Social Movement Rhetoric and the Social Psychology of Collective Action: A Case Study of...

Social Movement Rhetoric and the Social

Psychology of Collective Action : A Case Study ofAnti-Abortion Mobilization

Nick Hopkins1,3 an d Steve Reicher2

This paper se eks to contribute toward an integrate d approach to social

mo ve m e n t m obili za tion . It do e s so through conside ring how a soc ial

psycho logical accou nt of the de te rmination of collective behavior ( se lf-

cate gorization theory) may be applied to the mobilization rhetoric of social

movements. More specifically it argues that as people may define themselves

and act in te rms of social cate gorie s, we may usefully conce ive of social

move ment rhetoric as be ing organized so as to construct social cate gory

definitions which allow the activists’ preferred course of action to be taken on

by others as their own. O ur theoretical argument is illustrated through the

detailed analysis of cate gory construction in contemporary U.K. anti-abortion

argumentation.

KEY WORDS: social moveme nts; self-categorization theory; social identities;

rhetoric; abortion; fetus.

INTRODUCTION

If one considers the que stion of how people are mobilize d to pursue

particular political proje cts one is drawn to two lite ratures. The first con-

cerns social movements. The second, the social psychology of influe nce .

However, the dominant themes within these literatures are rathe r contra-

dictory.

On the one hand, the social movement literature demands a social

psychological analysis of colle ctive behavior and the role of rhetoric in

changing people ’s conceptions of themselves, social issues, and their rela-

Hum an Relations, Vol. 50, No. 3, 1997

261

0018¯7267/97/0300 ¯0261$12.50/1 Ó 1997 The Tavistock Institute

1Departme nt of Psychology, University of Dundee, Dundee, Scotland.2St. Andrews University, Scotland.3Requests for reprints should be addresseed to Nick Hopkins, De partment of Psychology,

University of Dundee, Dundee, Scotland.

tionship with such issues. Thus, there has been a growing awareness that

it is not enough to study the obje ctive conditions that give rise to grievances

or the ir psychological manife stations (e .g., feelings of ‘‘relative depriva-

tion ’’) without addre ssing the proce sse s whe re by issue s come to be

‘‘framed’’ or ‘‘named’’ as ‘‘social proble ms’’ (Schneider, 1985; Best, 1987;

Snow, Rochford, Worde n, & Be nford, 1986; Elder & Cobb, 1983) or

‘‘moral’’ issues (Lee & Ungar, 1989) . Further, there has been a recognition

of the relationship between such ‘‘framings’’ and the psychology of self-

definition: among othe r things, such framings organize experience, motivate

action, provide ‘‘vocabularie s of motive ,’’ ‘‘create’’ group members (Wil-

liams, 1995; Snow et al., 1986) . Indeed there is a general recognition that

the transformation of people ’s understanding of who they are and the situ-

ation that they are in is a key moment in mobilization and that activists

may be expe cted to construct what is at stake so as narrow or broade n the

conflict and ‘‘speak’’ to public constitue ncie s in ways that are supportive

of their project (Elder & Cobb, 1983) .

Yet, when one turns to the social psychological literature on collective

behavior and mass social influe nce, one finds a body of work striking for

its neglect of the way in which issues are named and framed. Indeed, far

from concerning itse lf with the content of political argument and the way

in which this constructs people ’s understandings of themselve s and their re-

lations with particular course s of action, we have a social psychology which

typically neglects the content of argumentation (Billig, 1987) and seeks to

explain mass social influe nce in terms of the effects of a source’s attractive -

ness and status (Mills & Aronson, 1965; Eagly & Chaiken, 1975; Hovland

& Weiss, 1951) , the role of emotion (Leventhal, 1970) , distraction from mes-

sage content (Osterhouse & Brock, 1970) , message structure (Hovland,

Lumsdaine , & Sheffie ld, 1949; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953) etc. The gen-

eral tenor of social psychology’s approach is well capture d in Pratkanis and

Aronson’s (1992) Age of Propaganda which emphasizes the limite d capacity

of human beings’ cognitive resources and the ways in which these may be

exploite d in order to circumvent thoughtful deliberation.

Thus, where students of social movements highlight the need for a so-

cial psychology capable of addressing the ways in which people ’s unde r-

standings of themselve s and the ir re lationship with the world may be

transformed through the ideas containe d in political rhetoric, we have a so-

cial psychology which seems to imply that the content of such rhetoric is of

little theoretical interest. Our purpose in this pape r is to contribute toward

the social psychological analysis needed for an integrate d analysis of social

movement communication. More specifically, we take a recently developed

theory of colle ctive behavior that has its roots in experimental social psy-

chology and consider how it may be applie d outside the laboratory to make

262 Hopkins an d Reicher

sense of several features of mobilization rhetoric. Below, we describe this

mode l, discuss how it may be extende d, and illustrate its utility through ap-

plying it to a specific example of social movement communication.

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Self-Cate gorization Theory or SCT (Turne r, 1991; Turne r, Oake s,

Haslam, & McGarty, 1994; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell,

1987) argue s that people are able to define themselves at different leve ls

of abstraction. Thus, people may define themselves in terms of their indi-

viduality (and contrast themselves from othe r individuals) . Or they may

define themselve s in terms of particular social categories (e.g., as Scottish

vs. English). At a still higher leve l of abstraction, they may define them-

selve s as members of the human race and differentiate themselves from

nonhumans. As a corollary, the theory holds that the way in which one

defines one self is not fixe d but variable and that one ’s sense of ‘‘psycho-

logical distance ’’ from othe rs will change according to the le ve l of

abstraction at which the self is defined. According to the theory, it is this

ability to define the self in terms of social categorie s that makes colle ctive

behavior possible . Put simply, the adoption of a particular se lf-cate goriza-

tion results in one seeing one self as equivale nt to, and inte rchange able with,

other exemplars of the category, with the corollary that one forms a cog-

nitive representation of the attribute s associated with this category which

is then used to guide one’s own behavior.

The argume nt that collective behavior is mediated by identification

with social categorie s carrie s several implications. First, conformity to the

cate gory’s norms is de pe nde nt upon ide ntification with the cate gory

(Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Reicher, 1984a). Second, the direction of behavior

(i.e ., what is done) is controlle d and determined by the category’s ‘‘con-

tents’’ (the norms and value s he ld to define the category) (Hogg & Turne r,

1987; Reicher, 1984b) . As a corollary, colle ctive behavior posse sses a co-

herence with message s which advocate actions that are incongrue nt with

the category definition being rejected (Reicher, 1987) . Third, as members

conform to the ir unde rstanding of what represents their cate gory in contrast

to othe rs, the theory implie s that a person’s ability to define a category’scontents will be de termined by the ir relationship to the category as a whole .

More specifically, as members view themselve s as inte rchange able exem-

plars of a category (rathe r than as unique individuals) , the views of those

defined as common category members will be perceived as more self-rele-

vant (and so be more influe ntial) than those defined as out-group members

(Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane , Hogg, & Turne r, 1990; Wetherell, 1987).

