Society of Self: The Emergence of Collective...

Psychological Review2000, VoL 107, No. 1, 39-61

Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.(Mm-295X/OQ/$5.QO DOI: I0.1037/W33-295X.107.1.39

Society of Self: The Emergence of Collective Properties in Self-Structure

Andrzej NowakWarsaw University

Robin R. VallacherFlorida Atlantic University

Abraham TesserUniversity of Georgia

Wojciech BorkowskiWarsaw University

Using cellular automata, the authors show how mutual influences among elements of self-relevant

information give rise to dynamism, differentiation, and global evaluation in self-concept. The model

assumes a press for integration that promotes internally generated dynamics and enables the self-structure

to operate as a self-organizing dynamical system. When this press is set at high values, the self can resist

inconsistent information and reestablish equilibrium after being perturbed by such information. A weak

press for integration, on the other hand, impairs self-organization tendencies, making the system

vulnerable to external information. Paradoxically, external information of a random nature may enhance

the emergence of a stable self-structure in an initially disordered system. The simulation results suggest

that important global properties of the self reflect the operation of integration processes that are generic

in complex systems.

When people think about or describe themselves, any number of

specific thoughts, memories, fears, and feelings may come to

mind. By themselves, however, the cognitive and affective ele-

ments that arise during self-reflection do not provide for a sense of

self. Rather, a person has a self-concept to the extent that he or she

has a relatively coherent structure within which the multitude of

self-relevant thoughts and feelings achieve organization. In this

sense, the self represents a society of autonomous, yet interdepen-

dent and interacting agents. Like a society of individuals, the self

can be viewed as a complex dynamical system, with interactions

among system elements promoting the emergence of macro-level

properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of the elements

in isolation. It is only at the level of such emergent properties that

one can meaningfully characterize the structure as a whole. People

can be said to have high or low self-esteem, for example, only

because their thoughts and feelings about themselves are organized

in a manner that indicates a relatively coherent evaluation, in much

the same way that societies can be said to have norms only because

the behaviors of individuals in a population are coordinated in a

relatively coherent fashion.

This reasoning does not mean that the self is not a unique

cognitive structure or that the specific elements of self-

representation are unimportant. If nothing else, the self is unique

Andrzej Nowak, Department of Psychology, Warsaw University, War-

saw, Poland; Robin R. Vallacher, Department of Psychology, Florida

Atlantic University; Abraham Tesser, Department of Psychology, Univer-

sity of Georgia; Wojciech Borkowski, Department of Biology, Warsaw

University.

Preparation of this article was supported in part by National Science

Foundation Grant SBR 95-11657.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Andrzej

Nowak, Department of Psychology, Warsaw University, Stawki 5/7,

00-183 Warsaw, Poland. Electronic mail may be sent to anowak@samba.

iss.uw.edu.pl.

by virtue of being the largest structure in the cognitive system,

encompassing all personally relevant information derived through-

out one's life (e.g., Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Kihlstrom &

Cantor, 1984; Markus, 1983). The thoughts and feelings that

populate the self-system, meanwhile, are unique in that they are

frequently derived from social experiences, revolving to a consid-

erable degree around real and imagined relationships with specific

and generalized others (cf. Cooley, 1902; Goffman, 1959; Mead,

1934; Rogers, 1961). The uniqueness of the self is apparent as well

in its role as an organizing force in other psychological structures

and as an agent of control for important personal and interpersonal

processes. In recognition of the unique and pervasive nature of the

self, theorists and researchers have identified a number of pro-

cesses that are specific to the self and make it unlike other

psychological structures. Phenomena such as self-esteem mainte-

nance (Tesser, 1988), self-verification (Swann, 1990), self-

affirmation (Steele, 1988), self-deception (Our & Sackheim,

1979), self-conscious emotions (Tangney & Fischer, 1995), iden-

tity maintenance (Brewer & Kramer, 1985), and self-regulation

(Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Higgins,

1996) attest to the special nature of the self-structure.

None of these defining aspects and processes of the self would

be possible without at least some semblance of integration among

self-relevant elements. Before one can verify one's self-concept or

maintain a level of self-esteem, after all, one must have a relatively

coherent perspective on the vast number of features relevant to

self-understanding. It is critical, then, to appreciate the means by

which specific cognitive and affective elements are integrated in

service of coherent self-understanding. Processes of integration are

not unique to the self-system. To the contrary, the issue of how

distinct elements become coordinated to form a coherent structure

constitutes one of the main challenges facing contemporary sci-

ence (cf. Schuster, 1984). Theory and research on nonlinear dy-

namical systems have had remarkable success in addressing this

challenge across diverse disciplines, from physics to economics.

39

40 NOWAK, VALLACHER. TESSER, AND BORKOWSKI

This work has established that many important features of the

integration process do not depend on the identity of elements per

se, but rather on the nature of the interactions among elements, and

that these features are invariant across otherwise distinct phenom-

ena and levels of analysis (cf. Weisbuch, 1991).

In this article, we hope to show that investigating the self as a

complex dynamical system leads to a variety of insights regarding

self-structure and self-process, some that resonate with phenomena

that have already been established empirically and others that may

establish a research agenda for future empirical work. We begin by

developing the analogy between self and society. Issues of struc-

ture and process in social systems have been broached successfully

from a dynamical systems perspective in recent years (e.g., Mes-

sick & Liebrand, 1995; Nowak, Szamrej, & Latane, 1990), and

because of the formal similarity among systems at different levels

of analysis, it may prove fruitful to extend this general approach to

the self-system. We then describe a cellular automata model of the

self-system and investigate the model's potential for capturing the

essence of integrative processes in self-understanding. This plat-

form is then used to simulate the response of the self-system to

incoming information (e.g., social feedback) as a function of the

system's existing organization and the strength of the press for

integration. In a concluding section, we summarize the advantages

of viewing the self from an explicitly dynamical perspective and

suggest lines of future theoretical and empirical work.

Self-Structure and Dynamics

Self and Society

The "society of self" metaphor can be viewed in the context of

the broader analogy between mind and society, which provides a

backdrop for both classic and contemporary theoretical frame-

works. Various scholars, for example, have argued that groups and

societies have a "collective mind" that functions in an analogous

way to individual minds. Le Bon (1895/1968) was especially

vehement on this point, insisting that groups think and feel in ways

that are not reducible to the thoughts and feelings of individual

group members. Contemporary perspectives have provided more

explicit (and correspondingly less mystical) accounts of the anal-

ogy between mind and society. The model of transactive memory

(Wegner, 1986), for example, is based on the idea that social

groups are directly analogous to minds with respect to the storage

and distribution of information and memories. In this view, thedevelopment of a role structure in groups (e.g., dyads) reflects the

same basic principles as the development of a differentiated cog-nitive structure in individuals.

Although mind has traditionally provided the frame of reference

for models of group and societal processes, recent work has

reversed the direction of the analogy, with society providing a

metaphor for mind. This metaphor was given explicit expression

by Minsky (1985), in his seminal work, Society of Mind. Minskyargued that the mind is modular, with many relatively simple

components performing specific tasks in a parallel fashion. None

of the modular components are themselves intelligent; rather,

intelligence is an emergent product resulting from the coordinated

interaction among the components. In the same way that societies

cannot be reduced to component individuals without characteriz-

ing the functional relations among them, the mind cannot be

reduced to separate mechanisms without taking into account their

mutual influence and coordination. Thus, different cognitive func-

tions are performed by specific structures that function in parallel

but interact to produce higher order structures with emergent

properties. As Minsky notes, this progressive integration of cog-

nitive functions is similar on a formal level to societal organiza-

tion. Thus, mutual influences among individuals lead to the emer-

gence of societal-level phenomena such as norms, public opinion,

and cultural values.

The essence of both mental and social structures is captured by

connectionist models (cf. Read & Miller, 1998), which suggest that

complex functions are the result of interactions among a large

number of extremely simple—sometimes even binary—elements

(cf. McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986). Within the connectionist

framework, models of attractor neural networks (cf. Hertz, Krogh,

& Palmer, 1991; Hopfield, 1982) are especially relevant to the

formal equivalence between mind and society. In this approach,

the brain is modeled as a collection of densely interconnected

neurons linked by synapses. Such systems are characterized by

multiple feedback loops, in which each neuron influences and is

influenced by numerous other neurons. In similar fashion, society

can be characterized as a collection of individuals interconnected

by social ties (cf. Cartwright & Harary, 1956; Moreno, 1953;

Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Each individual influences and is

influenced by other individuals with whom he or she has social

relations. Although connectionist models were developed to sim-

ulate brain function and mental processes, their underlying formal-

isms are proving useful in capturing social processes as well (e.g.,

Nowak, Vallacher, & Burnstein, 1998; Read & Miller, 1998).

Individuals are clearly different from neurons, of course, but the

overall structure and functioning of both minds and societies are

remarkably similar with respect to their formal properties. In both

cases, global properties stem from the structure of connections

among elements rather than from the nature of the elements

themselves.

The human mind is unique in that it not only reflects the

surrounding world, but also in that it reflects on its own operations

and content. The reflexive nature of mind provides the basis for

people's sense of self. The representation of self that results from

this reflexivity mirrors the myriad thoughts and feelings experi-

enced by mind and thus is a highly complex structure. At the same

time, though, a sense of self would not emerge if the enormous

range of self-relevant information was not characterized by at least

some degree of coherence. To develop and maintain virtually any

generalization about oneself, it is necessary to integrate at least

some portion of the component information. To build an image of

oneself as a good student, for example, one needs to integrate a

wide set of pertinent facts and evaluations. The mind may well be

a potential "tumbling ground for whimsies" (James, 1890/1950),

but there is a tendency for the separate elements of self to become

linked to each other via multiple feedback loops and thereby

achieve organization. In this process, congruent elements provide

cross-validation for each other, whereas incongruent elements set

in motion mechanisms designed to eliminate the incoherence or

isolate the incongruent elements (e.g., Clary & Tesser, 1983;

Hastie & Kumar, 1979). In this way, the salience of low-level

elements provides for the emergence of higher level structures (cf.Vallacher, 1993).

