€¦ · Something special: On Narendra Modi's Bhutan visit 55 Raja Mandala: What India has to...

Fortifying the Africa outreach 2

Cabinet approves signing of the UN Convention on International Settlement Agreements resulting

from mediation by India 4

India and Mozambique Sign Two MoUs to Further Strengthen Defence Co-Operation 6

U.S. formally withdraws from INF arms treaty 8

President of India in Guinea; Witnesses Signing of MoUs and Leads Delegation Level Talks; says

India is Committed to Strengthen Economic ties with Guinea in Support of Guinea’s National

Development Plan 10

RCEP must fix trade deficit, China told 12

India, Israel bond over Yeh dosti 14

Clouds of uncertainty over Afghanistan 16

India tells China to avoid commenting on Ladakh 19

Afghanistan shadow over India’s move 21

China vows to counter U.S. missile plans 23

The battle continues 24

Review decision on ties, India tells Pakistan 25

Home Minister-level Talks between India and Bangladesh 27

Pakistan formally suspends trade ties 29

Carry out changes in J&K by Indian Constitution, says Russia 31

China opposes unilateral action in J&K 33

Hong Kong on the brink: On continuing protests 35

War within war: On Saudi's intervention in Yemen 37

Ending J&K’s special status an internal matter, China told 39

Trade rhetoric: On U.S.’s WTO pullout threat 41

White House approves sale of F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan 42

Vice President embarks on a three-nation tour to advance India’s outreach in the Baltic region; 44

World and Valley 46

Fashioning India’s nuclear posture 47

India, Bhutan vow to strengthen ties 49

India, China review border situation 51

The far right’s disruption of globalisation 52

Something special: On Narendra Modi's Bhutan visit 55

Raja Mandala: What India has to offer in the Gulf 56

India-Maldives MoU on Training and Capacity Building Programme for Maldivian Civil Servants

operationalised 59

China and its quasi-colony 61

Free fall: On the Afghan conflict 64

IS is regaining strength in Iraq and Syria 65

Sexual violence and harassment at workplaces needs Parliament’s attention 67

Taking a ‘Far East’ turn to deepen a friendship 70

Index

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Source : www.thehindu.com Date : 2019-08-01

FORTIFYING THE AFRICA OUTREACHRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: Africa, African Union (AU) and India

This week two important Indian dignitaries began their respective visits to Africa. President RamNath Kovind commenced his seven-day state visit to Benin, Gambia and Guinea-Conakry (July28 to August 3) and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh arrived in Maputo on a three-day visit (July28 to July 30) to Mozambique. The simultaneity of the two visits may be a coincidence, but italso indicates enhanced priority to Africa. This should be welcomed.

During the past five years, Indian leaders have paid 29 visits to African countries. Forty-oneAfrican leaders participated in the last India-Africa Forum Summit in 2015, where India agreed toprovide concessional credit worth $10 billion during the next five years. By 2017, India hadcumulatively extended 152 Lines of Credit worth $8 billion to 44 African countries. India has alsounilaterally provided free access to its market for the exports of 33 least developed Africancountries. These sizeable efforts are also noteworthy for being countercyclical: India escalatedits commitments to Africa in an era of low-commodity prices when most other partners, includingChina, have scaled back theirs.

India has substantive economic engagement with Africa. Its trade with Africa totalled $63.3billion in 2018-19. India was ranked the third largest trading partner of Africa having edged pastthe United States during the year. The figures for Indians’ investments (estimated at $50 billion)and Indian diaspora (approximately three million) are a bit imprecise but are also substantivewhen put in the continental perspective. Although these statistics are impressive, they are wellbelow the potential for India-African economic synergy and are often dwarfed by thecorresponding Chinese data.

There seems to be a conspicuous disconnect between Indian developmental assistance to andIndia’s economic engagement with Africa. The time has now come to integrate these two axesfor a more comprehensive and sustainable engagement. It would also facilitate aided pilotprojects being scaled up seamlessly into commercially viable joint ventures.

Any objective cost-benefit analysis of India’s development assistance to Africa is unlikely toimpress. From the demand to remove the statues of Mahatma Gandhi in Ghana to the travails ofIndian investors in Africa, from occasional demonisation of the long-standing Indian communityto the non-recognition of Indian academic degrees, India’s large developmental footprint inAfrica does not produce commensurate empathy. India’s aid being unconditional, the recipientsoften take it as an entitlement.

But India is neither a rich country nor has its hands been tainted by a history of slavery,colonisation and the exploitation of Africa. In fact, it is a developing country with similar domesticchallenges of poverty, infrastructure deficit and underdevelopment. India’s funds committed andseats in our prestigious academic institutions offered to Africa are at the expense of the tax-paying Indians. India’s aid to Africa should be reciprocated by acknowledgement and quid proquo in terms of goodwill (beyond the easy-flowing official rhetoric), and institutional preference.India cannot simply be a cash cow for Africa, particularly when its own economy is slowingdown.

We need to ask ourselves these: for all the development billions spent, how many mega-projectsdid Indian companies get and how many natural resources does India have access to in Africa?We should reorient our developmental profile to be more economically productive.

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To this end, a number of steps can be considered: First, we need to take direct control of ourdevelopment programme instead of handing our funds to intermediaries such as the AfricanUnion, the African Development Bank Group and the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement (TEAM 9), whose priorities are often different from India’s. To make an impact,our aid should be disbursed bilaterally and aligned with national priorities of the recipient state,which should be a substantial stakeholder and co-investor in schemes and projects frominitiation to operation.

Second, India’s development assistance should prefer the countries with its substantial interests,both existing and potential. For instance, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Ghana, Angola andAlgeria are India’s top six trading partners in Africa, accounting for nearly two-thirds of its tradeand half its exports to the continent; yet, they do not figure commensurately in India’sdevelopmental pecking order. India’s own needs for raw materials, commodities and marketsshould be factored in its aid calculus. Third, we ought to prefer aiding countries which are willingto help us — from access to their natural resources to using our generics. Fourth, the aidedproject selected should be compatible with local requirements. They should be cost-effective,scalable, future ready and commercially replicable. Fifth, for greater transparency, India shouldprefer its public sector to implement the aid projects. Sixth, the Indian Head of Mission in therecipient African state must be an integral part of the aid stream including project selection, co-ordination and implementation. Apart from empowering our diplomacy, this would ensure betterharmonisation between our aid and economic objectives.

Finally, the aforementioned should not distract us from our duty to provide the neededhumanitarian assistance to Africa: to be rendered promptly and with sensitivity, but withoutnoise.

Mahesh Sachdev was the Indian High Commissioner to Nigeria and the Ambassador to Algeria.He is the author of ‘Nigeria: A Business Manual’

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Source : www.pib.nic.in Date : 2019-08-01

CABINET APPROVES SIGNING OF THE UNCONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTAGREEMENTS RESULTING FROM MEDIATION BYINDIA

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: UNO and its various Agencies

Cabinet

Cabinet approves signing of the UN Convention onInternational Settlement Agreements resulting frommediation by India

Posted On: 31 JUL 2019 3:37PM by PIB Delhi

The Union Cabinet chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi has approved the signing of theUnited Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements (UNISA) resulting frommediation by the Republic of India scheduled to be held at Singapore on 7th August, 2019, or atUnited Nations Headquarters.

Benefit:

Signing of the Convention will boost the confidence of the investors and shall provide a positivesignal to foreign investors about India's commitment to adhere to international practice onAlternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).

Initiatives to promote ADR Mechanisms:

In order to encourage international commercial arbitration in India, to evolve a comprehensiveecosystem of arbitration the Government is establishing the New Delhi International ArbitrationCentre (NDIAC) as a statutory body. The Commercial Courts Act, 2015, has been furtheramended and legislative exercise to further amend the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, iscurrently underway. These initiatives are being taken with a view to encourage the settlement ofcommercial disputes, domestic and international, in India through ADR Mechanism of Arbitration,Conciliation and Mediation. A new Chapter (IIIA) has been inserted in the Commercial CourtsAct, 2015, for mandatory pre-institution mediation and settlement in certain category of cases.Therefore, the provisions of the 'Convention' are in line with the domestic laws and the effortsmade to strengthen Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms.

Background:

The United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention on InternationalSettlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation ("the Convention") on 20th December 2018.The General Assembly authorized that the Convention will open for signature at a signingceremony to be held on 7thAugust 2019 in Singapore and will be known as the "SingaporeConvention on Mediation" (the Convention).

The Convention provides a uniform and efficient framework for the enforcement of internationalsettlement agreements resulting from mediation and for allowing parties to invoke such

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agreements, akin to the framework that the Convention onthe Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958) (the "New York Convention") provides for arbitralawards. The Convention defines two additional grounds upon which a court may, on its ownmotion, refuse to grant relief. Those grounds relate to the fact that a dispute would not becapable of settlement by mediation or would be contrary to public policy.

***********

VRRK/PK/SH

(Release ID: 1580824) Visitor Counter : 573

Read this release in: Urdu , Hindi , Marathi , Bengali , Gujarati , Tamil , Telugu



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INDIA AND MOZAMBIQUE SIGN TWO MOUS TOFURTHER STRENGTHEN DEFENCE CO-OPERATION

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: Africa, African Union (AU) and India

Ministry of Defence

India and Mozambique Sign Two MoUs to FurtherStrengthen Defence Co-Operation

Raksha mantri Shri Rajnath Singh holds Talks with PrimeMinister & Defence Minister of Mozambique

Posted On: 29 JUL 2019 7:38PM by PIB Delhi

Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh is currently on an official visit to Maputo, Mozambique fromJuly 28-30, 2019. This is Shri Rajnath Singh’s first visit abroad as Raksha Mantri and the first-ever visit of Defence Minister of India to Mozambique.

Today, the Raksha Mantri (RM) called on Mr. Carlos Agostinho do Rosario, the Prime Minister ofMozambique. He also held delegation-level talks with his counterpart Mr. Atanasio SalvadorM’tumuke. After the talks, two Memoranda of Understanding - agreement on sharing whiteshipping information and co-operation in the field of Hydrography – were signed betweenGovernment of India and Government of the Republic of Mozambique. The signing of the twoMoUs will further strengthen the ongoing Indo-Mozambican Defence co-operation.

The visit witnessed the growing defence co-operation between Mozambique and India, and thepotential such collaboration offers for enhancing security in the Indian Ocean Region.

The Raksha Mantri announced assistance of communication equipment and highlighted theimportance of working together to prevent non-traditional threats like smuggling, terrorism,piracy, poaching, etc. and overall co-operation in the maritime domain.

Defence Minister of Mozambique, Mr. Atanasio Salvador M’tumuke briefed RakshaMantri ShriRajnath Singh on the internal security situation and the ongoing Disarmament, Demobilisationand Reintegration (DDR) process. The RakshaMantri conveyed best wishes for the ongoingpeace process.

RM discussed the entire spectrum of bilateral relations while meeting the Mozambican leadersand noted the excellent Government-to-Government ties, strong business exchanges, vibrantdevelopment partnership, and long-standing people-to-people links between the two countries.

Mozambique sought co-operation from India to deal with the growing menace of terrorism andradicalisation. Shri Rajnath Singh assured co-operation and reiterated commitment to worktogether in this regard.

An elaborate ceremony was held today at Mozambican Naval Headquarters to hand over twoIndia-made Fast Interceptor Boats (FIBs) to Mozambique. The handing over certificate wassigned by the Director General, Coast Guards of India and Chief of Mozambican Navy. A four-

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member ICGS team is also assisting with training and support for maintenance and operation ofthe two boats.Mozambican Defence Minister expressed gratitude for India’s support forMozambican Defence Forces, in particular, for the boats being used for coastal surveillance.

On his arrival on 28th July, Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh was accorded Guard of Honour atthe Mozambican Army Head Quarters.

In the evening, RM addressed a gathering of Indian Diaspora and interacted with thecommunity.

The Raksha Mantriis accompanied by a high-level delegation including Defence Secretary, DG,Coast Guards and senior officials of Ministries of Defence and External Affairs.

India shares close, warm and friendly relations with Mozambique which is cemented by robustdevelopment partnership and a large presence of the Indian Diaspora. The visit of RM isexpected to further strengthen relations with Mozambique.

ABB/Nampi/Savvy


Read this release in: Urdu , Hindi



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U.S. FORMALLY WITHDRAWS FROM INF ARMSTREATY

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: International Treaties & Agreements, and other importantorganizations

Mike PompeoJonathan Ernst

The U.S. and Russia ripped up a Cold War-era missile pact on Friday in a move that raised thespectre of an arms race between the global superpowers.

The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty limited the use of medium-rangemissiles, both conventional and nuclear.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced Washington’s formal withdrawal in a preparedstatement at the ASEAN meet in Bangkok, minutes after Russia pronounced the treaty to be“dead”.

Both sides had signalled their intention to pull out of the treaty for months, trading accusations ofbreaking the terms of the deal.

“Russia is solely responsible for the treaty’s demise,” Mr. Pompeo said.

Shortly before Pompeo's announcement, Russia’s Foreign Ministry in Moscow said the deal hadbeen terminated at the “at the initiative of the U.S.”.

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PRESIDENT OF INDIA IN GUINEA; WITNESSESSIGNING OF MOUS AND LEADS DELEGATION LEVELTALKS; SAYS INDIA IS COMMITTED TO STRENGTHENECONOMIC TIES WITH GUINEA IN SUPPORT OFGUINEA’S NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: Africa, African Union (AU) and India

President's Secretariat

President of India in Guinea; Witnesses Signing of MoUsand Leads Delegation Level Talks; says India is Committedto Strengthen Economic ties with Guinea in Support ofGuinea’s National Development Plan

India Offers a line of Credit of US$170 Million for ConakryWater Supply Project

Posted On: 02 AUG 2019 6:26PM by PIB Delhi

The President of India, Shri Ram Nath Kovind landed in Conakry, Guinea, yesterday evening(August 1, 2019) in the final leg of his visit to – Benin, The Gambia and Guinea. He became thefirst Head of State/Head of Government from India to visit Guinea. On his arrival at the ConakryAirport, President Kovind was received by the President of Guinea, Prof Alpha Conde andaccorded ceremonial welcome.

Today (August 2, 2019), the President met President Conde. During the subsequent discussionswith him, the President said that India is keen to upgrade and enhance its political relations withGuinea. In keeping with the importance India attaches to enhance its ties, it has opened IndianEmbassy in Conakry in January this year. Subsequently, the President led delegation-level talksbetween the two sides.

The President said that India is committed to strengthen economic ties with Guinea in support ofGuinea’s National Development Plan. India has provided financial assistance for projectsidentified by Guinea in the energy, health and transportation sectors, including regional hospitalsprojects. India extended a new Line of Credit of US$ 170 million for Conakry Water SupplyProject.

He was happy to note that India is among the top trading partners of Guinea. He said that India’sgrowth and Guinea’s natural strengths complement each other. Indian companies are keen toinvest in Guinea, especially in the mining, infrastructure, health and pharmaceutical sectors.

The President said that India appreciates Guinea’s leading role in the affairs of the AfricanUnionespecially in dealing with issues of peace, security and stability in West African nations.He stated that terrorism is one of the gravest threats to humanity today and we must worktogether to strengthen the global fight against this evil.

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Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to reformed multilateralism and for comprehensivereforms of the UN Security Council to make it more representative, accountable, transparent,inclusive and effective. President Alpha Conde conveyed support for India’s candidacy as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the term 2021 – 2022.

The two Presidents witnessed the signing and exchange of MOUs on:

a. MoU between the Government of the Republic of Guinea and the Government of theRepublic of India on cooperation in the field of traditional system of medicine andhomeopathy

b. MoU between the Government of the Republic of Guinea and the TelecommunicationsConsultants India Limited for Participation in the e-VBAB Network Project

c. MoU between the Government of the Republic of Guinea and the Government of theRepublic of India on cooperation in the field of renewable energy

Later in the evening, the President will attend a banquet hosted in his honour by the President ofGuinea.

A Joint statement issued on the occasion is attached.

*****

VRRK/SH/BM


Read this release in: Hindi



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RCEP MUST FIX TRADE DEFICIT, CHINA TOLDRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: RCEP and India

India has sought greater market access from China for its products to narrow the high tradedeficit.Gettyimages/istock

India has told China that the proposed mega free trade agreement RCEP should address thecauses of high trade imbalances among the member countries, the Commerce Ministry said onSaturday.

The matter was among the issues raised by Commerce Secretary Anup Wadhawan in hismeeting with Wang Shouwen, the Vice Minister of China’s Commerce Ministry, on the sidelinesof RCEP inter-sessional ministerial meeting in Beijing on Friday.

The Secretary “emphasised on the importance of an RCEP agreement that would duly addressthe causes of existing trade imbalances,” the Ministry said in a statement. Mr. Wadhawan is inBeijing for the eighth RCEP inter-sessional ministerial meeting.

A joint statement, issued after the two-day RCEP ministerial meeting, said that the Ministersnoted that over two-thirds of market access negotiations have reached mutually satisfactoryoutcomes, and that work on the remaining areas were being intensified through constructiveengagements.

Determined to keep the momentum towards achieving the Leaders’ mandate to conclude theRCEP negotiations by the end of the year, the Ministers “called on all members to find pragmaticand solution-oriented approaches to narrow divergence on the various remaining issues”, itadded.

Covering 47.4% of the global population, 32.2% of the global economy, 29.1% of global trade,and 32.5% of global investment flows in 2018, the Ministers emphasised that RCEP is the mostimportant trade agenda in the region, supportive of an open, inclusive, and rules-based tradingsystem, and an enabling trade and investment environment.

The RCEP bloc comprises 10 ASEAN group members (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia,Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Laos and Vietnam), and their trade partnersIndia, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. India registered a trade deficit in2018-19 with 11 RCEP member countries of the 16 nations that have been negotiating a megatrade pact since November 2012.

