ESRC UK Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice:Working Paper 13

Social care knowledge: SCIE-like‘typologies’Ray Pawson

ESRC UK Centre for Evidence Based Policy andPractice

Queen MaryUniversity of London

Email: r.d.pawson@leeds.ac.uk

© January 2003: ESRC UK Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice

Ray Pawson is Reader in Social Research Methodology at Leeds University, and thesecond visiting senior research fellow at the ESRC UK Centre for Evidence BasedPolicy and Practice. This Working Paper is the second in a series emanating from aresearch project on Types and Quality of Knowledge in Social Care, commissioned bythe Social Care Institute for Excellence (SCIE).

The SCIE project

In June 2002 the Social Care Institute for Excellence commissioned an eight month,two stage study to devise a classification of types of social care knowledge, anddevelop standards for judging their quality. The research team includes members fromLeeds University (Ray Pawson and Colin Barnes), Salford University (Andrew Long)and the ESRC UK Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice (Annette Boaz andLesley Grayson). The project is led by Annette Boaz.

This paper is the second in a series of three ‘starter papers’ that describe stage one ofthe project. Primarily intended as working documents for the team, and as backgroundbriefings for SCIE on the progress of the project, they are reproduced here to illustratethe challenges faced in identifying the kinds of knowledge that might be of value asevidence in social care, and in categorising them in a way that is useful and useableboth for those who organise knowledge, and for those who make use of it.

Abstract

This paper moves on from the initial attempt at identifying potential categories ofknowledge to be included in a classification of social care knowledge to examine whatexisting classifications have to contribute, in particular to the task of rationalising andsimplifying the 13+ categories of knowledge already identified in Working Paper 12.A selection of eight from the many available classifications is examined. From thisanalysis, two possible approaches to classification are identified based on thepurposes of knowledge (Route 1), and the sources of knowledge (Route 2). These arefurther examined, drawing on the eight existing classifications, using a matrixapproach for Route 1 and a tree or lineage approach for Route 2.

Key words: social care; knowledge; classification

The purpose of the Working Paper series of the ESRC UK Centre for Evidence BasedPolicy and Practice is the early dissemination of outputs from Centre research andother activities. Some titles may subsequently appear in peer reviewed journals or

other publications. In all cases, the views expressed are those of the author(s) and donot necessarily represent those of the ESRC.

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Social care knowledge: SCIE-like ‘typologies’

Introduction

This is the first draft for another Starter Paper on ‘existing typologies’ and on scouring themfor hints that we can use. Whilst our particular task is unique, there has been no shortage ofprevious attempts to classify and codify ‘forms of knowledge’ in social care-related activities.The selection examined below calls on typologies of ‘forms of evaluation’, ‘forms of actionresearch’, ‘forms of social research’ and ‘forms of social work knowledge’, ‘models ofprofessional knowledge’ and so on. The last is often accompanied by hand-wringing aboutwhether social work is actually a profession (control of a formalised body of knowledge beingone of the classic defining feature of a professional body (Thyer, 2002)). Note, that I stopshort at eight typologies: there are many, many more available but they are chips off the sameblock and the gains to be had from considering any more are probably slight. Note also, that Ifound no exact parallel to our task. There is nothing out there considering itself to be atypology of ‘social care’ knowledge.

Some of the frameworks are extremely detailed and I append charts and diagrams of the fulltypologies at the end of the document. To save the reader a lot of page flapping I duplicate the‘horizontal axis’ from each typology as the first point of comparison – in other words Ireproduce the various authors’ thoughts on key types without listing their ideas on content.

It is intended that this paper be read in conjunction with Starter Paper 1 (SP1; reproduced inthis series as Working Paper 12). The upshot of SP1 is that we have candidates galore (13+)for consideration as ‘types’ but that such a number would be far too unwieldy for anyone touse (or even remember). The battle is on to simplify them and this is the prime focus of thediscussion in each of the eight sections below.

1. Owen and Rogers (1999) – ‘Forms’ of evaluation and their ‘primaryorientation’

Pro-activesynthesis

Clarificativeclarification

Interactiveimprovement

Monitoringjustification/fine-tuning

Impactjustification/

accountability

This example is, perhaps, the nearest I have found to a ‘model’. It has probably the mostcomprehensive range of ‘orientations’ that I have uncovered. As well as being presented in arather formidable table (see Appendix 1) it is used as the framework for an entire book, whichgoes on to spell out in further detail the approaches, issues and standards that are entailedwithin each approach.

The main problem with the 13+ types lurking in SP1 is that the organising framework (thehorizontal axis) is expressed in terms of ‘forms of knowledge’. This terminology is part of thebrief, of course, but in classification terms it is too open-ended and ambiguous. It fetches inorientations that are basically ‘techniques’ (consultation) as well as others that are‘epistemologies’ (post-modernism). It also fetches in orientations that are part of theorganisational chassis of social care (the legal framework) as well as others that are almostsubliminal (tacit knowledge).

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Owen and Rogers avoid this initial typological fuddle by formulating the horizontal axis morenarrowly. The five headings are clearly formulated with respect to ‘purposes’ – clarification,fine-tuning, accountability etc. (but note, perversely, that these aims are referred to as ‘forms’of inquiry and ‘orientations’). Thinking in terms of the different purposes to which enquiry isput allows the authors to collapse some of the finer technical distinctions that can be drawnbetween approaches. So, for instance, both ‘needs assessment’ and ‘research review’ areconsidered as ‘proactive’ forms of evaluation in that their purpose is to dig out information onproblems and potential solutions before an intervention is designed. Similarly, ‘actionresearch’ and ‘empowerment’ are corralled together under the purpose of ‘improvingpractice’. The aim of these examples, by the way, is to demonstrate the simplificationpotential of ‘purpose’ as a classificatory device rather than to affirm these particularmarriages.

The Owen and Rogers format is also useful because of the insightful way that a significantrange of characteristics is assembled for the vertical axis. We can borrow some of these,though we will clearly need to go beyond them.

However, there are some immediate problems that prevent wholesale borrowing of the Owenand Rogers framework. The typology relates mainly to ‘program evaluation’ and thereforeomits any mention of ‘tacit’ knowledge, which has a focus at the level of the individualdecision. Some of the ‘audit’ and ‘regulatory’ and ‘legislative’ approaches in social care havethe wider remit of ‘service provision’ and are also not covered as a form of programmeevaluation.

