Some Consequences of Four Incapacities

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Some Consequences of Four IncapacitiesCharles S. Peirce

Journal of Speculative Philosophy (1868) ! 1"#$1%&.

'escartes is the father of mo ern philosophy! an the spirit of Cartesianism $$ that hich principallyistin*uishes it from the scholasticism hich it isplace $$ may +e compen iously state as follo s,

1. It teaches that philosophy must +e*in ith universal ou+t- hereas scholasticism ha neverquestione fun amentals.

. It teaches that the ultimate test of certainty is to +e foun in the in ivi ual consciousness- hereasscholasticism ha reste on the testimony of sa*es an of the Catholic Church.

. /he multiform ar*umentation of the mi le a*es is replace +y a sin*le threa of inferenceepen in* often upon inconspicuous premisses.

". Scholasticism ha its mysteries of faith! +ut un ertoo0 to e plain all create thin*s. 2ut there aremany facts hich Cartesianism not only oes not e plain +ut ren ers a+solutely ine plica+le! unless tosay that 34o ma0es them so3 is to +e re*ar e as an e planation.

In some! or all of these respects! most mo ern philosophers have +een! in effect! Cartesians. 5oithout ishin* to return to scholasticism! it seems to me that mo ern science an mo ern lo*ic

require us to stan upon a very ifferent platform from this.

1. e cannot +e*in ith complete ou+t. e must +e*in ith all the pre7u ices hich e actually havehen e enter upon the stu y of philosophy. /hese pre7u ices are not to +e ispelle +y a ma im! for

they are thin*s hich it oes not occur to us can +e questione . ence this initial s0epticism ill +e amere self$ eception! an not real ou+t- an no one ho follo s the Cartesian metho ill ever +esatisfie until he has formally recovere all those +eliefs hich in form he has *iven up. It is! therefore!as useless a preliminary as *oin* to the 5orth Pole oul +e in or er to *et to Constantinople +ycomin* o n re*ularly upon a meri ian. 9 person may! it is true! in the course of his stu ies! finreason to ou+t hat he +e*an +y +elievin*- +ut in that case he ou+ts +ecause he has a positive reasonfor it! an not on account of the Cartesian ma im. :et us not preten to ou+t in philosophy hat e onot ou+t in our hearts.

. /he same formalism appears in the Cartesian criterion! hich amounts to this, 3 hatever I amclearly convince of! is true.3 If I ere really convince ! I shoul have one ith reasonin* an shoulrequire no test of certainty. 2ut thus to ma0e sin*le in ivi uals a+solute 7u *es of truth is mostpernicious. /he result is that metaphysicians ill all a*ree that metaphysics has reache a pitch ofcertainty far +eyon that of the physical sciences- $$ only they can a*ree upon nothin* else. In sciencesin hich men come to a*reement! hen a theory has +een +roache it is consi ere to +e on pro+ationuntil this a*reement is reache . 9fter it is reache ! the question of certainty +ecomes an i le one!+ecause there is no one left ho ou+ts it. e in ivi ually cannot reasona+ly hope to attain theultimate philosophy hich e pursue- e can only see0 it! therefore! for the community ofphilosophers. ence! if iscipline an can i min s carefully e amine a theory an refuse to accept it!this ou*ht to create ou+ts in the min of the author of the theory himself.

. Philosophy ou*ht to imitate the successful sciences in its metho s! so far as to procee only fromtan*i+le premisses hich can +e su+7ecte to careful scrutiny! an to trust rather to the multitu e an



variety of its ar*uments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasonin* shoul not form a chainhich is no stron*er than its ea0est lin0! +ut a ca+le hose fi+ers may +e ever so slen er! provi e

they are sufficiently numerous an intimately connecte .

". ;very uni ealistic philosophy supposes some a+solutely ine plica+le! unanaly<a+le ultimate- inshort! somethin* resultin* from me iation itself not suscepti+le of me iation. 5o that anythin* is thus

ine plica+le can only +e 0no n +y reasonin* from si*ns. 2ut the only 7ustification of an inference fromsi*ns is that the conclusion e plains the fact. /o suppose the fact a+solutely ine plica+le! is not toe plain it! an hence this supposition is never allo a+le.

In the last num+er of this 7ournal ill +e foun a piece entitle 3=uestions concernin* certain Facultiesclaime for >an!3 hich has +een ritten in this spirit of opposition to Cartesianism. /hat criticism ofcertain faculties resulte in four enials! hich for convenience may here +e repeate ,

1. e have no po er of Introspection! +ut all 0no le *e of the internal orl is erive +yhypothetical reasonin* from our 0no le *e of e ternal facts.

. e have no po er of Intuition! +ut every co*nition is etermine lo*ically +y previous co*nitions.

. e have no po er of thin0in* ithout si*ns.

". e have no conception of the a+solutely inco*ni<a+le. /hese propositions cannot +e re*ar e ascertain- an ! in or er to +rin* them to a further test! it is no propose to trace them out to theirconsequences. e may first consi er the first alone- then trace the consequences of the first ansecon - then see hat else ill result from assumin* the thir also- an ! finally! a the fourth to ourhypothetical premisses.

In acceptin* the first proposition! e must put asi e all pre7u ices erive from a philosophy hich+ases our 0no le *e of the e ternal orl on our self$consciousness. e can a mit no statementconcernin* hat passes ithin us e cept as a hypothesis necessary to e plain hat ta0es place in hat

e commonly call the e ternal orl . >oreover hen e have upon such *roun s assume one facultyor mo e of action of the min ! e cannot! of course! a opt any other hypothesis for the purpose ofe plainin* any fact hich can +e e plaine +y our first supposition! +ut must carry the latter as far as it

ill *o. In other or s! e must! as far as e can o so ithout a itional hypotheses! re uce all 0in sof mental action to one *eneral type.

/he class of mo ifications of consciousness ith hich e must commence our inquiry must +e onehose e istence is in u+ita+le! an hose la s are +est 0no n! an ! therefore (since this 0no le *e

comes from the outsi e)! hich most closely follo s e ternal facts- that is! it must +e some 0in ofco*nition. ere e may hypothetically a mit the secon proposition of the former paper! accor in* to

hich there is no a+solutely first co*nition of any o+7ect! +ut co*nition arises +y a continuous process.e must +e*in! then! ith a process of co*nition! an ith that process hose la s are +est un erstoo

an most closely follo e ternal facts. /his is no other than the process of vali inference! hichprocee s from its premiss! 9! to its conclusion! 2! only if! as a matter of fact! such a proposition as 2 isal ays or usually true hen such a proposition as 9 is true. It is a consequence! then! of the first t oprinciples hose results e are to trace out! that e must! as far as e can! ithout any othersupposition than that the min reasons! re uce all mental action to the formula of vali reasonin*.

2ut oes the min in fact *o throu*h the syllo*istic process? It is certainly very ou+tful hether a



conclusion $$ as somethin* e istin* in the min in epen ently! li0e an ima*e $$ su enly isplaces t opremisses e istin* in the min in a similar ay. 2ut it is a matter of constant e perience! that if a manis ma e to +elieve in the premisses! in the sense that he ill act from them an ill say that they aretrue! un er favora+le con itions he ill also +e rea y to act from the conclusion an to say that that istrue. Somethin*! therefore! ta0es place ithin the or*anism hich is equivalent to the syllo*isticprocess.

9 vali inference is either complete or incomplete. 9n incomplete inference is one hose vali ityepen s upon some matter of fact not containe in the premisses. /his implie fact mi*ht have +een

state as a premiss! an its relation to the conclusion is the same hether it is e plicitly posite or not!since it is at least virtually ta0en for *rante - so that every vali incomplete ar*ument is virtuallycomplete. Complete ar*uments are ivi e into simple an comple . 9 comple ar*ument is one hichfrom three or more premisses conclu es hat mi*ht have +een conclu e +y successive steps inreasonin*s each of hich is simple. /hus! a comple inference comes to the same thin* in the en as asuccession of simple inferences.