In 2018-19, India’s trade deficit with China stood at $50.2 billion.

“India’s concerns regarding market access and other issues leading to imbalanced tradebetween some of the partner countries was specifically flagged during the meetings,” theMinistry said.

The Secretary also raised bilateral trade issues with the Chinese Minister. India has soughtgreater market access from China for its products like sugar, rice and pharmaceuticals to narrowthe high trade deficit.

He also pushed for greater market access to other items such as milk and milk products,pomegranate, soybean meal, and okra. Besides, he asked for easing of the business visa

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regime by China for Indians. In his meeting with Boonyarit Kalayanamit, Permanent Secretary ofThailand, the Secretary requested Thailand to improve its offer in goods and services underRCEP.















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INDIA, ISRAEL BOND OVER YEH DOSTIRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - Israel

Israel greeted India on Friendship Day with a Twitter message that featured popular Bollywoodsong Yeh dosti from the movie Sholay , drawing an equally warm response from Prime MinisterNarendra Modi who said the bond between the two countries was “strong and eternal”.

“Happy #FriendshipDay2019 India! May our ever strengthening friendship & growing partnershiptouch greater heights,” the Israeli Embassy here tweeted on Sunday.

The tweet included a short montage of the various meetings between Mr. Modi and hiscounterpart, Benjamin Netanyahu, with the music of Yeh dosti from the 1975 hit movie, starringAmitabh Bachchan, Dharmendra and Hema Malini, in the background.

The message had lyrics of the song in Hindi and emoticons conveying that Israel loves India.

Mr. Modi responded with a tweet in Hebrew saying, India and Israel have proved their friendshipover time.

“Thank you and wishing a Happy Friendship Day to Israel’s wonderful citizens and my goodfriend (Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin) Netanyahu. India and Israel are time tested friends. Ourbond is strong and eternal! May the friendship between our nations grow and prosper even morein the times to come!” he said.













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CLOUDS OF UNCERTAINTY OVER AFGHANISTANRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: Effect of policies and politics of developed & developing countries

on India's interests

“The Afghan government has lost credibility.” A suicide attack on Amrullah Saleh, the candidatefor vice president, at his party office in Kabul marked the beginning of the campaigning period inKabul. NYT

After Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s ‘successful’ visit to Washington last month, anotherround of Doha talks between the U.S. and the Taliban has started. U.S. Special Representativefor Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad was in a hurry to go to Doha via Islamabad toensure that Pakistan will deliver. On July 31 he tweeted, “In Doha, if the Taliban do their part, wewill do ours, and conclude the agreement we have been working on”.

U.S. President Donald Trump has reversed his Afghanistan policy over the past two years. The2017 policy aimed at breaking the military stalemate in Afghanistan by authorising an additional4,000 soldiers, giving U.S. forces a freer hand to go after the Taliban, putting Pakistan on notice,and strengthening Afghan capabilities. Within a year, it became clear that the policy was notworking. The U.S. failed to understand that no insurgency can be defeated as long as it enjoyssanctuary. Direct talks with the Taliban began with the appointment of Mr. Khalilzad. But soon,the U.S. realised that it needed the Pakistan army’s help to get the Taliban to the negotiatingtable. A politically savvy Khalilzad understood that his negotiating time frame was governed byPresident Trump’s re-election due in 2020; therefore any deal had to be concluded before theend of 2019. This reality wasn’t lost on either the Taliban or the Pakistan army; time was on theirside.

While the U.S. maintained that the seventh round of Doha talks would cover four issues — acessation of hostilities; an intra-Afghan peace dialogue; assurance from the Taliban that Afghanterritory would not be used for attacking U.S. interests; and U.S. troop withdrawal — the Talibanmade it clear that its priority was the last issue. It rejected a ceasefire, instead launching itsspring offensive, Operation Fath, as well as talks with the Afghan government, describing it as a“puppet regime”. The Taliban provided some assurances on the third issue but kept demandinga firm date for U.S. troop withdrawal.

The Taliban relented on the second issue, an intra-Afghan peace dialogue, when pushed byPakistan. In early July, it met with an Afghan delegation, which included some officials who werepresent in their personal capacity.

The quid pro quo for Pakistan for delivering on this soon emerged in Mr. Khan’s meeting withMr. Trump on July 22. On January 1, 2018, Mr. Trump had accused Pakistan of “lies anddeceit”. He tweeted that while the U.S. had given Pakistan “$33 billion in aid”, Pakistan wasproviding a “safe haven to terrorists”. He conveyed his displeasure by cutting off $1.3 billion ofassistance. Nearly 18 months later, with Mr. Khan standing beside him, Mr. Trump told the worldthat “Pakistan is going to help us out to extricate ourselves”.

Mr. Khan cleverly tickled Mr. Trump’s ego by suggesting that as the leader of the “most powerfulcountry in the world”, he could “play an important role in bringing peace in the subcontinent”. Mr.Trump lapped it up and offered his mediation skills to help resolve the Kashmir problem, addingthat Prime Minister Narendra Modi had himself suggested it during their exchange in Osaka, aclaim that was promptly rejected by the Indian authorities. As a downpayment for the next roundof Doha talks, the U.S. also cleared a $125 million support package for Pakistan’s F-16 fleet.

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Meanwhile, elections in Afghanistan have been postponed twice and will now be held onSeptember 28 to give time for the Doha talks. The Afghan government has lost credibility andthere is little support for its term being extended. A deteriorating security environment makes itdifficult for a credible election to be held. Afghan security forces are losing 25 to 30 men daily, atoll that is depleting ranks and dampening morale.

Campaigning kicked off on July 28 and was marked by a suicide attack on Amrullah Saleh, thecandidate for vice president as Ashraf Ghani’s running mate, at his party office in Kabul. Mr.Saleh had a narrow escape but the suicide attack claimed over 20 lives. Mr. Saleh has beenamong the most vocal critics of the hasty reconciliation process and the U.S.’s gullibility atreposing faith in the Pakistan army. A close aide to the former Northern Alliance leader AhmadShah Massoud, Mr. Saleh has long been targeted by the Taliban.

The Taliban is not going to take part in the election, and once a deal is concluded, its demandwill be for an interim government. Even if elections take place, an elected government wouldsoon find itself at cross purposes with the interim government. Further, a number of promisedelectoral reforms are yet to be implemented.

An interim government would prepare the ground for fresh elections after constitutionalamendments and electoral reforms that would be decided by the traditional Loya Jirga processover two years. However, this approach is strongly opposed by the more secular and liberalAfghan groups, including women, who see it as a step back from the democratic rights andprinciples enshrined in the 2004 Constitution. There is a deepening sense of unease andbetrayal in the Afghan government which feels that its legitimacy is being eroded by the U.S.tacitly making deals and leaving it in the lurch.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has already indicated September 1 as a deadline forconcluding the Doha process. Instead of a messy and contentious election, an interimgovernment would provide a better environment for the U.S. to manage its exit in keeping withthe 2020 election calendar.

The reality is that there can be no peace unless the Taliban and Afghan security forces de-escalate, and this will require talks between the Taliban and the government. The Taliban wantsto bypass this by entering government through the back door, using the interim structure. Such amove is likely to create strains within the Afghan security force which needs a clear chain ofcommand to function. There is a rise in ethnic polarisation in Afghanistan. With the emergenceof the Islamic State, there is growing evidence of sectarian polarisation. Any dilution of thecohesiveness of the Afghan security forces, which are dependent on external funding (primarilythe U.S.), would dramatically increase the risks of fragmentation of Afghanistan.

All Afghans are tired of conflict, want peace, and accept that this requires reconciliation. But notall Afghans want peace on the terms of reconciliation dictated by the Taliban. Today 74% of theAfghan population is below 30 years and has lived for most part in a conservative but opensociety. That is why there is no national consensus on reconciliation. In the absence of anational consensus, external actors are able to intervene to support their own favourites. Butthat is not Mr. Trump’s problem. The U.S.’s exit will end its long war in Afghanistan but growingpolitical uncertainties will only exacerbate Afghanistan’s ongoing conflict.

Rakesh Sood is a former diplomat and currently a Distinguished Fellow at the ObserverResearch Foundation



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INDIA TELLS CHINA TO AVOID COMMENTING ONLADAKH

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - China

Historically the district of Leh covered the area of Aksai Chin that remains out of Indian control.

The exchanges over Ladakh are expected to set the backdrop of the August 11 to 13 visit toBeijing by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar who will participate in the High LevelMechanism between two sides.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry had highlighted the creation of Ladakh as a union territory whilecriticising the Indian move to end the special status for Kashmir. Foreign Ministry spokespersonHua Chunying said on Tuesday that change of the status of Ladakh was ‘unacceptable’ toChina.

“We urge India to exercise prudence in words and deeds concerning the boundary question,strictly abide by relevant agreements concluded between the two sides and avoid taking anymove that may further complicate the boundary question,” said Ms. Hua in response to aquestion on the creation of a union territory in Ladakh that she described as ‘Chinese territory’ inthe western sector of the Sino-India boundary question.

MEA statement

In response the MEA spokesperson said, Delhi and Beijing are committed to maintain peaceand tranquillity in the border region. “The border issue will be dealt with on the basis of thePolitical Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of India-China BoundaryQuestion,” said the MEA spokesperson.














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AFGHANISTAN SHADOW OVER INDIA’S MOVERelevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - Afghanistan

India’s move to end the special status to Jammu and Kashmir indicates that the government isbracing for serious geo-strategic shifts that will unfold in South Asia over the next few months.

Though the domestic reasons for ending the status was presented through a detailed analysis ofthe negative effects that the Article 370 had for Kashmir, the real reason for this hurriedmakeover lies in the international context.

‘Great progress’

Soon after Union Home Minister Amit Shah presented his case for turning Kashmir into a UnionTerritory, a message from U.S. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad stated that his talkswith the Taliban in Qatari capital had yielded “great progress” and that he was heading to Delhito create greater consensus in favour of peace in Afghanistan.

The implication of this peace agreement between the Taliban and the U.S. will be felt acrossSouth Asia and in the West Asia.

Pakistan is waiting anxiously till its biggest strategic assets – the Taliban – seal the deal with theU.S. The Taliban have a historical parallel going back to the 1980s. In 1988, following theGeneva Accords of 14 April, South Asia went into a tailspin with Pakistan trying to use some ofthe resources secured for the Afghan Mujahideen fighters to Kashmir where insurgency peakedsubsequently.

The immediate outcome of the U.S.-Taliban deal will be the visible display of Americandisinterest in South Asia. This is the context in which India keeping a firm grip on Kashmir hasbeen seen.













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CHINA VOWS TO COUNTER U.S. MISSILE PLANSRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: Effect of policies and politics of developed & developing countries


China threatened countermeasures on Tuesday if the United States deploys intermediate-range,ground-based missiles in Asia and warned U.S. allies of repercussions if they allow suchweapons on their territory.

U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper said on Saturday he was in favour of placing ground-launched, intermediate-range missiles in the region soon, possibly within months.

U.S. pulled out last week from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a 1987 pact withthe former Soviet Union that banned ground-launched nuclear and conventional ballistic andcruise missiles with ranges of 500-5,000 km. The withdrawal also allows the Pentagon todevelop new weapons to counter China.

Fu Cong, Director General of the Arms Control department at China’s Foreign Ministry, saidBeijing “will not stand by idly ” and warned “China will be forced to take countermeasures”.


















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Source : www.indianexpress.com Date : 2019-08-07

THE BATTLE CONTINUESRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: World Trade, WTO and issues involved

© 2019 The Indian Express Ltd.All Rights Reserved

On Monday, the US formally labeled China a currency manipulator after Beijing allowed itscurrency to fall to an 11-year low — below the psychological mark of 7 per dollar. This comesafter US president Donald Trump accused China of weakening its currency to create an unfairtrade advantage. Though the decision to label China is largely symbolic — it will be followed upby consultations between the US Treasury and China — it marks an escalation in the ongoingtrade war. These developments suggest a hardening of positions between the warring parties,belying expectations of a resolution.

To be labeled a currency manipulator, a country is measured, and seen to have failed, on threeparameters — its current account surplus, trade surplus with the US, and interventions in thecurrency market. Despite the US Treasury’s charge against China, the allegation of currencymanipulation today is weak at best. As economists at the Peterson Institute For InternationalEconomics have pointed out: “China was by far the largest currency manipulator between 2003-12. It reversed that practice in 2015-16.” In fact, in its External Sector Report released lastmonth, even the International Monetary Fund noted that China’s external assessment is movingfrom “moderately stronger to broadly in line”. But though China has said that the “devaluationreflects pressure on the exchange rate stemming from the US decision” and that it has “refusedto engage in competitive devaluation”, other countries which compete with China might followsuit — weakening their currencies in order to maintain their competitiveness — triggering off acurrency war.

In India, too, some have argued in favour of a weak currency — going by the RBI’s real effectiveexchange rate (REER), the currency is overvalued. But at the current juncture it may be prudentto avoid getting caught in these wars. Instead, the focus should be on addressing the deeperstructural issues that affect export competitiveness. Resolving issues regarding taxation and taxadministration, reducing policy uncertainty, carrying out reforms to boost exports, especially oflabour intensive sectors, and creating conditions for greater integration with global supplychains, should be the pressing concern of the government.

Download the Indian Express apps for iPhone, iPad or Android

© 2019 The Indian Express Ltd. All Rights Reserved



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REVIEW DECISION ON TIES, INDIA TELLS PAKISTANRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - Pakistan

The earlier provisions of Article 370 denied development opportunities to Kashmir, and annullingthe special status would ensure an end to the “socio-economic discrimination and ensure anupswing in economic activity and improve the livelihood prospects of all people of Jammu andKashmir,” it said.

Pakistan’s National Security Committee (NSC) on Wednesday declared that it was downgradingdiplomatic relations with India and froze trade ties in response to India ending the special statusto Kashmir.

Following the host country’s order, Indian envoy Ajay Bisaria left Islamabad for Delhi onThursday afternoon. Besides ordering his return, the NSC also declared that all bilateralarrangements with India would be reviewed.

In response, India described Article 370 as a temporary provision and that the removal of thesame would lead to improvement of social and economic indicators in the Kashmiri society.

“The recent developments pertaining to Article 370 are entirely the internal affair of India. TheConstitution of India was, is and will always be a sovereign matter. Seeking to interfere in thatjurisdiction by invoking an alarmist vision of the region will never succeed,” said the MEAstatement.













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HOME MINISTER-LEVEL TALKS BETWEEN INDIA ANDBANGLADESH

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - Bangladesh

Ministry of Home Affairs

Home Minister-level Talks between India and Bangladesh

Posted On: 08 AUG 2019 9:40AM by PIB Delhi

The Seventh meeting of the India-Bangladesh Home Minister Level Talks (HMLT) was held inNew Delhi on 07 August 2019. The HMLT was co-chaired by Shri Amit Shah, Home Minister ofIndia and Mr. Asaduzzaman Khan, Minister for Home Affairs of Bangladesh.

Home Minister congratulated the visiting dignitary on his resumption of the office as HomeMinister of Bangladesh for a second term, and reiterated India’s full support for BangladeshPrime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s development agenda. Both the Ministers reiterated thesignificance attached to the bilateral relationship, which is forged in the 1971 Liberation War,which goes far beyond a strategic partnership. Today, our ties are a role model for goodneighbourly relations across the world. They are rooted in history, culture, language and sharedvalues of democracy, secularism, development cooperation and countless other commonalities.

During the meeting, the Ministers expressed satisfaction that both countries are working closerthan ever before in every sector, including security and border management. They reiteratedtheir commitment to keep the borders friendly, and in this regard appreciated the close co-operation between their border guarding forces. Home Minister appreciated Bangladesh’s policyof not allowing use of its territory by extremists and insurgents for perpetrating violence in othercountries including India.

The gamut of issues related to bilateral security co-operation were discussed during themeeting. Both the Home Ministers reaffirmed the need to further curb the menace of trans-border crimes, and therefore agreed to the need for greater co-operation to achieve our aim of asecure border. Both sides also reviewed the pending issues related to security and infrastructureat the borders, and agreed to take steps towards the expedited resolution of these matters.Home Minister Shri Amit Shah also raised India’s concern regarding the illicit movement ofundocumented persons across the border, with a view to find solutions to this problem especiallyin North East India.

The Indian Home Minister assured the Home Minister of Bangladesh of India’s continuingsupport for safe and speedy repatriation of the displaced Myanmar citizens sheltered inBangladesh, for whom India has provided humanitarian assistance in four tranches sinceSeptember 2017.

The leaders also looked forward to enhancing cooperation in simplifying people to peoplecontact and travel for business, health and tourism, including through promoting connectivity.

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Read this release in: Urdu , Hindi , Marathi , Bengali , Gujarati



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PAKISTAN FORMALLY SUSPENDS TRADE TIESRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - Pakistan

Red signal:A file photo of trucks from Pakistan moving towards the trade facilitation centre nearUri.NISSAR AHMAD

Pakistan has formally suspended trade relations with India after New Delhi revoked the specialstatus of Jammu and Kashmir.

On Friday, the Federal Cabinet, headed by Prime Minister Imran Khan, endorsed the decisionstaken by the National Security Committee and the joint session of Parliament, includingsuspension of trade ties, The Dawn reported.

Trade relations had already been strained by the Pulwama terror attack, with India havingimposed a 200% customs duty on all goods from Pakistan. Imports from Pakistan declined by92% to $2.84 million in March this year, as against $34.61 million in March 2018, according todata from the Commerce Ministry. From January to March during the 2018-19 fiscal, importsfrom Pakistan declined by 47% to $53.65 million.

Two notifications were issued soon after the Cabinet meeting to implement the decision tosuspend trade with immediate effect and until further orders, the report said.

One notification suspends all exports to India and the other bans import of goods of Indian originor those imported from it. Earlier, this ban was limited to imports from Israel, with which Pakistanhas no trade relations at all.

