Socratic Reasoning in the "Euthyphro"

Socratic Reasoning in the "Euthyphro"Author(s): Albert AndersonSource: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Mar., 1969), pp. 461-481Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20124875 .

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SOCRATIC REASONING IN THE EUTHYPHRO1

ALBERT ANDERSON

Is Socrates guilty of faulty reasoning in the Euthyphro? In

recent years it has been argued that, contrary to traditional analysis of this early dialogue of Plato, Socratic reasoning there is

fallacious in several important respects.2 However representative of contemporary philosophical assessment of the Euthyphro this

trend might be, it should not go unexamined. Thus, in what

follows I want to challenge certain recent objections to Socrates'

arguments, and, in addition, to vindicate Socratic reasoning, by

attempting to supply interpretations more plausible than those of

his critics. Moreover, both traditional and contemporary efforts

to clarify what is surely the most obscure Socratic argument in

Euthyphro lOa-c fail to do justice to features of significant con

ceptual interest in the context of Socrates' general line of reason

ing. If my suggestions make sense, then the dialogue deserves

a respect which it does not presently enjoy, and accordingly it is

bad judgment to conclude either that the dialogue is philosophically immature or that it is intuitively mistaken.

I

In the dialogue Plato portrays a confrontation between

Euthyphro, a self-appointed expert on matters divine, who is about

to charge his own father with impiety for alleged mistreatment

1 For extremely helpful criticism of this paper I am indebted to two

of my colleagues, Mr. William Mann of the Philosophy Department, and

Mr. Lloyd Gunderson of the Classics Department, St. Olaf College. Refer

ences are to the text of Plato's Euthyphro, edited with notes by John Burnet

(Oxford, 1964). 2

In particular I have in mind Peter Geach, "Plato's Euthyphro: An

Analysis and Commentary," The Monist, Vol. 50, No. 3 (July, 1966), pp. 369

382; John H. Brown, "The Logic of the Euthyphro 10A-11B," The Philo

sophical Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 54 (January, 1964), pp. 1-14; and Robert

G. Hoerber, "Plato's Euthyphro," Phronesis, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1958), pp. 95

107.



462 ALBERT ANDERSON

and eventual death of a slave (himself a murderer), and Socrates,

already charged with impiety, who exploits the coincidence to

elicit from Euthyphro certain complexities of the concept of

piety'.

The first questionable claim one meets with in Geach 3

occurs

with reference to a typical move by Socrates, near the beginning of the dialogue, where Socrates challenges Euthyphro to explain

'piety' not by recourse to examples but by concern for a general definition. Of course, just how much insight Socrates actually expects to get from Euthyphro is a matter of conjecture. Never

theless Socrates probably believes that if Euthyphro really knows

when a particular action is pious, and when it is not, then he must

know in general what is common to all pious actions. Yet, Geach

accuses Socrates of mistaken thinking here, resulting, he states, from accepting two questionable assumptions. The assumptions are

(A) that if you know you are correctly predicating a given term 'T'

you must "know what it is to be T," in the sense of being able to give a general criterion for a thing's being T; (B) that it is no use to try and arrive at the meaning of 'T' by giving examples of things that

are T. (p. 371)

Geach calls this thinking "the Socratic fallacy." Further, Geach

claims that (A) and (B) are related such that (B) follows from

(A), because "if you can already give a general account of what

'T' means, then you need no examples to arrive at the meaning of T'

" (p. 371).

Inasmuch as 'T' seems to be functioning as a variable, I

presume that Geach intends (A) and (B) to be universal claims; that is, that he is claiming that Socrates endorses them without

exception. It should also be noted that by "general criterion" and

"general account" Geach seems to have in mind a formal defini

tion (p. 371). It is simply false that Socrates espouses (B). From this it

follows either that Socrates also does not subscribe to (A), or

that if he does, his doing so is inconsistent. I shall argue that

3 Geach, op. cit., p. 371. Hereafter references to Geach appear in

parentheses.



SOCRATIC REASONING IN THE EUTHYPHRO 463

Socrates does not subscribe to (A), or at least to any universal

application of it. First, it is important to see what is wrong with (B) from the Socratic viewpoint. We might note that there is nothing in the Euthyphro which indicates any attitude on

Socrates' part towards (B)?favorable or unfavorable. Thus it is

quite unfair on the basis of the text to ascribe to Socrates the

assumption in (B). Geach presumably does not intend us to

restrict ourselves to the Euthyphro, however; the ulocus classicus"

is the Socratic dialogues (p. 371). He may have in mind as an

example of (B), Socrates' complaints to Meno at Meno 72a, 74d, and 79a-c. Yet within the same dialogue Socrates does appeal to

examples of people and acts we would want to call 'virtuous' in an effort to improve upon, or reject, some general definition,

namely at Meno 73d and 78c-d.

It should be clear that Socrates invokes (B) at times, but at

other times proceeds in a fashion that denies (B). It does not

follow that he is playing both sides of the street. He does think

it inappropriate to begin a conceptual inquiry by citing examples, but he does not think it inappropriate to guide and regulate the

progress of an inquiry by using examples as touchstones.