Psych ology of Collective Action 263

Applying this logic to the issue of mass social influence and political

mobilization has the following implication. If what is done is determined

by the category’s contents and who is involve d in this activity is determined

by the breadth of the category’s boundarie s, political mobilization may be

viewed as depending upon people adopting a se lf-cate gorization, the con-

tents of which support the actions that activists wish to promote .

ARGUMENTS ABOUT SOCIAL CATEGORIES

As individuals may define themselves in a multitude of different ways,

it is obvious that an adequate account of mass social influe nce and mobi-

lization must addre ss the issue of how particular categorie s come to be

used rathe r than others. Turne r et al. (1994) seek to addre ss this question

through the concepts of ‘‘accessibility’’ and ‘‘fit.’’ ‘‘Accessibility’’ refers to

the individual ’s readine ss to use a particular category according to their

goals, motive s and past experiences. ‘‘Fit’’ refers to the match between a

category and the nature of the situation and take s two forms. The first, or

‘‘comparative fit,’’ refers to the relationship between categorie s and the dis-

tribution of the stimuli that are to be categorized. Thus, stimuli are more

like ly to be categorize d as an entity to the degree that the average differ-

ences between them are less than the average diffe rences between them

and the other stimuli that comprise the frame of reference . The second,

or ‘‘normative fit,’’ implie s that if a particular categorization is to be ac-

cepted as appropriate , there must be a congruency between the category’ssocial meaning and the nature of the stimuli. Thus, according to the theory,

gende r categorie s are more like ly to be used to represent a discussion be-

tween men and women if all the males said one thing and all the females

anothe r (comparative fit) , and if the content of these different positions

were consonant with gende r stereotype s (normative fit) .

While recognizing the merits of this formulation and its experimental

support (Oakes, Turne r, & Haslam, 1991), it is ope n to readings which

imply that the relevance of social categories may be mechanically ‘‘read

off’’ the social context by an isolate d individual engage d in an inte rnal cog-

nitive act of computation (Reicher, 1993; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, b).

At first sight, this might be take n as signaling the limitation of SCT’s utility

in a domain in which the contested nature of social reality is a key theme.

Inde ed, if the analysis of social movements shows anything it is that the

issue of how people make sense of themselves and their situation is com-

plex. As Elder and Cobb put it, the issue of who has what at stake is never

simply a matter of the “ ‘facts of the situation’ but of what facts are con-

side red relevant and of the meanings people assign to them” (Elder &

Cobb, 1983, p. 129) . In a similar vein, Reicher (1993) obse rves that in order


to make sense of something like the Gulf war, one must identify the nature

of the conflict and the identitie s of those involve d, and that this inevitably

require s argument about who is to be viewed as part of the social context

and how their actions are to be construe d. Thus, when deciding on how

to make sense of the conflict we could be faced with arguments about

whether to include U.S. activitie s in Vietnam, Grenada, and Nicaragua in

the picture or not, and if so, how to represent these activitie s. Similarly,

when conside ring the Arab states’ position in the war, our judgments are

continge nt on argumentation about which pieces of information should be

take n as best representing their position (e.g., we may argue over whether

to pay attention to state presidents’ or spiritual leaders’ pronounce ments,

the number and size of the pro- and anti-war demonstrations, etc.). In other

words, whether the conflict is defined as involving two adjace nt dictator-

ships, a dictator and the rest of the world, the West against the Islamic

world, and so on, is crucially dependent upon argume ntation about which

pieces of information are relevant and how they are to be characte rized

(c.f. Elder & Cobb, 1983) .

These observations about the essentially conte stable nature of social

reality are not intende d to dispute the core theoretical thrust of SCT.

Rather, they are to make the point that if categorie s are to be viewed as

intimate ly relate d to context, then our ability to argue about the nature of

that context entails an ability to argue over the relevance , inclusive ness,

and content of social categories. Thus, while accepting SCT’s analysis of

colle ctive behavior as action in accordance with the norms, values, and

‘‘knowle dge’’ associate d with categories, we wish to emphasize that the na-

ture of these categorie s is a site of argument and is constructed in and

through language (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, b). Indeed, we would ob-

serve that it is precise ly because of the consequences of social category

definitions for the scope and direction of collective action that argume nts

about such issues are felt important and therefore exist.

THE PLACE OF CATEGORY ARGUMENTS IN POLITICAL

MOBILIZATION

If both the scope and the content of colle ctive action is determined

by category definitions then we could expe ct this to have implications for

mobilization rhetoric. First, we could expect activist speake rs to define the

category boundarie s so as to include as many of the audience as possible .

Second, if the speake r’s views are to be perceived as relevant for others,

we may expe ct the category boundarie s to be constructed so that the

speaker and audience are defined in terms of a common categorization

and opposition activists re prese nte d as standing outside this category.


Third, as attitude s and behaviors are adopte d according to their perceived

congruence with the relevant self-de finition, we could expe ct the relation-

ship between the speaker’s propose d attitude s/behaviors and the category

used to define the audience to be constructe d so as to be congruent (and

those of the opposition as incongrue nt). While the term ‘‘argume nt’’ con-

veys the notion that category definitions are constructe d and disseminated

through language , it is also important to recognize that this occurs in a

conte xt where there are alte rnative category constructions in circulation

(Billig, 1987) . Thus, at the same time as exploring the ways in which a

particular definition is constructed, it is also important to consider how

these opposition alternative s are represented and the ways in which the

preferred construction unde rmines them.

In order to demonstrate the utility of this formulation, we now con-

side r the debate about abortion and the role of category arguments in

defining the debate ’s protagonists and the nature of their positions.

ARGUING ABOUT ABORTION

The relevance of the Protagorian maxims that ‘‘there are two sides to

every issue ’’ and ‘‘humans are the measure of all things’’ is graphically il-

lustrated if one considers the status of the human fetus. This entity may

be conside red to be both similar to and different from childre n or adult

persons and its categorization is therefore inevitably dependent upon the

argume ntative construction of particular attribute s as relevant for our judg-

ment. Furthe r, as the weighing of these argume nts about the existence ,

relevance , and value of these dimensions is inextricably linke d with a com-

munity’s beliefs and values, the categorization of the fetus is inevitably a

social choice (Condit, 1990) in which as Knutson puts it ‘‘people are defined

by people ’’ (Knutson, 1967, p. 7). The socially chosen nature of the dimen-

sions according to which the fetus may be categorized is well illustrate d in

social anthropologic al (Williamson, 1978; Minturn, 1989; Morgan, 1989)

and ethnographic (Kovit, 1978) studies.

However, the controve rsy around abortion is not restricted to the

status of the fetus: people also argue over the meaning of abortion, the

nature of the abortion debate’s protagonists, and their re lationship with

wider publics. Inde ed, in keeping with our general position, there is evi-

dence that activists in the debate seek to name or frame the issue so as

to broade n the constituency to which their position appe als (Mall, 1981) .