9 complete! simple! an vali ar*ument! or syllo*ism! is either apo ictic or pro+a+le. 9n apo ictic ore uctive syllo*ism is one hose vali ity epen s uncon itionally upon the relation of the fact inferre

to the facts posite in the premisses. 9 syllo*ism hose vali ity shoul epen not merely upon itspremisses! +ut upon the e istence of some other 0no le *e! oul +e impossi+le- for either this other0no le *e oul +e posite ! in hich case it oul +e a part of the premisses! or it oul +eimplicitly assume ! in hich case the inference oul +e incomplete. 2ut a syllo*ism hose vali ity

epen s partly upon the non$e istence of some other 0no le *e! is a pro+a+le syllo*ism.

9 fe e amples ill ren er this plain. /he t o follo in* ar*uments are apo ictic or e uctive,

1. 5o series of ays of hich the first an last are ifferent ays of the ee0 e cee s +y one a multipleof seven ays- no the first an last ays of any leap$year are ifferent ays of the ee0! an thereforeno leap$year consists of a num+er of ays one *reater than a multiple of seven.

. 9mon* the vo els there are no ou+le letters- +ut one of the ou+le letters ( ) is compoun e oft o vo els, hence! a letter compoun e of t o vo els is not necessarily itself a vo el.

In +oth these cases! it is plain that as lon* as the premisses are true! ho ever other facts may +e! theconclusions ill +e true. @n the other han ! suppose that e reason as follo s,$$39 certain man ha the9siatic cholera. e as in a state of collapse! livi ! quite col ! an ithout percepti+le pulse. e as+le copiously. 'urin* the process he came out of collapse! an the ne t mornin* as ell enou*h to+e a+out. /herefore! +lee in* ten s to cure the cholera.3 /his is a fair pro+a+le inference! provi e thatthe premisses represent our hole 0no le *e of the matter. 2ut if e 0ne ! for e ample! thatrecoveries from cholera ere apt to +e su en! an that the physician ho ha reporte this case ha0no n of a hun re other trials of the reme y ithout communicatin* the result! then the inference

oul lose all its vali ity.

/he a+sence of 0no le *e hich is essential to the vali ity of any pro+a+le ar*ument relates to somequestion hich is etermine +y the ar*ument itself. /his question! li0e every other! is hether certaino+7ects have certain characters. ence! the a+sence of 0no le *e is either hether +esi es the o+7ects

hich! accor in* to the premisses! possess certain characters! any other o+7ects possess them- or!hether +esi es the characters hich! accor in* to the premisses! +elon* to certain o+7ects! any other

characters not necessarily involve in these +elon* to the same o+7ects. In the former case! the



reasonin* procee s as thou*h all the o+7ects hich have certain characters ere 0no n! an this isin uction- in the latter case! the inference procee s as thou*h all the characters requisite to the

etermination of a certain o+7ect or class ere 0no n! an this is hypothesis. /his istinction! also!may +e ma e more plain +y e amples.

Suppose e count the num+er of occurrences of the ifferent letters in a certain ;n*lish +oo0! hich

e may call 9. @f course! every ne letter hich e a to our count ill alter the relative num+er ofoccurrences of the ifferent letters- +ut as e procee ith our countin*! this chan*e ill +e less anless. Suppose that e fin that as e increase the num+er of letters counte ! the relative num+er of eAsapproaches nearly 11 1B" per cent of the hole! that of the tAs 8 1B per cent! that of the aAs 8 per cent!that of the sAs & 1B per cent! etc. Suppose e repeat the same o+servations ith half a o<en other;n*lish ritin*s ( hich e may esi*nate as 2! C! '! ;! F! 4) ith the li0e result. /hen e may inferthat in every ;n*lish ritin* of some len*th! the ifferent letters occur ith nearly those relativefrequencies.

5o this ar*ument epen s for its vali ity upon our not 0no in* the proportion of letters in any;n*lish ritin* +esi es 9! 2! C! '! ;! F an 4. For if e 0no it in respect to ! an it is not nearlythe same as in the others! our conclusion is estroye at once- if it is the same! then the le*itimateinference is from 9! 2! C! '! ;! F! 4 an ! an not from the first seven alone. /his! therefore! is anin uction.

Suppose! ne t! that a piece of ritin* in cipher is presente to us! ithout the 0ey. Suppose e fin thatit contains somethin* less than 6 characters! one of hich occurs a+out 11 per cent of all the times!another 8 1B per cent! another 8 per cent! an another & 1B per cent. Suppose that hen e su+stitutefor these e! t! a an s! respectively! e are a+le to see ho sin*le letters may +e su+stitute for each ofthe other characters so as to ma0e sense in ;n*lish! provi e ! ho ever! that e allo the spellin* to +e

ron* in some cases. If the ritin* is of any consi era+le len*th! e may infer ith *reat pro+a+ilitythat this is the meanin* of the cipher.

/he vali ity of this ar*ument epen s upon there +ein* no other 0no n characters of the ritin* incipher hich oul have any ei*ht in the matter- for if there are $$ if e 0no ! for e ample! hetheror not there is any other solution of it $$ this must +e allo e its effect in supportin* or ea0enin* theconclusion. /his! then! is hypothesis.

9ll vali reasonin* is either e uctive! in uctive! or hypothetic- or else it com+ines t o or more ofthese characters. 'e uction is pretty ell treate in most lo*ical te t+oo0s- +ut it ill +e necessary tosay a fe or s a+out in uction an hypothesis in or er to ren er hat follo s more intelli*i+le.

In uction may +e efine as an ar*ument hich procee s upon the assumption that all the mem+ers ofa class or a**re*ate have all the characters hich are common to all those mem+ers of this classconcernin* hich it is 0no n! hether they have these characters or not- or! in other or s! hichassumes that that is true of a hole collection hich is true of a num+er of instances ta0en from it atran om. /his mi*ht +e calle statistical ar*ument. In the lon* run! it must *enerally affor prettycorrect conclusions from true premisses. If e have a +a* of +eans partly +lac0 an partly hite! +ycountin* the relative proportions of the t o colors in several ifferent han fuls! e can appro imatemore or less to the relative proportions in the hole +a*! since a sufficient num+er of han fuls oulconstitute all the +eans in the +a*. /he central characteristic an 0ey to in uction is! that +y ta0in* theconclusion so reache as ma7or premiss of a syllo*ism! an the proposition statin* that such an sucho+7ects are ta0en from the class in question as the minor premiss! the other premiss of the in uction



ill follo from them e uctively. /hus! in the a+ove e ample e conclu e that all +oo0s in ;n*lishhave a+out 11 1B" per cent of their letters eAs. From that as ma7or premiss! to*ether ith the propositionthat 9! 2! C! '! ;! F an 4 are +oo0s in ;n*lish! it follo s e uctively that 9! 2! C! '! ;! F an 4have a+out 11 1B" per cent of their letters eAs. 9ccor in*ly! in uction has +een efine +y 9ristotle asthe inference of the ma7or premiss of a syllo*ism from its minor premiss an conclusion. /he functionof an in uction is to su+stitute for a series of many su+7ects! a sin*le one hich em+races them an an

in efinite num+er of others. /hus it is a species of 3re uction of the manifol to unity.3ypothesis may +e efine as an ar*ument hich procee s upon the assumption that a character hich

is 0no n necessarily to involve a certain num+er of others! may +e pro+a+ly pre icate of any o+7ecthich has all the characters hich this character is 0no n to involve. Just as in uction may +e

re*ar e as the inference of the ma7or premiss of a syllo*ism! so hypothesis may +e re*ar e as theinference of the minor premiss! from the other t o propositions. /hus! the e ample ta0en a+oveconsists of t o such inferences of the minor premisses of the follo in* syllo*isms,

1. ;very ;n*lish ritin* of some len*th in hich such an such characters enote e! t! a! an s! hasa+out 11 1B" per cent of the first sort of mar0s! 8 1B of the secon ! 8 of the thir ! an & 1B of thefourth./his secret ritin* is an ;n*lish ritin* of some len*th! in hich such an such characters enote e! t!a! an s! respectively,

;r*o!D /his secret ritin* has a+out 11 1B" per cent of its characters of the first 0in ! 8 1B of thesecon ! 8 of the thir ! an & 1B of the fourth.