SOCIETY OF SELF 41

The interdependency of self-relevant elements may be charac-

terized as an associative network (e.g., Greenwald et al., in press).

In this view, specific thoughts about the self call to mind related

thoughts, which become organized into progressively higher order

assemblies that have emergent properties, such as self-evaluation

and self-regulatory potential. Thoughts about a recent social inter-

action, for example, might bring to mind memories of other social

encounters, and together these thoughts might generate an overall

assessment of one's social skill and provide standards for how to

behave in the future. Associative networks describe relations

among the elements of self-structure in much the same way that

social networks provide the means of describing relations among

individuals. In both cases, mutual influences among the elements

in question (i.e., thoughts and individuals) are responsible for the

emergence of higher order properties and functions. Just as basic

elements provide cross-validation in the self-structure, interacting

individuals provide cross-validation for one another's perceptions,

opinions, beliefs, and values. Social cross-validation is responsible

for the emergence of coherence on a societal level and paves the

way for the emergence of public opinions, group norms, and

societal values.

Self-Integration

The self provides integration for other psychological structures.

Self-schemas, for instance, influence what we notice about other

people and how we organize our judgments of them (cf. Markus,

Smith, & Moreland, 1985). Although it is easy to appreciate how

the self-system imposes organization on other structures, it is far

from clear what imposes organization on the self-system. This

question raises the specter of the homunculus (cf. Ryle, 1949;

Vallacher, 1980), an infinite regress of higher order structures in

which each structure provides organization for the structure at the

next lower level. Clearly, simply invoking yet higher levels of

organization and control does little to solve the basic problem. One

can always ask what organizes the highest level organizer.

The phenomenon of self-organization provides a solution to this

long-standing philosophical problem. Numerous computer simu-

lations, as well as analytical considerations, have established that

global order in a system may emerge from local interactions

among lower level elements, without any higher order supervisory

mechanism (cf. Haken, 1982; Kelso, 1995; Prigogine & Stengers,

1984; Weisbuch, 1991). The process of self-organization provides

a way of thinking about the process of integration in self-concept

Integration is not achieved through the control of a higher order

structure, but rather is an emergent property deriving from the

local interactions among the elements themselves. In this process,

each element adopts a state that brings it into alignment with the

states of other relevant elements.

It is important to note, however, that global integration is not the

only fate of a complex system. In many diverse types of systems,

only specific subsets of elements become integrated. This result

occurs for two general reasons. First, there may be conflicting

demands for integration. This is the case, for example, in most

models of neural networks (cf. Hertz et al., 1991). Because ele-

ments may experience conflicting signals from other elements,

conforming to some elements may increase the incongruence with

respect to others. Although the system as a whole cannot achieve

global coherence, specific subsets of neurons may achieve coher-

ence with respect to one another. This constraint on global inte-

gration is applicable to structure in the self-system. Some elements

of the self, to begin with, may simply be incompatible. Friendli-

ness and competitiveness, for example, may be equally positive

characteristics for a person, but the expression of one may negate

the expression of the other. Other elements of the self may be in

conflict because of their social definition. When two people are

antagonistic toward each other, for example, a person's friendli-

ness toward one may be viewed as unfriendliness toward the other

(cf. Heider, 1958).

The second reason for partial as opposed to global integration is

that the elements in a system sometimes can interact only with a

limited number of neighboring elements. In cellular autorriata, forexample, one often observes the emergence of local structures

rather than unification (cf. Lewenstein, Nowak, & Latane, 1992;

Nowak et al., 1990; Weisbuch, 1991; Wolfram, 1986). In an

initially disordered system, local interaction usually produces clus-

ters of internally consistent elements. Depending on a variety of

specific factors (e.g., individual differences among elements),

these clusters may or may not become globally integrated (Lewen-

stein et al., 1992). This constraint is also relevant to the fate of the

integration process in the self-system. For such a large structure as

the self, it is virtually impossible—not to mention unnecessary—to

relate each element to all other elements. Particularly if one's

behavior is effectively segregated by roles and social contexts,

there may be no reason to consider a given pair of elements in

relation to one another. One's competence at, say, spelling may

never be considered with respect to one's effectiveness as a tennis

player.

The notion that elements pertaining to the self may be segre-

gated into separate evaluatively coherent areas is consistent with

several lines of'theory and research in social psychology. There is

considerable psychometric evidence, first of all, that the cognitive

structures underlying social judgment tend to be multidimensional

(e.g., Bieri et al., 1966; Kelly, 1963; Osgood, Suci, & Tannen-

baum, 1957; Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972; Scott, Osgood, & Peter-

son, 1979). Viewing someone as intelligent, for example, does not

necessarily bear on how one views his or her sociability (cf.

Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972). Researchers who have proposed

functional accounts of social cognition and self-concept have

reached similar conclusions regarding the multifaceted nature of

underlying cognitive structures (e.g., Aronson, 1992; Gergen,

1971; Linville, 1985; Showers, 1995; Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock,

Skitka, & Boettger, 1989; Vallacher, 1980). Role theorists, too,

have recognized the functional necessity of segregating different

aspects of the self into independent domains (cf. Biddle &

Thomas, 1966; Sarbin & Allen, 1968). From this perspective, to

perform effectively in a given role may mean acting in ways that

are inconsistent with the demands of other roles.

A person's degree of certainty regarding specific elements

within well-integrated structures is considerably higher than his or

her degree of certainty regarding the same elements in isolation.

By itself, any given element is open to disconfirmation whenexposed to external influences (e.g., social feedback or new infor-

mation). If the element is well integrated with other elements,

however, it receives supportive influence from these elements and

thus can withstand challenges posed by incoming information. It

may be easy to challenge someone's free-throw ability on the basis

of a missed shot, for example, if free-throw ability is not well

42 NOWAK, VALLACHER, TESSER, AND BORKOWSKI

integrated into the person's sense of self as a basketball player. Butif the person is well integrated in this respect, such challenges arelikely to be ineffective, at least in the long run, as other relevantinformation allows the person to rebound from the challenge. Inline with this reasoning, researchers have established that rela-tively global challenges to well-integrated structures (e.g., self-schematic personality traits) more often result in reactance than inacceptance, whereas challenges to isolated lower level elements(e.g., concrete instantiations of the trait) may well undermine theperson's confidence in such elements (cf. Eagly & Chaiken, 1993;Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Even if incoming information causesan element in a well-integrated structure to change, the influenceof the other elements in the structure is likely to restore its originalvalue.

This account of integration tendencies and the development ofstructure in the self-system is analogous to the development ofsocietal organization. In a similar way that different social groupsare internally integrated but only loosely coordinated with oneanother most of the time, different subsets of low-level elementspertaining to the self become internally coherent but largely inde-pendent of each other. The stability afforded by differentiation isalso similar in self-systems and societies. Thus, an isolated indi-vidual is highly vulnerable to the influence of external pressureand information, whereas the same individual in a supportivesocial network can withstand even intense social pressures tochange.

Evaluative Coherence and Differentiation

There is reason to think that evaluative coherence provides thebasis for integration in the self-system. Evaluation, after all, isarguably the most important global variable in the mental system(Tesser & Martin, 1996), and evaluative consistency is widelyrecognized as providing the basis for organizing social judgmentsgenerally (cf. Abelson et al., 1968; Eiser, 1994; Fiske & Taylor,1991; Heider, 1944; Wegner & Vallacher, 1977) and self-conceptin particular (cf. Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Showers, 1995; Tesser& Campbell, 1983). The evaluative dimension can provide inte-gration for low-level elements that may be quite disparate withrespect to cognitive content and means-end relations (Vallacher &Nowak, 1994, 1997; Vallacher, Nowak, & Kaufman, 1994). Do-nating money to charity and helping a child with homework areclearly distinct elements, for example, but are similar with respectto their reflection on one's sense of self as a socially responsibleperson. By the same token, cognitive elements that form a logi-cally consistent structure may be vastly different in their evaluativeimplications. Being helpful to a stranger in need has a conflictingevaluative connotation with being helpful to a criminal. Becauseevaluative consistency provides the ultimate basis for integration,these two elements may be hard to reconcile with respect to one'ssense of self. In short, although elements can be related to oneanother in many ways, the degree to which they are effectivelyintegrated is often signaled by their evaluative consistency.

The press for integration on the basis of evaluative consistencycan take many diverse forms. Well-documented mechanisms suchas denial, discounting, selective recall, confirmatory bias, defen-sive attribution, and dissonance reduction all serve to maintainevaluative consistency in the face of potentially incongruent in-formation. Consider, for example, an act of lying by someone who

considers himself or herself to be a moral person. To maintainevaluative consistency in this aspect of his or her self-concept, theperson may deny the act, discount the act as unimportant, forgetthe act over time, justify its occurrence in terms of a larger moralconcern, or even change his or her view about the morality oflying. Although these mechanisms are clearly distinguishable andmay occur under somewhat different circumstances, they all reflectan underlying concern with maintaining evaluative consistency inan important region of the self-system and may substitute for oneanother under certain conditions (cf. Tesser, Martin, & Cornell,1996).

As noted earlier, however, it is unlikely that the self-system canachieve global and complete integration. Instead, integration islikely to be achieved with respect to subsets of elements, with eachsubset corresponding to particular aspects of the self, such as roles,domain-specific self-images, self-schemas, and areas of personalcompetence or concern. Thus, a person might have a positiveself-view with regard to, say, the domain of social skills but a farless flattering self-view with respect to the domain of mechanicalskills. When each region of the self-system is internally consistentwith respect to evaluation and the various regions differ in thevalue of this variable, the self-system as a whole can be describedas evaluatively differentiated or compartmentalized (cf. Showers,1995). In a perfectly differentiated system, there is clear separationbetween those aspects of self that are viewed positively and thosethat are viewed negatively. In effect, the person knows in whichrealms he or she is good and in which realms he or she is bad.