By way of example , consider the symbolic significance of the names used

by campaign groups oppose d to the U.S. Equal Rights Amendment and

abortion: names such as ‘‘Women Concerned for America’’ and ‘‘FLAG’’(Family, Life , America, God) framed these as threats to the ‘‘American


way’’ and so construed the oppone nts of these measures as representing

(and defending) the national community against a subversive opposition

(cited in Cobb & Elder, 1983; Marshall, 1985) . Reciprocally, pro-abortion

activists have sought to disseminate alte rnative definitions of the debate

and alternative categories for action. Inde ed, as the identification of po-

litical inte rests is bound up with the ways in which people represent (or

categorize ) themselves, it is no surprise to find that pro-abortion activists

have been active ly involve d in constructing and disseminating new ‘‘politi-

cized’’ collective identitie s for women which make talk of abortion as a

‘‘right’’ possible and meaningful (Brodie , Gavigan, & Jenson, 1992; Condit,

1990) .

However, while analyse s of the abortion debate provide materials

which illustrate the general point that the argumentative construction of

an issue and people ’s relationship with it is a key moment in political mo-

bilization, there is little detaile d analysis of how eithe r pro- or anti-abortion

rhetoric is organize d to allow collective mobilization. Instead, analyse s have

concentrate d on the development of campaigning networks and alliance s

(e.g., Stagge nborg, 1991) or aspe cts of within-move ment rhetoric (Vander-

ford, 1989; Soloman, 1980) . Further, where more public rhetoric has been

conside red it has come from parliame ntary debates, news media, submis-

sions to judicial inquirie s, etc. While particularly appropriate for analyse s

of official decision-making, such materials are not always ideal for analyse s

of rhetoric designe d to mobilize public action. For example , parliame ntary

debate s, by their very nature can only involve MPs (rathe r than activists)

and are unusual in that it is not at all clear who the audie nce actually is

(othe r MPs in the chamber? members of the judiciary? news headline writ-

ers? ). Similarly, the structure of parliame ntary debate is distinctive with

regard to the length of contributions, the ritualize d language , the number

and place of interruptions, and so on. Conse que ntly, while demonstrating

something of the range of constructions, they are unsuitable for analyse s

of the sustaine d argumentation of mass mobilization.

Elsewhere, we have applie d our analysis of the role of category con-

struction in mass mobilization to a specific piece of public abortion-re lated

rhetoric: a speech delive red by a leading U.K. anti-abortion speaker to an

audie nce of me dical stude nts/staff at a te aching hospital (Hopkins &

Reiche r, 1992; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a) . In this speech, members of

the audie nce were addressed as members of the medical profession with

the speake r constructing a contradiction between this identity and abortion.

For example , abortion was construe d as contradicting the core values of

the category and those practitione rs willingly involve d in its (legal) provi-

sion, characterized as a nonprofe ssional ‘‘out-group.’’ Other example s of

category-re lated argume ntation were to be found when the speaker con-


structed a broade r more inclusive category which include d himse lf, his audi-

ence , and othe rs (e .g., enviornme ntalists, activists concerned about animal

welfare , etc.) and defined it in contradistinction from anothe r broad cate-

gory of people (whose value s lead them to tole rate the exploitation of

nature for personal gain) . Thus, although not himself able to claim mem-

bership of the medical profession, the speake r and audience were, at this

higher order of abstraction, defined as common category members and our

analysis explore d the ways in which this construction of an in-group rela-

tionship allowe d him to represent himself and his anti-abortion views as

not only relevant for this audience but as arising from their identity.

While we cannot know whether audie nce members accepted these

category constructions, we feel that our analysis provide s prima facie evi-

de nce for the im portance of cate gory argum e ntation in polit ical

mobilization. However, the general applicability of our framework may be

que stione d for it could be argued that the promine nce of category-re lated

argume ntation in this speech was due to the distinctive nature of the audi-

ence (members of a profe ssional occupational category at their workplace )

and that our framework would be of less use in making sense of the conte nt

of speeches addre ssing more he teroge neous audie nces. In orde r to examine

the wider applicability of our analysis of the place of category argumenta-

tion in organizing collective action, this pape r analyze s a speech give n to

just such an audie nce . Before proceeding, we conside r several aspects of

anti-abortion rhetoric designed for mass public consumption.

ANTI-ABORTION ARGUMENTATION AND GENERAL AUDIENCES

The historical depende nce of the anti-abortion position on religious

argume ntation has meant that anti-abortion communication with general

public audiences has often been difficult (Hopkins & Reicher, 1992) . While

meaningful within the relevant (e.g., re ligious) communitie s, this discourse

has had little widespread resonance and has isolate d anti-abortionists from

large sections of an increasingly secular society. An important response to

the mismatch between this rhetoric and wider public audie nces has been

the attempt to establish the fully human status of the fetus through other

means. Of particular inte rest has been the use of photographic image ry

(Condit, 1990; Petchesky, 1987; Mall, 1981; Danie ls, 1993) . Three features

of this material stand out. First, these images are highly selected and cut

so as to maximize the perceived similarity between fetus and neonate . For

example , one particularly powerful image is of the feet of a 10-we ek-old

fetus he ld between an adult’s finge rs. Although a 10-week-old fetus looks

very diffe rent from a newborn, their fetal feet are visually similar. When

photographe d in such a way that the adult’s finge rs holding the fetus quite


literally obscure the visual diffe rences between it and the newborn, we are

led to see the feet as standing in for the whole and hence perceive a ‘‘small

human being’’ (Condit, 1990, p. 88) . Second, these picture s are ‘‘read’’through a lens of cultural meanings. For example , Condit argue s that in

Western socie ties, the code for what is visually human is very broad and

that in a culture where “even the bright look in a dog’s eye can be inter-

preted as ‘personality’’’ (Condit, 1990, p. 85) it was not surprising that fetal

picture s could be read as human be ings and ‘‘the richly embedded cultural

meanings of human be ing’’ ascribed to them (Condit, 1990, p. 211) . Third,

although highly selected and cut so as to be read through these cultural

lenses, the appare nt objectivity of photographic materials (their appe arance

of be ing a “mechanical analogue of reality” and “a message without a

code”; Barthe s, 1982, cited in Petchesky, 1987, p. 269) obscures the argu-

mentative nature of these images. Indeed, their association with medical

science has allowed an inevitably highly constructe d image of the fetus to

be represented as a ‘‘fact’’ thereby laying the basis for the generalization

of an anti-abortion position to a much wider audie nce than that within

reach of more traditional argume ntation.

Given the central role of visual image ry in anti-abortion materials de-

signed for general audiences (e .g., leafle ts, posters, adve rts), it was little

surprise to find that it playe d a promine nt role in the speech de livered to

the general audie nce that we analyze here. Of course , the fact that it was

so prominent makes the speech particularly inte resting. While there has

been some attention to the content and organization of such photography

(see Condit, 1990; Petchesky, 1987) there has been little exploration of the

ways in which our readings of such images are directed by verbal argumen-

tation. However, Condit obse rves that this analysis is particularly important:

on the ir own visual image s are rathe r inexplicit and a picture is ‘‘pote ntially

a thousand different words’’ (Condit, 1990, p. 81, original emphasis) . Thus,

the analysis of this speech provide s an opportunity to consider the argu-

mentation surrounding such image ry and indeed this imagery’s place in

category definition.