There are also some problems with mutual exclusivity and inclusivity (see SP1). Owen andRogers do have ‘emancipatory research’ as a sub-sub-category of their interactive approach(#3). Classifying ‘empowerment’ as a form of programme improvement might be a bitwounding for the user-led radicals and a bit too low-profile in the balance of UK social careactivities. On first reading, I also have problems distinguishing between ‘clarificative’ and‘interactive’ (they both sound rather improving to me). My guess is that clarificative is inthere because Owen is very fond of getting programme goals articulated and because‘evaluability assessment’ was high on the agenda a few years back. There are also furtherboundary problems in placing specific techniques in this framework, e.g. should audit be in‘monitoring’ or ‘impact’? should systematic review be in ‘pro-active’ or ‘impact’?

In short – some mileage in this one (scope, purpose as framework, presentation ideas, andvertical axis content).

2. Mark et al (2000) – Four purposes of evaluation

Assessing meritand worth

Program andorganisationalimprovement

Oversight andcompliance

Knowledgedevelopment

This again relates mainly to ‘program evaluation’, being from a US text that seeks an‘integrated framework’ for understanding that mode of inquiry (see Appendix 2). And again itis a relatively clean classification because it uses ‘purposes’, in this case quite unequivocally,as the column headings. Comparing it to Owen and Rogers, it is virtually the same in terms of

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‘oversight and compliance’ (= ‘monitoring’). ‘Assessing merit and worth’ is almost the sameas ‘impact’. ‘Programme and organisational improvement’ is the same as ‘interactive’.Perhaps the only difference in this respect is that these headings are rather clearer (partly aquestion of better chosen terminology, partly a question of sticking closely to the ‘purpose’criterion).

Mark et al do, however, add ‘knowledge development’ as an item not considered by Owenand Rogers. This orientation is from the academic end of evaluation and the knowledge inquestion is seen in terms of, and assessed by, the normal standards of social science, i.e.developing and refining theories through empirical evidence. Hence, what is catered for inthis final category are the theory-driven approaches to evaluation and the long-term,‘enlightenment’ model of research usage (Thyer, 2002).

Comparing Owen and Rogers to Mark et al, the latter lacks ‘pro-active’ knowledge, i.e.assessment and problem identification. It may be that Mark et al consider this as part of their‘oversight’ category, and this is the first of several potential overlaps within theirclassification system. The typology lacks even the faintest whiff of ‘emancipation’ as alegitimate purpose of evaluation research (this is America and Mark et al assume a consensualnotion of ‘social betterment’ as applied to all policy making). They are also unconcerned with‘frameworking’ knowledge like legislation.

This typology is not so useful on the vertical axis. It does have a further breakdown by‘inquiry modes’ – description, classification, causal analysis, values inquiry (see appendix).These relate in rather complex ways to the four types (if you are assessing merit and worthyou need a bit of causal analysis, a smidgen of values inquiry and so on). ‘Inquiry modes’ arealso presented rather narrowly in terms of research techniques and we will want to travelrather further in our search for vertical components.

In short, Mark et al offer affirmation of the potential of ‘purpose’ as the classificationframework and perhaps some sharper terminology. Overall, their typology is too researchdriven (not surprisingly given that this is the purpose) to cover the whole SCIE line.

3. Hart and Bond (2000) – Action research typology

Experimental Organisational Professionalising Empowering

The focus of this approach is even narrower – just ‘action research’, i.e. the approach in whichstakeholders and researchers intermix, and findings are introduced into, and tested out, inpractice. The typology, quite properly, acknowledges that this formula has been stretched inrecent years and now it carries sub-types within itself, especially in relation to whichparticular stakeholders call the tune and to what end.

It seems to work well as a typology in the following respects. There is a clear focus to thesub-types; in this case it is about ‘purpose’ again, although it is assumed that these purposesmay be directed at a much wider spectrum of political objectives and policy goals than in

Consensus model of societyRational social management

Conflict model of societyStructural change

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typologies 1 and 2. The idea of defining ‘orientations’ in terms of who defines the ‘problem’is, potentially controversial but the notion of differentiating forms of knowledge according towhether they espouse rational social management or structural political change could, ofcourse, be handled on the vertical axis. Hart and Bond, by the way, are excellent on thevertical axis in many other respects (see Appendix 3; lots of interesting suggestions for ourtypology, not discussed further here).

Hart and Bond’s effort doesn’t work so well in the following terms. The ‘experimental type’of action research is arguably a bit of a sham; it is there to provide a conceptual contrast to theemancipators. Basically, in their so-called ‘experimental action research’ all the key decisionsare made externally, which makes it the antithesis of action research. It goes without sayingthat Hart and Bond’s typology does not, and could not possibly, work in terms of the fullgamut of non-action approaches and so most of the 13+ categories in SP1 are ignored.

Interestingly, it is not clear whether this effort picks up on ‘tacit knowledge’. Potentially,action research is the form of research most reliant upon and friendly towards ‘everydaywisdom’. But folk ideas are not considered as knowledge until they get picked up in theaction research cycle of research, negotiation and education. We could go along with this andomit knowledge-that-just-hangs-about entirely from our typology, but if we consign it tooblivion it will send out unmistakable signals that professionals won’t like. Also, in terms ofdocumented knowledge, would it eliminate from consideration the kind of descriptivematerial exemplified by the 2pp Community Care article on ‘how we do it here’ or ‘whatabout this for a new approach to x’?

In terms of comparisons with the first two typologies, Hart and Bond echo ‘clarificative’ and‘interactive’ from Owen and Rogers as well as ‘program and organisational improvement’from Mark et al. The ‘experimental’ and ‘organisational’ sub-forms of action research maynudge into the ‘oversight’ and ‘monitoring’ elements of the first two typologies. Given itsnarrower focus, it is inevitably able to discover sub-divisions within what others see as theuniform domain of action research.

In short, this one provides food for thought. Whatever classification we devise, this shows thatit will be prone to sub-sub-categories. It is again a model of typology presentation and hassome good vertical axis content.

4. Peile (1988) – Research paradigms in social work

Empirical Alternative Normative Alternative

This is quite an elderly typology but also (apparently) quite famous in its time (see Appendix4). It pulls in many of the classical binary opposites in social research (qualitative vs.quantitative, value-free vs. value-laden, cause vs. meaning etc.) in a ‘paradigm wars’presentation before the author goes on to suggest that some newly emerging paradigms (nowquite old) might ‘resolve the stalemate’.

As a typology, it works well in the following respects. It does capture, in the roundest sense,the idea of ‘forms of knowledge’ or ‘orientations’ or ‘paradigms’ being comprehensiveframeworks. That is to say, it shows how a simple set of organising principles can work itself

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into all aspects (epistemological, ontological, ethical, political, methodological) of socialwork knowledge. Accordingly, it is another useful pointer to some items on the vertical axis.It is also, incidentally, a model for how to annotate a typology with illustrative cases (look atthe footnotes).

