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Question(R4.6):WhatarethecompetingnationalinterestsoftheUnitedStatesandIranintheMiddleEastandwhataretheoptionsforalleviatingUnitedStates/Iraniantensionstomutualsatisfactionandimprovedregionalstability?

Citation: Astorino-Courtois, A. (Ed.). (2017). Alleviating US-Iran Tensions. Arlington, VA: StrategicMulti-layerAssessment(SMA)Reach-backCell.Retrievedfromhttp://nsiteam.com/sma-reachback-R4.6_Alleviating_US_Iran_Tensions/

Contributors: Alex Dehgan (Conservation X Labs); Mark Luce (USASOC); Payam Mohseni (HarvardUniversity); Laura Jean Palmer-Moloney (Visual Teaching Technologies, LLC); Daniel Serwer (JohnsHopkinsSchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudies,SAIS)1ExecutiveSummaryDr.AllisonAstorino-Courtois,NSITheUSandIranhavethesametypesofinterests — national security,international influence, economic, anddomestic political—at stake in theconflicts surrounding Iraq and Syria.However, the different ways that eachcountrycurrentlydefinestheseinterestsplacesthemonacontinuumthatrangesfrom full accord over select regionalissues to complete, zero-sum discord.This is an importantpoint andone verypertinent to the question of alleviatingUS-Irantensions:IranandtheUSdonotdisagree on everything and nationalsecurity is not always the primary issueat stake. Themostpromising avenue toalleviate tensions therefore may be tofocus on issues on which US and Iranian interests tend to converge. However, there may be moreleverageoverwhatseemtobefullydivergentintereststhanatfirstappears.2

1ThisReach-backreportisbasedbothontheexpertcontributionscontainedhereandonexistingReach-backreportsonIran,addinginsightsfromanother26expertsonIranianinterestsandmotivationstothoselistedabove.2Forthesakeofbrevity,thisreportwillfocusononlysomeoftheissuesontheconvergence-divergencecontinuum(showninred boxes in Figure 1). More complete descriptions of Iranian and US interests can be found in prior Reach-back reportsincluding:Question(R3QL4):WhatarethecriticalelementsofacontinuedCoalitionpresence,followingtheeffectivemilitarydefeatofDa’esh[inIraq]thatIranmayviewasbeneficial?Availableat:http://nsiteam.com/sma-reachback-iran-beneficial-elements-of-continued-coalition-presence/Question (R1 LR2):Whatwillbe Iran’sstrategiccalculusregarding Iraqandtheregionpost-ISIL?Howwill JCPOA impact thecalculus? What opportunities exist for the US/Coalition to shape the environment favorable to our interests? Available at:http://nsiteam.com/sma-reachback-irans-post-isil-strategic-calculus/

6January2017SMAReach-back 8June2017

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Convergent Interests: Stability inSyria,StabilityinIraqRegardless of current US policy,the defeat of ISIS, followed byrelative stability in Iraq and Syriaare in the interests of both Iranand the US. For Iran, there arepotentially huge post-conflictreconstruction contracts in theoffinginSyria,providedtheSyrianregimeisfriendlyorweakenoughfor Iran to control a largepartofthatbusiness. Theearnings couldbe a boon for Rouhani and themoderate leadership in Iran whohad promised yet-to-be-seeIranian gains following the IranNuclearDeal(JCPOA).USsecurityinterestsintheregionalsoarenotservedbyinstabilityinSyria,evenif this means abiding by aweakened Assad regime for theimmediateterm.DivergingInterests:StrongIraqiArmyThestrengtheningoftheIraqiArmyisacontentioussubjectbetweentheUSandIran.TheUSwouldliketohaveinfluenceinIraqimilitaryinstitutions,aswouldIran.TheidealoutcomefortheUSappearstobea professionalized Iraqi military strong and capable enough to secure its borders, maintain internalstability,andclampdownonradicalextremistorganizationsin Iraqandelsewhere.Whileit is inIran’sinterests to see a security force in Iraq strong enough tomaintain internal order and put down anyresurgenceofSunniextremism,anIraqiforcestrongenoughtoposeathreatoutsideIraq’sbordersissomethingnoIranianleaderlikelycouldorwouldsupport.ThehorrorsandtraumaoftheIran-IraqWararestillinthevividmemoriesofagoodportionoftheIranianpopulation.

Question(R1V6):WhatarethestrategicandoperationalimplicationsoftheIrannucleardealontheUS-ledcoalition’sabilitytoprosecute thewar against ISIL in Iraq and Syria and to create the conditions for political, humanitarian and security sectorstability?Availableat:http://nsiteam.com/sma-reachback-cell-v6-implications-of-iran-nuclear-deal/

Question(R1V7):Whatarethestrategicobjectivesandmotivationsofindigenousstateandnon-statepartnersinthecounter-ISILfight?Availableat:http://nsiteam.com/sma-reachback-cell-v7-state-non-state-partners-countering-isil/

Question(R2QL9):WhatinternalfactorswouldinfluenceIran’sdecisiontointerferewiththefreeflowofcommerceintheStraitofHormuzortheBabelMandeb?Availableat:http://nsiteam.com/sma-reachback-commerce-in-the-strait-of-hormuz/

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CompleteDivergence:RegionalSecurityandIsraelProbablythemostrigidpointsofconflictinUSandIranianinterestsinvolvehoweachdefinesregionalsecurityand,asa result,whichactionsandactors itperceivedas threatening. Iranscholar,Dr.PayamMohseniofHarvardUniversity,identifiestwosecurityissuesthatserveas“thecornerstone”ofUS-Iranantagonism: “revisionism for the security architecture of the Middle East” including eliminating USmilitaryinfluenceintheMiddleEastfollowingISISdefeat,andsupportoforoppositiontoIsrael.

