SOME TOPICSFOR C REVIEW - Smith College

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1

SOME TOPICS FORCOURSE REVIEW

CSC 249MAY 3 2018

sect Layer 1 ndash applicationsect web browsing email

sect Layer 2 ndash transport data transfer

sect Layer 3 ndash network routing from source to destination

sect Layer 4 ndash link single hop data transfer

sect Layer 5 ndash physical (electrical signals)

application

transport

network

link

physical

5318

2

3

A

B

propagation

transmission

nodalprocessing queueing

We will return to these concepts throughout the semester

4-4

Comparison of basic protocols

sect Push v pull protocol

sect ASCII v binary data

sect Multiple objects in one message or one object per message

sect One v two connections

sect Other comparisons

5318

3

sect process sendsreceives messages tofrom its socket

sect socket analogous to doorsect sending process shoves message out doorsect sending process relies on transport infrastructure on other side of door to

deliver message to socket at receiving process

Internet

controlledby OS

controlled byapp developer

transport

application

physicallink

network

process

transport

application

physicallink

network

processsocket

6

Host A

Seq=92 8 bytes data

ACK=100

loss

tim

eout

Cumulative ACK scenario

Host B

XSeq=100 20 bytes data

ACK=120

time

SendBase= 120

What does lsquoArsquo do next

5318

4

8

sectThe transport layer services aresect

sect

sect

sect

sectThe transport layer does not providesect

sect

sect

sect

5318

5

9

sectTCP Reliability includessect

sect

sect

sect

1

23

0111

value in arrivingpackets header

routing algorithm

local forwarding tableheader value output link

0100010101111001

3221

Interplay between routing and forwarding

routing algorithm determinesend-end-path through network

forwarding table determineslocal forwarding at this router

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6

Network Layer

sect IP address 32-bit identifier for host router interface

sect interface connection between hostrouter and physical linksect routers typically have

multiple interfacessect host typically has one or two

interfaces (eg wired Ethernet wireless 80211)

sect IP addresses associated with each interface

223111

223112

223113

223114 223129

223122

223121

223132223131

2231327

223111 = 11011111 00000001 00000001 00000001

223 1 11

DHCP server 223125 arrivingclient

time

DHCP discover

src 0000 68 dest 25525525525567yiaddr 0000transaction ID 654

DHCP offersrc 223125 67dest 255255255255 68yiaddr 223124transaction ID 654Lifetime 3600 secs

DHCP requestsrc 0000 68dest 255255255255 67yiaddr 223124transaction ID 655Lifetime 3600 secs

DHCP ACKsrc 223125 67 dest 255255255255 68yiaddr 223124transaction ID 655Lifetime 3600 secs

yiaddr = lsquoyour internet addressrsquobroadcast address 255255255255 agrave sent to every host in the subnet

5318

7

13

1

23

0111

Address value in arrivingpackets header

routing algorithm


0100010101111001

3221

Oslash Create versus use the forwarding table

RoutingAlgorithm

bull Individual routing algorithm is run in each and every router bull Routers interact with each other in ldquocontrol planerdquo to compute forwarding

tablesbull Traditional approach

dataplane

controlplane

41 bull OVERVIEW OF NETWORK LAYER 309

tables In this example a routing algorithm runs in each and every router and both forwarding and routing functions are contained within a router As wersquoll see in Sec-tions 53 and 54 the routing algorithm function in one router communicates with the routing algorithm function in other routers to compute the values for its forward-ing table How is this communication performed By exchanging routing messages containing routing information according to a routing protocol Wersquoll cover routing algorithms and protocols in Sections 52 through 54

The distinct and different purposes of the forwarding and routing functions can be further illustrated by considering the hypothetical (and unrealistic but technically feasible) case of a network in which all forwarding tables are configured directly by human network operators physically present at the routers In this case no routing protocols would be required Of course the human operators would need to interact with each other to ensure that the forwarding tables were configured in such a way that packets reached their intended destinations Itrsquos also likely that human configu-ration would be more error-prone and much slower to respond to changes in the net-work topology than a routing protocol Wersquore thus fortunate that all networks have both a forwarding and a routing function