Highly disordered (i.e., random) systems obviously lack evalu-ative differentiation, but so might systems that are highly differ-entiated in purely cognitive terms. It may well be possible, forexample, to make subtle distinctions within a given substructure ofthe self, generating a mix of positively and negatively valencedelements concerning that aspect of the self. Although such sophis-ticated understanding might represent evidence of enhanced self-knowledge, it may provide conflicting information and thus be anineffective guide to action with respect to that domain. Recogniz-ing a multitude of both positive and negative consequences of anaction in a given role, for example, may render a decision con-cerning the action virtually impossible. So although evaluativeconsistency in a region of the self-system may obscure specificdistinctions in an informational sense, this very quality is whatprovides a basis for unequivocal action (cf. Jones & Gerard, 1967).In this view, it is the press for integration that enables people toact in spite of their intrinsic capacity for seemingly unlimitedcognition.

In sum, the press for integration is a causal force underlying thedevelopment of an evaluatively differentiated self-structure. Themutual influences among elements result in the integration of localareas of the self-system, where each area is internally coherentwith respect to evaluation. A person may have a highly positiveview of himself or herself as a parent, for example, but a far lessflattering view of himself or herself with respect to athletic ability.In both cases, the person has an evaluatively coherent sense of self.The self-system is evaluatively integrated within specific domains,and as long as there is no press to integrate across domains, thesystem does not experience incongruencies.

There is reason to think that evaluative differentiation is highlyadaptive, enabling a person to maintain a relatively stable, positiveself-evaluation despite a high number of negative elements in his

SOCIETY OF SELF 43

or her self-system. This is because the existence of well-defined

positive and negative regions of the self-system makes it possible

for the person to concentrate on the positive regions and to disre-

gard the negative regions (e.g., Pelham & Swann, 1989; Showers

& Kling, 1996). This is true even if the negative regions contain

highly salient negative elements. In a self-system that is not

organized according to evaluation, in contrast, concentration on

any single area of the system is likely to produce a self-evaluation

that reflects the relative proportions (and relative salience) of

positive and negative elements in the system as a whole. Effec-

tively, then, an evaluatively differentiated self provides for self-

certainty, a sense of personal integration, and the possibility ofmaintaining positive self-evaluation despite the existence of salient

negative elements in the serf-system.

Intrinsic Dynamics of Self-Organization

To examine generic features of self-integration and the emer-

gence of collective properties of the self, we performed a series

of computer simulations. These simulations were based on a

cellular automata model designed to capture the process of

integration due to local influences among basic elements. After

describing the basic features of this model, we describe the

results of simulations exploring important issues of self-

dynamics and structure. First, we explore how an initially

disorganized self-system might develop structure from its own

intrinsic dynamics. Second, we investigate how the course of

intrinsic dynamics in a disorganized system is affected by

incoming information of varying intensity and valence. Finally,

we examine the effects of incoming information on a self-

system that has already developed structure and reached an

equilibrium. Although intrinsic dynamics in this case have

effectively ceased, incoming information may perturb the sys-

tem's equilibrium and thus reinstate internally generated

changes until a new equilibrium is reached.

Cellular Automata as a Model of Self-Organization

Models of cellular automata provide a formal platform for

investigating properties of systems consisting of mutually inter-

acting elements. Cellular automata are discrete dynamical systems

composed of many simple elements. Each element may display

two or more states. Time is also discrete, consisting of innumer-

able successive moments, r15 f 2 , . . . , ?n. The elements are arranged

in a specific spatial configuration, often a two-dimensional lattice.

The state of a given element at time t + 1 depends on the states of

its neighboring elements at time t. The specific form of this

dependence is expressed in updating rules. Different neighborhood

structures are possible for the various spatial configurations used

in cellular automata models. In a two-dimensional lattice, for

instance, each element may have four neighbors (one on each side)

or eight neighbors (the original four plus an additional four in the

diagonals).

In research using cellular automata, one commonly observes the

emergence of regularities and patterns on a global level that were

not directly programmed into individual elements. These emergent

properties often take the form of spatial patterns, with clusters of

elements displaying the same state after a number of iterations of

the updating rule. Emergent properties can also take the form of

temporal patterns (cf. Wolfram, 1986), including evolution toward

a stable equilibrium (fixed-point attractor), alternation between

different states (periodic attractor), and apparent randomness

(chaotic attractor). Cellular automata are thus proving useful in

investigating how different forms of local influence among ele-

ments (i.e., updating rales) promote the generation of global prop-

erties in a complex system. Several distinct and theoretically

meaningful aspects of this linkage between local rules and collec-

tive properties have been identified in the context of group- and

societal-level phenomena in recent years. These phenomena in-

clude the nature of social influence (e.g., Nowak et a!., 1990), the

emergence of cooperation (e.g., Messick & Liebrand, 1995), and

key features of political and economic transitions in society (e.g.,

Nowak, Lewenstein, & Szamrej, 1993; Nowak, Urbaniak, & Zien-

kowski, 1994).

The society-of-self model shares some of the general features

of the cellular automata model of social influence proposed by

Nowak et al. (1990). We assume that a self-system is composed

of n elements, each reflecting a specific item of information

relevant to the self. The elements are represented as cells

arranged on a square grid with 20 cells on a side. The proximity

of cells denotes their degree of relatedness and thus their

potential for mutual influence. Because the focus here is on the

generic features of the integration process, we assume that the

elements correspond to the most rudimentary or low-level fea-

tures of self-understanding. The integration of such elements

results in the emergence of evaluatively consistent areas of the

self-structure that serve as a basis for higher order features of

the self (e.g., traits, areas of competence).

Each element is characterized with respect to its current

evaluation. An element can be either positive, denoted by light

gray, or negative, denoted by dark gray (see Figure 1). The

assumption of bipolarity in evaluation is consistent with re-

search showing that for personally important targets of judg-

ment, the evaluation of target-relevant information tends to be

dichotomous, with only extreme values (i.e., very good vs. very

bad) represented phenomenologically (cf. Kelly, 1963). The

covariation between personal importance and evaluative ex-

tremity is apparent, for example, in the tendency for opinions

on important issues to be distributed in a bimodal (i.e.,

U-shaped) fashion (Latan6 & Nowak, 1994). The self is obvi-

ously a very important target of judgment (e.g., Greenwald et

al., in press; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984), so it is reasonable

to assume that self-relevant information is evaluated in a binary

(i.e., good vs. bad) manner. Because the elements are binary

(i.e., either positive or negative), when they change they do so

in an all-or-none rather than in an incremental manner.1

1 Although the assumption that serf-relevant infoimatkm is dichotomous

in valence reflects theoretical considerations, it may not be critical in an

operational sense. Simulations based on cellular automata in which the

states of elements are continuous rather than dichotomous reveal qualita-

tively similar properties, as long as the rule specifying change in an

element's state is nonlinear in nature (Latan6 & Nowak, 1997). See

Lewenstein et al. (1992) for an analytical treatment of this class of cellular

automata models. For treatment of the relative importance of nonlinearity

in the change rule versus the discrete nature of elements, see Hopfield

(1984).


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I I I / / / / I / / / _'f I / / / / / / / / r' / / / / ' / / /

LJ

Figure-1. Self-organization in the self-system.

The elements also differ in their respective weights, with somehaving greater centrality than others in a given area of the self-system. This means that some basic elements of self-understandingplay a disproportionate role compared with other elements inshaping one's self-evaluation in a given area. Their centrality alsomeans that they play a disproportionately strong role in validatingthe evaluation of other elements and that dieir valence is corre-spondingly difficult to change by virtue of influence from otherelements. In thinking about one's social skill, for example, keepingpeople's attention validates the evaluation one has attached totelling jokes, maintaining eye contact, and the like. An element'scentrality is represented by a number between 2 and 10, withhigher numbers denoting greater centrality. An element's central-

ity is represented visually as its height in Figure 1. For the sake ofsimplicity, we assume that an element's centrality does not changeduring the course of simulation. The self-system obviously con-sists of many areas, each of which has its set of central elements.For the sake of simplicity, we randomly positioned three maxi-mally central elements (i.e., elements with a value of 10) in thegrid and surrounded them with rings of elements with graduallydecreasing centrality. The simulation grid can thus be understoodas a self-structure composed of three different areas, each of themcontaining a highly central element and other elements varying incentrality in proportion to their distance from the central element.

To capture the nature of the integration process, we decided tostart from the most extreme case, namely, a system that was totally

SOCIETY OF SELF 45

disordered with respect to evaluation, and then observe the effect

of imposed integrative mechanisms.2 We assume that each element

influences and is influenced by its eight neighboring elements

(four on the adjacent sides and four on the connecting diagonals).

In the course of simulation, a randomly chosen element, i, adjusts

to its neighboring cells by checking how much influence it re-

ceives from the positive as opposed to the negative elements. The

basic idea here is that the element tends to adopt the valence most

characteristic of its neighbors. In this process, each neighbor's

centrality is taken into account, such that neighboring elements

with greater centrality have greater influence on the element's

valence. This involves weighting the valence, V, of each neighbor,

j, by the neighbor's centrality, W (i.e., V, X W}). The resultant

computation is the weighted sum of evaluations of the neighboring

elements, 2(V,- X W,), reflecting a process similar to information

integration (Anderson, 1981).3

This evaluative input from neighboring elements is then com-

pared with the current state of the element. If the sign of the

element agrees with the overall evaluation suggested by its neigh-

boring elements, no change in the element's evaluation occurs. If

the sign of the element differs from the overall evaluation sug-

gested by its neighboring elements, however, the element changes

evaluation only if the combined weight of evaluation from other

elements is higher than the element's own weighted evaluation,

that is, if 2(V^ X W,) > V, X Wt. In other words, it is relatively

easy for neighboring elements to change the evaluation of a

relatively noncentral (i.e., peripheral) self-characteristic but diffi-

cult to change the evaluation of a more central characteristic.

After the element's state is adjusted, another element is ran-

domly chosen in a Monte Carlo fashion and the process is re-

peated. Because this procedure involves sampling with replace-

ment, it is possible for a particular element to be chosen more than

once in a single simulation step and for other elements not to be

chosen in that step. Each so-called Monte Carlo step in the simu-

lation corresponds to 400 (20 X 20) samplings, so that on average

each element is likely to be chosen once. This process is repeated

until the state of the system reaches an asymptote, reflecting either

no further change in the states of elements or a stable pattern of

changes in the system. Three global measures are derived in this

model:

1. Self-evaluation is the weighted average of all the elements in

the structure (cf. Anderson, 1981), with the weight of each element

corresponding to its centrality. It is computed according to the

following formula:

the proportion of neighbors sharing a common valence (as com-

pared with the total number of possible links among neighbors).4

It is computed according to the following formula:

(V, X W,)

Eval =

where V, is the valence for element i, with 1 denoting positively

and -1 denoting negativity, and W, is the weight (centrality) of

element i. This index can range from —1 to 1, with a value of 0

corresponding to a balance between the weighted average of

positive and negative elements.

