Some Salient Conclusions in Aiming for Global Accounting ...Some Salient Conclusions in Aiming for...
Transcript of Some Salient Conclusions in Aiming for Global Accounting ...Some Salient Conclusions in Aiming for...
Some Salient Conclusions in Aiming for Global
Accounting Standards: The International Accounting
Standards Board, 2001-2011
Stephen A. Zeff
Rice University
Scope and nature of the IASB history research project
• Commissioned by IASB Chairman Sir David Tweedie
• Six-year project, from 2008 to 2014
• IFRS Foundation reimbursed us for travel costs
• Examined both hard copy and digital documentation:
correspondence, drafts, comment letters, agenda
papers, minutes of IASB Board, trustee and
Monitoring Board meetings, memoranda, speeches,
annual reports, and final standards and
interpretations
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• Conducted more than 170 interviews around in the
world: Europe, North America, Japan, China, Hong
Kong, Australia and New Zealand, almost all face-to-
face and recorded
– 22 Board members, 14 trustees, IASB’s senior
staff, members of SAC/IFRS Advisory Council and
of IFRIC/IFRS Interpretations Committee, EU and
SEC officials, national standard setters,
users/analysts, preparers, audit firm partners,
academics, trade associations
• Sent draft chapters to selected interviewees for their
comments and suggestions
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Impelling factors
I. Forces that led the movement towards IFRSs
A. EU’s 2002 IAS Regulation for 15 countries and
6,700 companies
1. Australia promptly followed Europe’s lead
B. World Bank’s ‘Reports on Standards and Codes,
Accounting and Auditing’ for developing
countries and emerging economies
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C. EU’s ‘Equivalence Assessment’ for IFRSs (2004-
2008), especially in Japan, China and South Korea
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European influence
II. Because of geographical proximity to the IASB and
its early, large bloc of IFRS-using companies, Europe
has had an inordinately strong impact on the work of
the IASB
Divisiveness in Europe
III. Europe has been the IASB’s most difficult
constituency, because it is so divided and lacks a
central body that can coalesce around a consistent,
coherent policy on financial reporting and on how
the IASB should perform its role
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US influence
IV. Because of the importance of its capital market and
its long and respected tradition for standard setting
and regulation, the United States has had an
inordinately strong impact on the work of the IASB
Worldwide comparability
V. The abandonment of 25 national GAAPs in favour of
IFRSs beginning in 2005 in the EU has been a huge
step forward, which is frequently taken for granted
and then forgotten
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VI. Genuine worldwide comparability is elusive, because
of the different business models and customs,
income tax incentives and disincentives, accounting
and auditing cultures, and regulatory cultures around
the world – uniformity of method will not achieve
comparability
A. The IASB has had to make amendments to
overcome some of these jurisdictional obstacles
1. China – ‘deemed cost’ – revision of IAS 16
2. Canada – ‘regulatory deferral accounts’ –
IFRS 14
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VII. The IASB, in making difficult choices, finds itself
balancing the following issues:
• Whether its standards should be principles- or
rules-based
• Whether its standards should reflect a balance
sheet or income statement focus
• How to weigh relevance against reliability
• Whether, and where, to use more fair value in its
standards
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Convergence
VIII. While the achievements of the IASB-FASB
convergence program has been short of the boards’
ambitions, it must be recognized that the two boards
have very different sizes, compositions (both
members and staff) and vastly different
constituencies – making agreement on common
standards difficult to achieve
A. Pulled by the FASB, the IASB distanced itself
from stewardship and prudence, and dropped
reliability (2010)
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Evolution of the Board and Foundation
IX. The history of the IASB and of the IFRS Foundation
has so far has been very much an evolutionary
process of making periodic, incremental changes in
strategy, organizational structure, due process,
operating procedures, and links with other bodies
and interested parties – rather than one of carrying
out a coherent plan from the outset
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IASB Board composition
X. The IASB began in 2001 with a heavily technical
membership (former members of the IASC Board and
national standard setters), but by 2011 it was much
less technically strong with ex-regulators and ex-
users much more prominent – leading to a Board
that was more pragmatic and more willing to listen to
constituents
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The profile of global standards
XI. During the IASB Board’s first ten years, there was
little consensus over what global standards should
look like, especially as more and more jurisdictions
moved towards adopting or converging with IFRSs
and thus became constituents
A. The IASB and jurisdictional constituents began
forming bodies for conveying their views to the
Board:
• European Financial Reporting Advisory Group
(EFRAG), since 2001
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• IFRS Advisory Council (formerly SAC), since
2001
• World Standard-Setters, since 2002
• Capital Market Advisory Committee (formerly
Analyst Representative Group), since 2003
• International Forum of Accounting Standard-
Setters, since 2005
• Global Preparers Forum, since 2008
• Asian-Oceanian Standard-Setters Group,
since 2009
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• Emerging Economies Group, since 2011
• Group of Latin American Accounting Standard
Setters (GLASS), since 2011
• Pan African Federation of Accountants, since
2011
• Accounting Standards Advisory Forum, since
2013
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David Tweedie
XII. Chairman David Tweedie, although not without his
critics, was a leader who achieved more than people
expected in 2000, both in directing the work of the
Board and in dealing with senior government
officials around the world, in the political sphere
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Role of the US Securities and Exchange Commission
XIII. The US SEC, always a supporter of a single global
set of high quality accounting standards, would
likely have mandated that domestic companies use
IFRSs if it were not for the onset of the global
financial crisis in 2008 and the pro forma
requirement for Chairman Cox to tender his
resignation upon the election of a new US President
(Obama in November 2008)
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Transparency
XIV.The IFRS Foundation and the IASB have achieved an
admirable openness of process – it is difficult to
think of any other international policy-making or
standard-setting body that comes close to them in
this respect. This observation remains valid even
when it is acknowledged that outside criticism and
pressure for reform have provided much of the
impetus for many process improvements.
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Accountability to public authorities
XV. In 2009, the IFRS Foundation trustees, under
pressure from the European Parliament and others
who claimed that the IASB organization was not
accountable to public authorities, established a
Monitoring Board composed of the SEC, Japan’s
Financial Services Agency, the EU Commissioner
overseeing IFRS issues, and two representatives of
the International Organization of Securities
Commissions.
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It was to vet the selection of trustees and review the
trustees’ oversight of the IASB’s standard-setting
process. It is too early to assess the Monitoring
Board’s effectiveness.
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Funding
XVI.Beginning in 2006, the IFRS Foundation trustees
began campaigning for ‘stable funding platforms’ so
that they would not have to continue going ‘hat in
hand’ to companies, banks and other interested
parties for funds to support the IASB organization.
This step became necessary after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 directed the SEC to assess a levy
on issuers in order to fund the FASB.
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By 2014, some 52% of total contributions came from
established funding programmes of national
standard setters, government ministries, and stock
exchanges, of which 13.7% (£3.1m) came from the
EU as a block grant. Some 28% came from the
international audit firms (US$2.5m per Big 4 firm).
Switzerland gave £92k (4 tenths of 1%), mainly from
SwissHoldings and the Swiss National Bank.
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