. 9 passa*e ritten ith such an alpha+et ma0es sense hen such an such letters are severallysu+stitute for such an such characters./his secret ritin* is ritten ith such an alpha+et.

;r*o!D /his secret ritin* ma0es sense hen such an such su+stitutions are ma e.

/he function of hypothesis is to su+stitute for a *reat series of pre icates formin* no unity inthemselves! a sin*le one (or small num+er) hich involves them all! to*ether (perhaps) ith anin efinite num+er of others. It is! therefore! also a re uction of a manifol to unity. ;very e uctivesyllo*ism may +e put into the form

If 9! then 2-2ut 9,

;r*o!D 2.

9n as the minor premiss in this form appears as antece ent or reason of a hypothetical proposition!hypothetic inference may +e calle reasonin* from consequent to antece ent.

/he ar*ument from analo*y! hich a popular riter upon lo*ic calls reasonin* from particulars toparticulars! erives its vali ity from its com+inin* the characters of in uction an hypothesis! +ein*analy<a+le either into a e uction or an in uction! or a e uction an a hypothesis.

2ut thou*h inference is thus of three essentially ifferent species! it also +elon*s to one *enus. e haveseen that no conclusion can +e le*itimately erive hich coul not have +een reache +y successionsof ar*uments havin* t o premisses each! an implyin* no fact not asserte .

;ither of these premisses is a proposition assertin* that certain o+7ects have certain characters. ;very



( hether involvin* some matter of fact concernin* the su+7ect of ar*ument! or merely a ma im relatin*to a system of si*ns)! accor in* to hich it is a vali ar*ument. If this principle is false! the ar*ument isa fallacy- +ut neither a vali ar*ument from false premisses! nor an e cee in*ly ea0! +ut notalto*ether ille*itimate! in uction or hypothesis! ho ever its force may +e over$estimate ! ho ever falseits conclusion! is a fallacy.

5o or s! ta0en 7ust as they stan ! if in the form of an ar*ument! there+y o imply hatever fact may+e necessary to ma0e the ar*ument conclusive- so that to the formal lo*ician! ho has to o only iththe meanin* of the or s accor in* to the proper principles of interpretation! an not ith the intentionof the spea0er as *uesse at from other in ications! the only fallacies shoul +e such as are simplya+sur an contra ictory! either +ecause their conclusions are a+solutely inconsistent ith theirpremisses! or +ecause they connect propositions +y a species of illative con7unction! +y hich theycannot un er any circumstances +e vali ly connecte .

2ut to the psycholo*ist an ar*ument is vali only if the premisses from hich the mental conclusion iserive oul +e sufficient! if true! to 7ustify it! either +y themselves! or +y the ai of other

propositions hich ha previously +een hel for true. 2ut it is easy to sho that all inferences ma e +yman! hich are not vali in this sense! +elon* to four classes! vi<., 1. /hose hose premisses are false-

. /hose hich have some little force! thou*h only a little- . /hose hich result from confusion of oneproposition ith another- ". /hose hich result from the in istinct apprehension! ron* application! orfalsity! of a rule of inference. For! if a man ere to commit a fallacy not of either of these classes! he

oul ! from true premisses conceive ith perfect istinctness! ithout +ein* le astray +y anypre7u ice or other 7u *ment servin* as a rule of inference! ra a conclusion hich ha really not theleast relevancy. If this coul happen! calm consi eration an care coul +e of little use in thin0in*! forcaution only serves to insure our ta0in* all the facts into account! an to ma0e those hich e o ta0eaccount of! istinct- nor can coolness o anythin* more than to ena+le us to +e cautious! an also toprevent our +ein* affecte +y a passion in inferrin* that to +e true hich e ish ere true! or hich

e fear may +e true! or in follo in* some other ron* rule of inference. 2ut e perience sho s that thecalm an careful consi eration of the same istinctly conceive premisses (inclu in* pre7u ices) illinsure the pronouncement of the same 7u *ment +y all men. 5o if a fallacy +elon*s to the first ofthese four classes an its premisses are false! it is to +e presume that the proce ure of the min fromthese premisses to the conclusion is either correct! or errs in one of the other three ays- for it cannot+e suppose that the mere falsity of the premisses shoul affect the proce ure of reason hen thatfalsity is not 0no n to reason. If the fallacy +elon*s to the secon class an has some force! ho everlittle! it is a le*itimate pro+a+le ar*ument! an +elon*s to the type of vali inference. If it is of the thirclass an results from the confusion of one proposition ith another! this confusion must +e o in* to aresem+lance +et een the t o propositions- that is to say! the person reasonin*! seein* that oneproposition has some of the characters hich +elon* to the other! conclu es that it has all the essentialcharacters of the other! an is equivalent to it. 5o this is a hypothetic inference! hich thou*h it may+e ea0! an thou*h its conclusion happens to +e false! +elon*s to the type of vali inferences- an !therefore! as the no us of the fallacy lies in this confusion! the proce ure of the min in these fallaciesof the thir class conforms to the formula of vali inference. If the fallacy +elon*s to the fourth class! iteither results from ron*ly applyin* or misapprehen in* a rule of inference! an so is a fallacy ofconfusion! or it results from a optin* a ron* rule of inference. In this latter case! this rule is in factta0en as a premiss! an therefore the false conclusion is o in* merely to the falsity of a premiss. Inevery fallacy! therefore! possi+le to the min of man! the proce ure of the min conforms to theformula of vali inference.

/he thir principle hose consequences e have to e uce is! that! henever e thin0! e have



present to the consciousness some feelin*! ima*e! conception! or other representation! hich serves as asi*n. 2ut it follo s from our o n e istence ( hich is prove +y the occurrence of i*norance an error)that everythin* hich is present to us is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves. /his oes notprevent its +ein* a phenomenon of somethin* ithout us! 7ust as a rain+o is at once a manifestation+oth of the sun an of the rain. hen e thin0! then! e ourselves! as e are at that moment! appear asa si*n. 5o a si*n has! as such! three references, first! it is a si*n to some thou*ht hich interprets it-

secon ! it is a si*n for some o+7ect to hich in that thou*ht it is equivalent- thir ! it is a si*n! in somerespect or quality! hich +rin*s it into connection ith its o+7ect. :et us as0 hat the three correlatesare to hich a thou*ht$si*n refers.

(1) hen e thin0! to hat thou*ht oes that thou*ht$si*n hich is ourself a ress itself? It may!throu*h the me ium of out ar e pression! hich it reaches perhaps only after consi era+le internal

evelopment! come to a ress itself to thou*ht of another person. 2ut hether this happens or not! it isal ays interprete +y a su+sequent thou*ht of our o n. If! after any thou*ht! the current of i eas flo son freely! it follo s the la of mental association. In that case! each former thou*ht su**ests somethin*to the thou*ht hich follo s it! i.e.! is the si*n of somethin* to this latter. @ur train of thou*ht may! it istrue! +e interrupte . 2ut e must remem+er that! in a ition to the principal element of thou*ht at anymoment! there are a hun re thin*s in our min to hich +ut a small fraction of attention orconsciousness is conce e . It oes not! therefore! follo ! +ecause a ne constituent of thou*ht *ets theuppermost that the train of thou*ht hich it isplaces is +ro0en off alto*ether. @n the contrary! fromour secon principle! that there is no intuition or co*nition not etermine +y previous co*nitions! itfollo s that the stri0in* in of a ne e perience is never an instantaneous affair! +ut is an eventoccupyin* time! an comin* to pass +y a continuous process. Its prominence in consciousness!therefore! must pro+a+ly +e the consummation of a *ro in* process- an if so! there is no sufficientcause for the thou*ht hich ha +een the lea in* one 7ust +efore! to cease a+ruptly an instantaneously.2ut if a train of thou*ht ceases +y *ra ually yin* out! it freely follo s its o n la of association aslon* as it lasts! an there is no moment at hich there is a thou*ht +elon*in* to this series!su+sequently to hich there is not a thou*ht hich interprets or repeats it. /here is no e ception!therefore! to the la that every thou*ht$si*n is translate or interprete in a su+sequent one! unless it +ethat all thou*ht comes to an a+rupt an final en in eath.