2. Evaluative differentiation reflects the degree to which the

elements form clusters of similar valence. This measure reflects

where Cohs is the number of existing links between neighboring

elements of the same valence, Cchance is the number of links

between neighboring elements of the same valence expected in a

randomly ordered system, and Cmax is the maximum number of

links between neighboring elements of the same valence that is

possible in a system in which positive and negative elements form

two compact clusters. A random arrangement of elements has a

value of 0, and the perfect separation of elements into two compact

clusters has a value of 1. Intermediate values reflect corresponding

degrees of spatial order. Note that Cobs is based on observation,

whereas Cch£mc(. and Cmax are derived theoretically, and their val-

ues depend on the number of positive and negative elements and

on the geometry of the matrix (see Latane, Nowak, & Liu, 1994).

In a maximally clustered system, all the elements (except those on

the border of a cluster) are surrounded by other elements of the

same valence. In a system lacking evaluative differentiation, on the

other hand, the probability of two neighboring elements having the

same valence is dictated only by the overall proportions of positive

and negative elements.

3. Self-dynamism reflects the proportion of elements that change

their state in a given simulation step. At each simulation step, it is

computed according to the following formula:

kDyn - - ,

n

where k is the number of elements that change their value and n is

the total number of elements (i.e., 400). The value of this measure

varies between 0, reflecting no change, and 1, reflecting a change

in all the sampled elements. When tracked over time, this measure

characterizes the volatility of the system's temporal evolution. The

value of this measure at the last simulation step (i.e., after the

system has reached an asymptote), then, specifies whether the

2 In reality, of course, people's self-concepts are rarely totally disorga-

nized with respect to evaluation. To start with a system that is partially

organized, one could simply disregard the initial step in the simulation and

assume that the second step of the simulations, which is likely to be

characterized by some degree of organization, represents the starting state

of the system. The final set of simulations to be reported start with a

self-system that is already organized.3 In information integration theory, one typically divides the weighted

sum by the sum of weights to derive a weighted average. Although the

procedure we used is based on a weighted sum, the number of elements

entering into each computation is constant (i.e., eight), so the resultant

value is not affected by set size.4 Note that self-evaluation and evaluative differentiation are largely

independent of one another. Self-evaluation represents the (weighted)

proportion of positive versus negative elements, whereas evaluative dif-

ferentiation describes the grouping of these elements. A system may be

both highly positive and highly differentiated, for example, if it contains

very few negative elements that are confined to a compact region of the

self-system.


-•-Differentiation

-»- Self-Evaluation

-*- Dynamism

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 50

Simulation Steps

Figure 2. Time course of change in self-variables.

self-system has reached a static equilibrium or instead can be

characterized in terms of a dynamic equilibrium with a specific

value of volatility.

The Process of Self-Organization

Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics typically observed in the

process of self-organization. In the starting configuration, the

arrangement of positive and negative elements is random, corre-

sponding to a self that lacks structure (i.e., evaluative differentia-

tion). To capture the positivity bias in self-evaluation (e.g., Taylor

& Brown, 1988), however, we assume that 60% of the elements

are positive and 40% are negative.5 Because centrality is assigned

randomly to positive and negative elements, the initial 60%-40%

distribution corresponds to weighted average values that vary

around a mean of .2 rather than 0.

Figure 2 illustrates how self-dynamism, self-evaluation, and

evaluative differentiation change over the course of simulation.

The results are averaged over 100 simulation runs. At the begin-

ning of the simulation, there are pronounced dynamics, with many

elements changing their state. The number of changes decreases in

the course of simulation, until an equilibrium state is finally

reached. Because these changes occur in the absence of external

influence, they reflect intrinsic dynamics. The most apparent

change is the emergence of evaluatively coherent regions from the

initially random distribution of positive and negative elements.

The emergence of evaluative differentiation reflects the local na-

ture of influence among elements. If an element is surrounded

primarily by elements of the same valence, its valence will not

change. If the element is surrounded by elements with a different

valence, however, it is likely to change its state to conform to these

elements, although if it is highly central it may resist the summed

influence of its neighboring elements.6 As a result of this process,

elements of similar valence tend to cluster and produce evalu-

atively coherent regions.

In addition to the emergence of structure, the positivity bias also

becomes more strongly pronounced over the course of simulations,

changing from the initial value of .2 to an asymptotic value of .64.

This increase reflects the fact that more elements change from

5 The positivity bias can also be represented by assuming that elements

of positive valence have greater weight (i.e., centrality) than negative

elements. Both analytical considerations (Lewenstein et al., 1992) and

computer simulations have established that similar effects are observed

whether bias is created through unequal numbers of elements or through

the unequal weighting of an equal number of elements.6 Note that elements on the borders of the matrix are surrounded by five

rather than eight elements, and those in the corners are surrounded by only

three elements. This gives clusters of negative elements in these positions

a slight survival advantage because their relative isolation protects them

against influence from conflicting elements.

SOCIETY OF SELF 47

negative to positive states than vice versa. In a disordered system,

the proportion of both positive and negative elements in any given

area corresponds roughly to the proportion of positive and negative

elements in the system as a whole. A given element is thus more

likely to be surrounded by positive than by negative elements and

is thus likely to experience a pull in a positive direction. In a

clustered system, however, most elements are surrounded by ele-

ments of the same valence, so that only the elements on the borders

of the clusters are subjected to conflicting influence. The emer-

gence of evaluative differentiation thus stabilizes the self-structure.

Although there is an increase in the proportion of positive

elements, the negative elements that manage to survive tend to be

highly central and thus resistant to further change. In effect, as the

self grows in positivity, the mean weight of negative elements

increases as less central negative elements are eliminated. This

result is consistent with research showing that although positive

information is more prevalent than negative information in cogni-

tive structures, negative information tends to be more salient than

positive information (e.g., Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997;

Coovert & Reeder, 1990; Kanouse & Hanson, 1971; Peelers &

Czapinski, 1990; Pratto & John, 1991; Skowronski & Carlston,

1989; Taylor, 1991; Tesser & Martin, 1996). This conclusion

regarding the average strength of minority elements has also been

reached through analytical considerations (Lewenstein et al.,1992).

The intrinsic dynamics observed in these initial simulations

are due to mutual influences among elements in the model.

Such influences presuppose a press for integration; lacking such

a press, there would be no intrinsic dynamics and thus no

self-organization. The strength of this press, however, can

clearly vary in accord with contextual and personal variables

(e.g., Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995). In some situations, for

example, people are more likely to feel self-aware and con-

cerned with issues of consistency (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981;

Wicklund & Prey, 1980). Conditions that make salient the

transmission rather than the receipt of information also tend to

promote a greater concern with information integration (cf.

Zajonc, 1960). It is also the case that people may momentarily

lack the cognitive resources necessary to achieve integration of

diverse elements. This may happen, for example, when people

are under stress or experience cognitive overload (cf. Bargh,

1997; Gilbert, 1993). Achieving integration presumably re-

quires cognitive resources (Treisman & Schmidt, 1982), so

anything that diverts such resources to other cognitive tasks can

promote a corresponding weakening of integration tendencies.

Even under conditions that promote self-awareness (e.g., the

presence of an audience) or a concern with transmitting infor-

mation, the demands in that context (e.g., performing a difficult

or stressful task) may effectively exhaust the cognitive re-

sources that might otherwise be used to achieve integration.

To capture this type of variation, we ensured that subsequent

simulations systematically varied the strength of influence

among elements. This was done by multiplying the computed

influence on each element by a value, P, that is constant for a

given round of simulations. The higher this value, the greater

the weight attached to the summary evaluation associated with

the other elements. The influence from neighboring elements on

a given element, then, can be expressed as P X 2(V,- X Wj),

where P equals the value of press for integration. This variable

corresponds to a person's concern with evaluative consistency.

In the simulations, a value of I represented high press for

integration and a value of . 1 represented low press for integra-

tion.7 We chose relatively extreme values of P to ensure that

qualitatively different behaviors of the system were captured.

The high value (P = 1) means that the state of neighboring

elements has the same influence as the element has on itself,

whereas the low value (P = .1) means that each of the neigh-

boring elements has only 10% of the influence that the element

has on itself. Because there are eight neighboring elements, low

press for integration means that their combined effect cannot

exceed the influence of the element on itself unless one (or

more) of the neighboring elements is considerably more central

(i.e., has greater weight) than the element itself.8

Intrinsic Dynamics and Incoming Information

The self does not develop in a vacuum. To the contrary,

self-understanding depends to a large degree on the nature and

quantity of experiences in everyday situations. Were it not for

such experiences, there would be no elements of the self to

become organized. The sources of self-relevant information are

diverse, reflecting such processes as social feedback, social

comparison, self-perception of one's actions, perceptions of

success versus failure, and so forth. Obviously, then, the intrin-

sic dynamics of the integration processes that assemble the self

are rarely left untouched by external influences. To model the

effects of these influences on the emergence of collective

properties in the self-system, we started with an initially disor-

ganized system, similar to the initial configurations used in the

simulations reported above, and varied the intensity and valence

of incoming information.

In the first set of simulations, positively and negatively valenced

information entered the system with equal probability. Note that

this means that incoming information was less positive on average

than the initial state of the self-structure (i.e., 60% positive ele-

ments). Operationally, we treated incoming information as a ran-

dom variable from a normal distribution with a mean of 0, signi-

fying neutral evaluation, but with one of four standard deviations

(0, 1, 3, and 6). So although the incoming information was neutral

(M = 0) when averaged over time, the valence of the information

varied around this mean with different degrees of magnitude

corresponding to the different standard deviations. For example, a

standard deviation of 1, signifying low intensity, meant that 95%

of the time the valence of the information was between -1.96

and 1.96, whereas a standard deviation of 6, signifying the highest

intensity, meant that 95% of the time the valence of the informa-

tion was between —11.76 and 11.76. By way of comparison, the

influence of an element on itself ranged between 2 (low centrality)

and 10 (high centrality).