IranianRevisiontoRegionalOrder.IranhaslonghadagoalofchangingthepowerdynamicsintheMiddleEastregion.Thisservesmultiple Iranian interestssimultaneouslyandshapesthepolicies itpursues. First, from the Iranianperspective,expanding its reachvia Shi’a groups in Iraq, theGulf,andLebanonisanimportantmeansofdefendingIraniansecurityinaregioninwhichitisaminority.Considering what Iran perceives as its main security threats (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Israel—bothbacked by US force), togetherwith a desire for regional recognition and prestige, explains Iran’sattachment to a nuclear program. Revisions to the current system that enable Iran to exertadditional regional influence and establish additional economic ties also serve the domesticobjectivesofthemoremoderatepoliticalandcommercialelite.3Israel. Ironically, relationswith Israel serve theUSand Iran in similarways. Support for Israel is aconsistent element of US foreign policy and is very much tied to US electoral politics. Since theIranianRevolution,theGovernmenthasused itsstrongoppositiontothesecuritythreatposedbyIsraelandtheWesttogarnerdomesticapprovalandunderscoreitsbreakfromtheIranofthepast(i.e., its revolutionary bona fides) to enhance its (self-proclaimed) legitimacy as the regionalprotectoroftheMuslimpeople.

Both Iranian and US security concerns are indelibly intertwined with the desire of each to increaseregionalinfluenceandprestige,andtosomedegree,domesticsupport.Anargumentcanbemadethatthis coupling of interests iswhat generates the zero-sumquality of theUS and Iranian positions andmakes mutual animosities so easy to ignite. A situation perceived as zero-sum, “I win-you lose” bydefinitionisoneinwhichmutualgainisnotpossible;antagonismisassumed.Asaresult,allactionbytheopponentisperceivedascompetitiveand,inthestrategicsense,theonlyoptionsavailabletoeachsideareoppositionorcapitulation.Atpresent,bothUSandIranianpolicy-makersimaginetheregionalexpansion,influence,andattemptstochangetheregionalorderbyandoftheotherasimportantthreatstotheirownsecurityandprestige.Inthiscontext,aperceivedsecuritygainfortheUSoritsallies,forexamplebyincreasingthepresenceofUSforcesintheregionorinkinga$110billionweaponsdealwithSaudiArabia,inevitablyisalossforIran.Similarly,anIraniangain,forexampleincreasedinfluencewithintheShi’a-ledgovernmentinIraq;professionalization and institutionalization of “mini Hezbollahs,” or IRGC clones in the Iraqi armedforces,isseenintheUSprimarilyasIranianaggression.Cantensionsbereduced?No.NotwithoutreconceivingtheUSapproachFortunately, the zero-sum nature of US and Iranian perspectives on these critical issues is not amathematicalabsolute(assuggestedbytheterm).Rather,USdecisionmakersinterestedinalleviatingtensions with Iran must recognize that the intractability in how the US and Iran have conceived of

3However,asMohseninotes,“Inthisnewcontext[oftransformationintheMiddleEast],IranianrevisionismtoregionalorderislessadriverofMiddleEastconflictdynamicsthantheactualerosionandstructuralweaknesses,liabilities,andvulnerabilitiesofArabstates,manyofwhicharetraditionalalliesofAmerica.”

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regionalsecurity isapsychologicalconstruct, inlargepartbasedinmutualuncertaintyaboutwhattheotherwill choose todo.While itmay require considerable cognitive andperhapsemotional effort toaccomplish,reconceptualizinghowtheUSapproachesMiddleEastregionalsecurityandIran’sroleinitisverypossible.MohseniemphasizesnotjustthepossibilitybuttheurgencyofmakingthesechangesinUSthinking.HearguesthatchangedandchangingconditionsintheMiddleEastnowdemandrethinkingofUSinterestsintheregionandthethreatsthatitperceivesfromIran:in“today’sincreasinglyfractiousandunstableMiddleEast, it isallthemoreimportanttounderstandwhereandhowtheUnitedStatesandIrancanseeeye-to-eye.”HestrengthensthisargumentwiththediscerningobservationthateveniftheUSwereto succeed in containing Iran and eliminating the security threat that Iran poses to US allies in theregion, some of the most pressing threats in the region, like the spread of violent jihadism andinsurgencyandpoliticalinstabilityintraditionalUSallies,willremain.CriticalthreatstoUSinterestsandallieswillnotbemitigatedbyweakeningIran.Thisnewcontextrequiresnewthinking.How?SmallstepsIfnotseeingcompletelyeye-to-eye,alleviatingtensionsessentiallymeansthatdivergingIranianandUSinterests aremoved closer together; toward convergence. Eachof the contributors suggests that thiscan only happen via direct engagement with Iran, which is essential not only for alleviating US-Irantensions,butindeedfordefendingtheUS’sownsecurityinterestsintheregion.First,Dr.DanielSerwer(JohnsHopkinsSAIS)arguesthatUS-Irantensionscannotbeovercomeinabilateralsetting,butinsteadthataregionalsecurityarchitecturethatcouldhelpreducetensionsamongotherregionalactorsandonother issues (e.g., Sunni-Shi’a competition) is needed. In a similar vein, SFC Mark Luce (USASOC)suggests using diplomacy to reduce Iran’s isolation by, for example, opening dialogueswith Iran andRussia on Afghanistan and counter-VEO activities, encouraging others to expand diplomatic andeconomicrelationswithIran,andprovidingUSsecurityguaranteestoSaudiArabiaandtheGulfstatesintheeventofIranianaggression.WhilenegotiatingthesearrangementscertainlywouldrequiretimeandsignificantUSdomesticandregionalresolve,otherexpertssuggestmoretacticalandshort-tomid-termsteps for initiating US-Iran cooperation. Specifically, Dr. Laura Jean Palmer-Moloney (Visual TeachingTechnologies)andDr.AlexDehgan(ConservationXLabs)citethevaluethatIranhashistoricallyputonscience,andsuggestscientificexchangeparticularlyonwater, food,andenergy issues.TheynotethatIranianscientistsalready“co-authormorescientificpaperswithUSscientiststhanwithscientistsofanyothercountry,”andthatUS-trainedSTEMscientistsserveinkeypositionsintheIraniangovernment.