Presumably, therefore, Geach is primarily concerned

about (A), and he gives what he regards as two "clear examples" of what is wrong with Socratic reasoning. First, he says, it is a

fallacy to require that the term 'word' be given a rigorous defini

tion before one commits himself to the claim that a proper name is a word in a sentence. Second, Geach offers, it is a fallacy to

challenge the view that machines are not alive for the simple reason that the term 'alive' is so far undefined. Geach asserts:

We know heaps of things without being able to define the terms in

which we express our knowledge. Formal definitions are only one

way of elucidating terms; a set of examples may in a given case be more useful than a formal definition, (p. 371)

It is apparent that with this argument Geach expresses a

prejudice for a position for which, in our time, Wittgenstein 4

is

4 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by

G. E. M. Anscombe (Second edition, New York, 1967); Part I, paragraphs 62, 65-67, 72, and 75, for examples.



464 ALBERT ANDERSON

largely responsible?the view that the appropriateness of a defini

tion is a function of the purpose with which language is used. Un

fortunately Geach must suppose that his own position is self

evidently true, since he does not argue for his claim. To assert

what Geach asserts is to be anti-Platonic, not to be obviously on

the side of logic or right thinking.5 It is true that Socrates insists

upon the priority of questions which beg a certain kind of general answer (as in 6d-e and 11a). He simply makes it clear that he is

more interested in the "one" than he is in the "many" (6c, 14a).

However, given the general features of Platonic philosophy, Soc

rates makes no mistake in holding that "knowing" one's own

action is pious presupposes in some sense "knowing" what it is to

be pious. At worst Socrates is guilty of punning on the use of the

term 'know'. For example, Euthyphro "knows" that only by

prosecuting his father will he rid the family of the possible tinge of pollution. And of course he knows this without having to be

able to formally define his terms. Euthyphro also "knows" that

piety is a kind of moral rectitude, but this latter piece of knowl

edge, Socrates would maintain, is a radically different kind from

the former. In what respects they differ is a long and familiar

story. Only the latter kind would Socrates count as philosophical

knowledge. Socrates is probably aware that when Euthyphro uses the term

'piety', something like the acceptable opinion or current teaching about piety is at stake. Yet, for Socrates the many apparently dis

tinguishable applications of the terms 'pious', 'piety' (and their

opposites) are interesting if and only if the actions to which they refer have some eioos (6e) or o?g?ol (11a) in common (5d). (Of course the most shocking thing one might conjecture about this

Socratic prejudice is that the only justification for ordinary use of

5 See also Brown, op. cit., p. 6. Brown insists that to import recent

philosophical distinctions into the text is not anachronistic, in that "it is

wrong to think we cannot attribute to a person's usage distinctions which

the person does not, and even cannot, formulate explicitly." However, this

view is misleading. Clearly it is not wrong to hypothesize, and thus to

examine philosophically, what we suppose Socrates (or Plato) means, and it

is not wrong to think that we are capable of attributing to him such distinc

tions; but it is wrong to think that it is always proper to attribute to Socrates

something which it is equally plausible he also might not mean.




the term 'pious' is that the various things so predicated do have

something in common?a prescription which implies that any other use of the terms is incorrect. However, it is not clear that

Socrates' quarrel is with ordinary use per se; rather, his is the

problem of getting at a reality which is not self-evidently clear in

ordinary use.) Socrates would urge that when one is seeking philosophical

knowledge, the importance of providing formal definitions comes

to the fore, much more so than in cases of non-philosophical

knowledge. But even in that respect (A) does not reign supreme. The typical Socratic dialogue proceeds along lines that involve an

interplay between (A) and the giving of examples to test a partic ular application of (A). Socrates is mistaken, if Geach is right,

only if he supposes that giving examples is never "more useful

than a formal definition" (p. 371). When Geach suggests that

utility is a sufficient criterion for elucidating a concept, the differ

ence between Geach and Socrates is manifest. If the problem at

hand is how best to elucidate the meaning of a term 'T' for the

purposes in mind, then any exclusivity of Socratic concern may

legitimately be challenged. But when a philosophy not of present

utility but of changeless reality is at stake, as it very likely is in the

present case, then Geach has, it seems, misinterpreted the Socratic

enterprise. At any rate, it is hard to see how Socrates could be

charged with having committed a fallacy.

II

A second questionable part of Geach's analysis of the

Euthyphro is his claim that Socrates' argument with Euthyphro

(who comes to hold that piety is whatever the gods love) is at

best an ad hominem (p. 373). Precisely what Geach has in mind

by "ad hominem' is not clear, and clarity makes a difference (per

haps the kind of difference which Socrates himself worries about

when he insists that knowing whether x is an instance of y pre

supposes knowing what is meant by y).

Perhaps Geach is suggesting that Socrates' argument is

fallaciously designed to show that Euthyphro's recourse to support from the gods (for legal action against his father) is simply too



466 ALBERT ANDERSON

embarrassing for a man like Euthyphro (already some kind of

laughing-stock) to admit. In that case Socrates is intentionally

sophistic. The embarrassment?presumably the significant fea

ture of the ad hominem?comes, we may say, from admitting that

the gods quarrel about moral matters, and therefore they are likely to differ about the action of Euthyphro against his father (since this is surely a moral matter).