THE SPEECH

The speech, involving a slide presentation, was given by a senior male

official from the U.K. ‘‘Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child’’(SPUC) to stude nts at a public meeting organize d by a stude nt anti-abor-

tion society.4 Transcribed, it runs to 15 and a half pages of single -spaced


4The speech was given in a lecture theatre at Dundee University, Scotland, in 1993. Of course

it is possible to conce ive of a student audience as differing from an ‘‘ideal’’ general audience

text. After some introductory comments referring to a contemporary legal

judgment concerning euthanasia, the speaker turne d to abortion and the

slide presentation began. A total of ten slides were shown. First, five slides

depicted the fetus at various stage s of development. In seque nce they were:

a fetus at 6 and half weeks (shown inside an amniotic sac hanging between

the finge rs of a doctor) ; a 10-we ek-old fetus’s feet (the rest of the body

was masked by an adult’s finge rs); fetuses at 11 or 12 weeks; 16 weeks; 23

weeks. Second, four slide s of dismembered aborted fetuses were presented

as he described common abortion procedure s. Finally, and as a conclusion,

a slide of an intact 10-week-old fetus was presented.

ANALYSIS

The Issue: Abortion as Killin g

The general framing of the issue at hand (offered in his introduction)

drew a paralle l between abortion and the war in Northern Ireland. Indeed,

he note d that recently there had been:

1. ‘‘The three thousandth death, the three thousan dth victim of the trou-

bles in Northern Ireland, which coincidentally began in 1967, the year the

Abortion Act was passed, the three thousandth victim ’s life was claim ed on,

you know, all sides of the tragic circumstances surrounding Northern Ireland.

Every single week in hospitals, in Britain, three thousand five hundred unborn

children are killed. Now, what one has to make up one’s mind abou t on this

issue, is, is the unborn child a fellow human or not? To my mind, that is the

crunch issue and everything else, if you like is dependen t upon that answer.

If the answer you arrive at, let’s say after this evening, is ‘no,’ the unborn child

is not a fellow hum an being, then that’s fine, let’s forget abou t it. But if the

answer is ‘yes,’ the unborn child is a fellow human being, then how do we

face up to the fact that three thousan d five hundred are killed? ’’One hour late r, the presentation conclude d with the final slide and

these words:

2. ‘‘Here we have an embryo, a fetus of 10 weeks growing in the womb

and the womb has becom e the most dangerous place on earth to be: one baby

is killed for every four babies that are born .’’


and imagine argumentative constructions which are specifically designed to appeal to students

in terms of value s associated with age or education (e .g., ‘‘academic rationality’’). However,we believe that a student audience may be seen as exemplifying many of the features of a

more ge neral public audience: while a speaker faced with a medical audience working in a

hospital has an audience for whom a specific occupational identity is particularly meaningful

and which presents itself as a fairly obvious focus for attention, a general student audience

offers no such distinctive identity to work with.

Overall, these paralle ls imply a direct comparability between the fetus

and the adult person and between abortion and killing. Before turning to

how this definition of the heart of the debate was deve lope d through his

construction of the fetus le t us consider his construction of the debate’sprotagonists and their relationship with the audie nce.

The Protagon ists an d Their Style of Argumentation

A major problem facing U.K. anti-abortion propagandists is the wide-

spread public support for access to legal abortions (Francombe , 1989)

which means that they are particularly vulnerable to argume nts which de-

fine them and the ir ide as as unre presentative and marginal to public

opinion. At the start of the speech, the speake r’s construction of SPUC

took steps to counter such a construction:

3. ‘‘We have tradition ally over the past 25 years gathered most of our

support from young people which is why we are a growing society. We have

six and a half thousand new m embers last year and given that we are, as

well as being an education al organ isation , an organ isation dedicated to pro-

moting research, dedicated to prom oting knowledge on the unborn child, we

are also a non-party political organ isation and I think for any group to be

developing that fast, if it was any political party that had six and a half thou-

sand new paid up members in the course of the year, I think they would be

pretty happy.’’This construe s his own position as one which has a growing base. Fur-

the r, it is represented as base d upon rese arch with his own mode of

communication involving education and the dissemination of knowledge .

This theme was also manife sted in his use of research scientists’ findings

to back up his claims as well as in his invitation for the audie nce to conduct

its own research:

4. ‘‘So, incidentally, I don ’t expect you to swallow what I say, I don’texpect you to just believe what I say hook, line and sinker. But I do expect

people to check on what I say and I also expect people to check on what the

pro-abortion lobby says on these issues, go back and check. I think it’s terribly

important when so many claim s on so many issues are constantly made, we

should always go back and check.’’With his own style of argumentation defined as educational and open

to rational appraisal, he defined the opposition ’s as devious. For example ,

he argued that the media collaborate d with the pro-abortion ‘‘lobby’’ and

silenced debate with this be ing illustrate d by a story of how a radio phone -

in presenter switched off a SPUC member mid-sentence and ‘‘proceeded

in the rest of the program me to refer to her as ‘‘that clown who was talking

out of her backside.’’’ This contrast between the protagonists’ style of ar-


gumentation implied that pro-abortion sentiments only circulate because

proper debate is silenced with the corollary that public support for abortion

is based on misinformation. This theme was developed through the con-

struction of a series of commonalitie s between anti-abortionists and public

opinion. One step was to emphasize the receptive ness of the public to

SPUC argumentation:

5. ‘‘I am sure that many if not all of you here this evening will be en-

couraged to know that education, persistence and giving people access to the

truth, giving people access to facts from objective sources, does actually work.

People are fundam entally open to the truth and you know, the one thing we

have to guard again st, and I think it goes wider, than , in in than , just on the

defence of the sanctity of human life. What we have to guard again st are those

in our community who seek to stop a particu lar poin t of view being expressed

by variou s intim idatory measures.’’Overall, this defines anti-abortionist argumentation as having a natural

resonance with public opinion and construe s pro-abortion activists as be ing

a small and deviant group who fail to prope rly represent both the contents

of wider opinion and the appropriate style of argument. The implication

that people would adopt an anti-abortion position if only free and open

debate were allowe d is made quite explicit when he argued that ‘‘99.99%

of students’’ would be anti-abortion if ‘‘given the facts.’’A second step in building a consonance between anti-abortionist ar-

gumentation and the wider constitue ncy of public opinion involve d the

representation of the content of anti-abortion argume ntation as ‘‘common-

se nse .’’ For example when discussing the argument that without legal

abortion there would be dange rous ‘‘back street abortions’’ he argued that:

