 31, 32, 35

Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) 465 U.S. 668 ............................................... 28, 29

McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky. (2004) 545 US 844 .............................. 28

MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose

(2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204 .............................................................. 18, 25

People v. Department of Housing & Community Development

(1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 185 ....................................................................... 12

7

Rowe v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1711 ................................. 28

San Franciscans Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City & County

of San Francisco (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 656 ....................................... 14

San Francisco Tomorrow v. City and County of San Francisco

(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 498 .................................................................... 16

Sedlock v. Baird (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 874 ........................................... 29

Sequoyah Homeowners Assn v. City of Oakland (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 704 ...................................................................... 14

Sierra Club v. Cal. Coastal Commission (2005) 35 Cal.4th 839 ................ 35

Wollmer v. City of Berkeley (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 933 .......................... 14

Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Board of Equalization

(1998) 19 Cal.4th 1 .................................................................................. 25

Statutes

42 U.S.C. 2000cc ...................................................................................... 35

Govt Code 65009 .................................................................................... 13

Other Authorities

Cal. Const., art. 1, 6 .................................................................................. 34

Cal. Const., art. XI, 7 .......................................................................... 13, 29

Cal. Const., art. XVI, 5 ............................................................................. 36

Sonoma County Code 26-02-010 ............................................................. 29

8

I. INTRODUCTION

This case concerns a Tibetan Buddhist retreat that the County of

Sonoma (County) approved in 2004. The religious retreat, called Ratna

Ling, took over the site of a luxury resort that went out of business. The

Countys 2004 use permit approval authorized the Ratna Ling retreat as a

primary use of the property, and a Buddhist printing press as an accessory

use to the retreat. In 2008, the County also approved four storage structures

to house the religious texts produced in the printing facility.

In 2014, the County Board of Supervisors approved a Master Use

Permit for the site, authorizing a variety of minor changes to the existing

facility. (AR 36-67.)1 This action challenges that approval. The Master

Use Permit makes permanent the text storage structures that were approved

in 2008, and approves a seasonal campground and five-bedroom house as

additions to the retreat. As the trial court summarized, the Master Use

Permit involves a number of changes to the existing, approved uses and

facilities but they are all of the same kind, each rather small, each change

merely modifies individual components of the existing ones and sometimes

without any increase [in what is allowed] at all. Contrary to [Appellants]

argument it does not involve a huge increase of printing facilities. (AA

267.)2

1 AR stands for Administrative Record.

2 AA stands for Appellants Appendix.

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The Master Use Permit was considered and approved by the County

Board of Zoning Adjustment (BZA) after two hearings, and was considered

and approved by the County Board of Supervisors (Board) after two more

hearings. In reaching its decision to approve the Master Use Permit, the

Board carefully considered the project and various arguments regarding the

proper application of the Countys own General Plan and zoning ordinance.

The Board found that the project is consistent with all County requirements,

in part based on the imposition of 97 conditions of approval. Appellant

Coastal Hills Rural Preservation (CHRP) sued, arguing that the County

violated its General Plan, zoning code, and the California Environmental

Quality Act (CEQA). The trial court rejected CHRPs claims.

CHRPs present appeal followed, which focuses primarily on

arguments never raised in the administrative proceedings or in the trial

court. In this brief, the County explains why CHRPs General Plan and

zoning claims fail. The County also explains why CHRPs new attempt to

recast its land use arguments into a rather surprising tale about the County's

unconstitutional establishment of religion namely, Tibetan Buddhism

misunderstands both the Countys requirements and the record. In broad

terms, CHRP objects to the special treatment of Ratna Ling. CHRPs

new argument necessarily fails, however, as there is no evidence of special

treatment.

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II. JOINDER IN BRIEF OF REAL PARTIES.

The brief filed by Real Parties in Interest addresses the CEQA issues

raised in CHRPs appeal. The County joins in the Real Parties Opposition

Brief.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

For a full discussion of the facts in this case, the County respectfully

refers the Court to the Statement of Facts in the Real Parties Opposition

Brief.

IV. ARGUMENT

Sonoma County carefully considered its decision to approve a

Master Use Permit for the Ratna Ling Buddhist Retreat Center. CHRPs

latest challenge to the Countys approval fails because it misapplies the

deferential standard of review, ignores and mischaracterizes the record

evidence, and makes an untimely challenge to a 2004 accessory use

determination. The record demonstrates that the Board properly exercised

its unique expertise and discretion when it required a multitude of

conditions of approval to address concerns expressed by CHRP and other

members of the public, and found that the project complies with Sonoma

Countys General Plan and zoning ordinance.

For the first time in the long procedural history of this project, in an

11

attempt to resuscitate its land use arguments, CHRP seeks to raise

constitutional arguments. This approach suffers from fatal procedural

defects, as CHRP did not properly exhaust its administrative remedies on

these claims. The claims are also substantively wrong. The Countys

recognition of the retreats religious activity in its confirmation of the

printing press accessory use determination raises no constitutional issues.

CHRPs arguments fail on both procedural and substantive grounds.

A. The Board Properly Found That The Project Complies

With General Plan 2020 And The Countys Zoning Ordinance.