( ) /he ne t question is, For hat oes the thou*ht$si*n stan $$ hat oes it name $$ hat is itssuppositum? /he out ar thin*! un ou+te ly! hen a real out ar thin* is thou*ht of. 2ut still! as thethou*ht is etermine +y a previous thou*ht of the same o+7ect! it only refers to the thin* throu*h

enotin* this previous thou*ht. :et us suppose! for e ample! that /oussaint is thou*ht of! an firstthou*ht of as a 5e*ro! +ut not istinctly as a man. If this istinctness is after ar s a e ! it is throu*hthe thou*ht that a 5e*ro is a man- that is to say! the su+sequent thou*ht! man! refers to the out arthin* +y +ein* pre icate of that previous thou*ht! 5e*ro! hich has +een ha of that thin*. If eafter ar s thin0 of /oussaint as a *eneral! then e thin0 that this ne*ro! this man! as a *eneral. 9nso in every case the su+sequent thou*ht enotes hat as thou*ht in the previous thou*ht.

( ) /he thou*ht$si*n stan s for its o+7ect in the respect hich is thou*ht- that is to say! this respect isthe imme iate o+7ect of consciousness in the thou*ht! or! in other or s! it is the thou*ht itself! or atleast hat the thou*ht is thou*ht to +e in the su+sequent thou*ht to hich it is a si*n.

e must no consi er t o other properties of si*ns hich are of *reat importance in the theory ofco*nition. Since a si*n is not i entical ith the thin* si*nifie ! +ut iffers from the latter in somerespects! it must plainly have some characters hich +elon* to it in itself! an have nothin* to o ithits representative function. /hese I call the material qualities of the si*n. 9s e amples of such qualities!



ta0e in the or 3man!3 its consistin* of three letters $$ in a picture! its +ein* flat an ithout relief. Inthe secon place! a si*n must +e capa+le of +ein* connecte (not in the reason +ut really) ith anothersi*n of the same o+7ect! or ith the o+7ect itself. /hus! or s oul +e of no value at all unless theycoul +e connecte into sentences +y means of a real copula hich 7oins si*ns of the same thin*. /heusefulness of some si*ns $$ as a eathercoc0! a tally! c. $$ consists holly in their +ein* reallyconnecte ith the very thin*s they si*nify. In the case of a picture such a connection is not evi ent!

+ut it e ists in the po er of association hich connects the picture ith the +rain$si*n hich la+els it./his real! physical connection of a si*n ith its o+7ect! either imme iately or +y its connection ithanother si*n! I call the pure emonstrative application of the si*n. 5o the representative function of asi*n lies neither in its material quality nor in its pure emonstrative application- +ecause it is somethin*

hich the si*n is! not in itself or in a real relation to its o+7ect! +ut hich it is to a thou*ht! hile +othof the characters 7ust efine +elon* to the si*n in epen ently of its a ressin* any thou*ht. 9n yet ifI ta0e all the thin*s hich have certain qualities an physically connect them ith another series ofthin*s! each to each! they +ecome fit to +e si*ns. If they are not re*ar e as such they are not actuallysi*ns! +ut they are so in the same sense! for e ample! in hich an unseen flo er can +e sai to +e re !this +ein* also a term relative to a mental affection.

Consi er a state of min hich is a conception. It is a conception +y virtue of havin* a meanin*! alo*ical comprehension- an if it is applica+le to any o+7ect! it is +ecause that o+7ect has the characterscontaine in the comprehension of this conception. 5o the lo*ical comprehension of a thou*ht isusually sai to consist of the thou*hts containe in it- +ut thou*hts are events! acts of the min . / othou*hts are t o events separate in time! an one cannot literally +e containe in the other. It may +esai that all thou*hts e actly similar are re*ar e as one- an that to say that one thou*ht containsanother! means that it contains one e actly similar to that other. 2ut ho can t o thou*hts +e similar?/ o o+7ects can only +e re*ar e as similar if they are compare an +rou*ht to*ether in the min ./hou*hts have no e istence e cept in the min - only as they are re*ar e o they e ist. ence! t othou*hts cannot +e similar unless they are +rou*ht to*ether in the min . 2ut! as to their e istence! t othou*hts are separate +y an interval of time. e are too apt to ima*ine that e can frame a thou*htsimilar to a past thou*ht! +y matchin* it ith the latter! as thou*h this past thou*ht ere still present tous. 2ut it is plain that the 0no le *e that one thou*ht is similar to or in any ay truly representative ofanother! cannot +e erive from imme iate perception! +ut must +e an hypothesis (unquestiona+ly fully

7ustifia+le +y facts)! an that therefore the formation of such a representin* thou*ht must +e epen entupon a real effective force +ehin consciousness! an not merely upon a mental comparison. hat emust mean! therefore! +y sayin* that one concept is containe in another! is that e normally representone to +e in the other- that is! that e form a particular 0in of 7u *ment of hich the su+7ect si*nifiesone concept an the pre icate the other.

5o thou*ht in itself! then! no feelin* in itself! contains any others! +ut is a+solutely simple anunanaly<a+le- an to say that it is compose of other thou*hts an feelin*s! is li0e sayin* that amovement upon a strai*ht line is compose of the t o movements of hich it is the resultant- that is tosay! it is a metaphor! or fiction! parallel to the truth. ;very thou*ht! ho ever artificial an comple ! is!so far as it is imme iately present! a mere sensation ithout parts! an therefore! in itself! ithoutsimilarity to any other! +ut incompara+le ith any other an a+solutely sui *eneris. hatever is hollyincompara+le ith anythin* else is holly ine plica+le! +ecause e planation consists in +rin*in* thin*sun er *eneral la s or un er natural classes. ence every thou*ht! in so far as it is a feelin* of apeculiar sort! is simply an ultimate! ine plica+le fact. Get this oes not conflict ith my postulate thatthat fact shoul +e allo e to stan as ine plica+le- for! on the one han ! e never can thin0! 3/his ispresent to me!3 since! +efore e have time to ma0e the reflection! the sensation is past! an ! on theother han ! hen once past! e can never +rin* +ac0 the quality of the feelin* as it as in an for



itself! or 0no hat it as li0e in itself! or even iscover the e istence of this quality e cept +y acorollary from our *eneral theory of ourselves! an then not in its i iosyncrasy! +ut only as somethin*present. 2ut! as somethin* present! feelin*s are all ali0e an require no e planation! since they containonly hat is universal. So that nothin* hich e can truly pre icate of feelin*s is left ine plica+le! +utonly somethin* hich e cannot reflectively 0no . So that e o not fall into the contra iction ofma0in* the >e iate imme ia+le. Finally! no present actual thou*ht ( hich is a mere feelin*) has any

meanin*! any intellectual value- for this lies not in hat is actually thou*ht! +ut in hat this thou*htmay +e connecte ith in representation +y su+sequent thou*hts- so that the meanin* of a thou*ht isalto*ether somethin* virtual. It may +e o+7ecte ! that if no thou*ht has any meanin*! all thou*ht is

ithout meanin*. 2ut this is a fallacy similar to sayin*! that! if in no one of the successive spaces hicha +o y fills there is room for motion! there is no room for motion throu*hout the hole. 9t no oneinstant in my state of min is there co*nition or representation! +ut in the relation of my states of minat ifferent instants there is. In short! the Imme iate (an therefore in itself unsuscepti+le of me iation$$ the Hnanaly<a+le! the Ine plica+le! the Hnintellectual) runs in a continuous stream throu*h our lives-it is the sum total of consciousness! hose me iation! hich is the continuity of it! is +rou*ht a+out +ya real effective force +ehin consciousness.

/hus! e have in thou*ht three elements, first! the representative function hich ma0es it arepresentation- secon ! the pure enotative application! or real connection! hich +rin*s one thou*htinto relation ith another- an thir ! the material quality! or ho it feels! hich *ives thou*ht itsquality.