6. ‘‘There’s an awful lot of good pro-life people who find this a difficu lt

argument. When I say, good pro-life people, I mean people who are naturally

pro-life, but just don’t, you know, they have been convinced by the constant

media repetition of this argum ent. And again, we have to do two things, there’sthe common-sense of the mum and dad, who have seen their baby on the

ultra sound machin e at the hospital; there is the common sense way of looking

at this argum ent. And there is also the hard evidence.’’ This constructs a body of people who, though appare ntly supporting

the availability of legal abortions, are in essence ‘‘naturally pro-life’’ and

against abortion. Further, his invocation of ‘‘common-sense’’ in his discus-

sion of how to communicate with such people implie s a fundame ntal

congruency between what people naturally think or feel and the anti-abor-

tion message. This militate s against constructions of anti-abortionists as

outside mainstre am opinion and inde ed implie s that they are simply ar-

ticulating what people already know but may have lost sight of because of

the ‘‘constan t media repetition .’’ A particularly interesting feature of this


construction concerns the way in which this ‘‘pro-life ’’ ‘‘common-sense’’ is

constructed through reference to the vie ws and experiences of quite specific

people (i.e ., ‘‘the mum and dad, who have seen their baby on the ultra sound

machine at the hospital’’). The selection of these people to stand in for the

whole (i.e ., public opinion) is important because such people stand in a

particular relationship to the fetus. Such people have willingly accepted the

pregnancy, deve lope d a sense of responsibility for it, and, through their

actual and anticipate d reorganization of the ir lives, welcomed the fetus as

a separate entity into their live s (Lumley, 1980; Stainton, 1985) . As such,

social and relational factors are so important in the ascription of fetal per-

sonhood (Minturn, 1989; Morgan, 1989) , and the willingly pregnant like ly

to see the fetus in qualitative ly diffe rent ways from the unwillingly pregnant

(Maquire , 1989) , the construction of such figure s as representative s of eve-

ryday common-sense is important for the audie nce is encourage d to see

what such willing parents may see: a baby person. Furthe r, generalizing a

construction of the fetus which is actually continge nt upon particular social

relations to all is important because it has the effect of representing a highly

constructed perception of the fetus as natural and inevitable . Inde ed, the

definition of such a construction of the fetus as common-sense implie s that

it is not his construction (and hence one that is constructe d and interested)

but a neutral description of what ‘‘everyone ’’ knows. Again this not only

naturalize s a particular construction of the fetus (see below) but give s sub-

stance to his claim that there are broad congrue ncie s between himse lf and

the ‘‘common-sense’’ of the community. Inde ed, these two issues are intri-

cate ly related: the anti-abortion position is represented as base d upon the

common-se nse ‘‘knowledge ’’ that every ordinary person has.

Having outline d his representation of the protagonists in terms of their

style of argume ntation and his representation of the commonalitie s be tween

himself and his audie nce in terms of the form and content of their argu-

mentation, we can now more prope rly turn to his construction of the fetus.

The Fetus

Constructing the Fetus as a Human Person

7. ‘‘Now, you were you and I was me at the moment of conception . When

sperm and ovum unite in fertilisation , the complete genetic information is pre-

sent, that spells out the characteristics, that you are goin g to have ginger hair,

6 foot tall, be good at maths or music, maybe a great athlete, maybe you will

develop some sort of heart condition . All these characteristics are there in the

single cell with which we all began .’’


Here there is a se lection of a series of dimensions of similarity/diffe r-

ence (and a definition of their significance ) which creates a powerful sense

of continuity in personal identity. Furthe r, it is one which is of personal

significance for every living adult; each of us is invite d to see a range of

attribute s of enormous significance for our current sense of personhood as

being similarly present in the fertilized ovum. This sense of continuity is

developed in his commentary upon the first slide (which features a vague ly

discernible embryo in its amniotic sac which was removed as it was an ec-

topic pregnancy):

8. ‘‘This slide demonstrates how viable the embryo is, what a tremendous

determination to live the embryo has, because even though it’s in the wrong

place, it’s not being very clever, it’s not showin g much foresight, which is a

very human characteristic, the embryo carries on growin g in the tube because

it has the right nutrients surroundin g it: thus test-tube babies, which grow first

of all in the petrie-dish .’’‘‘Viability,’’ often used to diffe rentiate between stages of fetal deve l-

opment (and hence legitimate abortion at particular developmental stages),

is construed to dissolve such distinctions and advance instead a sense of

continuity. Further, the embryo is ascribed an agency (a ‘‘tremendous de-

termination to live’’) which, through its construction as error-prone , appe ars

distinctive ly ‘‘human.’’ In his commentary upon the second slide (showing

two fetal feet and introduce d as ‘‘one of the most upsetting pictures we show,

because these two perfectly formed feet were attached to a perfectly formed

tiny body’’) he again ascribes the fetus an age ncy:

9. ‘‘Mothers to be and fathers to be, routinely see these days, their chil-

dren developing in the womb, moving around in the womb as early as 7

weeks when spontaneous movements begin and one lawyer m ember of ours

said he saw his unborn child doin g the breast-stroke in the wom b. And we

move with much m ore agility and co-ordin ation and ease and grace of move-

ment in the womb where we are surrounded by amniotic fluid, where you

know, in those early weeks in the womb we have tremendous space in which

the tiny hum an can move aroun d, it’s only a couple of inches long, but every-

thing is there and the baby leaps around like a ballet dancer, like an acrobat.

(Excluded material) It can also make complex facial expressions and even

sm ile.’’ The naming of movements (as ‘‘swimming,’’ ‘‘smiling,’’ etc.) construes

them as controlle d or purpose ful, and further, because it ascribes them a

social significance allows us to perceive a sense of continuity between our-

selve s as we are now and as ‘‘we’’ were then. This is developed when he

argue s that ‘‘we’’ moved with more ‘‘ease and grace’’ in the womb thereby

implying that the only difference between these stage s of our personal ex-

istence is that ‘‘we’’ have lost something. Once again it is note worthy that


our perspective on the fetus is constructed through the eyes and experi-

ences of quite specific people ; willing pare nts watching the ultrasound

video-screen. Again, this invite s us to view the fetus through the eyes of

particular social actors and so not only encourage s us to ascribe the fetus

the status ascribed by those positione d in this re lationship (Maquire , 1989)

but grounds this highly constructed image in the direct experience of eve-

ryday othe rs.

Elsewhere, these same constructions were grounde d in the direct ex-

perience and ‘‘hard evidence’’ (c.f. extract 6) of scientists. For example he

cited one ‘‘leadin g geneticist’’ as obse rving that those involve d in the first

test-tube baby:

10. ‘‘ . . . knew with absolu te certainty, that the being that was created

in a petrie-dish would develop into nothing other than a mature human if it

just developed in the normal way and didn ’t die on route, that they could be

absolu tely certain it wasn’t a mole, it was a member of the human family and

I say, they put it very simply themselves: ‘She looked beautifu l in the test tube,

she looks beautiful now.’ ’’ ‘‘Her’’ beauty in the petrie dish and her beauty as a newborn, create

a powerful sense of continuity such that our cultural response to the latter

is applie d to the former. Of particular interest is the way in which the

ascription of attribute s associate d with personhood is made easier through

the argument that ‘‘they could be absolutely certain it wasn ’t a mole, it was

a member of the human family.’’ Simply put, the ambiguity concerning what

being a ‘‘member of the human family’’ entails, means that our agre ement

with the statement that this be ing is human (and not a mole ) may encour-

age us to ascribe to it all of those things that we associate with hum an

beings.