The Ratna Ling retreat site has a Resources and Rural Development

(RRD) land use designation under the Countys current General Plan,

General Plan 2020.3 (AR 46.) The purpose of the RRD land use

designation is to protect lands used for timber, geothermal and mineral

resource production and for natural resource conservation. (AA 159.) The

RRD land use designation also expressly allows [l]odging, campgrounds,

and similar recreational and visitor serving uses provided they are not

inconsistent with the resource purposes of the area. (AA 160.) The

3 As in other jurisdictions, parcels in Sonoma County are mapped with both a

General Plan and zoning designation. The project site has a General Plan

designation of RRD and zoning that is also RRD. The County updated its

General Plan in 2008; the 1989 General Plan was in effect at the Countys 2004 approval, and General Plan 2020 applied to the Countys 2014 approval. General Plan 2020 did not change the language for the RRD land use designation. (AR

46-47.)

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religious retreat, like the resort that came before it, is a visitor serving use.

(AR 47.)

CHRPs challenge focuses primarily on the printing facility and

storage. In the 2014 approval, the Board found that the printing facility has

been and will continue to be an accessory use since it continues to be

related to, subordinate to, and appurtenant to the primary retreat use.4 (AR

48.) The Board found that [t]he uses sought [under the MUP] are

clarifications and expansions of the previously approved uses already

determined to be consistent with the General Plan, and that [t]he Project

would not involve the loss of timber and would not interfere with

geothermal resource production (the Project Site is not identified as an

aggregate resource site in the Aggregate Resources Management Plan).

Further, watersheds, fish, and wildlife habitat will be protected. (AR 47.)

The Board found that various arguments raised before it that attempted to

reopen the prior accessory use determination for the print facility were

untimely. (AR 46-49.)

1. CHRPs General Plan and Zoning Consistency Challenges Are Time-Barred.

The County made the determination that press facility is an

accessory use to the primary retreat use in 2004, and authorized the press

on that basis. CHRP impermissibly asks this Court to set aside a decade-

4 The County used the terms ancillary use and accessory use interchangeably,

and explained why. (AR 48).

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old General Plan and zoning code consistency determination. (AR 6.) In

approving the Master Use Permit, the Board explicitly noted what was and

was not new. The 2014 Master Use Permit approval changed some aspects

of the printing facility operations -- such as increasing occupancy, and

reducing hours and workdays -- but the broader issue of the permissibility

of the printing facility use was never at issue. The Board explained:

The Project being approved at this time does not include the

religious printing facility, which TCFPD describes as an industrial use. The religious printing facility was approved [in 2004] as part of Use Permit UPE04-0032 as an ancillary use to the retreat use, and

has been constructed in compliance with all applicable codes. The

aspect of the Project at issue here is making the sacred text storage

structures permanent.

(AR 45 [modification supplied]; see also AR 4321-22 [explaining that the

printing presses are not part of the Master Use Permit].)

The statute of limitations to challenge the approval and General Plan

consistency of the printing use lapsed in 2004. The statute of limitations to

challenge the use determination for the storage structures to which CHRP

objects lapsed in 2008. CHRPs claims are time-barred both by statute and

by equity. (Gov. Code 65009; People v. Dept. of Housing & Community

Development (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 185, 200.) Furthermore, the County

had independent adjudicatory authority to determine that CHRPs

allegations were untimely attempts to reopen established findings for the

Ratna Ling site. (AR 47; Cal. Const., art. XI, 7; cf. Goat Hill Tavern v.

City of Costa Mesa (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1529 [Interference with

14

the right to continue an established business is far more serious than the

interference a property owner experiences when denied a conditional use

permit in the first instance].)

2. The Boards General Plan Consistency Findings Were Appropriate and Are Entitled to Deference.

An agencys general plan consistency determination is subject to a

deferential standard of review that CHRP asks this Court to ignore. The

Board is the legislative body that adopted the General Plan and has unique

expertise when interpreting and applying the plan in an adjudicatory

context. (Friends of Lagoon Valley v. City of Vacaville (2007) 154

Cal.App.4th 807, 816.) Courts will not substitute their view for the

agencys, nor reweigh conflicting evidence. The courts role is to decide if

the County considered the applicable policies and the extent to which a

project conforms to those policies. (Ibid.; see California Native Plant

Society v. City of Rancho Cordova (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 603, 638 [[I]t

is the province of elected officials to examine the specifics of a proposed

project to determine whether it would be in harmony with the policies

stated in the plan. It is, emphatically, not the role of the courts to

micromanage these development decisions.].)

Since general plans have many competing goals and policies, an

agency is allowed to weigh and balance the plans policies. (Friends of

Lagoon Valley, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th 807, 816; see also San Franciscans

15

Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City & County of San Francisco (2002)

102 Cal.App.4th 656, 678; Wollmer v. City of Berkeley (2009) 179

Cal.App.4th 933, 941; Sequoyah Homeowners Assn. v. City of Oakland

(1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 704, 719.) A county has broad discretion in

deciding how to interpret its policies in light of the plans purpose.

(Friends of Lagoon Valley, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 816.) The

Countys general plan consistency finding can only be reversed if the

finding is based on evidence from which no reasonable person could have

reached the same conclusion. (A Local and Regional Monitor (ALARM)

v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 630, 648.)

All of CHRPs arguments challenging the Countys General Plan

consistency findings fail. First, CHRPs repeated assertion that the Board

could not approve the project because it is industrial (AOB, 47, 48)5 is a

red herring. The RRD General Plan designation does not preclude

industrial uses. The RRD General Plan designation allows for extremely

intensive industrial uses, including large-scale geothermal power plants,

energy transmission facilities and pipelines, biomass energy facilities, oil

and gas production wells, mining, hardrock quarries, and lumber mills.

