Socialism, Economic Development and Planning in Mali, 1960-1968

Socialism, Economic Development and Planning in Mali, 1960-1968Author(s): Guy MartinSource: Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines, Vol.10, No. 1 (1976), pp. 23-46Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of the Canadian Association of African StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/483923 .

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Revue canadienne des 6tudes africaines / Canadian Journal of African Studies Volume X, no 1, 1976, 23-47

Socialism, Economic Development and Planning in Mali, 1960-19681

Guy MARTIN *

RESUME - Le socialisme, le developpement 6conomique et la planification au Mali, 1960-1968

Cet essai se situe dans la tradition marxiste de l'economie politique. Adoptant une methodologie pluridisciplinaire, il s'interroge sur les causes de l'echec du regime socialiste de Modibo Kdita que le Mali a connu entre 1960 et 1968. L'analyse semble rdveler que les causes de cet echec sont a rechercher a' la fois dans des problmes d'ordre economique et socio-politique. Une etude attentive de l'economie demontre que, compte tenu de l'etroitesse de la base &conomique initiale et des difficultes dues c I'environnement ge'ographique et a la rarete des ressources &conomiques, le Mali accusait des le depart tin fort handicap dans la poursuite de quelque politique de developpement que ce soit. D'autre part, I'analyse des classes sociales dimontre qu'en fait l'experience socialiste au Mali ne fut autre qu'une tentative de la part de la classe bureaucratique, devenue politiquement dominante, de se constituer la base economique qui lui manquait jusqu'd l'indedpendance. En ce faisant, elle se posait en ennemie de la classe marchande au plan economnique, et en ennemie de l'aristocratie traditionnelle au plan politique. En derniere analyse, le socialisme aut Mali semble n'avoir itd qu'un faux-semblant iddologique utilise au profit exclusif de la classe bureaucratique dirigeante.

INTRODUCTION

This paper purports to belong to the Marxist tradition of political economy in the study of development problems in the Third World initiated by Paul Baran and maintained by such contemporary scholars as Andr6 Gunder Frank for Latin

* Lecturer in Political Science, University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Gaborone, Botswana.

1. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1975 Annual Conference of the Canadian Association of African Studies, York University, Toronto, February 19-22, 1975. I am indebted to Professors Sheldon Gellar and Richard E. Stryker, Indiana University, Gerald K. Helleiner, University of Toronto, Frank Holmquist, Hampshire College, and Colin Leys, Queen's University, for their comments and criticisms on the original draft. The ideas, remaining mistakes and other shortcomings contained herein are, of course, my sole responsibility.

23



24 REVUE CANADIENNE DES ETUDES AFRICAINES

America, and Samir Amin for Africa. 2 Such an approach implies a multidisciplinary methodology in which the tools of history, sociology, political science and economics will be brought to bear on the particular case study presented here as far as the author's competence permits.

At this point, a few prefatory remarks on the particular meaning of "socialism" in the African context are in order. This is obviously not the place for an exhaustive discussion of this vast topic. 3 It will suffice to say that the available evidence seems to suggest that there is, in fact, no such thing as "African Socialism," implying the existence of a coherent body of a discernable doctrinal trend which is not to be found anywhere in Africa today. Rather, African paths to socialism on a country-by-country basis are what seem to be prevalent in Africa. Accordingly, one might validly talk of a Guinean path to socialism, or of a Tanzanian path to socialism. Thus, despite evident similarities, each socialist experiment in Africa has been unique in many ways and consequently can only be judged on its own merits.

A great deal of attention has been devoted in the past by scholars of all denominations to the socialist experiments of Ghana (terminated by the February 1966 coup d'Etat) and Guinea. Disillusioned with the overall failure of the first and the economic difficulties of the second, scholars have increasingly turned their attention to what seems currently to be the most promising socialist experiment of all, that of Tanzania. 4

However, it would seem that there is an inherent danger in this propensity to study whatever experiment is most likely to succeed. The fact of the matter is that, in my opinion, the socialist experiments of Ghana, Guinea and Mali have not yet been adequately studied. By this, I mean that the lessons from the evident or apparent failure of socialism in these three countries from a political economy perspective remain to be drawn. Yet, such an undertaking would seem to be a high priority item at a time when African governments display disquieting signs of political ambiguity, economic difficulties and ideological confusion.

It is with this type of concern in mind that I have undertaken to examine the economic and socio-political aspects of the socialist experiment in Mali between

2. Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, New York: Monthly Review Press (hereafter M.R.P.), 1957 ;Andre Gunder Frank, 4Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York: M.R.P., 1967; Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale, New York: M.R.P., 1974 (2 vols.).

3. One of the best general presentations of "African Socialism" remains that of W. H. Friedland and C. G. Rosberg, Jr. (Eds.), African Socialism, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964, despite the fact that it has now become somewhat outdated. See also: Jitendra Mohan, "Varieties of African Socialism," The Socialist Register 1966, pp. 220-266.

4. The literature on these three experiments is so prolific that it would be futile to attempt a meaningful selection in such a short space. However, what seems to be to date the best available analysis in my opinion are : for Ghana: Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, Ghana: End of an Illusion, New York : M.R.P., 1966; for Guinea: B. Ameillon, La Guinee: bilan d'une independance, Paris: Frangois Maspero, 1964: and for Tanzania: John S. Saul, "African Socialism in One Country: Tanzania," in G. Arrighi and J. S. Saul, Essays on the Political Economy of Africa, New York: M.R.P., 1973, pp. 237-335.



SOCIALISM, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING IN MALI, 1960-1968 25

1960 and 1968. Except for a few outdated and extremely general political studies, 5 no extensive pluridisciplinary work on the socialist experiment of Mali is available to this day. 6 This "benign neglect" towards Mali on the part of scholars must

partly be attributed to the overall scarcity and unreliability of data added to particularly unfavourable research conditions within Mali itself. Understandably, these constraints equally apply to the present writer. Remaining fully aware of the limitations placed on this study by such constraints, I will nevertheless attempt a preliminary investigation into the socialist experiment of Mali from a political-economic perspective, relying primarily on available government documents and secondary sources.

Mali became independent as a separate entity on August 20, 1960, after the break-up of the short-lived Federation of Mali created with Senegal on June 20, 1960. The September 22, 1960 extraordinary congress of Mali's single party, the Union Soudanaise-RDA enthusiastically decided to set the country on a socialist

path to development. From then on, all the energies of the leaders were - apparently at least - directed toward the building-up of "socialism in one country," economically as well as politically, with a seemingly prevalent concern for ideology.

The proud, handsome and eloquent President Modibo K6ita apparently embodied all the necessary qualities and virtues of the Malian people for him to best personify the national aspirations and conscious efforts for far-reaching, overall development along socialist lines. With its partners of the Union of African States, Ghana and Guinea, Mali best exemplified the so-called "radical" trend of the immediate post-independence period, and indeed managed to achieve a position of respect in the international community, with a range of diplomatic relations much wider than that of almost any other African country during that period.

Thus, the seemingly easy take-over of power by a handful of junior army officers led by Lieutenant (now Colonel) Moussa Traor6 on the morning of November 19, 1968, came as a complete surprise to most observers of the African political scene. 7 On closer examination, however, some signs of economic difficulties, political tensions and popular disillusionment were apparent as early as 1966.

This study, covering the "socialist era" of independent Mali, from September 22, 1960 to November 19, 1968, will be concerned essentially with the main

5. The two most notable of which being: Frank G. Snyder, One-Party Government in Mali, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965; and: Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, "Mali,:" in James S. Coleman and C. G. Rosberg, Jr. (Eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966, pp. 216-258; see also : Horeya T. Megahed, Socialism and Nation- Building in Africa: The Case of Mali (1960-1968), Budapest: Center for Afro-Asian Re- search, 1970.