/hat a sensation is not necessarily an intuition! or first impression of sense! is very evi ent in the caseof the sense of +eauty- an has +een sho n! else here! in the case of soun . hen the sensation+eautiful is etermine +y previous co*nitions! it al ays arises as a pre icate- that is! e thin0 thatsomethin* is +eautiful. henever a sensation thus arises in consequence of others! in uction sho s thatthose others are more or less complicate . /hus! the sensation of a particular 0in of soun arises inconsequence of impressions upon the various nerves of the ear +ein* com+ine in a particular ay! anfollo in* one another ith a certain rapi ity. 9 sensation of color epen s upon impressions upon theeye follo in* one another in a re*ular manner! an ith a certain rapi ity. /he sensation of +eautyarises upon a manifol of other impressions. 9n this ill +e foun to hol *oo in all cases. Secon ly!all these sensations are in themselves simple! or more so than the sensations hich *ive rise to them.9ccor in*ly! a sensation is a simple pre icate ta0en in place of a comple pre icate- in other or s! itfulfills the function of an hypothesis. 2ut the *eneral principle that every thin* to hich such an sucha sensation +elon*s! has such an such a complicate series of pre icates! is not one etermine +yreason (as e have seen)! +ut is of an ar+itrary nature. ence! the class of hypothetic inferences hichthe arisin* of a sensation resem+les! is that of reasonin* from efinition to efinitum! in hich thema7or premiss is of an ar+itrary nature. @nly in this mo e of reasonin*! this premiss is etermine +ythe conventions of lan*ua*e! an e presses the occasion upon hich a or is to +e use - an in theformation of a sensation! it is etermine +y the constitution of our nature! an e presses the occasionsupon hich sensation! or a natural mental si*n! arises. /hus! the sensation! so far as it representssomethin*! is etermine ! accor in* to a lo*ical la ! +y previous co*nitions- that is to say! theseco*nitions etermine that there shall +e a sensation. 2ut so far as the sensation is a mere feelin* of aparticular sort! it is etermine only +y an ine plica+le! occult po er- an so far! it is not arepresentation! +ut only the material quality of a representation. For 7ust as in reasonin* from efinitionto efinitum! it is in ifferent to the lo*ician ho the efine or shall soun ! or ho many letters itshall contain! so in the case of this constitutional or ! it is not etermine +y an in ar la ho itshall feel in itself. 9 feelin*! therefore! as a feelin*! is merely the material quality of a mental si*n.



impulse an not from eli+eration.

/hat hich istin*uishes +oth sensations proper an emotions from the feelin* of a thou*ht! is that inthe case of the t o former the material quality is ma e prominent! +ecause the thou*ht has no relationof reason to the thou*hts hich etermine it! hich e ists in the last case an etracts from theattention *iven to the mere feelin*. 2y there +ein* no relation of reason to the eterminin* thou*hts! I

mean that there is nothin* in the content of the thou*ht hich e plains hy it shoul arise only onoccasion of these eterminin* thou*hts. If there is such a relation of reason! if the thou*ht is essentiallylimite in its application to these o+7ects! then the thou*ht comprehen s a thou*ht other than itself- inother or s! it is then a comple thou*ht. 9n incomple thou*ht can! therefore! +e nothin* +ut asensation or emotion! havin* no rational character. /his is very ifferent from the or inary octrine!accor in* to hich the very hi*hest an most metaphysical conceptions are a+solutely simple. I shall+e as0e ho such a conception of a +ein* is to +e analy<e ! or hether I can ever efine one! t o! anthree! ithout a iallelon. 5o I shall a mit at once that neither of these conceptions can +e separateinto t o others hi*her than itself- an in that sense! therefore! I fully a mit that certain verymetaphysical an eminently intellectual notions are a+solutely simple. 2ut thou*h these conceptscannot +e efine +y *enus an ifference! there is another ay in hich they can +e efine . 9ll

etermination is +y ne*ation- e can first reco*ni<e any character only +y puttin* an o+7ect hichpossesses it into comparison ith an o+7ect hich possesses it not. 9 conception! therefore! hich asquite universal in every respect oul +e unreco*ni<a+le an impossi+le. e o not o+tain theconception of 2ein*! in the sense implie in the copula! +y o+servin* that all the thin*s hich e canthin0 of have somethin* in common! for there is no such thin* to +e o+serve . e *et it +y reflectin*upon si*ns $$ or s or thou*hts- e o+serve that ifferent pre icates may +e attache to the samesu+7ect! an that each ma0es some conception applica+le to the su+7ect- then e ima*ine that a su+7ecthas somethin* true of it merely +ecause a pre icate (no matter hat) is attache to it $$ an that e call2ein*. /he conception of +ein* is! therefore! a conception a+out a si*n $$ a thou*ht! or or - an sinceit is not applica+le to every si*n! it is not primarily universal! althou*h it is so in its me iate applicationto thin*s. 2ein*! therefore! may +e efine - it may +e efine ! for e ample! as that hich is common tothe o+7ects inclu e in any class! an to the o+7ects not inclu e in the same class. 2ut it is nothin* neto say that metaphysical conceptions are primarily an at +ottom thou*hts a+out or s! or thou*htsa+out thou*hts- it is the octrine +oth of 9ristotle ( hose cate*ories are parts of speech) an of ant( hose cate*ories are the characters of ifferent 0in s of propositions).

Sensation an the po er of a+straction or attention may +e re*ar e as! in one sense! the soleconstituents of all thou*ht. avin* consi ere the former! let us no attempt some analysis of thelatter. 2y the force of attention! an emphasis is put upon one of the o+7ective elements ofconsciousness. /his emphasis is! therefore! not itself an o+7ect of imme iate consciousness- an in thisrespect it iffers entirely from a feelin*. /herefore! since the emphasis! nevertheless! consists in someeffect upon consciousness! an so can e ist only so far as it affects our 0no le *e- an since an actcannot +e suppose to etermine that hich prece es it in time! this act can consist only in the capacity

hich the co*nition emphasi<e has for pro ucin* an effect upon memory! or other ise influencin*su+sequent thou*ht. /his is confirme +y the fact that attention is a matter of continuous quantity- forcontinuous quantity! so far as e 0no it! re uces itself in the last analysis to time. 9ccor in*ly! efin that attention oes! in fact! pro uce a very *reat effect upon su+sequent thou*ht. In the first place!it stron*ly affects memory! a thou*ht +ein* remem+ere for a lon*er time the *reater the attentionori*inally pai to it. In the secon place! the *reater the attention! the closer the connection an themore accurate the lo*ical sequence of thou*ht. In the thir place! +y attention a thou*ht may +erecovere hich has +een for*otten. From these facts! e *ather that attention is the po er +y hichthou*ht at one time is connecte ith an ma e to relate to thou*ht at another time- or! to apply the



conception of thou*ht as a si*n! that it is the pure emonstrative application of a thou*ht$si*n.

9ttention is rouse hen the same phenomenon presents itself repeate ly on ifferent occasions! or thesame pre icate in ifferent su+7ects. e see that 9 has a certain character! that 2 has the same! C hasthe same- an this e cites our attention! so that e say! 3/hese have this character.3 /hus attention is anact of in uction- +ut it is an in uction hich oes not increase our 0no le *e! +ecause our 3these3

covers nothin* +ut the instances e perience . It is! in short! an ar*ument from enumeration.9ttention pro uces effects upon the nervous system. /hese effects are ha+its! or nervous associations. 9ha+it arises! hen! havin* ha the sensation of performin* a certain act! m! on several occasions a! +! c!

e come to o it upon every occurrence of the *eneral event! l! of hich a! + an c are special cases./hat is to say! +y the co*nition that

;very case of a! +! or c! is a case of m!

is etermine the co*nition that

;very case of l is a case of m.

/hus the formation of a ha+it is an in uction! an is therefore necessarily connecte ith attention ora+straction. oluntary actions result from the sensations pro uce +y ha+its! as instinctive actions resultfrom our ori*inal nature.

e have thus seen that every sort of mo ification of consciousness $$ 9ttention! Sensation! anHn erstan in* $$ is an inference. 2ut the o+7ection may +e ma e that inference eals only ith *eneralterms! an that an ima*e! or a+solutely sin*ular representation! cannot therefore +e inferre .