Others’ Constructions of the Fetus

At the same time alternative constructions of the fetus were charac-

terised so as to rende r them unte nable . One strategy was to present a se ries

of diffe rent criteria for categorization (‘‘you ’ll get som e who say hum an life

begins then, you ’ll get others who say, no, it begins when the baby starts m oving,

you’ll get others who’ll say no, it begins when the baby’s heart starts beating’’)and conclude on the basis of this range of constructions that:

11. ‘‘So, we see there is a complete incon sistency in the argum ent, as

there must be if you claim as any other starting poin t that which can be shown

to be the case from a scientific poin t of view that human individual develop-

ment begins from conception . Any other point is completely arbitrary.’’


Charge s of inconsiste ncy are freque ntly obse rved in argume ntation

(Billig, 1987) and are of special inte rest here for they turn attention to the

opposition ’s argumentation while detracting attention from aspe cts of his

own. Indeed, his ridiculing of others’ argumentation surrounding the selec-

tion of features as a basis for categorizing the fetus is inte resting because

it seemingly denies the possibility of social categorization at all and thereby

obscures the fact that his own categorization is similarly base d upon the

active singling out and construction of dimensions of similarity and conti-

nuity. This tactic of advancing a categorization as ‘‘natural’’ or ‘‘give n’’through appare ntly denying the possibility of categorization was also to be

found in his description of how a pro-abortionist (Profe ssor Wendy Savage )

had responde d to an anti-abortion ist in a TV debate. During the pro-

gramme the latte r held up a plastic mode l of a fetus declaring

12. ‘‘ ‘Look this is what we are talkin g abou t. This is a baby of 18 weeks.’and Professor Wendy Savage shouted across the room , the studio: ‘That’s not

a baby, it’s a fetus.’ Now, all of us have different technical nam es as we go

through life’s journey. We begin as embryos, we go on to be fetuses, when we

are born the doctors call us neonates, we become infants, toddlers, children ,

adolescen ts, adults, geriatrics and so on. I have yet to hear of a proud new

father looking over the cot of his new born baby and saying: ‘What a lovely

neonate I’ve got.’ (some audie nce laughte r) If he did, I think it would say

more abou t him and his state of mind than it would abou t the humanity of

his baby. Well, it’s quite proper for the doctor to call it a neonate, it’s quite

proper for the doctor to call the unborn child a fetus, bu t you start usin g names

like that deliberately and you could question what is Professor Wendy Savage

trying to do? She is trying to foist a particular attitude towards the unborn

child and towards the unborn child’s rights on to the viewers on that particu lar

occasion and you know, using nam es to distance people from the hum an re-

ality of the unborn child, this is a common ploy in all great campaigns for

and against human rights, in particular instan ces.’’ This construes the opposition ’s use of the category ‘‘fetus’’ as a specific

instance of their general deviousne ss. Thus, while both pro- and anti-abor-

tionists se e k to advance particular constructions of the fe tus, his

construction of the opposition ’s motive s detracts from the argumentative

substance behind it, and through the contrast that it implie s, rende rs his

own as disinte rested. That his preferred construction should be seen as a

nonconte stable description of reality is developed by his dismissal of the

relevance of the distinctions implie d by such categorizations as ‘‘neonate ’’or ‘‘adole scent.’’ Defining them as merely ‘‘technical’’ has the effect of de-

tracting attention from the way in which our categorizations are bound up

with complex public de libe ration about the meaning of adulthood and the

degree to which the rights of adulthood can be claimed by othe rs (Aries,


1962) . In effect, this constitute s an argument against arguments which do

support a differentiation between human beings according to stage and so

allows him to advance his own categorization in such a way as to give the

impression that it is unconstructe d.

The Fetus in Words and Pictures.

The inte raction between the visual imagery on the screen and his dis-

cursive representation of the fetus was especially appare nt in those sections

of his speech where he sought to contrast his own and the opposition ’scategorization. For example , while the image of two fetal feet lingered on

screen he commented;

13. ‘‘Now, this is when the pro-abortion lobby will talk abou t a safe, early

abortion , an early abortion which is just a blob of jelly, they will argue. I ask

you, a blob of jelly with two feet and can make complex facial expression s

and even smile! So, that when we begin to examine unemotionally, objectively,

the kind of arguments put forward by the pro-abortion lobby, we find that they

just don ’t stand up to scrutiny. That they can be rebuffed by the observation

of an ordinary mum and dad who’ve never read an article in the British Medi-

cal Journal, but they can also be rebuffed by a learned article read by doctors

throughout the world .’’With this characterization of the opposition ’s construction of the fetus

and the sharp contrast between the amorphous shape less form of a ‘‘blob

of jelly’’ and the precisely de fined feet on the screen, the audie nce is invited

to judge and reject the opposition ’s claim (‘‘I ask you, a blob of jelly with

two feet and can make complex facial expression s and even smile!’’). That

this is the appropriate response is deve lope d through the argument that

the opposition ’s construction can be ‘‘rebuffed by the observation of an or-

dinary mum and dad who’ve never read an article in the British Medical

Journal.’’The use of the eyes and voice s of willing pare nts was similarly appare nt

in his observations about the slide showing a 23-week-old fetus:

14. ‘‘Here we have a baby girl who was christened Kelly, who was born

very, very prematurely at 23 weeks. You can see how tiny she is from the nurse’sweddin g ring on her forearm here and when she was born , the doctors and

nurses did everything they possibly could to enable her to survive. Sadly she

died of pneumonia which is a common enough fate for a baby born this pre-

mature because of the immaturity of the lungs, but when she died it was a

little baby girl called Kelly who died. It wasn’t a piece of tissue that had been

got rid of, or a blob of jelly. It was a little baby girl called Kelly who died and

the doctors and nurses and parents mourned her passing. But, the fact is, that


possibly at the same hospital at possibly the same day in Britain , a baby pos-

sibly the same age would have been taken and put into an incinerator lawfully,

or put into a kidney dish and left to die, the only difference would be that

this is a so called ‘wanted’ baby and the other is a so called ‘unwanted’ baby.