6. The most comprehensive recent economic study on socialist Mali is that of William I. Jones, Planning and Economic Policy in Socialist Mali, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Geneva, 1970.

7. A detailed chronology of the coup is contained in Tamar K. Golan, "L'anatomie du coup d'Etat malien du 18 novembre 1968," Revue frangaise d'etudes politiques africaines, no. 99 (March 1974), pp. 27-51.



26 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES

reasons behind the evident failure of socialist policies in that country. I will successively examine what I think are the two main causes for such a failure.

On the one hand, it is quite clear that economic difficulties inherent in the natural, geographical conditions of Mali and compounded by the additional stresses of socialist austerity loom large in the explanation of the failure of socialism in Mali. On the other hand, I would submit that a class analysis offers the most satisfactory complementary explanation for this failure. Basically, the socialist experiment in Mali appears as an attempt by the bureaucratic class to build an economic basis for itself, in economic opposition to the merchant class and in political opposition to the traditional aristocracy, using socialism as a convenient ideological smoke-screen.

I therefore believe that a genuinely multidisciplinary approach taking into account historical, economic, sociological and political factors is best capable of comprehending the socialist experiment of Mali in its various aspects, and thus of giving the most adequate - though necessarily limited - explanation for its failure.

It is necessary to briefly describe the context and meaning of socialist planning in Mali before a preliminary investigation into the causes for the failure of such planning can be attempted.

I- THE CONTEXT AND MEANING OF SOCIALIST PLANNING IN MALI

First of all, the social structure and political history of Mali will be briefly reviewed so that the Malian definition of socialist planning can be assessed in its proper context.

A - Social stratification in Mali : traditional and modern

Traditionally, the social organization of Mali is founded on three institutions which are common in varying degree to most of the societies in Africa: clans, castes and slavery.

Clans are made up of all the members of a patrilineal group bearing a single patronym (jamu), related to a common but usually mythical ancestor and respecting common prohibitions (tana). What is important to note here is that people of the same clan hold varying social positions according to where they live, and this means that rank and status must be considered within the limits of each chiefdom or sometimes even within a village.

Institutionally, the society is divided into three categories : the freemen, the casted people and the slaves.

The highest category, that of the hord (freemen) or "nobles" is composed of people not bound into servitude or submission by birth. The hord are further divided into three less formal categories: the aristocratic or ruling families; the commoners, without access to dynastic power ; and somewhere in-between (in the




islamized areas) the families of Muslim clerics (marabouts), who are also kept out of the ruling group, but who remain influential and are often involved in commercial activities.

Next are the peoples who are members of casts or nyamakala. The most commonly found castes are the blacksmiths and the praise-singers (or jeli). Casted clans have hereditary functions and only people belonging to the caste may fulfill them. Marriage between hor6 and nyamakala is strictly prohibited. Praise-singers (also known in the French-speaking areas as griots) are the guardians of hor6 families traditions, their genealogists and panegyrists. Although they are considered to be morally inferior, jeli of renown are very influential. Nyamakala status is hereditary : there is no possibility of upward or downward mobility.

The last category is that of the slaves. These were originally war captives, whose descendants born in the house of the master acquired the priviledgied status of woloso (literally : "born in the house") whereby they became an integral part of the family. Slave condition remained hereditary, however, and even today, descendants of slaves are still submitted to the same matrimonial prohibitions, and strong social prejudices discriminate against them. 8

Prior to colonization the country was divided into political formations of various sizes, from independent villages to kingdoms. Kingdoms were in the process of elaborating more advanced political institutions under the centralized rule of powerful dynasties when, in the nineteenth century, two main historical events disturbed this pattern of political organizations: the conquests of the Tijani Muslim reformer El Haj 'Umar Tall (1854-64), and French conquest, completed by the end of the nineteenth century.

Traditionally, political power rested with the aristocratic dynasties. Power was by no means a monopoly of the aristocratic class, however, and the history of Mali is replete with instances in which people of lower social status (casted and slaves) achieved positions of prominence and became extremely influential and powerful, to the point of becoming rulers themselves in some celebrated cases. 9

Furthermore, the traditional social structure favoured collective leadership and decision-making in the political sphere, a feature which still characterizes to a large extent present-day Malian politics. o0

8. On social stratification in pre-colonial Mali, see Claude Meillassoux, "A Class Analysis of the Bureaucratic Process in Mali," Journal of Development Studies, VI, 2 (January 1970), pp. 99-105. For an interesting discussion of the problem of slavery in the social system of Segou, Mali, see Jean Bazin, "War and servitude in Segou," Economy and Society, III, 2 (May 1974), pp. 107-144.

9. For instance, in two notable cases, leaders of slave descent resigned over the Mali Empire; these were Sakoura (1285-1300) and Sandigui (1388-1390) (Charles Monteil, Les empires du Mali, Paris: G. P. Maisonneuve and Larose, 1968, pp. 77 and 142). Similarly, the "Tonjon" dynasty,, of slave ancestry, ruled over the Bambara kingdom of Segu between 1736 and 1750 (Charles Monteil, Les Banibara du Segou et du Kaarta, Paris: E. Larose, 1924, pp. 58ff.).

10. On this point, see T. Hodgkin and R. S. Morgenthau, "Mali," op. cit., pp. 223-225 and R. S. Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964, pp. 263 and 292.




During the colonial period, the old aristocracy tried to hold on to its power in the rural areas, where it had always been based, while the new economic and social development took place in the cities. This new development essentially favoured the merchant class and the emerging bureaucratic class.

Traditionally, merchants used to belong to marginal or foreign ethnic groups (Jula, Soninke) or to semi-casted people such as the Jawando. The development of trade during the period of the medieval empires was accompanied by the development of Islam and the growth of cities. Colonies of merchants were notably found in such places as Timbuktu and Djenne. For centuries they had been in latent opposition to the warrior aristocracy, who often looted their caravans, or imposed tribute on their goods, and who always kept them out of power. With the expansion of a monetary economy, the development of transportation and urbanization, African trade also became established in cities like Bamako and Mopti. Traders, who continued to be drawn from the same marginal groups, also remained very close to Islam.

When the French opened schools in Mali, the aristocratic families proved reluctant to send their children to far-away places where they acted as hostages to the conquerors. These schools were therefore best attended by people of a lower social status, and the aristocracy allowed itself to be out-distanced educa- tionally by commoners, casted people or woloso. These people therefore came to be the only educated ones and acquired a near-monopoly of administrative and teaching skills which would prove a decisive asset at a time when such skills became most in demand, namely at independence.

B - A brief political history, 1960-1968

The political struggle for independence was dominated by the three groups described above: the aristocracy, the bureaucracy and the merchants.

On the main, the aristocracy, led by the chefs de canton, joined the Parti progressiste soudanais (PSP). The PSP was founded in December 1945 by Fily Dabo Sissoko, son of a traditional chief and former chef de canton, with Harnadoun Dicko as other prominent personality. The PSP was predominantly a conservative and tr'ditionalist party which enjoyed the support of the French colonial administration from its creation. Basically, the party's program of slow transition to independence enhanced the chances of the aristocracy remaining in power.

The literate, urbanized and westernized bureaucrats led the Union Souda- naise-RDA. This party was founded in 1946 by Mamadou Konat6, a teacher who died in 1956, to be replaced at the head of the party by one of his former students and a teacher himself, Modibo Keita, who became President of independent Mali in 1960. Other leading party members who were to attain positions of prominence at independence were Ousmane Bi, Mahamane Alassane Haidara and Idrissa Diarra.