3Sin*ular3 an 3in ivi ual3 are equivocal terms. 9 sin*ular may mean that hich can +e +ut in oneplace at one time. In this sense it is not oppose to *eneral. /he sun is a sin*ular in this sense! +ut! as ise plaine in every *oo treatise on lo*ic! it is a *eneral term. I may have a very *eneral conception of

ermolaus 2ar+arus! +ut still I conceive him only as a+le to +e in one place at one time. hen anima*e is sai to +e sin*ular! it is meant that it is a+solutely eterminate in all respects. ;very possi+lecharacter! or the ne*ative thereof! must +e true of such an ima*e. In the or s of the most eminente poun er of the octrine! the ima*e of a man 3must +e either of a hite! or a +lac0! or a ta ny- astrai*ht or a croo0e - a tall! or a lo ! or a mi le$si<e man.3 It must +e of a man ith his mouth openor his mouth shut! hose hair is precisely of such an such a sha e! an hose fi*ure has preciselysuch an such proportions. 5o statement of :oc0e has +een so scoute +y all frien s of ima*es as his

enial that the 3i ea3 of a trian*le must +e either of an o+tuse$an*le ! ri*ht$an*le ! or acute$an*letrian*le. In fact! the ima*e of a trian*le must +e of one! each of hose an*les is of a certain num+er of

e*rees! minutes! an secon s.

/his +ein* so! it is apparent that no man has a true ima*e of the roa to his office! or of any other realthin*. In ee he has no ima*e of it at all unless he can not only reco*ni<e it! +ut ima*ines it (truly orfalsely) in all its infinite etails. /his +ein* the case! it +ecomes very ou+tful hether e ever haveany such thin* as an ima*e in our ima*ination. Please! rea er! to loo0 at a +ri*ht re +oo0! or other+ri*htly colore o+7ect! an then to shut your eyes an say hether you see that color! hether +ri*htlyor faintly $$ hether! in ee ! there is anythin* li0e si*ht there. ume an the other follo ers of2er0eley maintain that there is no ifference +et een the si*ht an the memory of the re +oo0 e ceptin 3their ifferent e*rees of force an vivacity.3 3/he colors hich the memory employs!3 says ume!



3are faint an ull compare ith those in hich our ori*inal perceptions are clothe .3 If this ere acorrect statement of the ifference! e shoul remem+er the +oo0 as +ein* less re than it is- hereas!in fact! e remem+er the color ith very *reat precision for a fe moments (please to test this point!rea er)! althou*h e o not see anythin* li0e it. e carry a ay a+solutely nothin* of the color e ceptthe consciousness that e coul reco*ni<e it. 9s a further proof of this! I ill request the rea er to try alittle e periment. :et him call up! if he can! the ima*e of a horse $$ not of one hich he has ever seen!

+ut of an ima*inary one $$ an +efore rea in* further let him +y contemplation fi the ima*e in hismemory . . . . as the rea er one as requeste ? for I protest that it is not fair play to rea furtherithout oin* so. $$ 5o ! the rea er can say in *eneral of hat color that horse as! hether *rey! +ay!

or +lac0. 2ut he pro+a+ly cannot say precisely of hat sha e it as. e cannot state this as e actly ashe coul 7ust after havin* seen such a horse. 2ut hy! if he ha an ima*e in his min hich no moreha the *eneral color than it ha the particular sha e! has the latter vanishe so instantaneously fromhis memory hile the former still remains? It may +e replie ! that e al ays for*et the etails +efore

e o the more *eneral characters- +ut that this ans er is insufficient is! I thin0! sho n +y the e tremeisproportion +et een the len*th of time that the e act sha e of somethin* loo0e at is remem+ere as

compare ith that instantaneous o+livion to the e act sha e of the thin* ima*ine ! an the +ut sli*htlysuperior vivi ness of the memory of the thin* seen as compare ith the memory of the thin*ima*ine .

/he nominalists! I suspect! confoun to*ether thin0in* a trian*le ithout thin0in* that it is eitherequilateral! isosceles! or scalene! an thin0in* a trian*le ithout thin0in* hether it is equilateral!isosceles! or scalene.

It is important to remem+er that e have no intuitive po er of istin*uishin* +et een one su+7ectivemo e of co*nition an another- an hence often thin0 that somethin* is presente to us as a picture!

hile it is really constructe from sli*ht ata +y the un erstan in*. /his is the case ith reams! as issho n +y the frequent impossi+ility of *ivin* an intelli*i+le account of one ithout a in* somethin*

hich e feel as not in the ream itself. >any reams! of hich the a0in* memory ma0es ela+oratean consistent stories! must pro+a+ly have +een in fact mere 7um+les of these feelin*s of the a+ility toreco*ni<e this an that hich I have 7ust allu e to.

I ill no *o so far as to say that e have no ima*es even in actual perception. It ill +e sufficient toprove this in the case of vision- for if no picture is seen hen e loo0 at an o+7ect! it ill not +eclaime that hearin*! touch! an the other senses! are superior to si*ht in this respect. /hat the picture isnot painte on the nerves of the retina is a+solutely certain! if! as physiolo*ists inform us! these nervesare nee lepoints pointin* to the li*ht an at istances consi era+ly *reater than the minimum visi+ile./he same thin* is sho n +y our not +ein* a+le to perceive that there is a lar*e +lin spot near themi le of the retina. If! then! e have a picture +efore us hen e see! it is one constructe +y themin at the su**estion of previous sensations. Supposin* these sensations to +e si*ns! theun erstan in* +y reasonin* from them coul attain all the 0no le *e of out ar thin*s hich e

erive from si*ht! hile the sensations are quite ina equate to formin* an ima*e or representationa+solutely eterminate. If e have such an ima*e or picture! e must have in our min s arepresentation of a surface hich is only a part of every surface e see! an e must see that each part!ho ever small! has such an such a color. If e loo0 from some istance at a spec0le surface! it seemsas if e i not see hether it ere spec0le or not- +ut if e have an ima*e +efore us! it must appearto us either as spec0le ! or as not spec0le . 9*ain! the eye +y e ucation comes to istin*uish minute

ifferences of color- +ut if e see only a+solutely eterminate ima*es! e must! no less +efore our eyesare traine than after ar s! see each color as particularly such an such a sha e. /hus to suppose that

e have an ima*e +efore us hen e see! is not only a hypothesis hich e plains nothin* hatever!



+ut is one hich actually creates ifficulties hich require ne hypotheses in or er to e plain thema ay.

@ne of these ifficulties arises from the fact that the etails are less easily istin*uishe than! anfor*otten +efore! the *eneral circumstances. Hpon this theory! the *eneral features e ist in the etails,the etails are! in fact! the hole picture. It seems! then! very stran*e that that hich e ists only

secon arily in the picture shoul ma0e more impression than the picture itself. It is true that in an olpaintin* the etails are not easily ma e out- +ut this is +ecause e 0no that the +lac0ness is the resultof time! an is no part of the picture itself. /here is no ifficulty in ma0in* out the etails of the pictureas it loo0s at present- the only ifficulty is in *uessin* hat it use to +e. 2ut if e have a picture onthe retina! the minutest etails are there as much as! nay! more than! the *eneral outline ansi*nificancy of it. Get that hich must actually +e seen! it is e tremely ifficult to reco*ni<e- hile that

hich is only a+stracte from hat is seen is very o+vious.

2ut the conclusive ar*ument a*ainst our havin* any ima*es! or a+solutely eterminate representationsin perception! is that in that case e have the materials in each such representation for an infiniteamount of conscious co*nition! hich e yet never +ecome a are of. 5o there is no meanin* insayin* that e have somethin* in our min s hich never has the least effect on hat e are consciousof 0no in*. /he most that can +e sai is! that hen e see e are put in a con ition in hich e area+le to *et a very lar*e an perhaps in efinitely *reat amount of 0no le *e of the visi+le qualities ofo+7ects.

>oreover! that perceptions are not a+solutely eterminate an sin*ular is o+vious from the fact thateach sense is an a+stractin* mechanism. Si*ht +y itself informs us only of colors an forms. 5o one canpreten that the ima*es of si*ht are eterminate in reference to taste. /hey are! therefore! so far *eneralthat they are neither s eet nor non$s eet! +itter nor non$+itter! havin* savor nor insipi .