Values in arrivingpacketrsquos header

1

23

Local forwardingtable

header

0100011001111001

1101

3221

output

Control plane

Data plane

Routing algorithm

Figure 42 diams Routing algorithms determine values in forward tables

M04_KURO4140_07_SE_C04indd 309 110216 314 PM

1

2

0111

values in arriving packet header

3

5318

8

230100 1101

values in arrivingpackets header

logically-centralized routing controller

1

control plane

data plane

Each router contains a flow table that is computed and distributed by a centralized routing controller

local flow tableheaders counters actions

16

collisions can still occurpropagation delay means two nodes may not heareach otherrsquos transmission

collisionentire packet transmission time wasted

spatial layout of nodes

noterole of distance amp propagation delay in determining collision probability

5318

9

17

18

q Hubv

v

q Switchv

v

q Router v

v

q SDN Packet Switchv

v

5318

10

20

Link Differences from wired link hellip

sect decreasing signal strength EM signal attenuates as it propagates through matter (path loss)

sect interference from other sources wireless network frequencies (eg 24 GHz) shared by other devices (eg phone microwave)

sect multipath propagation EM signal reflects off objects arriving at destination at slightly different times (like echoing)

hellip make communication across (even a point to point) wireless link much more error-prone

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11

network Multiple wireless senders and receivers create

additional problems (beyond multiple access)

AB

C

Hidden terminal problem

A B C

Arsquos signalstrength

space

Crsquos signalstrength

Signal fading

22

APA B

time

RTS(A)RTS(B)

RTS(A)

CTS(A) CTS(A)

DATA (A)

ACK(A) ACK(A)

reservation collision

defer

5318

12

23

Permanent address 12811940186

Care-of address 79129132

dest 12811940186

packet sent by correspondent

dest 79129132 dest 12811940186

packet sent by home agent to foreign agent a packet within a packet

dest 12811940186

foreign-agent-to-mobile packet

1)

2)

3)

4)

Provided via

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

5318

13

symmetric key crypto Bob and Alice share same (symmetric) key K

sect eg key is knowing substitution pattern in mono alphabetic substitution cipher

Q how do Bob and Alice agree on key value

plaintextciphertext

K S

encryptionalgorithm

decryption algorithm

S

K S

plaintextmessage m

K (m)S

m = KS(KS(m))

Network Security

plaintextmessage m

ciphertextencryptionalgorithm


Bobs public key

plaintextmessageK (m)B

+

K B+

Bobs privatekey

K B-

m = K (K (m))B+

B-

5318

14

large message

mH Hashfunction H(m)

digitalsignature(encrypt)

Bobs private

key K B-

+

Bob sends digitally signed message

Alice verifies signature integrity of digitally signed message

KB(H(m))-

encrypted msg digest

KB(H(m))-


large message

m

H Hashfunction

H(m)

digitalsignature(decrypt)

H(m)

Bobs public

key K B+

equal

Digital signature = signed message digest

sect Alice Bob need shared symmetric key

sect KDC server sharesknows different secret key for each registered user (many users)sect Alice Bob know own symmetric keys KA-KDC KB-KDC for communicating with KDC

sect Permanent static existence of these lsquoidentityrsquo keys

q KDC creates a unique single use ldquosession keyrdquo for each new communication between Alice and Bob

KB-KDC

KX-KDC

KY-KDC

KZ-KDC

KP-KDCKB-KDC

KA-KDC

KA-KDCKP-KDC

KDC

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15

sect certification authority (CA) binds public key to particular entity E

sect E (person router) registers its public key with CAsect E provides proof of identity to CA sect CA creates certificate binding E to its public keysect certificate containing Es public key digitally signed by CA ndash CA says this is Es public key