The merchants, although they were islamized, traditionalist and illiterate, after some hesitation joined the US-RDA. For one thing, they naturally identified with the bureaucrats as people of comparable social origins. Furthermore, by joining the US-RDA, they expected to be rid of French business competition.




This social basis helps explain two of the most characteristic features of the US-RDA : its equalitarian outlook and constant opposition to traditional forces; and its early plea for immediate self-government, which, of course, the bureaucratic class alone could assure.

With the Referendum of September 28, 1958 on the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, the overseas territories were faced with the necessity of choosing, individually, between local autonomy within a new French-dominated community and independence outside it. Contrary to its Guinean counterpart the Parti ddmocratique de Guinee (PDG), to which it had traditionally been politically close, the US-RDA decided in favor of a "yes" vote in this referendum. It has been suggested that "the main reason for the decision of the US to vote oui would appear to have been the strong commitment of its leadership to the idea of unity." 1 More likely, the US frankly regarded its internal position as less secure and less favorable than that of the PDG. Thus, it was not until March 1959 that the party achieved a position of total monopoly of power, when Fily Dabo Sissoko announced that the PSP (later renamed Parti du Regroupement soudanais : PRS) was dissolving to merge with the US into a single party.

In January 1959, Senegal and Soudan decided to join in a new territorial entity, the Federation of Mali. In September 1959, the Government of the Mali Federation opened negotiations with France for the recognition of its independence, within the framework of the community, by the method of transferring to Mali all the powers hitherto exercised by the community. As a consequence of these negotiations the Mali Federation achieved its formal independence (limited in practice by a number of Franco-Malian agreements, in regard to such matters as defense, diplomatic relations, finance and currency, higher education, etc.) on June 20, 1960. In this relatively rapid transition to independence, there is no doubt that the initiative of the Union soudanaise within the Mali Federal Govern- ment played an important part.

The Federation of Mali as an independent state survived exactly two months, from June 20, 1960 to August 20, 1960. The causes for the break-up of the Federation have been analyzed elsewhere. 12 Basically, the leaders of the two territories found themselves in sharp personal, political and idological dis- agreement. In effect, the economic difficulties arising out of the disruption of communications with Senegal, particularly the closing of the Dakar-Niger railway, strengthened the drive to construct a socialist economy within Soudan, no longer restrained by the "dead hand" of Senegal and its "bourgeois" leadership. In Modibo Keita's own words,

It is also my opinion that separation from Senegal has contributed to the total mobilization of the Soudanese masses. This will allow the Soudanese Republic to fully realize its political, economic, social and cultural objectives on the basis of a genuine socialism, and exclusively according to the interests of the most deprived sections of the population. 13

11. T. Hodgkin and R. S. Morgenthau, "Mali," p. 239. 12. See William J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation, New

Haven : Yale University Press, 1965, especially pp. 187-188. 13. Congres extraordinaire de I'U.S.-RDA, 22 septembre 1960: Le Mali continue...,

Bamako: Imprimerie du Gouvernement, n.d., p. 16.




Thus, the "historic" September 22, 1960 extraordinary congress of the US-RDA resolutely set Mali on a "new course" by deciding unanimously to opt for a socialist path of development. In organizational terms, this meant that the US-RDA would function according to the Marxist principle of "Democratic Centralism," which institutionalizes communications between the leadership and the rank-and-file of the party, with ultimate decision-making power resting with the highest executive organ of the party, the National Political Bureau (Bureau Politique National : BPN). Other important organizational principles were the "primacy of the political" and collective decision-making.

According to the first of these the party, being the emanation of the popular will, takes precedence over the administration: the party decides; the government, using the administration as a technical instrument, executes. The second emphasizes the fact that decision-making should be, as much as possible, the outcome of collective deliberation rather than expressing the will of a few.

This latter principle, however, had not stood up to the test of time. Although President Modibo K6ita always indicated that he was speaking only in the name of the BPN, it became increasingly evident that his personal stature had grown over time to the dimension of a unique national figure. This had important implica- tions at the level of the "entourage" of the President. As power became increasingly concentrated within the presidency, the struggle of factions and influence around it became naturally more acute.

On the one hand, a "hard core" of dedicated and austere radicals, including such personalities as Ousmane Bea, Seydou Badian Kouyat6, Madeira Kei'ta and Idrissa Diarra stood as the guardians of the purity of Malian Socialism and manifested a continued vigilance in denouncing any policy or personality which they judged "anti-socialist" in any way.

On the other side of the political spectrum, the "moderates," represented by such personalities as Jean-Marie Kon6, Mahamane Alassane Haidara, Bar6ma Bocoum, Hamacir6 N'Dour6 and others seemed increasingly to use the socialist ideology as smokescreen for patently anti-socialist activities.

Ultimately, political activity in Mali was more concerned with the question of which of these two factions would win the upper hand in influencing the presidency than with party activities related to development problems. That the Minister in charge of planning, Jean-Marie Kon6, was one of the leading personalities of the "moderate" faction did not seem to be a very auspicious sign for the success of socialist planning in Mali.

In March 1966, a "National Committee for the Defense of the Revolution" (CNDR) was established by the National Political Bureau to become the highest political body of the country. Although the CNDR had no visible functions until 1967, it served the immediate purpose of satisfying demands of the "radical" ideologues in the BPN. 14

14. On political and economic developments during the period 1966-1968, see Frank G. Snyder, "The KYi'ta Decade: An Era Ends in Mali"; and William I. Jones, "The Kfi'ta Decade: Economics of the Coup," in Africa Report, XIV, 3-4 (March-April 1969), pp. 16-53.




Faced with a growing stagnation of the commercial agricultural sector and unable to curb the continuing inflation stimulated by its resorting to loans from the central bank, the government soon found itself in an economic impasse.

As a way out of this desperate situation, Mali signed monetary agreements with France on February 15, 1967. The agreements provided for French assistance in curbing inflation and restoring the convertibility of the Malian franc. The bargain required Mali to devalue its currency by fifty per cent and cut back sharply on government expenditures.

The Malian "Cultural Revolution," launched in mid-1967, was apparently a move designed to assuage the radical wing of the government and the youth, disgruntled at what they saw as an outright betrayal of the socialist principles. The young Malian "Red Guards" loudly proclaimed their support for Modibo Keita, condemned enemies of the party who had criticized the President and called for ideological purification of the party, the removal of corrupt employees from government, and for an administrative reorganization of the state.

Increasing administrative centralization and political coercion led to the dissolution of the BPN on August 22, 1967. At the same time, the CNDR, which had been dormant since 1966, was assigned full powers over the party and the government. In the countryside, regional CNDRs replaced the local political bureaus, leaving only the sub-section and village committees of the former party organization.

If this "active revolution" had a point of no return, it may have come on January 16, 1968. The National Assembly then met in its opening session of the year and voted unanimously to dissolve itself "in response to the wishes of the people". President K6ita accepted the Assembly's wishes, and the CNDR soon named a 28-member "legislative delegation" composed of former deputies to serve pending elections.

However, the gap between the militant wing of the government (led by Foreign Minister Ousmane Ba), which demanded rigorous attention to the socialist option while Mali carried out the agreements with France, and the moderates (with newly-appointed Finance Minister Louis Nbgre and Jean-Marie Kon6 as chefs de file) who gave top priority to economic recovery, was rapidly increasing to unbridgeable proportions.

