Social Theory Sd Lane

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Theory and Methodology

Social theory and system dynamics practice

David C. Lane

Operational Research Department, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK

Received 27 January 1997; accepted 11 May 1998

Abstract

This paper explores the social theories implicit in system dynamics (SD) practice. Groupings of SD practice are

observed in dierent parts of a framework for studying social theories. Most are seen to be located within `functionalist

sociology'. To account for the remainder, two new forms of practice are discussed, each related to a dierent paradigm.

Three competing conclusions are then oered:

1. The implicit assumption that SD is grounded in functionalist sociology is correct and should be made explicit.

2. Forrester's ideas operate at the level of method not social theory so SD, though not wedded to a particular social

theoretic paradigm, can be re-crafted for use within dierent paradigms.

3. SD is consistent with social theories which dissolve the individual/society divide by taking a dialectical, or feedback,stance. It can therefore bring a formal modelling approach to the `agency/structure' debate within social theory and

so bring SD into the heart of social science.

The last conclusion is strongly recommended. 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Systems; Simulation; Philosophy; Relationships with other disciplines; Modelling

``System dynamics needs a broader and deep-

er debate about its underlying philosophy,

the contrast with alternative philosophies,

the nature of knowledge, the role of subjec-tive and observational information, and the

criteria for judging validity''. Forrester

(1980a, p. 15)

1. Introduction

This paper explores the practice of system dy-

namics (SD) modelling in the context of some

theories of the social sciences. The motivation

derives from a comparative study of SD and

OR (Lane, 1994a) which observed that connections

between the grounding theories of the social sci-ences and OR have been explored to a much

greater and fruitful extent than the possible

connections with SD. But what is meant by social

theory, and why might the activity of SD model-

ling wish to be related to it? In discussing the social

theory of any modelling approach we can unravel

dierent elements of the process. We can use

Eden's headings and so talk about an approach as

consisting of tools, techniques, method and theory

(Eden, 1989, 1990). Although these elements

European Journal of Operational Research 113 (1999) 501527

0377-2217/99/$ see front matter 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

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derive from the study of group decision support

approaches they are in the same spirit as Check-

land's analysis of systems approaches (Checkland,

1981) and may reasonably be applied to any OR

approach.

With SD we then have simulation `tools' such

as iThink and Vensim and we employ various

`techniques' of knowledge elicitation, model vali-

dation and quantitative simulation. Combined

with rules about the correct construction of mod-

els and the aspirations of the approach, these all

unite to form the `method' of SD. Now when we

ask what the theory is, it is clear that we are asking

a deeper question. In pursuing the social theory of

SD we are asking, ``What model of social reality isimplied by the... methodology'' (Checkland, 1981,

p. 245). All OR modelling approaches may be re-

lated to a social theory some assumptions of how

human beings behave in society, how they com-

municate and make decisions, how knowledge

about such processes can be acquired and what

form such knowledge can take. Such assumptions

may be explicitly articulated, as with the soft sys-

tem methodology (SSM) approach of Checkland

(1981), or they may remain as unexamined pre-

suppositions. Nevertheless, these assumptionshave implications for the type of modelling work

that is possible and the nature of any changes that

may be made in consequence. The extent to which

the process of SD has articulated a social theory

for its practice is considered in the next section but

the comment ``The present [system dynamics]

paradigm is not sharply dened'' (Forrester, 1985,

p. 1) indicates a lack of clarity at this deep level

since Forrester also observes that, ``surprisingly

few papers discuss the philosophy and validity of

models'' (Forrester, 1985, p. 2).

The potential advantages of debating the socialtheoretic assumptions of SD are many. The social

sciences are perhaps over-rich in descriptive theo-

ries which have limited practical application whilst

SD oers a formal theory which is highly practical.

Interaction of the two therefore oers the potential

of supplying SD for the practical study of a wider

range of issues in the social sciences. This can only

enhance the respectability of SD but has been

limited in the past because the lack of a clear

theory has resulted in criticisms of SD and ``the

opportunities [the criticisms] aord for inuencing

other paradigms have not been pursued'' (Mea-

dows, 1980, p. 1) because of the eld's inability to

conduct a discourse at the appropriate level. Sim-

ilarly, the crafting of a suitable social theory for

SD would allow more eective reection on prac-

tice and hence more coherent re-crafting of that

practice. Practice may also be enhanced by com-

parison with other approaches which share the

same basic assumptions since deep commonalties

will become visible (Lane, 1994a). Additionally,

research at this level will contribute to the debate

on choice of method (Flood and Jackson, 1991;

Watson, 1992) and clarify appropriate validation

criteria (cf. Eden, 1995; Lane, 1995a).The consideration of such issues is found in

other disciplines. In addition to OR, we might also

compare the debate with that which continues in

the eld of information systems. Various authors

have illustrated that completely dierent sets of

assumptions about social reality may be used

fruitfully; each oers dierent approaches and in-

sights but, in their own terms, each appears to be

valid (see Galliers, 1991; Hirschheim and Klein,

1989). The same paradigmatic approach of these

authors is taken in this paper. We rst give a briefaccount of the various ideas and debates con-

cerning SD. We then describe and explore a

framework for understanding dierent schools of

social theory. This framework is then used to an-

alyse both current and potential forms of practice.

We close by oering three competing conclusions

to this analysis and discuss the implications of

each.

2. System dynamics modelling practice: A historical

review of ideas and debates

System dynamics certainly possesses explicit

theory. The two notions that the feedback ap-

proach and the endogenous perspective generate

explanatory power are theories (Forrester, 1961),

as is the hierarchy of system structure (Forrester,

1968b) but these are not social theories. The social

theoretic assumptions of SD must be inferred from

the literature of the eld, there being few examples

of such theories being articulated explicitly. In this

502 D.C. Lane / European Journal of Operational Research 113 (1999) 501527


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section we therefore revisit the key descriptions of

SD modelling and raise from the ``sub-conscious''

to the ``conscious'' level (cf. Meadows, 1980) the

social theoretic assumptions that these descrip-

tions make.

2.1. The initial ideas of system dynamics

Forrester (1961) laid out the fundamental ideas

of the eld to the extent that most of the work

since then might be seen as extensions, elabora-

tions and implementations of these core initial

concepts. From a social theoretic perspective, it

oers a stimulating combination of dierent ideas,sometimes mutually supportive, sometimes con-

tradictory. The position appears to be ontologi-

cally realist; SD models are presented as abstract

representations of the actual physical and infor-

mation ows in a system, their feedback implying

that, ``decisions are not entirely ``free will'' but are

strongly conditioned by the environment'' (For-

rester, 1961, p. 17). However, in contrast to this

seemingly objective stance, Forrester proposes that

the purpose of a model is to manifest a mental

model, to state it in a `precise' way. In conse-quence, a model should be focused around a par-

ticular issue. A wide range of data sources is

proposed, including externally stored data on

tangible objects and knowledge about systems held

only in the minds of system actors. The limited

ability to share, challenge and generally utilise

mental models would be assisted by articulating

personal assumptions, whilst computer simula-

tions would form managerial laboratories in which

meaningful experiments could be conducted re-

garding the inherent behaviour characteristics of a

dynamic, non-linear feedback system. The purposewas therefore not just to explain but to aid system

re-design and to promote individual and organi-

sational learning in order to impart ``a better in-

tuitive feel [which] improves... judgement about

the factors inuencing company success'' (For-

rester, 1961, p. 45). As a result, the usefulness, and

hence validity, of such models would only be ap-

propriately judged in a personal way, ``the evalu-

ation of improved managerial eectiveness will

almost certainly rest on a subjective judgement

rendered by managers in regard to the help they

have received [from engaging with a model]''

(Forrester, 1961, p. 115, italics added).

Later works extended the application areas and

embellished the details of the approach but kept to

the initial ideas (Forrester, 1968a, b, 1969, 1971a).

Forrester (1971b) sought to improve both valida-

tion and implementation by emphasising the role

of a `process' of modelling. He contrasted this

stance with an over-attachment to nalised,

blackbox models which he all too frequently saw

cast in the role of oracle.