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SubjectMatterExpertContributions

MarkLuce,4thMISG,1stSFC,USASOCTheUnitedStatesand Iranpossessedcommongoalsand interests intheMiddleEastuntil the IranianRevolution(1979).Historically,Iranhasalwaysbeenthedominantpowerintheregion.AftertheBritishwithdrewfromthePersianGulf,Iran,undertheShahofIran,MuhammadRezaPahlavi,becametheUSproxy in the Persian Gulf (Nixon Doctrine) and was given carte blanche to buy almost any weaponsystemsthathedesired.The Iranian Revolution (1979) with its anti-Western, anti- US rhetoric and actions advocated for theexport of its revolution throughout the Middle East and billed itself as the unifier of MuslimseverywhereandthechampionsofthePalestinianstoregaintheirhomelandandliberateJerusalem.TheEmbassyhostagesituationinTehran,the1983BeirutsuicidebombingoftheMarinebarracksattheU.S.Embassy,otherinternationalactsofterror,andIranianenergiesandresourcesexpendedinLebanontofoster and nourish a militant Hezbollah among other things set the United States and Iran in clearoppositiontooneanother.TheUnitedStatescommitteditsNavyandforcestoprotectthePersianGulfandtheStraitsofHormuz(Carter doctrine), thus reassuring its Gulf allies that any Iranian aggression would be checked.Additionally, the United States supported Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War (1980 – 1988).AmericannationalinterestsatthattimeincludedthecontainmentofIran,thedefenseofIsraelanditsArab allies, themaintaining of regional security and stability and the status quo. However, regionalstabilitysteadilydeterioratedbecauseoftheconsequencesofthefollowing:

• The1stGulfWar,• The2ndGulfWar,• TheriseofSalafi-Jihadists(al-Qa’idaandaffiliatesandISIS),• TheArabSpring,• TheescalationofSunni-Shi’itestrife,exasperatedbytheISISzero-toleranceforShi’ites,and• The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA; [Persian: مشترکاقدامجامعبرنامه ] Iran

NuclearDeal)

The aftermath of these wars and events and their continued effects have changed the Middle Eastenvironmentcompletely.Currently,therearewarsraginginLibya,Syria,Iraq,YemenandAfghanistan.Additionally, civil unrest, low-grade insurgencies or VEO activities drag on in Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain,Pakistan,andIranianBaluchistan.TheresultofthesevolatileandhostilecircumstanceshasalteredbothUSandIran’sactionsintheregion.TheIranianSituation:GrowingSectarianismand“EnduringRivalries”ThewarsinSyria,IraqandYemenandthecivilunrestinBahrainarealldifficultsituations.Iranhascometo the aid of its allies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Iran’s relationswith Syria and Yemen are tenuouslylinked to Shi’a Islam [Alawis (Nusayris) in Syria, Zaydis in Yemen]. In Iraq, the majority 12er [Ithna‘Ashari] Iraqis hold the same religious beliefs while rejecting the Iranian concept of Vilayat-e faqih.Iran’sprimaryandimmediategoalinIraqistopreventthecollapseoftheIraqigovernment.

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Onthesurface, these threeconflicts (Syria, Iraq,andYemen)demonstrateagrowingsectarianSunni-Shi’idividethathasbroadenedthroughouttheregion.Theycanbepartiallyexplainedbythe“enduringrivalry”thatexistsbetweenSaudiArabiaandIran.WithintheGCC,thereisdiscordinthewakeoftheArabSpringmovement.SaudiArabiaandtheUAEareespeciallypanickedby:

• theArabSpring[thetopplingoftheTunisian,Libya,Egyptian,andYemenigovernmentsandtheUSresponse],

• Qatari endorsement and funding of the Muslim Brotherhood and other organizationalmovements,

• theNucleardeal(JCPOA)mainlybrokeredbytheUnitedStates,• theriseofISISandAQAP,• GCCandYemeniyouthjoiningal-Qa’ida,itsaffiliatesandISISinSyria,and• theuprisinginBahrainandShi’iunrestintheEasternProvinceofSaudiArabia