The conflict was finally resolved by the November 19, 1968 military take- over, to the advantage of the moderates who were temporarily maintained in power while the radicals were immediately jailed without trial, and, for the most part, remain so to this day. 15

15. It is significant to note in this respect that while such personalities as Louis Negre, Mamadou Aw and Jean-Marie Kon6 were maintained in governmental positions of responsibility for a short period after the coup, others such as the President himself, Ousmane Ba, Madeira Ke'ita, Seydou B. Kouyat6 and Mahamane Alassane Hafdara (to name only the most important ones) were immediately jailed without trial, despite early promises of fair trial by the military. On April 3, 1975, the Malian Government announced, as a gesture of goodwill, the release of fifteen political detainees of the 1968 coup d'Etat, among whom Mahamane A. Ha'dara and Seydou B. Kouyate. It is noteworthy that such prominent "radical" personalities as Ousmane Ba and Madeira Kfi'ta, as well as President Modibo Kfi'ta, have not benefited from such clemency measures.




C - Socialist planning : A Malian interpretation

Economic planning has different meanings, in different contexts and under different circumstances. To a large extent, the choice between "indicative" and "imperative" planning will be determined by the nature of the political regime confronted with such a choice, i.e. by its espousal of a capitalist or socialist ideology.

For the socialists, planning is, in essence, a purely socialist concept. For them, there can be no planning other than socialist planning. Consequently, everything which does not conform to the socialist conception of planning is not planning, but a mere collection of loosely defined objectives. In Charles Bettelheim's words,

If one accepts the fact that planning is not simply a technique, but rather the way in which a certain type of society operates, one must admit that planning can exist only in a society in which the conditions for the construction of socialism are realized, or in the process of being realized. 16

Or, to put it in slightly different terms:

...no planning worth the name is possible in a society in which the means of production remain under the control of private interests which administer them with a view to their owner's maximum profits... 17

This is echoed in the following remark by the one-time Malian Minister in charge of planning :

It is only in a socialist regime that planning can be established in accordance with objectives consistent with the public interest. 18

Since the Malian leaders unequivocally opted for socialist planning, 19 it is of some interest to see how such planning is defined by its main proponents :

...socialist planning is a collective action whereby the workers of a socialist country first specify the production and consumption targets to be attained in a coherent way and according to objective economic principles and the exigencies of social development; and secondly, provide for the realization of these objectives under the best possible conditions. 20

In the Malian circumstances, planning was seen as the best way of achieving quickly the main objectives of socialist economic development. Planning appeared as the indispensable technique by which such objectives might be rapidly attained :

16. Charles Bettelheim, Planification et croissance accelerde, Paris: F. Masp6ro, 1970, p. 8 (C. B.'s emphasis).

17. Paul A. Baran, The Political Econonmy of Growth, p. xxix. 18. Seydou Badian Kouyat6, Les dirigeants d'Afrique noire face a leur peuple, Paris:

F. Masp6ro, 1965, p. 69. 19. The term "planned socialism" as used by Kenneth W. Grundy ("Mali: The

Prospects of 'Planned Socialism'," in W. H. Friedland and C. G. Rosberg, Jr. (eds.), African Socialism, pp. 175-193) appears a particularly inadequate and confusing one. The fact that the term is never specifically defined leads the author to use it to variously characterize such different notions as socialism, economic planning, and economic development. Hence the choice of the term "socialist planning" which, in my opinion, is more accurate and specific.

20. C. Bettelheim, Planification et croissance acceldree, p. 9.




As a technique for the speedy building-up of a new society, planning appeared as a necessity; the choice of planning is a necessary and logical consequence of our determination to progress quickly and surely towards our national objective... planning was, under the circumstances in which we found ourselves, the only technique capable of helping us fully and speedily realize popular aspirations. 21

Socialist planning also appears as the best instrument for the rational and

orderly development of the country. In the President's own words:

We want our development to be rational and orderly. We want it to proceed in stages, starting with the urgent and indispensable tasks, until we have attained all our objectives. We want to advance by stages, to begin with that which is essential, knowing where we are going, and how, by what means we are going there. That is what our planning stands for. 22

This leads us to take a closer look at the objectives and priorities of socialist planning.

As it is currently defined, the ultimate objective of planning in a socialist context is the improvement of the standard of living of the working classes, or, in any case, of the most deprived socio-economic classes (peasants in Mali).

This being accepted, the theoreticians of socialism concede that in certain

circumstances, particularly in underdeveloped economies, there might exist higher priorities in the short run, such as the realization of economic independence, for instance. The shifting of priorities in this case does not affect the fundamental

principles of socialist development, but merely represents a contingent and tempo- rary development called for by particular circumstances. Professor Bettelheim is

quite explicit on this point:

The ultimate goal of socialist planning is the steady improvement of the standard of living of the workers and the increasing satisfaction of social needs. However..., the strengthening of national economic independence might constitute a priority during a certain period... 23

Possibly as a result of the indirect influence of Professor Bettelheim on the

conception of Malian planning, 24 one :finds this very same idea explicitely devel-

oped in the Malian Five-Year Plan:

The ultimate objective of the planning of our economy is the improvement of the standard of living of the population. However, the investible surplus realized through the implementation of planning cannot be totally divested for that

21. Seydou B. Kouyatd, "La politique dconomique de l'Union Soudanaise - RDA," in Deuxiemne Siminaire de l'US-RDA, Bamako : Librairie Populaire, 1963, pp. 57-58.

22. "Modibo K6i'ta: Radio Speech to the People of Mali, October 1, 1961," in Modibo Keita : A Collection of Speeches, Bamako, 1965, pp. 72-73.

23. Bettelheim, Planification et croissance accldre'e, p. 13. 24. At the request of the Malian government, Charles Bettelheim instructed one of

his former students, Jean Benard, to select a team of advisers which was to play an instrumental (indeed essential) r1le in the drawing up of the projected Four-Year Plan, 1961-64, and the actual Five-Year Plan, 1961-66, and which included, among others, Samir Amin.




particular purpose: a great portion of this surplus must be devoted to exports and investment. 25

Ultimately, this boils down to the difficult (and never satisfactorily resolved) dilemma of "growth" versus "development." 26 For as much as one can gather so far, the Malian decision-makers seemed to have opted for a strategy whereby growth and development would be pursued simultaneously, with a slight emphasis on growth in the short run and development as the ultimate objective. Whether this strategy in fact contributed to the failure of socialist planning in Mali is what we will determine in the following section.

I - A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INTO THE CAUSES FOR THE FAILURE OF SOCIALIST PLANNING IN MALI

An economic analysis of the Malian Five-Year Plan 1961-1966 contrasting the actual results (as of 1966) with the initial objectives lead the observer to the conclusion that, in spite of some successes in certain sectors, the Plan was an overall failure. Such an analysis, which has been conducted in some detail elsewhere, need not concern us here. 27 I will consequently concentrate the remaining discussion on the causes, both economic and socio-political, for the failure of socialist planning in Mali.

A - The failure of socialist planning

The area in which the Plan was not successful was clearly that of the structural transformation so desired by the politicians. The creation, during the first years of the Plan, of state enterprises in the main sectors of the economy (36 in all) constituted a prerequisite for the gradual elimination of foreign capital domination. In addition, an extensive rural cooperative network was organized, although it did not function as effectively as one might have expected. The progressive institution of the instruments of an independent financial and monetary policy - foreign exchange control, Treasury (September 1960), national currency and

25. Rapport sur le Plan Quinquennal de Ddveloppement economique et social de la Republique diu Mali, 1961-1965, Bamako: ministere du Plan et de l'Economie rurale, n.d., p. 8.

