SOLIVEN vs.docx

7/27/2019 SOLIVEN vs.docx

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SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR

167 SCRA 393

FACTS:

In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or

not petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against

them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by

the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the

constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a

warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if

any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue

moot and academic.

On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion for

reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the

City Fiscals finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for

reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April

7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the

resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration

was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments,

petitioners contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available

under the law has lost factual support.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were violated when

respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the

complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable clause

Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate

criminal proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit


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RULING:

This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants

of arrest:

Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and

for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall

issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after

examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may

produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things

to be seized.

Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to

personally examine the complainant and his witness in his determination of probable

cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests.

However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal

responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In

doing so, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his

witness.

Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall:

(1) Personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal

regarding the existence of probable cause (and on the basis, thereof, issue a warrant of

arrest); or

(2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals

report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in

arriving at a conclusion as to the evidence of probable cause.

Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the Presidents

filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the

prosecution, bringing her under the trial courts jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way


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defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she

would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and

may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the

Presidents behalf.

The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the Presidents

prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person

(And there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the

privilege).

Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged

character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would

produce a chilling effect on press freedom.

Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this stage to rule

on the chilling effect point.


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ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO

G.R. NO. 146710-15, MARCH 2,2001

FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June

30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos SurgovernorLuis Chavit" Singson, a close friend the President,

alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a

bank account known as Jose Velarde" a grassroots-based numbers game. Singsons

allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of

Representatives filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000.

House SpeakerManny Villarfast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment

suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief

Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded not guilty.

The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd

continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing

organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of

protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the

Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the

protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment

trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election

to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He

added that he will not run in this election.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilocos_Surhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chavit_Singsonhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chavit_Singsonhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chavit_Singsonhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manny_Villarhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilario_Davide,_Jr.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_National_Policehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armed_Forces_of_the_Philippineshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armed_Forces_of_the_Philippineshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armed_Forces_of_the_Philippineshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armed_Forces_of_the_Philippineshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_National_Policehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilario_Davide,_Jr.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manny_Villarhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chavit_Singsonhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilocos_Sur


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On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was

vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post". Noon of the same day,

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA,

becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts

about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president", but saying he

would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his

family later left Malacaang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he

countered by filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary

injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further

proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also

prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of

the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office,

and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the

President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution."

ISSUES:

Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable,

whether or not petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.

Whether or not petitioner may invoke immunity from suits.

RULING:

The Court defines a political issue as those questions which, under the

Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to

which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive

branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,

not legality of a particular measure.


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The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo

presidency. The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government

spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution,

overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was

a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the

president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president

(president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the

issue is legal and not political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to

resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow

the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore,

the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estradas implied

resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is

acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its

legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The

Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior,

contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material

relevance on the issue.

As to the issue of the petitioners contention that he is immuned from suits, the

Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court

added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a

public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim

executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting

President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of

the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure. (the term during which the

incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim

to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents

shall succeed one another).


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SENATE VS. ERMITA

G.R. NO. 169777 APRIL 20,2006

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has

abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation

of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of

Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the

Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void

for being unconstitutional.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various

Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call

for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department,

bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled

Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National

Police (PNP).

The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive

Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway

project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire

tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.

Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as

provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in

Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either

house of Congress.

ISSUE:

Whether or not is the Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials,

enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing

before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?


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RULING:

No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the

executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that

certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the

public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to

disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high

degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it

is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the

ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it

must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade

congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so

and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions,

the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.


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DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 85468 SEPTEMBER 7, 1989

FACTS:

Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on

Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA

3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and

director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to

supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and

airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or

DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).

An information was then filed by the Tanodbayan against Doromal for the said

violation and a preliminary investigation was conducted. The petitioner then filed a

petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan to

file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman.

The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special

Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and

duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct

preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the

Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the

information filed by the Tanodbayan.

A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the

Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner

of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and

unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading

Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President, and which company

participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and

Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is

prohibited by law and the constitution.