7 Strong versus weak press for integration can be visualized as small

versus large distance between adjacent elements. This equivalence between

spacing of elements and influence reflects the assumption that influence

decays with distance (cf. Nowak et al., 1990).8 We have run a number of simulations with intermediate values of P.

The results observed in these simulations are intermediate to the results

presented here involving extreme values.


The information was introduced into the system by adding arandom number, R, to the weighted sum of internal influences oneach element. The value of J? changed randomly (within a givenrange of intensity), bolh across elements and simulation steps, sothat the same element might experience a positive influence at onesimulation step but a negative influence at the next step. Becauseof its random nature, information may be considered noise enteringthe system. In addition to varying the intensity of information, wevaried the press for integration, P, at two levels, with a value of 1representing high press and .1 representing low press for integra-tion. The total influence each element received at each simulationstep was thus P x £(V, x Wj) + R.

The simulations were run for 50 Monte Carlo steps, so that eachelement had on average 50 opportunities to adjust its state to thatof the other elements. The measures of self-evaluation, evaluativedifferentiation, and self-dynamism were obtained after the final(i.e., 50th) simulation step. The results, averaged across 1(K) sim-ulations, arc displayed in Figures 3, 4, and 5. In the absence ofnoise (i.e., M and SD = 0), the system stabilized within the first 10steps, whereas in the presence of noise, stabilization was notobserved even after the 50 steps. Overall, however, the incominginformation had much less effect under conditions of high press forintegration than under conditions of low press for integration. Thisresult is directly reflected in self-dynamism. With high press for

integration, only a very small proportion of elements (.03) changedIheir state, even under conditions of high information intensity.Self-evaluation and evaluative differentiation also were largelyunaffected by the intensity of incoming information when therewas a high press for integration. These results suggest that havingsufficient cognitive resources available enables people to activelyresist incoming information lhat might otherwise undermine theirexisting sense of self.

Wilh weak press for integration, in contrast, incoming infor-mation had a marked effect on all three variables. When theinfluence from neighboring clemenls is too weak to change anelement, intrinsic dynamics in the self-system are at a mini-mum. This makes the system highly reactive to any incominginformation. In effect, such information shakes up the system.Under low values of intensity, though, the incoming informa-tion is insufficient to independently dictate the value of ele-ments. Rather, the relatively few elements that change theirstate in a given simulation step almost always do so in thedirection of influence from other elements. Such enhancementuf the system's intrinsic dynamics has the effect of increasingthe degree of differentiation and positivity bias in the system.This scenario corresponds to a situation where external infor-mation is assimilated into a system only if it agrees with many

0.35

Low PressHigh Press

0 1 3

Intensity

Figure 3. Self-dynamism by press for integration and intensity of incoming information.

SOCIETY OF SELF 49

I Low Press

I High Press

IntensityFigure 4. Self-evaluation by press for integration and intensity of incoming information.

• Low Press• High Press

Figure 5. Evaluative differentiation by press for integration and intensity of incoming information.


of the system's elements and thus increases the coherence of the

system.9

In this model of self-structure, then, incoming information of a

random structure has a paradoxical effect, increasing rather than

decreasing the organization among elements, provided such infor-

mation is not sufficiently intense to overpower the system. It

follows from the model that a person with a low press for inte-

gration may benefit from social feedback and other sources of

self-relevant information, as long as such information does not

convey highly conflicting evaluations. Such information has a way

of facilitating the person's self-integration, even if its evaluative

structure is essentially random and less positive than the person's

existing sense of self. This suggests that people may turn to others,

not to learn specific things about themselves, but to facilitate their

own internal process of achieving coherence in their self-concept.

This situation reverses dramatically with higher values of infor-

mation intensity. In effect, the shaking becomes sufficiently strong

that it dictates the dynamics of the system rather than facilitating

the system's intrinsic dynamics. Extrapolating from these results,

under weak press for integration, a person's existing sense of self

is insufficient to provide a basis for rejecting incoming informa-

tion. This makes the person vulnerable to evaluatively intense

social feedback and other sources of self-relevant ideas. Because

the structure of incoming information is random and because

system elements change their state independently of their neigh-

borhood context, higher order differentiated structures begin to

decompose (or cannot be formed in the first place). The system

loses intrinsic dynamics and simply follows outside influences.

And because these influences are less positive than the initial state

of the system, the positivity bias in self-evaluation also diminishes.

In short, when the system lacks the cognitive resources to check

for possible inconsistencies and conflicts among elements, it be-

comes vulnerable to new information from outside sources. With-

out the capacity for rejecting incoming information, even patently

absurd ideas may be initially incorporated into the system without

much of a fight (cf. Gilbert, 1993).

Intrinsic Dynamics and Biased Incoming Information

In the simulations described thus far, incoming information was

equally balanced between positive and negative valence. Clearly,

information relevant to the self is rarely balanced like this in

real-world settings. Feedback from other people, for example, is

commonly slanted toward favorable or unfavorable judgments,

with positively biased information being more common than neg-

atively biased appraisals (e.g., Tesser & Rosen, 1975). To explore

evaluative biases, we ran further simulations in which a constantpositive or negative value was added to incoming information. To

represent negative bias, we changed the mean of incoming infor-

mation from 0 to —2; to represent positive bias, the mean was

changed to 2. The absence of information, meanwhile, was repre-

sented by a value of 0. We ran two sets of simulations to explore

the effect of bias. The first investigated the effects of hias on the

development of the self-system as a function of low versus high

press for integration. The second investigated how a self-system

that has already formed (i.e., a self that is positive, differentiated,

and high in integration press) reacts to biased incoming informa-

tion. In both cases, the simulations were run for 50 steps. Results

for each condition represent the average across 100 simulations.

Consider first the results for the effect of incoming information

on the formation of the self-system. In general, the results are

consistent with the results of the simulations investigating the

effects of random information (described earlier). Under condi-

tions of high press for integration, the self-system was able to resist

incoming information, regardless of its valence. Under low press

for integration, in contrast, the self-system was strongly affected

by incoming information. This effect is apparent with respect to

change versus stability in self-evaluation (see Figure 6). Under low

press, negative incoming information was able to reverse the

positivity bias and promote negative self-evaluation. Biased infor-

mation was also similar to random information in its effect on

evaluative differentiation (see Figure 7). Under high press for

integration, information of either valence had little effect on the

degree of clustering, although positive information tended to pro-

mote slightly greater clustering than did negative information.

Under low press for integration, incoming information of either

valence tended to increase differentiation in the self-system, a

result that again replicates the findings regarding the impact of

noise.

Consider now the effect of biased information on a self-system

that has already formed. This set of simulations investigated how

the self-system reestablishes equilibrium after exposure to positive

versus negative incoming information. They differed in two basic

ways from the previous simulations. First, the starting configura-

tion reflected the typical final configuration of the initial simula-

tions (i.e., after 50 steps). Thus, the starting self-system was at

static equilibrium, with a strong positivity bias, a high degree of

differentiation, and no dynamism. Second, the valenced informa-

tion was presented only at the outset instead of being supplied

throughout the simulation steps. The information was introduced

by reversing the valence of 15% of either the positive or the

negative elements (randomly chosen in both cases). The system

was then allowed to run without the introduction of any further

information. The simulations in all cases were conducted under

high press for integration.

The results of these simulations for self-evaluation and evalua-

tive differentiation are presented in Figures 8 and 9, respectively.

Each graph portrays the changes in these measures, with Time 1

depicting the equilibrium of the system before the receipt of

information, Time 2 depicting the state of the system immediately

after the information was introduced, and the three succeeding

9 To understand this mechanism, consider a noncentral negative element

surrounded by eight positive elements with low centrality. The total influ-

ence of all eight elements is equal to 1.6 (eight elements, each with a

centrality value of 2 and a press value of .1). This value is not sufficient to

override the influence of an element on itself (which equals 2). When the

incoming information acts in the same direction as the influence of ele-

ments within the system, even low values of incoming information can

change an element's valence, [f, on the other hand, the same configuration

of elements is evaluatively consistent, the value of incoming information

necessary to change an element's valence is 3.6, because an element's

influence on itself (2) is in the same direction of the influence from its eight

neighboring elements (1.6). Because intensity was normally distributed, a

value of 3.6 or greater occurred with considerably less frequency than

values exceeding .4. Changes in the direction of greater evaluative consis-

tency were thus much more frequent in the presence of noise than were

changes in the direction of lower consistency.

SOCIETY OF SELF 51

-0.2

-0.4

• Low Press• High Press

0 2

Evaluative Bias

Figure 6. Self-evaluation in a disordered system by press for integration and biased incoming information.

I Low Press

I High Press

Evaluative Bias

Figure 7. Evaluative differentiation in a disordered system by press for integration and biased incoming

information.


I NegativeI Positive

2 3 4 5 6

Time

Figure 8. Self-evaluation by biased incoming information for a stable system with high press for integration.

times depicting successive simulation steps. Time 6 portrays thefinal equilibrium of the system, which was typically achievedbefore 10 simulation steps.

For self-evaluation, negative information had a temporary ef-fect, serving to decrease the proportion of positive elements atTime 2. After three simulation steps, however, self-evaluation wasrestored to almost its original value (.6). Positive information alsoproduced an initial effect, serving to increase self-evaluation, al-though this effect was much less pronounced than the correspond-ing effect of negative information. Because of the positivity bias,fewer negative elements were available to be reversed. The incre-ment in self-evaluation in response to positively biased informa-tion diminished less than the corresponding decrement producedby negative information. The results for evaluative differentiationalso revealed some asymmetry between positively and negativelybiased incoming information. Negative information served to dis-organize an already organized system to a higher degree man didinformation biased toward positivity. This effect is due to the factthat 15% of positive elements represents a higher number than15% of negative elements. In both conditions, however, the sys-tem's structure became fully reestablished after several simulationsteps.