2.2. The eld develops and broadens

Bell and Bell (1980) directly addressed ques-

tions of ontology and epistemology. Rejecting in-

strumentalism and `dogmatic paradigmism', they

advanced refutationism as the appropriate theory

for SD since causal models oer clear test points

by which problems can be solved and theory ad-

vanced.

Meadows' attempt explicitly to probe the

``deep, implicit operating assumptions'' (Mead-

ows, 1980, p. 23) of SD though frequently cited in fact discriminated between the `paradigms' of

SD and econometrics on the grounds of the use to

which respective models are put. The detailed

quantitative analysis for precise prediction and the

use of statistical validation techniques in econo-

metrics was contrasted with the policy design as-

pirations and validation by condence approach

of SD. The aim of this paper was to reveal the

fundamentally dierent assumptions in the two

elds in the hope of improving mutual under-

standing and the poor reputation SD had acquired

amongst economists. Sterman (1988a) revisitedthis debate and oered a strong argument, emp-

hasising that the, ``primary function of model

building should be educational rather than pre-

dictive... modeling [is] a process rather than... a

technology for producing an answer'' (p. 165).

The provision of a modelling process as a

means of creating individual learning by personal

experience was problematic in an age of main-

frame computers and text-driven programs. System

dynamics modelling was happening, primarily,

D.C. Lane / European Journal of Operational Research 113 (1999) 501527 503


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away from clients. Additional work was necessary

to use the model to adjust managers' mental

models. In consequence, concern moved to the

somewhat neglected process of `implementation'

(e.g. Roberts, 1978). Richardson and Pugh (1981)

were well aware that, ``A model's utility and ef-

fectiveness depend... on the degree to which the

model communicates, helps to generate insights,

enhances understanding, and in general reaches

and inuences its audience'' (pp. 312313) and

stated the diculties very clearly; ``The need to

insinuate model-based policy conclusion in the

intuition of the client suggests [that] the client be

an integral part of the modelling process. Insights,

when they come, are more likely to come out of theprocess rather than the nal products of a mod-

eling study'' (p. 355). In response they developed

the work of Forrester and Senge (1980) and de-

scribed validation as a hybrid combination of in-

terwoven technical and more subjective elements.

2.3. A tension within system dynamics

The tension implicit in this last combination

may be found in Forrester (1980a), in which heappears to take a strikingly deterministic, and

nomothetic, approach to the nature of human

decision making whilst re-emphasising the role

that personal experience plays in gaining insights

from a model building process. The hybrid ap-

proach of Richardson and Pugh can therefore be

seen as presaging what became two dierent re-

sponses to the issues of validation and implemen-

tation. The more technical approach pushed the

refutationist line (Bell and Senge, 1980) and in-

troduced some statistical validation tests as a

means of generating condence (Sterman, 1984;Barlas, 1986). Similarly, the behavioural decision

making wing of SD including the bounded ra-

tionality work of Morecroft (1983) and exempli-

ed by Sterman (1989) employs controlled

experiments to demonstrate how system structure

inuences human decision making.

The alternative view focused attention on the

social aspects and requirements of model building.

The use of causal loop diagrams (CLDs) was re-

crafted in an attempt to render both models and

model building more accessible to client under-

standing (Goodman, 1974; Roberts et al., 1983)

and `qualitative SD' (or QSD) appeared (Wol-

stenholme and Coyle, 1983). The notion of learn-

ing in an organisational context began to be

studied explicitly (Senge, 1985, 1990a) and new

software tools were developed to break down the

barrier between model and model-owner (Rich-

mond, 1985; Richmond et al., 1987). Morecroft

(1988) reported that Seymour Papert's idea of

`transitional objects' had been united with (a very

US view of) group decision support to produce a

role for SD modelling as a process for supporting

strategic debate. The use of computer-based, pre-

packaged `management ight simulators', `man-agement games', or `micro-worlds' was proposed

as a way of accelerating the process of conveying

dynamic insights and understanding (Sterman,

1988b; Kim, 1989; Senge and Sterman, 1992; Lane,

1995b), whilst D.L. Meadows (1989) developed

board games, or board game-like interfaces with

the same aim. Senge (1990b) united many of these

existing ideas to propose certain SD elements as

tools for negotiating and sharing organisational

vision and enabling organisational learning and

commitment. Lane (1992) advocated a style offacilitation consultancy based on the ideas of

Schein (1969) and explored how the `Modelling as

Learning' group decision support (GDS) approach

tted in with similar OR tools whilst beginning to

advance a more socially subjective understanding

of such processes, a view discussed further in Lane

(1994a). Finally, Richardson and Andersen (1995)

described the dierent technical and social roles

that were required for group model building to be

eective.

2.4. Comments from outside the eld

Keys (1988, 1990) oered the view that SD as

originally created had the same major assumptions

as hard system approaches but then underwent

signicant change when it engaged with pluralist

contexts, becoming more subjective and shifting

towards but, signicantly, not into the theory of

soft approaches. Rather baingly, Keys sees the

key change as being ``the use of inuence diagrams



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to provide an initial focus for the analysis'' (Keys,

1990, p. 486). This attempt to occupy two philo-

sophical stances is deemed to have opened up SD

to criticisms from both sides. Although Keys

(1988) advanced the possibility that SD is an

amalgam of objective and subjective approaches,

he forewarned that `ìf this is a valid explanation,

then it must be shown how SD can break through

paradigm incommensurability in a logically con-

sistent way'' (p. 223). This analysis is in harmony

with the work of Flood and Jackson (1991) in

which SD is labelled as being based on ùnitary'

assumptions about organisations and `simple' as-

sumptions about the system under study. These

impoverished views would appear to persist inseeing SD as, `àn attempt to apply the ideas of

control engineering to socio-economic problems''

(Keys, 1988, p. 8), ignoring or being unaware of

the importance attached to the personal experience

of model building and the associated process of

experiential learning. Finally, Dash (1994) oers a

more recent account of the eld. Drawing on a

more broad literature than Flood and Jackson,

though still attached too much to European

sources, he describes how its assumptions have

undergone various changes, leading to a `concep-tual shift' towards less objective and unitary

practice.

2.5. To the present

Further contributions include that of Radzicki

(1990) who conrms the poor esteem in which

economists hold SD. He then oers the diagnosis

that this basic dierence in research philosophy is

located in the utilisation by the majority of econ-

omists of the logical empiricist approach, whilstSD can be seen as an example of pragmatic in-

strumentalism. Barlas and Carpenter (1990), in a

deep consideration of the basic assumptions of the

eld, similarly reject logical empiricism. However,

they employed a careful reading of Forrester and

his notions that model validation is achieved solely

by owner condence to support the proposal that

a Quinian, relativistic approach to model valida-

tion is appropriate. Validation is then, `à gradual

process of building condence in the usefulness of

a model'' (p. 157), and it, `ìs inherently a social,

judgmental, qualitative process: models cannot be

proved valid but can be judged to be so'' (p. 148).

Hence, ``Validation is a matter of social conver-

sation, because establishing model usefulness is a

conversational matter'' (p. 157).

Cavaleri (1992) explicitly considered the social

theory of SD using Burrell and Morgan's frame-

work (q.v.). He claimed that the discipline had

such powerful integrative properties that it could

be placed in the centre of that framework, strad-

dling all four paradigms but his positioning

is logically invalidated by his failure to address

the question of inter-paradigmatic incommensu-

rability.The need to see condence as involving both

technical and social aspects is re-emphasised in

Lane (1995a) which analyses the standard valida-

tion tests and nds them to be strongly biased

towards technical factors. This paper then extends

the framework in Richardson and Pugh (1981) by

proposing further tests which might help a group

develop condence by ensuring that a modelling

process ts with the culture of that group and their

organisation.

Finally Vennix (1996) impressively advancesthe exploration of the links between SD and Eu-

ropean-style GDS/OR. Drawing heavily on the

literature of the latter, he shows how human in-

terpretations of situations inuence how people

dene problems, recall and value information and

judge possible courses of action. From a social

theoretic perspective he is saying that people's

perceptions of their social environment inuence

their behaviour and hence inuence the environ-

ment. He argues that social reality is a world of

shared intersubjective meaning. He concludes

that in doing interactive model building to address`messy' problems such features must be a central

consideration if the group is to use SD to create a

shared understanding of a problem.