(AA 170-171.) By any measure, these uses are much more intensive and

industrial than a printing press and storage of religious texts. CHRP

ignores this fact, and instead argues that because industrial designations

5 AOB stands for Appellants Opening Brief.

16

exist in the General Plan, this implicitly means that industrial uses are not

permitted in the RRD designation. As demonstrated by the zoning code, the

County does not interpret or implement its General Plan in this manner, and

it is not required to do so.6

CHRP correctly says that County staff have stated that a press would

not be allowed in the RRD designation unless it was accessory to the

primary use (see AR 5986), but CHRP misunderstands and misstates the

reason why. A printing press in the RRD designation must be an accessory

use not because of the industrial nature of the use, but because a free

standing press would neither be a resource-based use nor a visitor serving

use. (See AA 160 [RRD permitted uses], see also AA 163 [section 26-10-

005, discussing visitor serving uses], and AA 168 [section 26-10-010(ii)]

and AA 172 [section 26-10-020(ss)], both permitting uses similar to uses

enumerated in the code.) Here, however, we do not have a free standing

press. Rather, the printing press is completely intertwined with the visitor-

serving religious retreat use.

Second, CHRP alleges that the General Plan required that the Board

find that the public services and infrastructure are inadequate, specifically

in terms of the road hazards and fire risks allegedly presented by the

6 CHRPs assertion that the County has redefined industrial is thus irrelevant to

General Plan compliance, and CHRP's assertion is also based on unfortunate crop

quoting of findings related to storage, fire, and the building code. (AOB 49; AR

45.)

17

printing press. CHRP fails to recognize the Boards imposition of

conditions of approval that address these risks. With respect to roads, the

Board found that the project will reduce the impact of truck trips by

placing limits on the number and time of day of trips and the size of

trucks. (AR 41.) The Master Use Permit imposed new conditions

limiting truck traffic related to sacred text and non-textual sacred art

production to a maximum of one, twenty-four foot long truck round trip per

day Monday through Saturday and no truck trips on Sundays. (AR 51,

emphasis added; AR 62 [condition 61].) The Master Use Permit also

imposes numerous fire-related conditions, including funding for training at

the local volunteer fire district and a new on-site fire truck with trained

firefighters. (AR 65-66 [conditions 79, 80, 81, 86].)

CHRP asserts that the County's fire risk findings are not supported

by substantial evidence. (AOB, 48-49.) CHRP's argument misstates

CHRPs burden, but it does not matter. (See San Francisco Tomorrow v.

City & County of San Francisco (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 498, 514

[consistency determination must be demonstrated to be entirely lacking in

evidentiary support].) As is recited in the Real Parties brief, abundant

and more than substantial evidence supports the Boards approach to fire

risk. (RPOB,7 at 21-25; AR 44-45, 65 [condition 81], 135, 4430-4431,

12143-12145.)

7 RPOB stands for Real Parties Opening Brief.

18

Finally, CHRPs assertion that the County should have applied

General Plan Policy LU-6e (AOB 47, 50; AA 149 [policy LU-6e]) to the

site cannot overcome deference to the Boards proper exercise of its

discretion. General Plan Policy LU-6e addresses the siting of community

and public assemblies, which include traditional churches. The retreat

involves lodging, and is not like a traditional church. County staff

explained why Policy LU-6e does not apply to this use in the hearing

before the Board:

[T]hose standards related to places of religious worship, those were

added, and evaluated, and discussed at length during the general plan

update. In this case, though, this use was a retreat, not a church or a

place of public assembly and worship, so that we were comparing

this to lodging-type facility when it was originally approved. So

those standards were not applied to this [retreat].

(AR 4271.) Unlike a church, but very much like the resort that the

Buddhist retreat took over, the retreat is a visitor-serving lodging rather

than a community assembly. (See AA 163 [section 26-10-005 of the

County Code, allowing visitor-serving uses in the RRD zone].) The Board

reviewed and considered the distinctions between a public or community

assembly and a private retreat, and properly found it did not apply. CHRP

cannot carry its burden of showing that the Countys interpretation of its

own General Plan is entirely lacking in evidentiary support and that no

reasonable person would agree with the County.8

8 Policy LU-6e does not apply, but it bears note that the project is also not at all at

19

3. The Board Properly Confirmed That Under The Countys Zoning Ordinance The Printing And Printing Storage Remain Accessory To The Retreat

Use.

For zoning ordinance consistency determinations in quasi-

adjudicatory proceedings, a reviewing court looks to see whether

substantial evidence supports the findings, and uses its independent

judgment in interpreting the ordinance, while affording deference to the

agencys own expertise that derives from enacting and interpreting its

ordinance. (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose

(2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 219.)

Confirming that the religious printing press would still be an

accessory use to a religious retreat was well within the Boards discretion

under the Sonoma County zoning code. Sonoma County Code section 26-

02-140 defines accessory use as: [a] use of land that is related to and

subordinate to the primary use of the land or building located on the same

lot. In this case, the retreat and printing press were already in operation

and the relationship between them was abundantly documented. (See AR

odds with its various requirements. The project has obtained a use permit; is not

on agricultural lands designated Land Intensive Agriculture; does not result in

conflicts with agricultural or visitor serving uses; is consistent with Agricultural

Resources Element Policy AR-4a; avoids conflicts with other resource production

activities; has adequate public services and infrastructure available for the use; is

limited to 50% of the parcel or 10 acres, and is in keeping with the rural character

of the area. The site is not on a designated collector or arterial roadway, but it

does not need to be because this private retreat is not comparable to a church or

other place of community or public assembly.