Or, perhaps it is more charitable to suppose that Geach's claim

is the following: Socrates' argument is thought by Socrates to

refute Euthyphro's definition, but fails to do any more than to

embarrass Euthyphro; and that is odious but not terribly damag

ing, as Socrates himself would have to admit. In that case Soc

rates' sophistry is not intentional; his reasoning is simply bad.

Rather, as Geach's subsequent discussion suggests, Socrates may have intended to argue that factual questions about weight and

length are decidable, while moral questions about piety are un

decidable, and further, that this is crucial in his argument against

Euthyphro (p. 373). If that is Socrates' intention, Geach states, his argument fails because such claims are not categorically true

(pp. 373-374). Is Socrates a nasty but not very clever sophist, or is he simply

a poor philosopher? It is not clear what Geach infers by his

charge of ad hominem.

Fortunately, one can make a more plausible case for the fact

that Socrates' intention is not to argue seriously, however

fallaciously, for the categorical distinction between factual and

moral questions.6

The concern which Socrates has about the settlement of dis

putes is occasioned by Euthyphro's insistence (originally supposed

by him to indicate how concerned the gods are about matters of

justice) that war, bitter hatreds, and battles rage between the

gods (6c, 7c). One naturally raises the question: What kind of

disagreement could cause such bitterness? Socrates leads

Euthyphro to agree that surely we know how to put an end to

disputes about the correctness of arithmetical sums, about how

6 Of course it is possible that Socrates merely toys with Euthyphro: if

the gods quarrel as seriously as Euthyphro insists, then the matter must be

one of great cosmic significance, not simply one of counting correctly!




much something weighs, or about which of two things is larger than the other. We simply count, weigh,

or measure, as the case

may be. However, if we differ and can reach no agreement about

whether something is just or unjust, honorable or dishonorable,

good or bad, we frequently do become emotionally exercised (7d). Socrates' "if" implies, of course, that we might not differ, that we

might reach satisfactory agreement about matters of justice, honor, or goodness. Judging from this state of affairs among men, it is

probable that if the gods quarrel, they quarrel about moral matters; and if they cannot agree about moral matters, it is possible that

a certain action x (such as Euthypro's) is judged to be just by some

gods, and unjust by other gods?assuming that the gods concern

themselves with moral matters, as Euthyphro insists that they do (8a).

Moreover, Socrates suggests that there is a close analogy be

tween the way gods must decide on justice and injustice, and the

way men must decide (8d, 9c). Once both gods and men are

clear about what is injustice, for example, they certainly do not

disagree with the principle that injustice must be punished (8c). What either gods or men might question is whether or not an

action x, which is alleged to be unjust, really is so (9c). And, Socrates might have continued, the problem of deciding whether or not something x really is what we claim it to be is exactly similar to Euthyphro's present problem of deciding whether or

not his action against his father is pious.

However, Socrates is willing to concede, let us suppose that

the gods do agree in acclaiming Euthyphro's action to be pious

(9d). What possible value can such a pronouncement have for

the answer to the question about piety in general? That is, what

is it about Euthyphro's (pious) action which makes it so? It is

clear that the gods' pronouncement is no help. Whether the gods

agree or disagree, there is no significant advance on the substantive

question about piety, until an acceptable definition is available

to them. Hence, the distinction which Geach attributes to Soc

rates, that in principle factual disputes are decidable, and moral

disputes are not, is not a significant matter for the Socratic line

of reasoning. What is significant is that if gods or men disagree, it is very likely because they have no common understanding of

the concept?perhaps, we might suggest, they have nothing like



468 ALBERT ANDERSON

the "standards" in virtue of which matters of arithmetic and

weight are determined.7

Finally, to argue for the distinction, as Geach does, poses the

possibility that Socrates privately believes that in principle there is

no final answer, of a sort to which all rational men could assent, to the substantive question about piety which Socrates raises.

And in that case Socrates is either an outright deceiver, or he is

unintentionally self-contradictory! Either he deceives Euthyphro into believing that together they could eventually agree about

something which the gods themselves cannot do; or Socrates

fails to see that the present moral question is undecidable. Either

way, it is not a case of simple ad hominem.

As an alternative let us suppose that, by pointing out that the

gods quarrel, Socrates can show that what the gods love varies

among them; and that if the gods quarrel about anything, then

the object of the gods' love is not some one thing; what is piety

(according to Euthyphro's definition) to one god may be impiety to another, in the absence of any standard which gods have in

common. Therefore, if Euthyphro wants to define 'piety' by reference to what the gods love (and 'impiety' by reference to

what they do not love) he runs the risk of contradicting himself

with the claim that the gods themselves would approve his action.