TheIraniansperceivethemselvesandtheirco-religionistsastargetsofintolerantSunnis.TheJCPOAmayhavedeterredtheadvancementofIran’snuclearprogrambuttheSaudisandEmiratisarestillprofoundlydisturbed.TheIranianscontinuetoadvancetheirmissiledevelopmentprogramandbuild-uptheirmilitary.Intheregion,Iranhasfurnishedsupplies,arms,troopsandadvisors(IranianRevolutionaryGuardCorps(IRGC)/QudsForce[alsotheArteshinSyria])inSyria,Iraq,andYemen.Numbersofpro-IranianShi’itemilitias in both Syria and Iraq (PMF) are loyal to the Iranian Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah AliKhamenei,thusaddingthepotentialfortheemergenceofadditionalunitedandarmedSyrianandIraqiHezbollah-likeorganizationsinthefuture.Internationally,theIranianshavealliedwiththeRussiansoverSyriaandhavecollaboratedtogetherwiththeTalibaninAfghanistan.PossibleU.S.actionsthatmayalleviateU.S./IraniantensionsforimprovingregionalstabilityThe United States and Iran are both involved in four major conflicts (Syria, Iraq, Yemen andAfghanistan).The twocountriesareonoppositesides inSyriaandYemen,yetare technicallyallies inIraqandAfghanistan. Theelectionof IranianPresidentRouhaniandthesuccessfulnegotiationof theJCPOAhaveenabledIrantomoveforwardandbegintoemergefromdecadesofinternationalisolationcausedbysanctionsagainstit.Thosepast sanctions strengthened thepositionof thepolitical hardliners, allowedPresidentAhmadi-nezhad to weaken private sector businesses (which are guaranteed by Article 44 of the IranianConstitution)andeconomicallyenrichedandempoweredtheIRGC.IbelievethatthefollowingactionswouldalleviateU.S.–Iraniantension:

• ConvinceGCC countries, primarily Saudi Arabia and theUAE that theUnited Stateswill notallowIrantoposeasecuritythreat,

• BrokerapeacesettlementinYemenandavertfamine.• Encouragecountriesaroundtheworldtostrengthendiplomaticandeconomicrelationswith

Iran. The Supreme Leader is continuing to advocate for his “Resistance Economy” whichemphasizes domestic self-dependency. The Iranian economy is in shambles and all effortsshould bemade to stimulate andpromoteprivate businesses and international investment.Thiswillhelp loosentheIRGC’sartificialstrangleholdonkeycontractsandprojectsandhelploosentheeffectsofthe“culturewar”(jang-enarm- نرمجنگ )byimprovingtradeandtravel.

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• MaintainaflexiblenegotiatingpositiononthefutureofSyria.WhiletheAsadregimeisbrutal,itsoustercurrentlywouldonlyprecipitatechaosorempowermoreradicalIslamistelements.

• Openadialoguewiththe IraniansandRussiansonthefutureofconflicts inAfghanistanandPakistanandthecontainmentofViolentExtremeOrganizations(VEOs)inCentralAsia.

• In Iraq,work to strengthen the government andmilitary and assistwith strategies thatwillfacilitate the disarming of Popular Mobilization Force(PMF) Shi’ite militias and integratingthemintotheIraqiSecurityForces.Anumberofthesemilitias,suchasAsa’ibAhlal-Haqq,areloyal to Iran alone. All efforts should bemade to assure that Iraqi political parties are notallowedtopossessarmedmilitias.

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PayamMohseni,HarvardUniversityU.S.andIranianstrategicvisionsfortheMiddleEastclashacrossmultiplefronts:ideologicallybetweenpan-Islamismandanti-imperialismvs. liberalism;geopoliticallywithregardstoIsraelandthenatureofregionalorder; andmilitarilyover the continuedU.S. armedpresence in the region. Inparticular, thecornerstone of the Iranian posture that sets the two countries on a confrontational path is IranianoppositiontotheexistenceofIsraelandIranianrevisionismforthesecurityarchitectureoftheMiddleEast.Americangoals to contain,undermine,orpushback Iranian influenceare thus consequencesoffundamentallyopposingregionalvisionsofthetwocountries.SincetheIslamicrevolutionof1979,theUnitedStatesanditsallieslikeSaudiArabiahaveconsistentlyaimedtolimit,debilitate,andisolateIran,whetheraspartofthe“dualcontainment”doctrineinthe1990sorthecurrenteffortstoconfrontIran’sincreased regional reach. As a result, current flashpoints of contentionwith Iran across the region—whetherinYemen,thePersianGulf,Iraq,Syria,andelsewhere—arenaturallyseenthroughtheprismofthis largerconfrontationandassessedwithintheself-assignedparametersofU.S.national intereststopushbackIran.Today,however, there is an inherent flaw inhowU.S. national interests andgoals towards Iranhavebeen traditionally conceptualized. The Middle Eastern landscape is undergoing a fundamentaltransformationwiththeerosionoftheArabstatesystem,thede-legitimizationandbreakdownofbrittleauthoritarianregimes,andtheexpansionofpowervacuumsthatresult inviolentconflicts, theriseofnon-state actors, and military interventions in nominally sovereign territories by regional andinternational powers. This trend line towardsMiddle East disorder and chaos therefore changes thepower relations and calculations of regional actors and thus necessitates a rethinking of previousanalyticalassumptions.EveniftheUnitedStatessucceeds in itspushbackagainst Iran,themajorityofthestrategicproblemsthatendangerU.S. interests in theregion includingtheriseof jihadi terrorism,thethreattoallies’securityanddurability,threatstoenergysecurityandAmericanpoliticalandmilitaryinstallations, the rise of anti-American social forces, and general political instability—will not benecessarilyalleviated.Inthisnewcontext,IranianrevisionismtoregionalorderislessadriverofMiddleEastconflictdynamicsthantheactualerosionandstructuralweaknesses, liabilities,andvulnerabilitiesofArabstates,manyofwhicharetraditionalalliesofAmerica.Moreover, as a result of these structural dynamics, traditionalAmerican diplomacy and alliance-building is increasinglyuncertain as its major partners and the poles of power in theMiddle East—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey—are rethinkingtheirroleintheregionorfaceseriousinternalsocialandpoliticalchallenges. Turkey and Saudi Arabia are becoming increasinglyassertive andexpect theUnited States todomore as an activepatron while simultaneously bending less to American wishesandinterestsintheregion.Thescrambleforpowerandstabilityby American allies complicates the traditional convergences ofintereststhathaveexistedbetweenthepartners.Manyofthesestructural changes in the Middle East and new allied political-diplomatic mindsets increase the costs and lower the benefits that these traditionally allies offeredAmerica. The question of Saudi, Gulf, and Turkish patronage of jihadi groups in the region adds anadditional questionmark to the viability and utility of their partnership to the United States and its

