SIXTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

RESEARCH PROJECT: CRIME AND CULTURE

Crime as a Cultural Problem. The Relevance of Perceptions of Corruption to Crime Prevention. A Comparative Cultural Study in the EU-Accession States Bulgaria and Romania, the EU-Candidate States Turkey and Croatia and the EU-States Germany,

Greece and United Kingdom

Project no.: 028442

Instrument: SPECIFIC TARGETED RESEARCH PROJECT

Thematic Priority: PRIORITY 7, FP6-2004-CITIZENS-5

UNITED KINGDOM: STATE OF THE ART REPORT

Perceptions of Corruption in the United Kingdom A Content Analysis of Documents from Politics, Judiciary, Police, Media,

Civil Society and Economy

Period covered: from January to September 2006Date of preparation: October 2006

Start date of project: 1st January 2006Duration: January 2006-December 2008

Project co-ordinator name: Dr Othon AnastasakisAuthor: Dr. Sappho Xenakis

Project co-ordinator organisation name: Southeast European Studies at Oxford, Oxford University

Revision (draft 1)

1. Introduction

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The contribution to this multi-sited study of perspectives on corruption by the UK case is intended primarily to offer a contrasting example to that of the so-called continental types represented by the other cases studies of the research project. As pointed out in the project’s objectives, the UK has tended to favour and promote liberalisation as opposed to regulation and its approach has generally been considered to be less étatist in its political, economic, juridical and administrative culture than that of some of its continental counterparts. This may be what defines practice in the UK regarding corruption and anti-corruption, but it does not appear to lie at the basis of British perceptions of corruption. In this area, the specificity of British history – its relatively stable recent history and apparent continuity of political tradition, in comparison to its European neighbours – and the cultural legacy of being a post-colonial power; these factors seem to have had an impact in shaping some of the positive perceptions of standards of public life in the UK which have been evident from the research.

The long-term stability and strength of its political and financial system means that in some respects Britain is amongst the strongest of the states being considered within the Project. The power of the British market internationally has nevertheless meant that certain expectations and temptations with regard to corruption and anti-corruption initiatives have arisen that may also be considered particular to the British context.

Equally, however, the British case demonstrates notable similarities with the conundrums facing political parties in other EU and candidate states; notably, the problems of how and from whom political parties should be funded, and how to manage the relationship between business and political elites in such a way that the principal of equality, fundamental to liberal democracies, is not seen to be violated.

Corruption in the UK

As has been noted in the detailed description of the Crime and Culture Project proposal, the UK is perceived to be experience relatively low levels of corruption in comparison with other states worldwide, scoring only 11th on Transparency International’s Corruptions Perception Index in 2005.1 Very few cases of corruption are reported to the British Audit Commission every year. Between 1995/6 and 2003, an average of 43 cases were reported a year (with annual losses averaging £262,000). An average of 21 people a year were prosecuted under the three pieces of legislation on corruption between 1993 and 2003. Between 1998-2003, the Serious Fraud Office prosecuted only seven cases where corruption was the charge.

While the necessity of paying bribes in return for routine public services is rarely encountered in British life by the ordinary citizen, at the higher levels of political life it has been argued by some commentators and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that acts that should be understood as corrupt regularly take place but either avoid definition as such by law and/or evade characterisation as such in public discourse.

Both cases relate to interest; for example, it is argued by some NGOs (e.g. Tax Justice Network and Transparency International UK) included in the research below that ‘tax avoidance’ and the acceptability of tax havens by the UK constitutes a form of corruption that manages to retain a legitimacy because it is in the interest of an elite (political and business) within the UK for it to do so, and because the UK’s stature as a hub for international markets

1 Transparency International 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index, www.transparency.org/surveys/#cpi>.

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supports its interpretation of legality.2 Complaints are also often raised by observers that Members of Parliament tend to be reluctant or insufficiently informed regarding their duties of self-regulation and oversight of parliamentary affairs.3

Furthermore, with regard to the evasion of the use of the term ‘corruption’ to define acts that are perceived to be, or are by law, illegitimate and could commonly be otherwise understood to be examples of corruption, this is a subject that is frequently touched upon within the research materials. Explanations for the paucity of usage of the term ‘corruption’ in application to pertinent examples in British public life frequently rely on cultural attitudes; typically, the perceived impoliteness or vulgarity of the term. However, a more pragmatic suggestion of the cause is also raised; the severity of the British libel laws and their penalties is likely to be a strong inducement for commentators to be cautious in their application of the term.4