Bobs public

key K B+

Bobs identifying

information


CA private

key K CA-

K B+

certificate for Bobs public key

signed by CA

sect Multimedia applications can be classified into three categories Name and describe each category

sect Streaming video systems can be classified into three categories (three stages in protocol evolution) Name and briefly describe each of these categories

5318

16

sect Client Bufferingsect Streaming (iii) client begins viewing a few seconds after receiving the

first video chunk at one location in the video whilehellip (ii) the client also is receiving later portions of the video whilehellip (iii) the server continues to send the videosect Avoids the need to download and store the entire video and so incur a delay in

playback if waited to download whole video

sect Pre-fetching Datasect Downloadreceive the video frames at a rate higher than the

consumption rate (frames to be viewed in the future)sect Prefetched video is stored in the client application buffersect Occurs naturally with TCP streaming and congestion avoidance

mechanism

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA

1 generalizedldquo flow-basedrdquo forwarding (eg OpenFlow)

2 control data plane separation

3 control plane functions external to data-plane switches

hellip4 programmable

control applications

routing access control

loadbalance

5318

18

IP Src = 103IP Dst = 102 forward(3)

match action

ingress port = 2IP Dst = 10203ingress port = 2IP Dst = 10204

forward(3)

match action

forward(4)ingress port = 1IP Src = 103IP Dst = 102

forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller

Examplebull datagrams from hosts

h5 and h6bull should be sent to h3

or h4bull via s1 and from there

to s2bull Avoid direct link from

s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D

D(F)p(F)infinityinfinity

4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z

D (ZY)X c(XY) + min D (Zw)w=

= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20

sect What is the difference between a forwarding table for destination-based forwarding and OpenFlowrsquos flow table

sect Each entry in the forwarding table of a destination-based forwarding contains

1 Only an IP header field value and 2 The outgoing link interface to which a packet (that matches the IP

header field value) is to be forwarded

sect Each entry of the flow table in OpenFlow includes 1 A set of header field values to which an incoming packet will be

matched2 A set of counters that are updated as packets are matched to flow table

entries (number of packets matched time since last updatehellip)3 A set of actions to be taken when a packet matches a flow table entry

such as forward duplicate drop rewrite header fieldhellip

48

1 Adaptor receives datagram from network layer amp creates frame

2 If adapter senses channel idle (senses for 96 bit-times) it starts to transmit frame If it senses channel busy it waits until channel is idle

3 If adapter transmits entire frame without detecting another transmission the adapter is done with frame

4 If adapter detects another transmission while transmitting it aborts and sends jam signal

5 After aborting adapter enters exponential backoff 1 After the mth collision adapter chooses a K at random from

012hellip2m-1 2 Adapter waits K512 bit times and returns to Step 2

5318

21

q Alice wants to provide secrecy sender authentication amp message integrity hellipHow

q Alice uses three keys her private key Bobrsquos public key the newly created symmetric key

q What does Bob do to retrieve the msg amp be sure it came from Alice

H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

2

3

A

B

propagation

transmission

nodalprocessing queueing

We will return to these concepts throughout the semester

4-4

Comparison of basic protocols

sect Push v pull protocol

sect ASCII v binary data

sect Multiple objects in one message or one object per message

sect One v two connections

sect Other comparisons

5318

3




Internet

controlledby OS


transport

application

physicallink

network

process

transport

application

physicallink

network

processsocket

6

Host A

Seq=92 8 bytes data

ACK=100

loss

tim

eout


Host B


ACK=120

time

SendBase= 120


5318

4

8


sect

sect

sect


sect

sect

sect

5318

5

9


sect

sect

sect

1

23

0111


routing algorithm


0100010101111001

3221




5318

6

Network Layer






223111

223112

223113

223114 223129

223122

223121

223132223131

2231327

223111 = 11011111 00000001 00000001 00000001

223 1 11


time

DHCP discover






5318

7

13

1

23

0111


routing algorithm


0100010101111001

3221


RoutingAlgorithm



dataplane

controlplane





1

23


header

0100011001111001

1101

3221

output

Control plane

Data plane

Routing algorithm


M04_KURO4140_07_SE_C04indd 309 110216 314 PM

1

2

0111


3

5318

8

230100 1101



1

control plane

data plane



16





5318

9

17

18

q Hubv

v

q Switchv

v

q Router v

v


v

5318

10

20






5318

11



AB

C


A B C


space


Signal fading

22

APA B

time

RTS(A)RTS(B)