Pakistan’s imports have already entered negative growth with almost all countries, except India,as Islamabad mostly imports raw materials from India, the report said.

According to data from the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, thetotal exports from India to Pakistan during the 2018-19 fiscal were around $2 billion. The majoritems exported include chemical products and textiles. The imported items include mineralproducts.












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CARRY OUT CHANGES IN J&K BY INDIANCONSTITUTION, SAYS RUSSIA

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - Pakistan

Russia has called upon both India and Pakistan to save the situation in Kashmir from spirallingout of control and carry out the changes in the region within the constitutional parameters ofIndia.

No new aggravation

“We hope that the parties involved will not allow a new aggravation of the situation in the regionas a result of the decisions,” said the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a statement onFriday, referring to India's latest legislative steps on the territory.

Normalisation

Moscow has underlined that it seeks normalisation of ties between India and Pakistan andbilateral dialogue.

“We hope that the differences between them will be resolved by political and diplomatic meanson a bilateral basis in accordance with the provisions of the Simla Agreement of 1972 and theLahore Declaration of 1999,” the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said.

This is the first comment from Moscow on the Kashmir issue which has drawn severalinternational statements since India ended special status of the area and turned it into a newUnion Territory.














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CHINA OPPOSES UNILATERAL ACTION IN J&KRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - Pakistan

China on Friday backed the resolution of the Kashmir issue on the basis of the UN SecurityCouncil resolutions as well bilateral agreements between India and Pakistan — a veiledreference to the Shimla accord of 1972.

Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, following talks with his counterpart fromPakistan, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, who had arrived on an “urgent” visit to Beijing in the wake ofchange of status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, said that “China will stand up for justice onthe Kashmir issue.”

Mr. Wang said that China is “seriously concerned” about the recent escalation of tensions inKashmir.

“The Kashmir issue is a dispute left from colonial history. It should be properly and peacefullyresolved based on the UN charter, relevant UN Security Council resolutions and bilateralagreements,” he said.

Veiled criticism

But in a veiled criticism of India, Mr. Wang said that “China believes that unilateral actions thatwill complicate the situation should not be taken.” Mr. Qureshi’s unscheduled arrival in Beijing,precedes the visit of External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, who arrives in the Chinese capitalon August 11 to prepare for an informal summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping andPrime Minister Narendra Modi in October.
















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HONG KONG ON THE BRINK: ON CONTINUINGPROTESTS

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: Effect of policies and politics of developed & developing countrieson India's interests

Protests broke out in Hong Kong two months ago when local authorities proposed a Bill thatwould have allowed them to extradite suspects to places with which the city doesn’t haveextradition treaties, including mainland China. The Bill was suspended amid public anger, butthe protests, now entering the tenth week, continue to rock the city, affecting the economy andsetting off an unprecedented political crisis. The police have tried several tactics to rein in theprotesters and restore normalcy in the city, a major Asian financial hub and business centre.They have fired tear gas shells and rubber bullets. Dozens have been arrested, some on riotcharges. Still, the city has been on a standstill. Public transportation is hit. People, fromconstruction workers to teachers and lawyers, have joined the demonstrations. The protestersransacked the local legislative council building and occupied parts of the airport, which led to thecancellation of several flights. Graffiti appeared across the city calling for “a revolution” and“liberation” of Hong Kong. Despite warnings from both the city government and Beijing, theprotesters don’t seem to be in a mood to leave the streets.

It is no longer about the extradition Bill as a leadership-less group keeps coming up with newand varied demands. Carrie Lam, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, has said the Bill is dead.The protesters first wanted the city government to formally withdraw the Bill. Then they wantedMs. Lam, the architect of the Bill, to go. Now, the protesters say they won’t end the rallies even ifMs. Lam quits. They have made a host of demands — withdraw the Bill, order an independentprobe into the clashes between protesters and police, drop all charges on the arrestedprotesters and start the process to reform the electoral system. Ms. Lam, perhaps wary of beingseen to be weak in the face of mounting pressure, has ruled out any more concessions. For her,the top priority is to restore order, while Beijing, with its patience wearing thin, has hinted that itcould interfere to end the crisis. Both the city government and the protesters share responsibilityfor the crisis Hong Kong is in today. Ms. Lam could have officially withdrawn the Bill instead ofmerely pronouncing it dead. Her reluctance to do so even after the Bill was suspended onlyfanned the flames. The protesters on the other side took an excessively provocative path whenthey ransacked the city Parliament and attacked the police. What could have been a peacefulprotest against an extradition Bill led to the biggest political crisis Hong Kong has seen since itwas handed over to China by the British colonialists. At least now, the focus of both the localleadership and protesters should shift to finding common ground and a peaceful settlement. It’sin everyone’s interest to arrest the slide of Hong Kong.



Pakistan must recognise India’s resolve in securing the safety of Jadhav



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WAR WITHIN WAR: ON SAUDI'S INTERVENTION INYEMEN


The Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen is proof of how things can go wrong with an ill-conceived, poorly strategised and geopolitics-driven military interference that cares little abouthuman lives. After four years of war, the Saudis have not met their declared goal — pushingback the Shia Houthi rebels from the capital Sana’a and restoring the ousted government whichis now temporarily headquartered in the southern city of Aden. On the contrary, the war haspushed Yemen into what the UN calls the worst humanitarian crisis. Thousands have beenkilled, tens of thousands displaced and about two thirds of the country’s 28 million people do nothave enough to eat. And now, there is a rebellion within the coalition. Last week, the SouthernTransitional Council (STC), a militia group that was fighting the Houthis as part of the Saudi-ledcoalition, turned against their masters and captured the presidential palace in Aden as well asthe city’s main port. In return, Saudi jets targeted STC fighters before a tenuous ceasefire set in.It now looks like a three-way conflict. The Shia Houthis, who the Saudis claim are backed byIran, are controlling much of the country’s north including Sana’a. Yemen’s internationally-backed government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, the Saudi ally, is controlling the south, thoughMr. Hadi is running the purported administration from Saudi Arabia. The STC wants the south tobe an independent entity, like it was till the Yemeni unification in 1990.

The STC’s rebellion also signals the growing friction in the multi-national coalition Saudi Arabiahas stitched together to fight the Houthis. The STC is backed by the UAE, a crucial partner ofSaudi Arabia in its foreign policy adventures. They stayed together in propping up the militarydictatorship of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, in countering the spread and influence of theMuslim Brotherhood in the Arab world, in opposing the Iran nuclear deal and on blockadingQatar. But when it comes to Yemen, the Saudis see the Hadi government and Sunni Islamicparties, including the Islah, as allies who could stabilise and rebuild the whole country after theHouthis are defeated, while the UAE, already frustrated by the coalition’s failure to defeat therebels, counts on the STC and is staunchly opposed to the Islah party, which has ties to theBrotherhood. The UAE has already pulled out of the Yemen war leaving it to Saudi Arabia todefeat the Houthis. And with their continued backing to the STC, the Emiratis appear lessconcerned about defeating the Houthis than maintaining their influence in southern Yemen. Thisshould be a moment of reckoning for Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi Arabian Crown Princeand the main architect of the Yemen intervention. He has lost the war and his coalition iscrumbling, while Yemen is left with unimaginable human suffering. It is time for a nationwideceasefire and talks with all stakeholders under the mediation of a willing UN to find a politicalsettlement to the crisis.








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ENDING J&K’S SPECIAL STATUS AN INTERNALMATTER, CHINA TOLD

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - China

External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar told the Indian media on Monday that in his talks, Chinahad raised the question of Aksai Chin — a territory claimed by India, but under Chinese control.

Regarding India’s decision to withdraw special status to Jammu and Kashmir, Mr. Jaishankarsaid that he had told his hosts that “this was an internal matter for India.” “The issue related tochanges in a temporary provision of the Constitution of India and was the sole prerogative of thecountry.”

He said his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, had also referred to rising tensions between Indiaand Pakistan as a result of these changes. In his response, Mr. Jaishankar said he hademphasised that “these changes had no bearing on Pakistan as it was an internal matter.”

“It did not impact the Line of Control (LoC). Where India-Pakistan relations are concerned, theChinese side should base its assessment on realities,” he had told Mr. Wang.

“India as a responsible power had shown restraint in the face of provocative Pakistani rhetoricand actions. India has always stood for normalisation of the ties in an atmosphere free of terror,”he noted. Asked if he had objected to China’s reference to the UN charter and UN SecurityCouncil resolutions to resolve the Kashmir issue following Mr. Wang’s talks with visitingPakistani Foreign Minister Mahmood Qureshi on Thursday, Mr. Jaishankar said: “I am not hereto have an argument with something they (the Chinese) did with Pakistan or some other country.I am here to represent my position and have a conversation with my counterpart. My counterpartraised certain issues related to legislative changes in India. I replied to that.”

Mr. Jaishankar said the situation in Afghanistan was also discussed. “The Chinese ForeignMinister shared his assessment because they have been talking to various parties. He gave hisassessment. We had a fairly detailed conversation.” There was also a dialogue on theBangladesh China India Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor, he added.












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TRADE RHETORIC: ON U.S.’S WTO PULLOUT THREATRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: World Trade, WTO and issues involved

U.S. President Donald Trump opened up another front in the ongoing global trade war onWednesday by ramping up rhetoric against the World Trade Organization (WTO). He eventhreatened to pull the U.S. out of the multilateral trade organisation if it fails to treat the U.S.fairly and blamed it for allowing too many countries to claim the status of a “developing country”.In a memo to the U.S. Trade Representative last month, Mr. Trump pointed out that nearly two-thirds of the 164 WTO members classified themselves as developing countries, and raised theissue of even many rich economies claiming to be “growing” rather than “grown” economies.This time around, in Pennsylvania, the President targeted India and China in particular for“taking advantage” of the U.S. by classifying themselves as “developing countries” at the WTO.The status of a developing country allows countries to seek partial exemptions from the WTO’srules for free and fair trade between countries. The status, for instance, allows countries likeChina and India, with their special tag, to impose higher tariffs on imports from other countriesand also offer more subsidies to local producers in order to protect their domestic interests.Developed countries find this to be unfair on their producers who are put at a relativedisadvantage, but countries like China have argued that their developing country status isjustified given their low per capita income.

Mr. Trump’s recent attacks on the WTO would be welcome if they were truly about creating aglobal trading arena with lower tariffs and fewer barriers to trade. The “developing country”status, which offers substantial benefits to countries that want to protect their domestic interestsand which most countries are more than happy to make use of, has indeed skewed global tradeover the years in favour of certain countries. But he may be raking up the issue not to further thecause of global free trade, but simply as a convenient pretext to justify further trade barriersagainst China and other countries. By pointing fingers at other countries that follow protectionistpolicies, Mr. Trump will find it justified to impose retaliatory tariffs against them. This will help himbolster his “America First” approach and allow him to successfully hold on to his support base inAmerica’s manufacturing belt that has been affected by foreign competition. Even if countrieslike China and India offer to lower their tariffs, Mr. Trump would not take them up on their offer.That is because it would require reciprocation in the way of lowering U.S. tariffs, which wouldwork against the interests of local American producers.










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WHITE HOUSE APPROVES SALE OF F-16 FIGHTERJETS TO TAIWAN


The Trump administration is moving forward with an $8 billion sale of F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan,American officials said on Friday. The move is certain to further anger China at a time when along-running trade war between Washington and Beijing has upended relations between theworld’s two largest economies and contributed to stock market turmoil.

The State Department told Congress on Thursday night, right after Secretary of State MikePompeo had signed a memo approving the sale, officials said. Congress is not expected toobject to the move. For weeks, lawmakers from both parties had accused the administration ofdelaying the sale to avoid jeopardising trade negotiations or to use it as a bargaining chip.

But trade negotiations held in Shanghai at the end of July led to nowhere.

Mr. Trump’s National Security Adviser, John Bolton, has been a longtime advocate of armssales to Taiwan. Some analysts say China could retaliate by punishing U.S. companies withsanctions, which it has done in the past.

The sale of 66 jets to Taiwan would be the largest single arms package transaction between theU.S. and the democratic, self-governing island in years.NY Times
















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VICE PRESIDENT EMBARKS ON A THREE-NATIONTOUR TO ADVANCE INDIA’S OUTREACH IN THEBALTIC REGION;

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: Europe, European Union (EU) and India

Vice President's Secretariat

Vice President embarks on a three-nation tour to advanceIndia’s outreach in the Baltic region;

Shri Venkaiah Naidu to hold high-level meetings inLithuania, Latvia and Estonia


Advancing India’s outreach in the Baltic region, the Vice President of India, Shri M. VenkaiahNaidu has left here today on a three-nation visit to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. His visit isexpected to enhance India’s bilateral ties with each of the three countries and help in promotingpeople-to-people contacts and business opportunities.

Shri Naidu will kick-start his tour by visiting Lithuania on 17th August and hold a tête-à-tête withthe President of Lithuania, Mr. Gitanas Nauseda and subsequently hold delegation-level talkswith him. Later both the leaders will witness the signing of MoUs before making the pressstatements. Shri Naidu will attend the state banquet hosted by the President.

On 18th August, the Vice President will meet Mr. Visvaldas Matijosaitis, Mayor of Kaunas andlater proceed to the Sanataka Valley of the Kaunas University of Technology. Shri Naidu and thedelegation members will be guided on an explanatory tour of the activities undertaken by theinstitution. Later the Vice President will attend a presentation on ‘Krunois Hydro Power Plant’.

Later in the evening, Shri Naidu will address the Indian Community.

The next day, the Vice President will meet with the Prime Minister, Mr. Saulius Skvernelis andlater both the leaders will address India - Lithuania Business Forum Meeting. Shri Naidu will laythe wreath at the Memorial to those who died in the struggle for Lithuanian Independence.

The other important engagement include his meeting with Mr. Viktoras Pranckietis, Speaker ofthe Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament) before emplaning for Riga, the capital city of Latvia

Upon his arrival in Riga, the Vice President is scheduled to address the Indian CommunityReception and interact with Indians settled in Latvia.

On 20th August, the Vice President along with Mr. Egils Levits, President of the Republic ofLatvia will pay tributes to martyrs at the Freedom Monument and proceed to the National HistoryMuseum of Latvia and visit the Exhibition ‘Latvia’s Century’.

He will hold a meeting with the Latvian Prime Minister and witness the signing of MoUs. ShriNaidu will meet Ms. Inese Libina-Egnere, the acting Speaker of the Saeima and later reach Riga

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Castle and hold delegation level talks with Mr. Egils Levits, President of the Republic of Latvia.

In the evening, the Shri Naidu along with the President of Latvia and his delegation willparticipate in India-Latvia Business Forum Meeting. The Vice President will later unveil the bustof Mahatma Gandhi at National Library of Latvia before emplaning for Tallinn, the capital ofEstonia for the last leg of his visit.

On 21st August, the Vice President will be given a ceremonial welcome at the PresidentialPalace. He will hold a tête-à-tête with Ms. Kersti Kaljulaid, President of the Republic of Estonia.

Later Shri Naidu will hold talks with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Estonia, Mr. Juri Ratasand attend a lunch hosted by the President of Estonia, Ms. Kersti Kaljulaid. He will also meet Mr. Henn Polluaas, President of the Parliament (Riigikogu).

The Vice President will address a Seminar of the Heads of Missions/ Ambassadors at theMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia and later attend the India-Estonia Business Forum.Subsequently, Shri Naidu will address the Indian Community and emplane for Delhi.

During the visit, the Vice President will be accompanied by a high-level delegation including ShriSanjay Shamrao Dhotre, Minister of State for HRD, Communications and Electronics &Information Technology, Smt. Ranee Narah, Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha, Shri ManasRanjan Bhunia, Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha, Shri Ramesh Bidhuri, Member ofParliament, Lok Sabha and senior officers of the Government of India.

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RRK/BK/MS/RK


Read this release in: Urdu , Hindi



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WORLD AND VALLEYRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: UNO and its various Agencies


Last week, Delhi fended off a vigorous Chinese attempt at getting the United Nations SecurityCouncil to pronounce, after more than five decades, on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. Butit is too early to celebrate. For, Pakistan’s campaign to draw the international community into theKashmir question has just begun. When the government surprised the nation and the world byrevoking the special status of J&K and bifurcated the state into union territories, theinternationalisation of the issues was central to Pakistan’s furious response. China has been aneager accomplice. The resolute support from the US and France to the Indian position that thepolitical rearrangement of J&K was an “internal matter” prevented a formal discussion and apotential statement or resolution at the UNSC. Russia, which had exercised its veto in favour ofIndia during the Cold War years when Kashmir was on the UNSC agenda, insisted that theproblems between India and Pakistan must be resolved bilaterally. Britain, apparently, tiltedtowards the Chinese view that the UNSC must issue a statement.

Although the weight of collective opinion at the UNSC was in India’s favour, Delhi knows it has aprolonged diplomatic challenge at hand. Delhi can easily dismiss Islamabad’s claim that the veryfact that there were consultations on the Kashmir question at the UNSC is a political triumph forPakistan. But India can’t ignore Islamabad’s declared intention to keep returning to the UNSCwith China’s support. How the UNSC might respond the next time will depend on the groundsituation in Kashmir.

Any breakdown of law and order in the Kashmir Valley and Delhi’s use of force against civilianswill certainly weaken international support for India. Any serious escalation of military tensionswith Pakistan on the LoC could be seen as a “threat to international peace and security” andprovide the basis for the UNSC’s political intervention. India then faces a three-fold attack fromthe Pakistan-China strategic axis. Pakistan is likely to unleash its proxies to trigger violence inthe Valley. It may also raise the military temperature on the LoC. China has signalled its intent tobring its full weight to bear at the UNSC against India. Delhi may have no time to contemplate afourth dimension — of Beijing’s potential to open a second military front on its long andcontested borders with India. After all, Beijing has accused Delhi of “challenging China’ssovereign interests” by altering the internal political status quo in Kashmir. The accusation mighthave no basis in reality, but it underlines China’s deepening political hostility towards India. IfDelhi can’t afford to underestimate the challenges — domestic, trans-border and international —arising from its Kashmir move, it also knows that failure on any front is not an option.