As much as ‘corruption’ has largely been regarded a problem foreign to British public life, class-based networks of influence, the ‘old boys network’, have for just as long been taken for granted as important factors in determining public positions and contracts (while selection processes are competitive, until recently, the criteria for selection was believed to be best met by those who had attended prestigious schools and universities).5

Since the mid-1990s the use of such networks have been de-legitimised and they have increasingly been supplanted as a public concern by new forms of relationships that have linked the worlds of politics, business and media; so-called ‘cronyism’. While allegations of ‘sleaze’ (a term used to characterise low-level corruption of individual Members of Parliament, as illustrated in the Cash for Questions scandal) in the 1990s helped propel the Labour Party to government in 1997, the new government itself was soon subject to criticism for its appointment of friends and supporters - ‘cronies’ – to positions of public responsibility. This has been a development that has grown alongside an equally scandal-prone set of relationships that have centred around lobbyists. From the 1970s onwards, a number of scandals arose relating to lobbyists and the relationship between businesses and politicians, leading to a requirement in 1981 that Members of Parliament list their business interests.

Anti-Corruption Measures in the UK

Until recently, British law on corruption rested on a combination of common law and statutes, known as the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889 to 1916. These were considered by the Law Commission in 1997 to have left the law on the subject in an unsatisfactory condition, being neither comprehensive nor consistent.6

In 1974, the Salmon Commission had been established:

2 Transparency International UK, ‘Corruption and Money Laundering in the UK: One Problem, Two Standards’, October 2004.3 Alan Doig, ‘An Apparent Abuse in the Use of Dining Rooms: The British Parliament and Lobbying’, Corruption and Reform, 5 (1990), 189-203.4 K.D.Ewing & N.S.Ghaleigh, ‘The Cost of Giving and Receiving: Donations to Political Parties in the United Kingdom’, <www.law.edu.uk> 19 July 2006, p.10, accessed 13/10/06.5 United Nations Development Programme, ‘Case Study UK-Britain: G05E’, PARAGON Generic Training Module on Public Service Ethics and Accountability Consultant,

<www.unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/ public/documents/eropa/unpan002691.pdf> 6 The Law Commission, ‘Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption’, Consultation Paper 145 (London: The Stationery Office, 1997).

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“… to enquire into standards of conduct in central and local government and other public bodies in the United Kingdom in relation to the problem of conflict of interest and the risk of corruption involving favourable treatment from a public body.”

Its report, published in 1976, called for a review of the law in this area, but its findings were not discussed in the House of Commons and the government took no action in response to it.7

In January 1994 Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee produced a report on “The Proper Conduct of Public Business” listing many failures which represented “a departure from the standards of public conduct which have mainly been established during the past 140 years”, and giving a checklist of rules and procedures that ought to be kept in mind to reduce the risks of further failures.8

Following the ‘Cash for Questions’ scandal, and despite the staunch opposition of some MPs who defended their right to self-regulation, the Prime Minister set up a Committee on Standards in Public Life, chaired by Lord Nolan. The Nolan Committee’s first report in May 1995 proposed seven principles that encapsulated public expectations of the standards of behaviour of public office holders. The seven principles were:

1. Selflessness: motivations should be for the public interest rather than for gain for oneself, one’s family or friends.

2. Integrity: no obligation to others should be accepted that might influence one’s official duties

3. Objectivity: staff appointments and the placement of contracts should be based on merit

4. Accountability: public office holders should be accountable to the public and subject to scrutiny

5. Openness: public officer holders need to provide reasons for their decisions and restrict information only when it is in the wider public interest to do so

6. Honesty: private interests of public office holders should be declared, and any conflicts of interest be resolved in such a way that the public interest is protected.

7. Leadership: these principles should be promoted via leadership and example.

The Committee recommended that the conduct of MPs should not be left to “self regulation” but should come within the law. MPs should report their assets and interests to an officer who would be effectively an “ethics commissioner”. The Nolan Committee also recommended that the law on the area of corruption be reviewed.

The British Law Commission published a consultation paper on how to modernise British anti-corruption law in January 1997, and published its proposals in March 1998. It concluded that the present arrangements were ‘obscure, complex, inconsistent and insufficiently comprehensive’. It proposed repeal of all or parts of the existing relevant Acts from 1889 to 1995 and their replacement by a modern statute and incorporation of the common law offences of bribery. The new offences, drawn from these existing statutes and common law, would apply to both the public and the private sector. The Commission took the view that it is no longer useful or practical to distinguish between the agents involved in public authorities and those in the private sector, given privatisation, the contracting out of government services

7 Ibid, 1, 25, 27-28.8 United Nations Development Programme, ‘Case Study UK-Britain’.

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and the general blurring of the boundaries.9 According to Transparency International UK, however, the Law Commission failed to pay sufficient consideration to the issue of bribery of foreign officials.