RTS(A)

CTS(A) CTS(A)

DATA (A)

ACK(A) ACK(A)


defer

5318

12

23



dest 12811940186


dest 79129132 dest 12811940186


dest 12811940186


1)

2)

3)

4)

Provided via

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

5318

13




plaintextciphertext

K S

encryptionalgorithm


S

K S

plaintextmessage m

K (m)S

m = KS(KS(m))

Network Security

plaintextmessage m



Bobs public key


+

K B+

Bobs privatekey

K B-

m = K (K (m))B+

B-

5318

14

large message



Bobs private

key K B-

+



KB(H(m))-


KB(H(m))-


large message

m

H Hashfunction

H(m)


H(m)

Bobs public

key K B+

equal






KB-KDC

KX-KDC

KY-KDC

KZ-KDC

KP-KDCKB-KDC

KA-KDC

KA-KDCKP-KDC

KDC

5318

15



Bobs public

key K B+

Bobs identifying

information


CA private

key K CA-

K B+


signed by CA



5318

16






mechanism

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA







loadbalance

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

3




Internet

controlledby OS


transport

application

physicallink

network

process

transport

application

physicallink

network

processsocket

6

Host A

Seq=92 8 bytes data

ACK=100

loss

tim

eout


Host B


ACK=120

time

SendBase= 120


5318

4

8


sect

sect

sect


sect

sect

sect

5318

5

9


sect

sect

sect

1

23

0111


routing algorithm


0100010101111001

3221




5318

6

Network Layer






223111

223112

223113

223114 223129

223122

223121

223132223131

2231327

223111 = 11011111 00000001 00000001 00000001

223 1 11


time

DHCP discover






5318

7

13

1

23

0111


routing algorithm


0100010101111001

3221


RoutingAlgorithm



dataplane

controlplane





1

23


header

0100011001111001

1101

3221

output

Control plane

Data plane

Routing algorithm


M04_KURO4140_07_SE_C04indd 309 110216 314 PM

1

2

0111


3

5318

8

230100 1101



1

control plane

data plane



16





5318

9

17

18

q Hubv

v

q Switchv

v

q Router v

v


v

5318

10

20






5318

11



AB

C


A B C


space


Signal fading

22

APA B

time

RTS(A)RTS(B)

RTS(A)

CTS(A) CTS(A)

DATA (A)

ACK(A) ACK(A)


defer

5318

12

23



dest 12811940186


dest 79129132 dest 12811940186


dest 12811940186


1)

2)

3)

4)

Provided via

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

5318

13




plaintextciphertext

K S

encryptionalgorithm


S

K S

plaintextmessage m

K (m)S

m = KS(KS(m))

Network Security

plaintextmessage m



Bobs public key


+

K B+

Bobs privatekey

K B-

m = K (K (m))B+

B-

5318

14

large message



Bobs private

key K B-

+



KB(H(m))-


KB(H(m))-


large message

m

H Hashfunction

H(m)


H(m)