So, people are given human rights accordin g depen ding on their degree of want-

edness.’’The choice of a slide of a wante d fetus again invite s the audie nce to

see the fetus through the eyes of people who have welcomed the preg-

nancy and are like ly to ascribe the fetus a distinctive social status. Inde ed,

the act of naming is a practice associate d with ‘‘social birth’’ (Minturn,

1989; Morgan, 1989) and powerfully conveys ‘‘her’’ welcome into a social

community. Again the important point here is that a sense of personhood

that is continge nt on a particular social re lationship (and which affects

our reading of the visual image before us) is unive rsalize d so that all fe-

tuses are seen as ‘‘Kellys’’ rathe r than as ‘‘pieces of tissue’’ or ‘‘blobs of

jelly’’ and as a corollary, the pro-abortion construction ridicule d as wholly

inade quate .

So far, we have described the speake r’s construction of the protago-

nists’ re lationship with ‘‘ordinary’’ people and explored the way in which

a particular construction of the fetus was made to seem obvious. Let us

now look at the construction of women.

Wom en an d Pro-abor tion ists

As anti-abortionists speak in a conte xt in which they are vulne rable

to constructions which define them as reactionary and anti-wome n, we

could expe ct the speake r to define the relationship between women and

abortion so as to break the opposition ’s construction of abortion as ex-

pressing women’s political inte rests. Inde ed, in a speech dire cted to a

general audie nce which seeks to unive rzalise a particular construction of

the fetus and the act of abortion through presenting it as be ing grounde d

in everyone ’s common-se nse knowle dge of reality, it is vitally important

that the speake r anticipate alte rnative constructions which could splinte r

such a general category and identify categorie s of people that have a

pro-abortion position base d on political analyse s of women’s place in so-

cie ty.

Below we consider how women were represented in relation to the

fetus, the act of abortion and the debate’s protagonists, and how the con-

struction of these relations functioned to se parate women from those

calling for abortion.


The Significant Absence of Women as Persons

At the same time as the fetus was establishe d as a separate social actor,

the woman’s presence was obscured. Thus, as a corollary of representing

the fetus as a free-floating autonomous being, the woman was rendered in-

visible (e.g., in extract 9 she was reduced to a backdrop—a ‘‘tremendous

space’’). In similar vein, the woman was represented as an ‘‘environme nt.’’For example , in his discussion of test-tube babie s he argued that:

15. ‘‘If the test tube were to say, ‘this baby is my property,’ nobody would

believe the test tube. And when the pro-abortion lobby argues the baby is part

of the mother’s body, it is exactly, we can make exactly the sam e poin t, we

have a living human growing in the mother’s womb dependent upon the mother

for life, but dependence does not mean you are part of the body of which you

are dependent.’’Construing an equivale nce between the test tube and women invite s

us to view the woman as akin to a non-animate containe r. This not only

supports a clear sense of the separate identity of containe r and containe d,

but also encourage s us to see the woman as simply a passive environme nt

which like the test-tube is not dramatically affected by the containe d. The

construction of woman as containe r was furthe r developed through the fol-

lowing representation of ‘‘depende ncy’’:16. ‘‘All of us were dependen t on som e body when we were born, we were

not part of the people upon whom we were dependent. My baby granddaughter

was born prematurely at thirty weeks, was dependen t upon the incubator in

the first several weeks of her life. She did not stop being part of her mother’sbody when she was born prematurely at thirty weeks and start to be part of

an incubator. We recognised her as Hannah who required a particular envi-

ronment in which to live and we all require a particular environm ent in which

to live.’’Again, the analogy between the woman and the incubator is powerful

because it defines the woman as an inanimate containe r that is unchange d

by the presence of the fetus. With no sense of the woman’s personhood

and no sense of the reciprocal relationship between woman and fetus, we

have little sense of how the woman’s personhood is affected by the change s

of pregnancy and hence no sense of the woman as a person able to ar-

ticulate claims about her body.

Women as Onlookers

That women may articulate demands for abortion was also counte red

by a construction of the debate’s protagonists which defined women as on-


lookers while others advocate d abortion on the grounds of cost-cutting. This

construction of the logic behind abortion occurred while the image of the

23-we ek-old ‘‘Kelly’’ lingered on screen (5th slide , extract 14) . Having con-

trasted the care extende d to Kelly with the abortion of similarly age d

others, he argued that most of ‘‘the children who are killed ’’ after 24 weeks

are handicappe d and that the Department of Health and some doctors

‘‘prom ote the killin g of the disabled for explicitly financial reasons.’’ Thus,

while his earlie r construction of women as environme nts meant that there

was an absence of women as persons, the disability example allows him to

represent women as particular sorts of persons: those that desperate ly want

the ir babie s and who are forced into abortion in ‘‘a moment of pan ic’’ be-

cause of the pressures imposed upon them by othe rs.

Women as Victims

In addition to the above , the speake r also constructe d women’s health

as a direct victim of abortion:

17. ‘‘Now, post-abortion syndrom e is a disorder which is in exactly within

the same sort of pattern as other post traum atic stress disorders which is some-

thing first recognised in war veterans, whereby if you like, behaviour patterns

in these veterans might cu lminate in some dram atic inciden t or other and mas-

sive evidence was built up to show that all sorts of behaviou r patterns really

related back to som e unresolved trauma that they had experienced while fight-

ing in Vietnam and unfortunately because, you know, there is a tremendously

growing body of evidence, you’ll see it in popu lar women’s magazines, you ’llsee it in serious medical journals, showin g that women need to go through a

natural grieving process followin g miscarriage; they’re mourning their lost child.

They don’t talk after all, they say, ‘I lost my baby,’ they do not talk about

havin g aborted a fetus which is perhaps a more accurate technical way of

puttin g it. They say they’ve lost their baby. And there is the same sort of rec-

ognition about abortion .’’The expe rience of a woman who is willingly pregnant and desperately

wants a child (and here has a miscarriage ) is once again made to stand in

for all women’s experiences. While before this meant that a construction

of the fetus continge nt upon a particular relationship was generalize d and

naturalize d, a similar effect is obtaine d here for women. In other words,

the experiences of a woman who has defined herself and her fetus in terms

of a mother¯child relationship is made to stand in for the whole . As a

consequence we see all pregnant women as viewing their fetuses as ‘‘unborn

children’’ and as experiencing the same sense of loss after abortion as that

suffered by a woman after miscarriage . Note too how the meaningle ssness


of the categorization ‘‘fetus’’ is conve yed and how this again advance s his

own as directly arising from women’s experience. Furthe r, this construction

of women’s experience has conseque nces for others’ attempts to represent

abortion as an important element of women’s political inte rests. Thus, in-

stead of be ing an expre ssion of women’s inte rests, abortion is represented

as inevitably harmful with the implication being that it is the anti-abortion-

ists that best represent women’s interests. This is forcefully conveyed when

the speake r refers to the pro-abortion campaigne rs’ slogan ‘‘a woman’sright to choose ’’ and their opposition to anti-abortion ‘‘education’’: their

opposition shows that they can never prope rly represent women because:

18. ‘‘They want a woman ’s right to choose but they don’t want a woman ’sright to know what she’s choosing.’’

DISCUSSION

Inevitably, the application of our theoretical analysis to specific in-

stance s of communication e ntails a proce ss of active interpre tation.