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Source : www.hindustantimes.com Date : 2019-08-19

FASHIONING INDIA’S NUCLEAR POSTURERelevant for: International Relations | Topic: India's Foreign Policy evolution and changes

Aug 18, 2019-Sunday-°C

Humidity-

Wind-

Metro cities - Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata

Other cities - Noida, Gurgaon, Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Bhopal , Chandigarh , Dehradun, Indore,Jaipur, Lucknow, Patna, Ranchi

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Defence Minister Rajnath Singh reiterated that “no first use” remained the governing doctrine forIndia’s nuclear weapons posture, but added “what happens in future depends on thecircumstances.” Similar off-the-cuff remarks have come from Indian officials in the past. Someclaim this reflects an evolving nuclear doctrine, in which New Delhi is moving towards anembrace of a nuclear first strike. However, India’s written nuclear doctrine and the deliverysystems it is deploying remained geared to no first use. There is no real evidence that the strongconsensus within the Indian strategic and political community in favour of no first use haschanged.

Nonetheless, at times of crisis which involve Pakistan and China, the Indian leadership is proneto indirectly hinting that no first use may not be a hard and fast rule. Singh’s comment derivesfrom the present shift in Kashmir policy and the possibility of an aggressive response byPakistan and China. The primary reason New Delhi feels the need to let its neighbours bereminded of its nuclear arsenal is the lack of credibility of its overall defence situation. Nucleardeterrence assumes that all players understand that they cannot win in an exchange of massdestruction. But India cannot be wholly sure that this is accepted by its neighbours. Pakistan hasa warhead hoard that is probably larger than India’s. China’s is obviously much larger. Numberscan be compensated with deployments designed to survive a first strike. The most survivablepart of India’s arsenal is its submarines but that is an effective fleet of one.

All this is compounded with a conventional defence deficit caused by almost two decades ofunderspending on the armed forces. New Delhi fills this gap by making hints about its nuclearcapabilities whenever it has security concerns about its immediate neighbours. The perfectanswer is for India to spend more on its conventional defences and complete its nuclear triad. AUnited States and China do not need to flash their atomic sabres, their nuclear credibility is clearand present. However, given the costs involved, changes in technology and China’s rapiddefence buildup, it could be decades before India reaches the state of comfort that allows it tofirewall its nuclear posture from its conventional security problems. In the meantime, the bestthat India can do is to make sure its nuclear footnotes are extremely rare and understated, butalways keeping in mind that cumulatively they undermine rather than enhance the credibility ofits nuclear posture.

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First Published: Aug 18, 2019 18:08 IST



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INDIA, BHUTAN VOW TO STRENGTHEN TIESRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - Bhutan

The two leaders jointly inaugurated the Ground Earth Station and SATCOM network, developedwith assistance from ISRO for utilization of South Asia Satellite in Bhutan.

Mr. Modi said India is committed to facilitating Bhutan’s development through the use of spacetechnology. India will enhance the communication, public broadcasting and disastermanagement coverage in Bhutan, he said.

‘Unique model’

He said the collaboration and relationship between Royal Bhutan University and IITs of Indiaand some other top educational institutions are in line with today’s requirements for educationand technology.

“I believe that India and Bhutan will remain a unique model of relations between two countries inthe world,” he said.

Prime Minister Tshering said India and Bhutan may vary in size but their beliefs, values andmotivation are common. “On his (Modi) first visit to Bhutan, I remember him saying that Bhutanand India are close not because we have open borders, but because we have opened ourhearts to each other. Your visit this time shows how much you meant it,” he said.

Mr. Modi also planted a sapling at Simtokha Dzong.

Earlier, Prime Minister Modi inspected a guard of honour during his ceremonial welcome atTashichhodzong Palace here.

“Traditional Chipdrel procession and welcome ceremony at the Tashichhodzong Palace for PM@narendramodi before the audience with His Majesty the King of Bhutanm The ceremonysymbolises the purification of path along which the guests are led,” Ministry of External Affairsspokesperson Raveesh Kumar tweeted.

Mr. Modi received a red-carpet welcome at the Paro airport where he was received by theBhutanese Prime Minister.

“I am extremely grateful to @PMBhutan for welcoming me at the airport. His gesture is deeplytouching,” Mr. Modi tweeted.

“A memorable welcome in Bhutan! This is a land blessed with natural beauty and wonderfulpeople. There is immense enthusiasm here and the people of Bhutan want to see the India-Bhutan friendship scale newer heights of success,” he said.

Prime Minister Modi will also address young Bhutanese students at the prestigious RoyalUniversity of Bhutan on Sunday.




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INDIA, CHINA REVIEW BORDER SITUATIONRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - China

India and China reviewed the situation on the border and agreed on more port calls by eachother’s Navies as part of measures to improve military-to-military cooperation at a meeting of theJoint Working Group (JWG) between the Defence Ministries in Beijing last week.

Core issues

“The focus of the discussions was on border management, more port calls and activities linkedto the celebration of 70 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries between April2020 and March 2021,” a defence source said on Monday. The JWG meeting coincided withExternal Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s visit to China to prepare for the second informal summitbetween Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in October.

The JWG meeting was held on August 13 and 14.

The Indian delegation was led by a Joint Secretary from the Defence Ministry along with a one-star officer each from the three Services. The JWG discussions will be followed by the annualdefence and security dialogue headed by the Defence Secretary. There is also a proposed visitof Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to China by year-end.


















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THE FAR RIGHT’S DISRUPTION OF GLOBALISATIONRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: World Trade, WTO and issues involved

By launching a trade war against China, the United States government that had pressured manya country to liberalise trade and globalise seems to have turned against its own agenda. In aseries of aggressive moves, the U.S. — the one-time votary of freer trade — has put in placeand widened the coverage of a protectionist shield aimed at stimulating domestic production andreducing the country’s trade deficit. While these moves initiated by the Donald Trumpadministration were on occasion targeted at multiple countries and involved rewriting the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico, the focus of the trade andtechnology war has been China.

China-specific tariff aggression began with a 25% tariff on imports worth $50 billion, out of thetotal of $540 billion imported by the U.S. from China in July 2018. Soon, an additional $200billion worth of imports from China were subjected to tariffs of 10%, and those levies were alsoraised to 25% in May this year. Most recently on August 1, the balance of around $300 billionworth of imports from China were subjected to a phased 10% levy, with a clear threat that theselevies too can be raised to 25%. China’s responses to U.S. actions, which came at every step ofthe trade war, have in turn led to the $120 billion of goods it imports from the U.S. being subjectto a 25% duty. The U.S. has also imposed sanctions on and shut off business relations withindividual Chinese firms, such as Huawei, on grounds varying from national security to allegedtheft of intellectual property from U.S. firms. This prevents the firms targeted from either sellingin U.S. markets and that of its allies or buying goods, services and technology from U.S. firms orthose of its allies.

Parallel to all this, based on the allegation that the Chinese authorities have deliberately allowedthe yuan to depreciate vis-à-vis the dollar to support its exporters, the U.S. Treasury hasdesignated China as a currency manipulator. What additional action that would lead to is yetunclear. What is clear, however, is that given the importance of China as a global manufacturinghub, these measures have disrupted global value chains and production networks that are thehallmark of globalisation. Deglobalisation may yet be a distant prospect, but the fact that theworld’s leading superpower is willing to disrupt globalisation provides both an example and thejustification to other governments that find the need to move in that direction.

The U.S. justifies its actions against China by citing that country’s significance as a source ofinadequately reciprocated imports into the U.S. Imports from China account for more than a fifthof aggregate U.S. imports. With exports to China being nowhere as large, the U.S. runs anannual trade deficit with that country of around $420 billion, which ‘imbalance’ is attributed toChinese policy.

There are, however, two important facts that this argument sidesteps. First, the gains to the U.S.from its economic relationship with China are inadequately captured by the trade figures. Amajor gain for U.S. companies, even if not for the U.S. per se, is the local sales by subsidiariesof American multinationals located in China. Official statistics from the U.S. indicate that U.S.multinational affiliates based in China notched up local sales of $222 billion in 2015, which donot figure in trade calculations. Second, these subsidiaries are responsible for a chunk ofChina’s exports to the U.S. According to one estimate, more than half of Chinese exports to theU.S. originate in foreign invested enterprises which are either U.S. multinational arms or firmswith parents in other advanced economies. That is, the U.S. trade deficit with China is the resultof the off-shoring associated with globalisation, rather than to Chinese policy favouring its ownfirms.

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Not surprisingly, it troubles the neoliberal policy establishment that the fallout of this kind of tradeaggression can set back globalisation across the world. Members of the G20 other than the U.S.have strenuously and unsuccessfully tried to get the latter to sign on to another call forstrengthening free trade. The International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation and ahost of international institutions have warned of the dangers of the new protectionism. Implicit intheir reasoning is that the tariff aggression is an error being made by a maverick or misguidedadministration. But that does not take into account the fact that Mr. Trump had been railingagainst trade agreements that hurt the U.S. even in the course of his election campaign andwithdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement days after he took office. It also ignoresthe fact that a section hurt by the Trump tariffs — U.S. farmers for whom China was a $6 billionmarket in 2018 with it absorbing 60% of U.S. soyabean exports — still support him. A survey bythe Purdue Center for Commercial Agriculture found that 78% of farmers held that the Trumptariffs will in time benefit them and a Pulse survey by Farm Journal found that Mr. Trump had a79% approval rating among farmers.

The faith in Mr. Trump and rejection of economic liberalism are telling. These farmers along withU.S. industrial workers have for long felt they had been left behind in the neoliberal years whenelites in developed and developing countries alike captured all the benefits of growth andinequality increased hugely. With the increase in income and wealth at the top of the pyramidaccruing largely through transactions in the financial sector, productive activity that could havedelivered benefits to others has been lagging.

The idea that the benefits of whatever growth occurred under the neoliberal regime would trickledown to the poor and lower middle classes was shown to be what it was: patently false. Seen inthat context, Mr. Trump is no maverick, despite his wild twitter and vocal outbursts. He tappedinto a genuine grievance and railed against elements of a regime he too was a beneficiary of.That brought him to power once. It may well return him to power again. When in power he needsto adopt at least some policies that go against the grain of free market philosophy and theglobalisation that flows from it.

That this is not confined to the U.S. comes through from the rise of what is dismissed as “rightwing populism” in Europe, which is not just sceptical of free trade even within the EuropeanUnion but is coming out against the fiscal conservatism promoted by financial interests thatleaves the continent mired in a trajectory of low growth and high unemployment and individualcountries reeling under austerity. Combining this with anti-immigrant rhetoric delivers a toxic mixthat is helping them gain popularity and even a seat in some governments. On the other hand,sections of the centre left that had bought into the neoliberal paradigm are being shown thedoor. The pleasure derived by the advocates of neoliberalism from the significant decline of theleft in the decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union (which deprives the progressivecritique of neoliberalism of a strong political base) has proved short-lived.

Needless to say, the far right is hardly committed to the anti-globalisation strain implicit in itsrhetoric. It is as wedded to the hegemony of capital and the markets as are the neoliberaldogmatists. Their ideological pragmatism is opportunistic and fickle. Yet for the moment, theiractions, especially that of Mr. Trump, have disrupted globalisation.

C.P. Chandrasekhar is Professor at the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, JawaharlalNehru University, New Delhi




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SOMETHING SPECIAL: ON NARENDRA MODI'SBHUTAN VISIT

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - Bhutan

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s two day visit to Thimphu affirmed a long-standing traditionbetween India and Bhutan, where the leaders of both countries have given visiting each othera major priority early in their tenures. Mr. Modi returned a state visit to India by Bhutan PrimeMinister Dr. Lotay Tshering in December 2018; this visit was actually delayed to includeoutcomes such as the inauguration of the 720 MW Mangdechhu hydropower plant. Therelationship is indeed built on a traditional closeness, one that is unique in today’s world. Openborders, close alignment and consultation on foreign policy, and regular, open communicationson all strategic issues are the hallmark of the relationship that has maintained its consistency forthe past many decades. Bhutan’s unequivocal support to India on strategic issues has meant alot to India on the international stage and at the United Nations. Equally, Bhutan’s leadershiphas not flinched in opposing threats to India; for instance, the former King’s efforts in 2003 todrive out ULFA rebels or more recently, support for India’s stand against Chinese troops on theDoklam plateau. India’s assistance to Bhutan’s planned economy, to constructing its highestrevenue earner of hydropower generated electricity, and then buying the electricitygenerated has also ensured a symbiotic and mutually beneficial base to the relationship, whichhas been nurtured by the leaders in both countries, in a manner Mr. Modi called “exemplary”.

It would however, be a mistake for New Delhi to take the relationship with Thimphu for granted.In the past few years, ties came under a strain over India’s sudden change in its powerpurchasing policy, rigid rates and refusal to allow Bhutan to join the national power grid andtrade with third countries like Bangladesh. These issues are being addressed now. Anotherconcern that could create differences is over Bhutan’s worry that too much trade, transport andtourism from India could put its environment at risk. India’s plans for a Motor VehiclesAgreement (MVA) in the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal grouping have been held up, and aBhutanese proposal to levy entry charges on Indian tourists could cause differences with India.Earlier generations of Bhutanese students never looked beyond India, but in recent years youngBhutanese have shown a preference for education destinations in Australia, Singapore andThailand. There is thus much to repair in the ties. More importantly, New Delhi will have toremain alert to strategic powers which are courting Bhutan assiduously, as is evident from thehigh-level visits from China and the U.S. In a world of growing options, it remains in India’s andBhutan’s best interests to make each other’s concerns a top priority.



As protesters make new demands, the prospects of a quick settlement recede





https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-bhutan-natural-partners-modi/article29128001.ece

https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-bhutan-natural-partners-modi/article29128001.ece

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/pm-modi-inaugurates-mangdechhu-hydroelectric-power-plant-in-bhutan/article29120270.ece

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/pm-modi-inaugurates-mangdechhu-hydroelectric-power-plant-in-bhutan/article29120270.ece



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RAJA MANDALA: WHAT INDIA HAS TO OFFER IN THEGULF

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - Middle East


C. Raja Mohan is Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University ofSingapore, and the consulting editor on foreign affairs for 'The Indian Express'. Before hisassociation with The Indian Express began in 2004, Raja Mohan worked for The Hindu as itsWashington correspondent and Strategic Affairs Editor. He was a distinguished fellow at theObserver Research Foundation, New Delhi. In his academic avatar, Raja Mohan has beenprofessor of South Asian Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and theNanyang Technological University, Singapore. As a think tanker, he worked at the Institute forDefence Studies and Analyses and Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi. He is on theeditorial board of various international affairs journals and is affiliated with the Institute of SouthAsian Studies, Singapore; the Lowy Institute, Sydney; and the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, Washington DC. He is the author, most recently, of Samudra Manthan:Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain this weekunderlines Delhi’s continuing commitment to the transformation of India’s relations with the Gulfregion. Although, the Gulf’s value for India had steadily risen for more than four decades, Modi isthe first one to pay sustained high-level political attention to the region.

If no prime minister of India had travelled to the UAE for more than three decades, before 2015,Modi is about to head to the Emirates for the third time since then. That Modi is being honouredwith the Zayed Medal, the highest civilian honour in the Emirates, underlines the new good will,trust and personal intimacy between PM Modi and the UAE leadership. The Zayed Medal isnamed after the founder of the kingdom, Sheik Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan.

If India tended to see the Gulf region through the prism of Pakistan in the past, it has now learntthat the conservative Gulf Kingdoms are quite eager to develop an independent relationship withDelhi. Three areas highlight the region’s new approach to India.

First, some Gulf countries have expanded counter-terror cooperation with Delhi, extendingsupport to India in the unfolding conflict over Jammu and Kashmir, and have sought to open theOIC platform for India despite Pakistan’s objections. Delhi has long chafed at Pakistan’s routinemobilisation of the Organisation Islamic Cooperation against India.

Second, recognising Modi’s special interest in the welfare of the Indian diaspora and expatriatelabour, the Gulf kingdoms have begun to address many of the long-standing Indian concerns.Third, the oil rich Gulf has begun to see India, one of the world’s leading energy importers, as amajor economic partner. The recent Saudi decision to pick up 20 per cent stake in the oilbusiness of Reliance Industries Limited and UAE’s support for the construction of India’sStrategic Petroleum Reserve are two examples of deepening energy interdependence.

Modi’s non-defensive and non-ideological approach to the Gulf has been a major contribution toIndia’s foreign policy. But there is one weakness that remains to be overcome. If the focus ofModi’s first term was on what India can get from the region, the emphasis in the second must be

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on what Delhi can do for the Gulf. Three opportunities present themselves for India.

The first is about paying greater attention to the domestic dynamics in the different kingdoms ofthe Gulf amidst the region’s deepening political turbulence. One important new trend has beenthe effort to promote moderate Islam in the region. The UAE has been at the forefront of thiseffort aimed at modernising and stabilising the Arab Gulf societies. In Saudi Arabia, CrownPrince Mohammed bin Salman has taken some small but significant steps to liberalise theeconomy and society.

While the West has reacted with scepticism or is demanding faster pace in these reforms, Delhishould offer strong public support for the reform agenda in the region. No country has a higherstake in the efforts to reclaim the legacy of peaceful co-existence of religions in the Gulf.Supporting positive reform will lend greater weight to India’s concerns about the continuingnegative trends in the region, such as the support for extremist ideologies.