Bobs public

key K B+

equal






KB-KDC

KX-KDC

KY-KDC

KZ-KDC

KP-KDCKB-KDC

KA-KDC

KA-KDCKP-KDC

KDC

5318

15



Bobs public

key K B+

Bobs identifying

information


CA private

key K CA-

K B+


signed by CA



5318

16






mechanism

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA







loadbalance

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

4

8


sect

sect

sect


sect

sect

sect

5318

5

9


sect

sect

sect

1

23

0111


routing algorithm


0100010101111001

3221




5318

6

Network Layer






223111

223112

223113

223114 223129

223122

223121

223132223131

2231327

223111 = 11011111 00000001 00000001 00000001

223 1 11


time

DHCP discover






5318

7

13

1

23

0111


routing algorithm


0100010101111001

3221


RoutingAlgorithm



dataplane

controlplane





1

23


header

0100011001111001

1101

3221

output

Control plane

Data plane

Routing algorithm


M04_KURO4140_07_SE_C04indd 309 110216 314 PM

1

2

0111


3

5318

8

230100 1101



1

control plane

data plane



16





5318

9

17

18

q Hubv

v

q Switchv

v

q Router v

v


v

5318

10

20






5318

11



AB

C


A B C


space


Signal fading

22

APA B

time

RTS(A)RTS(B)

RTS(A)

CTS(A) CTS(A)

DATA (A)

ACK(A) ACK(A)


defer

5318

12

23



dest 12811940186


dest 79129132 dest 12811940186


dest 12811940186


1)

2)

3)

4)

Provided via

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

5318

13




plaintextciphertext

K S

encryptionalgorithm


S

K S

plaintextmessage m

K (m)S

m = KS(KS(m))

Network Security

plaintextmessage m



Bobs public key


+

K B+

Bobs privatekey

K B-

m = K (K (m))B+

B-

5318

14

large message



Bobs private

key K B-

+



KB(H(m))-


KB(H(m))-


large message

m

H Hashfunction

H(m)


H(m)

Bobs public

key K B+

equal






KB-KDC

KX-KDC

KY-KDC

KZ-KDC

KP-KDCKB-KDC

KA-KDC

KA-KDCKP-KDC

KDC

5318

15



Bobs public

key K B+

Bobs identifying

information


CA private

key K CA-

K B+


signed by CA



5318

16






mechanism

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA







loadbalance

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

5

9


sect

sect

sect

1

23

0111


routing algorithm


0100010101111001

3221




5318

6

Network Layer






223111

223112

223113

223114 223129

223122

223121

223132223131

2231327

223111 = 11011111 00000001 00000001 00000001

223 1 11


time

DHCP discover






5318

7

13

1

23

0111


routing algorithm


0100010101111001

3221


RoutingAlgorithm



dataplane

controlplane





1

23


header

0100011001111001

1101

3221

output

Control plane

Data plane

Routing algorithm


M04_KURO4140_07_SE_C04indd 309 110216 314 PM

1

2

0111


3

5318

8

230100 1101



1

control plane

data plane



16





5318

9

17

18

q Hubv

v

q Switchv

v

q Router v

v


v

5318

10

20






5318

11



AB

C


A B C


space


Signal fading

22

APA B

time

RTS(A)RTS(B)

RTS(A)

CTS(A) CTS(A)

DATA (A)

ACK(A) ACK(A)


defer

5318

12

23



dest 12811940186


dest 79129132 dest 12811940186


dest 12811940186


1)

2)

3)

4)

Provided via

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

5318

13




plaintextciphertext

K S

encryptionalgorithm


S

K S

plaintextmessage m

K (m)S

m = KS(KS(m))

Network Security

plaintextmessage m



Bobs public key


+

K B+

Bobs privatekey

K B-

m = K (K (m))B+

B-

5318

14

large message



Bobs private

key K B-

+



KB(H(m))-


KB(H(m))-


large message

m

H Hashfunction

H(m)


H(m)

Bobs public

key K B+

equal






KB-KDC

KX-KDC

KY-KDC

KZ-KDC

KP-KDCKB-KDC

KA-KDC

KA-KDCKP-KDC

KDC

5318

15



Bobs public

key K B+

Bobs identifying

information


CA private

key K CA-

K B+


signed by CA



5318

16






mechanism

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA







loadbalance

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

6

Network Layer






223111

223112

223113

223114 223129

223122

223121

223132223131

2231327

223111 = 11011111 00000001 00000001 00000001

223 1 11


time

DHCP discover






5318

7

13

1

23

0111


routing algorithm


0100010101111001

3221


RoutingAlgorithm



dataplane

controlplane





1

23


header

0100011001111001

1101

3221

output

Control plane

Data plane

Routing algorithm


M04_KURO4140_07_SE_C04indd 309 110216 314 PM

1

2

0111


3

5318

8

230100 1101



1

control plane

data plane



16





5318

9

17

18

q Hubv

v

q Switchv

v

q Router v

v


v

5318

10

20






5318

11



AB

C


A B C


space


Signal fading

22

APA B

time

RTS(A)RTS(B)

