Mahmoud 1

Jaffar Mahmoud

Professor Li-Chen Sim

HSS-210-901

12/31/13

Defeating Somali Piracy: Soft Power vs. Hard Power

Today the notion of pirates is so outdated and anachronistic that any mention of the

topic immediately conjures romanticized and comedic images of swashbuckling, one-eyed

buccaneers to the forefront of our consciousness. Unfortunately for some, primarily ships

sailing through the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, images of pirates are not only confined to

their imaginations. Due to the exploits of Somali pirates, between 2005-2012 an estimated

$339-$413 million dollars were paid in ransoms in order to reclaim Somali commandeered

ships and kidnapped sailors (The Economist, 2013). As a result, many countries including the

US, UK, France, Russia, India, and China, are launching counter-piracy initiative in hopes of

eliminating the problem, yet despite the common aim, there is much dispute on how to carry

out the operation. One of the existing disputes is whether or not to intervene in a forceful and

punitive manner, known as hard power, or to gradually persuade them through means of

finding solidarity in values and ambitions, known as soft power. Those who advocate for the

latter of the two fail to acknowledge the reality of the Somali Piracy situation. First, it must

be noted that the Somali pirates are unlikely to find any grounds of solidarity with foreign

powers, given that they attribute their piracy as a reaction to the exploitative pursuits of

foreign nations; second, Somalia lacks the security, freedom, and basic infrastructure for the

traditional methods of soft-power dispersion to be truly effective; and finally, direct force

through economic and military means will weaken the Somali pirate enterprise as well as the

mainland networks, which sustain them, thus eradicating the problem much more thoroughly

than any soft power approach could hope to do.

Power is defined as getting others to do something that they otherwise would not. In

international affairs, power divides into two main camps, hard power and soft power. Hard

power is generally easy to identify, as it manifests itself in very tangible forms, military force,

or economic sanctions or incentives. The ultimate goal of hard power is to force its subjects

to abide by it demands. Soft power is more difficult to identify as it takes on a less distinct

form and seeks to engage its subject in a different manner in hopes of co-opting them and

“winning them over”. Political scientists Joseph Nye, who formalized the concept of soft

power, drew a distinction between the two in stating that soft power “…occurs when one

country gets other countries to want what it wants-might be called co-optive… in contrast to

hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants” (1990, p. 165). Soft power

influence can occur in finding commonality in areas regarding human rights, democracy,

natural disasters, and cultural affinity. Perhaps one of the greatest examples of states sharing

commonality in many areas is the relationship between United States and the United

Kingdom. For example, before US involvement in WWI, both Germany and the Britain

attempted to win over the American public, however, where Germany failed to impassion the

American public, the British were able to find much cultural affinity between their

aristocracy and staunch American republicans (Nye, 2004).

In order for the initial stages of soft power to even begin to take root it requires that

there at least be some reason for the two countries involved to see eye to eye, i.e. some germ

of common ground. Unfortunately, much of Somalia has developed a deep seeded mistrust

for foreign governments. Many Somali pirates believe that they are reacting to over 20 years

of illegal fatal toxic disposal as well as unregulated fishing. Nick Nutall, a spokesman for the

United Nations Program for the Environment (UNEP) stated that radioactive uranium waste

and heavy metals like cadmium and mercury, industrial, hospital, and chemical waste have

been dumped in Somali waters since the early 1990’s. Suspicions point to illegal dumping by

various European countries via the Italian mafia. Also, Somalia, which is considered to be

one of the richest fisheries in the world has become victim to illegal fishing for quite some

time, with over 800 illegal vessels at one time in 2005 (Valerie, 2010). The compounded

effect of these variables interacting has resulted in a large number of Somali fishermen

turning to a life of piracy, in a country that is already in desolation. As a result many of the

pirates consider themselves to be very well justified in their behavior, as they see no

alternative to their situation which has been thrust upon them through the careless and

destructive behavior of more developed nations. This causes a credibility gap, in which the

Somali pirates feel as though whatever overtures of reconciliation and peace that foreign

governments may make, they are still ultimately interested in themselves, Sir Michael Butler,

a British diplomat stated that “If your government is perceived as self-interested, reactionary

and unhelpful, it will seriously hamper your ability to get your way” (as cited in Nye, 2004).

In light of this, it is very likely that basic need to find commonality and solidarity as a

prerequisite for the development of soft power is highly unlikely, especially considering that

not only do the Somali pirates have disparate views with those who are trying to eliminate the

piracy, but in fact are anti- those foreign countries. Likewise, the domestic situation, which is

also in a state of chaos, riddled with extremist military Islamist groups, such as the Al

Shabab, a located in southern Somalia (National Counterterrorism Center, 2013), gaining

more authority and power, will only perpetuate anti-foreign, particularly Western based,

attempts at creating peace. A situation like this only further supports the need for hard power

resolutions. For example, the case of Iran, which is known for its anti-Western stance, often

referring to the US as the “Great Satan”, has finally began to concede to outside demands

regarding its nuclear program after having endured severe economic damage since sweeping

sanctions were imposed on it in 2007 (BBC News, 2013).