Second, Delhi must reciprocate more productively to the enthusiasm in the Gulf region forstrategic economic cooperation with India — ranging from energy and digital innovation to armsproduction and space technology. While the region is ready to deploy its considerable amountsof capital in India’s growth story, Delhi has been tardy in facilitating investments from the Gulf.

China, in contrast, has moved quickly to elevate its economic and commercial profile in theregion. As India begins to take the dangers of an economic slowdown seriously, it should try andunclog multiple bureaucratic and policy obstacles to investments from the Gulf.

Third, security cooperation, where the unrealised potential remains huge. The highly vulnerableGulf regimes have long depended upon Britain and the US to protect themselves from threats —internal, regional and international. Amidst the current domestic turmoil in the Anglo-Americanworld, President Donald Trump’s talk on downsizing America’s role in the Gulf is encouragingthe region to diversify its security partnerships.

It is time Delhi showed some initiative to develop a more pro-active strategy for defencecooperation in the region. Inaction now will necessarily lead to reaction as other Asian powerslike China carve out a larger security role in the Gulf. Russia and France have already steppedup their involvement in the Gulf region’s security affairs.

As the internal conflicts within the Gulf region — the intra-Arab, as well as between the Arabsand the Iranians — sharpened in recent years, Delhi’s instinct was to avoid getting drawn intothese. But ducking can’t be a permanent Indian security strategy in the Gulf. Thanks to thepotential American retrenchment, the Gulf powers are recognising the importance of engagingeach other. The recent talks on maritime security between UAE and Iran, who have had atroubled relationship for long, could be a sign of things to come. The question for India is nolonger about taking sides; it is about contributing to the regional security in whatever manner itcan.

The writer is director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore andcontributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express



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INDIA-MALDIVES MOU ON TRAINING AND CAPACITYBUILDING PROGRAMME FOR MALDIVIAN CIVILSERVANTS OPERATIONALISED

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - Indian Ocean Island nations

Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions

India-Maldives MoU on Training and Capacity BuildingProgramme for Maldivian Civil Servants operationalised


The India-Maldives MoU on Training and Capacity Building Programme for Maldivian CivilServants was operationalised following discussions between the senior officials of theDepartment of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances (DARPG), the National Centre forGood Governance (NCGG) and the Maldives Civil Service Commission today in a ceremonyheld at the Civil Services Commission of Maldives at Male. An Indian delegation led by ShriV.Srinivas, Additional Secretary Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievancesheld delegation level discussions with a Maldives delegation led by Dr. Aly Shameem, Chairmanof the Civil Services Commission of Maldives. The High Commissioner of India to Maldives Mr.Sanjay Sudhir graced the occasion with his presence.

Following delegation level talks, a consensus was reached between the 2 sides on the datesand participation levels for the first 10 training programmes from September, 2019 to December,2020. The first 3 training programs under the MoU would be held in 2019 (a) September 16-28,2019 and November 18-30, 2019 for 60 officers of the middle management level (b) December2-14, 2019 for 30 officers of top management level. Further on the sidelines of the trainingprogram for top management level civil servants, the National Center for Good Governancewould collaborate with the Civil Services Commission of Maldives to convene a Conference onGood Governance & Innovations in Governance depicting the best governance practicesbetween the two Nations. A training calender reflecting the dates and program time-table wasreleased by Dr. Aly Shameem, Mr Sanjay Sudhir and Shri V.Srinivas at the Civil ServicesCommission today. An academic committee would be established between the 2 institutions forenhanced cooperation in the implementing the training programs and would cover areas relatingto subject matter, faculty and timelines of the trainings.

The Prime Minister of India in his visit to Maldives in June 2019, had emphasised India's'Neighbourhood First' policy and assured India's full support to Maldives in realising itsaspirations for broad based socio-economic development and strengthening of democratic andindependent institutions. One of the MoUs signed during the visit was between the NationalCenter for Good Governance, India and the Civil Services Commission of Maldives whichenvisaged capacity building activities for 1000 Civil Servants of Maldives at the National Centrefor Good Governance over the next 5 years. The Agreement envisaged that the National Centerfor Good Governance, India will be the nodal institution for designing customised trainingmodules and its implementation taking into account the requirements of the Civil ServiceCommission of Maldives. The subject matter of the training programs include publicadministration, e-governance and service delivery, public policy and governance, informationtechnology, urban development and planning, ethics in administration and challenges inimplementation of SDGs.

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Following delegation level talks, the Indian delegation called on Vice President Mr FaisalNaseem. The Vice President of Maldives congratulated the Indian delegation and thanked theIndian Prime Minister for early implementation of the June 2019 MoU on capacity buildingprograms of Maldivian Civil Servants. He said that the challenges before the Maldives CivilServants are effective implementation of public policy, timely public service delivery, maintainingfairness, gender equality, e-governance, ethics, accountability and transparency in governance.Vice President Mr Naseem said that he expected good results from the collaboration betweenCivil Service Commission and National Center for Good Governance. Shri V.Srinivas, AdditionalSecretary DARPG informed Vice President Mr Faisal Naseem of the strides undertaken by Indiain end to end service delivery and improvements in citizen services following adoption of e-Governance practices and many services being digitalized. He further said that the MaldivianCivil Servants would be undertaking exposure visits to the Unique Identification Authority ofIndia, Passport Sewa Kendra and the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation.

The High Commissioner of India to the Maldives Mr Shri Sunjay Sudhir said that India hasemerged as the largest development partner for capacity building of Maldivian Civil Servantsand Indian training institutes represent the best practices in training. He also said that thecollaboration between Civil Service Commission of Maldives and the National Center for GoodGovernance, India represents a mega development project with 1000 short-term trainingopportunities. He hoped that Maldivian Civil Servants would make best use of this opportunity.

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VG/NK




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CHINA AND ITS QUASI-COLONYRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - China


The writer, a former Indian Ambassador with extensive experience on China, UN and nationalsecurity issues, is director general of Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.Views are personal.

On August 16, the 15 members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) engaged inclosed-door informal consultations in response to a letter written by Pakistan’s Foreign MinisterShah Mahmood Qureshi to the President of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),backed by a request by Pakistan’s “iron brother” China, on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir(J&K).

A great deal of hullabaloo has been raised about the meeting. However, informal consultationsare held in the UNSC all the time. There is no official record of the proceedings nor does theinformal exchange result in any outcome document. In this case, the only consensus that hadthe backing of the majority of members was that India and Pakistan should resolve mattersbilaterally. The members of the UNSC did not authorise the rotational president for the month ofAugust, Poland, to issue even informal remarks on their behalf to the mediapersons who stakeout the chamber, let alone a UNSC press statement by the president, which needs to benegotiated in a formal meeting and must be based on consensus, at least among the fivepermanent members. Such a press release or press advisory is not even considered an officialdocument on record.

But for China’s request, even the closed-door informal discussion would not have taken place.China’s attempts to get the president of the UNSC to issue an informal statement to the media,was curiously backed by the UK, perhaps in the hope of scoring some brownie points with thelarge domestic constituencies of Pakistanis. The UK might also have hoped to curry somefavour with China to further its mercantilist interests in the face of an imminent Brexit meltdown.

Pakistan’s Permanent Representative Maleeha Lodhi made a mendacious and propagandiststatement to the media making allegations against India, claiming that “the voice of the people ofKashmir was being heard in the UNSC”. Pakistan should first permit the voice of the Balochpeople to be heard, along with that of the oppressed in Gilgit-Baltistan.

China’s Permanent Representative Zhang Jun egregiously arrogated to himself the role of thepresident of the UNSC in an extraordinary breach of traditional practice and protocol, andspuriously claimed that members of the UNSC “had expressed their serious concern concerningthe situation in Jammu and Kashmir”. He added that “they are also concerned about the humanrights situation there and also, it is the general will of the members that parties concerned shouldrefrain from taking any unilateral action which might further aggravate the tension”. He then wenton to repeat the remarks of Chinese state councillor and foreign minister, Wang Yi, that “theKashmir issue is a dispute left from colonial history. It should be properly and peacefullyresolved based on the UN charter, relevant UN Security Council resolutions and bilateralagreements”.

The Indian government’s bold step to revoke the special status of J&K, long overdue, has givenPakistan and its cohorts in J&K a big jolt. It has hurt vested interests in the Valley who, for

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generations, have siphoned off the wealth of the state and waltzed with separatists at the sametime. Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasised in his Independence Day address that themove to revoke Article 370 will bring development and prosperity to the region. Earlier, theexternal affairs minister, S Jaishankar, had clearly conveyed, during his visit to Beijing, that thedecisions were internal to India and aimed at providing good governance, promoting socialjustice and ensuring economic development in J&K. He had also pointed out to the Chinese thatthe constitutional change in India had no bearing on the boundary issue or the Line of ActualControl with China.

While it is a known fact that China treats Pakistan as a quasi-colony and backs it on all matters,its initiative to trigger informal consultations in the UNSC may have a broader rationale. China isfacing global censure for its unbridled human rights violations in Xinjiang province, the massincarceration of Uighurs in so-called re-education camps and the razing of mosques and otherhistorical places that give the Uighurs their distinct identity.

The daily images on television screens around the world of the mass unrest in Hong Kong mustbe galling for a regime that takes pride in its ability to use force to quash dissent and seeks, withvaulting ambition, to emerge as the number one power in the world. The long-drawn publicprotests in Hong Kong are a reaction to the progressive erosion of the special status accorded toHong Kong Special Administrative Region under the terms of its Basic Law, which protects HongKong’s capitalist system, the independence of the judiciary and the media.

Apart from its undying commitment to Pakistan, it is to deflect scrutiny of its own actions inXinjiang and Hong Kong that China would have decided to support Pakistan’s request and alsoto have its permanent representative masquerade as a spokesman for members of the UNSC.

That China has never commented when Pakistan unilaterally changed the status of regions inPoK exposes its deep bias. Gilgit-Baltistan was re-designated by Pakistan as Northern Areas in1970. In 1974, Pakistan unilaterally overturned a law of the erstwhile princely state of Jammuand Kashmir prohibiting outsiders from owning property, and encouraged large-scale settlementby Sunnis in predominantly Shia-populated Gilgit-Baltistan. Pakistan once again unilaterallyissued the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order in 2009, without anyconsultation with the people.

One should recall that in 1965, when China reorganised the erstwhile Tibet region into the TibetAutonomous Region, giving it a provincial status, India was not apoplectic, like China has beenfollowing the designation of Ladakh as a union territory. That was not necessary since the claimsof the two sides and the ground situation remained unchanged, whether then or now. Based onthe principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, India has always refrained frommaking statements concerning the internal situation of China.

It is patently wrong to claim, as vested political interests have done in India, that the scrapping ofArticle 370 has resulted in the “internationalisation of Jammu & Kashmir” and that the informaldiscussion by UNSC members is the first of its kind in six decades.

Many sections of the Indian media have erroneously claimed that the last time the UNSCdiscussed the issue of J&K was in 1965. First, the UNSC does not have any agenda itemexplicitly termed “Jammu and Kashmir”. The only agenda item on its mandate is “The IndiaPakistan Question”. Second, UNSC Resolutions 209, 210, 211, 214 and 215 of September 1965focussed on a ceasefire during the war and demanded that the two sides cooperate withUNMOGIP. Third, the last formal resolution under the agenda item titled “The India PakistanQuestion”, was UNSC Resolution 307 of 21 December 1971, which noted India’s unilateraldeclaration of a ceasefire in the western theatre during that war, Pakistan’s acceptance of it,


https://www.indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-article-370-has-not-been-scrapped-but-kashmirs-special-status-has-gone-5880390/

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and, demanded a durable cessation of all hostilities.

It was under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that India first brought the matter before theUNSC using Article 35 of the UN Charter, in a letter of January 1, 1948, from the Representativeof India P P Pillai, addressed to the UNSC president. The agenda item was titled “The Situationin Jammu & Kashmir” until the 230th meeting of the UNSC, held on 20 January 1948. Pakistantoo had written a letter dated January 15, 1948, addressed by Pakistan foreign minister,Zafarullah Khan, to the UN secretary general. As a result, the agenda item was re-designated as“The India-Pakistan Question” in the 231st meeting of the UNSC on January 22, 1948, dilutingthe question of “aggression” that India had taken up. The item has since remained on theagenda of the UNSC.

Pakistan’s communications to UN bodies of matters relating to J&K are not a new development.Every year, Pakistan’s permanent representative to the UN in New York writes to the secretarygeneral requesting that the agenda item “The India Pakistan Question” be retained, lest it isstruck off the agenda for lack of any formal action on the subject over the years. Similarly, inGeneva, the Pakistani mission routinely engages in propaganda about alleged human rightsviolations.

With the exception of Pakistan and a few of its supporters, the global community endorses thebilateral framework for resolution of differences between India and Pakistan. Pakistan will nodoubt try to rake up the issue at the October meeting of the Human Rights Committee at theUNHRC, hoping to capitalise on the insidious report prepared in 2018 by former UN HighCommissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, a Pakistan sympathiser.

The informal meeting at the UNSC may have occasioned much jubilation in Pakistan thoughwell-informed Pakistanis must surely know that it is a pyrrhic victory. The global community willno doubt take positive note of the steps being taken by India to restore normalcy in J&K throughrestoration of landlines, phased lifting of restrictions and the re-opening of government officesand schools. And, as Pakistan remains mired in its medieval ways, the world will soon seevisible evidence of rapid development in J&K, which will contrast sharply with the backwardnessof Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

The writer, a former Indian Ambassador with extensive experience on China, UN andnational security issues, is director general of Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,New Delhi. Views are personal. The full version of this article is available onindianexpress.com





https://indianexpress.com/about/jawaharlal-nehru


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FREE FALL: ON THE AFGHAN CONFLICTRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: Effect of policies and politics of developed & developing countries


The suicide attack at a crowded wedding hall in Kabul on Saturday night that killed at least 63people and injured more than 180 others is yet another tragic reminder of the perilous securitysituation in Afghanistan. The blast, claimed by the local arm of the Islamic State (IS), occurred ata time when the U.S. and the Taliban are preparing to announce a peace agreement to end the18-year-long conflict. But if the IS attack is anything to go by, it is that peace will remain elusiveto most Afghans irrespective of the agreement reached between the Taliban and the U.S. It’snow a three-way conflict in Afghanistan — the government, the Taliban insurgents and theglobal terrorists. The government in Kabul, backed by the U.S. and the international community,is fighting to preserve the existing system, which despite its faults, at least offers a semblance ofdemocracy. But the government is a failure in ensuring safety and security of the people. TheTaliban, which controls the mountainous hinterlands, wants to expand its reach to the urbancentres. The IS, which has declared a province (Khorasan) in eastern Afghanistan’s Nangarhar,has emerged as the third player. Attacks against civilians, especially the Shia minority, is thecentral part of its brutal military tactics. Afghanistan’s Hazara Shias were the target of thewedding hall bombing as well. The IS, which released a video of the purported bomber, aPakistani, said he attacked “polytheistic rejectionists”, as the group calls Shia Muslims.

This complex, mutually destructive nature of the conflict is the biggest challenge before anyattempt to establish order and stability in Afghanistan. As part of a potential peace deal, the U.S.is ready to pull troops from Afghanistan in return for assurances from the Taliban that they willnot allow the Afghan soil to be used by transnational terrorists such as the IS and al-Qaeda. Itwill be left to the Taliban and the government to have their own peace talks and settledifferences. Arguably, a peace deal or at least a ceasefire between the Taliban and the Kabulgovernment would allow both sides to rechannel their resources to fighting terrorist groups. Butthe Taliban’s intentions are hardly clear. What if the Taliban, which ran most of Afghanistanaccording to its puritanical interpretation of the Islamic law from 1996 to 2001, turns againstKabul once the Americans are out? What if the country plunges into a multi-party civil war as itdid after the Soviet Union pulled out in 1989? The IS has demonstrated an ability to survive andstrike in Afghanistan despite the U.S.’s heavy air campaign in the east. Ideally, the internationalcommunity should have strengthened the hands of the Kabul government against all kind ofterrorists, before seeking a settlement with the insurgents. They should have helped alter thebalance of power in the conflict. But it does not seem likely now. And Afghanistan is in a free fall.










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IS IS REGAINING STRENGTH IN IRAQ AND SYRIARelevant for: International Relations | Topic: India- West Asia

Five months after U.S.-backed forces ousted the Islamic State from its last shard of territory inSyria, the terrorist group is gathering new strength, conducting guerilla attacks across Iraq andSyria, retooling its financial networks and targeting new recruits at an allied-run tent camp, U.S.and Iraqi military and intelligence officers said.

Though President Donald Trump hailed a total defeat of the Islamic State this year, defenceofficials in the region see things differently, acknowledging that what remains of the terroristgroup is here to stay.

A recent report warned that a drawdown this year from 2,000 U.S. forces in Syria to less thanhalf that, ordered by Mr. Trump, has meant the U.S. military has had to cut back on its supportfor Syrian partner forces fighting the Islamic State.

Although there is little concern that the IS will reclaim its former physical territory, a caliphatethat was once the size of Britain and controlled the lives of up to 12 million people, the terrorgroup has still mobilised as many as 18,000 remaining fighters in Iraq and Syria.

Huge war chest

These sleeper cells and strike teams have carried out sniper attacks, ambushes, kidnappingsand assassinations against security forces and community leaders.

The IS can still tap a large war chest of as much as $400 million, which either has been hiddenin Iraq and Syria or smuggled into neighbouring countries for safekeeping. It is also believed tohave invested in businesses, including fish farming, car dealing and cannabis growing. And thegroup uses extortion to finance clandestine operations. Farmers in northern Iraq who refuse topay have had their crops burned to the ground.

During the past several months, IS has made inroads into a sprawling tent camp in northeastSyria, and there is no ready plan to deal with the 70,000 people there, including thousands offamily members of IS fighters. U.S. intelligence officials say the Al Hol camp, run by SyrianKurdish allies, is evolving into a hotbed of IS ideology and a breeding ground for futureterrorists.NY Times










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SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT ATWORKPLACES NEEDS PARLIAMENT’S ATTENTION

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: UNO and its various Agencies


The writer is professor of law, University of Warwick,and former vice chancellor of Universities ofSouth Gujarat and Delhi.