The draft legislation proposed by the Commission was adapted in a Draft Bill published by the Government in 2003. This was referred for scrutiny to an (all-party) Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), which was very critical of the government’s approach, primarily due to the lack of clarity in its definition of corruption which was widely perceived to be a hindrance to effective implementation of the new legislation.

Following a critical report of the Draft Bill by the OECD, in December 2005 the government launched a new consultation process to see if agreement could be achieved on the formation of a new anti-corruption statute. The new paper directly addressed the issue of bribery of foreign officials, an issue that had been critically absent from the government’s earlier proposed Bill (although it had apparently been propelled by the requirement for Britain to conform to OECD guidelines on the issue). British acceptance of an OECD Convention against bribery required British law to make it an offence for a British citizen to offer or pay bribes to an official in a foreign country (previously, as they were not illegal, such payments were tax deductible). However neither Part 12 of the 2001 Act nor Clause 13 (Corruption outside the UK) of the draft legislation proposed in 2003 specifically referred to foreign public officials.

The Home Office’s Consultation Paper on ‘Reform of the Prevention of Corruption Acts and SFO Powers in Cases of Bribery of Foreign Officials’ invited a response, by 1 March 2006, to a set of specific questions on different aspects of the 2003 draft bill on corruption.  The paper proposed an extension of the powers of the Serious Fraud Office in cases of foreign bribery in a way that would enhance the likelihood of prosecutions. On 23 May 2006, a Corruption Bill prepared by Transparency International was introduced to the UK parliament. The second reading of the Bill was scheduled to take place in October 2006.

Significant legally-binding obligations undertaken by Britain as a result of international agreements have included the following:

1. The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: This convention is legally binding on the UK and was implemented by Part 23 of the British Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001.

2. Protocol to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities financial interests: also legally binding on the UK.

The Committee’s comments on the affect of the international movement to combat corruption on British law were particularly interesting:

“Over the past few years there has been a growing international movement on the part of the developed and the developing world to eradicate corruption, demonstrated by a number of international instruments and initiatives. It is in the interests of the United Kingdom to be seen to play an effective part in this field, not least because of its preeminent position in world financial markets. While the passage of time and new international obligations are two factors pointing to the need for new legislation, a

9 These paragraphs draw considerable material from: Ruth Winstone, ‘Corruption Draft Legislation’, Parliament and Constitution Centre, 3 September 2003 < www.parliament.uk/commons/ lib/research/notes/snpc-02059.pdf>.

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third is the increasingly complex relationship between the public and private sectors. The old statutes are based on a clear separation that may no longer be appropriate.”

2. Data Generation

2.1 The Selection of Case Studies

The two case chosen for the UK Study were firstly the ‘Loans for Peerages’ Affair of 2006 and secondly the Pergau Dam/Balfour Beatty Affair of 1994.

As with each of the participating research groups in the Project, the first case study addresses the issue of corruption in party financing. This particular case was chosen because of its proximity to recent legal developments concerning the definition of corruption in the UK and importance in shaping contemporary public perceptions of corruption in the country.

The second case study was chosen because its characteristics were perceived to highlight a concern about corruption that is particularly specific to the UK. The case is of specific relevance to the UK for several reasons. Firstly, the case figures prominently and relatively popularly in domestic anti-corruption campaigns and in domestic political discourse on corruption. Indeed, it is a particular characteristic of British anti-corruption NGO work that it has tended to focus on corruption issues that have a foreign dimension. Secondly, the case is important because it has been argued by various commentators that the effort to legislate on corruption in the UK has largely been driven by the requirement to implement the rules set against bribery of foreign officials contained in OECD recommendations. The issue of bribery of foreign officials by UK citizens has been the most prominently debated point about the government’s efforts to introduce anti-corruption legislation in the UK.

Additionally, this case is of particular pertinence to the overall research project UK because it addresses the issue of the degree to which the UK has been committed to anti-corruption policies at home as well as abroad (namely in EU candidate states).

Cases involving local-level corruption could as easily have been chosen; corruption at the level of local government has been the subject of scandals in the recent past and offers viable subjects for research in the context of the project.

Nevertheless, while low-level corruption might well be a more significant trend within the UK, the issue of bribing of foreign officials was judged to be a more prominent, nationally recognisable and stereotypical form of ‘British corruption’, and therefore a preferable case study for the project.