It must also be asked, if the soft power actually became influential, exactly who

would disassemble the Somali Piracy organization? The individuals who run the piracy

expeditions are not likely to concede to outside power given that this has proven to be a very

lucrative career for them, and it is going to be extremely difficult to break apart a complicated

criminal network- imagine the Italian mafia or Yakuza in Japan turning themselves in. The

most obvious answer and also least likely to get the job done is the Somali government,

which has been the not so proud recipient of the 1st place rank (worst position) for the Failed

State Index since 2008, due to its government’s lack of control upon other variables as well

(Fund For Peace, 2013). This leads to my second point about Somalia lacking the necessary,

security, freedom, and infrastructure to actually facilitate the spread of soft power.

One of the major obstacles for the spread of soft power within this particular context

is that many of the main avenues for dissemination are poorly developed. Nye claims that the

manner in which soft-power is dispersed is rapidly changing today, earlier forms such as

propaganda no longer produce the same yield given that foreign populations have become

more critical and sensitive to such forms of information. In fact, Nye goes on to say that

public diplomacy is the newest form of developing soft power, citing three key avenues daily

communications, which requires the explanation of domestic and foreign policy decisions,

strategic communication, emphasizing a set of simple but central themes which you want to

your country to be identified for, and developing long-lasting cultural relationships (2004).

Nye may be correct in the context of dealing with countries of a more developed

status, or those that have a more congenial relationship with the Western powers, but even he

acknowledges that “Conventional military force was used successfully, albeit against the

extremely weak states…” (1990, p. 156). Additionally, Russian Scholar Sergei Karaganov in

a statement supported by Joseph Nye said that “Russia had to emphasize ‘hard power’,

including military force because it lives in a much more dangerous world and has no one to

protect it” (2010), a situation that is undoubtedly worse in Somalia. Nye believes that daily

and strategic communication are crucial factors in establishing soft power, in the case of the

US, this may mean that US officials or independent news programs reach out to Somalians

and interpret events that are taken place in US domestic and foreign affairs as well as

promote US themes of democracy and freedom of speech. Since soft power targets the

general population, the general population must have access to such news outlets. According

to Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press score Somalia received a score of 84, with 100

being the worst possible score, according to the report “There is no freedom of information

law and defamation is a criminal offence...” and that “Somalia remained one of the deadliest

countries for journalists in 2011” (2013). Regardless of that, even if Somali citizens had a

free press, their access to information is greatly limited, according to CIA World Factbook,

there are only 100,000 main telephone lines in use, ranking Somalia as 146 out of 232 other

areas, of course this is not nearly as bad as available internet hosts, which lands Somalia

ranking of 202 in the world (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). That being said, if the US

still insisted upon promoting central themes of democracy, freedom of speech, womans rights

etc, it would require atleast a partially educated and thinking citizenry in order for there to be

a truly influential shift in the social landscape; however given the grotesque humanitarian

conditions, only 37% of the total population over age 15 is literate, and according to the

United Nations Development Program, of the 1.7 million children of primary school age,

only 42% of children are in school (Somalia Federal Republic, 2013; Central Intelligence

Agency, 2013).

That being said, it must also not be forgotten that soft power must appeal to the minds

of those who are subject to it, capturing their imaginations and inducing change, however, it

is common knowledge that before one cultivates the mind, the basic needs of life must be

met. Somalia is undergoing a severe humanitarian crisis, with an estimated 30,000 childrens

death, 3.7 million people in need of assistance, 1 in 3 children malnourished, and everyday

there is an estimated 1,500 Somali refugees arriving into Kenya (Dagne, 2011); given these

conditions, it is highly unlikely for the population to be receptive to any form of soft power.

In light of these numbers, one might consider it in opportune moment to use humanitarian

organisations as a way of associating foreign bodies within Somalia with progress and

development, values that most Somalis undoubtedly share. Unfortunately, according to the

US Congressional Research Service African Affairs specialist, Ted Dagne, “Civilians,

humanitarian workers, journalists, and human rights advocates have been the primary targets

of the insurgents, TFG, and Ethiopian security forces…many human rights advocates and

journalists have fled Somalia to neighboring countries for safety” (2011, p. 5). It should be

noted that Turkey has done what many other countries have been too afraid to do, given that

many Turkish engineers have gone into war torn Mogadishu and have constructed numerous

schools as well as hospitals. It must also be noted that the Turks are taking a great risk,

especially since Mogadishu has been the site for regular bombings by Al-Shabab and other

militant groups. In fact, in order to mitigate the dangers posed by the city, armed guards must

surround the Turkish humanitarian workers as they work (Lough, 2012). Thus despite

Turkey’s noble efforts, many humanitarian groups do not have the protection of trained

military personnel, nor are they willing to chance the risk of working without them. It is true

that the soft power approach to diplomacy is a preferable option to using brute force, but it

appears as though Somalia is in such a state of chaos and the citizens in such deep destitution

that any efforts towards soft power will fall upon callused hearts and deaf ears. In order to

eradicate the Somali pirate menace in an effective and timely manner foreign countries must

turn to the hard power alternative.