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The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid

since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed

against him.

The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary

investigation is unnecessary because both old and new informations involve the same

subject matter.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.

Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both informations involve

the same subject matter.

Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of

preliminary investigation.

RULING:

Yes, The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the

application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a

business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the

Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at

least an indirect interest."

Yes, The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its

denial over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss

of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" provided by the Constitution.

Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that

time shall also be considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation

must be conducted.

No, The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over

the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it


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defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before

entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of

dismissing the information should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct

it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be

conducted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan

shall immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for

preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending

the result of such investigation.


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CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. EXEC. SEC.,

194 SCRA 317

FACTS:

Consolidated petitions are being resolved jointly as both seek for the declaration

of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 (EO No. 284) issued by former

President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

EO No. 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and Assistant

Secretaries to hold other than their government positions in addition to their primary

positions.

Section 1: A Cabinet member, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary or other appointive

officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not

more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations and receive

corresponding compensation thereof.

Section 2: If they hold more than the requisites of Section 1, they must relinquish the

excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank but in no case shall

any officer hold not more than two (2) positions other than his primary position.

Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be

a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.

Petitioners are challenging EO No. 284's unconstitutionality as its provisions are in direct

contrast with Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, the

only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those

provided in the Constitution namely: 1) the Vice President may be appointed as a

Cabinet member under Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The Secretary of Justice is and ex-

officio of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8, Article VIII.


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Constitutional provisions:

Section 13, Article VII: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and

their Deputies or Assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided by the Constitution,

hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, directly or

indirectly, during their tenure, practice any other profession, participate in any business,

or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege

granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,

including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall

strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

Section 8, Article VIII: Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his

position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the

government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-

owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

RULING:

No, It has been held that in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the

object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be

prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of

the times and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed.

The legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials

from holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment which is a betrayal

of public trust.

The provisions of EO No. 284 above-mentioned are in direct contradiction to the express

mandate provided by the Constitutional provisions (Sec 13, Art VII and Sec 8, Art VIII).

The Constitution, the fundamental law of the land, shall reign supreme over any other

statute. When there is conflict, it shall be resolved in favor of the highest law of the land.


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Thus, the Court held that EO No. 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As a result, DENR

Secretary Fulgenio Factoran, Jr., DILF Secretary Luis Santos, DOH Secretary Alfredo

Bengzon and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague are ordered to immediately relinquish

their offices and employment.

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualifications stated, the petitions are GRANTED.

Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.


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MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS (PART 1)

177 SCRA 668

FACTS:

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the

non-violent people power revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed,

has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino,

considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability

of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning

to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos

and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening

events:

failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists

plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a

Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar

Honasans failed coup

Communist insurgency movements

secessionist movements in Mindanao

devastated economy because of

accumulated foreign debt

plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue

them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquinos

decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquinos

power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that

the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health.

Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property

without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives


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them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution,

may only be impaired by a court order.

ISSUES:

Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the

President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the

Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and

decided to bar their return.

RULING:

No, Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers.

According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the executive

power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. However, it does not define

what is meant by executive power although in the same article it touches on exercise of

certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive

departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power

to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons (art VII secfs. 14-23).

Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined &

exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which

include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect

the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the

Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the

President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at

153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American

President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but

also on the day-to-day operation of the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Theyre flexible depending on the

circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines

cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing


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liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which

clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must

be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers

of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in

that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or

demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the

President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

No, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for

the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the

Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The

supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The President must

take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the

people. She has to uphold the Constitution.


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MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS (PART 2)

178 SCRA 760

FACTS:

In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven,

dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave

abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his

family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the

Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.

President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of

those who will take the death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and

for the tranquility and order of the state and society, she did not allow the remains of

Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines.

A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following

arguments:

Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their

country of birth and all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos.

The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had

exercised it arbitrarily.

There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to

return in the Philippines be granted.