20

cites in RPOB, footnote 7.) Volunteering at the presses is an integral

component of the retreat use. (AR 48.) Before the Board, retreat

participants discussed the retreat and the value they placed on their

participation in book production.

Addressing the subordinate to component, County staff explained

that the County made the accessory use determination for the printing

facility in 2004, and that staff sometimes uses informal rules of thumb for

making accessory use determinations, but that there is no set criteria. (AR

4102). Floor area is not always the appropriate metric. County staff

explained that the County also uses [n]umbers of people, numbers of truck

trips; things like that (AR 4102.)

The Board found that [v]olunteering or working in the religious

printing facility is an integral part of the retreat uses religious practice.

(AR 48.) The uses are thus related and intertwined, and the Boards finding

is supported by substantial evidence. (E.g., AR 4154-4163; see AR

citations in RPOB, footnote 7.) Recognizing that the uses are intertwined,

the Board found that the retreat use is the primary use based on six

objective factors establishing that the printing facility is subordinate and

appurtenant to the primary retreat use. (AR 48-49, 532.) These factors are:

(1) land the retreat use occupies 98.75% of the site while the printing

facility occupies 1.25%; (2) septic the retreat use consumes 95% of

capacity while the printing facility uses just 5%; (3) water demand 97.5%

21

for the retreat use as compared to 2.5% for the printing facility; (4) energy

consumption 76% (retreat) compared to 24% (printing facility); (5) hours

of operation 24 hours a day compared to limited hours; (6) traffic

94.27% compared to 5%; and (7) revenue the retreat use generates 89%

of the revenue while the printing facility generates just 11%, which is used

to off-set the cost of producing the sacred texts. (AR 48-49.) As the trial

court concluded: Obviously, there are many factors to consider in

determining whether a use is accessory and simple floor area is only one

of these. (AA 265.)

CHRP argues that the Board should have relied solely on building

floor area. (AOB 24.) However, as County staff explained before the

Board, there were sound policy reasons not to do so, including the fact that

storage is a relatively low intensity use for a building. (AR 4061.) CHRP

also suggests in passing that the changes to the occupancy limits on the

press removes the worker/housing ratio that had attempted to ensure the

press facility remained an accessory use. (AOB 13, 20.) This suggestion

is meritless. Both the press and the non-press occupancies were increased

with the Master Use Permit in similar proportions. (AR 51.)9 CHRPs

focus on the worker/housing ratio does not advance a valid challenge.

9 Ratna Lings original intent with the Master Use Permit was to increase the

press occupancy to what is allowed by code, but after discussion with Ratna Ling,

the County conditioned the occupancy limit below this level. (AR 51, 8819-

8820.) The occupancy level was increased, but the hours and days of operation

were decreased.

22

Nothing requires the Board to take the approach CHRP advocates

for on appeal. Applying the County Codes accessory use definition was a

matter of policy that was within the Boards discretion. The evidence that

volunteering to work on the texts in the press facility is an integral part of

this religious retreat is abundant, and the Board did not abuse its discretion

when it found that the press continued to be an accessory use.

4. An Accessory Use Determination Is Not An Exemption To County Code Requirements.

CHRPs apparent logic is that the printing press should not have

been approved because it would not have been approvable had it not been

an accessory use. There is no requirement in the General Plan or the

County Code that an accessory use be approvable as a primary or non-

accessory use. If this were true, the County would not need an accessory

use provision. Beyond this suggestion, CHRPs core argument is that the

County abandoned its practices to exceed the normal bounds of the zoning

laws, and that the applicant received special treatment. (AOB, 36, 19.)

CHRP even says the County in effect invented a new zoning category

peculiar to religious uses. (AOB, 43.)

CHRP is fundamentally mistaken. The County made findings

pursuant to its Zoning Code, which are routine when accessory uses are

part of a proposed use permit. (AR 48-49.) In making its special

treatment argument, CHRP asserts that other applicants would not be

23

allowed to have accessory printing facilities in the area (AOB, 46), and

repeatedly makes statements like the accessory designation is not

available to a non-religious owner or any other religion. (AOB, 22.)

These conclusions find no support in the record or the Countys process.

CHRPs argument is based on a misunderstanding of how the language in

the conditions relates to the adjudicatory process applicable to use permits.

Like this Court, the Board considers the facts of each particular case. (AR

49.) Because the Boards findings hinged on the accessory use

determination, and because the accessory use determination could be

different for new occupants (for whom, one can hypothesize, a lodging use

and a printing press use might not be related), the Board conditioned the

project such that the underlying determinations would have to be revisited

if new and different occupants took over the facility. (AR 62 [condition

65].) CHRP states: [The] accessory designation is unavailable to a

nonreligious entity or even a non-Tibetan Buddhist entity. (AOB, 35).

The Board did not opine on applications that were not before it, and there is

no basis in the record to raise concerns about other projects. Nor is CHRP

correct in its suggestion that the accessory use analysis was made as a

religious accommodation. Instead, the religious nature of the retreat and

the religious nature of the press were considered because they are, in this

particular case, reasons why the primary and subordinate uses are related.

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5. CHRPs Zoning Argument Regarding Commercial Uses Is A Red Herring.