TurkeyandSaudiArabiaarebecomingincreasinglyassertiveandexpecttheUnitedStatestodomoreasanactivepatronwhilesimultaneouslybendinglesstoAmericanwishesandinterestsintheregion.ThescrambleforpowerandstabilitybyAmericanalliescomplicatesthetraditionalconvergencesofintereststhathaveexistedbetweenthepartners.

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ideological goal to champion liberal democracy and human rights—especially given Turkey’s turntowardsgreaterIslamicauthoritarianismandSaudi’sgrowingadventurism.Consequently,intoday’sincreasinglyfractiousandunstableMiddleEast,itisallthemoreimportanttounderstandwhereandhowtheUnitedStatesandIrancanseeeye-to-eye.TheobjectivetoisolateIranhas notworked successfully in the past as demonstrated by Iran’s steady rise in theMiddle East, letalonenowandintothefuturehorizonofincreasedregionalinstability.Iran’scapabilitiesandcapacitiesin the region—including the Shi’a militias that may be traditionally seen as contradictory to U.S.interests—could potentially be used to further U.S. goals of regional stability and the fight againstterrorisminacontextwhenpreviousstatenodesofpowerarewaning.ByengagingwithIran,theU.S.willsimultaneouslyreduceitsperceiveddependenceonalliessuchasSaudiArabiaandTurkeyandallowthe country to leverage its multi-pronged diplomacy and influence to best shape the increasinglycomplexandmulti-polarorderoftheregion.ItcanalsoreducethestrengtheningoftiesbetweenIranandRussia,andthusopenthespacefortheUnitedStatestoinfluenceregionaleventsandthepoliticsoftheAxisofResistancecountries.Iranian-Americancoordinationcanbringstabilityincriticalgeostrategicarenas—includingintheLevant,PersianGulf,andCentralAsia.Thiscooperationhasthepotentialtoprovideviableshortandlongtermpoliticalpathsfortrans-regionalorder.Iran’sunparalleledpositiononthegeopoliticalmapanditsabilityto simultaneously act as a power inmultiple geographic areasmakes it simply indispensable tomostmajor issues that confront theMiddle East, theCaucuses, Central Asia, aswell as SouthAsia. In theshort run, cooperation between the two states can provide a security umbrella over energy transit,combatterrorism,andensurethesecurityandlegitimacyoftheArabGulfstates.Iran’s interest in combatting radical jihadism, providing security for global energy exports andinternational trade, and its commitment to providing indigenous governing-security structures in thefailedstatesoftheMiddleEastmeanthatAmerican-Iraniancooperationcantakeonnoveltrajectoriesto shape a new Middle East. Whether or not official policy in either state creates opportunity forworkingwithoneanother remains tobe seen,butgeo-political factorsdictate that cooperationmusttakeplacegiventheover-lappingzonesofinfluenceandprioritiesIranandAmericahaveintheMiddleEast.

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LauraJeanPalmer-Moloney,VisualTeachingTechnologies,LLC&AlexDehgan,ConservationXLabs

Regarding options for alleviating U.S./Iranian tension and helping achieve regional stability—considerthe importance of the water-food-energy nexus in the dynamic variation of regional climate andopportunitiesforDoDandDoSledengagement.ScientificCooperationasPositiveLeverageTheU.S.mayuse its considerable scientific expertise inwater and agriculture in engagement efforts.Iranisasocietythatgreatlyvaluesscience,bothhistoricallyandinthepresentandhashighlightedtheimportanceofscienceinitsnationalstrategicplan,andinstatementsoftheSupremeLeaderKhameni(notedin1387/2008,theyearof“innovationandflourishment”).Science,technology,andeducationinIran are as respected as much, or more so, than the mullahocracy. Within the Iranian government,scientists,physiciansorengineers,someofwhichweretrainedintheWest,serveinkeypositionsintheOfficeofthePresidentandintheCabinet.Americaleadstheworldinscienceandtechnology,andUSS&T commands great respect throughout the Islamic world. This is particularly true in Iran, whereIranianscientistsco-authormorescientificpaperswithU.S.scientists,thanwithscientistsofanyothercountryintheworld.UnderstandingandrespectforIran’sscientificheritagebuildsthemutualrespectandtrustnecessaryforrealengagement.This,inturn,isaprerequisiteforreducingthecurrentinsecuritiesthatcontributetotheaggressiveandcounter-productivebehaviors,includingnuclearproliferation,oftheIranianregime.Sciencealsoprovidesacommon languageandcommonvalues toengage Iranians inamanner that istransparent and non-threatening to the government, yet contains seeds for closer engagement andfuture change. Those values are honesty, doubt, respect for evidence, openness, accountability,meritocracy, toleranceand indeedhunger foropposingpointsof view. Asanexample, theextensivecontactsbetweenU.S.andSovietscientistsduringtheheightoftheColdWarhelpedeffectthedramaticchangesthatendedtheSovietUnion.