RULING:

No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied

because of lack of merit.


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Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration. Factual

scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to the

government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic

effect, have not been shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President

Aquino illegal claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal president.

President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power.

Enumerations are merely for specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving

the rest to flow from general grant that power, interpreted in conformity with other parts

of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can exercise power from

sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US).

This does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos

power of legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with implied powers. It is

within Aquinos power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound

to comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily


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BIRAOGO et. al vs. PHIL TRUTH COMMISSION

G.R. NO. 192935 DECEMEBER 7,2010

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary

task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers

and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous

administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,

Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it

is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render

awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and

assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have

subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their

arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable

cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from

performing its functions. They argued that:

E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to

create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987

cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to

structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and

efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was

hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.

E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth

Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the


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Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created

under the Administrative Code of 1987.

E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation

and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is

their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and

present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued

that:

E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents

executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct

investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the

Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A.

No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such

bodies.

E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is

no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the

Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body

and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.

The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was

validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O.

No. 1;

Whether or not E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.


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RULING:

The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body

to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired,

so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in

the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and

privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are

allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on

their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of

sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No.

1.

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In

private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that

every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment

in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts

a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative

of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He

has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the

securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as

a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers

matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court.

There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in

view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents


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The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully

executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the

Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this

constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows

from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully

executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an

inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly

advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and

enforcement of the laws of the land.

Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in

view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1,

Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be

treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public

bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The

purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states

jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the

express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly

constituted authorities.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not

similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause.

The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning

the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The

intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past

administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly

situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.

Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a

vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make

for a valid classification.


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The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at

least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all

other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and

all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be

stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of

the Constitution.


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DENR vs. DENR EMPLOYEES

G.R. NO. 149725 AUGUST 19, 2003

FACTS:

Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum directing the

immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal

(formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. The Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR

Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles,

which reads in part:

Subject: Providing for the Redefinition of Functions and Realignment of Administrative

Units in the Regional and Field Offices:

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 192, dated June 10, 1987 and as an interim

administrative arrangement to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in delivering its services

pending approval of the government-wide reorganization by Congress, the following

redefinition of functions and realignment of administrative units in the regional and field

offices are hereby promulgated:

Section 1. Realignment of Administrative Units:

The DENR hereby adopts a policy to establish at least one Community Environment and

Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or Administrative Unit per Congressional District

except in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the National Capital

Region (NCR). The Regional Executive Directors (REDs) are hereby authorized to

realign/relocate existing CENROs and implement this policy in accordance with the

attached distribution list per region which forms part of this Order. Likewise, the

following realignment and administrative arrangements are hereby adopted:

x x x x x x x x x

1.6. The supervision of the Provinces of South Cotabato and Sarangani shall be

transferred from Region XI to XII.


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Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII who are members of the employees

association, COURAGE, represented by their Acting President, Baguindanai A. Karim,

filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders with prayer

for preliminary injunction.

ISSUES:

Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid

Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.

RULING:

This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for

under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,

bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No.

1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the

President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national

government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to

abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and

activities and to standardize salaries and materials.

The DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of

the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato.

In Chiongbian v. Orbos, this Court stressed the rule that the power of the President to

reorganize the administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional

centers.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The

resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58896 dated May 31, 2000 and


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August 20, 2001, as well as the decision dated January 14, 2000 of the Regional Trial

Court of Cotabato City, Branch 15, in Civil Case No. 389, are REVERSED and SET

ASIDE. The permanent injunction, which enjoined the petitioner from enforcing the

Memorandum Order of the DENR XII Regional Executive Director, is LIFTED.