Although India is among the very few erstwhile colonies to have signed the treaty thatestablished the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the country’s Parliament, mass media,and human rights and social movement activists remain too preoccupied with other issues topay attention to some of the landmark events associated with the agency’s centenarycelebrations. Although in a welcome move last year, the Union home minister issued directionsto states to ensure that Internal Complaints Committees to examine the issue of sexualharassment at the workplace are constituted, only benign neglect has so far greeted the ILO’sConvention and Recommendation on the human right to freedom from sexual harassment andviolence in the “world of work”. Issues like national security are important but sexual violenceand harassment at workplaces is so widespread that one hopes the issue will receive due,effective and expeditious attention in Parliament’s next session.

The ILO adopted the Convention and the Recommendation at the 108th meeting of theInternational Labour Conference. Held in Geneva from June 10 to 21, it was attended by morethan 5,700 delegates, representing governments, workers and employers from the agency’s 187member states. These were the first set of instruments to be enunciated by the InternationalLabour Conference since 2011, when the Domestic Workers Convention was adopted.Conventions cast legally binding obligations whereas Recommendations offer valuable advisorypathways. And the history of ILO archives the importance of both.

Of the 476 delegates, 439 voted for the treaty, seven voted against it, and 30 abstained.Interesting was the policy reversal by the US, which chose to vote in favour of the Conventionthough it did not vote for the Recommendation. Widely reported, too, is the fact that thegovernments that stood up for stronger protections included those of Uganda and Namibia(which led the African group of states), the European Union group led by France, as well asCanada, New Zealand, the Philippines, and many Latin American and Caribbean states. Indiaprobably played a leading role, too, but remained off the media radar.

The treaty’s scope is undoubtedly wide. It covers not just workers, trainees, those whoseemployment has been terminated, job seekers, and interns, but also applies to both the formaland informal sectors. It also extends to third parties, such as clients, customers, or serviceproviders. The treaty is unique, for no domestic law has gone this far. Indeed, the World Bank’s2018 report, unsurprisingly, found that as many as 59 out of the 189 countries had no specificlegal provisions covering sexual harassment in employment.

The “world of work” is a concept invented by the ILO and includes all employees “as defined bynational law and practice, as well as persons working irrespective of their contractual status,persons in training, including interns and apprentices, workers whose employment has beenterminated, volunteers, job-seekers and job applicants, and individuals exercising the authority,duties or responsibilities of an employer”. The Convention’s Article 2 further “applies to all

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sectors, whether private or public, both in the formal and informal economy, and whether inurban or rural areas”. This is a wide sweep, but note that it was accepted by a tripartite body,representing workers, employers, and the states.

The terms “violence and harassment” in the world of work refer to the same phenomenon. Notonly is discrimination violence but it is also harassment— “a range of unacceptable behavioursand practices, or threats thereof”, whether singly or repeated, that “aim at, result in, or are likelyto result in physical, psychological, sexual or economic harm, and includes gender-basedviolence and harassment”. And Article 1 further renders impermissible violence/harassmentdirected against LGBT and inter-sex communities. This marks a great normative advancement.The Convention also recognises the prevalence of same sex violence.

The Convention also significantly advances the state’s obligations to “respect, promote andrealise the fundamental principles and rights at work”. These include : One, “the freedom ofassociation and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining”; two, “theelimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour”; three, “the effective abolition of childlabour”; and four, “the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation, aswell as promote decent work” (Article 5).

The importance of the Convention in reinforcing the rights of the working people in the world ofwork cannot be overemphasised, given the global conversations about making the planet safefor investors. Any law reform agenda that only promotes the rights of capital overlooks thesimple fact that labour contributes as much, if not more, to profit-making.

Articles 7-12 of the Convention impose obligations upon member states to frame laws,regulations, and policies to effectively arrest sexual harassment and violence at work. Theseobligations are not effete. The public authorities have a specific role in the case of workers in the“informal economy”. They have to now identify the “sectors or occupations and workarrangements” in which “workers and other persons concerned are more exposed to violenceand harassment” and “take measures to effectively protect such persons” (Article 8). Theobligation here is not just to denounce unfair labour practices. Rather, it specifically defines aproactive administration, which has duties of care and concern to the systemically disorganisedlabour. Such identification must occur “in consultation with the employers’ and workers’organisations concerned and through other means”. In other words, the identification in order tobe effective has to be participatory and reflexive, not just routinely bureaucratic.

One hopes that the centennial ILO Convention and Recommendation will have resonance withthe UN’s Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations andother Business Enterprises With Respect to Human Rights. In the interim, one also expects thecivil society and the state in India to engage more imaginatively and vigorously with the ILOConvention and Recommendation, which already stand implicit in the Directive Principles ofState Policy of the Constitution.

This article first appeared in the print edition on August 23, 2019 under the title ‘For a safer worldof work’. The writer is professor of law, University of Warwick,and former vice chancellor ofUniversities of South Gujarat and Delhi.



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TAKING A ‘FAR EAST’ TURN TO DEEPEN AFRIENDSHIP

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - Russia

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in New Delhi in October2018.

Some 48 years ago, when the U.S. and British Navies tried to threaten Indian security during theIndia-Pakistan war in 1971, the Soviet Union dispatched nuclear-armed flotilla from its PacificFleet based at Vladivostok in support of India. Ever since then, the city of Vladivostok, located inRussia’s Far East, has had a special place in the hearts of Indians. When Prime MinisterNarendra Modi visits the city as the guest of honour at Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) inSeptember, he would be announcing India’s plans to invest in Russia’s Far East, thus, payingback the long-held Indian debt to Vladivostok.

The Far East lies in the Asian part of Russia and is less developed than the country’s Europeanareas. As part of his ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy, President Vladimir Putin is inviting foreign countriesto invest in this region. The country’s outreach to Asian nations has especially gainedmomentum after the 2014 Crimea crisis spoiled its relations with the West.

At the same time, the idea of an ‘Indo-Pacific region’, which signals India’s willingness to workwith the U.S. mainly to counter China’s assertive maritime rise, has also left Russia concerned.Moscow is apprehensive that the U.S. would exert pressure on India’s foreign policy choices andthat it could lose a friendly country and one of the biggest buyers of Russian military hardware.

New Delhi, on its part, has maintained that Indo-Pacific is not targeted against any country andstands for inclusiveness and stability. Mr. Modi made this clear to Mr. Putin during their Sochiinformal summit in 2018. Later, at the Shangri-La dialogue, he again emphasised that for India,Indo-Pacific is not a club of limited members and that New Delhi wants to have inclusiveengagement with all the relevant stakeholders.

This constant engagement has borne fruit and the two countries are now working for a multipolarIndo-Pacific. India has also been able to convince Russia that its engagement with the U.S. isnot going to come against Russian interests.

On its part, Russia also wants to make sure that China does not become a hegemon in theEurasian region and is hence deepening cooperation with countries like India, Vietnam andIndonesia. Here, the Far East has the potential to become an anchor in deepening India-Russiacooperation; more so considering that New Delhi has expanded the scope of its ‘Act East policy’to also include Moscow.

At least 17 countries have already invested in the Far East which, with its investment-friendlyapproach and vast reserves of natural resources, has the potential to strengthen India-Russiaeconomic partnership in areas like energy, tourism, agriculture, diamond mining and alternativeenergy.

Mr. Modi’s visit to Vladivostok would not be an event in isolation as New Delhi and Moscow havebeen drawing up the plan to cooperate in the region in the last few years. A bilateral businessdialogue was included in the business programme of EEF in 2017 and, in 2018, India was one ofthe 18 countries for which Russia simplified electronic visas to encourage tourism in the Far

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East. New Delhi will also provide an annual grant of $10,000 to fund the study of Indology at theCentre of Regional and International Studies at Far Eastern Federal University. Also, aMemorandum of Understanding has been signed between Amity University and Far EasternFederal University to intensify cultural and academic exchanges in the areas of research andeducation.

A lack of manpower is one of the main problems faced by the Far East and Indian professionalslike doctors, engineers and teachers can help in the region’s development. Presence of Indianmanpower will also help in balancing Russian concerns over Chinese migration into the region.Further, India, one of the largest importers of timber, can find ample resources in the region.Japan and South Korea have also been investing and New Delhi may explore areas of jointcollaboration.

Mr. Modi has also given due importance to ‘paradiplomacy’ where Indian States are beingencouraged to develop relations with foreign countries. States like Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat,Maharashtra, Haryana and Goa would be collaborating with Russian Provinces to increase tradeand investments. Earlier this month, Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal led adelegation to Vladivostok that included Chief Ministers of these States and representatives fromabout 140 companies. For India, there is immense potential for mid-sized and small businesseswho should be assisted to overcome language and cultural barriers so that they successfullyadopt local business practices. A meeting between the heads of the regions of Russia andvarious Chief Ministers from Indian States may soon take place and this should become aregular feature.

The two countries are also looking at the feasibility of Chennai-Vladivostok sea route that wouldallow India access to Russia’s Far East in 24 days, compared to the 40 days taken by thecurrent route via Suez Canal and Europe. This route would potentially add the required balanceto peace and prosperity in South China Sea and could open new vistas for India, like the India-Russia-Vietnam trilateral cooperation.

Great power rivalry is back in international politics, making it more unpredictable. In times whenU.S. President Trump is interested in ‘deglobalisation’ and China is promoting ‘globalisation 2.0with Chinese characteristics’, it makes sense for India and Russia to increase their areas ofcooperation and trade in order to hedge against disruptive forces and make their tiessustainable.

Harsh V. Pant is professor at King’s College London; Raj Kumar Sharma is consultant, Facultyof Political Science, IGNOU



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BELT AND ROADBLOCKSRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: Effect of policies and politics of developed & developing countries


Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks at a press briefing at the end of the Belt and Road Forumat the Yanqi Lake venue outside Beijing on April 27, 2019. | Photo Credit: AFP

China’s raging trade war with the U.S., mounting criticism of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),and growing schism in its Politburo on handling these issues has compelled the Chineseleadership to review the ininitiative. The BRI was conceived as a response to the vastovercapacity in infrastructure-related industries due to credit-fuelled growth in China in 2008following the global economic recession, when its exports started dwindling. In 2009, formerDeputy Director of China’s State Administration of Taxation, Xu Shanda, came up with aproposal called the Chinese Marshall Plan which suggested that China should utilise its vastforeign exchange reserves, expertise in building infrastructure, overcapacity in iron, cement,aluminium, glass, coal and shipbuilding industries and unemployed labour to meet theinfrastructure demand in Southeast, Central Asia and Africa.

Announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2013, the BRI consists of a belt of railroutes, highways, oil and gas pipelines and other infrastructure projects extending from Xian inCentral China through Central Asia, Russia, West Asia and Europe. There is also a branchextending from Kashgar in Xinjiang to Gwadar in Balochistan via Pakistan occupied Kashmir(PoK). The ‘road’ segment comprises a network of ports and coastal infrastructure stretchingfrom eastern China across Southeast Asia and South Asia, the Gulf, East Africa through theMediterranean up to Rotterdam in Europe.

According to China, more than 120 countries have signed and joined the BRI. China’s trade withthese countries since 2013 has crossed more than $5 trillion and investment has totalled about$200 billion for 2,600 projects. In the first seven months of 2019, China’s trade with BRIcountries was 6% higher than the growth of its global trade.

However, BRI has not succeeded in the full utilisation of overcapacity in infrastructure industries.China has been forced to close many companies. About one-third of its projects are failing dueto several anomalies. There is no open tendering, competitive bidding or practice of anindependent pre-feasibility or environmental impact studies, as per global norms. Many projectssuffer from lack of local inputs, protests on land procurement, pollution, performance delays,corruption, financial viability, unsustainable debt and low investment returns. The interest ratescharged by China are high, upward of 3% on government loans and 17%-18% on commercialloans with sovereign guarantee of the local government. As many loans turn non-performingassets, China is becoming selective in giving new loans.

Some BRI projects do not make economic sense. For example, the cost of transportation by the12,000 km-long Yiwu-London rail line will be twice more expensive than shipping. Similarly, thecost of supplying crude oil and gas from Gwadar port to Tianjin in northeastern China via the7,000 km-long pipeline proposed by China will be $10 per barrel costlier than ocean freight.Many countries such as the Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Malaysia haveasked China to restructure or downsize the BRI projects. India has rightly decided not toparticipate in BRI over concerns relating to sovereignty (the China-Pakistan Economic Corridorpasses through PoK), lack of transparency, openness, financial sustainability, high interest andthe ‘tied’ nature of these loans.

https://www.thehindu.com/profile/photographers/AFP/

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After a chorus of international criticism, the old swagger about BRI has faded. President Xipromised at the second Belt and Road forum in April that China would ‘finetune’ the BRI withopen consultation, clean governance and green projects. The growth of BRI is down as China’sinvestment in these projects in the first quarter of 2019 grew only by 4% compared to 22% in2018. The real challenge is whether best practices can be incorporated in BRI or it will remainonly a ‘Chinese’ scheme given that state-owned enterprises play the lead implementing role.

Yogesh Gupta is a former Ambassador












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SHOULD INDIA TINKER WITH ITS ‘NO FIRST USE’POLICY?

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: India's Foreign Policy evolution and changes

Last week, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said that the future of India’s ‘No First Use’ (NFU)policy on nuclear weapons depended on “circumstances”. Mr. Singh’s statement has raisedapprehensions on the likely revision of India’s NFU policy and nuclear doctrine. In aconversation moderated by Dinakar Peri, Rajesh Rajagopalan and Manpreet Sethi addressthese concerns.

Rajesh Rajagopalan is Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Manpreet Sethi is aDistinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies

Excerpts:

Rajesh Rajagopalan: I am not sure if it is really a revision of India’s NFU policy because all hesaid was that in future the policy might change. That has always been the case. The doctrine isonly valid for as long as the government says it is valid. It would be foolish to suggest thatdoctrines cannot change or that they will hold for all times and under all circumstances. All hewas suggesting was that we cannot guarantee that the doctrine will hold for all times.

This is possibly a signal to Pakistan that it should not take India’s restraint for granted for alltimes to come, but I think even that would possibly be an exaggerated reading of the statement.I think Rajnath Singh’s statement is somewhat different from former Union Minister ManoharParrikar’s statement. He had said at a book launch that he doesn’t understand why we have towait until we hit back. That was a lot more problematic even though it was clarified subsequentlythat his statement was his personal view rather than the government’s policy. I don’t see Mr.Singh’s statement as signifying a change in the doctrine. And obviously if we did change theNFU policy, that would not be particularly useful.

Manpreet Sethi: I quite agree with how Professor Rajagopalan has interpreted Mr. Singh’sstatement. I think it is a very normal statement. Policy adjustments get made as situationschange. I don’t see anything in the statement that is indicative of any desire for change as ofnow. As regards the BJP manifesto that you mentioned, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made itclear that there was not going to be any revision. Individual voices, most of whom are retiredofficials who occupied positions of power, have brought up this issue of revision of NFU, but theydid not mention any revision of NFU when they were in those positions. Late last year, on theoccasion of the announcement of the first deterrence patrol of India’s ballistic missile nuclearsubmarine INS Arihant, the Prime Minister once again reiterated that the basic tenet of India’snuclear doctrine will be NFU. As far as I can see, there is no change in the doctrine on thecards. But having said that, there are always the ‘Nuclearazzi’, who are out with theirmicroscopes to look at everything that has been said and who read more into statements. I thinkthat’s what is happening in the case of India’s NFU. I do believe it’s a good policy and there’s noreason for the country to change it.

What would a change in India’s nuclear policy posture mean? | The Hindu Parley podcast

RR: Absolutely. I mean obviously we want stability in the nuclear front, but I don’t think thatstability was under threat. Pakistan repeatedly raises this bogey of nuclear escalation every timeit engages in some action in terms of sending terrorists across. But that is a way of constraining

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India’s response, as a way of preventing India from responding militarily to those kinds ofattacks. The idea is that if you raise the issue, if you bring in nuclear escalation as a threat, it willconstrain India’s response. It is always a false expectation, a false argument, because there isno direct link between conventional escalation and nuclear escalation.

In Kargil, for example, when we started using air power to dislodge Pakistan air forces frommountain heights, initially Pakistan complained about escalation. It said this could lead tonuclear escalation. But pretty soon it was clear that there was no such thing. Similarly, duringthe 2016 surgical strikes, Pakistan again complained about the possibility of escalation. But ineach of these cases we have not seen any escalation. There are several layers in between, andthose layers are where Pakistan has benefited because it can’t really escalate to something likeBalakot or to surgical strikes.

So, yes, we want nuclear stability and that nuclear stability exists. It is just an exaggeration byPakistan that nuclear stability is always under threat and anything we do will put it underimmense strain.

Of late, we have repeatedly shown that we can take action without it escalating anywhere closeto the nuclear level.

MS: First of all, I don’t think any ambiguity has been brought into India’s doctrine as of now. Ithink India is very clear on its NFU policy.

On the likely Pakistan reaction, Pakistan is working on what it calls the full spectrum deterrencecapability. So, in terms of the arsenal build-up, I don’t think there is going to be any majorchange except that it will likely show urgency or justification for the large stockpile build-up that itis anyway engaged in. More likely, removal of NFU will put India in a problematic situationbecause for a credible ‘first use’ you have to build different kinds of capabilities which will meangoing on a different trajectory. So, it is most likely that India will get pulled into an arms race if itwas to remove the NFU.