As a reductio ad absurdum (and not an ad hominem) the argu ment works only if the gods quarrel about piety. Neither Soc

rates nor Euthyphro insists upon that particular quarrel. But

surely, if the gods cannot agree about piety, then it follows that

they cannot agree that Euthyphro's proposal is pious?and

Euthyphro is forced to recognize that implication. Geach's case against Socrates depends on his claim that Soc

rates fails to distinguish categorically between factual and moral

disputes. There is nothing in the Euthyphro which indicates that

Socrates tries to make such a distinction, or that he thought that

one kind was essentially undecidable. Nor is it necessary that

Socrates sustain such a distinction in his argument against

Euthyphro. If everything turns on the assumption that the gods

quarrel, then that they resolve some disputes but not others (as

7 The later Plato did not think that the establishment of standards for

questions of value was impossible; see, e.g., the activity in Philebus 66a-67b.




men do) is beside the point. The force of Socrates' argument is

ad absurdum, not ad hominem in any simple sense, except in the

sense that embarrassment frequently attends self-contradiction.

Socrates' argument that opposition implies difference of opinion

(or disposition) is sufficient only if the gods are not presently of

one mind about what is pious; otherwise the argument is in

sufficient. The nature of the quarrel is at stake only in the admis

sion that, like men, gods quarrel about religion. The fact that

they quarrel sometimes, if not always, is sufficient to make it prob able that they may not be agreed that Euthyphro's action is pious

?and the simple intrusion of uncertainty appears to be enough to show Euthyphro the inadequacy of his definition. Just how

philosophically inadequate the definition is, however, Euthyphro does not so far appreciate.

Ill

If Euthyphro's definition is not sound, then, the question becomes: just what is good definition like? On the basis of what

has transpired, the strongest argument which Socrates now could

offer would be one which supported his concern for an ideal defini

tion of piety?an argument in advance of which both parties were

prepared to grant that in matters of morality the gods are always in agreement. Indeed, Socrates does provide this argument, and

it is an argument which does not depend on the categorical distinc

tion between factual and moral questions which Geach suggests. Socrates' argument, at the heart of the dialogue, is admittedly

most obscure to the English reader; and Geach's analysis of it does

little to dispel the obscurity, while other recent critics simply reject it. Geach cites this important argument of Socrates when he notes

that lOa-b "purports to refute the thesis that pious is the same as

loved by the gods, regardless of whether 'the gods' means 'all the

gods' or 'some gods' "

(p. 376). Socrates presents the classic claim that a thing is pious not

because the gods love it, but rather, perhaps, for its own sake, on

its own terms, whether the gods love it or not. However, it is

assumed by Socrates and Euthyphro alike that the gods without

exception love what they suppose to be pious, but it does not fol



470 ALBERT ANDERSON

low that whatever they love is pious. Precisely why it does not

follow is what Euthyphro does not understand.

To explain this to Euthyphro Socrates attempts a bit of teach

ing the point of which is notoriously arguable for most com

mentators. The teaching amounts to a series of examples?all

presumably bearing on the same conceptual clarification?each of

whose distinctions embody grammatical differences which are

difficult to render in non-misleading English. It would not be

out of line with Socrates ' normal dialectical procedure to construe

this Socratic lesson as an attempt to move Euthyphro in successive

ly clearer steps from the conventionally familiar to the conceptually real.

For example, the first step comes in 10a where Socrates states

that we speak of being carried ( oepojxevov, a passive participle) and

carrying (<pspov, an active participle), being led (?y?fjtevov, pass,

part.) and leading (?yov, act. part.), being seen (opwjjievov, pass,

part.) and seeing (opwv, act. part.), and being loved (cpdo?u.evov,

pass, part.) and loving (cpdouv, act. part.). Moreover, he asserts,

each member of each pair means a different thing (10a). But

just when it appears that Socrates wants to make something of the

difference between an "active" and a "passive," a second step is

discernible. In 10b he reintroduces the examples, this time using

only "passive" pairs (e.g., cpep?pevov, ?pspeTai, the passive participle and the singular inflected passive forms, respectively, of the verb

<pspw). In these cases apparently it would be improper to assert the

singular inflected member of a pair "because" ( fat) of the participle member (e.g., cpdet/cai oti cpt^o?pisvov) ; but it would be proper to

reverse the members around the "because" (e.g.,- <p?Aou}xevov on

<ptXetTai). Then, a third step is taken in 10c when Socrates clarifies

the "meaning" of the preceding, by asserting the proper reversal

in step two with respect to the way we speak of something coming into being because it comes into being (yiyvofxevov oti yiyvexat.,

middle forms of an intransitive verb), or to the way we speak of

something being affected because it is affected (iztoyov 6ti rc?oryei, active forms whose meaning is rendered in the passive)?verb

pairs whose grammar is even more peculiar than that of the initial

pairs. The question is whether these changes in grammatical nuance provide any basis from which to infer the conceptual point of Socrates' lesson to Euthyphro.