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MONDANO vs. SILVANO

97 PHIL143 MAY 30,1995

FACTS:

The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of

Mainit, province of Surigao. Consolacin Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with

the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed

on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter

in a place other than the conjugal dwelling. The Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed

the complaint to the respondent provincial governor for immediate investigation,

appropriate action and report. The provincial governor issued Administrative Order No. 8

suspending the petitioner from office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear

the charges preferred against the petitioner over his objection. The petitioner prays for a

writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the respondents from further

proceeding with the hearing of the administrative case against him and for a declaration

that the order of suspension issued by the respondent provincial governor is illegal and

without legal effect

ISSUES:

Whether or not the investigation of the charges against petitioner by theprovincial board

is unauthorized and illegal.

Whether or not the suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the municipality of Mainit is,

consequently, unlawful and without authority of law.

RULING:

Sec. 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code and 37 of Act No. 4007 expressly

and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial

governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath

against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of

maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral

turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the


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matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either

personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer pending

action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of

the officer in question. "In the instant case, the charges preferred against the respondent

are not malfeasances or any of those enumerated or specified in section 2188 of the

Revised

Administrative Code, because rape and concubinage have nothing to do with the

performance of his duties as mayor nor do they constitute or involve "neglect of duty,

oppression, corruption or any other form of maladministration of office." The Court ruled

that before the provincial governor and board may act and proceed in accordance with

the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code referred to, a conviction by final

judgment must precede the filing by the provincial governor of charges and trial by the

provincial board. Even the provincial fiscal cannot file an information for rape without a

sworn complaint of the offended party who is 28years of age and the crime of

concubinage cannot be prosecuted but upon a sworn complaint of the offended spouse.

Hence, the charges preferred against the petitioner, Municipal Mayor of Mainit,province

of Surigao, not being those or any of those specified in Sec.2188 of the Revised

Administrative Code, the investigation of such charges by the provincial board

is unauthorized and illegal. Consequently, the suspension of the petitioner, of the

Municipality of Mainit, is unlawful and without authority of law.


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VILLENA vs. SEC. OF INTERIOR

67 PHIL 451

FACTS:

Villena was the then mayor of Makati. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior

recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved

the same. The Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the

Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the

local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative Code.

Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over

local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in

accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of

charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the

Administrative Code as amended.

In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over

local governments, if he has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188

of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to

be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of the

Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law.

ISSUES:

Whether the Secretary of the Interior has the legal authority:

(a) to order an investigation, by a special investigation appointed by him, of the charges

of corruption and irregularity brought to his attention against the mayor of the

municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, who is the petitioner herein, and

(b) to decree the suspension of the said mayor pending the investigation of the charges


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RULING:

Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code provides as follows:

The Department Head shall have direct control, direction, and supervision over all

bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing law to the

contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus of

offices when advisable in the public interest.

The Department Head may order the investigation of any act conduct of any person in

the service of any bureau of office under his department and in connection therewith

may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such

investigations, and such committee, official, or person may summon, witness

by subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, administer oath and take testimony relevant

to the investigation.

The above section speaks, it is true, of direct control, direction, and supervision over

bureaus and offices under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, but this section

should be interpreted in relation to section 86 of the same Code which grants to the

Department of the Interior executive supervision over the administration of provinces,

municipalities, chartered cities and other local political subdivisions. Therefore, the

Secretary of the Interior is invested with authority to order the investigation of the

charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose.

Administrative Code which provides that The provincial governor shall receive and

investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,

oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by

final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. For minor delinquency he may

reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable he shall

submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of

such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such

case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board,

if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question.

Where suspension is thus effected, the written charges against the officer shall be filed


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with the board within five days. The fact, however, that the power of suspension is

expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor

does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the

Interior from exercising a similar power.

The suspension of the petitioner should be sustained on the principle of approval or

ratification of the act of the Secretary of the Interior by the President of the Philippines.

Under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the

departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section

12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are

adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments

are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief

Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of

the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and

administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the

executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed

and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or

reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.