CHRP asserts at some length that the Countys findings are

unsupported because the printing press is commercial. There is no

evidence that the Project is for profit, which is the standard the County used

in both 2004 and 2014. (AR 7, 9, 17, 20, 29, 30, 110.) In the context of

printing, volunteers produce the texts for a nonprofit organization. (AR

581-583, 999-1003.) Eighty-nine percent (89%) of the revenue from the

project site comes from the retreat use and 11% from the press use. While

98% of the total press output is given away, 2% of the press output

produces revenue. (AR 4163-64.) The 2% press output is from the sales of

religious texts produced in English. (AR 4163.) This figure is for sales,

not profit. (AR 4164.) The small amount of revenue generated from the

press is then used to support the production of more religious texts. (AR

4163.)

CHRP asserts that the finding in 2004 that the retreat use is similar

to a non-commercial club or lodge uses the wrong category of use and

[is] unsupported by any evidence. (AOB 48.) CHRP ignores the fact that

the Board only had to make a finding that the use is similar and [has a]

compatible nature to other uses explicitly permitted with a use permit.

(AA 172 [section 26-10-020(ss)].) The County applied its ordinance in a

manner that took into account the fact that a nonprofit organization has

25

taken over what was formerly a commercial lodging (which had also

previously been referred to as a lodge facility (AR 4489)). Lodging,

campgrounds, and non-commercial clubs and lodges are all permissible

uses in the RRD land use designation. (AR 47; see AA 170-171 [sections

26-10-020(v) and (ee)].) The Boards finding that the retreat continues to

be similar to enumerated uses is supported by the entire permit history and

common sense. (AR 6, AR 4597-4598, AR 46-47, AR 4489-4490.)

CHRP also completely ignores the fact that commercial uses are

permitted in the RRD zone. The use that preceded Ratna Ling was a resort

lodging that operated for profit. This was a permitted commercial use.

(AA [section 26-10-020(ee)].) The County required that the printing

facility be non-commercial so that it remains accessory to the primary use,

not because commercial uses are prohibited as CHRP suggests.

6. The County Did Not Exempt The Project From Building Code Requirements.

CHRP makes scattershot and inexplicable arguments that the

Countys 2008 determination that the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI)

building code requirements do not apply to the site's accessory structures10

somehow violated the Countys General Plan. (AOB, 17, 26, 49.) First,

the statute of limitations to make the building code claim has lapsed.

10

CHRPs briefing is unclear, so it is important to emphasize that accessory uses under the Zoning Ordinance and accessory structures under the building code

involve separate ordinances.

26

Second, the relevant County action with respect to the WUI requirements

was not unique to either Ratna Ling or the RRD General Plan designation

and zone as CHRP suggests. (AOB, 49.) Rather, when the County

amended Chapter 7 of the County Code, it exempted all accessory

structures in the County from Chapter 7A of the County Code, which is the

County Code chapter that contains the WUI requirements. (AR 7624-

7625.) This County-wide legislative action was not particular to Ratna

Ling. The Chief Building Official, the official who interprets Chapter 7,

confirmed the 2008 determination that the County-wide exemption applied.

(AR 7624-7625.) The Chief Building Official is entitled to deference.

(Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Board of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1,

8; MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106

Cal.App.4th 204, 219.)

7. The Project Did Not Involve A Change In Zoning, And Accordingly Did Not Involve Spot Zoning.

CHRP asserts the Master Use Permit constitutes spot zoning. Spot

zoning occurs when an agency allows more or less restrictive zoning for a

parcel, or island, than surrounding parcels. (Foothill Communities

Coalition v. County of Orange (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1311, review

denied.) CHRP did not raise this issue in the trial court, and for good

reason. The approval did not include a legislative change in zoning, so the

spot zoning argument must fail. The County did not zone the project site

27

with different restrictions than surrounding parcels, and all but one

surrounding parcel is zoned RRD. (AR 858.)11

B. The Countys Action Approving The Master Use Permit Raises No First Amendment Or Establishment Clause

Issue.12

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: Congress

shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting

the free exercise thereof. (First Amendment). The First Amendment

protects against three main evils: sponsorship, financial support, and active

involvement of the sovereign in religious activity. (Lemon v. Kurtzman

(1971) 403 U.S. 602, 612.) Article 1, Section 4 of the California

Constitution, in relevant part, similarly states: [t]he Legislature shall make

no law respecting an establishment of religion. (Establishment Clause.)

Since the Establishment Clause in our State Constitution does not provide

any greater protection than the First Amendment, these arguments will be

11

CHRP sites no authority for the odd proposition that spot zoning can occur

without a change in zoning because the argument finds no support in precedent or

logic. In Avenida San Juan Partnership v. City of San Clement, a city rezoned a

parcel to be more restrictive than surrounding parcels. The court found that this

was unpermitted spot zoning because the uses on the parcel would be less dense

than every parcel surrounding it and proceeded to a regulatory takings analysis.

(Avenida San Juan Partnership v. City of San Clemente (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th

1256, 1270.) Foothill Communities similarly involved a rezone that was found

not to be spot zoning. (Foothill Communities Coalition v. County of Orange

(2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1302.) 12

As is set forth in the Real Parties' brief, CHRP's constitutional arguments are

procedurally barred. Without waiving the argument, in an abundance of caution,

the County will address their lack of merit.

28

addressed together in this brief. (East Bay Asian Local Development Corp.

v. State of California (2000) 24 Cal.4th 693, 718-719.)