Taken together, these results suggest that the self-system isquite immune to information that contradicts its current state.Self-systems characterized by positive self-evaluation seem to

be especially immune to negative information. There is animmediate effect of such information, but because of the ongo-ing integration process, the self fairly quickly regains its pre-existing equilibrium. In view of the previous simulation results,however, it is clear that the effects of incoming informationdepend not only on self-evaluation, but also on the structuraland dynamic properties that shape the process of integration andassimilation of information.

Temporal Structure of Conflicting Information

The results of the simulations thus far suggest that an inte-grated self-system is remarkably immune to the effects ofincoming information of negative valence. Even if such infor-mation temporarily disrupts the evaluative organization of thesystem and reduces positivity, the integrative mechanisms canrestore the organization and overall valence of the system. Thisfinding corresponds to empirical work by Showers and hercolleagues (e.g., Showers & Kling, 1996); they demonstratedthat compartmentalization in the self-structure breaks the linkbetween negative information and negative self-evaluation.This effect is said to reflect the concentration of negativeinformation in nonsalient areas of the self-structure. The resultsof our simulations suggest an additional mechanism by whichcompartmentalization may shield the self from negative infor-

SOCIETY OF SELF 53

0.1

I NegativeI Positive

Figure 9. Evaluative differentiation by biased incoming information for a stable system with high press forintegration.

mation. As long as contradictory information is sufficientlyspaced in time, even repetitive sets of such information areunlikely to destabilize the existing structure because each setarrives at a system that has effectively nullified the effects ofearlier sets. This temporal spacing of incoming informationhelps explain how people can maintain positive self-evaluationin the face of seemingly overwhelming negative feedback andtraumatic life events (cf. Showers, Abramson, & Hogan, 1998).

Although the self-system is clearly capable of reintegrationwhen faced with contradictory information, this effect does notoccur instantly but rather unfolds in real time. If the self-systemdoes not have sufficient time to reintegrate before the arrival offurther contradictory information, there may be an appreciable tollon the organization and positivity of the system. To explore thispossibility, we began with a well-differentiated and positive self-structure and exposed it to incoming information of contradictory(i.e., negative) valence. The negative information was introducedby reversing the valence of 60% of the positive elements. Theamount of the incoming information was constant, but we variedthe rate at which it was introduced into the system. The negativeinformation was spread over 6 simulation steps (lowest temporalconcentration), 3 steps, or 2 steps, or it was all presented in the firstsimulation step (highest temporal concentration). In a controlcondition, no negative information was presented. The simulations

in each case were run for 30 steps after the first instance ofincoming information, and self-evaluation was assessed at the 30thsimulation step.

Results showed that in all cases, self-dynamism was 0 at the30th step, indicating that the process of integration had com-pleted. As expected, the temporal concentration of negativeinformation affected self-evaluation (see Figure 10). The fasterthe information entered the system, the lower the positivity ofthe system. Even when all the negative information entered thesystem in two steps, however, self-evaluation remained posi-tive. Only when the negative information was presented all atonce (highest temporal concentration) did self-evaluation be-come negative. The highly concentrated information was able tochange the self-structure because the mutual support providedby a large number of negative elements in a short time was ableto counteract the influence of positive elements in the system.This effect suggests that although people often appear immuneto inconsistent feedback (cf. Baumeister, 1993; Swarm, 1990),such feedback might promote change if it were concentrated intime and effectively changed elements at a rate that exceededthe rate of self-integration processes. People with low self-esteem might be especially inclined to change in this manner, inview of the connection between low self-esteem and indexes of


O'*3re_3

reui

0̂)CO

-0.6

Control 6 Steps 3 Steps 2 Steps

Temporal Spacing of Information

Figure 10. Self-evaluation by temporal concentration of inconsistent information.

1 Step

uncertainty and poor differentiation (e.g., Baumgardner, 1990:Campbell et al., 1996; Kernis, 1993; Vallacher, 1978).

The Self-System in Perspective

There is widespread agreement that the self is multifaceted,consisting of many diverse cognitive and affective elements. Thereis also consensus that the self is a unitary concept, open todescription with global notions such as self-esteem and self-certainty. At first blush, these two perspectives on the self seemirreconcilable. A primary theme of this article is that the "oneversus many" issue can be resolved by assuming that the self isdefined in terms of the organization among basic elements and theemergent properties to which this organization gives rise. Theglobal properties of the self-system, then, cannot be reduced to thesum or average of the values associated with the starting config-uration of basic elements. Rather, the properties that characterizethe system as a whole reflect the interactions among the system'selements. In principle, very different self-concepts, each charac-terized by unique values of global variables (e.g., self-esteem), canbe built from the same set of self-relevant thoughts, memories, andfeelings.

The model we have presented here provides a framework withinwhich certain organizational tendencies in the self-system can bedepicted and investigated. As a means of highlighting the basicfeatures of this model and its primary implications for self-theory,we consider the results of the simulations in light of three long-

standing issues in theoretical accounts of the self: the interplay ofinternal and external factors in shaping self-concept, the nature ofstability and change in self-concept, and the bases for coherence inself-concept. We conclude by noting the limitations of the modelin its present form and by suggesting avenues for future researchwithin this paradigm.

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Dynamics

To an appreciable extent, the dynamics of self-organization areinternally generated, produced by mutual influences among thelower level elements of self-understanding. This means that in theabsence of incoming information, the self-system displays changeas the system elements attempt to align themselves with respect toevaluation. Because of the sheer size of the self-system and theenormous diversity of self-relevant thoughts and memories, thisprocess of progressive integration is unlikely to result in globalcoherence. Instead, the elements are likely to become organizedinto a number of coherent subsets that are relatively independent ofeach other.

This is not to suggest that external information has no influenceon the self-system. To the contrary, incoming information plays acritical role in the formation of self-structure and continues to playa role in systems that have achieved organization. The specificeffect of incoming information, however, depends on its interac-tion with the existing organization of the self-system. In a rela-tively unorganized system, random information (i.e., information

SOCIETY OF SELF 55

without a consistent valence) can increase or decrease self-

organization tendencies, depending on the extremity of this infor-

mation. Nonextreme incoming information tends to increase orga-

nization, facilitating the emergence of structure in a system that

otherwise would not be able to cohere into subsets of elements.

Extreme random information, on the other hand, can exceed the

capacity of the integrative mechanisms in the serf-system and thus

disrupt the emergence of coherent subsets of elements. This effect

is more readily pronounced under conditions associated with low

press for integration. In essence, the system begins to follow the

structure of the incoming information, so that the dynamics of the

system become extrinsic rather than intrinsic.

Extrapolating from these considerations, it may be that the

appetite for self-relevant information from others is driven in part

by the need to achieve and maintain organization in the self-

system. In this view, even random external information is desired

when people are uncertain about themselves, because incoming

information helps to organize existing elements. Social feedback

and other interpersonal sources of self-relevant information may

have little in the way of coherent content, but such input may serve

to shake up the self-system and in this way facilitate the process of

mutual influence among elements in the system. This principle

may in fact be relevant to mental systems generally. The research

on sensory deprivation (e.g., Zubek, 1969), for example, has

shown that in the absence of external information, thoughts be-

come progressively disorganized, even bizarre. When deprived in

this manner, people become desperate for any outside stimulation,

perhaps because such information provides a means by which

internally generated thoughts and sensations can become orga-

nized. In a related vein, Arnit (1989) has argued that the brain

cannot function effectively without noise. Presumably, noise in-

teracts with the existing structure of synaptic connections to pro-

duce meaningful dynamics (i.e., dynamics that convey informa-

tion). In light of this work, it is reasonable to suggest that the self

needs incoming information to achieve and maintain coherence.

The results of the simulations suggest that the strength of this need

is enhanced when the self-system lacks sufficient structure to

organize the wealth of information it contains.

This perspective on the role of incoming information in self-

concept dynamics and structure provides a new way to think about

affiliation motives. In this view, people may seek out others not so

much for the specific insights these people have to offer but rather

for the priming of self-organization tendencies their comments are

likely to generate. It is noteworthy in this regard that affiliation

tendencies are enhanced when people are uncertain about their

thoughts, feelings, competencies, and other aspects of their per-

sonal state (cf. Festinger, 1954; Schachter, 1959; Trope, 1986).

The specific information gleaned from such contact may not be

particularly memorable, let alone inspiring, but it may provide a

basis for sorting out and organizing the myriad diverse thoughts

and feelings experienced by the person when he or she is uncertain.

Even negative feedback from others may be embraced when

people are uncertain about a particular aspect of the self, because

such feedback provides a basis for achieving coherence and sta-

bility in self-concept (cf. Vallacher, 1980). At the same time,

though, the very same people are most likely to be hurt by

incoming information if it exceeds a certain threshold of intensity.

If we extrapolate from the simulation results, we see that infor-

mation that is widely divergent in valence can overwhelm the

integrative capacity of a weakly organized self-system and disrupt

whatever degree of organization exists.

By the same token, when people have a relatively coherent

perspective on themselves in a given context, their need for in-

coming information is correspondingly diminished. Indeed, even

coherent (as opposed to random) feedback may have little impact

on people with a currently well-structured sense of self, because

the mutual influences among organized elements insulate them

against change. In such instances, only feedback that is consistent

with the global valence of the self-domain in question is likely to

be assimilated (cf. Swann & Ely, 1984).