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DanielSerwer,JohnsHopkinsSchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudies(SAIS)

Iran is a revolutionary power looking to extend its security perimeter into neighboring states and toburnishitsIslamistcredentialsbyresistancetoIsrael.Itwillbeimpossibletoovercometheseproblemsexclusively in a bilateral US/Iran context, though increased communication between Tehran andWashington (including diplomatic representatives at some level in each of their capitals) is highlydesirable.

Regional stabilitywould also benefit from some sort of regional security architecture—thinkOSCE inEuropeorASEANinAsia.Thiswouldaimatde-escalatingSunni/Shia,Saudi/Iranian,Turkish/Iranian,andotherregionalconflictsandtensions.TherearefewplacesonearthtodaywithlessregionalcooperationandconnectivitythantheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.

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ReprintedfromReach-backReportV7Iran’sStrategicInterestsRegardingRegionalConflictAllisonAstorino-CourtoisandNSITeam

INTERESTTYPE

IranINTEREST

DESCRIPTION

Nationalsecurity/populationsafety

Int’l/intergroupprestige

Domesticpolitics/regimesecurity/constituentsupport

Economicsurvival/prosperity

Identity/ideology

IncreaseIranianinfluenceinregion;Dominate/sustainSunni-Shi’abalanceofpower;mitigatethreatfromIsrael,SaudiArabia,andtheU.S.

Iran has long sought to establish itself as a key cultural,political, and economic player in the Middle East bystrategically engaging Shia populations in the region(Bazoobandi, 2014; Cook, Barkey, & Natali, 2015; R.Mohammed,2015).AsthelargestShiamajoritycountryinthe region, Iran has a strong interest in offsetting Saudiinfluence across the region and claiming a place as aregional power with global reach (Bazoobandi, 2014). InYemen,itsbackingoftheHouthirebels,aZaidiShiagroupdirectly opposes Saudi interests and influence (R.Mohammed,2015).In Iraq, Iran has sought to maintain strong politicalinfluencebyinvestinginaShia-dominatedIraqigovernmentthat supports Tehran’s foreign policy objectives in theregion (Bazoobandi, 2014; Martin, Cowan, & Mcalaster,2015; R.Mohammed, 2015). Providingmilitary support toIraq and aid to Shiite militias in the fight against ISIL(Almukhtar & Yourish, 2015; Martin et al., 2015; R.Mohammed,2015)bothstrengthen Iran’s influence in IraqandaddresstheexternalthreatofSunnijihadism.In Syria, Iran has worked to safeguard the survival of theAssad regime which enhances its influence in Syria – astrategic location that is the lynchpin of Iran’s influenceovertheArab-IsraeliconflictasitprovidesatransitwayforIran to ship arms and resources to Hezbollah (Bonsey,2014). Iran’s backing of Hezbollah also provides itconsiderableinfluenceinLebanon,whichprovidesleverageagainstIsrael(Khatib,2014;Salem,2014).

X X

DefendeconomicassetsinSyria;gainfootholdinpost-conflicteconomy

Syria remains a focus of Iranian economic activity andforeign investment, particularly in the face of remainingWesternsanctions.Sincecivilconflictbrokeoutin2011,andTurkeyandQatarhaltedSyrianaid,theIslamicRepublichasprovided nearly $5 billion in loans to Syria to prop up itseconomy and rebuild infrastructure (al-Saadi, 2015).Despite the fighting Iran’s tradewith Syria is growingandexpectedtoreach$1billionin2015(PressTV,2015).Iran'seconomic investments and previous banking and energyagreements may be undermined by an opposition ortransitional government replacing the Assad regime(Rafizadeh, 2013). If Assad survives, Iran - the largestproducerofcementandironintheMiddleEast-willbeinagood position to benefit from post-conflict reconstructionprojects - a point reiterated by the top Iranian economicofficial in Damascus according to an 18 May 2015 newsreport(PressTV,2015).

X X

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EnsureIranianinternalsecurityandsovereigncontrol

Threatstothe internalstabilityof Iranemanatefrombothinsideandoutsideofthecountryandatpresentinvolvetwocritical concerns: protecting Iran’s borders and assuringstability the southwest. In the past the regime has facedseparatistmovementsfromAzeris–theArabpopulationinthesouthwestoilproductionareaofKhurzestan.Especiallyas sanctions are lifted, Iran is keen to avoid any concernamong foreign investors. More immediately, Iran hasworkedtoavoidISILorotherSunniextremistgroupstakingupresidenceonitsborders.FromtheoutsetIranhassoughttokeepthefightinginIraqcontained(atthesametimethatit extends its influence there) forexample,by trainingandfunding the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), andproviding support to the Iraq Security Forces and theKurdish Peshmerga (one of the groups along with Syriawho supported Iran in its devastating was with Iraqduringthe1980s).