3. Burrell and Morgan's framework for social

theories

We must choose a means of exploring the so-

cial theory of SD practice. Dierent approaches,



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operating at dierent meta-theoretical levels, are

available. We might operate at the grand level of

unprovable fundamental assumptions of science

(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992). We

could employ Habermas' theory of human cog-

nitive interests (Habermas, 1968; White, 1988) or

use the `structuralist' or `meaning and action'

perspectives of Cu et al. (1990). A choice must

be made and there is no possibility of a `knock-

down argument' for it. We shall choose to oper-

ate at the level of paradigm or disciplinary matrix

using the classic framework of Burrell and Mor-

gan (1979).

In describing the dierent approaches to the

study of organisations, Burrell and Morgan con-cluded that the various schools of thought can

usefully be conceived as residing in four para-

digms, generated by two axes. Although there are

dierences of emphasis between schools, the dis-

tinctive meta-theoretical assumptions are shared

within a particular paradigm and are in opposition

to those of the other three. The advantage of

choosing this framework is that it is useful for

debating underlying assumptions whilst still being

based on straightforward denitions. Used as

recommended, `às a heuristic device rather than asa set of rigid denitions'' (Burrell and Morgan,

1979, p. xii), it demonstrates considerable de-

scriptive power. This, combined with its use in

similar studies in the elds of OR and information

systems (for example, Checkland, 1981; Jackson,

1993a; Hirschheim and Klein, 1989), motivates its

selection here. To set the scene for the examination

of SD the two axes of this schema are described in

more detail below and the constituent paradigms

are then explored in Section 4.

3.1. The `nature of social science' axis: Subjecti-

vism/objectivism

In proposing this axis, Burrell and Morgan

bundle together four strands of theoretical as-

sumptions implicit in social science thought, ar-

guing that the poles of these complexes may

usefully be labelled as `subjective' and òbjective'

approaches to the social sciences (see Fig. 1).

Òntological' assumptions concern the natureof the phenomena being studied; what the world is

and what it contains. The realist view takes the

social world as being prior to individual humans

and their appreciation of it, formed of tangible

structures which have existence even if they are not

consciously recognised and named by humans.

The nominalist position views the social world as

being a product of human consciousness; there is

no `real' structure to the world, only the articial

descriptions and names that humans agree to use

as tools to make sense of the world and to nego-tiate their actions.

Èpistemological' issues concern the type of

knowledge that is possible and the means by which

it can be communicated. The positivist view is that

knowledge can be revealed by deducing proposi-

tions, by searching for laws (regularities, structures

and causal relationships) which may be perceived

Fig. 1. The four strands of theory which constitute the `nature of social science' axis of Burrell and Morgan's schema. The `subjective'

and òbjective' stances possible within each strand are also displayed.



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by an external, objective, observer. The anti-posi-

tivist stance takes knowledge to be personal, con-

cerned with experience and insight, almost

spiritual in nature, and lacking laws. Knowledge is

not `revealed', as implied by positivism, but

`manufactured' by specic actors.

The `human nature' strand concerns the implicit

or explicit model of humans and their relationship

with their environment. The deterministic view

has people responding in an almost mechanistic

way, functioning as products of an environment,

or social structure, which both forms the situations

which they encounter and the conditioning which

they imbibe. The voluntarist approach ascribes a

much more creative, free will approach to humans,having them act as agents able to create their

environment by their thoughts and actions.

Finally, two dierent forms of `methodology'

are specied, indicating the processes by which

phenomena are investigated and knowledge ob-

tained. The nomothetic theory promotes the

search for universal laws by a process of identify-

ing tangible concepts and then constructing tests

which allow the concepts to be measured. An id-

eographic approach is concerned with accessing

the unique understanding that an individual usesto interpret the world around them.

3.2. The `nature of society' axis: Regulation/radical

change

The approaches dening this axis involve

schools of social thought with concerns which are

summarised in Fig. 2 and described below. `Reg-

ulative' theories concern the status quo, seeking to

explain the processes of consensus creation and

need satisfaction that result in the continuation

(though also evolution) of a society. Similarly,

social interactions are studied with a view to un-

derstanding their function in respect of social co-

hesion. In contrast `radical change' theories seek to

understand the structural conicts of a society.

These theories seek to understand ways of tran-scending present limitations to produce emanci-

pation.

4. Exploring the paradigms

4.1. Functionalist sociology

The schools of social thought which are placed

within this paradigm are characterised by objective,

regulative assumptions. The major contributors

were originally motivated by the stunning successes

Fig. 2. The two approaches which dene the `nature of society' axis: the schools of social thought dening the `regulation' and `radical

change' stances have the concerns shown.



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of natural science in the 19th century and sought

to emulate them; ``From its beginning, scientic

sociology has had a severe case of `physics envy'...

early sociologists had a vision for sociology that

looked like Newtonian physics'' (Turner, 1994, p.

42). Additionally, as these early workers in this

eld made the implicit assumption that industrial

society was the zenith of human achievement,

problems of regulating society were deemed pre-

eminent: interest centred on the means by which

society could be seen as an integrated system. In

consequence, this paradigm can be seen as having

a positivistic approach, conceptualising sociology

as the objective study of existing phenomena. The

application of the research approach of the naturalsciences was proposed by Auguste Comte and

signicantly advanced by Emile Durkheim whose

work centred on the uncovering of `social facts'

and their objective measurement. The goal was to

generate a theory regarding the cause of a fact and

the function that it played in maintaining an or-

derly society and to give accounts of actions

deemed to be rational in a given situation. The

knowledge so revealed was claimed to be analyti-

cal, existing independently of individual con-

sciousness and therefore public and value-free,

subject to empirical testing, repeatable and refut-

able. As a theory, functionalism has been repeat-

edly developed and enhanced, constantly attacked

and responsively amended in order to be re-

throned. As a result, functionalism now contains a

very wide range of schools of thought (see Fig. 3)

and has attracted the majority of workers in the

eld.

Within the `objectivism' school, `behaviourism'aspires to data-validated theories of human be-

haviour derived from tightly controlled stimulus

and response experiments. Humans are conceptu-

alised as passive responders, machine-like in their

reactions to external conditions and the methods

Fig. 3. Framework proposing four paradigms (bold) for the analysis of social theory and the constituent schools of such social theories.

Figure re-drawn from Burrell and Morgan (1979).



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of natural science are employed in the pursuit of

the laws which govern behaviour in a given situ-

ation, the work of B.F. Skinner being a prime

example. Objectivism also contains àbstracted

empiricism', a term used to describe any of the

functionalist schools which are seen as undermin-

ing the perhaps less objective strands of their

stance with a profoundly and inappropriately no-

mothetic methodology.

In the school of `social systems theory' the

concept of `function' is particularly important.

Social life is deemed to exist because of the func-

tioning of its social structure, and the measure-

ment of the attributes of this structure is a

constant concern. Social systems theory is thus aclear development of positivism applied to the

social sciences. Burrell and Morgan see it as con-

sisting of two schools. `Structural functionalism'

derives from Herbert Spencer's work in which the

processes of evolution, development and adapta-

tion are understood by placing heavy emphasis on

analogies drawn between societies and organisms.

Talcott Parsons used the approach to describe the

processes by which the social system maintains

equilibrium with its environment and integrated its

diverse processes to preserve its internal integrity.In contrast, `systems theory' is not conned to

biological analogies since its emphasis on open

systems allows a wide range of analogies to be

brought to bear; using principles concerning

boundaries, feedback, sub-systems etc. disequilib-

rium and homeostatic situations can be studied.

The `general system theory' of von Bertalany

(1968) is an example of such a theoretical systems

theory approach, derived from (but not dependent

upon) biological concepts. The more practical

work of the Tavistock Institute (see, for example,

Dill, 1958; Rice, 1963) and that of Katz and Kahn(1966) employs a mixture of mechanical, and bi-

ological analogies, used to explain the factors

which create and maintain a stable social system.