Stability and Change in the Self-System

Most theoretical accounts of the self emphasize the importance

of maintaining stability in one's overall sense of serf and in one's

more specific self-images (e.g., Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Higgins,

1996; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997;

Swann, 1990; Tesser, 1988). The self provides an important frame

of reference for thought and action, so it is entirely reasonable that

it should be invested with a fair degree of stability in the face of

contradictory information, setbacks, and other challenges posed by.

the social and physical environment. The results of the simulations

confirm the tendency toward stability in global properties of the

self, but they also point to two rather different manifestations of

this tendency. In a self characterized by static equilibrium, there is

resistance to incoming information that would change the status of

an element or a subset of elements. In a self-concept characterized

by dynamic equilibrium, there may be assimilation of inconsistent

information in the short term but a tendency for elements and

subsets of elements to return to their original value on a longer

time scale. Research on the stability issue has typically centered on

people's immediate reaction to influence (e.g., social or perfor-

mance feedback) and thus is relevant to static equilibrium. How-

ever, there is reason to suspect that dynamic equilibrium is also a

pervasive feature of the self-system and hence warrants investiga-

tion in its own right.Consider first the case of static equilibrium. This tendency is

likely to be observed in a self-system that is relatively unintegrated

but consists of relatively strong individual elements. When this is

the case, the person's sense of self is tied up in the content of

specific self-assessments. In the face of evidence contradicting

these assessments, the person may actively resist change and thus

demonstrate impressive stability in his or her self-image. At some

point, however, the magnitude and weight of incoming contradic-

tory information may become overwhelming and promote a dra-

matic change in the person's self-image. Assuming the elements

maintain their degree of strength (i.e., centrality), once such a

change occurs the original self-image is unlikely to be restored.

Dynamic equilibrium follows a quite different scenario. This

tendency is likely to be observed in a serf-system that is relatively

integrated, consisting of clusters of elements that provide mutual

support for one another. The individual elements may be relatively

weak, so that the person's sense of self is not tied to any one

particular consideration. When such a consideration is challenged,

then, the incoming information may be temporarily accepted and

compared with other elements in that self-domain. Because the

information conflicts with many other elements and because these

elements provide support for the original element, the incongruent

56 NOWAK, VALLACHER, TESSER, AND BORKOWSK1

information will ultimately be rejected. In this scenario, then,

incoming incongruent information engages integration mecha-

nisms, temporarily producing volatile dynamics in the system.

After some time, however, the original self-image (as well as

corresponding self-evaluation) is restored.

It is interesting to map these two forms of self-concept stability

onto individual differences with respect to dimensions such as

ego control (e.g., Loevinger, 1997) and open- versus closed-

mindedness (e.g., Rokeach, 1968). People with an unintegrated

sense of self (i.e., a weak ego) have their self-worth tied up in

specific aspects of themselves (e.g., Crocker & Wolfe, 1998), and

the centrality of those aspects to self-esteem can make their self-

concepts very resistant to change. Rather than considering incon-

gruenl evidence, such information is rejected outright in a rigid and

closed-minded manner. A person's self-worth, for example, may

be highly linked to specific athletic talents or indications of wealth.

If those attributes are undermined, the person's entire sense of self

may be threatened. If, on the other hand, a person's sense of self

is built on a broad combination of specific virtues and talents, each

element contributes relatively less to the person's self-evaluation

and can be compensated for by other elements that have not been

changed (cf. Linville, 1985; Vallacher, 1980). And because of the

supportive influence of other elements with which it is locally

integrated, there is potential for restoration of an element that has

changed in response to incongruent information.

It is conceivable, of course, that a well-integrated system might

consist of strong rather than weak elements. Such a system should

show the greatest resistance to change, combining the features of

both static and dynamic equilibrium. Not only does integration

with other elements provide potential for each element to bounce

back after it has changed, but the strength of these elements also

makes it more difficult to change in the first place. By the same

token, it is conceivable that a self-system might be characterized

by both lack of integration and uniformly weak elements. Such a

system would demonstrate neither static nor dynamic equilibrium

and would effectively be at the mercy of incoming information. A

self-concept reflecting these dynamical and structural features

would be insufficient to provide the frame of reference for judg-

ment and action that is commonly assumed in theoretical accounts

of the self.

The distinction between static and dynamic equilibrium under-

scores the importance of time scales when attempting to under-

stand the dynamics of the self-system (Nowak & Vallacher,

1998a). When a self-image is disturbed by moderately strong

influence, in the long run the effect of the disturbance will be

negligible regardless of which type of equilibrium characterizes

the system. In the short run, however, the person with dynamicresistance may show a strong effect with a rebound occurring at

some later time, whereas the person widi static resistance will

show negligible effects in the short run as well. Although it may be

difficult to distinguish the two types of resistance under moderate

disturbance in the long run, the types will show qualitatively

different dynamics once change has occurred. Whereas a dynam-

ically stable self-system will restore its original state, a self-system

characterized by static equilibrium may lack this restorative ca-

pacity because of the weakness of its integrative potential.

Even in a system characterized by dynamic equilibrium, it is

possible for incoming information to undermine the system's

structure and produce long-term qualitative changes in global

properties of the system. A key factor here is the temporal spacing

of incongruent information. If the time lag between elements of

negative information is sufficiently long, the self-system will have

time to reestablish equilibrium after each element is changed, so

that the information will have negligible long-term effect. On the

other hand, if all the incongruent elements are presented at the

same time, they may push the system to a new equilibrium, making

it difficult for (he self-system to return to its initial state. From

another perspective, if a single conflicting element enters an al-

ready organized domain, it is easily rejected by the combined

influence of the other elements in the domain. But if several

conflicting elements arrive at the same time, they can provide

mutual support for each other and hence organize into a cluster,

and such a cluster can counteract the mutual influences among

elements in the domain in question.

Coherence in Self-Concept

The notion of self-concept coherence assumes the operation of

integrative mechanisms in the self-system. This is a highly rea-

sonable assumption in light of many independent lines of theory

and research that invoke motives toward cognitive and evaluative

consistency in psychological systems (cf. Abelson et al., 1968;

Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958; lesser, 1978). Results from the

work on thought-induced attitude polarization (Tesser, 1978), for

instance, have demonstrated that when people think about some-

thing (i.e., an object, activity, or person) that has personal impor-

tance, there is a tendency for the initial evaluation to become

progressively extreme during the course of judgment. Presumably,

thoughts that are consistent with the initial evaluation reinforce

one another, whereas inconsistent cognitive and affective elements

are suppressed or reinterpreted to bring them into line with the

prevailing sentiment. Integrative mechanisms of this kind are

posited in the present model. Thus, elements of the self are put into

juxtaposition and checked for possible inconsistencies. When in-

congruities are detected, the system actively rejects or reinterprets

the element in question so as to achieve or maintain internal

coherence. The detection of incoherence may focus integration

mechanisms on the relevant aspects of the self, and the amount of

cognitive resources devoted to this task may increase until inte-

gration is achieved, unless a parallel task drains cognitive re-

sources (cf. Gilbert, 1993), or the attempt becomes sufficiently

hopeless or aversive that it promotes disengagement (cf. Carver &

Scheier, 1990).

Because of the complexity and sheer size of the self-system,

complete evaluative integration is unlikely to be attained. The lack

of global integration is not problematic for people as long as they

can achieve local integration with respect to subsets of elements in

their self-system. In fact, there is evidence that having a differen-

tiated self-concept facilitates adaptive functioning. Linville (1985),

for instance, has found that highly differentiated people better

accommodate failures, setbacks, and other sources of negative

information pertaining to the self. Research on self-schemas

(Markus, 1980), in turn, has shown that having a well-defined

knowledge structure in a given domain enables the person to

respond quickly and decisively to information of a self-relevant

nature. These benefits, however, are likely to be manifest only

when the elements within regions of the self are evaluatively

coherent (e.g., Showers & Kling, 1996). Cognitive differentiation

SOCIETY OF SELF 57

(e.g., Linville, 1985) provides a basis for rich understanding of

information pertaining to the self, but if this understanding is

evaluatively inconsistent it may provide weak and conflicting

guides for action. Evaluative coherence within a region of the

self-system, on the other hand, may represent insensitivity to

subtle distinctions, but this integrative tendency allows for ready

interpretation of incoming information and a ready basis for the

planning and conduct of action.

The degree of coherence observed in a self-system clearly

depends on the strength of the press for integration. There is reason

to think that the importance of integrative mechanisms rise and fall

in accord with meaningful and specifiable factors. Particularly

relevant in this regard is self-awareness theory (Duval & Wick-

lund, 1972), which focuses explicitly on variation in people's

conscious concern with achieving and maintaining self-con-

sistency. According to this theory, a person in a self-aware state is

motivated to maintain consistency with respect to whatever aspect

of the self is currently salient for him or her. Incoming information

that is incongruent with the salient self-domain becomes a source

of discomfort, leading to compensatory thought and behavior to

restore consistency to the system. Incongruent social feedback, for

instance, might be rejected after considering it in light of well-

structured (and hence well-protected) clusters of relevant thoughts

and feelings. Such concerns are said to be lacking when a person

is not in a state of self-focused attention. Instead, the non-self-

aware person is said to be responsive to rewards, costs, and other

factors in the immediate context, with little regard for the impli-

cations of his or her behavior for self-concept coherence (cf.

Carver & Scheier, 1981).

Variability in the press for integration also follows from theory

and research on cognitive busyness (Gilbert, 1993), if one makes

the reasonable assumption that mental resources are required to

engage in the integrative processes depicted in the present model.

Presumably, any factor that drains cognitive resources (e.g., dis-

traction, a parallel task) can both inhibit the comparison of ele-

ments with respect to mutual consistency and weaken the mutual

influences among elements that would establish coherence. In this

light, it is interesting to consider research showing that when

people are put under cognitive load, they demonstrate an enhanced

tendency to incorporate information that is inconsistent with their

prevailing self-concept (e.g., Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, &

Gilbert, 1990). Thus, although people with low self-esteem tend to

reject positive information by virtue of its inconsistency with

global properties of their self-system, they tend to readily embrace

such information when they are induced to be cognitively busy

(e.g., Paulhus & Levitt, 1987). Presumably, the drain on mental

resources is tantamount to weakening the press for integration that

would otherwise protect them against the incongruent (but flatter-

ing) self-relevant information.We hasten to add that the correspondence between the press for

integration as developed in the present model and relevant vari-

ables established in experimental work is necessarily speculative at

this point. Future researchers must develop precise means of

assessing variation in the press for integration and determine

whether such variation maps onto established phenomena such as

self-awareness and cognitive busyness. Researchers must also

investigate whether and to what extent the press for integration

plays a theoretically meaningful role in people's reaction to self-

relevant information. The results of such work, in turn, can inform

future theoretical work. It is through feedback from different

approaches that richer and more precise understanding of the

self-system is likely to be achieved.