For example, we might take Socrates seriously when he offers

the verb pairs in 10c as a clarification of lOa-b. Suppose the pairs are meant to illustrate, however dimly or intuitively, the idea of

something existing "in its own right," "on its own terms," "for its own sake." Ultimately we want to know why it will not do for

Euthyphro to say that whatever the gods love is pious. For the

sake of the argument Socrates has assumed both that the gods love

whatever they suppose to be pious, and that Euthyphro's action

against his father is a matter of piety. If the gods loved what they

really knew to be pious, they Avould love Euthyphro's action

for its piety, that is, for the action's ouata. The Tightness of

cpiXo?^evov or? ?Outrai lies in the notion that the ousia of the action,

'piety', is being loved (<piAo?u.evov) by the gods because it is loved

(oTt, cpi^strat), that is, for what it is, and not because of any other

part of the action. Relative to the o?s?a everything else is mere

7??Go;? and the being of something in its own right ( yiyvou.evov oti

y?yvsTat), like the o?a?a of 'piety', enjoys a kind of conceptual

independence from whatever thing (also in its own right) affects it (?r?ffyov bzi Tt?ayei). Thus, we suggest, Euthyphro's claim

evidences no appreciation for the idea of something which the

gods might love for its own sake. As we shall see, even if this

interpretation is plausible, so far it does not clarify the "con

ceptual independence" of the oJaia of 'piety'.8 At any rate, Socrates in the latter lines of 10c, appears to focus

attention on the wrongness of saying cpt^eirai, ?ti cp?oopevov and

8 Cf. Burnet, op. cit., pp. 47-48: "Socrates begins by distinguishing

what we call the active and the passive voice. That distinction is quite familiar to us, and the whole argument might be much abbreviated and

simplified by taking it for granted. We must remember, however, that

grammatical terminology did not exist in the time of Socrates, or even in

that of Plato. ... If we forget that, we may imagine that the argument is more intricate than it really is." If Burnet is right about the absence of

grammar, then, contrary to his later encouragement to construe Socrates'

clarification as a causal argument, it follows that we have no warrant for

attributing to Socrates some special nuance of meaning which we have since

learned to associate with something's being, say, "passive." Nevertheless

Brown, op. cit., also insists (footnote, p. 7) that Socrates' explanation logi cally implies causation, but he complains that Burnet and others have failed to elucidate the philosophical meanings of the grammatical forms. However, it is doubtful that anything philosophical can be inferred safely from the

grammatical forms.



472 ALBERT ANDERSON

the Tightness of saying ?p?Xo?pievov ou

'ftXetrou. Inadequately para

phrased it reads: we may say not that a thing is loved by those

who love it because it is (in a state of) being loved; but rather, that it is (in a state of) being loved because they love it.

In his recent dramatic paraphrase of the early Plato,9 I.A. Richards decided to delete the entire series of examples which

Socrates uses to provide the explanation. This decision is typical of the exasperation which readers of the passage experience. Most commentators are likely to hold one of three broad views

about this Socratic lesson: (a) it has no bearing on Socrates'

major argument (e.g., it is a Platonic literary device); (b) it

reveals an early and rudimentary doctrine of causality (which view, if it is not warranted by the language, is at least an explanation) ;

and (c), sometimes together with (b), it constitutes a broken link

in Socrates' chain of reasoning (which is a view that G:-ach,

Brown, and Hoerber share). Since, as I have suggested, there

are plausible roles for the lesson to play in Socrates' argument, in

which case (a) is implausible, I want to comment on views (b) and (c) first.

A fairly promising way to make (b) plausible is to construe

the passive ?ptXetTai as an "active" form which seems to imply the

initiation of a process we call 'love'. Then, by allowing the other

passive, <puo??jievov, to refer to the process already initiated, we

could argue (in Socrates' behalf) that, upon analysis of the con

cepts, neither the initiation nor the process necessarily results in

anything other than itself?and that is the causal reason why whatever is loved by the gods is, by its very nature, in a merely

contingent relationship with piety.10 However, this construction

entails two questionable moves: Socrates would be interpreted as

subtlely begging the question against Euthyphro, by presupposing the view that the nature of love is a stuff peculiar to itself, incapable of bringing about any distinguishably different stuff (such as piety) ;

and this interpretation plays fast and loose with the actual gram

9 I. A. Richards, Why so Socrates? (Cambridge, 1964), p. 15ff.

10 Burnet, op. cit., p. 48; Paul Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago,

1958), pp. 76-77; and A. E. Taylor, Plato, The Man and His Work (New

York, 1956), pp. 151-152, subscribe to various forms of the causal inter

pretation.




matical disparities (while depending on part of the grammar to

provide the causal insight) between this passive-passive opposi tion (which need not imply causation, providing Socrates had

some other intention), the clearly active-passive forms in 10a

(which do suggest causation), and the middle and active pairs

(the former intransitive, the latter "passive") in 10c.

Indeed, by way of introducing view (c), Socrates' perplex

ing move from the "agent-patient" relationship in 10a to the

"patient-patient" relationship in lOb-c (?) strikes one scholar,

Hoerber, as a patently illogical move.11 According to Hoerber, the move is designed by Plato to set up a "straw man" which Soc

rates may proceed to knock down with ease. By failing to notice

the disparity, Euthyphro foolishly assumes that the agent-patient

relationship applies throughout the clarification which Socrates

supplies; and on that assumption Socrates deviously misleads him

to the conclusion that at best what is loved by the gods is a 7ca9o?

(affectation, 11a; from the verb ir?o-yu as in 10c) of piety, not its

o&rta?and that is the (fallacious) reason that 'piety' is not what is

'loved by the gods', contrary to Euthyphro's definition.

Brown 12

contends that while Hoerber is right about the

fallaciousness of Socrates' argument, he is wrong about the loca

tion of Socrates' mistake. Brown insists that the ?-nayoy-rj (Soc rates' explanation) exploits a series of examples in each of which

pair the participial constructions "logically imply causation."