Systems theory is not, of itself, tied to a regulative

view of social reality; by using mechanical, bio-

logical, cybernetic, morphogenetic (q.v.), factional

and catastrophic analogies, increased degrees of

change can be investigated. However, the use in

most cases of the rst two analogies explains the

placement in the schema.

Ìnteractionism' is a fusion of ideas from Ger-

man idealism and positivism. With contributions

from Georg Simmel and George Herbert Mead, the

common (positivistic) approach is the observation

of the attitudes and interactions of social life, with

Mead concentrating on the use of gesture and lan-

guage and Simmel studying the activities of groups.

The (nomothetic) goal is the uncovering of the

pattern of social rules that underlies the variety and

complexity of human associations. These rules are

determined by larger social structures (family, tribe,

state) but acts of individual association can aect

these structures (an excellent example of a feedback

theory) and it is this ontological stance that places

this school of thought at the least objective end ofthe paradigm. Similar comments apply to the `so-

cial action theory' of Max Weber which attempts to

understand the pattern of social life by interpreting

human actions using a typology of ìdeal types'

of those actions (q.v.). Again, the voluntarism of

the theory is mitigated by the nomotheticism of its

goals and the (albeit weakened) positivism of

its approach (Gneuss and Kocka, 1988).

Finally, ìntegrative theory' is the term used to

describe four sociological schools which Burrell

and Morgan see as illuminating social systemtheory with the interactionist perspective and also

addressing issues of conict arising from Marx. Of

the four, the primary interest of this paper is in

Buckley's `morphogenetic systems theory' which

rejects as inadequate models based on mechanical

or organic analogies. Buckley believed that society

cannot be understood using models based on

equilibrium or homeostasis. He also asserted that

modern socio-cultural systems need to be under-

stood in terms of the transmission of information,

that systems theories which concentrate only on

physical or material ows oer inadequate ana-lyses. His systems models treat information as a

carrier of meaning which may be present in many

places and which is subject to perception and in-

terpretation by the actors in the system. This work

therefore uses ideas from systems theory and cy-

bernetics to organise and make use of the under-

standing gained from interactionist research in

order to explain the means by which societies

change, elaborate and evolve their underlying

structures.



10/27

4.2. Interpretive sociology

This alternative paradigm, itself containing

many dierent views, is the product of German

idealism, developed from the ideas of Immanuel

Kant and George Hegel by Weber, Wilhelm Dil-

they, Edmund Husserl, Alfred Schutz and Harold

Garnkel. Interpretive sociology emphasises the

essentially spiritual nature of the social world

which must be interpreted in terms of the sub-

jective understanding which individual human

agents ascribe to their social situations. The in-

terpretive paradigm views the social world as be-

ing constantly created by individuals via processes

of dialogue, negotiation and learning. Social re-ality is then an emergent property of the actions

of human beings, a manifestation of human

consciousness brought into existence through in-

tentional acts and intersubjectively shared mean-

ing. Interpretation attempts to illuminate social

action by oering an account of the acts of ra-

tional people and the signicance that people as-

cribe to those acts in order to create meaning for

their conduct. The form of knowledge on oer

makes for unusual science: experimental repeti-

tion can be impossible and disagreements ariseconcerning criteria for hypothesis testing and

refutation. Explanations may operate only at the

level of individual consciousness and subjectivity.

Knowledge better thought of as `understanding'

is not revealed but manufactured by social in-

teraction.

The least subjective of these views (see Fig. 3) is

that humans externalise their personal under-

standing of the world through the creation of ob-

jective social phenomena, artefacts which can be

interpreted by others. The need to establish criteria

for validating interpretations led Dilthey to es-tablish the science of `hermeneutics', in which an

approach similar to textual analysis is used to

understand and interpret the meaning and signi-

cance of these artefacts. A signicant element of

the research method here is called Verstehen. It is

employed to place social researchers in the role of

an individual concerned with the phenomenon, to

re-experience what had originally been thought or

felt by an artefact's creator. The goal is the re-

trieval of the meaning that he/she imparts to his/

her actions so that meaning can be communicated

to others. Interpretation is then done with refer-

ence to `ideal types', a complex concept derived

from Comte, Durkheim and Weber which may be

read here as thinking aids, drawn from real phe-

nomena, with which a situation is compared in

order to understand its signicant components and

so generate explanatory value (Oliga, 1988; Cu

et al., 1990).

With his `phenomenology' theory, Husserl

attempted to probe not the manifestations of

consciousness but individual, transcendental con-

sciousness itself. He believed that the phenomena

contained therein within the immanent con-

sciousness, prior to any reection or judgement were the true objects of study for the social

sciences (Husserl, 1907).

Beyond Husserl's ideas lies the philosophy of

`solipsism' in which the universe is reduced to

the contents of an individual's consciousness,

the extreme self-containedness of this view ar-

guably rendering the issue of society's nature

(regulative or otherwise) irrelevant and mean-

ingless.

In the school of `phenomenological sociology' a

balance is struck between Husserl and Dilthey.The concern is not with objective realisations of

consciousness nor with individual consciousnesses

but is instead with understanding how, through

social interaction, humans swap and transmit in-

dividual subjective meanings and so negotiate a

shared understanding and meaning. Knowledge of

this network of intersubjective meaning allows

understanding of the world of everyday experi-

ences and actions in society. Ethnomethodology is

an example of a phenomenological approach (see

Coulon, 1995).

4.3. Radical structuralist sociology

Deemed by Burrell and Morgan to have been

founded by the later writings of Marx, and taking

a realist view, this paradigm uses a natural scien-

tic approach to critique the status quo of society

and to understand the contradictions and conicts

inherent in the structure of society.



11/27

Variations on this position (most deriving

from dierent interpretations of Marx' writings)

include Russian social theory, based on the work

of Engels and Plekhanov, emphasising the scien-

tic rationality of Marx and leading to the his-

torical materialism of Bukharin and Kropotkin's

anarchistic communism (see Fig. 3). In contrast,

contemporary Mediterranean Marxism re-em-

phasises the Hegelian inuences, somewhat re-

ducing the role of economic factors to allow a

greater role for ideological developments and

contradictions whilst preserving a positivistic and

deterministic approach. Finally, conict theory

contains a radicalised version of Weber's inter-

actionist ideas, which attack economic determin-ism by demonstrating that economic behaviour

can be formed by ideology and so oer a more

sophisticated analysis of class and power legi-

timisation.

4.4. Radical humanist sociology

In contrast to radical structuralism, the para-

digm of radical humanism, with its roots in Ger-

man idealism, oers a radical critique of societybased on individual consciousness. Burrell and

Morgan (1979) describe the fundamental concept

of this paradigm as being, ``that the consciousness

of man [sic.] is dominated by the ideological su-

perstructures with which he interacts, and that

these drive a cognitive wedge between himself and

his true consciousness. This wedge is the wedge of

àlienation' or `false consciousness', which inhibits

or prevents true human fullment'' (p. 32).

Viewing society as essentially anti-human because

it limits personal development, this paradigm

therefore takes as its aim the emancipation ofhumans so that they can achieve their full po-

tential.

Within this paradigm (see Fig. 3) lies `Critical

Theory', the overtly political work of Max Hor-

keheimer, Theodor Adorno and other German

scholars collectively known as the Frankfurt

School who, from the 1920s, established a pro-

foundly critical view of the shallowness of modern

culture. A contemporary, and continuing, re-

sponse to this despairing view is the Critical

Theory of Jurgen Habermas who sees social

development not in Marxist terms of the growth

of economic production but rather centred on

the accumulation of knowledge (Habermas,

1968, 1981a, b; White, 1988). Habermas seeks a

form of knowledge which he calls Èmancipatory'.

He argues that truth and rationality in the Life-

world are a matter of agreement; knowledge arises

from free discussion and agreement, from debate

which is aware of the interests behind contributing

views and treats all contributors as equal partici-

pants. Such processes will allow the creation of

rational consensus via undistorted debate, or

`communicative competence'.