Caveats and Future Iterations

Our intent in this paper was to provide a formal framework for

investigating collective properties of the self. Within this frame-

work, it is possible to capture basic and robust features of self-

concept organization and to investigate the consequences of this

process. The results of the computer simulations revealed that

some processes presumed to be unique to the self may in fact be

characteristic of complex systems in general. Like complex dy-

namical systems in other areas of science, global properties of the

self-system emerge from the interaction of basic elements. So

although the self is a controlling agent for other psychological

processes, it does not need a controlling agent to control its own

operation. Nor is the basic configuration of the self-system a

passive reflection of incoming information. To the contrary, the

emergence of structure in the self-system reflects mutual influ-

ences among basic elements and thus can be said to be internally

generated. External factors such as social feedback play a role, of

course, but they do so by interacting with the intrinsic dynamics of

the self-system.

This conclusion does not mean that the self-structure is indis-

tinguishable from other psychological structures. As noted at the

outset, the self is unique in many important ways that have been

documented in empirical research over the years. The self may

have built-in values and preferences, for example, reflecting evo-

lutionary considerations such as altruism and social connectedness

(cf. Axelrod, 1984; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Beach & Tesser, in

press; Buss, 1995; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997). Unique emo-

tional and motivational mechanisms also play important roles in

self-evaluation and in response to external (primarily social)

sources of information (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990; Higgins,

1996; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tesser, 1988). The self is also

intimately linked to other psychological systems, such as bodily

processes (e.g., Schachter & Singer, 1962), action systems (e.g.,

Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), and representations of the social

world (e.g., Markus & Sentis, 1983). The unique aspects of the

self-system point to limitations in the analogy between self and

society and, more generally, impose constraints on the emergence

of collective properties in the self-system. Clearly, then, a simpli-

fied characterization cannot hope to capture all the richness

and complexity of the features and processes specific to the

self-system.

The formal framework we have presented should not be looked

on as a substitute for the rich insights generated by other theories

and research on the self. To the contrary, considering such insights

in light of the present model should enable us to determine which

facets of the self are unique and which represent invariant prop-

erties that characterize complex systems of all kinds. With this in

mind, both the formal approach we have developed here and the

empirical approach to self-process should be used to inform one

another. Within the cellular automata framework, future research-

ers should incorporate empirically established processes as addi-

tional variables and constraints. We did this to some extent in the

present simulations by introducing features such as a two-

dimensional lattice to represent the relatedness of self-relevant


infonnation, a variation in the press for integration to simulate

variation in self-awareness or cognitive busyness, and a starting

configuration consisting of more positive than negative elements

to simulate the positivity bias. Successive iterations of this ap-

proach will no doubt introduce yet other important constraints and

processes that have been revealed empirically.

The cellular automata framework, meanwhile, provides features

and generates results that can benefit subsequent empirical agen-

das. On the basis of results of the present simulations, for example,

future researchers should give explicit consideration to the time

dimension in investigating processes and properties of the self-

system. The temporal spacing of self-relevant information, first of

all, may prove to be an important independent variable in such

research. Variation in the rate of incoming information, for exam-

ple, may provide insight into the mode of stability (i.e., static vs.

dynamic) characterizing a person's self-system, and it may deter-

mine whether a dynamically stable system ultimately rejects in-

congruent information or instead undergoes structural change to

accommodate the infonnation. Second, it is imperative that peo-

ple's reaction to social feedback and other sources of self-relevant

information be assessed on appropriate time scales to discern the

system's mode of functioning. In focusing only on the immediate

impact of incongruent information, one cannot determine whether

self-concept change reflects structural change in the self-system or

simply a short-term response in service of dynamic stability. By

the same token, the lack of change in the short term might mask

beneath-the-surface structural changes in the self-system that be-

come manifest after long periods of time. Restricting one's focus

to long-term changes, on the other hand, would blur the distinction

between static and dynamic equilibrium, because in both cases

there is a tendency for the system ultimately to resist incongruent

information from outside the system.

The cellular automata approach obviously oversimplifies the

complex cognitive and affective machinery responsible for the

emergence and maintenance of self-structure. Although some sim-

plifications are inevitable when attempting to model a highly

complex phenomenon, two features of the present model warrant

special comment. The first concerns the identity of the elements in

the cellular automata. We assumed that each element represents a

relatively low-level representation of self, corresponding to spe-

cific events, assertions, instances of feedback from others, and so

forth. Clearly, when people reflect on themselves, considerably

higher level aspects of self come to mind. Thus, people routinely

think about their personality traits, domains of personal compe-

tence, moral values, and personal goals. This problem does not

have an obvious counterpart in cellular automata models of soci-

ety, where each element is clearly identified as an individual (cf.

Nowak et al., 1990). Although the present model is ultimately

defined in terms of low-level elements, it is because of integrative

processes that subsystems of the self-structure achieve sufficient

coherence to be identified as meaningful higher level aspects of the

self. Integrative processes working on the emergent substructures,

in turn, could generate even higher level features of the self, and so

on, in a manner reflecting progressive integration.

The second feature of the cellular automata model that warrants

consideration represents a more serious concern. We assumed that

the neighborhood structure in the self-system does not change over

time for a given simulation, so that each element has a fixed rather

fluid relation to other elements. There is reason to think, however,

that any given element can enter into multiple self-structures.

"Being agreeable," for instance, can be considered with respect to

different sets of elements and take on different meanings and

evaluations as a result. In the context of a social relationship, this

element of the self is likely considered in relation to such elements

as "friendly," "interesting," and "talking rapidly" and so is likely

to be evaluated positively. In a leadership context, however, "being

agreeable" is more likely to be considered in relation to such

self-relevant elements as "acting decisively," "taking charge," and

"not wasting time on small talk" and as a result may be evaluated

negatively. The model we presented does not allow for such

gestalt-like transformations of individual elements.

This basic limitation is shared by cellular automata models of

societal processes as well (see Nowak & Vallacher, 1998b).

Clearly, the same individual belongs to different social structures,

in each of which he or she may be closely linked to entirely

different sets of people. To model this multiplicity of social struc-

tures, one can assume that each individual is represented in several

social spaces, with each space corresponding to a distinct social

structure (e.g., work, family, neighborhood). In an analogous fash-

ion, one can assume that each element of the self-system enters

into different structures corresponding to various self-schemata or

roles. This assumption suggests that the emergence of self-

structure observed in the present simulations may be specific to

particular domains rather than characteristic of the self-system in a

global sense. Nonetheless, the generality of the effects observed

across different domains suggests that they are generic features of

the self-system in any given context.

It is possible, though, to incorporate the possibility of change in the

relations among elements into the present model by allowing elements

to move within the grid. This feature can be implemented by assum-

ing that there are unoccupied cells. If an element that would otherwise

have to change its valence is in the vicinity of an empty cell, it will

move to that cell instead of changing its valence. Simulations of such

dynamics in societal contexts (Szamrej, 1989) have revealed in-

creased clustering (corresponding to greater differentiation in the

present model) and decreased polarization (corresponding to de-

creased positivity in the present model). The empty cell in this

approach corresponds to a barrier in the flow of information. With

respect to the self-system, this means that elements separated by an

empty cell do not influence each other (i.e., are not directly com-

pared). Note that when such changes take place, they create the

potential for subsequent movement of other elements by virtue of

creating empty cells in the original neighborhood. The results ob-

tained with this feature present are qualitatively similar to the results

obtained in the present model. For this reason and for the sake of

simplicity, we did not incorporate the movement option into this

preliminary version of the society-of-self model.

In the society-of-self model, elements of the self are portrayed in

analogy to individuals in society. Self-integration processes act in a

manner similar to social influence, and evaluative self-organization is

analogous to the emergence of public opinion (Nowak et al., 1990).

The simplifications used in the development of this model with

respect to the self also parallel the simplifications necessary to model

social influence processes in cellular automata models of societal

structure. At this stage in their development, these models do not

capture features of social life such as the emergence of social insti-

tutions or the various social hierarchies that organize the fabric of

society, hi a like manner, the society-of-self model at present does not

SOCIETY OF SELF 59

provide for the emergence of well-documented self-functions, such

as self-esteem maintenance, self-conscious emotions, and self-

regulation. Societal applications of cellular automata models do not

provide for the content of attitudes, opinions, or interests, but rather

ate designed to capture the formal structure of social influence and

interdependency. In an analogous manner, the elements of die self-

system cannot be characterized with respect to their content, but rather

are defined with respect to their evaluation and relatedness to one

another.

Although there are important formal similarities between the

organization of self and society, the societal metaphor of self

clearly has limitations. Evaluatively charged cognitive elements,

after all, are not the same as individuals. Beyond that, there are

many important mechanisms specific to the self that are not shared

by social systems. It is not clear in the present model, for example,

how evaluatively coherent regions of the self provide for self-

regulation and other bases for action. Nor does the present model

provide a complete depiction of positivity biases in self-concept.

Research relevant to positivity indicates that this tendency goes

beyond simply having more positive than negative elements in

one's self-concept. It appears instead that people tend to emphasize

their strengths (e.g., areas of competence, traits) and to downplay

their weaknesses and shortcomings (e.g., Tesser & Campbell,

1983; Showers & Kling, 1996)—even if there is relatively abun-

dant low-level evidence relevant to the latter aspects of self. The

society-of-self model illustrates how integrative mechanisms pro-

mote evaluative differentiation, but the model does not explain

why positive regions of the self tend to achieve prepotence at the

expense of negatively valenced regions.

Despite these simplifications and limitations, the society-of-self

model is useful for revealing properties of the self-system that are

common to complex systems composed of many interconnected ele-

ments. Thus, by abstracting from semantic content to formal proper-

ties of self-elements, one can gain insight into the emergence of stable

self-understanding from the dynamic interplay of initially disordered

elements and external influences. And from a strictly empirical point

of view, the simulation results are compatible with well-established

theory and research on the self. Although this approach is in a

preliminary stage of development, it promises to provide a well-

defined platform for integrating existing ideas and for testing new

predictions regarding the structure and process of the self-system. The

society of self serves as a model of qualitative understanding that

holds the potential for integrating the self-system with other complex

systems in social life and the natural world.

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Received March 16, 1998

Revision received December 15, 1998

Accepted March 13, 1999 •

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