RTS(A)

CTS(A) CTS(A)

DATA (A)

ACK(A) ACK(A)


defer

5318

12

23



dest 12811940186


dest 79129132 dest 12811940186


dest 12811940186


1)

2)

3)

4)

Provided via

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

5318

13




plaintextciphertext

K S

encryptionalgorithm


S

K S

plaintextmessage m

K (m)S

m = KS(KS(m))

Network Security

plaintextmessage m



Bobs public key


+

K B+

Bobs privatekey

K B-

m = K (K (m))B+

B-

5318

14

large message



Bobs private

key K B-

+



KB(H(m))-


KB(H(m))-


large message

m

H Hashfunction

H(m)


H(m)

Bobs public

key K B+

equal






KB-KDC

KX-KDC

KY-KDC

KZ-KDC

KP-KDCKB-KDC

KA-KDC

KA-KDCKP-KDC

KDC

5318

15



Bobs public

key K B+

Bobs identifying

information


CA private

key K CA-

K B+


signed by CA



5318

16






mechanism

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA







loadbalance

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

7

13

1

23

0111


routing algorithm


0100010101111001

3221


RoutingAlgorithm



dataplane

controlplane





1

23


header

0100011001111001

1101

3221

output

Control plane

Data plane

Routing algorithm


M04_KURO4140_07_SE_C04indd 309 110216 314 PM

1

2

0111


3

5318

8

230100 1101



1

control plane

data plane



16





5318

9

17

18

q Hubv

v

q Switchv

v

q Router v

v


v

5318

10

20






5318

11



AB

C


A B C


space


Signal fading

22

APA B

time

RTS(A)RTS(B)

RTS(A)

CTS(A) CTS(A)

DATA (A)

ACK(A) ACK(A)


defer

5318

12

23



dest 12811940186


dest 79129132 dest 12811940186


dest 12811940186


1)

2)

3)

4)

Provided via

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

5318

13




plaintextciphertext

K S

encryptionalgorithm


S

K S

plaintextmessage m

K (m)S

m = KS(KS(m))

Network Security

plaintextmessage m



Bobs public key


+

K B+

Bobs privatekey

K B-

m = K (K (m))B+

B-

5318

14

large message



Bobs private

key K B-

+



KB(H(m))-


KB(H(m))-


large message

m

H Hashfunction

H(m)


H(m)

Bobs public

key K B+

equal






KB-KDC

KX-KDC

KY-KDC

KZ-KDC

KP-KDCKB-KDC

KA-KDC

KA-KDCKP-KDC

KDC

5318

15



Bobs public

key K B+

Bobs identifying

information


CA private

key K CA-

K B+


signed by CA



5318

16






mechanism

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA







loadbalance

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

8

230100 1101



1

control plane

data plane



16





5318

9

17

18

q Hubv

v

q Switchv

v

q Router v

v


v

5318

10

20






5318

11



AB

C


A B C


space


Signal fading

22

APA B

time

RTS(A)RTS(B)

RTS(A)

CTS(A) CTS(A)

DATA (A)

ACK(A) ACK(A)


defer

5318

12

23



dest 12811940186


dest 79129132 dest 12811940186


dest 12811940186


1)

2)

3)

4)

Provided via

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

5318

13




plaintextciphertext

K S

encryptionalgorithm


S

K S

plaintextmessage m

K (m)S

m = KS(KS(m))