On the downside, it is a clear example of forcing a classification – there are only two polaropposites to accommodate everything. {There is, of course, another school of typologyformation – the minimalist, ‘ideal-type’, one-sided-accentuation-of-reality approach thatmakes a virtue out of this. But I don’t think we are going down that road for SCIE}. In short,as an empirical typology it fails to reflect the full variety of forms of knowledge that we haveto deal with. Sticking with just two ‘forms’ corrals widely differing approaches together likequalitative and emancipatory research, or like realism and RCTs. It also omits some ‘forms’altogether, for example tacit and framework knowledge. Nor do Peile’s bridgeheads for thecreative synthesis of the two approaches seem to have stood the test of time. They are eitherjust different again (like the ‘creative paradigm’, an early form of relativism/post-modernism)or they are partial or unsuccessful attempts at synthesis (like the ‘new paradigm’ approach).

In short. A dreadful warning that the ‘po-mos’ are correct about one thing – it’s all so muchmore messy these days. Once again it is a research-led typology that struggles with anythingoutside the academic journals but a potentially useful model in terms of annotation andpresentation.

5. Hammersley (2000) – Varieties of social research: a typology

Theoreticalscientificresearch

Theoreticalsubstantive

research

Dedicatedpracticalresearch

Democraticpracticalresearch

Contract-based

practicalresearch

Autonomouspracticalresearch

This sketches on a much bigger canvas in seeking to clarify the distinction between ‘pure’ and‘applied’ research. Hammersley is worried about demands that investigations meet standardsappropriate to both types of ‘inquiry’, and his expectation that different forms of researchshould meet very different standards is of obvious relevance to this project.

He believes that one traditional way of perceiving the distinction between ‘basic’ and‘applied’ research is misconceived – application is not simply the implementation offoundational knowledge. Accordingly, the pure and the applied should be distinguished interms of the immediate goals of inquiry, which Hammersley calls ‘scientific inquiry’ and‘practical inquiry’ (see Appendix 5). Two different ‘validating mechanisms’ are involved. Inthe first there is a slow, continuous, collective ‘evaluation’ by members of the researchcommunity. Practical inquiry, by contrast, is validated according its ‘relevance’ to itsimmediate audience, which is normally responsible for dealing with a particular phenomenonin a particular locality.

Hammersley then moves onto subsets. Scientific inquiry is categorised as ‘theoretical’ or‘substantive’. The first is about abstract, general causal relationships between concepts; thesecond provides explanations of perennial issues and cases. Practical inquiry gets a rathermore complex set of types, distinguished first of all by whether the researcher has an

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autonomous role and secondarily by whether the research is aimed at all stakeholders or aparticular subset. This gives four sub-types as per the diagram (see Appendix 5).

The paper ends at this point. Hammersley’s claim is simply that there are key differences informs of knowledge, but details on how they are validated (i.e standards) are omitted.

Is this of any use to us? The framework of the typology is an unusual mix; the types are formsof ‘research’ yet again, but distinguished by a mixture of ‘purpose’, ‘audience’, andresearcher ‘autonomy’ (its nearest neighbour is probably Hart and Bond). It is certainly ofpotential relevance to our endeavour, in as much as the 13+ types identified in SP1 couldprobably be mapped onto this framework. It might thus offer another way of simplification. Italso clarifies some of the distinctions involved e.g.• RCTs seek a ‘scientific’ warrant rather than a ‘practical’ one• Audit is for governance rather than enlightenment• User-led inquiry is dedicated, not autonomous• Post-modernism is strictly for the journals

Against its further take up is:• The fact that it just classifies forms of ‘research’ – so pimpernel tacit knowledge, and

skulking legal and organisational knowledge are missing once again• It probably involves as many borderline disputes as all the other typologies – for example,

imagine trying to judge how much ‘autonomy’ a researcher has had• It lacks a vertical axis – it assumes we know the ‘kind of thing’ to which Hammersley is

referring

In short, half a loaf is half a loaf. It is hard to evaluate a typology without it being put to use.However, it provides more support for ‘purpose’ as the defining criterion, and a further loudhint to get ‘audience’ and ‘autonomy’ on the vertical axis.

6. Adams, Dominelli and Payne (1998) – Social work: themes, issues, criticaldebates

This takes us a little beyond the formal attempts at typologies of knowledge. I thought itmight be worth a look at how social care (social work) professionals make knowledgedistinctions, using the textbook as the ‘public pronouncement’ of how wisdom hassedimented and compartmentalised. The aim is to explore the use of chapter headings as‘prototype-typologies’ in line with the view of textbooks as the ‘footprint’ of a discipline.

As a practical approach this proved difficult because social work texts mark and demarcatetheir territory in a massive number of different ways:• By client group – elderly, offenders, mentally ill etc.• By intervention options – therapy, education, group, community work etc.• By relationship/role – listener, empathiser, adviser, professional, problem solver etc.• By problem – drugs, homelessness, mental health, sex offending etc.• By cause of problem – moral, psychiatric, psychological, interactional, cultural,

contextual etc.

The nearest one seems to get to a ‘knowledge’ demarcation is the division of the field by‘practice theories’, a term which Payne defines as follows: ‘practice theories seek to explain

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in organised ways how social workers may usefully act, using their knowledge about thesocial world in which they are involved’. The idea (I think) is that these theories emerge inreflective practice about what works for clients but become institutionally hardened throughtraining, textbooks and networks. They then provide a resource that can be continually calledupon in interventions with particular cases and specific clients.

Using the chapter headings from Part II of Adams et al (see Appendix 6) thus gives thefollowing typology. (Remember that this is a ‘horizontal’ axis, I just can’t fit it all across thepage)

CounsellingGroupworkCommunity workPsychosocial workCognitive behavioural practiceTask-centred workRadical social workFeminist social workAnti-oppressive practicePost-modern approaches

This is potentially a very worrying classification for our task. The first half-a-dozen typeshave not really showed up in the 13+ SP1 categories, yet they might well constitute the keyknowledge base of a great deal of social work practice. Practice theories provide the basicjustifications for particular types of intervention and so they undoubtedly stand as the‘orientations’ or ‘forms of knowledge’ in our remit. The book chapters are not written to acommon format, so they are hardly in the form of a typology, but it would be possible tocompare each approach systematically in terms of: how it views the problem; what it deemsto be successful outcomes; what resources it calls upon; how it links with other agencies; howit collects evidence to develop its theories; and so on. In short, these practice theories havefeatures of, or are, ‘paradigms’ in a rather classic sense.