Located within this paradigm we also ndèxistentialism', usually associated with Jean-Paul

Sartre, a radical form of Husserlian transcen-

dental subjectivity, and the anarchistic individu-

alism of Max Stirner and others. The strong

subjectivism or individualism of these schools

make them less relevant to the discussion in this

paper.

5. Explicating the social theory of established

practice

Because of the range of SD practices, this paper

deals separately with dierent types, initially tak-

ing a chronological view and then moving to treat

tailored uses of SD which can be seen as distinct.

First, in this section we attempt to unearth the

theory implicit in existing forms of practice. In

Section 6 we then build on this analysis to propose

two innovative forms of SD activity, grounded in

new areas of social theory.

5.1. Initial system dynamics practice

We deal rst with the practices of SD which

began with the creation of the discipline (signalled

by the publication of Forrester, 1958) and then

followed on for the next two decades, impelled and

directed by Forrester's core ideas. The location of

this grouping Ìnitial SD' is crucial to the ar-

gument which follows (see Fig. 4). Forrester can



12/27

be interpreted as having proposed a form of sys-

tems theory based on a positivistic and servo-

mechanistic view of the social world, taking a re-

alist and determinist stance. The approach's in-

tended contribution to strategic change gives this

grouping a slight weighting away from the regu-

lative extreme. However, the ability to treat dis-

equilibrium situations and the interest in repre-

senting the ow and interpretation of informationallows the extension into integrative theory (via

morphogenetic systems theory). Most important

of all are the three notions of mental model rep-

resentation, validation by condence and the

provision of learning experiences based on the

never entirely nished process of model building.

These ideas, clearly present at the creation of the

eld, indicate an embryonic inclination towards a

much more interactionist stance. For two decades

these founding ideas were used in an increasingly

wide range of applications. Publications during

this period reect on experience and add detail but

fail to advance theory to any great extent; SD

seemed merely to be a new variety of computer

simulation modelling. The tension innate in its

contradictory ideas remained.

5.2. Broad system dynamics practice

These tensions became more apparent, and

began to be worked out, in the third decade of the

eld's life (see region `Broad SD' in Fig. 4). In this

interval of time the `period of interpretative di-

vision' we see the eects of two emerging chal-

lenges to the eld; the rst concerning the poor

reception of SD among economists (see Meadows,

1980) and the second deriving from increased dif-

culties in implementation (see Roberts, 1978).

Fig. 4. Explication of the social theories of SD practice. The regions (and `ashes') of established practice have been located in the

social theoretic paradigms and constituent schools with which their implicit operating assumptions seem consistent. The black arrows

indicate the `interpretive division' in the evolution of ideas in the eld. The two circular regions denote idealised new forms of practice.The grey arrows indicate possible inspiration or support for these paradigms by existing ideas within SD. Compare with Fig. 3.



13/27

The responses can then be viewed as a division in

approach, centred around more and less objective

interpretations of the notion of `validation by

condence'. Bell and Bell's (1980) support of ref-

utationism as a theory so that causal and be-

havioural hypotheses are stated and tested and

the subsequent employment of statistical tech-

niques (see Sterman, 1984), aspired to the aus-

terity of logical positivism and advanced the

theory of SD in the objective direction. In their

interpretation, `condence' is created by these

`truly scientic' means provided by expert con-

sultants; the methods were familiar to managers

and thus implementation would be eased and also

SD would be able to present itself as dierent instyle to econometrics but, crucially, not dierent

in kind.

The alternative response saw condence as

arising from social conversations. Meadows

(1980) rendered SD quite distinct from econo-

metrics on these grounds and went on to expend

her considerable energies on making insights de-

rived from the SD perspective more popularly

comprehensible to people (see D.H. Meadows,

1989; Meadows, 1991). Similar attempts to cope

with implementation diculties concentrated ondeveloping approaches by which the process, and

hence experience, of modelling could be brought

closer to the user and its value perceived and

imparted more readily. Consultants acted as

process facilitators. The emphasis on CLDs and

the advocacy of QSD discussed previously can

both be seen as attempts to make SD models

carry more meaning for untrained users. The in-

troduction of STELLA was a late but signi-

cant advance in this regard. The combination of

technical and less objective elements to validation

can be seen in the approach of Richardson andPugh (1981) to validation and shows that this

interpretation of the `condence' notion is moving

to the subjective end of functionalist sociology,

via integrative theory (and possibly into interac-

tionism).

The fact that this broad range of views be-

came acceptable interpretations of Forrester's

ideas may be read into his comments around that

time (Forrester, 1980a) in which the original

tension is re-stated, though perhaps his call for

more work on the paradigm of the eld (For-

rester, 1985) indicates some discomfort in this

regard. Nevertheless, in this period we can see

SD establishing itself across a broad region of

social theory. Although dierent and more spe-

cialised views have since emerged (see below),

these still overlap with this region which may

therefore be seen as the heartland of the eld of

SD. The enduring relevance of these ideas is in-

dicated by the continued appearance of diverse

work done in a style best seen as consistent with

this form of SD, for example, the recent studies

of developing nations (Saeed, 1994) and of the

software development process (Abdel-Hamid and

Madnick, 1990).Arising from `Broad SD', at times which it is no

longer useful to locate with great precision, we

may now identify the emergence of some special-

ised forms of SD. It is to these that attention now

turns.

5.3. Interactive system dynamics practice

`Interactive SD' encompasses both SD-based

interventions performed in a GDS style and its useto support organisational learning (see Fig. 4).

These ideas can be seen as a signicant extension

albeit a natural and evolutionary one of the least

objective view of condence. Dash (1994) seems to

be describing this area of practice when he refers to

a `conceptual shift' in SD.

The emphasis throughout Interactive SD is on

the provision of tools with which individuals and

groups interact in order to take a systemic view of

their environment and of the current goals, actions

and policies of the actors within it. The tools

provide a language with which opinions can bearticulated precisely and discussed so that indi-

viduals learn together and decide on a course of

action which they believe will achieve agreed aims.

It is this focusing on group understanding and the

belief in the feedback relationship between actors

and environment which places these activities at

the least objective end of the paradigm of func-

tionalist sociology.

The contributors to this region are large in

number so that any list of inuences risks oence.



14/27

Sterman's piece (Sterman, 1988a) on the need to

convey understanding and Richmond's concept

(Richmond, 1987) of the `strategic forum' are im-

portant inuences but there are many others.

These include Meadows' board games (D.L.

Meadows, 1989), Morecroft's connection with the

transitional object idea (Morecroft, 1988) and

Lane's advocacy of increasingly personal and

participative modelling in a style (Lane, 1992)

motivated by the work of Schein (1969) Lane

using the term `Modelling as Learning' to describe

this form of GDS. The link to Schein's ideas and

the connection, in turn, of his ideas to those of

Goman (1959), establish this area of practice as

lying within the interactionism and social actiontheory school. The early ideas of Vennix (1990)

may be locatable here also, though this is a ques-

tion to which we will return. Tools for this form of

practice include even more exible, enjoyable and

hence usable software, microworlds (oering pre-

built models as a path to rapid learning) and ar-

chetypes (a hybrid of concepts from QSD and the

work on generic structures which provide a suite of

readily usable ideographic CLD models for de-

bating system problems). Note that the use of

microworlds to facilitate organisational learning isproblematic: Lane (1994a) asks whether the em-

ployment of models in pre-packaged microworlds

promotes genuine change or simply generates

greater support for the status quo by via more

eective indoctrination. This query motivates the

slight extension of this region in the regulative

direction.

Richardson and Andersen (1995) contributed

to the understanding of the best way of patterning

a formal group model-building process and simi-

lar work continues to appear from SUNY at

Albany, whilst Senge (1990b) is undoubtedly themost popular expression of the `organizational

learning' usage. However, the question of whether

the ideas that he advocates can be located within

this paradigm is problematic and is considered

further Section 6.2. These diverse features together

justify the extension of this form of practice into

the school of interactionism and social action

theory.

The activities of Interactive SD are on the ex-

treme of the range of schools contained within the

paradigm of functionalist sociology. Indeed, some

of the practice included in this grouping is argu-

ably toying with subjective ideas, perhaps presag-

ing a new form of SD. This notion will be

addressed in Section 6.