26. The essence of these two concepts is aptly defined by James Coleman : "(Economic) growth may be defined as increasing output (GNP) per capita. (Economic) development has broader reference to the building of institutions, new lines of production, and the dissemina- tion of attitudes essential for self-sustaining growth," James S. Coleman, "The Resurrection of Political Economy," in W. F. Ilchman and N. T. Uphoff (eds.), The Political Economy of Development, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972, p. 33 (J. C.'s emphasis).

27. A critical analysis of the Plan by an insider is contained in Samir Amin, Trois experiences africaines de developpement : le Mali, la Guinde et le Ghana, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965, pp. 99-129. For a detailed study of Mali's planning in relation to its economy, see William I. Jones, Planning and Economic Policy in Socialist Mali. In addition, my own paper presented at the 1975 CAAS Conference contains a slightly more elaborate discussion of the economic aspects of the plan than is presented here (see pp. 19-31 and appended tables pp. 38-43).




central bank (July 1962) -, completed this structural transformation. In this area at least, one could say that the socialist principles had been translated into practice and that the prerequisites for the success of a socialist development strategy were realized.

In the final analysis, however, one is led to the conclusion that the planning experience in Mali over the period 1961-1966 was a failure. The assessment provided by the post-coup government officials is a fairly accurate one, although not devoid of political opportunism :

The first Five-Year Plan... has resulted in an unmitigated failure, despite some commendable realizations in the industrial sector and some spectacular realizations in the field of infra-structure... The inefficiency of the productive sector, the low level at which modern enterprises have been operating, and the absence of a taxation system adapted to the rural world have both prevented the realization of an export output sufficient to cover imports and of a surplus revenue that would have allowed to cover the ever-increasing recurrent administrative costs. Consequently, a point of equilibrium could be reached only by resorting to an inflationary currency circulation and by external indebtedness. 28

Indeed, as Samir Amin concluded in 1965:

Under the circumstances, the gap between the Plan and its implementation has become so great that it is legitimate to wonder whether there really exist an effective Malian planning function. 29

Not only did the Plan fail, but planning itself was abandoned in the period 1966-1968, before the November 19, 1968 military coup put an end to the socialist experiment in Mali. Why this was the case will be our next concern.

B - An economic explanation of the failure of socialist planning in Mali

Basically, the economic causes for the failure of socialist planning in Mali are of two kinds : what could be called "basic" economic constraints on the one hand, and purely economic problems and difficulties on the other hand.

1 - "BASIC" ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS: SOCIALISM IN A CONTEXT OF SCARCITY

By all conventional economic standards, Mali is a poor country. Thus, in a recent classification made on the basis of per capita gross national product and population, Mali was ranked fourteenth in a list of the twenty-six least developed African countries. 30 In 1971, per capita GNP was estimated at $70 for Mali and Upper Volta as against $250 for Ghana and Senegal. 31 It is against this general

28. "Le Programme triennal 1970-1972 de Redressement economique et financier du Mali," in Les Plans de Ddveloppement d'Afrique Noire, Paris: Ediafric, Ist edition, 1972, p. 25.

29. Samir Amin, Trois experiences africaines, p. 128. 30. The Least Developed Nations: Development Approaches for the Environmentally

IConstrained, Worcester: Clark University, 1974, Appendix I, p. 8. 31. Figures from James W. Howe, The U.S. and the Developing World : Agenda for

Action 1974, New York: Praeger, 1974, pp. 144, 146 and 148.




background of overall poverty that one should view the chances of success of the socialist experiment initiated by the September 22, 1960 extraordinary congress of the party.

It has been argued by some scholars that "the major elements of socialist policy are ill-suited to present African circumstances" and that, consequently, socialism in contemporary Africa "is the wrong ideology, in the wrong place, at the wrong time." 32 Although this appears to be a somewhat extreme view, there is clearly some truth in it, to the extent that socialism in Africa can be viewed as creating some additional, self-imposed economic constraints in an already unfavourable economic and social environment. It is in this context that the distinction established by G. K. Helleiner between "basic" economic constraints and "self-imposed" economic constraints becomes particularly relevant.

For Helleiner, the "basic" economic constraints are

of the type which are largely beyond the control of the policy-makers ; they form, so to speak, the state of nature within which the planners must work and are usually considered in terms of the traditional textbook-style factors of production (land, labour, capital, etc.)... These endowments form the boundaries within which political and social experimentation are confined. 33

On the other hand, the "self-imposed" economic constraints

consist of certain political, social, or even purely economic rules or objectives which are to guide or "constrain" one's development policies. 34

Socialism constitutes just one such "self-imposed" constraint, the term "constraint" having no particularly negative connotation in this context but being merely seen as blocking off a range of possible policies.

More specifically, Helleiner sees the major "basic" constraints upon any nation's economic development as being:

( i) its basic natural resources of land, soil, climate, water, etc.; (ii) the existing stock of capital and the possibility of its future accumula-

tion through savings ; (iii) the present and future stock of skills (human capital) and knowledge ; (iv) the present and prospective flow of foreign exchange earnings. 35

Let us now briefly consider the Malian position with respect to these constraints. Essentially, Mali's "basic" economic constraints can be summarized as follows :

(a) transportation problems, due to distance from the sea, distances within the country (1 400 miles from east to west), and inadequate infrastructure gre greatly affect the cost of goods and investments ;

32. Elliot J. Berg, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXVIII, 3 (August 1964), pp. 560 and 571.

33. Gerald K. Helleiner, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tanzania," Journal of Development Studies, VIII, 2 (January 1972), p. 184.

34. Helleiner, op. cit., p. 184. 35. Ibidem, p. 185.




(b) actual lack of exploited energy, besides the hydro-electric plant of Kayes and that of Sotuba, which merely serves local purposes: hence the high cost of energy (particularly oil) in Mali, which needs to be totally imported;

(c) actual scarcity of exploited mineral resources, although prospection has uncovered some sizeable deposits of various ores and oil: this problem is compounded by the two preceding factors, namely the high cost of transportation and energy, which render prospects for profitable exploitation rather bleak;

(d) poor and frail soils;

(e) insufficient water resources, especially in the sahelian part of the country;

(f) demographic pressure due to high birth rates and declining mortality rates ; with a population growing at an estimated 2,6 per cent per year, Mali's

population will double before the end of the century. The structure of this population is characterized by its youth (42 per cent of the population is between 0 and 14 years of age), which means (with five per cent of the population 60 years old and over) that about half of Mali's population is situated in the economically unproductive bracket;

(g) relative social heterogenity, due to the variety of ethnic groups and the opposition of two different types of societies and styles of life: sedentary agriculturalists and nomadic herdmen, whose interests conflict in a variety of instances ;

(h) shortage of human skills and knowledge and of adequately trained cadres ; this shortage is widespread and is characteristic of every sector and every level of economic activity ;

(i) lack of financial resources and local savings, due to the predominantly agricultural nature of the economy and to an unusually high rate of auto- consumption.

Such was the economic background against which the Malian policy-makers had to operate at independence. There is no doubt that these "basic" economic constraints were such as to greatly handicap any kind of economic policy they would formulate.

2- ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES

During the Plan period, the Malian economy met with a number of problems and difficulties of such a nature as to significantly impair the chances of success of the socialist experiment. Foremost among these were the difficulties in the agricultural sector, the structural transformation-vs.-economic growth dilemma, the public sector deficit and inflation and, lastly, economic difficulties inherent in the planning process itself. These will be examined in turn.

a) Difficulties in the agricultural sector

According to the Plan, revenue accruing from increased agricultural output was to provide the bulk of domestic income. Yet, the production and marketing of all the main agricultural products was in constant decline over the Plan period.