California courts apply the three-prong Lemon test when deciding if

an act or statute violates the Establishment Clause. (East Bay at p. 706.)13

The three prongs are: (1) did the conduct have a secular purpose; (2) is the

principal effect of the governmental conduct to advance or inhibit religion;

and (3) does the governmental conduct create an excessive entanglement

with religion? (Id. at 706.) Notably, Lemon itself states: [f]ire

inspections, building and zoning regulations . . . are examples of necessary

and permissible contacts. (Lemon, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 614.) Ironically,

CHRP cites to many cases, but almost all uphold the government actions

because they were sound.

1. The County Had A Secular Purpose When It Applied Its Facially Neutral Zoning Ordinance, Approved The

Project, And Confirmed That The Presses Are Still An

Accessory Use.

A governmental action can be invalidated for lacking a secular

purpose only when the activity was motivated wholly by religious

13

However, the U.S. Supreme Court has also stated: we have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this

sensitive area . . . [i]n two cases, the Court did not even apply the Lemon test. (Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) 465 U.S. 668, 679.) East Bay applied the Lemon test

only after noting that it should not be interpreted as preventing accommodation.

(East Bay at p. 708, quoting Rowe v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1711

[Under well-established principles of establishment clause analysis, the government can legitimately relieve religious institutions of [a burden that] . . .

can rationally be seen as posing a significant deterrent to the free exercise of

religion.]). CHRP's notion that the Lemon test categorically prohibits special treatment is wrong.

29

considerations. (Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) 465 U.S. 668, 680, citations

omitted, emphasis added.) The purpose of the government act must be

evaluated from the perspective of an objective observer who has taken

account of a comparable official act. (McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky.,

(2005) 545 U.S. 844, 860.) The purpose requirement prevents

government decision makers from abandoning neutrality and acting with

the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters.

(Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ Latter-Day

Saints v. Amos (1987) 483 US 327, 335.) Although the present action does

not involve a religious accommodation, alleviating a significant

government interference with the practice of religion, such as exempting

religious organizations from local landmark preservation laws, is a

permissible and neutral purpose under the Establishment Clause. (East

Bay, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 708.)

The California Constitution delegates a police power to counties.

(Cal. Const., art XI, 7.) This is the basis of every countys authority to

regulate land use matters through zoning ordinances and other tools. The

legitimate government interest and secular purpose of the Sonoma County

zoning ordinance is to regulate the public health, welfare and safety, and to

provide for the orderly development of land. (Sonoma County Code, 26-

02-010.)

Here, the County found that the retreat center, the primary use, is

30

allowed in the RRD zone because it is a visitor-serving use similar to

noncommercial lodges and would not result in the loss of timber,

geothermal, or aggregate resources. (AR 47.) The Countys application of

its zoning ordinance -- using objective criteria and supported by the

evidence before it -- has a legitimate secular purpose. The Countys

motivation was to follow its zoning ordinance, and nothing whatsoever

suggests the County was wholly motivated by religious considerations.

(Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 680.) In considering Ratna

Lings application, applying the Countys facially neutral zoning ordinance,

and approving the project with 97 conditions of approval, the Board

exercised its legitimate secular purpose under the County Code.

2. Approval Of The Master Use Permit Neither Advances Nor Inhibits Religion.

The second prong of the Lemon test is that the government action

must not advance or further religion. (Lemon, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 613.)

Like the first prong, this evaluation must be conducted from the perspective

of a reasonable observer. (Sedlock v. Baird (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 874,

887, citations omitted.) Government runs afoul of this prong only through

sponsorship, financial support, and actions that actively involve the

sovereign in religious activity. (Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the

Church of Jesus Christ Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, supra, 483 U.S. at p.

337.) Merely allowing a religious entity to advance its own religion is not

31

unconstitutional. (Ibid.)

Here, the County accepted a use permit application, considered and

analyzed the proposal at multiple public hearings, and approved the project

with conditions. This is the same process that all applicants for use permits

undergo. The County did not offer sponsorship or financial support, and

has never actively involved itself with any of Ratna Lings religious

activities.14

CHRP argues that approving the Master Use Permit had the primary

effect of advancing religion because the County abandoned its own zoning

ordinance, gave special benefits to Ratna Ling, and put the imprimatur of

the Countys power and prestige behind a religious practice. To the

contrary, the County held Ratna Ling to the same rigorous standard as any

other applicant. There were two hearings before the BZA (AR 38), two

hearings before the Board, and tremendous investments in time engaging

interested stakeholders. (AR 38-41.) The County only approved the

project after Ratna Ling spent significant time working with both the

County and its neighbors to resolve concerns, and after Ratna Ling made

adjustments to its proposed project. The County eventually approved a use

permit with 97 conditions of approval, which required significant annual

payments to the Timber Cove Fire Protection District, as well as annual

14

Ironically, CHRPs argument that the County should have treated the retreat like a community church rather than a lodge (AOB 48) effectively argues that the

County should be less neutral toward religious uses.

32

payments equivalent to the Countys Transit Occupancy Tax. (AR 51-67.)

The County further imposed a condition requiring removal of the printing

presses if the property is conveyed to a non-Tibetan Buddhist affiliate.

This does not benefit the applicant at all, and instead establishes that the

printing use does not run with the land. CHRP argues the County advanced

religion by enabling Ratna Ling to generate substantial revenues from the

presses, a benefit other religious groups do not have. (AOB, p. 37.) Other

proposals were not before the County, but the record does not support the

premise. The presses do not generate substantial revenue as 98% of the

total press output is given away, free. (AR 4163.)