Interactive SD has the advantage of a reason-

ably clearly stated social theory in Barlas and

Carpenter (1990). Although they retain the notion

that the concatenation of causal hypotheses which

makes up an SD model is, ``a theory about how a

system actually works'' (p. 149), so that ontologi-

cally they preserve the realist view of what a set of

causal links implies about the world, their social

conversation view of model validation, based on

Quine's relativism, may be a signicant withdrawalfrom a positivist view of epistemology.

5.4. Non-conformist economics

A number of usages of SD constitute this

grouping. Radzicki (1990) has a detailed argument

regarding the theory underlying his proposed use

of SD. He describes how institutional economics

draws on the work of Dewey, using pragmatic

instrumentalism as it attempts to place events intoknown patterns in order to oer explanations of

those events in a style akin to cultural anthropol-

ogy. By attempting to understand the interaction

between human values and the socio-economic

system in mature triplistic economies, institutional

economics proposes a consensus-based economic

planning approach based on the use of iterative

pattern modelling. The proposed use of SD as a

modelling tool for institutional economics must be

located in the functionalist paradigm, albeit in

integrative theory, the less objective and regulative

part (see Fig. 4). We can also locate here the workon evolutionary economics and stochastic recaus-

alisation (for example, Radzicki and Sterman,

1994; Mosekilde et al., 1983, respectively), though

the latter is shared with the region discussed next.

5.5. Policy engineering

The interpretation given in this paper to `Policy

Engineering' is that it is a withdrawal from inte-



15/27

grative theory into the `redoubt' of social systems

theory (see Fig. 4). It can be traced from the work

of Coyle (1977) and Lyneis (1980) and contains

the continued application of system dynamics as a

form of traditional simulation modelling by expert

consultants as part, either of a top-down corpo-

rate planning process, or as part of the policy

analysis of a social system. The name is proposed

in Sharp and Price (1984) and the approach is

positivist, sometimes returning explicitly to no-

tions of refutationism (Homer, 1996). The use of

CLDs notwithstanding, there is often little ap-

parent recognition of the individuals for whom the

modelling is done and the systems being studied

may be purely technical, almost mechanical, innature (see Coyle (1977) and parts of Wol-

stenholme (1990)). Here we nd Pidd's envelop-

ment of SD within `hard' simulation modelling

(Pidd, 1992) and work involving optimisation (see

Winch, 1977; Coyle, 1996), a style of analysis

which is clearly nomothetic. This area of practice

also contains the work on the National Model

(Forrester, 1980b, 1989) and other social problems

(Levin et al., 1975). The goal of supporting large

scale, strategically important analysis moves this

grouping a little further up our diagram but thesize of the models, the validation approach and

the optimising processes frequently used with

them imply a retreat from the more subjective,

personal experience interpretation of condence

creation.

5.6. Austere system dynamics practice

This grouping brings together applications

which emphasise more determinist, positivist and

arguably objectivist approaches (see Fig. 4). Here,perhaps surprisingly, we might locate some of the

work being done on the `validation' of micro-

worlds, or business ight simulators in which these

devices are treated almost as if their goal is be-

haviour modication in the style of Skinner and

great emphasis is placed on the collection of

quantitative data (see Bakken et al., 1992, for

examples). Similarly located is the behavioural

decision making work in SD (Sterman, 1989;

Kleinmuntz, 1993; Paich and Sterman, 1993).

Finally, the ideas on bounded rationality (Mor-

ecroft, 1983) may also be placed with Austere

SD since their treatment of humans as `sat-

issers' rather than `optimisers' appears to be a

modied form of behaviourism which leaves

them responding to their environment in a

more sophisticated but nevertheless deterministic

way.

Mis-understood as an extremist, determinist

type of SD (Jackson, 1993b), at one level this work

can be seen as an attempt to provide an academ-

ically irreproachable platform for SD within the

positivist environment of MIT. Of more profound

importance, however, is the role that this work

plays in the validation of the feedback perspectiveas a suitable tool for understanding behavioural

decision making. Forrester's views on social sys-

tems are not as clearly deterministic as they might

appear. In his careful reading, Bowen (1994) views

SD as being distinct from the ideas of Skinner

because, although demonstrating experimentally

that individual decisions are eected by system

structure, ``individuals can design and aect the

redesign of the social and managerial systems that

impose on them'' (Bowen, 1994, pp. 87, 88). One

interpretation of this position is that SD is,``caught in an appalling paradox'' (Jackson,

1993b, p. 22), that, ``there is an apparent con-

tradiction between deterministic ideas of systems

governed in particular ways and voluntaristic ideas

of our ability to do something about systems''

(Jackson, 1994, p. 220). Lane (1995c) argues that

this is false and that a more careful reading is

necessary. By showing from a positivist stance that

the determinist approach based on feedback has

explanatory power, this work justies and under-

writes the use of SD as a form of modelling which

has value in aiding self-awareness amongst deci-sion-makers. Austere SD therefore underpins, and

is an essential pre-requisite for, all of the SD ac-

tivities that reside in the paradigm of functionalist

sociology.

However, there is a diculty here which has

already been hinted at. It may be that the search

for experimental support of clear rules underlying

SD modelling undermines the more subjective

elements of these two activities; if a microworld

is a transitional object involving personal



16/27

experience, can it be validated in this way? Or

does such an approach smack of abstracted

empiricism?

5.7. `Flashes' of practice

Some uses involving utterly dierent social

theories are observable but these are not so much

established elds as they are sudden àshes' of

practice (see Fig. 4). To say that Wolpert's paper

(Wolpert, 1992) possesses any degree of theoretical

reection may be too charitable; certainly this ex-

traordinary attempt to create a `model of the dark

night of the soul' experience derives from the so-

lipsistic extreme of interpretivism. In stark con-

trast, some of the work of Ryzhenkov

(1989, 1990), with its emphasis on treating the

economic system as a system of imprisonment, is

grounded in the radical structuralist paradigm.

The linkage with Bukharin's brand of Russian

social theory is clear.

6. Using theory to propose new types of practice

6.1. Subjective approaches: Àgency dynamics'

If we probe the evolving understanding of

`condence' in SD we can see that it involves at

least three ideas. Firstly, condence is derived

from agreement on issue focus. However, opera-

tional researchers accept that problems usually

involve some sort of gap and are hence, ``concep-

tual entities that don't exist in the world, but

rather involve a relationship of disharmony be-

tween reality and one's preferences... [they] arepartially but intrinsically subjective'' (Smith, 1989,

pp. 965, 966). Secondly, we speak of the con-

dence that model builders have in the mental

models that they articulate, communicate and are

therefore made aware of in the form of a model.

Thirdly, condence is engendered by the process of

insight generation and knowledge creation and

internalisation. These three ideas can all be viewed

as social phenomena involving multiple perspec-

tives and/or consensus on issue focus, the attach-

ment of meaning to mental models and a personal,

that is, experiential and therefore nominalist, ap-

proach to learning. These comments open up the

possibility of Àgency Dynamics', SD practices

grounded in the two subjective paradigms. The

name derives from the focus on the ideas and

interpretations of individual human agents, in

contrast to objective approaches which treat

the inuence of system structure on behaviour

(Layder, 1994).

The most important element of Agency Dy-

namics is the shift to ontological nominalism.

Such a stance may appear to violate the precepts

of SD but it is not always clear that nominalism

is rejected in SD. In fact, the eld seems ratherconfused regarding the issues at stake on this.

For example, the statements in Forrester (1994)

do not constitute a conscious choice in favour of

realism since Forrester sees the stance taken in

Checkland's work as `à curious ambivalence''

(p. 250) rather than the self-aware nominalist

position that it is. Similarly, Richardson and

Pugh (1981) oers an example of ontological

uncertainty, proposing that, `òrganizations... are

feedback systems'' (p. 2, italics added) but then

falling back on the argument that, ``Viewing themas such'' (ibid) is useful, a seemingly nominalist

stance. Finally, Morecroft's comparison (Mor-

ecroft, 1988) of SD with OR, whilst deriving

many useful practical insights, fails to recognise

(and hence respond to) the profoundly dierent

social theory underlying the methods that he

studied. Such uncertainty and ignorance provides

space for a debate on the ontological position

of SD.