Network Security

plaintextmessage m



Bobs public key


+

K B+

Bobs privatekey

K B-

m = K (K (m))B+

B-

5318

14

large message



Bobs private

key K B-

+



KB(H(m))-


KB(H(m))-


large message

m

H Hashfunction

H(m)


H(m)

Bobs public

key K B+

equal






KB-KDC

KX-KDC

KY-KDC

KZ-KDC

KP-KDCKB-KDC

KA-KDC

KA-KDCKP-KDC

KDC

5318

15



Bobs public

key K B+

Bobs identifying

information


CA private

key K CA-

K B+


signed by CA



5318

16






mechanism

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA







loadbalance

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

9

17

18

q Hubv

v

q Switchv

v

q Router v

v


v

5318

10

20






5318

11



AB

C


A B C


space


Signal fading

22

APA B

time

RTS(A)RTS(B)

RTS(A)

CTS(A) CTS(A)

DATA (A)

ACK(A) ACK(A)


defer

5318

12

23



dest 12811940186


dest 79129132 dest 12811940186


dest 12811940186


1)

2)

3)

4)

Provided via

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

5318

13




plaintextciphertext

K S

encryptionalgorithm


S

K S

plaintextmessage m

K (m)S

m = KS(KS(m))

Network Security

plaintextmessage m



Bobs public key


+

K B+

Bobs privatekey

K B-

m = K (K (m))B+

B-

5318

14

large message



Bobs private

key K B-

+



KB(H(m))-


KB(H(m))-


large message

m

H Hashfunction

H(m)


H(m)

Bobs public

key K B+

equal






KB-KDC

KX-KDC

KY-KDC

KZ-KDC

KP-KDCKB-KDC

KA-KDC

KA-KDCKP-KDC

KDC

5318

15



Bobs public

key K B+

Bobs identifying

information


CA private

key K CA-

K B+


signed by CA



5318

16






mechanism

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA







loadbalance

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

10

20






5318

11



AB

C


A B C


space


Signal fading

22

APA B

time

RTS(A)RTS(B)

RTS(A)

CTS(A) CTS(A)

DATA (A)

ACK(A) ACK(A)


defer

5318

12

23



dest 12811940186


dest 79129132 dest 12811940186


dest 12811940186


1)

2)

3)

4)

Provided via

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

5318

13




plaintextciphertext

K S

encryptionalgorithm


S

K S

plaintextmessage m

K (m)S

m = KS(KS(m))

Network Security

plaintextmessage m



Bobs public key


+

K B+

Bobs privatekey

K B-

m = K (K (m))B+

B-

5318

14

large message



Bobs private

key K B-

+



KB(H(m))-


KB(H(m))-


large message

m

H Hashfunction

H(m)


H(m)

Bobs public

key K B+

equal






KB-KDC

KX-KDC

KY-KDC

KZ-KDC

KP-KDCKB-KDC

KA-KDC

KA-KDCKP-KDC

KDC

5318

15



Bobs public

key K B+

Bobs identifying

information


CA private

key K CA-

K B+


signed by CA



5318

16






mechanism

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA







loadbalance

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

11



AB

C


A B C


space


Signal fading

22

APA B

time

RTS(A)RTS(B)

RTS(A)

CTS(A) CTS(A)

DATA (A)

ACK(A) ACK(A)


defer

5318

12

23



dest 12811940186


dest 79129132 dest 12811940186


dest 12811940186


1)

2)

3)

4)

Provided via

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

5318

13




plaintextciphertext

K S

encryptionalgorithm


S

K S

plaintextmessage m

K (m)S

m = KS(KS(m))

Network Security

plaintextmessage m



Bobs public key


+

K B+

Bobs privatekey

K B-

m = K (K (m))B+

B-

5318

14

large message



Bobs private

key K B-

+



KB(H(m))-


KB(H(m))-


large message

m

H Hashfunction

H(m)


H(m)