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LACSON-MAGALLANES CO, INC vs. PANO

21 SCRA 895

FACTS:

In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permitted and actual occupant of a 1,103-

hectare pasture land situated in Davao. On 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and

interests to a portion of the above public land to the plaintiff. On 1954, the same was

officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural

land. On 1955, Jose Pao and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of 90

hectares of the released area. Plaintiff in turn filed its own sales application covering the

entire released area. The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict,

rendered a decision on 1956 giving due course to the application of plaintiff

corporation. When the case was elevated to the President of the Philippines, Executive

Secretary Juan Pajo, by authority of the president, declared that it would be for public

interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers, be allocated that portion on

which the petitioner have made improvements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary

and whether it can be further delegated by the Executive Secretary

RULING:

The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his

control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his

confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at

pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go

over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this

context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a

decision of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to

appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive

departments. And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or


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nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties

and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."

It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must

exercise in person. Not as correct, however, is it to say that the Chief Executive may not

delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that

he perform in person. Reason is not wanting for this view. The President is not expected

to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The

office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule

which has thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive

Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed

jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.


35/58

GANZON vs. CA

200 SCRA 271

FACTS:

Furthermore, we may already take judicial notice of the recently-approved Local

Government Code of 1991 (recently signed into law by the President) 18 which provides

(as to imposition of preventive suspensions) as follows:

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension

xxx xxx xxx

b) . . . that, any single preventive suspension of local elective official shall not extend

beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further that in the event that several administrative

cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more

than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and

known at the time of the first suspension.(emphasis supplied)

The main decision refers to the three (3) suspension orders the first, the second and

the third. As shown earlier, the first and the third orders have already been served. It is

only the second order which seems to have been unserved. If we follow the decision

which states that the three (3) suspensions are affirmed, there appears to be no reason

why the second order should not be served for another 60-day period. However, there is

no cogent reason why, under the bizarre circumstances of this case where the

respondent Secretary has chosen to impose preventive suspensions piecemeal, instead

of consolidating the several administrative cases of similar nature and close vintage

we cannot allow the concept of simultaneous service to apply to the second order (as we

did in the third order). It would follow then that the second order is also fully served to

this date for the service of said second order would have started on 5 August 1991

(when the main decision was rendered as this was the time when this Court found and

affirmed the validity of the three (3) suspension orders, including the second order). The

60-day period from 5 August 1991 expired on 4 October 1991.


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It appears that as to the second preventive suspension, petitioner manifested that there

is still an existing preliminary injunction issued by the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 33 in

Special Civil Action No. 18312, entitled Ganzon vs. Santos, et al. 20

One may ask as to the status of the case pending with the RTC, Iloilo City, Branch 33

insofar as the said case involves the issue on the validity of the second preventive

suspension order. Under the main decision of this Court, dated 5 August 1991, second

preventive suspension has been affirmed; under the present resolution, said second

preventive suspension has been served. Consequently, Special Civil Action No. 18312

before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City has been rendered moot and academic,

insofar as the second preventive suspension order is concerned.

ISSUE:

When will petitioner Ganzon may be allowed to re-assume his position and duties as

mayor of Iloilo City. Is it only after 19 October 1991 as claimed by respondents, or at

some earlier date? The answer to this question would depend on how petitioner has

served the preventive suspension orders issued against him.

RULING:

As to the petition (docketed CA-G. R. SP No. 25840) filed with the Court of

Appeals, which involves the question of the validity of the fourth order, and which has

clearly been served, petitioner admitted that he filed it, on the belief that it was the

proper remedy for his reinstatement to office; thinking that his suspensions have been

served and ended. 21 As we have ruled that petitioner has served the suspension orders

decreed in the main decision and in the light of the finding of this Court that the fourth

preventive suspension order has been served, the issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No.

25840; have also become moot and academic, warranting dismissal thereof.

WHEREFORE, the urgent motion of petitioner, dated 7 September 1991 is

hereby GRANTED. The temporary restraining order dated 5 September 1991 is

hereby LIFTED. Respondents are ordered to allow petitioner to re-assume his office as

elected Mayor of Iloilo City effective immediately.


