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8/6/2019 Sociology End End

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Candidate Number: STWD7

BENVGPLB: Urban Sociology essay

A critical appraisal of urban mega-

events and prestige projects, focussed on

Londons Millennium Dome

(Source: authors photograph)

This quote illustrates the criticisms frequently addressed to urban mega-projects and mega-

events as tools for urban development: Global over-investment in prestige projects and

events provides a highly inefficient subsidy to the private sector and () results in the

neglects of the basic social infrastructure on which the long-term future of cities depends.

Any benefits which are created are distributed unevenly, increasing social inequalities and

inhibiting social justice (Loftman et al, 1994: 3)1. Critically discuss.


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Introduction:

Built on site of a formerly contaminated and derelict gasworks at the Greenwich peninsula in

Greater London, the Dome was the centrepiece of Britains Millennium celebrations, housing

a year-long exhibition which closed on Dec 31 2000. Afterwards, it lay vacant for over six

years, a symbol of profligacy and mismanagement by the former New Labour government.

Belatedly, a legacy plan was forged through a profit-sharing deal with US sports conglomerate

Anschutz Entertainment Group. In 2005 the Dome was rebranded the O2 Arena in a 6 million

annual sponsorship deal with the mobile phone company 02. It is now the busiest music

venue in the world.

This essay calls for discussion along three lines: whether the Dome was an inefficient subsidy

to the private sector; whether it detracted from the social infrastructure needs of London; and

whether the benefits it created were distributed unevenly, increasing social inequality.

The essay will analyse each of these elements as regards the Dome, as well as more broadlyby looking at the literature of other mega-events and mega-projects. In doing so, it will seek

to answer two questions. First, is Loftman correct that large-scale schemes are generally

delusional fripperies of political ego that favour powerful private sector interests over needy

communities and waste public money? Or is it just that by their mega nature they are

merely a reflection writ big - of the delays and problems faced by the common householder

when embarking on home improvements? And is it inevitable that large-scale undertakings

suffer under massive public scrutiny with inflexible deadlines (in the case of events)?

Secondly, is there a problem with such schemes given so many suffer from cost-over-runs

and delays (for projects), which means authorities should tame their enthusiasm for themega? Or is there a problem with the way they are being judged?

Mega-event or Mega-project?

The Dome could be considered both a prestige project and a mega-event given that it

involved the construction of an iconic building designed by internationally acclaimed

architect Richard Rogers and a year-long event. According to Rogers, the building itself was

remarkably inexpensive costing 43 millioni. Given that the Dome cost 628 million of public

moneyii- not including the 200 million clear-up costs of the site (McGuigan 2003: pg674) - the bulk

of the expenditure was for the buildings contents and staging the exhibition (afterwards the interiorwas completely refurbished). The relatively modest construction costs put the Dome in a different

class from the multibillion dollar infrastructure projects with complex engineering requirements

described by Flyvbjerg (2003 :pg1). ). The inflexible timescale also situates the Dome more in

the mega-events category, which Roche (2000: pg1) describes as large-scale cultural

(including commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and

international significance. However, like the Olympics, what is left after the event is the structure,

and efforts to find a legacy for that could certainly be considered a prestige project.


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Inefficient subsidy?

The government gave the Dome away for free (Daily Mail 2005) in a deal with U.S. company

Anschutz Entertainment Group that required it to invest 500 million in transforming the space into a

23,000 seat arena, and gave the government a 15 percent cut of the profits for 25 years. The

Independent reported that AEGs UK arm made a net profit of 12 million in 2010. If it made similarprofits each year, the government could hope to gain around 45 million over 25 years hardly a good

rate of return.

Has the government therefore subsidised an American company? Even if you limit the governments

participation to the cost of cleaning up the site and the building 243 million or one third of the total

cost it could be argued that the state deserved at least double the 15 percent profit share. However it

is unlikely that a private partner would have been willing to shoulder the clean-up costs of the site, a

contaminated piece of land that had lain vacant for over 20 years. To develop brownfield sites,

authorities often subsidize the clean-up costs.

Still, the deal with AEG came after several botched attempts to sell the Dome, and it could be arguedthat embarrassed ministers were so eager to distance themselves from the disastrous story that they cut

a bad deal. Certainly, the six years it was left idle werent in anyones interest and could have

been avoided if the government had planned for the future. The minister initially in charge of

the Dome, Peter Mandelson, admitted to a House of Commons committee he had not

considered the legacy (McGuigan 2000: pg696).

However, the AEG partnership was not the worst decision the government made. If Rogers estimate

of the building costs is accurate, the bulk of the 628 million will have paid for the Millennium

Experience exhibition. The space was divided into 14 thematic zones, most of which were sponsored

by private partners. McGuigan is highly critical of the sponsorship deals, noting that the total of 150million was less than one fifth the amount of public money spent. Yet the sponsors were allowed to

have the loudest say in how the zones were set up, which resulted in them constructing culture in

the interests of corporate business. (2003: pg679-686). In other words, McGuigan is saying that the

government massively subsidised an exercise in corporate marketing.