2.2 Outline of the Two Case Studies and Subjects Raised in the Research Materials

Case 1. The ‘Loans for Peerages’ Affair

Background

Business Donations and The Funding of British Political Parties

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Since 1925, after the British Prime Minister of the day (Lloyd George) was found to have offered peerages and honours for his own personal financial gain, British law has considered illegal the attempt to gain a dignity or title of honour. The issue of corruption in the form of political honours (peerages or knighthoods) being awarded to those donating large sums of money to the political parties, is not new, but had tended to be associated with the Conservative Party as a result of its closer link to business than the other political parties.10 In post-war Britain, the principal source of funding for the Labour Party has been the trade unions, while for the Conservative Party it has been corporations (the bulk of Labour Party funding remains the trade unions: 64% of its donation income).11 The Conservative Party also remains heavily dependent on donations from business, but in general such donations have declined steeply.

There are several reasons why it is believed that companies have been reducing their donations to political parties. Thought to be partly responsible has been the requirement, introduced in 2000, that such donations are only made with shareholder approval. Also, with the abandonment of Labour’s socialist programme, its rise to government did not concern business as much as it had done in the past and dampened their sense of urgency about donating to the Conservative Party. Companies also became concerned that the disclosure of donations to political parties appeared to stimulate unwelcome public controversy.12

The influence exerted by business on politicians and political parties is a theme that runs through both case studies and is a common concern in British public life. As several commentators have suggested, however, corporate donations to political parties have receded as a principal form by which such pressure has been exerted.13 Increasingly, businesses have used professional lobbying firms to argue their case to politicians and gain a better insight into the policy preferences of the government. Since the 1980s, the relationship between select businesses, lobbyists and politicians has increasingly been the subject of public concern and scrutiny.14 As pointed out in the Pergau Dam affair, however, the implementation of oversight rules that prevent corruption are in the first instance only likely to be as good as the rules themselves.

By the late 1990s the Labour Party had diversified its sources of funding and had increased its funding from corporate sources. Indeed, over the 1990s, British political parties in general began to target wealthy individuals as a source of party funding. At first glance, this development was odd considering the tight spending limits that apply to parliamentary candidates and the ban on television advertising for political purposes. Nevertheless, there has been no limit on spending for national election campaigns.15

An important issue which the Labour Party had railed against whilst in parliamentary opposition and which played an important part in the party’s success in the general election of 1997 was ‘sleaze’. Typical examples of such were the ‘cash for questions’ affair, in which some MPs were found to have tabled questions in Parliament on behalf of a prominent businessman, from whom they had received payment for so doing. The scandal came to light

10 K.D.Ewing & N.S.Ghaleigh, ‘The Cost of Giving and Receiving: Donations to Political Parties in the United Kingdom’, <www.law.edu.uk> 19 July 2006, p.6, accessed 13/10/06.11 Ibid, p. 17.12 Ibid, p. 31-2.13 Doig, ‘An Apparent Abuse in the Use of Dining Rooms’.14 Greg Palast, ‘Lobbygate’, 5 July 1998, < http://www.gregpalast.com/lobbygate-there-are-17-people-that-count-to-say-that-i-am-intimate-with-every-one-of-them-is-the-understatement-of-the-century>, accessed 13/10/06.15 Ewing & Ghaleigh, p. 4-7. Also for two paragraphs below.

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in October 1994 when the Guardian newspaper revealed that two MPs had agreed to ask questions in Parliament in return for money. Accounts multiplied of similar behaviour. Much of what provoked the scandal in these instances, including the acceptance of “bribes” by MPs, was nevertheless legal because MPs are elected rather than appointed public officials, and are not therefore subject to the usual employment laws.

On being elected to government in 1997, the Labour Party itself experienced a series of funding scandals in 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2006. The first scandal involved a one million pound donation to the Labour Party from the owner of Formula One racing, Bernie Ecclestone (and negotiations for a further donation from him for the same amount), in conjunction with the introduction of a ban on tobacco advertising in sport (from which Formula one would be exempt). The matter was referred to the standing body concerned with ethical standards in public life; the Committee on Standards in Public Life. The terms of reference of the Committee did not include the funding of political parties, but its remit was expanded to do so by Prime Minister Blair in 1998.