So, what to do about them? We are looking to simplify, not to add orientations, and clearly wecould not manage an additional phalanx of practice theories on the vertical axis. The problemis instructive and again it lies with the ambiguity of using ‘forms of knowledge’ as theclassification base. We now have ‘practice theories’ limbering up alongside ‘organisationalknowledge’ and ‘tacit knowledge’ and ‘research knowledge’ and ‘user knowledge’, each onehaving sub-types and each one with the capacity to sustain a typology of its own.

Arguments for not getting too worried about practice theories are as follows:• There are simply too many of them. The list above is only for social work and presumably

mental health, probation, work with the elderly and so on will have spawned other brandsof intervention. Some, of course, will be shared. No doubt there are ‘cognitivebehaviouralists’ in probation and gerontology, and ‘counsellors’ in prisons and shelteredhomes etc. but, given the existence of sub-sub-types across a range of clients and contexts,these practice theories are probably too numerous to handle.

• They come and go. As such, practice theories may be too ephemeral for a permanent placein a typology. For instance, the chapter on ‘groupwork’ in Adams et al compares it toflares and loons.

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However, practice theories cannot be dismissed out of hand. Some on Adams et al’s list wereidentified under another form of knowledge in the 13+ of SP1. Thus Anti-oppressive practice(Adams et al #9) is familiar in typological terms (SP1 #6) because it has already beenidentified as a form of research practice (user-led). However, I do not see that such re-locationcould apply to all of the practice theories (especially the individual-focused ones).

In short, the ramifications of this ‘typology’ need further discussion. It suggests that it will bemonstrously difficult to ignore sub-sub-types. However, it provided no clues on how we mightaccommodate them.

7. Trinder (1996) – Social work research: the state of the art (or science)

Empirical Practice Pragmatism andPartnership

Critical Research

This returns us to more familiar territory. The platform of the classification is ‘social workresearch methodology’ and the clusters are simply the author’s interpretation of the threemain tribes. It is closely related to Peile (#4) above, making room for another distinctiveresearch orientation that emerged in the 90s. The one difference is that Trinder tries to relateeach method to ‘wider, social political and philosophical changes’. In other words, theclassification also covers the putative usage of the ‘findings’ of each research orientation.There is, incidentally, no formal presentation of a typology, so nothing is appended on thisone.

Empirical practice is very much identified with RCTs and the Macdonald/Sheldon wing ofsocial care. Measurement and output are privileged and this serves to emphasise certainprocesses within social care such as risk assessment, audit, performance management and soon. Some of these activities are depicted as separate orientations in SP1, so their inclusionhere is a fairly major act of compression. It probably also corrals ‘impact’ and ‘monitoring’from Owen and Rogers (and the equivalent from Mark et al). According to Trinder, empiricalpractice is located philosophically in ideas about the rational management of society.Specifically, it is about the regulation of practitioners.

The second grouping, ‘pragmatism and partnership’ spotlights a category that is intuitivelyrecognisable but one that I’ve not come across in the literature expressed in quite this way.Fuller is the author identified by Trinder as the supreme pragmatist and according to him,‘pragmatic research is the study of social work as it is?’. (Trinder’s view (and mine) isbasically, ‘ah, were it all so easy’) ‘Pragmatism and partnership’ thus refers to a looseamalgam of case studies and descriptive reports, usually qualitative and usuallycommissioned by a government or local agency. It is quite a narrow group, identified withinthe qualitative research tradition in SP1 (i.e. a small bit of one of the 13+). Why it figures solarge for Trinder, I think, is its political clout. She associates pragmatism with policypartnership as follows; ‘it is closely linked to the anti-intellectual traditions in mainstreamsocial work’. Research findings are seen as self-evident truths about administrativearrangements and working practices. They are about making the system work better or morereliably (c.f. Mark et al’s ‘program and organisational improvement’).

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The third groups is ‘critical research’, which sees ‘politics and participation’ as the domainconcerns of research. Research is not fact-finding but located within a world of unequalpower relations between genders, classes, races, professionals and clients. The house style isparticipatory, small-scale, bottom-up research designs. The wider vision of social careassumed in all this is an emancipatory/critical view of society in which issues have to beaddressed from the point of view of the ‘victims’. All this is familiar from SP1 and severaltypologies considered above as the ‘emancipatory’ and ‘user-led’ orientations, with maybe abit of ‘action research’ thrown in for good measure.

Trinder is clearly not that enamoured with the first two approaches, and considers that thethird may founder on the familiar problem of the million stakeholders’ standpoints.

In short, this is a research driven typology (once again) and so ignores tacit, organisationaland practice knowledge (as per usual). Despite the academic purview, the finer distinctionsbetween some specific research methods are also crushed (c.f. Peile). The link to ‘widersocial philosophies’ is interesting but is a standard matter for the vertical axis. Nothing muchnew here except the daunting (or haughty?) vision that government agencies are only reallyinterested in the ‘mish-mash of descriptive pragmatism’ produced within the second stable.

8. Hudson (1997) – A model of professional knowledge for social work

TheoreticalKnowledge

PersonalKnowledge

PracticeWisdom

ProceduralKnowledge

EmpiricalKnowledge

I get the feeling that this source might be very obscure. It is from the ‘practice forum’ sectionof Australian Social Work, and in the small print admits to being part of the PhD thesis of apractising social worker.

Nevertheless, it has much going for it. It is very simple. Five is a good number and each typecomes with a clear definition (see Appendix 7). The basic argument is that a range of differentforms of knowledge has influenced social work. These have shifted over the years as differentcultural and professional influences have prevailed. The author suggests that social workneeds eclecticism and so needs a form of ‘professional knowledge’, which incorporates allfive and which allows the practitioner to switch from one to the other as befits the needs ofthe problem, situation or client. In particular, the paper prescribes an increase in the use oftheoretical and empirical knowledge which, according to Hudson, have tended to be dormantin social work practice.

How does it stand in relation to the others? ‘Procedural knowledge’ pulls in the legal,administrative and inspection angle. ‘Empirical knowledge’ combines all the different formsof research based knowledge. ‘Practice wisdom’ is pretty near to Adams et al’s ‘practicetheories’ (but perhaps a bit more folkloric). ‘Personal knowledge’ is the common sense, tacitstuff that is used on the ground. ‘Theoretical knowledge’ covers more abstract conceptualframeworks. This is the least clear – it is explained in rather abstract terms with a nod toPopper – but might include the ‘policy think pieces’ which have bothered us elsewhere.

In short, this is very wide ranging. For once, tacit and organisational knowledge are notexcluded. Indeed, the typology might (unsurprisingly) be rather biased towards the social

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worker’s everyday decisions (practice wisdom and personal knowledge are a bit similar). It isalso packed very, very tightly in its empirical research corner. A significant omission,however, is anything about the ‘user perspective’. One reason why this typology spans thesocial care knowledge field quite well (users apart), is that the five types can be thought of as‘sources’ of knowledge. Hudson does not label them so – she too calls them 'forms ofknowledge’.

