Solitario Consti Cases 132-140-1

8/13/2019 Solitario Consti Cases 132-140-1

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ANIAG VS. COMELEC

[237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT 1994]Facts:

In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued ResolutionNo. 2323, Gun Ban, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting offirearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms bymembers of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance ofreaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providingfor the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting offirearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the GunBan, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitionerfor the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner theninstructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioners house and return them toCongress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached thecheckpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended anddetained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano wasonly complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later,COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner andArellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why heshould not be disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the

constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within theprovisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 isunconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections wasrendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections.

Issue:

Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the firearmsissued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car

Held:

A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority.However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is

neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicleis merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellanos waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside abag at the back of the car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughlysearched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction.Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petit ioner andArellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from thewarrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown inthe facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint.Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus ElectionCode. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminaryinvestigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot becontended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he

was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless searchconducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot beused as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 isunconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.


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People vs. Escano, Usana and Lopez [GR 129756-58, 28 January 2000]

Facts:On 5 April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban, some law enforcers of the Makati Police, namely,

PO3 Eduardo P. Suba, PO3 Bernabe Nonato, SPO4 Juan de los Santos, and Inspector Ernesto Guico, were

manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX).

They were checking the cars going to Pasay City, stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing

merely a running stop on the others. At about past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate TBH

493. P03 Suba saw a long firearm on the lap of the person seated at the passenger seat, who was later

identified as Virgilio Usana. They asked the driver, identified as Julian D. Escao, to open the door. P03

Suba seized the long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escao, upon order of the police,

parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other passengers were searched for more weapons. Their search

yielded a .45 caliber firearm which they seized from Escao. The three passengers were thereafter

brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven by PO3 Nonato. Upon reaching the precinct,

Nonato turned over the key to the desk officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of the vehicle,

he requested Escao to open the trunk. Escao readily agreed and opened the trunk himself using his

key. They noticed a blue bag inside it, which they asked Escao to open. The bag contained a parcel

wrapped in tape, which, upon examination by National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Chemist Emilia

A. Rosaldos, was found positive for hashish weighing 3.3143 kilograms. Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C.

Lopez, together with Julian D. Escao, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,

Branch 64, in Criminal Case 95-936 with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, as

amended. Escao and Usana were also charged in Criminal Cases 95-937 and 95-938 with illegal

possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree 1866. The cases were

consolidated and jointly tried. In its Decision of 30 May 1997, which was promulgated on 17 June 1997,

the trial court convicted Escao, Lopez and Usana in Criminal Case 95-936, Escao in Criminal Case 95-

937, and Usana in Criminal Case 95-938. Escao filed on 19 June 1997 a Notice of Appeal, but on 16 July

1997, he filed a Manifestation and Withdrawal of Appeal, which was granted by the trial court in its

Order of 17 July 1997. Usana and Lopez filed a Notice of Appeal on 30 June 1997, manifesting therein

that they were appealing to the Supreme Court and to the Court of Appeals. Considering the penalties

imposed, the decision in Criminal Case 95-936 was appealed to the Supreme Court, while the Court of

Appeals took cognizance of the appeal from Criminal Case 95-938. In its Order of 30 June 1997, the trial

court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the transmittal of the record in Criminal Case 95-936

to the Supreme Court and the record of Criminal Case 95-938 to the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, it is

only the appeal from the judgment in Criminal Case 95-936 that is before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the search conducted on Escanos car is illegal, and whether the evidence acquired

therein would be sufficient to convict Lopez and Usana for possession of illegal drugs.

Held: The Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the

exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For,

admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists' right to "free passage

without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of


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travelers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as

long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection

of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an

individual's right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed

area, are even less intrusive. The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban

enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized

agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such

ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need

a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. The facts adduced do not constitute a

ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3

Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose

windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they would

merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the car's doors or

subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the

situation demands. Despite the validity of the search, the Court cannot affirm the conviction of Usana

and Lopez for violation of RA 6425, as amended. The following facts militate against a finding of

conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escao; (2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was

stopped and after the accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from

the place where it was stopped until the police station; (4) the car's trunk was opened, with the

permission of Escao, without the presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police

station and until the opening of the car's trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the police

authorities. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car.

Their having been with Escao in the latter's car before the "finding" of the hashish sometime after the

lapse of an appreciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the

offense of selling, distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that

Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same

before it was seized.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO, et al. 420

SCRA 280 (2004)

FACTS: On the night of April 10, 1995, as about fifteen police officers were manning a

checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise

known as the COMELEC gun ban, a motorcycle with three men on board namely

appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), Arnold Roble (Roble) Gerlyn Wates (Wates) sped

past of the police officers. When they were ordered to return to the checkpoint, a police

officer asked what the backpack contains which the appellants answered that it was only

a mat. The police officers suspected that it was a bomb and when appellant opened the


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bag it turns out that its contents were marijuana. The three were then brought to the

police station and later to Camp Catitipan and there they were investigated by police

officials without the assistance of counsel, following which they were made to sign some

documents which they were not allowed to read. The Regional Trial Court rendered

them guilty for transporting, possessing and delivering prohibited drugs under Article

IV of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act

No. 7659), and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search upon the appellants and the seizure of the alleged 1,700

grams of marijuana violated there constitutional right against unreasonable search and

seizure?