Further funding scandals have revolved around allegations that donors to the Labour Party had been awarded government contracts without normal procedure having been followed, and had the benefit of government lobbying on their behalf for the procurement of contracts abroad. None of the allegations were found to have substance. Media reporting of the events created the scandal which ultimately also negatively affected public perceptions of the standards of ethics in British public life.16

In 2003, the Labour Party introduced its own ‘Statement for Donors’, in which it was pledged that donations were offered without expectation of advantage being incurred as a consequence.17

The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act of 2000

Following the Formula one Scandal, the Committee on Standards in Public Life, under Lord Patrick Neill Q.C., made a range of proposals to reform the way in which political parties were to be funded.18 These recommendations were largely accepted by the government and incorporated in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act of 2000. A key provision of the Act was to require the public disclosure to the Electoral Commission of sources of donations to political parties that exceed £5000.

The Act was limited in impact because it did not address the systematic problem of large donations by single individuals or businesses to political parties for contemporary liberal democracies. The Act also did not require the disclosure of loans made on commercial terms (reflecting the recommendations of the Committee on Standards in Public Life). Furthermore, the obligation to disclose donations on a weekly basis during an election campaign applied only to the political parties but not to individual candidates. Donors could therefore give money to candidates rather than to the party centrally, and donors of significant aggregate sums would not thereby always be easily identifiable.19

Loans or Donations: Was the Act of 2000 Contravened?16 Ibid, p. 8. 17 Ibid, 34.18 ‘The Funding of Political Parties in the United Kingdom’, <www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm44/4413/4413-04.htm> 27 July 1999.19 Ewing & Ghaleigh, p. 14, 26.

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In the recent scandal of 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair is believed to have allowed his close aide, Lord Levy, to fundraise £14 million for the governing Labour party (without informing the party’s treasurer, Jack Dromey) in advance of the 2005 election campaign. Lord Levy raised the money in the form of what he described as commercial loans, and by thus doing exploited a loophole in the regulations (introduced by the Blair government) governing party financing; all donations to political parties over £5000 have to be publicly declared. Senior officials kept these loans secret from the cabinet, the National Executive Committee, its elected treasurer, and delegates at the party’s annual conference in 2005.

There is an ongoing debate as to whether or not the money can actually be legitimately be considered to have been commercial loans, or whether the rate at which the monies were loaned means that they should actually be considered to be donations instead (and therefore should have been declared). Whether or not these loans were really donations lies in the technical issue of whether or not the loans were taken out at a genuinely commercial rate of interest; any money given without commercial terms should have been treated as a donation and reported. The loans appear to have been taken out at 6.75 per cent per annum, the equivalent of the Bank of England base rate plus 2 per cent, while it is practically impossible for a member of the public to get a loan for less than 7.9 per cent.20

Matt Carter, who was then Labour's general secretary, wrote to the party’s lenders emphasising that the interest rate on the loan “can be considered as a commercial rate of interest. Accordingly, the loan will not give rise to any reportable donation within the meaning of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act.” Following the public surfacing of the scandal, the current General Secretary of the Labour Party, Peter Watt, defended the party and the characterisation of the monies as loans in a letter to Channel 4 television, writing:

“The Labour Party and its officers have acted at all times in accordance with the requirements of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 and all other relevant legal and accounting requirements.”21

Were Peerages Sold?

Prime Minister Blair was accused of selling peerages after four men who gave the Labour Party £4.5 million (in these secret loans) were subsequently nominated by his party for peerages (i.e. to be able to sit in the UK’s second legislative chamber, the House of Lords).

The way in which individuals could become a Member of the House of Lords had been undergoing significant change since Labour came to power. In 1999, the right of hereditary peers to sit and vote in the House was abolished with the House of Lords Act, although ninety-two Members were elected to remain active until the following stage of the reform process. As of May 2000, the Honours Appointments Commission was established to recommend non-political figures to the House of Lords and to check the suitability of all nominees (including those nominated by political parties).In the following years, a gridlock of opinions became evident in both Houses on how to proceed with reform of the Second Chamber. It was widely agreed that Prime Ministerial patronage and hereditary peerages should be abolished in the nominations for Members of the

20 Martin Bright, ‘Cash for Peerages: The New Evidence’, The New Statesman, 25 September 2006.21 Ibid.

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House. The House itself argued for a fully elected chamber, the Lower House (the House of Commons) was divided on all the alternative solutions proposed to them, while the Prime Minister and his supporters favoured a split approach by which some Peers would be elected while others would be appointed via the recommendations of political parties. The way forward for reforms of the House of Lords has yet to be decided.

In 2005 the government abolished the Political Honours Scrutiny Committee. At the same time, some commentators alleging a connection between the fact that all million pound donors to the Labour Party since 1997 had been ennobled or knighted by that time; the independent NGO-funded Power Inquiry into the state of democracy in Britain revealed, during the period of the scandal, the fact that every donor who lent or gave the Labour Party over £1 million had received a peerage or a knighthood.