The record demonstrates that the County did not endorse, advance,

or confer any special benefit on the basis of religion. The County only

considered the religious particularities of the use because it was necessary

to evaluate the particularities of the project before it. (Lucas Valley

Homeowners Assn. v. County of Marin (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 130.) The

County was not required to ignore the religious practices of the applicant in

evaluating the use, as CHRP suggests.

3. Approval of a Use Permit Specific to the Applicant Is Not Excessive Entanglement.

The third prong of the Lemon test, excessive entanglement, requires

an analysis of the character and purpose of the benefitted institutions, the

nature of the governmental aid and the resulting relationship between the

33

government and the religious entity. (Lemon, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 615.) In

Lucas Valley, an orthodox Jewish congregation applied for a use permit to

convert a single-family home in a residentially zoned neighborhood to a

synagogue for religious uses. (Lucas Valley Homeowners Assn. v. County

of Marin, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at 139.) The religious uses included life

cycle events, classes, holiday festivals, a ritual bath, and administrative

services. (Ibid.)

Neighbors challenged the use permit arguing that enforcing the

conditions of approval was excessive entanglement. The appellate court

disagreed and quoted the Lemon court: [f]ire inspections, building and

zoning regulations . . . are examples of necessary and permissible

contacts. (Lucas Valley at p. 150, citing Lemon at p. 614, emphasis in

original.) The conditions did not entangle the county in divining religious

content or otherwise passing on the religious affairs of the orthodox Jewish

community because they dealt with mundane matters, such as operating

hours, attendance or occupancy limits, noise, etc. (Id. at 151.) The court

noted that if enforcing conditions of approval to a use permit constituted

excessive entanglement under the First Amendment, no religious

organization could ever obtain a permit in any jurisdiction. (Id. at 152.)

The permit at issue here is a conditional use permit, much like the

approval at issue in Lucas Valley. The Countys role is that of a regulatory

agency adopting and enforcing permit conditions. The conditions address a

34

myriad of issues to protect the public health, welfare, and safety. (AR 51-

67.) Enforcing them does not require the County to participate in any

religion, divine religious content, or pass on any religious affair. They

merely help the County meet its objective, neutral, and secular

responsibility to protect the public health, safety, and welfare, and to

provide for the orderly development of land.

CHRP offers a parade of horribles in which there will be excessive

entanglement in the future because other religious organizations will seek

zoning exceptions, inviting political divisions along religious lines. (AOB

pp. 37-39.) Besides basing its argument on speculation about cases that are

not before this Court, CHRP ignores the fact that both religious and non-

religious entities can seek approval of accessory uses.

C. The County Did Not Afford An Unconstitutional

Preference To Religion When It Approved The Project.

The California Constitution guarantees free exercise and enjoyment

of religion without discrimination or preference. (Cal. Const., art. 1, 6,

"No Preference Clause".) The California Supreme Court declined to

analyze a claim alleging that a statutory exemption from a landmark

preservation law violated the No Preference Clause because the exemption

satisfied the Lemon test, and there was thus no preference for or against

religion. (East Bay, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 719.) Here, no exemptions were

provided. There is no evidence that religious uses has received any

35

preference from the County, nor that religion in general was given any

preference by the approval.

CHRPs invitation to this Court to create new law with respect to the

No Preference Clause is foreclosed by existing precedent. CHRP cites an

appellate decision that predates the California Supreme Courts East Bay

decision by nine years, for the proposition that the No Preference Clause

provides greater protection than the Establishment Clause. (AOB, p. 39.)

The plaintiffs in East Bay made the same argument that CHRP now makes.

(East Bay, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 719.) The California Supreme Court

has already rejected it. (Ibid.)

CHRP urges this Court on policy grounds to create an independent

analysis for the No Preference clause because of the chilling effect of

RLUIPA.15

(AOB, p. 41, footnote 9.) Intentionally interpreting California

law to create a conflict with federal law is not a canon of construction

worthy of this Court's consideration, and it is a particularly unwarranted

suggestion on the facts of this case. CHRP suggests that Ratna Ling

brandished RLUIPA and bullied the County into giving it preferential

treatment, but the suggestion is contradicted by the record. The Countys

decision was based on the County Code, not concerns about RLUIPA.16

In

15

RLUIPA stands for the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act found at 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. 16

CHRPs insinuation to the contrary is baseless, and CHRPs invitation to factual speculation about unstated concerns about RLUIPA violates the basic rule

36

fact, the record reveals that County staff was advised that RLUIPA requires

all projects to be evaluated equally under County ordinances. (AR 4755-

56.) The record also reveals that Ratna Ling clearly stated during the

proceedings that it has never once asked for special treatment just because

of the religious nature of its activities. It does not do so now. (AR

13603.)

In sum, CHRPs argument fails on two grounds: The No Preference

Clause does not preclude religious accommodation as CHRP suggests, but

the record shows that no issue of religious accommodation or "preference"

arose here in any event.

D. The County Complied With The No Aid Clause When It

Approved The Project.

The No Aid Clause prohibits government from providing public

funds or granting anything to aid religion. (Cal. Const., art. XVI, 5.)

The clause bans any official involvement that has the direct, immediate

and substantial effect of promoting a religious purpose. (East Bay, supra,

24 Cal.App.4th at p. 721.) As set forth above, approving a use permit

under a neutral zoning ordinance does not constitute the provision of

improper aid to a religious group. (Lucas Valley Homeowners Assn., supra,

233 Cal.App.3d 130.)

that the Court will base its review on the Boards findings. (Fairfield v. Superior Court of Solano County (1975) 14 Cal.3d 768, 779; Sierra Club v. Cal. Coastal

Commission (2005) 35 Cal.4th 839, 864.)