Moreover, he argues, while Socrates' general argument may be

made formally valid, nevertheless it is fallaciously equivocal in ways that are not convincingly corrigible. On the other hand, by

assuming the causal interpretation, Brown argues, and by

construing the oti-connection between 'piety' and 'loved by the

gods' to be such that (1) one term is a logically sufficient condition

of the other, and (2) one term is logically prior (like genus to

species) to the other, the resulting "univocal definitional inter

pretation" would be consistent with the body of the argument but

not with the concluding summation, namely, where "Socrates

characterizes the basic fault of Euthyphro's definition as being that it does not give the essence of holiness but only something that

11 Hoerber, op. cit., p. 102f.

13 Brown, op. cit., footnote, p. 7.



474 ALBERT ANDERSON

happens to it." 13

Brown's argument is complex, but briefly he

holds that since you cannot both give a causal interpretation to

Socrates' argument (and in some sense you must) and construe

the or? -connection uni vocally, and since the causal interpretation leaves the argument in a very confused state, there is no com

pelling reason for Euthyphro to give in to Socrates.

In general Brown's reliance upon the causal interpretation makes it difficult for him to entertain a more satisfactory solution

?a solution which, as I hope to indicate, he fails to understand

from his own conclusions:

On the univocal definitional interpretation a more appropriate conclu

sion would have been that the definition does not give the essence of

holiness but rather something of which holiness is the essence. For

the upshot of the argument on that interpretation is precisely that being loved by the gods, instead of being the essence of holiness, is something

of which holiness is a sufficient and prior condition, i.e., the essence

or part of the essence. That is, Euthyphro's definition implies an

explanatory relation which runs in the opposite direction from the

actual relation.14

Perhaps in his effort to give a contemporary philosophical for

malization of the argument Brown misses the intuitive simplicity with which Socrates approaches the problem of good definition.

Moreover, Brown makes of one of Socrates' pair-examples ("carry

ing") a virtual paradigm case for imputing a causal point of that

sort to all of the pairs. In that respect he overlooks the philosophi cal differences between the pair-examples (e.g., the differences be

tween carrying and seeing and loving). Not only may cause-talk

not be the conceptual point of Socrates' ercayoyr,; one must also

note the curious naivete with which Socrates allows the disparity in kinds of relation to obtain in the examples. It may be quite consistent with Socrates' conceptual point to disregard both the

disparity of kinds and their reduction to a causal kind, and to fix

instead on what Euthyphro could learn about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of preferring one relation of the terms in a

pair-example to the other. Thus, something similar to Brown's

"univocal definitional interpretation" may be at stake in what

13 Ibid., p. 11, italics mine.

14 Ibid.




Socrates does, so long as one does not (and one need not) attribute

to him a fundamental commitment to a particular theory of, say, causation. On the other hand, Brown seems to be reluctant to

entertain the question, central to the Platonic corpus, of the rela

tion between Socratic definition and its metaphysical import. The

intriguing likelihood persists that, despite the absence of a precise statement of the relation, this early Socratic (Platonic) effort does

prefigure, for example, Socrates' explanation to Cebes in Phaedo

lOOd in which all beautiful things are said to be beautiful simply "because of" The Beautiful, and in which Socrates denies any of

the familiar causal explanations for it. However dimly he ex

presses his awareness of the way things really are, Socrates

believes that the ideal definition, once it is achieved, does have

metaphysical import. Geach's complaint against Socrates is quite simple to state.

He insists that we do not know what Plato had in mind with

the ?7iayoyr?, and that even if we did, the parity of reasoning among Socrates' examples would not hold (p. 378). Geach has difficulty

discerning any possible difference in meaning between cpdstToa and

?piXoujxevov, but he represents the former as "4> pass." and the latter

as "<&ed" so that the difference between ?piXeiTai cm cptXo?fjievov (which Socrates rejects) and <piXo?u.?vov ?ti ?piXe?rat (which Socrates urges) becomes

(7) A thing is <?> pass, because it is <l>ed,

the formulation which Socrates dismisses, and

(8) A thing is <I>ed because it $ pass.,

the formulation which is acceptable (p. 378). In what follows I

want to suggest some likely answers to problems raised by Soc

rates' effort.

IV

Let us suppose that in spite of the grammatical disparities of

his examples Socrates knew what he was doing, but that what he

was doing does not rest on a lesson in how the grammar implies the agent-patient (or patient-patient) relationship. This supposi

tion, however, does not preclude the possibility that, like the early

Wittgenstein, Socrates distinguishes what can be said from what



476 ALBERT ANDERSON

cannot be said. But if the conceptual point at stake is not a causal

one, then Hoerber and Brown are wrong in assuming so, and an

equally plausible interpretation of a different kind is sufficient to

clear Socrates of the appropriate charges. Similarly, if Socrates

does provide an intelligible explanation for the "conceptual inde

pendence" of 'piety' (as I suggested earlier), then Geach's com

plaints lack substance.