In terms of China’s reaction, I don’t see any material changes happening in response to India’scapability build-up. In any case, it has a lead on nuclear and delivery systems. It will definitelyuse the opportunity to denigrate India’s status as a responsible nuclear power. So, India’s claimto be a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group or for a permanent seat at the United NationsSecurity Council will come under strain as a result of that.

Frankly, as far as the response of the rest of the world is concerned, we are already in asituation where arms control is crumbling: the U.S.’s nuclear posture review is talking aboutlimited nuclear war once again. The rest of the world will not care much about this change,except at the rhetoric level where there will be criticism of what is going on. So, my concern isnot so much the rest of the world’s response to change in NFU, but what it will be for India itselfin terms of investment in financial and technological capabilities to make a first use credible.After all, it’s not just a question of dropping the ‘No’ from NFU, it is a matter of making the firstuse credible and that is not an easy proposition. There is no chance that India has of carryingout in the first strike a disarming or decapitating strike for the kinds of adversaries that we haveand therefore we will be sucking ourselves into an arms race if we were to go for a first usedoctrine.

RR: Yes, there is a problem when you use dual-use delivery vehicles and weapons systems.This is the problem we have faced in the past. Say Pakistan is holding its nuclear weapons insome airbase. We may be constrained from attacking that airbase because we wouldn’t wantPakistan to mistake a conventional attack on an airbase as an attack on its nuclear weapons.

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So, whenever you have dual-use weapons, there is a problem. There is a problem when bothmay misunderstand a particular platform, base or a submarine as containing nuclear weapons.One may be constrained from attacking that because we don’t want to give the impression thatwe are going after their nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it is an even bigger problem whenPakistan uses these dual-use systems. If a conventional missile or a short-range missile islaunched at us, we wouldn’t know whether it is a conventional missile or a nuclear missile andtherefore it is possible that one may mistake it as an incoming nuclear attack. Even our ownarmoury has both nuclear and conventional warheads, which is generally bad practice.

RR: I don’t think that makes a difference. I think whatever the Indian position, any attack wouldbe considered a nuclear attack even if it is a tactical nuclear weapon that is used against Indianforces or Indian territory. It will be considered a full-scale nuclear attack. I think that the responseto a tactical nuclear weapons attack, especially on Indian forces inside Pakistani territory, willmake it difficult for India to justify a full-scale massive retaliation that the Indian doctrinesuggests. But the Indian doctrine is also sufficiently flexible. Massive retaliation is one of theoptions it has in case of a nuclear attack. India can decide to use, for instance, another smallernuclear warhead in retaliation or a limited nuclear strike. So, it doesn’t mean the doctrine itselfhas to change in response to that. All the doctrine says as of now is, we will not be the first toattack and we will only retaliate. Our posture and doctrine are essentially retaliation only. We willnot initiate.












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FATF GROUP ‘BLACKLISTS’ PAKISTANRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: FATF

Pakistan has been placed on the lowest rung, or “blacklist”, of the Financial Action Task Force’sAsia Pacific Group (APG) for non-compliance and non-enforcement of safeguards against terrorfinancing and money laundering.

The APG, one of nine regional affiliates of the FATF, met in Canberra from August 18 to 23 todiscuss a five-year review of the Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) for Pakistan, and decided toplace it among countries requiring “enhanced, expedited follow-up”.

Quarterly reporting

While the placing does not bring any new punitive measures on Pakistan, it will mean quarterlyreporting to the group on improvement in its financial safeguards.

While the APG’s final report will be published in October, the group said in a statement that ithad “adopted a number of follow-up reports for APG members and for joint APG/FATF membersand also agreed on revised evaluation procedures for the coming year reflecting recent changesto global procedures”. Countries under review during the current session included China,Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, China, Pakistan, the Philippines and the Solomon Islands

The APG process is one of three review processes that Pakistan faces in the next few months.On September 5, the APG will meet again, to take forward the main 15-month process ofPakistan’s FATF evaluation, which will present its recommendations for the FATF plenarysession in Paris from October 18 to 23. At present, Pakistan is on the “greylist” of the FATF, acommon group for countries that are termed “high risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions”.

The Paris plenary will decide whether to remove Pakistan from the greylist, continue the listing,or downgrade it to a blacklist of non-cooperative countries. Officials said the downgrade mightnot occur, given that any three countries in the FATF can veto it, and Pakistan is likely to securethe backing of China, Turkey and Malaysia. However, the APG decision on Friday would make itdifficult for Pakistan to extricate itself from the greylist.

‘Wrong terminology’

In a statement, Pakistan’s Finance Ministry accepted that it had been placed in the enhancedfollow-up, which requires it to report on a quarterly basis, but said that the term “blacklist” did notapply to the APG process, calling the terminology “incorrect and baseless”.

Pakistani officials said that since the APG process only looked at Pakistan’s actions till October2018, it did not represent the decisions taken in the past year, which will be considered by thenext two reviews.

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OLD NEW FRIENDSRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: Europe, European Union (EU) and India


C. Raja Mohan is Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University ofSingapore, and the consulting editor on foreign affairs for 'The Indian Express'. Before hisassociation with The Indian Express began in 2004, Raja Mohan worked for The Hindu as itsWashington correspondent and Strategic Affairs Editor. He was a distinguished fellow at theObserver Research Foundation, New Delhi. In his academic avatar, Raja Mohan has beenprofessor of South Asian Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and theNanyang Technological University, Singapore. As a think tanker, he worked at the Institute forDefence Studies and Analyses and Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi. He is on theeditorial board of various international affairs journals and is affiliated with the Institute of SouthAsian Studies, Singapore; the Lowy Institute, Sydney; and the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, Washington DC. He is the author, most recently, of Samudra Manthan:Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.

For nearly four decades, successive French presidents — Francois Mitterand in the 1980s,Jacques Chirac from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s and Nicolas Sarkozy after that — maderepeated efforts to elevate the engagement with India to a higher level. If Paris was an eagersuitor, Delhi was distracted. Preoccupied with other major powers — US, Russia and China —and burdened by its inherited Anglo-Saxon bias, Delhi could hardly appreciate the pivotal valueof France, and more broadly that of Europe, in transforming India’s international position.

The one-sided love affair has begun to change as Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid greaterstrategic attention to France and Europe in the first term. While many pending issues relating toEurope were sorted out during 2014-19, it was the boosting of ties with France that stood out asan important feature of Modi’s foreign policy in the first term. The PM’s summit with FrenchPresident Emmanuel Macron this week and participation in the G-7 outreach next week markthe injection of some real content into the bilateral strategic partnership that was unveiled morethan two decades ago in 1998.

The Modi-Macron bromance could not have come at a more critical time for the two countries.The relative harmony between the major powers witnessed after the Cold War is now becominga distant memory. The growing tensions between the US on the one hand and China andRussia on the other are roiling the international waters. Meanwhile, thanks to Donald Trump, thecracks in the political West are widening.

As they come to terms with the breakdown of the post-War order, India and France recognisethe urgency of constructing coalitions that can provide a measure of stability in an increasinglyunstable world. France, which had sought strategic autonomy within the framework of its alliancewith the US, and India, which has valued independent foreign policy, are natural partners inbuilding the new coalitions for an uncertain era.

The rapid rise of China — and the expanding gap in the national power indices in favour ofBeijing — have altered the balance of power in India’s neighbourhood. During the Cold War,India had turned to the Soviet Union to ensure a stable regional balance.

In the last few years, Russia has been drawing steadily closer to China. This movement is not


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defined by any problem between Moscow and Delhi, but Russia’s larger global calculus. ThatRussia has a broader and deeper economic and political relationship with China means the newentente between Moscow and Beijing can only make it harder for Delhi to rely on the former tobalance the latter.

After the turbulent 1990s when Delhi and Washington argued over non-proliferation andKashmir, the two sides settled into a period of stable and expanding partnership under thepresidencies of George Bush and Barack Obama lasting from 2001-2017. The arrival of DonaldTrump in the White House in early 2017, amidst an unexpected turn in American domesticpolitics, has begun to produce complications for India on a range of issues — from bilateral tradeto regional and global affairs.

Trump was, by no means, trying to target India in particular. Delhi has been affected bysweeping changes in the foreign, economic and national security policies unleashed by Trump.He has turned hostile to the WTO and walked away from many multilateral arrangements. Hehas spewed venom on long-standing US allies for being a burden on the American exchequer.As he withdraws from some of the conflict zones, Trump insists that America’s allies and friendsdo more for their own security. His recent call on India to join the fight against Islamic State inAfghanistan is part of that belief system.

Whether these new emphases will survive the Trump presidency or not, they have unnervedmost of America’s partners in Europe and Asia. For many nations, including India and France,coping with the muscular assertiveness of China, the resurgence of Russia and theretrenchment of America become the central challenge of their foreign and security policies.

As they look for options in a world where the old political certitudes look shaky, India and Francesee that strengthening bilateral cooperation and building coalitions with like-minded countries iscritical for the protection of their long term interests. The new imperatives driving India andFrance have manifested themselves in a five-fold agenda for Modi and Macron.

First, enhancing bilateral cooperation in strategic sectors. France has always been an importantpartner in the development of advanced technologies. This is set to advance further with theconsolidation of civil nuclear cooperation and enhancing space cooperation. The summit thisweek saw the placing of artificial intelligence and the unfolding digital revolution at the top of thebilateral agenda. Second, the new commitment to go beyond the buyer-seller relationship in thefield of weapons procurement. When India comes up with clear policies for making arms in India,the synergies between India’s large defence market and the French strengths in armamentproduction would come into full play.

Third, political cooperation between India and France is relatively new; it began with Frenchsupport for India in limiting international sanctions on Delhi after its 1998 nuclear tests. Today,France has emerged as India’s most reliable partner on issues relating to terrorism and Kashmir.

Fourth, the relationship between India and France has gone beyond the bilateral to focus on theregional. Modi and Macron this week have agreed to intensify maritime and naval cooperation inthe Indian Ocean and more broadly the Indo-Pacific. There is a sweeping and ambitious oceanagenda awaiting the two countries — from maritime governance to oceanographic research andfrom interoperability between their armed forces to capacity building in the littoral.

Finally, it is the prospect of global agenda-setting that is beginning to make the India-Francestrategic partnership very exciting. After their joint efforts to limit climate change and develop theSolar Alliance, India and France have turned to more ambitious ideas. The road map oncybersecurity and digital technology issued by Modi and Macron this week provides the

https://indianexpress.com/about/barack-obama

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framework for long-term cooperation on a set of issues, whose weight is growing by the day.

France also opens the pathway for deeper engagement with Europe on global issues. Sinceindependence, India has experimented with different institutions — including the NAM andBRICS — to shape global norms. The new partnerships with France, Germany and other like-minded countries like Japan would hopefully turn out to be far more consequential for India’sinfluence on the global stage.

(The writer is director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singaporeand contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express)






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AN END TO ARMS CONTROL CONSENSUSRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: International Treaties & Agreements, and other important

organizations

International Day Against nuclear test vector design with nuclear vector icon design

The countdown on the U.S.-Russia Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty began lastOctober when President Donald Trump announced that U.S. was considering a withdrawal. OnAugust 2, the U.S. formally quit the pact. Concluded in 1987, the agreement had obliged the twocountries to eliminate all ground-based missiles of ranges between 500 and 5,500 km, anobjective achieved by 1991.

At risk is the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) signed in 2010 and due to lapse inFebruary 2021. It has a provision for a five-year extension but Mr. Trump has already labelled it“a bad deal negotiated by the [Barack] Obama administration.”

In May, Director of the Defence Intelligence Agency Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley declared that“Russia probably is not adhering to the nuclear testing moratorium in a manner consistent withthe ‘zero-yield’ standard” imposed by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The CTBThas not entered into force but the U.S. is a signatory and Russia has signed and ratified it. Manyhave interpreted Lt. Gen. Ashley’s statement as preparing the ground for a resumption ofnuclear explosives testing. Taken together, these ominous pointers indicate the beginning of anew nuclear arms race.

The decade of the 1980s saw heightened Cold War tensions. Soviet military intervention inAfghanistan in 1979 provided the U.S. an opportunity to fund a (barely) covert jihad with the helpof Pakistan. President Ronald Reagan called the USSR “an evil empire” and launched his spacewar initiative. Soviet deployments in Europe of SS-20 missiles were matched by the U.S. withPershing II and cruise missiles.

In 1985, the two countries entered into arms control negotiations on three tracks. The first dealtwith strategic weapons with ranges of over 5,500 km, leading to the START agreement in 1991that limited both sides to 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads. A second trackdealt with intermediate-range missiles, of particular concern to the Europeans, and this led to theINF Treaty in 1987. A third track, Nuclear and Space Talks, was intended to address Sovietconcerns regarding the U.S.’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) but this did not yield anyconcrete outcome.

The INF Treaty was hailed as a great disarmament pact even though no nuclear warheads weredismantled and similar range air-launched and sea-launched missiles were not constrained.Further, since it was a bilateral agreement, the treaty did not restrict other countries, but thishardly mattered as it was an age of bipolarity and the U.S.-USSR nuclear equation was the onlyone that counted. By 1991, the INF had been implemented. The USSR destroyed a total of1,846 missiles and the U.S. did the same with 846 Pershing and cruise missiles. Associatedproduction facilities were also closed down. In keeping with Reagan’s dictum of ‘trust but verify’,the INF Treaty was the first pact to include intensive verification measures, including on-siteinspections.

With the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the USSR in end-1991, the arms race was

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over. Former Soviet allies were now joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) andnegotiating to become European Union (EU) members. The U.S. was investing in missiledefence and conventional global precision strike capabilities to expand its technological lead.Importantly, some of these were blurring the nuclear-conventional divide.

In 2001, when the U.S. announced its unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Anti Ballistic MissileTreaty (ABM Treaty), a keystone of bilateral nuclear arms control was removed.

The INF Treaty had been under threat for some time. The U.S. had started voicing concernsabout the Novator 9M729 missile tests nearly a decade ago. As Russia began production,formal allegations of violation of the INF Treaty were raised by the Obama administration in2014. Russia denied the allegations and blamed the U.S. for deploying missile defenceinterceptors in Poland and Romania, using dual-purpose launchers that could be quicklyreconfigured to launch Tomahawk missiles.

Basically, Russia believes that nuclear stability began getting upset since the U.S.’s unilateralwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty. As the U.S. used its technological lead to gain advantage,Russia became more dependent on its offensive nuclear arsenal and began its modernisationand diversification.

The U.S.’s 2017 National Security Strategy and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) the followingyear reflected harsher-than-before assessment of its security environment and sought a moreexpansive role for nuclear weapons, in a break from the policies that had been followed sincethe end of the Cold War. Russia was seen as a ‘disruptive power’ pushing for a re-ordering ofsecurity and economic structures in Europe and West Asia in its favour. China was identified forthe first time as a strategic competitor that was seeking regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacificregion in the near-term and “displacement of the U.S. to achieve global pre-eminence in thefuture”.

With the geopolitical shift to the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. believes that the INF Treaty was putting itat a disadvantage compared to China which is rapidly modernising and currently has 95% of itsballistic and cruise missile inventory in the INF range. Against this political backdrop, the demiseof the agreement was a foregone conclusion.

The 2011 New START was a successor to the START framework of 1991 and limited both sidesto 700 strategic launchers and 1,550 operational warheads. It lapses in February 2021 unlessextended for a five-year period. Mr. Trump has indicated that a decision on the agreement willbe taken in January 2021, after the 2020 election. Given his dislike for it, if he is re-elected, it isclear that the New START will also meet the fate of the INF Treaty. This means that, for the firsttime since 1972, when the Strategic Arms Limitation Act (SALT) I concluded, strategic arsenalsfrom the U.S. and Russia will not be constrained by any arms control agreement.

The 2018 NPR envisaged development of new nuclear weapons, including low-yield weapons.The Nevada test site, which has been silent since 1992, is being readied to resume testing witha six-month notice. The U.S. Senate had rejected the CTBT in 1999 but as a signatory the U.S.has observed it. In addition to pointing the finger at Russian violations, Lt. Gen. Ashley declaredthat “China is possibly preparing to operate its test site year-round in a development that speaksdirectly to China’s goals for its nuclear force”. He suggested that China cannot achieve suchprogress “without activities inconsistent with the CTBT”. Since the CTBT requires ratification byU.S., China, Iran, Israel and Egypt and adherence by India, Pakistan and North Korea, it isunlikely to ever enter into force. Resumption of testing by the U.S. would effectively ensure itsdemise.

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A new nuclear arms race could just be the beginning. Unlike the bipolar equation of the ColdWar, this time it will be complicated because of multiple countries being involved. Technologicalchanges are bringing cyber and space domains into contention. All this raises the risks ofescalation and could even strain the most important achievement of nuclear arms control — thetaboo against the use of nuclear weapons that has stood since 1945.

Rakesh Sood is a former diplomat and currently a Distinguished Fellow at the ObserverResearch Foundation









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SHALLOW DRAUGHTS: ON TRUMP’S KASHMIRREMARKS

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - USA

In the run-up to the meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President DonaldTrump, expected on the sidelines of the G7 summit, many in South Block would have hoped thatthe U.S. President would not make any of his characteristically controversial statements. Thetwo leaders have a full bilateral agenda to discuss, including defence and strategic cooperation,and will need to resolve outstanding trade issues, as well as deal with possible U.S. sanctionson India for an upcoming purchase of the Russian S-400 anti missile systems and the future ofIran sanctions for oil purchases. It is clear that India’s concerns over the U.S.-Taliban peaceprocess will also be high on the agenda. However, Mr. Trump has made it clear, in at least threerecent statements, that the situation in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and resultant tensionsbetween India and Pakistan will claim much of the conversation. For starters, Mr. Trump hasrepeated, despite several rejections from India, that he would like to “mediate” between the twocountries. He has also called the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir a ‘religious problem’.While Mr. Trump is free to make assertions, his views on the Kashmir dispute betray anignorance of the nature of the conflict and the situation on the ground.