There are good reasons for explicitly adopting

a nominalist position in doing SD. Firstly, as

argued in detail elsewhere (Lane, 1994a), taking asubjective approach opens up the possibility of

engagement with the activities of `soft' OR, from

which many benets would ow. Secondly, some

of the current practice in the eld is better de-

scribed as `Àgency Dynamics'', although the

subjective stance is implicit and confused. It

would be better to make this stance explicit and

so hope to put such practice on a rm footing. In

Sections 6.26.4 these assertions are explored

further.



17/27

6.2. `Holon dynamics'

Holon Dynamics (or HD) is an envisaged form

of practice grounded in the interpretivist paradigm

(see Fig. 4). The name responds to Checkland

(1988). With HD the notion of model building as a

social process is embraced and models are nomi-

nalist representations, useful devices which help

human agents to create their social worlds via

debate and the construction of shared meaning. A

nomothetic methodology is inappropriate since

model building is accepted as a personal experi-

ence which can only be understood in its full

richness (see Eden and Jones, 1980; Lane, 1997 for

examples). This will also preclude positivism as anepistemology. Papers adopting this paradigm

might take a hermeneutic approach, giving rich,

personal accounts of projects, perhaps using some

of aspects of Verstehen to enable readers to share

in the meaning that had been installed in any

models by describing the circumstances of its cre-

ation. Modelling within this paradigm is most

likely to be in a GDS style, a phenomenological

approach being adopted, with the creation of a

model acting as a powerful device for co-ordina-

ting meaningful group action.Such practice is clearly inuenced by some of

the work in Interactive SD, the subjectivist stance

being one towards which Vennix and Lane have

been moving. The most tantalising and challenging

question is: does such practice exist? Perhaps in the

works of these authors and others reaching out

from Interactive SD? We believe that such practice

does take place, that three types of activity in our

eld may be viewed as having adopted an inter-

pretive paradigm and may therefore be thought of

as HD.

Unfortunately, in the case of the rst candidate Peter Senge it is dicult to tell since his most

widely read piece (Senge, 1990b) is such a mixture

of ideas. His work in pluralist contexts and his

ideas on the participative creation of vision state-

ments that engender deep personal commitment,

may be describing implicitly the creation of inter-

subjective meaning. His comment that, ``systems

thinking [can] become an active agent, continually

revealing how we create our reality'' (Senge, 1990b,

p. 95, italics added) appears both nominalist and

voluntarist. His emphasis on the use of models and

microworlds to obtain personal experience appears

to separate him from positivism. However, the

lack of a clearly espoused social theory makes any

placement of this book extremely problematic.

Kofman and Senge (1993) is an improvement

though still uncertain concerning its ground. At

worst, it repeats the style of vapid, feel-good gen-

eralities and infuriatingly indistinct platitudes. At

best, it oers some interesting ideas which hint at a

nominalist approach. Other commentators feel

that the activities described by Senge lack any clear

philosophical background (Jackson, 1993b). It will

therefore be interesting to see whether Senge ever

does choose to articulate a clear social theory forhis work and whether he will make the paradig-

matic break with functionalism in so doing.

Many of the ideas in Vennix (1996) parallel

those of Senge, although he grounds them securely

in the relevant literatures. He sees the goal of

group model building as the creation of a shared

description of a problem which can then act as a

basis for action. His central interest in working

with small groups and facilitating the creation

among them of intersubjective meaning looks in-

terpretive. Vennix's understanding of the work ofCheckland and his general command of the `soft

OR' literature reinforces the idea that he is at-

tempting to step away from a realist approach.

However, there are two important points to make

about this impressive book.

The rst concerns Vennix's championing of SD

as a suitable tool to facilitate the negotiation of

inter-subjective understanding. If he has indeed

chosen an interpretive stance, then there is no ar-

gument available to him to justify the use of any

particular modelling approach, all normative as-

pirations having been cast aside. Arguing for thecontinued use of SD retains an essentially nor-

mative, and therefore realist, view of the world. It

is not consistent with to use one example of an

interpretivist approach the `ethnomethodological

indierence posture', in which description is the

key (Coulon, 1995). In fact, Vennix is not confused

on this point (Pers. Com., 1997) His use of SD is

neither normative nor descriptive. Vennix is clear

that he cannot impose SD on a group which has

no appetite for. However, if that group is wrestling



18/27

with certain types of problems and nds SD

compelling and meaningful then he believes that it

can be used as a tool to move the group towards a

shared understanding. This stance is better

thought of as `conditionally prescriptive'. Such a

stance might seem to remove Vennix's ideas from

the interpretive paradigm, locating them back into

`Interactive SD'. But the situation is less clear and

this brings us to a second point. Vennix appeals

very briey to the ideas of Berger and Luckmann

(1966) who view social reality as being constantly

reproduced by human agents behaving according

to interpretations of the world which are them-

selves shaped by that world. Vennix's uses this idea

to justify the importance that he attaches to indi-vidual interpretations. It is the shared interpr-

etation that the group members have of the world

after a modelling process that is at the centre of

Vennix's interests. He wants to get as close as

possible to the ideas and attitudes of his group

members so that in using SD they have truly

changed their interpretations of the world, see it

dierently and act accordingly. It is a view very

similar to that of Senge but much better grounded.

Both this approach and Berger and Luckmann's

ideas are problematic. However, it is this attach-ment to the interpretations of the group that tips

the scales and makes us conclude that the most

useful way of seeing Vennix's more recent ideas is

as HD.

Interpretivism in SD practice is weakly declared

in the Modelling as Learning approach described

by Lane (1992) who certainly suggests that it oers

the best path for advancing that approach. Such

advance may be seen explicitly in Lane and Oliva

(1998). They describe carefully how the interp-

retivism of SSM might be used to generate multi-

ple perspectives on a situation before studying itfurther using SD. Although the approach that they

outline synthesises the methods of both SSM and

SD, to ensure consistency at the level of theory

they adopt completely the nominalist position of

the former. To some extent they avoid the criticism

concerning the advocacy of SD to which Vennix's

approach is open. However, the authors' discard-

ing of the normative argument does require them

to work very hard to describe why it would be

natural and expected for a group to choose to use

the tools of SD. Perhaps this paper is best seen as

an intellectual marking out of a clear and coherent

interpretivist position for system dynamicists. It

seems doubtful that its convoluted argument will

be attractive to many in the eld. Nevertheless,

this paper is perhaps the clearest statement of an

HD approach.

6.3. `Modelling as radical learning'

The form of Agency Dynamics christened here

as `Modelling as Radical Learning' implies the use

of SD modelling to further communicative com-

petence within groups. Considering its lineage,perhaps we should not be surprised that SD has

not yet drunk at the well of neo-Marxist commu-

nication theory (Lane, 1994b). But any modelling

which operates within organisations without tak-

ing an overt political stance on the ideological

superstructure of society in general does not es-

cape politics; it merely buries its stance. When we

articulate mental models are they those of alien-

ated prisoners? Do microworlds free people, or

help convey a management ideology more eec-

tively? Clearly the issues concerning power, ideo-logy, coercion and communication addressed in

the radical humanist paradigm are just as relevant

for SD.

Unlike HD, this is not a form of SD practice

that we would seriously argue exists at present.

Rather, it is a possibility suggested by both the

social theoretic literature and by developments in

the systems literature. But it is illuminating to

wonder how dicult is might be to re-craft SD

within the radical humanist paradigm. Inuences

from existing practice might support such re-

crafting (see Fig. 4). For example, Interactive SDoers much useful experience. We might also recall

that Forrester's New Corporate Design proposed

that the widespread use of SD insights in an or-

ganisation would have anti-authoritarian eects,

oering new freedoms to sta (Forrester, 1965).

Hence the very basic, `Initial SD', concepts of the

eld could also be advanced in developing such an

approach.