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The Court of Appeal is directed to dismiss CA-G.R. SP No. 25840 for having

become moot and academic. The Region Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33 before

which petitioner's action for prohibition (Special Civil Action No. 18312) is pending is also

ordered to dismiss the said case for having become moot and academic insofar as

petitioner prays therein to enjoin his (second) preventive suspension.

This resolution is without prejudice to the administrative cases (where the first,

second, third and fourth preventive suspension orders were issued) proceeding on the

merits thereof. Also, as decreed in the main decision of 5 August 1991.

. . . petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on

account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts

committed prior to August 11, 1988. . . .


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DADOLE vs. COA

G.R. NO. 125350 DEMECEMBER 3,2002

FACTS:

In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly

allowances through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang

Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for

each judge.

On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued

the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that such additional

allowances in the form of honorarium at rates shall be granted but it shall not exceed

P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities subject to the following

conditions:

a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs;

b) That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the

implementation of R.A. 6758 shall have been fully provided in the budget;

c) That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325 of R.A.

7160 should be satisfied and/or complied with; and

d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of functions/personnel in

accordance with R.A. 7160.3" (italics supplied)

Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of

disallowance to petitioners. Beginning October, 1994, the additional monthly allowances

of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were also asked to

reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to September, 1994.

The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest against the notices

of disallowance. But the City Auditor treated the protest as a motion for reconsideration

and indorsed the same to the COA Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional

Office referred the motion to the head office with a recommendation that the same be

denied.


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On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, for and in behalf

of the petitioner judges, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COA. In

a resolution dated May 28, 1996, the COA denied the motion. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of

Mandaue City. They also maintain that said circular is not supported by any law and

therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the President. Respondent COA, on

the other hand, insists that the constitutional and statutory authority of a city government

to provide allowances to judges stationed therein is not absolute. Congress may set

limitations on the exercise of autonomy. It is for the President, through the DBM, to

check whether these legislative limitations are being followed by the local government

units.

ISSUE:

Whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of

the President.

RULING:

The petitioners contention is meritorious. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987

Philippine Constitution provides that The President of the Philippines shall exercise

general supervision over local governments. This provision has been interpreted to

exclude the power of control. It was emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and

control -- differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows:

"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of

an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect

to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make

them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to

alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the

performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the

latter."ii 6


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In Taule v. Santos,iii 7 we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no

more authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were

performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot

interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority.

"Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over

an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body,"iv 8 we

said.

In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,v 9 the difference between control and

supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the

performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in

their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to

do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority.

Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do

not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the

rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to

such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have

no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

By constitutional fiat, local government units are subject to the President's

supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of

their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any

authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.

Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local

government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. Hence, the

President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the

concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the

Constitution.

It was then held that LBC 55 went beyond the law it seeks to implement.

LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a local

government unit should not exceedP1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in

municipalities. Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves

as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional allowances to judges "when


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the finances of the city government allow." The said provision does not authorize setting

a definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges. Setting a

uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way of

enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-

stepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition

that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the

prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed decision and

resolution, dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of the

Commission on Audit are hereby set aside.


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SARMIENTO vs. MISON

156 SCRA 549

FACTS:

Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performing the functions of the

Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and respondent Carague as Secretary

of the Dept of Budget from disbursing payments for Misons salaries and emoluments on

the ground that Misons appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs

is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by

the Commission onAppointments (CA). On the other hand, respondents maintain the

constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the (CA). It is

apparent in Sec 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution that there are four groups of officers whom

the president shall appoint.

(1) the heads of the exec departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and

consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other

officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution,

(2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided

for by law,

(3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint and

(4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the

President alone.

The 1st group is clearly appointed with the consent of the CA. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th

groups are the present bone of contention.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups should be appointed by the president with or

without the consent/confirmationof the CA


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RULING:

The fundamental principle of Constitutional construction is to give effect to the

intent of the framers of the organic law and the people adopting it. The Court will thus

construe the applicableconstitutional provisions not in accordance with how the

executive or the legislative may want them construed, but in accordance with what they

say and provide. The 1935 Constitution requiresconfirmation by the CA of all

presidential appointments. This has resulted in horse-trading and similar malpractices.