In general the problem is to show how Socrates ' entire line of

reasoning demands an ideal definition of 'piety', as opposed to

the definition by examples which Euthyphro offers. In particular what we want to know is: what is it about the distinction between

the pairs, ?piXetrai oti

<piXo?|jievov and cpiXo?pievov ?ts. cpiXeiTai, which con

ceptually refutes the thesis that 'pious' is the same as 'loved by the

gods'? The solution turns on a two-fold distinction which is

reasonably apparent in the text of the dialogue: first, between a

"thing" and its "sort"; and second, between a "part" and the

"whole." And this solution is quite in keeping with the Socratic

line of reasoning. The solution presupposes an awareness of the following

points :

(1) The explanation as a whole is designed to provide

successively clearer indications of a conceptual structure whose

understanding is sufficient to show Euthyphro both what is wrong with his definition and what good definition requires. Beginning with a distinction readily recognizable to Euthyphro as a part of

good ordinary usage (what we manage to distinguish with the

active and passive voices), Socrates then suggests a difference

between what it would be odd or confusing to say and what it

would be better to say, were one ever to say it, in the light of

philosophical knowledge. Philosophical knowledge, for example about things which exist in their own right, requires a conceptual structure which only a peculiar redesigning of ordinary language can foreshadow.

(2) The penultimate clarification which Socrates provides is

one which purports to show that 'piety' and 'loved by the gods' are

concepts which are "opposite and wholly different from one an

other," namely, "to u.ev y?p

oil cpiXelrai,

?arlv olov <fiXs?<y8a{..

to o'oti

?ctIv o?ov cpiXetcOat oi? touto ^ptXe?Tat "

(lla4-6). In virtue of the

relative pronoun, olov, we have little alternative but to translate




these lines: "For the one is of a sort to be loved because it is loved, while the other is loved because it is of a sort to be loved."

(3) The final part of the explanation is at 11a where Socrates

argues that Euthyphro's definition has failed to reveal the ou<na of

piety; rather, Socrates insists, he has come forward with a mere

Ti?Ooc of piety, namely that the gods love it. But Socrates is not

interested in a mere uaQo? of piety, "or whatever it is that happens to it" ( sits ?TioYi rcaiyei, llb3). Indeed, this almost derisive

idiomatic expression suggests, piety may be related to a number of

things. The important thing is to define 'piety' in a way which

distinguishes it from 'impiety' (lib).

(4) Notice that Socrates' most explicit choice of conceptual structure in the Euthyphro is that of the part-whole distinction; for example, reverence is a part of fear, and piety is a part of

justice. Yet, precisely what part of the whole something is, is the

most important ingredient in the ideal definition (12c). To return to Socrates' explanation at lOd, let the (pt-Xeira',

?tl cpiXo?jjievov (the reading which Socrates rejects) be read

(x) It is something loved because it is being loved,

and let it be interpreted to mean: because a thing is loved, it is the

sort of thing that is loved. Socrates rejects this because it entails

a confusion of a thing with its sort. There is no account of spe cific difference in this formulation of the bti-relationship between

some thing that is loved and the sort of thing that loving is. By

insisting simply that piety is whatever the gods love, Euthyphro has failed to entertain, for example, the possibility that 'piety' and

'loved by the gods' are not co-extensive domains. Initially (5d) he suggested that he did understand that his own proposed action

against his father was an example of what is pious, which in turn

was defined by what the gods loved. Socrates' intention is to

show that Euthyphro's example is, at best, not an example of

identity of classes but of classes whose conceptual relation is that

of sort to thing. Euthyphro must realize that 'loved by the gods' is likely to be more extensive than 'piety', and that if there is to be

any conceptual connection between them, it must be a sort-to

thing connection. It is, furthermore, a connection which must be

made explicit, as for example in the grammar of 'love'. Gram

matically, we may say, it is odd to say (x) because the 6-zi-relation



478 ALBERT ANDERSON

is unintelligible, or at least inexplicit; and the impropriety is

reflected in this extraordinary use of language- Philosophically,

however, the proper relation is fundamental to good definition.

That is, Socrates might ask: "What is it about the thing (e.g.,

Euthyphro's proposed action) that makes it the sort (e.g., piety) ?"

To point to the thing simpliciter does not significantly answer the

question, "What is piety?" From Euthyphro's action (which may

very well be loved by the gods) whole and unspecified, one cannot

learn to define 'piety'. The argument to a sort from the thing by

simple identity, or in a way which fails to make conceptual note

not only of difference between related entities but also of implica tions of the relation, is a wrong step in the direction of good defini

tion. It is not only that 'piety' is not the same as 'loved by the

gods'; it is, moreover, that no ascription of identity would eluci

date piety unless one already knew what it was for something to

be loved by the gods.

Thus, on the interpretation of (x) above (the thing that is of a

sort to be loved because it is loved), Euthyphro, when he under

stands the thing-sort distinction, understands that simply because

piety, to apply the distinction in point (4) above, is a part of (the

genus) 'loved by the gods', it does not follow that piety is

identical with what is loved (since there are, presumably, other

parts as well, e.g., justice). According to Socrates, the con

ceptual confusion in (x) must not be present in a definition of

'piety'.