Thus, the marketing of one of the main cash-crops, groundnuts, fell from 98 000 tons in 1957-58 to 66 427 tons in 1961-62 and 27 215 tons in 1965-66. 36

While this sluggish production can be partly attributed to unfavourable climatic conditions, the main reason for it is to be found in the fact that the cooperative sector in agriculture never functioned adequately. The global response from Malian villagers to the government's program of "Rural Units of Production" (Groupements ruraux de production et de secours mutuel : GRPSM) was rather the reverse of what the government expected; villagers neutralized government efforts at socialist mobilization through institutional change. They did so

by ignoring some institutions the government wished them to adopt, by turning others to local purposes, and, to the extent of their abilities, by frustating others which they could not control. 37

The failure of the government to provide substantial incentives for the peasants to increase their production led to a growing distrust of governmental policies in the rural areas, where socialism fell in disrepute, if it had ever been popular. This should be hardly surprising in view of the fact that, on balance and in many respects, the Malian peasant found himself worse off at the end of the Plan period than at the beginning. This is probably one of the areas in which socialism had beeen a most striking and inadmissible failure.

b) The structural transformation-vs.-economic growth dilemma This constitutes a general problem faced by all policy-makers in any underdeveloped country. In essence, it comes down to whether one prefers to give the priority to growth, or to development, or to both at the same time.

By deliberately choosing a socialist strategy of development, the Malian politicians had in mind primarily the possibility of rapid structural change. However, the planners felt that both growth and development could - and should - be pursued concurrently. This situation is aptly summarized by William Jones :

The politicians saw the primary purpose of the socialist option as structural change - having the state take over the commanding heights of the economy and probably a good deal more. The planners expected to have both structural transformation and fast economic growth. Indeed, far from expecting the structural transformation to impose economic costs on society, they thought it would start paying its way immediately and provide a surplus to finance other investments. 38

There certainly existed a danger inherent in the fact that, by choosing to pursue the two strategies simultaneously and pushing them too far, one was bound to failure. For one thing, these two strategies, by their different overall orientation and basic requirements, appear as somewhat incompatible. In any event, their

36. Memento de l'fcononmie et de la Planification africaines, 1968, Paris: Ediafric, 1968, pp. 241-244 and L'Agriculture africaine, Paris: Ediafric, Ist edition, t. 2, 1970, pp. 350-360.

37. William I. Jones, "The Mise and Demise of Socialist Institutions in Rural Mali," Geneva-Africa, XI, 2 (1972), p. 21.

38. W. I. Jones, "The Ki"ta Decade: Economics of the Coup," Africa Report, XIV, 3-4 (March-April 1969), p. 26.




success is determined by the economic capacity, size and potential of the economy in which they are to be implemented. As we have seen, neither of these were favourable to any strategy of developmnt in the case of Mali.

As a matter of fact, the Malian experiment appears as a good case against the choice of a simultaneous growth/development strategy for a developing country with an insufficient economic basis.

c) Two major economic problems : the public sector deficit and inflation

i) The public sector deficit

The years 1961-1962 were characterized by the creation of an important state sector in the economy, according to the instructions that the 1960 extraordinary congress delegates had given to the planners in line with the socialist option that had been decided upon. At the same time, important sums were allocated for the improvement and extension of the existing administrative and social infrastructure. The bulk of the increase in public investments was constituted by public corporations, and by the administrative and social sectors. Correlatively, private investments were significantly decreasing.

In addition, administrative services increased by 40 per cent over the 1959- 1962 period. Recurrent administrative expenditure increased from 9,1 billion Malian francs in 1959 to MF 14,4 billion in 1962, representing a 57 per cent increase. Transfers to public corporations, negligible in 1959, reached over MF one billion in 1962. The overall administrative deficit at that date was about MF 7 billion, resorbed through bank loans. This resulted in a MF 4,6 billion balance-of-

payments deficit in 1962, while in 1959 there had been none ; 39 and while the number of persons on the public payroll increased from 13 337 in 1961 to 22 903 in 1968, the state budget was growing from MF 6,7 billion in 1960 to MF 23,5 billion in 1967-68. 40 Current administrative expenditure (minus the public debt) increased from M F 6,8 billion in 1959 to 11,4 billion in 1962, 18 billion in 1965 and 24 billion in 1968, representing an average yearly increase of eleven to twelve per cent. Consequently, the deficit resulting from recurrent administrative expenditure averaged about MF 2,3 billion a year between 1959 and 1968. 41

At the same time, no noticeable improvement was realized in the way of the management of the public sector. All this resulted in a situation in which, far from being a factor of growth, the public sector appeared as a major handicap to the economic development of Mali. As Samir Amin observed,

If the public corporations are to constitute a financial burden on the current budget by necessitating subventions instead of realizing the expected profits, the

39. See Samir Amin, Trois experiences africaines, pp. 77-129; S. Amin, L'Afrique de l'Ouest bloquee, Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1971, pp. 255-281; and W. I. Jones, "The Kei'ta Decade : Economics of the Coup," op. cit., pp. 23-25.

40. Figures quoted in Anton Bebler, Military Rule in Africa : Dahomey, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Mali, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973, p. 84.

41. Figures from S. Amin, Trois experiences africaines, p. 111, and L'Ajrique de l'Ouest, p. 262.




state sector, instead of being an engine of growth, will in fact become an obstacle to the economic development of the country. 42

ii) Inflation The state of public finances had been steadily worsening over the Plan period. Thus, the budgetary deficit grew from MF 3,2 billion in 1961 to MF 5,5 billion in 1967-68.43

The inflationary process in Mali started with the obligation for the public treasury to finance an increasing public sector deficit. Thus, the total contribution of the monetary system to the public sector (administration and public corporations) increased by an average of MF 6,2 billion per year between 1961 and 1968. This represented an inflationary gap of ten per cent of the GDP. During the same period (1960-1968), both the total quantity of fiduciary circulation and the prices had doubled.

This created a situation in which the surplus of distributed revenues was spent on consumer's goods which, due to a sluggish domestic production, had to be imported. Such imports could not keep pace with demand, thus resulting in a constant pressure towards actual price increase on the black market. This situation could be solved only through an increased external indebtedness. Net external assets were cleared as early as 1962. The foreign debt averaged about MF 4,6 billion per year between 1962 and 1967. The actual foreign public debt as of the end of 1968 amounted to a total of MF 110 billion. 44

d) Economic difficulties inherent in the planning process Probably one of the most basic problems of Malian planning lies in the fact that it was never based on solid statistical foundations. The first national accounts were those which were hastily drawn in 1959 in the few months preceding the publication of a preliminary draft of the projected Four-Year Plan. 45 No serious statistics were available until 1961. Consequently, the plan's objectives, determined on the basis of the 1959 national accounts, were bound to be inaccurate. In particular, it appeared that the colonial legacy had not been accurately assessed, notably with respect to the public expenditure hitherto supported by the French administration. 46

In addition, experience has demonstrated that the choice of overall comprehensive planning for a poor country with a limited human, administrative and economic capacity can lead to an economic impasse. Indeed, the Malian Plan appeared to many observers as being over-ambitious and unrealistic, especially in the determination of the growth target (8,3 per cent a year) which, if attained,

42. S. Amin, Trois experiences africaines, p. 117. 43. S. Amin, L'Afrique de l'Ouest bloquee, table 60, p. 283. 44. All figures from Amin, L'Afrique de l'Ouest, pp. 261-264. 45. See Samir Amin, Comptes econolmiques de la Republique du Mali, 1959, Bamako,

1962. 46. For some comments along these lines, see Claude Alexandre, "L'exp6rience du

Mali, 1960-1968," Economie et Politique, nos. 196-197 (November-December, 1970), p. 101. The "traditional" French budgetary subsidy to the Soudanese budget during the latter years of the colonial period was of the order of $ 7,5 million par annum (A. Bebler, op. cit., p. 84).




would have placed Mali among the fastest growing countries in the world. It would seem that the planners wanted to go too fast, too soon, considering the limited overall economic capacity of the country. As it was, the results fell far short of

expectations.