HELD:

Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians

passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may

be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a

reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender

or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Warrantless

search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by the Court as valid,

because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a

plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and

attempted to flee. In light then of Vinecario et al.sspeeding away after noticing the

checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious

and nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they

passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-

appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine

Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their

inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of thelaw enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that the contents of the

backpack were instruments of some offense.


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Camara vs. Municipal Court of the City and Country of San Francisco [387 US 523, 5 June

1967]

Facts: On 6 November 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco

Department of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for

possible violations of the city's Housing Code. The building's manager informed the inspector that

Camara, lessee of the ground floor, was using the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence. Claiming

that the building's occupancy permit did not allow residential use of the ground floor, the inspector

confronted Camara and demanded that he permit an inspection of the premises. Camara refused to

allow the inspection because the inspector lacked a search warrant. The inspector returned on

November 8, again without a warrant, and Camara again refused to allow an inspection. A citation was

then mailed ordering Camara to appear at the district attorney's office. When Camara failed to appear,

two inspectors returned to his apartment on November 22. They informed Camara that he was required

by law to permit an inspection under 503 of the Housing Code. Camara nevertheless refused the

inspectors access to his apartment without a search warrant. Thereafter, a complaint was filed charging

him with refusing to permit a lawful inspection in violation of 507 of the Code. Camara was arrested on

December 2nd released on bail. When his demurrer to the criminal complaint was denied, Camara filed

the petition for a writ of prohibition in a California Superior Court alleging that he was awaiting trial on a

criminal charge of violating the San Francisco Housing Code by refusing to permit a warrantless

inspection of his residence, and that a writ of prohibition should issue to the criminal court because the

ordinance authorizing such inspections is unconstitutional on its face. The Superior Court denied the

writ, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, and the Supreme Court of California denied petition for

hearing.

Issue:Whether Camara can validly refuse the inspection of his dwelling by the Division of Housing

Inspection?

Held: The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit awarrantless code enforcement inspection of his personal residence. The basic purpose of theFourth Amendment, which is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth, through itsprohibition of "unreasonable" searches and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and security ofindividuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. With certain carefully definedexceptions, an unconsented warrantless search of private property is "unreasonable.

Administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interestsprotected by the Fourth Amendment, that such searches when authorized and conductedwithout a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment

guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in othercases for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial aweakening of the Fourth Amendment's protections. Contrary to the assumption of Frank v.Maryland, Fourth Amendment interests are not merely "peripheral" where municipal fire, health,and housing inspection programs are involved whose purpose is to determine the existence ofphysical conditions not complying with local ordinances. Those programs, moreover, areenforceable by criminal process, as is refusal to allow an inspection. Warrantless administrativesearches cannot be justified on the grounds that they make minimal demands on occupants;that warrants in such cases are unfeasible; or that area inspection programs could not function


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under reasonable search-warrant requirements. Probable cause upon the basis of whichwarrants are to be issued for area code-enforcement inspections is not dependent on theinspector's belief that a particular dwelling violates the code but on the reasonableness of theenforcement agency's appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole. The standards to guide themagistrate in the issuance of such search warrants will necessarily vary with the municipalprogram being enforced. Nothing here is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without

a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations. On the other hand, inthe case of most routine area inspections, there is no compelling urgency to inspect at aparticular time or on a particular day. Moreover, most citizens allow inspections of their propertywithout a warrant. Thus, as a practical matter and in light of the Fourth Amendment'srequirement that a warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that warrantsshould normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen complaintor there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry. Similarly, the requirement of awarrant procedure does not suggest any change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy,in most situations, of authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to inspect. Herein, Camara hasbeen charged with a crime for his refusal to permit housing inspectors to enter his leaseholdwithout a warrant. There was no emergency demanding immediate access; in fact, theinspectors made three trips to the building in an attempt to obtain Camara's consent to search.

Yet no warrant was obtained and thus appellant was unable to verify either the need for or theappropriate limits of the inspection. No doubt, the inspectors entered the public portion of thebuilding with the consent of the landlord, through the building's manager, but the City/Countydoes not contend that such consent was sufficient to authorize inspection of Camara'spremises. Assuming the facts to be as the parties have alleged, Camara had a constitutionalright to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may notconstitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. It appears from theopinion of the District Court of Appeal that under these circumstances a writ of prohibition willissue to the criminal court under California law.

Facts:On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command(RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit(liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt

Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listedin the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPAliquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification,Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons.While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Dural was positively identified by eyewitnessesas the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC RenatoManligot. As a consequence of this positive identification, Dural was referred to the CaloocanCity Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court ofCaloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of"Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority" (Criminal Case C-30112; nobail recommended). On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include, asdefendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified.Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Courton behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ ofhabeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen.Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February


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1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988. On 26 February 1988, however,Umil and Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges forviolation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they were accordinglyreleased.

Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant of arrest for the crime of

rebellion.

Held: It clearly appears that Dural was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 CAPCOMsoldiers nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came aday after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.However, Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), anoutlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of RolandoDural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense whenarrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes,and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitutedirect assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. The arrest ofpersons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-

violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course ofan armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them incourt for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in theprosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probablecause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense isbailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting orcapturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any othermilder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thusimpelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and itsgovernment and duly constituted authorities.

Solitario Consti Cases 132-140-1

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