/he ne t question is hether e have any *eneral conceptions e cept in 7u *ments. In perception!here e 0no a thin* as e istin*! it is plain that there is a 7u *ment that the thin* e ists! since a mere

*eneral concept of a thin* is in no case a co*nition of it as e istin*. It has usually +een sai ! ho ever!that e can call up any concept ithout ma0in* any 7u *ment- +ut it seems that in this case e onlyar+itrarily suppose ourselves to have an e perience. In or er to conceive the num+er &! I suppose! thatis! I ar+itrarily ma0e the hypothesis or 7u *ment! that there are certain points +efore my eyes! an I

7u *e that these are seven. /his seems to +e the most simple an rational vie of the matter! an I maya that it is the one hich has +een a opte +y the +est lo*icians. If this +e the case! hat *oes +y thename of the association of ima*es is in reality an association of 7u *ments. /he association of i eas issai to procee accor in* to three principles $$ those of resem+lance! of conti*uity! an of causality.2ut it oul +e equally true to say that si*ns enote hat they o on the three principles ofresem+lance! conti*uity! an causality. /here can +e no question that anythin* is a si*n of hatever isassociate ith it +y resem+lance! +y conti*uity! or +y causality, nor can there +e any ou+t that anysi*n recalls the thin* si*nifie . So! then! the association of i eas consists in this! that a 7u *mentoccasions another 7u *ment! of hich it is the si*n. 5o this is nothin* less nor more than inference.

;verythin* in hich e ta0e the least interest creates in us its o n particular emotion! ho ever sli*htthis may +e. /his emotion is a si*n an a pre icate of the thin*. 5o ! hen a thin* resem+lin* thisthin* is presente to us! a similar emotion arises- hence! e imme iately infer that the latter is li0e theformer. 9 formal lo*ician of the ol school may say! that in lo*ic no term can enter into the conclusion

hich ha not +een containe in the premisses! an that therefore the su**estion of somethin* nemust +e essentially ifferent from inference. 2ut I reply that that rule of lo*ic applies only to those



ar*uments hich are technically calle complete . e can an o reason $$

;lias as a man-;r*o!D. e as mortal.

9n this ar*ument is 7ust as vali as the full syllo*ism! althou*h it is so only +ecause the ma7or premiss

of the latter happens to +e true. If to pass from the 7u *ment 3;lias as a man3 to the 7u *ment 3;liasas mortal!3 ithout actually sayin* to oneAs self that 39ll men are mortal!3 is not inference! then theterm 3inference3 is use in so restricte a sense that inferences har ly occur outsi e of a lo*ic$+oo0.

hat is here sai of association +y resem+lance is true of all association. 9ll association is +y si*ns.;verythin* has its su+7ective or emotional qualities! hich are attri+ute either a+solutely or relatively!or +y conventional imputation to anythin* hich is a si*n of it. 9n so e reason!

/he si*n is such an such-;r*o!D /he si*n is that thin*.

/his conclusion receivin*! ho ever! a mo ification! o in* to other consi erations! so as to +ecome $$

/he si*n is almost (is representative of) that thin*.

e come no to the consi eration of the last of the four principles hose consequences e ere totrace- namely! that the a+solutely inco*ni<a+le is a+solutely inconceiva+le. /hat upon Cartesianprinciples the very realities of thin*s can never +e 0no n in the least! most competent persons mustlon* a*o have +een convince . ence the +rea0in* forth of i ealism! hich is essentiallyanti$Cartesian! in every irection! hether amon* empiricists (2er0eley! ume)! or amon* noolo*ists( e*el! Fichte). /he principle no +rou*ht un er iscussion is irectly i ealistic- for! since themeanin* of a or is the conception it conveys! the a+solutely inco*ni<a+le has no meanin* +ecause noconception attaches to it. It is! therefore! a meanin*less or - an ! consequently! hatever is meant +yany term as 3the real3 is co*ni<a+le in some e*ree! an so is of the nature of a co*nition! in theo+7ective sense of that term.

9t any moment e are in possession of certain information! that is! of co*nitions hich have +eenlo*ically erive +y in uction an hypothesis from previous co*nitions hich are less *eneral! less

istinct! an of hich e have a less lively consciousness. /hese in their turn have +een erive fromothers still less *eneral! less istinct! an less vivi - an so on +ac0 to the i eal first! hich is quitesin*ular! an quite out of consciousness. /his i eal first is the particular thin*$in$itself. It oes not e istas such. /hat is! there is no thin* hich is in$itself in the sense of not +ein* relative to the min ! thou*hthin*s hich are relative to the min ou+tless are! apart from that relation. /he co*nitions hich thusreach us +y this infinite series of in uctions an hypotheses ( hich thou*h infinite a parte ante lo*ice!is yet as one continuous process not ithout a +e*innin* in time) are of t o 0in s! the true an theuntrue! or co*nitions hose o+7ects are real an those hose o+7ects are unreal. 9n hat o e mean+y the real? It is a conception hich e must first have ha hen e iscovere that there as anunreal! an illusion- that is! hen e first correcte ourselves. 5o the istinction for hich alone thisfact lo*ically calle ! as +et een an ens relative to private in ar eterminations! to the ne*ations+elon*in* to i iosyncrasy! an an ens such as oul stan in the lon* run. /he real! then! is that hich!sooner or later! information an reasonin* oul finally result in! an hich is therefore in epen ent ofthe va*aries of me an you. /hus! the very ori*in of the conception of reality sho s that thisconception essentially involves the notion of a C@>>H5I/G! ithout efinite limits! an capa+le of a



each other- each increase of a manAs information involves an is involve +y! a correspon in* increaseof a or As information.

ithout fati*uin* the rea er +y stretchin* this parallelism too far! it is sufficient to say that there is noelement hatever of manAs consciousness hich has not somethin* correspon in* to it in the or - anthe reason is o+vious. It is that the or or si*n hich man uses is the man himself. For! as the fact that

every thou*ht is a si*n! ta0en in con7unction ith the fact that life is a train of thou*ht! proves that manis a si*n- so! that every thou*ht is an e ternal si*n! proves that man is an e ternal si*n. /hat is to say!the man an the e ternal si*n are i entical! in the same sense in hich the or s homo an man arei entical. /hus my lan*ua*e is the sum total of myself- for the man is the thou*ht.

It is har for man to un erstan this! +ecause he persists in i entifyin* himself ith his ill! his po erover the animal or*anism! ith +rute force. 5o the or*anism is only an instrument of thou*ht. 2ut thei entity of a man consists in the consistency of hat he oes an thin0s! an consistency is theintellectual character of a thin*- that is! is its e pressin* somethin*.

Finally! as hat anythin* really is! is hat it may finally come to +e 0no n to +e in the i eal state ofcomplete information! so that reality epen s on the ultimate ecision of the community- so thou*ht is

hat it is! only +y virtue of its a ressin* a future thou*ht hich is in its value as thou*ht i enticalith it! thou*h more evelope . In this ay! the e istence of thou*ht no epen s on hat is to +e

hereafter- so that it has only a potential e istence! epen ent on the future thou*ht of the community.

/he in ivi ual man! since his separate e istence is manifeste only +y i*norance an error! so far as heis anythin* apart from his fello s! an from hat he an they are to +e! is only a ne*ation. /his is man!

3. . . prou man!>ost i*norant of hat heAs most assure !

is *lassy essence.3

5otes1. Several persons verse in lo*ic have o+7ecte that I have here quite misapplie the term hypothesis!an that hat I so esi*nate is an ar*ument from analo*y. It is a sufficient reply to say that the e ampleof the cipher has +een *iven as an apt illustration of hypothesis +y 'escartes (Kule 1#! @euvreschoisies, Paris! 186%! pa*e ")! +y :ei+ni< (5ouveau ;ssais! li+. "! ch. 1 ! L1 ! ; . ;r mann! p. 8+)! an (as I learn from '. Ste art- or0s! vol. ! pp. #% et seqq.) +y 4ravesan e! 2oscovich! artley!an 4.:. :e Sa*e. /he term ypothesis has +een use in the follo in* senses, 1. For the theme orproposition formin* the su+7ect of iscourse. . For an assumption. 9ristotle ivi es theses orpropositions a opte ithout any reason into efinitions an hypotheses. /he latter are propositionsstatin* the e istence of somethin*. /hus the *eometer says! 3:et there +e a trian*le.3 . For a con itionin a *eneral sense. e are sai to see0 other thin*s than happiness e hypotheseos! con itionally. /he+est repu+lic is the i eally perfect! the secon the +est on earth! the thir the +est e hypotheseos! un erthe circumstances. Free om is the hypothesis or con ition of emocracy. ". For the antece ent of ahypothetical proposition. %. For an oratorical question hich assumes facts. 6. In the Synopsis ofPsellus! for the reference of a su+7ect to the thin*s it enotes. &. >ost commonly in mo ern times! forthe conclusion of an ar*ument from consequence an consequent to antece ent. /his is my use of theterm. 8. For such a conclusion hen too ea0 to +e a theory accepte into the +o y of a science.