However, we hope to have provide d the reade r with enough material to

be able to judge the argument that it is useful to pay close attention to

how the content of political rhetoric constructs social categories and cate-

gory contents. More specifically we hope to have demonstrated that this

discourse defines both anti-abortionists and audience as common-cate gory

members, and represents the anti-abortion construction of the fetus as

firmly grounde d in, and indeed as arising from, the common-se nse knowl-

edge and everyday expe riences of a category of people whose boundarie s

are so wide ly set as to include all ‘‘ordinary’’/‘‘everyday’’ people .

Furthe r, we hope to have provide d a fine -graine d analysis of the

rhetoric used to define the ‘‘conte nts’’ of this category. Thus, our analysis

highlights the way in which the expe riences of particular people (e .g.,

‘‘ordin ary m ums and dads,’’ women grie ving ove r miscarrie d babie s, etc.)

were used to stand in for and define the whole . More specifically, it ex-

plore s the way in which these othe rs’ expe riences imply that the speake r’spreferred representation of the fetus (i.e ., as a fully human person) is

ne ithe r his, nor argume ntative ly constructed, but a ‘‘give n,’’ known by all

within the community (and alte rnative constructions of the fetus con-

strued as thoroughly marginal) . Furthe r, we hope to have contribute d to

an unde rstanding of the ways in which our reading of visual image ry is

dire cted by verbal argumentation. ‘‘Seeing’’ the screen fetuses through

the eyes of willing pare nts allows the sense of fetal personhood contin-

gent upon that particular social re lationship (Maquire , 1989) to be gen-

eralize d to all. The real grie f associate d with miscarriage and the real

excitement of prospe ctive pare nts before an ultrasound scanne r, brings


these screen image s to ‘‘life ’’ in a way which counte rs opposition argu-

ments that anti-abortionists are preoccupie d with abstract metaphysical

and religious debate rathe r than everyday reality. Inde ed, according to

this construction, if anyone ignore s reality it is the pro-abortionists who

cannot see what everyone else can see—that the fetus is a human person

and that abortion is killing.

We would also emphasize that the power and significance of these

constructions can only be prope rly recognized if they are contextualize d in

relation to the pro-abortion alte rnative s that have some currency. Take for

example , the construction of women. As the identification of political in-

terests (and hence the demands for political ‘‘rights’’) is continge nt upon

the adoption of particular collective identities (c.f. Brodie et al., 1992) much

pro-abortion activity has been associated with the construction and dissemi-

nation of politic ize d analyse s of womanhood. For the se re asons, this

speaker’s construction of women has a special significance : whe re pro-abor-

tion activists have sought to represent women in terms of a distinctive

category with distinctive political demands, they are here either reconsti-

tuted as the prototypical representative s of an everyday knowledge which

holds that a fetus is a person or as victims of abortion.

CONCLUSION

As explaine d in the introduction, one reason for analyzing this par-

ticular speech was to conside r the degree to which our emphasis upon the

prominence of category argument could apply to speeches given to hetero-

geneous public audie nces as well as audiences that may be de fined in terms

of quite specific (e.g., occupational) categories. Comparing this speech with

that give n to medical staff (Hopkins & Reicher, 1992; Reicher & Hopkins,

1996a) illustrate s major differences in the content of argume ntation. The

speaker addre ssing the medical audie nce argue d that there was a funda-

me ntal schism in the public ’s value s and proce ede d to construct an

anti-abortion definition of what it meant to be a profe ssional medical prac-

titione r through locating it on one side of this value divide and in

opposition to the othe r. Thus, a striking feature of that speech was the

explicit construction of contrasting social categorie s defined in terms of

the ir value s.

When we consider the present speech we find such explicit category-

re late d argume ntation to be marke dly abse nt. Howeve r, our analysis

suggests that on closer inspe ction there is much to be gaine d from analyzing

both speeches in terms of their arguments about social category definitions.

More specifically, our analysis implie s that the key diffe rence between the se

speeches is the leve l of abstraction at which the categorie s used to represent


the audiences are defined. In the speech directed to the medical audience

the category was more specific/le ss inclusive and defined through contrasts

with other categorie s. In the speech analyze d here, the category was more

general and so inclusive as to be almost universal. Furthe r, and as a cor-

ollary, the cate gory conte nts we re de fine d in such a way that the

anti-abortion construction of the fetus was construed as arising from ‘‘or-

dinary’’ people ’s expe riences and common-se nse knowledge. Thus, although

the two speeches differ in the nature of the categories used and the manner

in which the ir contents were defined, there is an important sense in which

both speeches can be analyze d for the work that they do in representing

the anti-abortion position as arising from their audie nces’ social identitie s.

Of course , the detailed analysis of this anti-abortion speech should not

be taken as indicating that it is exceptional in any respect: we could expect

to find those seeking to mobilize support for abortion to devote consider-

able attention to constructing and disseminating social category definitions

which make mass pro-abortion action possible . Inde ed, in an analysis of

the mobilization rhetoric in anothe r domain (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b)

we describe how speakers with very different proje cts (those attempting to

mobilize support for a strike and those attempting to mobilize opposition

to it) used similar forms of argume ntation. More specifically our analysis

showed that although diffe ring in the content of their argume ntation, both

constructed category boundarie s and category contents which represented

the ir own position as embodying the mass of public opinion and their op-

pone nts as isolate d and pe riphe ral figure s. However, our de cision to

analyze this speech was made on theoretical grounds. While we could have

complemented our earlie r analysis of anti-abortion argume ntation by ana-

lyzing pro-abortion mobilization rhe toric, we be lie ve that the re is a

theoretical case for exploring category-re late d argume ntation in different

contexts. In particular, we hope to have demonstrated that even in contexts

where one may not expe ct category argume ntation (e.g., where the audi-

ence cannot be defined in terms of a distinctive group membership and

contraste d from others) it is he lpful to analyze the content of rhetoric for

the work that it does in constructing social category definitions.

Of course , to have demonstrated the existence of category-argume n-

tation in social movement communication is not to say anything about the

degree to which speake rs are consciously aware of their activity. Nor is it

to say anything about the reception give n to particular constructions. Thus,

the next stage of our research program is to conside r the degree to which

audiences accept particular category constructions as the basis for the ir ac-

tion. In this se nse , our e mphasis upon the importance of cate gory

construction in political mobilization must remain provisional. However, in

the light of the very considerable evidence that social categories have im-


portant conseque nces for cognition and action, we hope to have persuaded

the reader that this approach has some promise .

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to thank Jannat Saleem and Suzanne Zeedyk for

the ir very he lpful comments upon an earlie r draft of this paper.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

NICK HOPKINS is a Lecturer in Social Psychology at Dundee Unive rsity and has research

interests in issues conce rning social identity, social influence , social conflict, and politicalmobilization.

STEV E REICHER is a lecturer in Social Psychology at St. Andrews Unive rsity and has

rese arch interests in social conflict, social influence , mass/crowd behavior, racism, and thesocial construction of collective identities.


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