On the other hand, let the ?pOvoujAsvov ?tl ?iXeiToa (which Socrates

urges Euthyphro to accept) be read

(y) It is something being loved because it is loved,

and let it be interpreted to mean: a thing is (properly) a loved

thing when it belongs to the sort of things which are loved.

Socrates encourages this formulation because it evidences a proper, if purely conceptual relationship between a thing and its sort: it

is the nature of a sort, we may say, to have a thing. On this

interpretation (the thing that is loved because it is of a sort to be

loved) Euthyphro, if he understands the thing-sort distinction, can agree to its rather obvious truth. The cm-connection intro

duces no simple sense of "cause," and only oddly supplies a "rea

son" in terms of a simple explanatory structure. If one knows




how to classify a thing according to its sort, one has made the

first proper move to focus attention upon what it is about the

thing which makes it a determinate example of the sort, namely its o'Jcna. Moreover, by applying the part-whole distinction Soc rates could show that 'piety' is loved because it is a part of what

is 'loved by the gods', and that is a relationship already agreed

upon by both Socrates and Euthyphro in the assumption that the

gods certainly love (among other things they may love) whatever

they suppose to be pious (8c). However, not unlike the fact that

both gods and men have difficulty distinguishing justice from

injustice, here the unexpressed implication is that if what the gods suppose to be pious is not the o?vU of piety, then they do not know

what piety really is any more than men do.

Thus, Socrates' lesson to Euthyphro is a lesson in good defi

nition, and to say that piety is whatever the gods love is to fail to

make the thing-sort and part-whole distinctions clear. If these are

elementary distinctions, nevertheless they are fundamental, and

to fail to make them is to fail to get at the ouaia of 'piety', that is, its proper conceptual place in relation to things proximate to, but

wholly different from it. At best Euthyphro's definition begins to point in the opposite direction, toward the ousia of 'loved by the

gods', or some concept whose independent analysis is presently irrelevant. Nevertheless, the thing-sort and part-whole distinc

tions insure that the otaia which is sought will enjoy a conceptual

independence which, at the very least, precludes any simple identification of it with any other thing (n?Oos) to which it may be related. Perhaps one may say, further, that for purposes of philo sophical knowledge the ou<na also enjoys a peculiar existence, and so must be conceived as "the gods love piety," namely for its own

sake, on its own terms. More than that it is simply unsafe to say. So far as the more general question about the consistency of

the Socratic line of reasoning is concerned, one may infer from

Euthyphro's failure that in no case has his definition established

any clear metaphysical link between 'piety' and 'loved by the

gods'. If we couple this inference with the assumptions, namely (i) that the gods love something, and (ii) that whatever the gods suppose to be pious they also love; then Euthyphro's line of

reasoning does not work, while Socrates' line at least holds out



480 ALBERT ANDERSON

promise of working. Euthyphro's line would require the form,

(a) (Anything god-loved is pious) (b) This action against my father is god-loved

(c) Thus, this action against my father is pious

Socrates has shown that this argument does not work because the

premisses are both unacceptable, (a), which is implicit in, but

necessary to Euthyphro's line of reasoning, is false in case the

gods quarrel; but even if they agree on what is pious, in the

absence of the thing-sort and part-whole distinctions there is no

way of Euthyphro's knowing why, and therefore of knowing whether (b), an alleged instance of (a), is true. Neither (a) nor

(b) can be assumed to be true, and if you cannot assume the truth

of (a), the argument cannot get started. On the other hand, Socrates' own line of reasoning takes the form,

(d) (Anything pious is god-loved) (e) A certain action z is pious

(f) Thus, a certain action z is god-loved

Although (d) does not qualify as Socrates' finished definition

(because the appropriate thing-sort and part-whole relations are

incomplete), the line of reasoning succeeds because (d), on the

basis of the (y)-interpretation and of facts (i) and (ii) above, is

accepted without question by both Socrates and Euthyphro. If

Euthyphro's action is pious (a fact not established because (d) is

unfinished), then it is loved by the gods. The prospect of arguing in behalf of a defining o')<tLol makes it possible for Socrates to assess

Euthyphro's action for the first time. Euthyphro has not achieved

Socratic knowledge; and if Socrates' line of reasoning is correct, it is nevertheless far from answering the question, "What is

piety?" As every student of the early dialogues of Plato knows, Socrates is presented as one who is as much preoccupied with

fundamental procedure as he is with answers to substantive ques tions. Indeed, the important point about his explanation to

Euthyphro is that Socrates' linguistic program may sensibly be

construed as a consistent conceptual support for his general line of

reasoning, and short of any doctrine of causality. Thus, we need not accuse Socrates of faulty reasoning in the




Euthyphro, as Geach, Brown, and Hoerber do in various respects. Nor need we resign ourselves to the sometimes condescending

interpretations of commentators who either excuse or rebuke the

Socrates of the Euthyphro for his philosophical naivete. The

likelihood is that the simplest, most plausible reading of the

early Plato is most appropriate, and it is frequently quite en

lightening, if not always most pleasing to contemporary philo

sophical tastes. In any case I have argued that Socratic reasoning in the Euthyphro, even if seminal, deserves a hearing comparable to the attention we give to the Plato of later and more "mature"

dialogues. Concordia College.



Socratic Reasoning in the "Euthyphro"

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