Governments have been staging mega-events since at least the Great Exhibition at Crystal Palace in

1851, designed to show off to the world Britains industrial prowess. Andranovich et al. (2001) say

they are back in vogue because cash-strapped local authorities compete to ear-mark revenue streams

that would otherwise be spent elsewhere, and as a city-marketing tool amid increased global

competition. Whilst admitting that such strategies are high-risk (pg113), the authors show mega-events such as the Olympics can even be profitable as the 1984 Los Angeles games proved: the $225

million profits from television revenues etc. show if well-managed, mega-events can be an

opportunity for local authorities to make money from the private sector.

Neglect of social infrastructure?

Besides a year-long event which people had to pay up to 20 to see what did the public get for

their money spent on the Dome? There is now a landmark building where a derelict site once stood.

The success of the O2 is helping regenerate one of the most deprived areas of England, and shows

local residents that the government cares about their neighbourhood enough to invest in it (with the

caveat that they are allowed to stay not always the case with gentrification).


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Could the money have been better spent on housing, schools and hospitals? Certainly the Domes

many critics (Gray, Thornley etc.) point to serious managerial and financial concerns. But

incompetence also occurs in education and health as it does in the private sector. Moving away from

the mismanagement issues, the questions boils down to one of personal preference: how should public

money be spent? Some people will believe it should be spent on practical things such as schools and

hospitals, while others will point to the great monuments built by our ancestors, such as St PaulsCathedral, and say a nation also needs to celebrate.

In Birmingham, Oatley (1998: pg55) points out that while the city spent 380 million over six years

creating mega sporting and cultural centres such as the National Indoor Arena and the ICC, it spent

123 million less on housing than the average of local authorities nationally. Its capital budget for

education fell by 60 percent over the period, and social programs suffered. Over those six years, it

would therefore be reasonable to assert that Birmingham neglected social infrastructure in favour of

prestige projects. But spending such large sums of money will inevitably involve choices in the short-

term. If the period were to be extended it might be found that by regenerating its economy, providing

jobs and tax revenue, the local council was providing for the long-term social infrastructure of thecity.

Social Justice?

Culture, as Evans (2005) and others point out, has come to be considered a means as well as a

justification for regeneration, even if evidence is shaky (pg960). According to a House of Common

research paper, the governments main concerns with the Dome were less about regeneration and

more about boosting civic pride by making a great statement of confidence at the

Millennium (Carling 1998: pg5). The 50-page report does not address concerns for social justice.

However many mega-events and mega-projects - including the 2012 Olympic Games being hostednear the Dome explicitly use regeneration as a justification, although the results often fall short.

Loftman et al (1995) note the sought-after trickle-down effect rarely functions and few local people

benefit from job creation which leaks to better qualified outsiders (pg 310). They also note (pg309)

that the criteria for judging success are based on economic rather than social concerns, biasing the

priorities.

The problem may lie with the shortness of political horizons, which stretch as far as the hosting of a

prestige event, but not to the legacy it leaves. Garcia (2004) notes that even in Glasgow, credited as

the first European City/ Capital of Culture to take a broad and popular approach to culture, efforts

were top-down with little room for low-income communities (pg322). But this might not be the fault

of the scheme. Colomb (2011) notes that even with significant political commitment to

marginalised communities, socio-cultural barriers remain very difficult to overcome - beyond the

remit of planning and regeneration officials (pg77).

Loftman et al (1996) say the popularity of mega-events in U.S. has influenced Britain, whose cities

are also reacting to a shift in priorities from welfare-related to economic issues, and a decline in

powers of local government. Their assessment concludes that prestige projects entail huge public -

sector financial costs whilst offering extremely limited potential to improve the quality of life and

opportunities for the urban poor. However their choice of examples is flawed. That Sheffield thought

hosting the World Student Games in 1991 would bring them worldwide fame and media coverage was

misguided and as such not an argument against events that bring real prestige such as the Olympics


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(although Loftman could claim Sheffield as an example of delusional behaviour prompted by the

fashion for mega-events).

However, the shift in priorities deserves further reflection. As well as capturing national and EU

funds for specific projects, culture has been used as a tool for attracting inward investment (Tallon

2009: pg247). WTO, EU and even national rules can prevent authorities competing for businessthrough subsidies and other enticements. These rules reflect the dominant hegemony in favour of free

markets. Culture which is afforded some exemptions from these rules - gives local authorities a way

to side-step the rules.

Conclusion:

Just because an event or a project is big, does not necessary mean that it will favour vested private

sector interests to the disadvantage of poor or marginalised communities. However the assumption

behind Loftmans criticism that the vogue for prestige projects has so blinded municipal authorities

that they have let go of common sense - may be closer to the mark. Certainly, in the case of the Dome,the government was in a rush, and poor decisions were made.

However, even Loftman admits that mega-events can be a useful mechanism (1995: pg312) for

getting things done, given the limitations local authorities are now working under. While working

under a tight deadline for a one-off event might not be the most efficient way possible of providing

infrastructure and a more pleasant built environment, it might also be that we are missing the point.

Cities can be dynamic, but they are also old, rambling, slow-moving, rumbustious monsters.