The Metropolitan Police Service received three complaints (from Scottish Members of Parliament) about the Labour Party regarding the Prevention of the Abuse of Honours Act (of 1925), which it has since been investigating.

It is unlikely that a link between donations and peerages will be proved; it is almost impossible to prove cause and effect in such cases (that a donor received a benefit or an honour because of their donation to a political party).22 It should also be pointed out that each political party puts forward its own nominations for the political honours list and each therefore is faced with the same problem as that of the party in government; that those who have donated to it may be perceived as being nominated for that reason. However, there is little support for the idea that those nominated for peerages or knighthoods should not be allowed to donate to political parties.

Despite the lack of direct evidence of corruption, scandals over funding frequently arise. Above all, therefore, it seems likely that the continuing acknowledged and legitimised role of patronage in the British parliamentary system – i.e. the way in which individuals are nominated for peerages and may thereby sit in the Upper Chamber (the House of Lords) and participate in debating and voting on UK legislation – means that the regular surfacing of public suspicions of inappropriate or corrupt nominations are unlikely to be permanently quashed by any policy or legislation that does not directly address this issue directly.

The Impact on British Political Party Financing

Over the past decade or so, British political parties have moved from being among the least to being among the most highly regulated in the world.

The immediate impact of the ‘Loans for Peerages’ scandal has been that the Labour Party’s National Executive Committee has taken back control of party finances and financing powers from the office of the Prime Minister. The Conservative Party of opposition also subsequently experienced pressure to provide information on the sources and structure of its financing. The government also moved swiftly to introduce legislation that requires loans to be disclosed in the same way as donations, as well as announcing further reform of party funding.23

For some observers, the reliance of political parties on large donations remains a considerable concern because it tends towards the imbalance of the principal of political equality and a

22 Ewing & Ghaleigh, 33.23 Ibid, 36.

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corruption of the process of government.24 The problem appears to be that state donations (small, equal, public donations through taxation) is considered an unpalatable solution by the general public, while they regard large, singular donations from business to political parties as equally distasteful. The requirement to disclose donations does little to re-establish the public’s faith in political parties and their relationship with the corporate world, while businesses are discouraged from donating to parties because of disclosure and as a result fewer do (making their relationship with the parties appear even more disproportionate for a liberal democracy).

Case 2. The Pergau Dam/Balfour Beatty Affair

Background

1. Corruption and the Arms Trade

Allegations of corruption have long surrounded the arms trade and the media, NGOs and the general public have long been concerned about the role played by the British government in promoting arms exports as well as the relationship between high public office and senior positions in UK arms companies.25 The UK is one of the largest exporters of conventional arms; between 1996-2006 it accounted for 7% of global arms transfers and was the fourth largest arms exporter in the world.26 Despite accounting for less than 1% of total world trade, corruption in the arms market is believed to be highly disproportionate to its share of world trade.27

As the Arms-To-Iraq affair brought to light, a primary dilemma facing British politicians has been between moral considerations and the demands of a privileged arms industry that has made Britain an internationally significant arms exporter.28 In the mid-1990s, it was argued by some politicians that no other sector of UK industry was as successful in the international market place. Although many jobs in the industry have been lost since 1989, according to the Ministry of Defence in the mid-1990s (i.e. at the time that the Pergau dam scandal came to prominence) nearly 400,000 jobs were dependent (both directly and indirectly) on the arms industry in the UK.

In the earnestness of promoting British arms sales, it has appeared a blind eye has sometimes been turned to the use of bribery as well as to the official guidelines governing British exports. During the 1990s the government spent more than ten times as much promoting arms sales as it did civil exports, even though arms experts were worth only 1.7% of total British average exports between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. It has often seemed to be the case in the past that politicians have perceived it more important to promote British industry abroad than to carefully follow normative anti-corruption and anti-bribery rules. They have often defended their position by arguing that they have been trying to protect British jobs. This logic has been criticised by other commentators and the point is highly controversial.

24 Ibid, 12.25 Nicholas Gilby, ‘The UK Government and Arms Trade Corruption: A Short History’, Goodwin Paper 4, Campaign Against the Arms Trade, June 2005.26 SIPRI Yearbook, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: OUP, 2001) p. 326.27 Transparency International UK ‘Corruption in the Official Arms Trade’, Policy Research Paper 001, April 2002.28 Richard Norton-Taylor, Mark Lloyd and Stephen Cook, Knee Deep in Dishonour: The Scott Report and Its Aftermath (London: Victor Gollancz, 1996), 14.