Under the 1973 Constitution, the president has the absolute power of appointmentwith

hardly any check on the legislature. Given these two extremes, the 1987 Constitution

struck a middle-ground by requiring the consent of the CA for the 1st group

of appointments and leaving to the President without

such confirmation the appointments of the other officers. The clear and expressed intent

of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to exclude

presidential appointments fromconfirmation on the CA except appointments to offices

expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII. Therefore,

theconfirmation on the appointment of Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs by the

CA is not required.

The appointment of Mison without submitting his nomination the CA is within the

constitutional authority of the President.


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AYTONA vs. CASTILLO

4 SCRA 1

FACTS:

On December 29, 1961, Carlos P. Garcia, who was still President that time, made last

minute appointments while the Commission on Appointments was not in session. Said

last minute appointment included Dominador R. Aytona, who was appointed as ad

interim Governor of Central Bank. The latter took oath on the same day.

At noon on December 30, 1961, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office.

He issued Administrative Order No. 2 on December 31, 1961 recalling, withdrawing and

canceling all ad interim appointments made by President Garcia after December 13,

1961, which was the date when Macapagal was proclaimed President by the Congress.

He then appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank and

the latter qualified immediately.

On January 2, 1962, both exercised the powers of their office. However, Aytona was

prevented from holding office the following day and thus instituted a quo warranto

proceeding, challenging Castillos right to exercise the powers of the Governor of the

Central Bank. Aytona claims that he was validly appointed and had qualified for the post,

therefore making Castillos appointment void. Castillo then contended that Aytonas

appointment had already been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 issued by

President Macapagal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the new president has the power to cancel all ad interim appointments

made by the previous president after they have all qualified?

RULING:

To quote We are informed, it is Malacaan's practice which we find to be logical to

submit ad interim appointments only when the Commission on Appointments is in

session. One good reason for the practice is that only those who have accepted the

appointment and qualified are submitted for confirmation. Nevertheless, this time,


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Malacaang submitted its appointments on the same day they were issued; and the

Commission was not then in session; obviously because it foresaw the possibility that

the incoming President would refuse to submit later the appointees of his predecessor.

As a result, as already adverted to, some persons whose names were submitted for

confirmation had not qualified nor accepted their appointments.


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IBP vs. ZAMORA

G.R. NO. 141284 AUGUST 15,2000

FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the

Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate

with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the

PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared

that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in

nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have

improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine

Marines null and void andunconstitutional.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the

armed forces is subject to judicial review

(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility

patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and

the civilian character of the PNP

RULING:

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless

violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely

vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke

such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpusand the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However,

there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the

Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out

power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to

suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the

Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their


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revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powershighlights the intent to

grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call

out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the

power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose

martial law, both of which involve the curtailment andsuppression of certain basic civil

rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and

review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to

determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the

petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The

present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support

the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian

task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution.

The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy

clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for

civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility

patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the

civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with

the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the

Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be

no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in

the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.


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LACSON vs. PEREZ

MAY 10,2001

FACTS:

President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38)

on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to

suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and

promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition,

injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of

temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the

declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue

thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information

against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is

resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless

arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold

departure orders allegedly effected by the same.

RULING:

President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006,

accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents

have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain

regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1,

2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to

warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the

circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38.

Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an

individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of

Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,


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providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to

the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be

penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the

arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of

damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity

of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the

country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab

initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.

Petitioners prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is

premature being that no complaintshave been filed against them for any crime,

furthermore, the writ ofhabeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve

unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking

earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in

their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial

warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege

of Malacaang.


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DAVID vs. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

G.R. NO. 171396 MAY 3,2006

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of

the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No.

5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of

the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by

virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine

Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . .

may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my

capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the

Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all

forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce

obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me

personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the

Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,

respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the

conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army,

and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate

President Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and

take-over the reins of gov

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