Emerging suggestions for us

It may be useful to run the rule over a few more such efforts although I haven’t been able tolocate one that stimulates a significantly different response in my brain. Thus I halttemporarily here.

Two rather different typological frameworks are suggested by the examples above.‘Knowledge’, perforce, is an unwieldy beast and it is already clear from SP1 that that it willresist any simple classification system. A typology of ‘knowledge’ is a bit like a typology of‘everything’. Those discussed here suggest two ways to go, each starting with the obvioustactic of limiting the horizontal axis to one ‘dimension’ of knowledge:

• Route 1. Typologies 1, 2 and 3 suggest that there is much to be gained by looking at‘purpose’ as the foundation of the typology. What is knowledge for, what is it supposed todo? Using purpose has the added attraction for phase two of the project in that it gives usan immediate handle on ‘standards’. Standards, as we argued from the outset, have to be‘fit for purpose’ and this should make the second part of the exercise fit neatly with thefirst. So, the course of action here would be to attempt to work with some version ofOwen and Rogers, and Mark et al’s typology.

• Route 2. Typology 8, and the difficulties uncovered by the (chapter headings) typology 6,suggest that it might be wise to use ‘sources’ of knowledge as the backbone. The courseof action here would be to work with some version of Hudson’s model. We would have tolook at ‘user knowledge’ as an additional source and perhaps think about collapsing‘personal knowledge’ and ‘practice wisdom’ (they emerge from the same ‘source’, Ithink). The typology would also have to become multi-level. That is to say, each categorywould have to acknowledge sub- and perhaps sub-sub types. ‘Empirical knowledge’ hasbeen dissected in detail in SP1 and clearly there are profound differences within theresearch strategies uncovered there. Similarly, legislation and inspection form part ofHudson’s procedural knowledge. They have the same ‘source’ at the institutional level butdon’t have the same ‘orientation’ and won’t have the same ‘standards’. If we don’tacknowledge sub-types, then diversity of this kind will make life very difficult when weget to standards.

I close with some preliminary thoughts on the two routes.

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Route one: a purpose-based typology

Attempt one: Adapt Owen and Rogers. Go with purpose as the identifier. Add ‘emancipatory’and combine ‘clarification’ and ‘interactive’.

Pro-active

Identifyingneeds,

problems andexisting best

practice

Interactive

Clarifying,improving and

developingongoingpractice

Emancipatory

Empoweringusers andchanging

oppressivestructures

Monitoring

Managing,benchmarking,auditing andregulatingprovision

Evaluation

Discoveringwhat works,why, when

andwherefore

Attempt one again: Same idea using Mark et al language.

Pro-activeassessmentand trouble

shooting

Identifyingneeds,

problems andexisting best

practice

Programmeand

organisationalimprovement

Clarifying,improving and

developingongoingpractice

Empowermentand usercontrol

Emancipatoryresearch aimed

at changingoppressivestructures

Oversight,monitoring

andcompliance

Managing,benchmarking,auditing andregulatingprovision

Evaluationof

programmeeffectiveness

Discoveringwhat workswhy, when

and wherefore

Attempt two: Stick with ‘purpose’ as the identifier. Add ‘tacit knowledge’ even though it willcause havoc when it comes to creating standards, and add Mark et al’s ‘knowledgedevelopment’ even though theory development and enlightenment seem small potatoes in thebattle for social care.

Pro-activeassessment and

troubleshooting

Measures toassess client

needs, identifyproblem

sources andchart existingbest practice

Programmeand

organisationalimprovement

Actionapproaches to

clarify, improveand develop

ongoing practice

Emancipatoryresearch and

promoting usercontrol

Empowermentof users by

adopting theirvalues andchanging

oppressivestructures

Oversight,monitoring

andcompliance

Informationmanagement

forbenchmarking,auditing andregulatingprovision

Evaluation ofprogrammeeffectiveness

Formalresearch to

discover whatworks, why,

when andwherefore

Circulatingtacit

wisdom forpracticaldecisions

Promotingskills,

reflexivejudgementand activedecisionmakingthough

experienceand training

Testing socialsciencetheory forknowledgedevelopment

Generatingconcepts and

generalpropositions toenlighten the

policycommunity

12

Route two: a sources-based typology and a new way of mapping

Route 2 makes the modifications noted above to Hudson’s model of ‘professional knowledgeforms’ to create base-line categories that identify different institutional sources of knowledge.Knowledge deriving from users is added, ‘procedural’ is re-labelled as ‘organisational’ (betterto identify the ‘source’), and practice and tacit are combined since they both emerge frompractitioners’ heads.

In addition I’d like to contemplate a rather different way of mapping the territories of socialcare. Thus far, our (my) mind has been locked into ‘typologies’, that is to say a matrix withrows and columns. However, there is another way of sorting and ordering in complexsystems, based on the idea of ‘trees’ or ‘lineages’. The idea is to start with the identificationof a few major ‘families’ and then detail their membership at second, third and subsequentlevels. This has the great advantage of allowing for sub-types and sub-sub-types of whateverit is one is trying to classify. A first sketch is attached as Appendix 8 but I’ll build up to it stepby step as follows:

1) The first level is made up of basic sources of knowledge amended from Hudson’s model.

Organisational

Proceduralknowledge,

settingboundaries andlimitations on

serviceprovision.

DoH, socialservices,

charities etc.

Practitioner

Knowledgegained from

the conduct ofsocial care

practice, tacitwisdom andprofessionalstratagems

Socialworkers,probation

officers etc.

PolicyCommunityGrand policy

themes from thewider policycommunity,hortative andexplanatoryideas andconcepts

Ministers, thinktanks, agencies

(includingSCIE) etc.

EmpiricalResearchEvidencegathered

systematicallyby prescribed

methods,process and

outcome dataAcademics,

research unitsand institutes

Users

Knowledgegained from

the experienceof usingservices,

research andreflectionUser-led

organisationsand

individuals

2) The second level shifts down to the ‘processes’ or ‘broad strategies’ or ‘vehicles’ throughwhich the knowledge is created. The idea is that the same source of knowledge may utiliserather different strategies for arriving at the intelligence required to make it function. Thisgets us close to the realm of ‘forms of knowledge’ (our original goal) but as we are at leveltwo of this model, we can accommodate rather more of these strategies than in a matrix. Totake the simplest example – ‘organisational knowledge’:

Organisational knowledge – subtypes. This is procedural knowledge about the managementand legislative context that governs social care, and it is drawn from quite different strategies– inspection, audit and legislation. This gives three sub-types:

Organisational Knowledge

Inspection Audit Legislation

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Following this example, each of the other four ‘sources’ can be identified with a range ofstrategies in a similar manner.