A great deal of theoretical and practical work

would need to be done to develop such an ap-



19/27

proach but the highly innovative idea of mixing

SD with Critical Theory could produce exciting

and eective results. At the very least, any attempt

at such development would oer a stern challenge

to some of the platitudes on the subject of indi-

vidual empowerment that are too lightly used at

present and would sharpen the eld's aspirations

in this direction.

6.4. The potential contribution of agency dynamics

In closing Section 6, two observations must be

made about the contribution to SD that might be

derived from acknowledging the idea of AgencyDynamics. The rst concerns the necessity of such

acknowledgement whilst the second addresses the

peer support available. Lane (1994a) sees the

general inability within SD to choose between a

weakened engagement with functionalism and an

embrace with interpretivism as a fundamental

problem for the eld, a view conrmed by Jackson

(1993b, 1994). It may be necessary to choose one's

approach if the criticisms of those such as Keys

(1990) are to be answered. However, we should not

underestimate the careful theoretical eorts need-ed; Lane and Oliva (1998) demonstrate the care

needed when attempting to re-ground the eld in

another paradigm. Nevertheless, a second point,

and one to be emphasised, is that work inspired by

subjectivist ideas is already under way in other

elds. See, for example, Lane's description of `soft'

OR approaches (Lane, 1994a) particularly the at-

tempts of Ulrich (1983) and Flood and Jackson

(1991) to operationalise some of Habermas's ideas,

and the account of Walsham (1993) of the appli-

cation of an interpretive approach to information

system design. The study and application of subjective approaches to management science is an

active area of research. Furthermore, SD is being

drawn into the discussion by commentators some

of whom do not have a full command of the ideas

of the eld.

A System Dynamics/Agency Dynamics debate

would certainly inject into the eld the èssential

tension' that Maloney (1993) feels that it lacks!

Agency Dynamics may not itself be adopted by

many but the debate would enrich the eld.

7. Comments and conclusions

In closing this paper we rst comment on the

nature and relevance of the above analysis. We

then consider what that analysis means by pro-

posing three competing conclusions that could be

drawn.

7.1. On the analysis employed

Many elements of this analysis may be disput-

ed. Perhaps objections will be raised to the regions

of SD practice dened above, or to their positions

in Burrell and Morgan's schema. Readers maydispute the usefulness of the four paradigms, or

question the coherence of the two axes which

generate them. In response to such objections, we

would appeal to a maxim from the OR commu-

nity, àll models are wrong but some models are

useful'. We are not immovable on the exact form

of social theoretic analysis which might be utilised.

However, some means of examining social theories

is of crucial importance. There is the common

argument that dalliance with theoretical issues is a

modern equivalent of calculating the number ofangels dancing on the head of a pin, that we would

be better obeying the exhortation to `just get on

with it' (cf. Richmond, 1994). Now `getting on

with it' is perfectly possible for some gifted indi-

viduals. But the elds of SD and OR have both

been criticised for not reecting on such individ-

ual's skills so that they might be transferred to new

practitioners (see Lane, 1994a; Eden and Sims,

1979). The `pragmatic' rejection of theoretical is-

sues, `àbandons the hope of developing manage-

ment science as an intellectual discipline, the main

tenets of which can be passed on to àpprentices'''(Flood and Jackson, 1991, p. 47). Similarly,

``practice which is not reective about the ideas

upon which it is based will abandon the chance to

learn its way to better ways of taking action''

(Checkland and Scholes, 1990, p. xiv).

To demonstrate the benets of addressing so-

cial theoretic issues, we now discuss three dierent

and competing conclusions that might be drawn

from the analysis described in the previous two

sections. These conclusions concern the appropri-



20/27

ate social theory of SD and they are mutually ex-

clusive. In each case we state and justify the con-

clusion and then consider some implications of

adopting it. The last conclusion is a bold conjec-

ture which establishes an innovative agenda for

future research in this area.

7.2. Conclusion 1: Clarity and security in functiona-

list sociology

A rst possible conclusion from our analysis is

that SD is grounded in the functionalist paradigm.

Certainly the social theoretic paradigm under

which past and current SD practice can mostreadily be seen to have been applied is functiona-

list sociology (see Fig. 4). This is a secure home for

the eld since functionalist sociology remains ``the

dominant framework for the conduct of academic

sociology and the study of organisations'' (Burrell

and Morgan, 1979, p. 25). Operating within this

paradigm brings recognition and credibility to our

work from a variety of other social sciences.

What are the implications of this conclusion?

They are threefold. Firstly, we would have to reject

the claimed existence of SD practices within otherparadigms by labelling them as distracting errors.

We might wish to take their interesting aspects and

recast them within a functionalist frame but fun-

damentally we would see them as mistakes and

delusions. The recommendation would be that

practitioners return to the functionalist fold.

Since considerable breadth of interpretation is

seen even within functionalist sociology, a second

implication concerns that spread of practice. Ini-

tially, SD was practised in a way consistent with a

mixture of ideas from social systems theory and

integrative theory. Over time the eld extendedfurther in two dierent directions. The interpretive

division underlying Broad SD can be seen as

arising from utterly reasonable interpretations of

Forrester's functionalist ideas. Interactive SD and

Austere SD reveal new contributions and further

extend the implied social theory of SD but these

regions may be viewed simply as innovative in-

terpretations of the original ideas. Therefore, the

subjective wing of Broad SD and Interactive SD

can be seen as arising from an evolutionary re-

crafting and development of the eld's early as-

sumptions. Hence Keys` almost revolutionary view

of these developments is false. Furthermore, the

Interactive SD region of activity indicates the

eld's ability to engage successfully with pluralist

contexts. Interesting as the above account of the

eld's development may be, we are nevertheless

able to deduce that this spread of schools of

practice is relatively unproblematic because all are

within the one paradigm.

The third and last implication is that SD oers

a modern, practical, relevant and empirically

based approach which is at its best and most

condent when it operates as a mixture of ideas

from social systems theory and integrative theory,and even interactionism. We may observe that,

``with the exceptions of economics, the social sci-

ences which have best survived the antipositivist

challenge have been those which have thrown o

Vienna Circle-style methodological restrictions

while going on to build formal models around

`softer' data'' (Collins and Waller, 1994, p. 22).

Perhaps Policy Engineering and the wing of Broad

SD which places a positivistic style of scientic

thought at the heart of its concept of `condence'

are appropriate for those wishing to contribute tomainstream economic theory. However, we might

recommend that the social conversation view of

condence and hence the schools of practice to the

subjective side of functionalism which aim to mix

technical and softer considerations have the most

to oer those making more general attempts to

create formal theories about social systems and

that for this project the SD approach continues to

have a great deal to oer.

7.3. Conclusion 2: Re-craftable method

A second possible conclusion is that SD is at-

tached to no unique social theory. This view is

provoked by the range of practice described in our

analysis. Certainly some of the areas are theoreti-

cally unclear, provocative ideas more than practi-

cally tested approaches. The evidence for this

conclusion is therefore not overwhelming but the

attempts to utilise most of Forrester's assumptions

within other paradigms does lead one to wonder



21/27

whether those assumptions are denitively and

unambiguously xed in one paradigm.

This conclusion must provide an explanation

for the majority of practice being located within

functionalism. A possible argument would require

us to accept that although Forrester advanced

certain initial ideas for SD these operate only at

the level of tools, techniques and methods, to re-

use the framework of Eden (1989, 1990). Some of

the grounding assumptions of the eld may appear

to operate at the level of social theory but these are

frequently capable of dierent interpretations or

are contradicted or hedged with uncertainty in

other parts of the literature. So, as created, the

eld contained assumptions which could supportdierent interpretations regarding its social theo-

retic stance. Now functionalist sociology was

and is the paradigm naturally alighted upon by

researchers who are either not aware, or do not

accept, that other scientic approaches are possi-

ble. That functionalist sociology proved to be the

dominant interpretation of Forrester's ideas, at-

tracting the unacknowledged support of the eld's

earliest members, is therefore hardly a mystery; SD

was innovative and risky enough without bur-

dening Forrester's program with a research ori-entation that was also unusual. The predominant

application of SD within functionalist sociology

may therefore be explained as an historically and

institutionally contingent interpretation of ideas

which actually can be utilised in dierent ways.

Social Theory Sd Lane

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