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2. The Aid and Trade Provision

In 1977 a Labour government had introduced an ‘Aid and Trade Provision’ (ATP), by which UK development aid could be linked to the securing of contracts for British firms. The ATP scheme was a joint programme of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Overseas Development Agency (ODA). It was designed to support projects in developing countries that were of industrial and commercial importance to the UK which were also of developmental benefit to the recipient state. A British aid agreement was thus offered on the condition that the recipient government would place specified orders with UK businesses. Over the course of the 1990s, however, the ATP became associated with a number of scandals. During the 1980s, ATP projects had often taken place in countries that were considering major acquisitions of UK-built armaments, and indeed the British government had encouraged recipient states to buy British arms under the auspices of the programme.

The Pergau Dam Deal: Aid for Arms Sales

On 23 March 1988, George Younger - Mrs Thatcher’s leadership campaign manager - signed an ATP protocol with Malaysia that committed the UK to providing aid for the building of a dam in the country. He later stated to a Select Committee hearing on the subject that he thought the protocol was appropriate and did not link aid with arms expenditure. The British High Commission in Kuala Lumpar had appeared to know very little about the reasons for Young’s visit to Kuala Lumpar and then failed to inform the Foreign Office about what had been signed until some weeks after Young’s return to the UK. The Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir Tim Lankester, described Young’s mission as wholly unsatisfactory and ‘a lamentable slip-up’. The government’s stated view on the subject was that Mr Younger had made a mistake in signing the protocol, but that by doing so certain obligations had been made that could not subsequently be reneged upon.Thatcher made an oral offer to fund the dam during a visit to Malaysia in 1989, conditional on a full economic appraisal. Britain’s aid agency, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), conducted a review of the project which concluded that the Pergau dam would not be a viable economic proposition until the year 2005 at the earliest. The ODA made clear its opposition to the provision of British state funding of the Pergau dam. The government nevertheless agreed to fund the project in February 1991.

Documentary evidence subsequently revealed that the aid package in question had been linked in writing to a reciprocal arms deal, whereby the Malaysian government agreed to buy £1.3 billion worth of British military equipment in return for the UK funding Pergau.29

The UK Beneficiaries and their Political Connections

Work on the construction of a hydroelectric dam on the Pergau River in Malaysia began in 1991, funded by money from the UK’s foreign aid budget. The contracts for the construction of the dam were jointly awarded to Balfour Beatty (without competitive bidding) and Cementation International (a company which employed Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s son as an advisor). Balfour Beatty at that time was a major donor to the then-governing Conservative Party, though since the Labour Party’s rise to power it is believed to have become a significant supporter of that party. 29 Norton-Taylor et al, The Scott Report and Its Aftermath, 16.

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Balfour Beatty, a UK construction business, has been the engineering consultant and construction company for a number of highly controversial projects including Kainji (Nigeria), Muela (Lesotho), Pergau (Malaysia), Samanalawewa (Sri Lanka), Victoria (Sri Lanka), and the Ilisu dam (Turkey). These cases have led some to suggest that the practice of bribing foreign officials by UK companies has been viewed tantamount to patriotism by some politicians and has received political support at the highest levels of government.

How the Legality of the Deal was Challenged

In March 1994, a government inquiry began into the possibility that the sale of arms had been connected to the giving of aid. Conservative ministers in parliament had consistently denied the link between aid for the dam and arms.

A British non-governmental organisation (‘NGO’), the World Development Movement, had applied to the British High Court for a judicial review of the Foreign Secretary’s decision to proceed with the provision of aid for the building of the dam. The challenge to the Foreign Secretary's decision was based on the Overseas and Development Co-operation Act of 1980. On 9-10 November 1994, the High Court heard the case and ruled that the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, had acted ultra vires (outside of his power and therefore illegally) by allocating £234 million towards the funding of the dam, on the grounds that it was not of economic or humanitarian benefit to the Malaysian people (the decision to grant aid did not therefore comply with the conditions stipulated as necessary for aid to be granted by the relevant enabling Act).30 Additionally, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee and the Overseas Development Administration's own study of the programme showed that it would not create jobs or orders for British industry.