X X

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AuthorBiographiesAlexDehgan

AlexDehganistheCEO&co-founderofanewstartup,ConservationXLabs,focused on harnessing exponential technologies, open innovation, andentrepreneurship foraddressingglobal challenges, including launching thefirst Grand Challenge for Conservation on Aquaculture, creating the firstdigitalmakerspace,anddevelopingnewhandheldmicrofluidicsbasedDNAfield scanners. He is also The Chanler Innovator in Residence at DukeUniversity (and previously served as the Inaugural Rubenstein Fellow atDuke), where he researches and lectures on technology and innovation,includingthroughaMassiveOpenOnlineCoursewithCoursera,Innovation

andDesignforGlobalGrandChallenges.Dr.AlexDehganrecentlyservedastheChiefScientistattheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment,with rankofAssistantAdministrator, and founded andheaded theOffice of Science and Technology,andconceptualizedandhelpedcreate theGlobalDevelopmentLab,USAID’sDARPAforDevelopment.PriortocomingtoUSAID,AlexworkedinmultiplepositionswithintheOfficeoftheSecretary,theOfficeoftheScienceAdvisertotheSecretary,andtheBureauofNearEasternAffairs,attheU.S.DepartmentofState,aswellaswiththeCoalitionProvisionalAuthorityinIraq.AtState,AlexdevelopedpoliticalandsciencediplomacystrategiestowardsaddressingourmostchallengingforeignpolicyissuesinIran,Iraq,andthegreaterIslamicworld,includinghelpinginitiatingtheObamaAdministration’sdiplomaticeffortswithIranthroughsciencediplomacyworkingwithAmb.DennisRoss,andservingasaliaisontothelateAmb.RichardHolbrookeonIran-Afghanistanaffairs.Alex was also the founding Afghanistan Country Director for the Wildlife Conservation Society’sAfghanistanProgram.Throughhisleadership,WCSledeffortstocreateAfghanistan’sfirstnationalpark(andlateritssecond),conductedthefirstcomprehensivebiologicalsurveysofthecountryin30years,and curtailed illegal wildlife trade on US and ISAF military bases. Alex holds a Ph.D. & M.S. inEvolutionary Biology from The University of Chicago, and a J.D. from the University of California,Hastings.MarkLuceDr.LucewasaPeaceCorpsvolunteer inGhazni,Afghanistan.Heholds a Ph.D. inNear Eastern Languages andCivilizationsfromtheUniversityofChicago.HisspecializationisinIslamicThoughtandPersianliterature,withregionalexpertiseinIran,Afghanistan,Pakistan,thePersianGulfandYemen.HespeaksPersian(Dari,Farsi,Tajik),PashtuandArabic.Hehaslivedandworked in theMiddle East and SouthAsia formore than 25years (Afghanistan, Iran,Pakistan, theU.A.E., Jordan,Yemen,Qatar, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia). His current interests and

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projectsareISIS,Trans-regionalThreatStreamsandSunni-Shiasectarianstrife.Dr.Luceisananalystforthe Cultural Intelligence Cell, 4th MISG (A), 1st Special Force Command (provisional), USASOC at FortBragg,NorthCarolina.LauraJeanPalmer-Moloney

Movingfromhercareerasanestablishedgeographyprofessor,Dr.Palmer-MoloneyjoinedUSGovernmentservicein2009andbeganherresearchonwaterinthenationalsecuritycontext.Sheservedin Afghanistan from 2011 to 2012 as an AFPAK Hand/ SeniorAdviser onWater Management to the Commanding Generals ofRegional Command Southwest. She received the USACE ERDCawardforOperationalSupportforWaterSecurityinrecognitionofher geospatial reasoning contribution to Stability Operationsduring her deployment. After redeploying, Dr. Palmer-Moloney

was detailed from USACE ERDC to National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) where she led theInnoVisionAnticipatoryAnalyticsWaterSecurityresearchteam.ShecurrentlyworksasanindependentresearchscientistwithherconsultingcompanyVisualTeachingTechnologies.Dr.Palmer-MoloneyisarecognizedSubjectMatterExpertandfrequentlycontributestowatersecuritydialogue sponsored by the Atlantic Council, the Stimson Center, the Near East-South Asia StrategicStudies Center (NESA), Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), and the OSD StrategicMulti-Layer Assessment Office. She has authored numerous publications, including Human-EnvironmentInteractionandWaterComplexities:MusteringScienceandPolicyforaCoastalResourcesManagementApproachtoCounterinsurgency(COIN)Operations(2012,EastCarolinaUniversitydissertationon-line);“Water’sroleinmeasuringsecurityandstabilityinHelmandProvince,Afghanistan”WaterInternational,36 (3), 2011: 207-221; “Water as Nexus: Linking U.S. National Security to Environmental Security,”JournalofMilitaryGeography,1 (1),2011:52-65; (withA.O.DehganandM.Mirzaee)“WaterSecurityandScarcity:DestabilizationinWesternAfghanistanduetoInterstateWaterConflicts,” inE.Weinthal,J.Troell,andM.Nakayama(eds.)WaterandPost-ConflictPeacebuilding,London:Taylor&Francis(2012);and(withK.U.Duckenfield)“WaterInsecurity,HumanDynamics,andCOINintheSistanBasin,”inSocio-CulturalDynamicsandGlobalSecurity:InterdisciplinaryPerspectivesonHumanGeographyinanEraofPersistentConflict,eds.R.TomesandC.Tucker(USGeospatialIntelligenceFoundation,inpress).She holds a BA in Anthropology, anMA inGeography, and two PhDdegrees—one in curriculum andinstructionwith a focus inGeographic Education from theCollegeof Education,University ofDenver(1998);oneinCoastalResourcesManagementwithafocusinwetlandsecologyandhydrologyfromEastCarolina University (2012). In 2013, Dr. Palmer-Moloney completed the Harvard Kennedy School ofGovernment’sExecutiveEducationProgramontheWaterFutureofSouthAsia.