Practitioner knowledge – subtypes. One obvious vehicle is ‘training’ which gathers uppractitioner knowledge into a curriculum of experiential learning. Another is the ‘practicetheories’ which organise and justify different types of interventions (Adams et al, 1998).‘Tacit knowledge’ also belongs here but, as ever, is likely to cause problems – it is a ‘vehicle’of sorts for practitioner knowledge, but is it a strategy?

Policy community knowledge – subtypes. Here, I have in mind the products of the ‘chattering’(or thinking) classes that surround social care. They may have power, or simply aspire to it,but in either case the main vehicle for their ideas is ideas, packaged in the form of paperwhich might be white, green or grey. These materials could be subdivided into the ‘academic’and the ‘political’ (a mighty fine line to be drawn). The former would include works of long-term theory building, conceptual enlightenment etc., and the latter everything from themanifesto to the political thought piece.

Empirical research knowledge– subtypes. These are usually ‘academic’ too, but distinguishedfrom the aforementioned because these researchers get their hands dirty. The chosen vehicleis the ‘research report’. As noted throughout our discussions so far, there are potentiallydozens of these research families. At this second level I would distinguish broad researchstrategies, leaving level three to pick up the finer technical distinctions. Possible candidatesare thus ‘evaluation research’, ‘action research’ and ‘descriptive research’ (the ‘pragmatic’ or‘qualitative’ case studies provided by agencies about themselves).

User knowledge – subtypes. This is harder to grasp in terms of ‘strategies’. I suppose userviews always used to be tacit (and thus completely ignored) but nowadays, the user’s voicecomes to us as ‘emancipatory research’. This can be distinguished from the previous category(empirical research) in respect of who controls the research agenda, for it is the user ratherthan the researcher who calls the tune. The other vehicle of user knowledge is probably thecampaigning thought piece, which gets it uncomfortably close to the policy communitycategory.

3) The third level is made up of the outputs (the methods, the techniques-on-the-ground, thepractical manifestations, the actual bits of paper) that constitute knowledge from that source. Iwill not attempt to list all the potential sub-sub-categories here but, as examples: audit has afew distinctive subtypes and techniques to do with ‘performance indicator methodology’,‘cost-benefit’, ‘cost-utility’ analysis etc., and social care has fetched up its own specialismshere, by way of ‘joint reviews’, ‘best value audits’ and so on. Practice theories have alreadybeen covered in the chapter headings of the Adams text book, and evaluation research is alsostandard text book stuff.

At the sub-sub-group level, we could end up with 30 or 40 distinctive manifestations ofknowledge so it is bound to be more discerning than a six-headed typology, although overlapswould still occur aplenty. Exploring the third level further would be worthwhile only if wewere pretty sure that the end product of this approach to classification would be useable.

14

References

Adams R, Dominelli L, Payne M (1998) Social work: themes, issues and critical debatesLondon: Macmillan

Hammersley M (2000) Varieties of social research: a typology International Journal of SocialResearch Methodology Jul 3(3) pp221-229

Hart E and Bond M (2000) Using action research. In: Gomm R and Davies C (eds) Usingevidence in health and social care London: Sage

Hudson J (1997) A model of professional knowledge for social work Australian Social WorkSep 50(3) pp35-44

Mark M, Henry G, Julnes G (2000) Evaluation San Franscisco: Jossey-BassOwen J and Rogers P (1999) Program evaluation London: SagePeile C (1988) Research paradigms in social work: from stalemate to creative synthesis Social

Service Review Mar vol. 62 pp1-19Thyer B (2002) Developing discipline-specific knowledge for social work: is it possible?

Journal of Social Work Education Winter 38(1) pp 101- 113Trinder L (1996) Social work research: the state of the art (or science) Child and Family

Social Work vol.1 pp233-242

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Appendix 1 (Owen and Rogers, 1999)

Table 3.1 Evaluation forms: orientation, typical issues and key approachesProactive (Form A) Clarificative (Form B) Interactive (Form C) Monitoring (Form D) Impact (Form E)

Orientation Synthesis Clarification Improvement Justification/finetuning Justification/accountability

Typicalissues

*Is there a need for theprogram?*What do we knowabout the problem thatthe program willaddress?*What is recognised asthe best practice in thisarea?*Have there been otherattempts to find solutionsto this problem?*What does the relevantresearch or conventionalwisdom tell us about thisproblem?*What do we knowabout the problem thatthe program willaddress?*What could we find outfrom external sources torejuvenate an existingpolicy or program?

*What are the intendedoutcomes and how is theprogram designed toachieve them?*What is the underlyingrationale for thisprogram?*What program elementsneed to be modified inorder to maximise theintended outcomes?*Is the programplausible?*Which aspects of thisprogram are amenable toa subsequent monitoringor impact assessment?

*What is the programtrying to achieve?*How is this servicegoing?*Is the deliveryworking?*Is delivery consistentwith the programplan?*How could deliverybe changed to make itmore effective?*How could thisorganisation bechanged so as to makeit more effective?

*Is the programreaching the targetpopulation?*Is implementationmeeting programbenchmarks?*How isimplementation goingbetween sites?*How isimplementation nowcompared with amonth ago?*Are our costs risingor falling?*How can we finetunethe program to make itmore effective?*Is there a programsite which needsattention to ensuremore effectivedelivery?

*Has the program beenimplemented as planned?*Have the stated goals of theprogram been achieved?*Have the needs of thoseserved by the program beenachieved?*What are the unintendedoutcomes?*Does the implementationstrategy lead to intendedoutcomes?*How do differences inimplementation affectprogram outcomes?*Has the program been cost-effective?

Keyapproaches

*Needs assessment*Research review*Review of best practice(benchmarking)

*Evaluability assessment*Logic/theorydevelopment*Accreditation

*Responsive*Action research*Quality review*Developmental*Empowerment

*Component analysis*Devolvedperformanceassessment*Systems analysis

*Objectives based*Process-outcomes studies*Needs based*Goal free*Performance audit

Table 3.2 Evaluation forms: all dimensionsProactive (Form A) Clarificative (Form B) Interactive (Form C) Monitoring (Form D) Impact (Form E)

Orientation Synthesis Clarification Improvement Justification/fine tuning Justification/accountability

Typicalissues

[see Table 3.1] [see Table 3.1] [see Table 3.1] [see Table 3.1] [see Table 3.1]

State ofprogram

None Development Development Settled Settled

Majorfocus

Program context All elements Delivery Delivery/outcomes Delivery/outcomes

Timing(vis-à-visprogramdelivery)

Before During During During After

Keyapproaches

*Needs assessment*Research review*Review of best practice(benchmarking)

*Evaluability assessment*Logic/theorydevelopment*Accreditation

*Responsive*Action research*Quality review*Developmental*Empowerment

*Component analysis*Devolved performanceassessment*Systems analysis

*Objectives based*Process-outcomestudiesNeeds based*Goal free*Performance audit

Assemblyof evidence

Review of documentsand data bases, site visitsand other interactivemethods. Focus groupsand delphi techniqueuseful for needsassessments.