Bobs public

key K B+

equal






KB-KDC

KX-KDC

KY-KDC

KZ-KDC

KP-KDCKB-KDC

KA-KDC

KA-KDCKP-KDC

KDC

5318

15



Bobs public

key K B+

Bobs identifying

information


CA private

key K CA-

K B+


signed by CA



5318

16






mechanism

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA







loadbalance

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

12

23



dest 12811940186


dest 79129132 dest 12811940186


dest 12811940186


1)

2)

3)

4)

Provided via

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

5318

13




plaintextciphertext

K S

encryptionalgorithm


S

K S

plaintextmessage m

K (m)S

m = KS(KS(m))

Network Security

plaintextmessage m



Bobs public key


+

K B+

Bobs privatekey

K B-

m = K (K (m))B+

B-

5318

14

large message



Bobs private

key K B-

+



KB(H(m))-


KB(H(m))-


large message

m

H Hashfunction

H(m)


H(m)

Bobs public

key K B+

equal






KB-KDC

KX-KDC

KY-KDC

KZ-KDC

KP-KDCKB-KDC

KA-KDC

KA-KDCKP-KDC

KDC

5318

15



Bobs public

key K B+

Bobs identifying

information


CA private

key K CA-

K B+


signed by CA



5318

16






mechanism

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA







loadbalance

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

13




plaintextciphertext

K S

encryptionalgorithm


S

K S

plaintextmessage m

K (m)S

m = KS(KS(m))

Network Security

plaintextmessage m



Bobs public key


+

K B+

Bobs privatekey

K B-

m = K (K (m))B+

B-

5318

14

large message



Bobs private

key K B-

+



KB(H(m))-


KB(H(m))-


large message

m

H Hashfunction

H(m)


H(m)

Bobs public

key K B+

equal






KB-KDC

KX-KDC

KY-KDC

KZ-KDC

KP-KDCKB-KDC

KA-KDC

KA-KDCKP-KDC

KDC

5318

15



Bobs public

key K B+

Bobs identifying

information


CA private

key K CA-

K B+


signed by CA



5318

16






mechanism

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA







loadbalance

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

14

large message



Bobs private

key K B-

+



KB(H(m))-


KB(H(m))-


large message

m

H Hashfunction

H(m)


H(m)

Bobs public

key K B+

equal






KB-KDC

KX-KDC

KY-KDC

KZ-KDC

KP-KDCKB-KDC

KA-KDC

KA-KDCKP-KDC

KDC

5318

15



Bobs public

key K B+

Bobs identifying

information


CA private

key K CA-

K B+


signed by CA



5318

16






mechanism

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA







loadbalance

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

15



Bobs public

key K B+

Bobs identifying

information


CA private

key K CA-

K B+


signed by CA



5318

16






mechanism

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA







loadbalance

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

16






mechanism

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA







loadbalance

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

17

dataplane

controlplane

Remote Controller

CA

CA CA CA CA







loadbalance

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

18


match action


forward(3)

match action


forward(4)

match action

Host h110101

Host h210102

Host h410204

Host h310203

Host h510305

s1 s2

s312

3 4

1

2

34

1

23

4

Host h610306

controller





s3 to s2

44

Step012345

start NrsquoA

ADADE

ADEBADEBC

ADEBCF

D(B)p(B)2A2A2A

D(C)p(C)5A4D3E3E

D(D)p(D)1A

D(E)p(E)infinity

2D


4E4E4E

A

ED

CB

F2

21

3

1

1

2

53

5

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

19

45

X Z12

7

Y

D (YZ)X c(XZ) + min D (Yw)w== 7+1 = 8

Z


= 2+1 = 3

Y

46

a

b

b

a

aC

A

B

d

Aa

Ac

CbBa

c

b

c

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

20









48







5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

5318

21




H( ) KA( )-

+

KA(H(m))-

m

KA

-

m

KS( )

KB( )++

KB(KS )+

KS

KB+

Internet

KS

SOME TOPICSFOR C REVIEW - Smith College

Documents

Transcript of SOME TOPICSFOR C REVIEW - Smith College