Since 1947, the view on the Indian side has been that Partition was not on the basis of areligious divide, but an ideological one: the ‘idea of Pakistan’ vs. the ‘idea of India’. Pakistan wascarved out of India because sections of Muslims believed that they could not live equitably withthe majority Hindu community. India consisted of those who believed people of all religions couldlive together in a secular, pluralistic society; and it should be noted that more Muslims chose tolive in India than in Pakistan. India’s claim over J&K, a State that included Hindus, Muslims andBuddhists, stemmed from this very premise. The government has repeatedly stressed that itsdecision on J&K was mandated by a desire to provide better governance and development forthe people there. Mr. Trump’s assertion that the issue over Kashmir is a religious one unwittinglyplays into the Pakistani narrative of a conflict that has defied such narrow definitions for morethan 70 years. It is therefore necessary that the government firmly corrects Mr. Trump on thematter. While the government has decided wisely to ignore many of his quixotic comments, hisassertion that Kashmir is essentially a communal problem is dangerous, and needs to becountered by New Delhi in the interest of bilateral relations, as well as the resolution of theproblem itself.









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TAKING A ‘FAR EAST’ TURN TO DEEPEN AFRIENDSHIP

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - Russia

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in New Delhi in October2018.

Some 48 years ago, when the U.S. and British Navies tried to threaten Indian security during theIndia-Pakistan war in 1971, the Soviet Union dispatched nuclear-armed flotilla from its PacificFleet based at Vladivostok in support of India. Ever since then, the city of Vladivostok, located inRussia’s Far East, has had a special place in the hearts of Indians. When Prime MinisterNarendra Modi visits the city as the guest of honour at Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) inSeptember, he would be announcing India’s plans to invest in Russia’s Far East, thus, payingback the long-held Indian debt to Vladivostok.

The Far East lies in the Asian part of Russia and is less developed than the country’s Europeanareas. As part of his ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy, President Vladimir Putin is inviting foreign countriesto invest in this region. The country’s outreach to Asian nations has especially gainedmomentum after the 2014 Crimea crisis spoiled its relations with the West.

At the same time, the idea of an ‘Indo-Pacific region’, which signals India’s willingness to workwith the U.S. mainly to counter China’s assertive maritime rise, has also left Russia concerned.Moscow is apprehensive that the U.S. would exert pressure on India’s foreign policy choices andthat it could lose a friendly country and one of the biggest buyers of Russian military hardware.

New Delhi, on its part, has maintained that Indo-Pacific is not targeted against any country andstands for inclusiveness and stability. Mr. Modi made this clear to Mr. Putin during their Sochiinformal summit in 2018. Later, at the Shangri-La dialogue, he again emphasised that for India,Indo-Pacific is not a club of limited members and that New Delhi wants to have inclusiveengagement with all the relevant stakeholders.

This constant engagement has borne fruit and the two countries are now working for a multipolarIndo-Pacific. India has also been able to convince Russia that its engagement with the U.S. isnot going to come against Russian interests.

On its part, Russia also wants to make sure that China does not become a hegemon in theEurasian region and is hence deepening cooperation with countries like India, Vietnam andIndonesia. Here, the Far East has the potential to become an anchor in deepening India-Russiacooperation; more so considering that New Delhi has expanded the scope of its ‘Act East policy’to also include Moscow.

At least 17 countries have already invested in the Far East which, with its investment-friendlyapproach and vast reserves of natural resources, has the potential to strengthen India-Russiaeconomic partnership in areas like energy, tourism, agriculture, diamond mining and alternativeenergy.

Mr. Modi’s visit to Vladivostok would not be an event in isolation as New Delhi and Moscow havebeen drawing up the plan to cooperate in the region in the last few years. A bilateral businessdialogue was included in the business programme of EEF in 2017 and, in 2018, India was one ofthe 18 countries for which Russia simplified electronic visas to encourage tourism in the Far

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East. New Delhi will also provide an annual grant of $10,000 to fund the study of Indology at theCentre of Regional and International Studies at Far Eastern Federal University. Also, aMemorandum of Understanding has been signed between Amity University and Far EasternFederal University to intensify cultural and academic exchanges in the areas of research andeducation.

A lack of manpower is one of the main problems faced by the Far East and Indian professionalslike doctors, engineers and teachers can help in the region’s development. Presence of Indianmanpower will also help in balancing Russian concerns over Chinese migration into the region.Further, India, one of the largest importers of timber, can find ample resources in the region.Japan and South Korea have also been investing and New Delhi may explore areas of jointcollaboration.

Mr. Modi has also given due importance to ‘paradiplomacy’ where Indian States are beingencouraged to develop relations with foreign countries. States like Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat,Maharashtra, Haryana and Goa would be collaborating with Russian Provinces to increase tradeand investments. Earlier this month, Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal led adelegation to Vladivostok that included Chief Ministers of these States and representatives fromabout 140 companies. For India, there is immense potential for mid-sized and small businesseswho should be assisted to overcome language and cultural barriers so that they successfullyadopt local business practices. A meeting between the heads of the regions of Russia andvarious Chief Ministers from Indian States may soon take place and this should become aregular feature.

The two countries are also looking at the feasibility of Chennai-Vladivostok sea route that wouldallow India access to Russia’s Far East in 24 days, compared to the 40 days taken by thecurrent route via Suez Canal and Europe. This route would potentially add the required balanceto peace and prosperity in South China Sea and could open new vistas for India, like the India-Russia-Vietnam trilateral cooperation.

Great power rivalry is back in international politics, making it more unpredictable. In times whenU.S. President Trump is interested in ‘deglobalisation’ and China is promoting ‘globalisation 2.0with Chinese characteristics’, it makes sense for India and Russia to increase their areas ofcooperation and trade in order to hedge against disruptive forces and make their tiessustainable.

Harsh V. Pant is professor at King’s College London; Raj Kumar Sharma is consultant, Facultyof Political Science, IGNOU







END


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MODI, JOHNSON AGREE TO STEP UP BILATERALCOOPERATION

Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - UK

British Prime Minister Boris Johnson with Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the G7 summit inBiarritz on Sunday.GettyPool

Prime Minister Narendra Modi had a “good” meeting with his British counterpart Boris Johnsonhere on Sunday and they discussed ways to strengthen bilateral cooperation in areas like trade,investment, defence and education.

Mr. Modi met Mr. Johnson on the sidelines of the G7 summit. The Prime Minister arrived inBiarritz from Manama, the capital of Bahrain after concluding the first-ever prime ministerial visitto the Gulf nation.

“PM @narendramodi had a good meeting with UK PM @BorisJohnson on margins of #G7summit. Discussions focused on strengthening our bilateral ties going forward, inter alia, in trade& investment, defence & security, S & T and education sectors,” Ministry of External Affairsspokesperson Raveesh Kumar tweeted.

“PM Modi begins by congratulating PM Johnson on England’s spectacular win in the Third Testof the Ashes a short while ago,” the Prime Minister’s Office tweeted earlier.

This is the first meeting between the two leaders after Mr. Johnson became Prime Minister lastmonth, the third in fairly quick succession since Britain voted to leave the EU in June 2016 -following on from David Cameron and Theresa May.

Their meeting came against the backdrop of the Indian government revoking the special statusto Jammu and Kashmir and bifurcating the State into two Union Territories.

During a telephone call early this week, Mr. Johnson told Mr. Modi that Kashmir remains abilateral matter between India and Pakistan as far as the UK’s view is concerned.

“The Prime Minister made clear that the UK views the issue of Kashmir as one for India andPakistan to resolve bilaterally. He underlined the importance of resolving issues throughdialogue,” a Downing Street spokesperson said in an official readout of the phone call onTuesday.








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A TWO-WAY STREETRelevant for: International Relations | Topic: Europe, European Union (EU) and India


Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s fourth visit to France in a little over five years marks theconsolidation of a relationship that had offered much promise for so long. Although the two sideshad declared a strategic partnership way back in 1998, Delhi and Paris had struggled to take fulladvantage of its many possibilities. That has begun to change under Modi and PresidentEmmanuel Macron. If Macron’s visit to Delhi last year raised the level of ambition, Modi’s visitlast week saw the intensification of efforts to advance civil nuclear cooperation, enhanceengagement in civilian and security dimensions of outer space, and outline a new road map forbilateral cooperation in cybersecurity and digital technology. Framing this bilateral cooperation instrategic areas is the deepening political cooperation on regional issues.

French empathy for India’s concerns on cross-border terrorism and the external destabilisationof Kashmir has seen consequential results. Paris has offered unstinted support for India ontargeting the sources of violent extremism in Pakistan and helped limit the international backlashagainst Delhi’s effort to rewrite the rules of engagement in J&K. This stands in contrast toRussia’s growing ambivalence on the issues between India and Pakistan. Russia’s deepeningties with China, amid sharpening tensions between Delhi and Beijing, are casting a shadow overits South Asia policies. The US, which had made a definitive tilt towards India on its disputeswith Pakistan during the last two decades, appears shaky under President Donald Trump.Seeking to extricate itself from Afghanistan, it appears eager to please Pakistan and Trump isserving up reheated illusions about mediating the Kashmir question between Delhi andIslamabad.

The relations between Delhi and Paris are not a one-way street. France has reasons to seeDelhi as a strong partner on bilateral, regional and global issues. A rapidly expanding economymakes India a valuable commercial partner— in a range of sectors including high technology,defence and the unfolding digital revolution. On the regional front, Paris is as concerned as Delhiat the rising Chinese profile in the Indo-Pacific. It would like to work with India to offer crediblealternatives to Chinese economic and military assistance in the region. On the internationalfront, France is deeply concerned about the breakdown of the global order under relentlessassault from Trump’s unilateralism. Macron’s decision to have Modi as a special invitee at the G-7 summit is part of the French effort to mobilise India’s political weight in building a new “alliancefor multilateralism” with like-minded countries. Modi and Macron have equal stakes in buildingon this agenda.






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TALKING TRADE WITH THE EURelevant for: International Relations | Topic: Europe, European Union (EU) and India

Illustration of a long shadow waving European Union flag with a rupee coin icon

As the economy begins to suffer from the U.S.-China trade war, it is imperative for India topursue a free trade agreement (FTA) with the European Union (EU). Last month, negotiatorsfrom both sides met in Brussels, for more talks about talks, but time is now running out for NewDelhi.

Moving beyond the U.S. and China, this is the right time for India to engage the EU as anindispensable democratic partner to craft a favourable geo-economic order. A series ofeconomic and geo-strategic factors make the need for an economic deal with the EU moreurgent.

First, India risks being left behind amidst a collapsing global trade architecture, risingprotectionism and a new emphasis on bilateral FTAs. India is the only major power lacking anFTA with any of its top trade partners, including the EU, the U.S., China and Gulf economies.This situation is not tenable as most trade is now driven either by FTAs or global value chains.

The EU’s revived focus on FTAs could only exacerbate this risk for India. In June, Brusselsconcluded a trade deal with Vietnam and a historic FTA with the Mercorsur countries in SouthAmerica. India, in the meantime, is hanging on to its Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status. Itsstatus under the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) will face rising competitionfrom Pakistan or Sri Lanka, who enjoy GSP+ benefits.

Stuck in a ‘grey zone’, without preferential FTA tariffs or GSP+ status, India will struggle to keepexports competitive for Europe, its largest trade partner where 20% of its exports land up.

The good news here is that India’s talks with the EU have been advancing slowly but steadily.From agriculture to intellectual property, the EU and India have quietly been exchanging andaligning views. New areas like e-commerce have registered significant convergence becauseIndia’s position on data privacy is not that different from the EU’s. As with the EU-Japan deal,India may wish to proceed at two speeds: it could delay discussions about free flow of data for afew years and freeze differences on the tax moratorium issue or data localisation, even whilecommitting to liberalise in other areas.

Second, beyond mere economic cost-benefit analysis, India must also approach an EU FTAfrom a geo-strategic perspective. With Mr. Trump’s hostile spotlight focussing on India, andlingering concerns about the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, New Delhi mustrealise the long-term strategic benefits of a trade deal with Europe.

EU negotiators are now more willing to make concessions on labour or environmentalregulations, which used to be insurmountable obstacles. The collapse of the Transatlantic Tradeand Investment Partnership and concerns about excessive economic reliance on China havepropelled the EU to become a little more pragmatic, which New Delhi should leverage before it’stoo late.

The EU also offers India a unique regulatory model that balances growth, privacy and standards.India’s governance framework shares the European norms of democratic transparency andmulti-stakeholder participation on a variety of new technological domains, from regulating

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artificial intelligence to 5G networks. New Delhi must see this as a strategic premium that is notaccounted for in a strict cost-benefit economic analysis.

When New Delhi speaks of Europe as a strategic partner to uphold a multipolar order, it must gobeyond security and begin with the business of trade and technology.

Mohan Kumar, is chairman of Research and Information System for Developing Countries;Constantino Xavier is a Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings India










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‘COOPERATION IN RUSSIAN FAR EAST IS A PRIORITY’Relevant for: International Relations | Topic: India - Russia

A file photo of PM Narendra Modi with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

India sees Russia as a long-term, reliable partner and at the upcoming bilateral summit betweenPrime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin, both nations are set to add newareas of cooperation beyond the traditional ones, said Indian envoy in Russia D.B. VenkateshVarma.

“Russian Far East is a priority for us, it’s a priority for Russia. We see commonalities in terms ofeconomic cooperation and investment. You can expect some major announcements on howIndia-Russia relations are going to be diversified. And cooperation in the Russian Far East willbe a major component of that diversification,” Mr. Varma told a small group of journalists fromNew Delhi at the Indian Embassy in Moscow.

Mr. Modi has been invited as the chief guest of the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) inVladivostok by Mr. Putin on September 5. Mr. Varma said the summit, to be held on thesidelines of the EEF, would not only consolidate traditional areas of cooperation—defence,nuclear, space and energy—but also inter-regional cooperation.

External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar arrived in Moscow on Tuesday for talks with his Russiancounterpart Sergey Lavrov to finalise preparations for the summit meeting. He will speak at theValdai discussion club on Indo-Pacific and will hold discussions with Mr. Lavrov on Wednesday.

Mr. Varma said the special and privileged partnership between the two countries was poised fora “new leap forward”. He pointed to the “summer of intense activity” between the two countries.

Minister of Oil and Natural Gas, Dharmendra Pradhan will be in Moscow later this week, whichofficials said was for negotiations on expansion of energy cooperation, including long-term gassupplies. Next week, India and Russia are likely to seal a military logistics support agreement,the Agreement on Reciprocal Logistics Support (ARLS).

( The writer is in Moscow on the invitation of the Russian government for the MAKS-2019 airshow )











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‘ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS’ AND MANYPROBLEMS


A protester throws back a tear gas canister during clashes with police.AFP

Protests in Hong Kong, now in its 13th consecutive week, have brought a decades-old policy ofChina back into focus — ‘One Country Two Systems’.

The protesters, who started occupying the city’s streets in April after the local governmentproposed an extradition law, say Beijing is trying to violate this policy by infringing on HongKong’s autonomy. They want China to end its interference, while Beijing says it sticks to theprinciple and has likened the protesters to terrorists.

So, what’s this One Country Two Systems principle?

Origin of policy

To put it simply, it means Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions, both formercolonies, can have different economic and political systems from that of mainland China, whilebeing part of the People’s Republic of China.

The policy was originally proposed by Deng Xiaoping shortly after he took the reins of thecountry in the late 1970s. Deng’s plan was to unify China and Taiwan under the One CountryTwo Systems principle. He promised high autonomy to Taiwan. China's nationalist government,which was defeated in a civil war by the communists in 1949, had exiled to Taiwan. The islandhas since been run as a separate entity from the mainland China, though Beijing never gave upits claim over Taiwan.

Under Deng’s plan, the island could follow its capitalist economic system, run a separateadministration and keep its own army, but under Chinese sovereignty. Taiwan rejected theCommunist Party’s offer.

Back to China

The idea of two systems in one country resurfaced when Beijing started talks with Britain andPortugal, who were running Hong Kong and Macau, respectively.

The British had taken control of Hong Kong in 1842 after the First Opium War. In 1898, theBritish government and the Qing dynasty of China signed the Second Convention of Peking,which allowed the British to take control of the islands surrounding Hong Kong, known as NewTerritories, on lease for 99 years. Macau, on the other side, had been ruled by the Portuguesefrom 1557.

In the 1980s, China initiated talks with both Britain and Portugal for the transfer of the twoterritories. Beijing promised to respect the region’s autonomy under the One Country TwoSystems principle. On December 19, 1984, China and the U.K. signed the Sino-British JointDeclaration, which set the terms for the autonomy and the legal, economic and governmentalsystems for Hong Kong after the British exit. Similarly, on March 26, 1987, China and Portugal

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signed the Joint Declaration in which China made similar promises for Macau.

Hong Kong returned to Chinese control on July 1, 1997, and Macau on December 20, 1999. Theregions can have their own currencies, economic and legal systems, but defence and diplomacywill be decided by Beijing. Their mini-Constitutions will remain valid for 50 years — till 2047 forHong Kong and 2049 for Macau. It is unclear what will happen after this term.

Current crisis

In recent years, there has been a growing outcry among Hong Kong’s pro-democracy activistsagainst China’s alleged attempts to erode the city’s autonomy.

In 2016-17, six legislators critical of Beijing were debarred. In 2018, the Hong Kong NationalParty, a localist party, was outlawed. This year, Carrie Lam, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong,proposed the extradition Bill, which sought to extradite Hong Kongers to places with which thecity doesn’t have extradition agreements. Critics said it would allow the city government toextradite Beijing critics to the mainland China.

This triggered the protests, and they went on despite Ms. Lam’s decision to suspend the Bill.The protesters, who often clashed with the police, now want the Bill to be formally withdrawn,Ms. Lam to resign, the arrested protesters to be released and the city’s electoral system to bereformed.















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