Generally relies oncombination ofdocument analysis,interview andobservation. Findingsinclude program planand implications fororganisation. Can lead toimproved morale.

Relies on intensiveonsite studies, includingobservation. Degree ofdata structure dependson approach. Mayinvolve providers andprogram participants

Systems approachrequires availability ofManagement InformationSystems (MIS), the use ofindicators and themeaningful use ofperformance information.

Traditionally requireduse of preordinateresearch designs,where possible the useof treatment andcontrol groups, and theuse of tests and otherquantitative data.Studies ofimplementationgenerally requireobservational data.Determining all theoutcomes requires useof more exploratorymethods and the use ofqualitative evidence.

16

Appendix 2 (Mark et al, 2000)

Four Purposes of Evaluation

1. Assessment of merit and worth: the development ofwarranted judgements, at the individual and societal level, ofthe value of a policy or program

2. Program and organizational improvement: the effort touse information to directly modify and enhance programoperations

3. Oversight and compliance: the assessment of the extent towhich a program follows the directives of statutes,regulations, rules, mandated standards or any other formalexpectations

4. Knowledge development: the discovery or testing of generaltheories, propositions, and hypotheses in the context ofpolicies and programs

Four Inquiry Modes for Evaluation Practice

1. Description: methods used to measure events or experiences,such as client characteristics, services delivered, resources, orclient’s standing on potential outcome variables

2. Classification: methods used for grouping and forinvestigating the underlying structures of things, such as thedevelopment or application of a taxonomy or program sub-types

3. Causal analysis: methods used to explore and test causalrelationships (between program services and clientfunctioning, for example) or to study the mechanisms throughwhich effects occur

4. Values inquiry: methods used to model valuation processes,assess existing values, or dissect value positions using formalor critical analysis

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Appendix 3 Action research typology (Hart and Bond, 2000)

Consensus model of society Conflict model of societyRational social management Structural change

Action research type: Experimental Organisational Professionalising Empowering

Distinguishing criterion

1 Educative base Re-education Re-education/training Reflective practice Consciousness raising

Enhancing social science/ Enhancing managerial Enhancing professional Enhancing user-control andadministrative control and control and organisational control and individual’s shifting balance of power;social change towards change towards consensus ability to control work structural change towardsconsensus situation pluralism

Inferring relationship Overcoming resistance Empowering professional Empowering oppressedbetween behaviour and to change/restructuring groups; advocacy on behalf groupsoutput; identifying causal balance of power between of patients/clientsfactors in group dynamics managers and workers

Social science bias/ Managerial bias/client- Practitioner-focused User/practitioner-focusedresearcher-focused focused

2 Individuals in groups Close group, controlled, Work groups and/or mixed Professional(s) and/or Fluid groupings, self-selection made by groups of managers and (interdisciplinary) selecting or naturalresearcher for purpose of workers professional group/ boundary or open/closedmeasurement/inferring negotiated team by negotiationrelation between cause boundariesand effect

Fixed membership Selected membership Shifting membership Fluid membership

3 Problem focus Problem emerges from the Problem defined by most Problem defined by Emerging and negotiatedinteraction of social science powerful group; some professional group; some definition of problem bytheory and social problems negotiation with workers negotiation with users less powerful group(s)

Problem relevant for social Problem relevant for Problem emerges from Problem emerges fromscience/management management/social science professional practice/ members’ practice/interests interests experience experience

Success defined in terms of Success defined by Contested, professionally Competing definitions ofsocial science sponsors determined definitions of success accepted and

success expected

4 Change intervention Social science, experimental Top-down, directed change Professionally-led. Bottom-up, undetermined,intervention to test theory towards predetermined aims predefined, process-led process-ledand/or generate theory

Problem to be solved in Problem to be solved in Problem to be solved in Problem to be explored asterms of research aims terms of management aims the interests of research- part of process of change,

based practice and developing an understandingprofessionalisation of meanings of issues in terms of

problem and solution

5 Improvement and Towards controlled Towards tangible outcome Towards improvement in Towards negotiated outcomes involvement outcome and consensual and consensual definition practice defined by and pluralist definitions of

definition of improvement of improvement professionals and on improvement; account taken ofbehalf of users vested interests

6 Cyclic processes Research components Action and research Research and action Action components dominantdominant components in tension; components in tension;

action-dominated research-dominated

Identifies causal processes Identifies causal processes Identifies causal processes Change cause of events;that can be generalised that are specific to problem that are specific to problem recognition of multiple

context and/or can be and/or can be generalised influences upon changegeneralised

Time-limited, task-focused Discrete, rationalist, Spiral of cycles, Open-ended, process-drivensequential opportunistic, dynamic

7 Research relationship, Experimenter/respondents Consultant/researcher, Practitioner or researcher/ Practitioner researcher/ degree of collaboration respondent/participants collaborators co-researcher/co-change

agents

Outside researcher as Client pays an outside Outside resources and/or Outside resources and/orexpert/research funding consultant – ‘they who pay internally generated internally generated

the piper call the tune’Differentiated roles Differentiated roles Merged roles Shared roles

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Appendix 4 (Peile, 1988)

Table 1

CHARACTERISTICS OF ALTERNATIVES TO EMPIRICISM

Empirical Alternative Normative alternative

Prediction Explanation52

Bias limitation (value free) Bias incorporation (value ladenness)53

Separation of knowledge Integration of knowledge and values54

Observation Understanding55

Quantitative Qualitative56

Measurement and testing Insight and intuition57

Objective Subjective57

Detachment Involvement57

Certain knowable world absolutism Relativism – multiperspectives58

Focus on content Focus on process59

Aim for certainty Reliance on faith60

NOTE. Superscript numbers refer to notes accompanying text.

Table 2

THE PARADIGMATIC CONTEXT OF EMPIRICISM AND NORMATIVISM

Empiricism Normative

Cosmological assumptions (the universe Causal deterministic view of reality. Knowledge is contextual and a symbolic socialas a totality) construction.