Constructed badly, their appendages will quickly crumble and fall off. But made well, and their jewels

can last for generations. If the costs of Londons tube and sewers built in Victorian times and still

operating were calculating according to todays project management criteria, they might well havebeen judged costly and inefficient. But from todays perspective, they were a bargain.

As Morris (1994) says, the modern obsession with delivering projects to scope, in budget and on

schedule is too narrow and more attention should be given to how we set up and define the project

(pgxvii). If only we had invested as wisely as the Victorians in our countrys future in recent years.

Perhaps then Londoners wouldnt be plagued with constant tube delays and weekend closures.

As a project, the Dome was undoubtedly badly managed. But only ten years after the exhibition

opened, the program to bring the Greenwich peninsula back to life could already be considered a

success, one that can be enjoyed for generations to come. Perhaps we need to judge mega-events and

mega-projects not just on the immediate benefits they bring, but also on how they contribute to long-term health of a city or region.

Word count: 2148


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List of references:

1. Andranovich G, Burbank M, and Heying C (2001), Olympic Cities: Lessons Learned from Mega-Event Politics,Journal of Urban Affairs 23, no. 2 (4): 113-131

2. Garca, B (2004) 'Cultural policy and urban regeneration in Western Europeancities: lessons from experience, prospects for the future. Local Economy, 19: 4,312 326

3. Carling O & Seely A (1998) House of Commons RESEARCH PAPER 98/32 12MARCH 1998http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp98/rp98-032.pdf[Accessed Jan 5 2011]

4. Colomb C (2011), Culture in the city, culture for the city? The politicalconstruction of the trickle-down in cultural regeneration strategies in Roubaix,France, Town Planning Review 82, no. 1: 77-98.

5. Daily Mail (2005) Domes 500 million pounds rebirth May 26.[Consulted onNexisUK on Jan 4 2011]

6. Evans, G (2005), Measure for Measure: Evaluating the Evidence of Culture'sContribution to Regeneration Urban Studies, Vol. 42, Nos 5/6, 959983

7. Flyvbjerg, B., Bruzelius, N. and W. Rothengater (2003) Megaprojects and Risk:An anatomy of ambition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge [Chapter 1 (p1-10), Chapter 2 (pp11-21), Chapter 3 (pp22-31) and Chapter 12 pp136-151)].

8. Gray C (2003) The Millennium Dome: Falling From GraceParliamentary Affairs 56: 441-455.

9. Loftman P and Nevin B (1996), Going for Growth: Prestige Projects in ThreeBritish Cities, Urban Studies 33, no. 6: 991 -1019.

10.Loftman P. and Nevin B. (1995), Prestige projects and urban regeneration in the1980s and 1990s: a review of benefits and limitations,Planning Practice and

Research, 3(1), 31-39.11.Loftman P. and Nevin B. (1994), Prestige Project development: economic

renaissance or economic myth? A case study of Birmingham,Local Economy,

8(4), 307-325.12.Morris, P (1994) The Management of Projects, Thomas Telford, London.13.McGuigan J (2003), The social construction of a cultural disaster: New Labours

millennium experience, Cultural Studies 17, no. 5 (2003): 669.

14.National Audit Office (2002) Winding-up the New Millennium Experience CompanyLimitedhttp://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0102/winding_up_the_new_millennium.aspx [Accessed Feb 24 2011]

15.Oatley N (1998), Cities, Economic Competition and Urban Policy (SagePublications Ltd).


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16.Rogers R Millennium Experiencehttp://www.richardrogers.co.uk/work/all_projects/millennium_experience [Accessed Feb 24 2011]

17.Tallon A (2009), Urban Regeneration in the UK, 1st d. (Routledge).18.The Independent (2010) Taxpayer cashes in as star power pushes O2 sales to record

60mhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/taxpayer-cashes-in-as-star-power-pushes-o2-sales-to-record-16360m-2151504.html [Accessed Feb 242011]

19.Thornley A (2000), Dome Alone: London's Millennium Project and the StrategicPlanning Deficit, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24, no.3: pg 689-699

Further background readings:

1. Castells M (2009) Communication Power, Oxford : Oxford University Press2. Castells M (2000) The Rise of the Network Society, Oxford, UK: Blackwell

Publishers Ltd.3. Cochrane A (2006), Understanding Urban Policy: A Critical Approach (Wiley-

Blackwell.4. Hamnett C (2003), Unequal City: London in the Global Arena, 1st d. (Routledge).5. Newman P (2000), Cultural production, place and politics on the South Bank of the

Thames,International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24, no. 1,International Journal of Urban and Regional Research: 9-24.

6. Paddison R (1993), City Marketing, Image Reconstruction and Urban Regeneration,Urban Studies 30, no. 2 : 339 -349.

7. Savage M, Warde A, and Ward K (2002), Urban Sociology, Capitalism andModernity, 2 d. (Palgrave Macmillan).

8. The Economist (2011) The capitals creed. Londonism and its adherents.http://www.economist.com/node/18073240 [Accessed Feb 5 2011

ihttp://www.richardrogers.co.uk/work/all_projects/millennium_experience ii

According to the National Audit Office

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