Furthermore, one of the main institutional requisites of comprehensive planning - the existence or the creation of an extensive and adequately staffed administrative machinery, was hardly met in the case of Mali. Not only were the funds allocated for planning purposes patently insufficient, but, more importantly, the staff of the Ministry of Planning was particularly inadequate, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Thus, while the annual budget of the Ministry of Planning (59 million CFA Francs on the average) represented only 0,6 per cent of the overall budget, the personnel of the Ministry numbered only 107 civil servants, including 27 experts and highly-trained cadres, over most of the Plan period. 47

Other problems resulted from the lack of power vested in the various

planning institutions, and, first of all, in the Ministry itself. The inability of the Ministry in charge of planning to exert its authority over the entire planning process resulted in a series of uneconomic and unplanned investments decided by the political authorities between 1961 and 1962 and amounting to MF 20 billion. 48

It is also true that popular enthusiasm is one of the main ingredients of any successful planning experience. Yet, while the socialist regime in Mali enjoyed, in its early years at least - a certain degree of popular support and contribution, the fact of the matter is that popular consultation did not take place at the conception level, neither was popular control ever exerted at the implementation level, for the leaders never made such consultation and control possible.

If an economic explanation provides some useful insights into the mechanism of the failure of socialist planning in Mali, it leaves unanswered the most fundamental question of the rationale behind the economic decisions taken by the Malian leaders. In particular, it does not help answer the following question: what prevented the Malian policy-makers from taking the necessary steps to redress the disastrous economic and financial situation, despite early and repeated warnings to that effect on the part of the planners ? It is my belief that only a socio-political analysis of the failure of socialist planning in Mali in terms of class struggle is likely to offer an adequate answer to this most crucial question.

3- SOCIO-POLITICAL CAUSES: A CLASS ANALYSIS OF THE FAILURE OF SOCIALISM IN MALI

The first question that might be raised here is whether the concept of social class constitutes a valid instrument of analysis for our purpose. Indeed, class analysis in Africa faces methodological problems since the present society is the result of a dual evolution; one spreading from endogenous transformation of the tradi-

47. Figures from Michel Gaud, Les premidres experiences de planification en Afrique noaire,

Paris": Editions Cujas, 1967, pp. 85-87.

48. S. Amin, Trois experiences africaines, pp. 111-112.




tional social structures, the other from the severe impact of the western capitalist powers. It seems therefore necessary to use this concept with certain qualifications, as Claude Meillassoux has been careful to point out:

The concept of social class is a valid instrument of analysis, given, firstly, that the social evolution of dependent countries is considered as part of the broader social system constituted by the economic and political sphere of influence of the dominant foreign power, and, secondly, that a distinction is made between classes proper and other dependent social elements which are the outgrowths of classes. 49

If we dismiss the contention that African societies are classless as pure political opportunism, what we mean by social classes remains to be defined. In this respect, a strict Marxist definition still appears as the best operational definition to be found in the social sciences. We shall therefore endorse the definition whereby

Social classes.., proceed from the contradictory development of a mode of production, through which they are linked in a dialectical relationship. The essence of this relationship is that they cannot exist as classes independently of each other, while their interests remain fundamentally antagonistic. The dominant class has control over the instruments of production to which the dominated one has access only through the surrender of part of its labour force or product. 50

A class analysis of the Malian society along these lines shows that, prior to French colonization, a native aristocratic and slave society was in the process of developing. This development was halted by the French conquest, but the hitherto dominant aristocracy was maintained in an inferior, menial government position. The lack of industrial development did not permit the emergence of capitalist classes, while administrative growth gave rise to a comparatively numer- ous and able bureaucracy. African trade remained in the hands of a wealthy but illiterate Malian bourgeoisie. The colonial crisis suddenly brought these forces into competition for power, with the victory of the bureaucracy as the outcome. It would seem that, in the struggle for independence and the conquest of power, the bureaucratic class used the traditional merchants as tactical allies, the salaried workers as a trade-off group and the peasantry as a reserve force. 51

The socio-political and economic history of Mali provides powerful evidence that the bureaucratic class

(a) used the party to entrench its political power by neutralizing or eliminat- ing its political opponents (the aristocracy and the merchant class) ;

(b) used the administration to build an economic basis for itself that it was hitherto lacking, thereby gaining some of the characteristics of a social class that it did not possess before;

49. Claude Meillassoux, "A Class Analysis of the Bureaucratic Process in Mali," JDS, VI, 2 (January 1970), p. 97.

50. C. Meillassoux, "A Class Analysis," p. 103. 51. See Majhemout Diop, Histoire des classes sociales dans l'Afrique de I'Ouest. I. Le

Mali, Paris: F. Masp6ro, 1971, pp. 229-230 and 241.




(c) used socialism as a convenient ideology first to rally, then to deceive the peasantry.

Each of these points will be briefly elaborated on.

To a large extent, the PSP (Parti Soudanais Progressiste) created in Decem- ber 1945, was the party of the traditional aristocracy. Led by Fily Dabo Sissoko and Hamadoun Dicko, both members of prominent aristocratic families, the PSP constituted one of the two dominant political forces in the French Soudan until January 1956, when the balance clearly swung in favor of the party of the teachers and civil servants (then supported by the merchants), the Union Souda- naise-RDA. While the PSP at first enjoyed the all-out support of the French colonial administration, this support later shifted to the US-RDA which had gathered momentum and appeared as the only interlocuteur valable in the process of transfer of power.

During the interval between the loi-cadre period and the Referendum (1956- 1958), the US-RDA, although it legally tolerated the existence of the PSP, did everything possible to make life impossible for it. So much so that, seeing no other way out, Fily Dabo Sissoko, on behalf of the Political Bureau of the PRS (former PSP), announced the party's adherence to the Union Soudanaise on March 31, 1959, after a three-day conference. Hamadoun Dicko, at first reluctant, later rallied to the US. This episode marked the beginning of the one-party system in Mali and the end (on the surface, at least) of the political opposition of the aristocracy.

Although they had concluded a tactical alliance with the bureaucracy during the struggle for independence and had joined the US-RDA, the merchants soon found themselves in opposition to the socialist policies when these were initiated by the new government of the Republic of Mali in 1960. This was a somewhat paradoxical situation to the extent that the socialist option, with its nationalistic policies tending to restrain the activities of the foreign private sector and to systematicall encourage nationals to take initiatives in this area, initially favoured the merchant's interests.

However, the creation of the Malian Franc in July 1962 (seen by the merchants as seriouly restricting the scope of their trading operations), the strict regulation of trade through import-export licensing and the institution of a quasi- state monopoly in foreign trade and in the internal trading network all ran against the immediate interests of the merchants. From then on, the merchant class constituted the core of the resistance to the socialist regime of Modibo K6ita, although no formal channel for the expression of its opposition was available to it.

In effect, the government - as the emanation of the bureaucratic class - was busily engaged in building an economic basis for itself through the development of an extensive public sector in trade, and, consequently, had to check and discourage the development of an indigenous trade, which constituted a real and immediate threat to its own interests and development.