37

Rather than providing aid, the County has required compliance with

its use permit conditions, including the payment of a variety of fees. There

is no evidence that the County violated the No Aid Clause. Nonetheless,

CHRP argues that the County aided the Tibetan Buddhist religion by

allowing a printing facility because the accessory use is an exclusive

benefit unavailable to others. (AOB, pp. 45-46.) Any owner of RRD-

zoned property secular or religious can request an accessory use

determination, so there is no exclusive benefit vis--vis other landowners.

The fact that Ratna Ling is required to remove the press facility if the

Property is ever conveyed to a buyer not affiliated with Tibetan Buddhism

is not aid. (AR 62 [condition 65].) It means that only part of the permit

runs with the land, and that the land use entitlement obtained is accordingly

not marketable. There is no evidence that the County violated the No Aid

Clause, and CHRP's argument must be rejected.

V. CONCLUSION

After a lengthy process, the County properly approved the Master

Use Permit for sound reasons stated in the Boards findings. The County

38

respectfully requests that CHRPs appeal be denied and that the Superior

Courts decision be upheld.

Dated: November 24, 2015 Bruce D. Goldstein, County Counsel

/s/ Verne Ball

Verne Ball



County of Sonoma, Sonoma County

Board of Supervisors, and Sonoma

County Permit and Resource

Management Department

39

Word Count Certification

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 8.204(c)(1), I certify that

the attached brief contains less than 14,000 words, according to the word

count of the Microsoft Word program used to prepare the brief. According

to the word count, this brief contains 8,663 words.

Dated: November 24, 2015 Bruce D. Goldstein, County Counsel

/s/ Verne Ball

Verne Ball

40

PROOF SERVICE

I am employed in the County of Sonoma, California; I am over the

age of 18 years and not a party to the within action; my business address is

575 Administration Dr., Rm. 105A, Santa Rosa, California.

On November 24, 2015, I served the attached RESPONDENTS OPPOSITION BRIEF on the interested parties in the action by serving:

Janis Grattan

Provencher & Flatt, LLP 823 Sonoma Ave. Santa Rosa, CA 95404 Email: [email protected] Attorneys for Appellant Coastal Hills Rural Preservation Michael R. Lozeau Rebecca L. Davis Lozeau Drury LLP 410 12th Street, Suite 250 Oakland, CA 94607 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Attorneys for Appellant Coastal Hills Rural Preservation

Tina Wallis

Clement, Fitzpatrick & Kenworthy

333 Mendocino Ave., Suite 200



Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest

Jack Petranker and The Head Lama of

The Tibetan Nyingma Meditation Center.

XX By Electronic Service: Based on a court order or agreement of

the parties to accept service by electronic transmission, I caused the

documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic notification addresses

listed above. I did not receive, within a reasonable time afterwards, any

electronic message or other indication that the transmission was

unsuccessful.

41

XX By U. S. Mail: I placed each such sealed envelope, with

postage thereon fully prepaid for first-class mail, for collection and mailing

at Santa Rosa, California, following ordinary business practices. I am

readily familiar with the practice of Sonoma County Counsel for processing

of correspondence, said practice being that in the ordinary course of

business, correspondence is deposited in the United States Postal Service

the same day as it is placed for processing.

I served said document on the trial court by U.S. Mail, as indicated

above, as follows:

Superior Court of the State of California

County of Sonoma Appeals Division 600 Administration Drive

Santa Rosa, CA 95403-2878

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States

of America that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration

was executed on November 24, 2015, at Santa Rosa, California.

/s/ Eileen Shired

Eileen Shired

Certificate of Interested PersonsTABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF AUTHORITIESI. INTRODUCTIONII. JOINDER IN BRIEF OF REAL PARTIESIII. STATEMENT OF FACTSIV. ARGUMENTA. The Board Properly Found That The Project Complies With General Plan 2020 And The County's Zoning Ordiance1. CHRP's General Plan and Zoning Consistency Challenges Are Time-Barred.2. The Board's General Plan Consistency Findings Were Appropriate and Are Entitled to Deference3. The Board Properly Confirmed That Under The County's Zoning Ordinance The Printing And Printing Storage Remain Accessory To The Retreat Use.4. An Accessory Use Determination Is Not An Exemption To County Code Requirements.5. CHRP's Zoning Argument Regarding Commercial Uses Is A Red Herring.6. The County Did Not "Exempt" The Project From Building Code Requirements.7. The Project Did Not Involve A Change In Zoning, And Accordingly Did Not Involve Spot Zoning.

B. The County's Action Approving The Master Use Permit Raises No First Amendment Or Establishment Clause Issue.1. The County Had A Secular Purpose When It Applied Its Facially Neutral Zoning Ordinance, Approved The Project, And Confirmed That The Presses Are Still An Accessory Use.2. Approval Of The Master Use Permit Neither Advances Nor Inhibits Religion.3. Approval of a Use Permit Specific to the Applicant Is Not Excessive Entanglement.

C. The County Did Not Afford An Unconstitutional Preference To Religion When It Approved The Project.D. The County Complied With The No Aid Clause When It Approved The Project.

V. CONCLUSION

Sonoma Co Respondents' Opposition Brief; 11-24-15

Documents

Transcript of Sonoma Co Respondents' Opposition Brief; 11-24-15