The world is predictable, knowable, Events can be explained and their meaningand measurable.79 for people uncovered.Fragmentary view of reality (reality Parts can only be understood in context.can be understood as separate parts).80

Ontological assumptions (the essence Behavior can be explained in causal Behavior is intentional and creative.82 It canof nature and human nature) deterministic ways. It has a mechanistic be explained, but is not predictable.

quality.81

People are manipulatable and controllable.83 People shape their own reality.

Epistemological assumptions (knowing Knowledge arises from experimentation and Knowledge arises from interpretation andand how knowledge is generated) observation and is grounded in the certainty insight and is grounded by empathic

of sense experience.84 communication with the subjects of theresearch.85

Rejection of metaphysical knowledge.86 Symbols, meanings, and hidden factors areessential to understanding.

Ethical assumptions A separation between knowledge and values.87 Values are the subject of researchScience produces knowledge. How it is used Moral or ethical relativism. Leads to disinterestis a value, ethical or moral question, and is in ethical issues or anarchicoutside the concern of science.88 individualism.89

Spiritual assumptions Rejection of spiritual explanations or a clear Relativism of spiritual beliefs. Such beliefsseparation between science and religion. important in the social construction of meaning.

Relationship and political assumptions The relationship aim between science and society The relationship aim is empatheticis control.90 communication.91

The value-free stance implicitly supports the Implicitly conservative since there is nodominations of the established order.92 structural or historical analysis of society.93

Mutually supportive with both high technology Mutually supportive with a liberal societycapitalism and centralized industrial allowing individual freedom and self-socialism.94 determination.

NOTE: superscript numbers refer to notes accompanying text.

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Appendix 5 (Hammersley, 2000)

Figure 2 A typology of social research

Scientific inquiry Practical inquiry

The immediate audience is fellowresearchers

The immediate audience is practitioners andpolicymakers of various kinds, as well as otherswho have a practical interest in the particularissue

The aim is to contribute to acumulating body of knowledge

The aim is to provide knowledge that will be ofimmediate practical use

Findings are assessed primarily interms of validity; with a preference forerring on the side of rejecting as falsewhat is true rather than accepting astrue what is false

Findings are assessed in terms of relevance andtimeliness as well as validity, with the latterbeing judged on the basis of lay as well asresearch-based knowledge

Theoreticalscientificresearch

Substantivescientific research

Dedicated practicalresearch

Democratic practicalresearch

The goal is to provideinformation that isneeded by a specificgroup ofpolicymakers orpractitioners at aparticular time

The purpose is toprovide information thatwill be of use to anyoneconcerned with aparticular, currentlypressing, issue

Contract-basedpractical research

Autonomous, practicalresearch

The aim is todevelop and testtheoretical ideas:to produceknowledge aboutgeneral causalrelationships

The task is toprovidedescriptions andexplanations ofparticular casesrelevant toperennial, valueissues

This is commissionedon the basis of acontract to producespecific information

Researchers play anautonomous role inproducing practicallyrelevant information

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Appendix 6 (Adams et al, 1998)11. Counselling Helen Cosis Brown

IntroductionTheoretical groupings within counsellingCounselling and social workIssuesConclusionFurther reading

12. Groupwork David WardWhere has all the groupwork gone?The demethoding of social workGroupwork and work-in-groupsA continuing need for groupworkRe-establishing groupworkFurther reading

13. Community work Marjorie MayoIntroductionThe context‘Mapping’ community work: definitions and recenthistoryCommunity work and social workAlternative perspectives and implications for practiceSome current issues and dilemmasConclusionFurther reading

14. Psychosocial work David HoweIntroductionThe socialness of selfInner working modelsAttachment and relationship-based theories asexamples of a psychosocial perspectiveAssessmentsPracticeConclusionFurther reading

15. Cognitive-behavioural practice Katy CignoIntroductionThe policy context of social workCognitive-behavioural practiceAreas of practice and links with effectivenessAssessment and interventionConclusionAcknowledgementFurther reading

16. Task-centred work Mark DoelIntroductionTask-centred work and other social work ideasThe essence of task-centred workIssuesConclusionFurther reading

17. Radical social work Mary LanganIntroductionThe roots of radical social workThe radical social work diasporaThe end?ConclusionFurther reading

18. Feminist social work Joan OrmeIntroduction and contextFeminist theories for social workFeminist social work practiceIssuesConclusionFurther reading

19. Anti-oppressive practice Beverly Burke andPhilomena HarrisonIntroductionWhat is anti-oppressive practice?Amelia’s story as told to a friendTheory into practiceFurther reading

20. Postmodernism and discourse approaches to socialwork Nigel Parton and Wendy MarshallIntroductionWhat is meant by postmodernity and postmodernism?Social work and the postmodernThe importance of discourse and languagePossible implications of postmodern perspectives forpracticeDedicationFurther reading

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Appendix 7 (Hudson, 1997)

Figure 1. Model of professional knowledge forms

THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE

‘A set of concepts, schemes orframes of reference that present an

organised view of a phenomenon andenable the professional to explain,

describe, predict or control theworld’.

EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE

‘Knowledge derived from researchinvolving the systematic gathering

and interpretation of data todocument and describe

experiences, explain events, predictfuture states or evaluate outcomes’.

PROFESSIONALKNOWLEDGE

‘The cumulated information orunderstanding deriving fromtheory, research, practice orexperiences considered to

contribute to the profession’sunderstanding of its work and

that serves as a guide to itspractice’.PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE

‘An inherent or spontaneous processwhere the worker is necessarily

committing him or her self to actionsoutside of immediate consciousness,or is action based on a personalised

notion of ‘common sense’. Suchknowledge includes intuition,

cultural knowledge and commonsense.

PROCEDURAL KNOWLEDGE

‘Knowledge about the organisational,legislative, or policy context within

which social work operates’.

PRACTICE WISDOM

‘Knowledge gained from theconduct of social work practice

which is formed through theprocess of working with a

number of cases involving thesame problem, or gained

through work with differentproblems which possess

dimensions of understandingwhich are transferable to the

problem at hand.

22

Appendix 8: Route 2 typologyLevel I

OrganisationalProcedural knowledge and

management governing social care

PractitionerKnowledge gained from conduct of

social care

Policy CommunityGrand policy themes

Exhortative and explanatory ideasand concepts

Empirical ResearchEvidence gathered systematically

Process and outcome

UsersKnowledge gained from

experience of service use andreflection

Level IIInspection Audit Legal

Level IIIBest-value Cost-benefit

Practice wisdom Training Tacit

counselling groupwork community cognitive anti-oppressive

Political Theoretical

thought pieces manifestos

Evaluation Descriptive Action Research

RCTs Process Single case Theory-driven

Empirical Ideological

Emancipatory Co-opted

KeyLevel I: Primary SourceLevel II: Knowledge StrategyLevel III: Practical Manifestation

23

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