While the bureaucracy had managed to secure a quasi-monopoly of political power through skillful manipulation of the party organization at independence, it




still lacked a strong economic basis on which such power could rest and that would give it all of the characteristics of a social class as we have defined it. Upon attainment of independence, the first task of the newly-installed bureaucratic class was therefore to create an extensive public sector so as to economically anchor its politically dominant position, basing its power on collective, rather than private ownership of the means of production. Claude Meillassoux offers one of the best analyses of this process :

Once established in a governmental position, this social body (the bureaucracy) had to take several steps, both to gain certain positions of control in the modern economy and to eliminate opposition spreading from the Malian historical classes. One of the first steps was to infiltrate the national economy through the creation of a nationalized economic sector. This was done under the label of "socialism," which provided them with a convenient ideology to bring the economy under their control, supposedly of course on behalf of the entire population. "Socialism" permitted them to put the bureaucracy into the position of a managerial board of a kind of state corporation. 52

Thus, this so-called "socialism" appeared more as a kind of etatisme characterized by a deliberate proliferation of jobs for incoming recruits to the dominant group. As Milovan Djilas has observed in a different context,

The emergence of the new class has been concealed under socialist phraseology and... under the new collective forms of property ownership. The so-called ownership is a disguise for the real ownership by the political bureaucracy. 53

It is through this process that the Malian bureaucracy acquired some of the characteristics of a social class, namely control of the economic infrastructure and use of it as a means of exploitation ; and control of the means of repression involving a resort to various devices to maintain its dominance.

In the light of the foregoing analysis, it becomes possible to elucidate two important points for which no really satisfactory explanation had hitherto been provided.

(a) While the merchants proved useful - indeed necessary - allies to the bureaucratic elite in the process of the conquest of political power, they became a bothersome competitor in the process of the conquest of economic power. Thus, after having tolerated and used the merchant class to secure a monopoly of political power, the bureaucracy used this same monopoly to create its own economic basis, which led to the political neutralization and the economic elimination of the merchant class.

52. C. Meillassoux, "A Class Analysis," p. 106. 53. Milovan Djilas, The New Class, London: Unwin Books, 1966, p. 55. Similar

views are set forth by M. Shachtman in his study of Stalinist Russia: "The vast majority is dominated by a minority which monopolizes all political and economic power and aims at maintaining social relations that are even more alien to socialism than they are to capitalism. The ruling class too is unique, in that it does not own the national property which it rules but does "own" the state. It derives its vast economic power and privileges exclusively from the political power it exercizes through its chosen instrument, the Communist party" (Max Shachtman, The Bureaucratic Revolution, New York: The Donald Press, 1962, p. 1).




(b) Since the administration and the public sector in the economy constituted the economic basis of the political power of the bureaucratic class, any curtailment of the expenses in this sector would have meant, in effect, the under- mining of its own foundations, a suicidal operation that the bureaucracy was always careful to avoid. Hence its continuous inaction in the face of repeated advice by the economists to cut down on recurrent administrative expenditure and .re- organize the public sector so as to make it more profitable. If anything, the

bureaucracy tended to broaden its basis by creating additional state corporations. Furthermore, control over the administration and the public sector made the

party and the government the largest employer of wage-earners, and consequently the largest distributor of spoils in the country, which contributed to reinforce its politically and economically monopolistic position.

Viewed in the broader international context, the Malian bureaucratic class

appeared as the commercial agent of foreign economic interests in general, and of French economic interests in particular. In Fanon's formula, it saw itself as "the western bourgeoisie's business agent." 54 As Meillassoux has rightly observed,

Given the economic dependence of the country, the bureaucracy is itself a dependent group, and its origin as an instrument of western interests continues to influence its development. Instead of striving towards a real independence, after winning the right to assert themselves as political intermediaries with the outside world, the bureaucrats are content to return (with a higher international rank) under the rule of the old master. 55 It is against this background that the repeated failure of the various attempts

at regional integration should be assessed. In particular, the failure of the Union of African States (Ghana, Guinea and Mali) after 1962 clearly demonstrates that the bureaucratic elites of these countries gave priority to the consolidation of their national power base over common economic policies based on obviously similar ideologies.

Under colonial rule, the peasantry was in the process of becoming the exploited class of the French bourgeoisie. It was in fact such sad memories as forced labor, forced conscription and forced taxation which led the peasants to view the militants of the US-RDA as their liberators. Indeed, the party drew much of its justification and momentum from its r1le as liberator of the oppressed classes from the colonial yoke. Yet, as Meillassoux notes,

Although these bureaucrats drew their political justification form the rise of an exploited class in the new society created by colonialism, they remained less representative of the fundamental interests of this class than of their own particular interests. 56

In effect, the government never seriously encouraged any active popular participation that would have been conducive to an elaborate political conscious- ness on the part of the peasantry. Instead, socialism provided the bureaucracy with a convenient ideology that allowed it to continue to enjoy the support of the underprivileged classes after independence while pursuing its own class interests.

54. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, New York : Grove Press, 1968, pp. 152- 153.

55. C. Meillassoux, "A Class Analysis," p. 108. 56. C. Meillassoux, op. cit., p. 106.




CONCLUSION

Thus, while loudly proclaiming their faith in the virtues of socialism, the Malian leaders were in effect pursuing a set of policies in total contradiction with a truly socialist strategy of development, allowing, in particular, the condition of the peasantry to gradually deteriorate over the Plan period.

The gap between theory and practice was such that when a group of junior army officers took over power in the morning of November 19, 1968, hardly any popular reaction in support of the defunct regime was reported. Indeed, what most struck the observers of the coup was the extent of public apathy. The socialist regime had apparently prepared its downfall when it had decided to return into the Franc zone, a move in flagrant contradiction with its proclaimed socialistic policies. Furthermore, the abuses of the ubiquitous popular militia contributed to totally alienate the people from a government whose popularity had been steadily declining since 1967, when a passable caricature of the Chinese "Cultural Revolution" unsuccessfully attempted to make up for the lack of popular participation, enthusiasm and support.

In the final analysis, one can say that the so-called "socialist" regime of Modibo Keita had never been truly socialist according to the critical criterion of socialism, which, as Charles Bettelheim has observed, is the real social structure and nature of the ruling class of the society rather than the officially-proclaimed ideology of its leaders. 57 If one agrees that

The ultimate goal of socialist planning is the steady improvement of the standard of living of the workers [peasants in Mali, G.M.] and the increasing satisfaction of social needs. 58

it is abundantly clear from the preceding analysis that Mali never was a socialist country. While the rhetoric of socialism was adopted as the official doctrine, the essence of a truly socialist policy (namely public ownership of the means of production and equitable distribution of the national income in favor of the most deprived classes of society) never existed in Mali during the period 1960- 1968.

Since at no time during the Kei'ta regime were genuinely socialist policies ever carried out either at the economic, political or social levels, one is led to the conclusion that any discussion of the success or failure of socialism in Mali is simply irrelevant. Whether socialism could have succeeded given the existing economic, political and social context of Mali is a moot question. What one can discuss and analyze, however, is the aborted attempt of a segment of the bureaucratic class to monopolize the political and economic powers for its exclusive benefit. It is hoped that the present study has somewhat contributed to a better understanding of this process.

57. According to Charles Bettelheim, "...a country is socialist or capitalist not because of the ideas or intentions of its government, but because of the social structure which characterizes it, and the nature of the classes which play the decisive r61le in ruling it" (Planification et croissance accldre'e, p. 7).

58. Bettelheim, op. cit., p. 13.



Socialism, Economic Development and Planning in Mali, 1960-1968

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