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PayamMohseniDr. PayamMohseni is the Director of the Iran Project and Fellow for IranStudies at the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science andInternationalAffairs.HeisalsoaLecturerintheDepartmentofGovernmentat Harvard University where he teaches Iranian and Middle East politicsandis amultiplerecipientof theHarvardExcellence in Teaching award.Dr.Mohseni also serves asa scholar and member of Harvard’sIran WorkingGroup, which he co-chairs with Professor Graham Allison, and he alsomanages theBelferCenter’s Special InitiativeIranMatters,apremieroutletforpolicyanalysisonallaspectsofcontemporaryIranianaffairs.Dr.Mohsenico-chairedHarvard’sMindadeGunzburgCenterforEuropeanStudiesStudyGroupontheEasternMediterraneanandEuropefrom2014to2016.Dr.Mohseni’s research focuses on Iranian foreign anddomestic policymaking, ideology and sectarianconflictintheMiddleEast,andthepoliticsofauthoritarianismandhybridregimes.Dr.MohseniisfluentinPersianandtravelsfrequentlytoIran.HisanalysishasbeenfeaturedinTheNewYorkTimes,ForeignAffairs,WashingtonPost,TheNational Interest,Bulletinof theAtomicScientists,Bloomberg,U.S.Newsand World Report,andMSNBC, among others, including prominent international and Iranian mediaoutlets.

Previously, Dr. Mohseni was a postdoctoral Research Fellow with the Belfer Center's InternationalSecurity Program, a Junior Research Fellow at the Crown Center forMiddle East Studies at BrandeisUniversity, and a member of the Iran Study Group at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) inWashington, D.C. He holds a Ph.D. in Government from Georgetown University, and he obtained anM.A. in Conflict, Security, and Development from the Department of War Studies at King’s CollegeLondon,andaB.A.inDevelopmentStudiesfromtheUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley.DanielSerwer

Daniel Serwer is a Professor of the Practice of Conflict Management,directoroftheConflictManagementProgramandaSeniorFellowattheCenter for Transatlantic Relations, at the Johns Hopkins School ofAdvanced International Studies. Also a scholar at the Middle EastInstitute,DanielSerweristheauthorofRightingtheBalance(PotomacBooks, November 2013), editor (with David Smock) of FacilitatingDialogue(USIP,2012)andsupervisedpreparationofGuidingPrinciplesfor Stabilization andReconstruction (USIP, 2009). Righting theBalancefocuses on how to strengthen the civilian instruments of Americanforeign policy to match its strong military arm. Facilitating Dialogueanalyzes specific cases and best practices in getting people to talk to

eachother inconflictzones.GuidingPrinciples isthe leadingcompilationofbestpracticesforciviliansandmilitaryinpost-warstate-building.AsvicepresidentoftheCentersofInnovationattheUnitedStatesInstituteofPeace(USIP),Serwerledteamsworking on rule of law, peacebuilding, religion, economics,media, technology, security sector

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governance and gender. He was also vice president for peace and stability operations at USIP,overseeingitspeacebuildingworkinAfghanistan,theBalkans,IraqandSudanandservingasexecutivedirector of the Hamilton/Baker Iraq Study Group. As aminister-counselor at the U.S. Department ofState,SerwerdirectedtheEuropeanofficeofintelligenceandresearchandservedasU.S.specialenvoyandcoordinatorfortheBosnianFederation,mediatingbetweenCroatsandMuslimsandnegotiatingthefirstagreementreachedattheDaytonPeaceTalks;from1990to1993,hewasdeputychiefofmissionandchargéd'affairesattheU.S.EmbassyinRome,leadingamajordiplomaticmissionthroughtheendoftheColdWarandthefirstGulfWar.SerwerisagraduateofHaverfordCollegeandearnedMastersdegreesattheUniversityofChicagoandPrinceton,wherehealsodidhisPhDinhistory. AllisonAstorino-Courtois

Dr.AllisonAstorino-Courtois is ExecutiveVicePresidentatNSI, Inc. Shehasalsoservedasco-chairofaNationalAcademyofSciencesstudyonStrategicDeterrenceMilitaryCapabilitiesinthe21stCentury,andasaprimaryauthoronastudyoftheDefense and Protection ofUS SpaceAssets. Dr. Astorino-Courtois has served astechnical lead on a variety of rapid turn-around, Joint Staff-directed StrategicMulti-layer Assessment (SMA) projects in support of US forces and CombatantCommands. These include assessments of key drivers of political, economic andsocial instability and areas of resilience in South Asia; development of amethodology for conductingprovincial assessments for the ISAF JointCommand;

productionofa"richcontextualunderstanding"(RCU)tosupplementintelligencereportingfortheISAFJ2andCommander;andprojectsforUSSTRATCOMondeterrenceassessmentmethods.Previously, Dr. Astorino-Courtois was a Senior Analyst at SAIC (2004-2007) where she served as aSTRATCOM liaison to U.S. and international academic and business communities. Prior to SAIC, Dr.Astorino-CourtoiswasatenuredAssociateProfessorofInternationalRelationsatTexasA&MUniversityinCollegeStation,TX(1994-2003)whereherresearchfocusedonthecognitiveaspectsofforeignpolicydecisionmaking.Shehasreceivedanumberofacademicgrantsandawardsandhaspublishedarticlesinmultiplepeer-reviewedjournals.ShehasalsotaughtatCreightonUniversityandasavisitinginstructorat the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Dr. Astorino-Courtois earned her Ph.D. in InternationalRelationsandMAinandResearchMethodsfromNewYorkUniversity.HerBAisinpoliticalsciencefromBostonCollege.Finally,Dr.Astorino-CourtoisalsohasthedistinctionofhavingbeenawardedbothaUSNavyMeritoriousServiceAwardandaUSArmyCommander'sAward.