I *ive a fe authorities to support the seventh use,



Chauvin. $$ :e icon Kationale! 1st ; . $$ 3 ypothesis est propositio! quE assumitur a pro+an umaliam veritatem inco*nitam. Kequirunt multi! ut hEc hypothesis vera esse co*noscatur! etiam antequamappareat! an alia e ea e uci possint. erum aiunt alii! hoc unum esi erari! ut hypothesis pro veraa mittatur! quo nempe e hac talia e ucitur! quE respon ent phEnomenis! et satisfaciunt omni+us

ifficultati+us! quE hac parte in re! et in iis quE e ea apparent! occurre+ant.3

5e ton. $$ 3 actenus phEnomena coelorum et maris nostri per vim *ravitatis e posui! se causam*ravitatis non um assi*navi . . . Kationem vero harum *ravitatis proprietatum e phEnomenis non umpotui e ucere! et hypotheses non fin*o. =uicqui enim e phEnomenis non e ucitur! hypothesisvocan a est . . . In hac PhilosophiM Propositiones e ucuntur e phEnomenis! et re untur *eneralesper in uctionem.3 Principia. 9 fin.

Sir m. amilton. $$ 3 ypotheses! that is! propositions hich are assume ith pro+a+ility! in or er toe plain or prove somethin* else hich cannot other ise +e e plaine or prove .3 $$ :ectures on :o*ic(9m. ; .)! p. 188.3/he name of hypothesis is more emphatically *iven to provisory suppositions! hich serve to e plainthe phenomena in so far as o+serve ! +ut hich are only asserte to +e true! if ultimately confirme +ya complete in uction.3 $$ I+i .! p. 6".3 hen a phenomenon is presente hich can +e e plaine +y no principle affor e throu*he perience! e feel iscontente an uneasy- an there arises an effort to iscover some cause hichmay! at least provisionally! account for the outstan in* phenomenon- an this cause is finallyreco*ni<e as vali an true! if! throu*h it! the *iven phenomenon is foun to o+tain a full an perfecte planation. /he 7u *ment in hich a phenomenon is referre to such a pro+lematic cause! is calle a

ypothesis.3 $$ I+i .! pp. ""N! "%#. See also :ectures on >etaphysics! p. 11&.

J.S. >ill. $$ 39n hypothesis is any supposition hich e ma0e (either ithout actual evi ence! or onevi ence avo e ly insufficient)! in or er to en eavor to e uce from it conclusions in accor ance ithfacts hich are 0no n to +e real- un er the i ea that if the conclusions to hich the hypothesis lea sare 0no n truths! the hypothesis itself either must +e! or at least is li0ely to +e true.3 $$ :o*ic (6th ; .)!vol. ! p. 8.

ant. $$ 3If all the consequents of a co*nition are true! the co*nition itself is true. . . . It is allo a+le!therefore! to conclu e from consequent to a reason! +ut ithout +ein* a+le to etermine this reason.From the comple us of all consequents alone can e conclu e the truth of a eterminate reason . . . /he

ifficulty ith this positive an irect mo e of inference (mo us ponens) is that the totality of theconsequents cannot +e apo eictically reco*ni<e ! an that e are therefore le +y this mo e ofinference only to a pro+a+le an hypothetically true co*nition ( ypotheses).3 $$ :o*i0 +y JOsche-

er0e! ; . Kosen0. an Sch.! vol. ! p. 1.39 hypothesis is the 7u *ment of the truth of a reason on account of the sufficiency of the consequents.3$$ I+i .! p. 6 .

er+art. $$ 3 e can ma0e hypotheses! thence e uce consequents! an after ar s see hether the latteraccor ith e perience. Such suppositions are terme hypotheses.3 $$ ;inleitun*- er0e! vol. 1! p. % .

2ene0e. $$ 39ffirmative inferences from consequent to antece ent! or hypotheses.3 $$ System er:o*i0! vol. ! p. 1# .

/here oul +e no ifficulty in *reatly multiplyin* these citations.Keturn to te t.



. 9 7u *ment concernin* a minimum of information! for the theory of hich see my paper on

Comprehension an ; tension! in the Procee in*s of the 9merican 9ca emy of 9rts an Sciences! vol.&! p. " 6.Keturn to te t.

. @+serve that I say in itself. I am not so il as to eny that my sensation of re to ay is li0e mysensation of re yester ay. I only say that the similarity can consist only in the physiolo*ical force+ehin consciousness $$ hich lea s me to say! I reco*ni<e this feelin* the same as the former one! anso oes not consist in a community of sensation.Keturn to te t.

". 9ccor in*ly! 7ust as e say that a +o y is in motion! an not that motion is in a +o y e ou*ht to saythat e are in thou*ht an not that thou*hts are in us.Keturn to te t.

%. @n quality! relation! an representation! see Procee in*s of the 9merican 9ca emy of 9rts anSciences! vol. &! p. N .Keturn to te t.

6. 5o person hose native ton*ue is ;n*lish ill nee to +e informe that contemplation is essentially(1) protracte ! ( ) voluntary! an ( ) an action! an that it is never use for that hich is set forth to themin in this act. 9 forei*ner can convince himself of this +y the proper stu y of ;n*lish riters. /hus!:oc0e (;ssay concernin* uman Hn erstan in*! 2oo0 II! chap. 1N! L 1) says! 3If it an i eaD +e helthere in vie D lon* un er attentive consi eration! Atis Contemplation3- an a*ain (I+i .! 2oo0 II! chap.1#! L 1) 30eepin* the I ea hich is +rou*ht into it the min D for some time actually in vie ! hich iscalle Contemplation.3 /his term is therefore unfitte to translate 9nschauun*- for this latter oes notimply an act hich is necessarily protracte or voluntary! an enotes most usually a mentalpresentation! sometimes a faculty! less often the reception of an impression in the min ! an sel om! ifever! an action. /o the translation of 9nschauun* +y intuition! there is! at least! no such insuffera+leo+7ection. ;tymolo*ically! the t o or s precisely correspon . /he ori*inal philosophical meanin* ofintuition as a co*nition of the present manifol in that character- an it is no commonly use ! as amo ern riter says! 3to inclu e all the pro ucts of the perceptive (e ternal or internal) an ima*inativefaculties- every act of consciousness! in short! of hich the imme iate o+7ect is an in ivi ual! thin*!act! or state of min ! presente un er the con ition of istinct e istence in space an time.3 Finally! ehave the authority of antAs o n e ample for translatin* his 9nschauun* +y Intuitus- an in ee this isthe common usa*e of 4ermans ritin* :atin. >oreover! intuitiv frequently replaces anschauen oranschaulich. If this constitutes a misun erstan in* of ant! it is one hich is share +y himself annearly all his countrymen.Keturn to te t.

&. 2y an i eal! I mean the limit hich the possi+le cannot attain.Keturn to te t.

8. 3;a em natura est! quE in e istentia per *ra um sin*ularitatis est eterminata! et in intellectu! hocest ut ha+et relationem a intellectum ut co*nitum a co*noscens! est in eterminata.3 $$ =uaestionesSu+tillissimae! li+. &! qu. 18.Keturn to te t.



N. See his ar*ument Summa lo*ices! part. 1! cap. 16.Keturn to te t.

Some Consequences of Four Incapacities

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