A statistical analysis provided by the World Bank provides a deeper understanding of

the urgency of the problem. Since 2000, as much as 3,741 crewmembers have been captured

at some point by Somali pirates for durations of time for as long as 3 years. Reportedly,

between 82-97 seafarers have died during Somali pirate attacks or at some point while in

detention. Additionaly, as can be expected, economic factors have suffered as well, with a

7.4% drop in value of yearly trade between trading partners in the Arabian Sea. It is believed

that Somali piracy has a cumulative cost of nearly US$18 billion a year- a sum of money that

damages countries in proximity to the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea, which also happen to

be countries that are in deep need of such funds (2013). It should also be noted that as time

goes on and pirates become more sophisticated the range of their attacks are expanding and

becoming more prevalent, with the exception of 2012, an analysis by the International

Maritime Bureau (IMB) estimates that in 2002 incidents of Somali piracy only numbered

about 7.5% of world wide incidents, however by 2011 it reached 55.6% (The World Bank,

2013). The recent drop in 2012 may be attributed to the more aggressive counter-piracy

measures that have taken place recently- a potentially promising indication of the

effectiveness of hard power.

The World Bank report proceeded to mention a triad of interrelated variables, which

make the operation a success: manpower, money, and political capital. Manpower,

unfortunately is in abundance, given the dismal conditions of much of Somalia, with a youth

(15-64 years of age) dependency ratio of 94% (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013), more 15-

30 year old males are lining up than jobs that are actually available. The estimated payment

for the average pirate is anywhere between $30,000-$75,0000, but given the various

expenses, unfortunately, given to various expenses (food, water, and qat-narcotics plant) and

fines for misbehaviors, many pirates end up in debt after a hijack, thus making it increasingly

difficult for them to retire. The actual money/capital required to finance the expedition is

comparatively cheap, which can range from very simple undertakings which cost only a few

hundred dollar operations, to $30,000 professional expeditions which require external

investment- which comes from former police, military officers, civil servants, qat dealers,

fisherman and former pirates (The Economist, 2013). The last factor is the most important,

the political capital. It is estimated that 70-86% of all ransom profit goes to those who have

the political capital to enable Somali piracy. Not only does the money go to those who have

power within the government and tribal elders, as well as though who own the docks in

which the captured ships lie, but it also goes to other militias including Al Shabab, which

demand a “non-interference” fee (The World Bank, 2013). Fortunately, the system itself

provides the means for the destruction of the entirety of the piracy network.

In truth dealing with the first two variables are quite simple, by decreasing the rate of

the pirates success, which has been estimated to be at 15%, manpower will drop and the

money, which is not being replenished by the traditional successes will continue to run out,

which will be compounded by the fact that investors will no long be willing to invest given

the poor rate of success. How do we decrease the success of piracy? That answer rests in

history. A method employed during the Barbary Wars during the late 18th and 19th century

lies in the letters of marque, which are “legal authorizations enabling private entities-

privateers- to use force on behalf of the state to harass or prey on vessels belonging to foreign

nations or individuals” (Hutchins, 2011). It may not even need to be such a deeply offensive

measure given that the Somali pirates often avoid ships, which display armed forces on deck.

By employing US companies like Blackwater, which have fitted their own patrol boats to

escort ships (Lynn, 2009), the likelihood of Somali pirates attacking are minimized, and even

if they due, their success rate will be nearly zero. Consequently, after 2-3 years of failure, the

piracy enterprise will begin to consume and collapse upon itself. Although the Somali piracy

enterprise may have some characteristics of a sophisticated business, it does not change the

reality of the fact that Somalia is an extremely hostile environment, which is why it will

consume itself. By eliminating the ability of the managers of the piracy enterprise to actually

capture the ships and reap the necessary revenue, they will no longer be able to maintain

political capital. Upon losing political capital, they will also lose the “non-interference” fees

paid to the Al Shabab militias, while also losing the political protection that they need to

remain unhindered. This will be especially effective if the foreign governments apply

pressure on Kenya as well, which is known to have officials working within the port of

Mogadishu, informing the Somali pirates on which ships possess valuable cargo (Axe, 2009).

This will undoubtedly stimulate strife amongst the Somalis, especially those who feel that

they are taking risks without any form of compensation, creating enough chaos and

destruction that the piracy enterprise will likely collapse upon itself.

It is only through deliberate force that the Somali pirate operation will be defeated.

Soft power approaches, although advantageous in many cases, are not suitable for the

environment of Somalia. Various groups within the country are ardently opposed to the

intervention of foreigners, primarily westerners, and the pirates themselves are not liable to

“see the error of their ways” anytime soon. Likewise due to the inefficacy of the Somali

government combined with the overall lack of infrastructure and safety, the passages through

which soft power would traditionally disseminate are closed. The only way to truly take

control over the situation is through a traditional exercise of hard power. By effectively

stopping pirates through the hiring of privateers and added pressure on Kenya, the factors

which allow for piracy to flourish will collapse upon themselves, resulting the end of Somali

pirate enterprise.

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