The NGO’s action and subsequent High Court decision were considered by some observers to have been a more effective check on government than parliament had been; although successive select committees in parliament had criticised the government over the funding of the dam, they had not succeeded in influencing the government’s approach to the issue.31 As Sarah Collinson from the Overseas Development Institute writes, however,

‘Judicial Review is only possible where government policy and action is circumscribed by relevant and sufficiently clear legislation. […] If legislation in a particular policy area is especially weak or unclear, the accountability of the executive and government departments will be weak. Any gaps in legislation, and thus in the government’s legal accountability, can only be addressed through parliament.’32

The Limits of the Successful Challenge

The judgment held that the Foreign Secretary's decision was unlawful, and that future payments from the aid budget were to be halted. Nevertheless, the British government quickly

30 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex p World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 386; <www.privy-council.org.uk/files/other/jennings.jud.rtf>.31 Sarah Collinson, ‘Donor Accountability in the UK’, HPG Background Paper, Overseas Development Institute, December 2002, p.2.32 Ibid.

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stated their intention to meet their contractual obligations to Malaysia, possibly due to the threat of legal action from Malaysia if it failed to do complete the contract.

After the end of the affair, Sir Charles Powell, Thatcher’s foreign affairs advisor until 1990, became a director of Trafalgar House, the company owning Cementation. Lord Prior, a former minister under Thatcher, and Lord King, ennobled by Thatcher, were also linked to the affair.

Equally, despite Balfour Beatty’s record and whilst it was being investigated for corruption charges in Lesotho in the late 1990s, the Labour government permitted export credits to be awarded to the company to support its bidding for a contract to build the Ilisu dam in Turkey. Though this project fell through, it also demonstrated the way in which British governments of different political hues have been willing to continue to support companies regardless of their reputation for corrupt modes of business, especially if they have established relationships with such companies via their contributions to party funds.

Longer-term Repercussions of the Affair

1. The Elevating of Developmental Concerns within Government

On the Labour Party’s rise to government in 1997, it created a new Department for International Development (DFID). The elevation to Cabinet-level responsibility and power of development issues was widely seen as being very significant. DFID’s predecessor, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) had been a division within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and had since 1979 been run by a junior minister. UK aid policy had until 1997 been an issue that had been the site of struggle between political, commercial and developmental interests in government, the latter usually being overruled by the former two.

2. The Untying of British Aid

The new government announced its intention to make development aid guided uniquely guided by the principal of the interests of the poor rather than being influenced by UK national self-interest in its White Paper on International Development, ‘Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century’ (November 1997). No new ATP contracts were issued, but the proposal to abolish ATP while retaining ‘mixed credits’ was received sceptically by some commentators who pointed out that the mixed credits system carried the same flaws as the ATP, and could be used to subsidise British exports.33 Nevertheless, in December 2000, the government declared that all British aid would be untied with effect from April 2001. As of 1 January 2002, UK aid was officially untied in all aspects (including balance of payments and structural adjustment support, debt forgiveness, sectoral programme assistance, investment project aid, import and commodity spport, commercial services contracts, and assistance to NGOs for procurement-related activities).34

How Perceptions of Appropriate Aid Policy Changed

33 Overseas Development Institute (ODI), ‘Changing Aid Politics of the Major Donors: UK Case Study’, October 2003 <www.odi.org.uk> , p.11.34 ODI, ibid, p.12.

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The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the Export Group for the Construction Industry (ECCI) opposed the move to untie British aid on a unilateral basis for fear that British companies would lose out internationally.35 The government nevertheless moved towards steadily towards that position, though it also promoted the untying of aid internationally.

The decision to untie British aid was supported from several quarters:

Officials in the ODA had in the past been frustrated by development being subordinated to British political and trade interests in thepast, and believed that tied aid was not helpful for development.

DFID cited evidence that tying aid reduced competitiveness and increased the cost of goods and services considerably.

There was also a popular sentiment in Britain that viewed aid tying as a form of corruption (though this perception is hard to quantify, it was confirmed in a series of public consultations carried out by DFID over the course of 2000), since aid policy was being distorted by the interests of big business (often arms manufacturers) who were linked to the political establishment.

The role of NGOs such as the World Development Movement and the media in drawing attention to the subject of tied aid is believed to have been significant in generating broad public support for the untying of aid.36

Most persuasively for the government was perhaps also the fact that the sums of tied

aid were relatively small for the UK (£80 million of the approximately £3 billion aid budget in 1997), so the cost of untying aid to British business would not have been considered overly significant.37

Research Materials

The following chart lists the sources of data that were analysed. Not all the material gathered for the purposes of analysing perceptions of corruption in the UK were subjected to the Atlas-ti programme. This was usually due to restrictions of format and time. The insights they offered were nevertheless used both as background material, to inform the understanding of the results achieved with the use of Atlas-ti, and to bolster interpretations of the findings with regard to the construction of codes and analysis of their significance.

Perceptions of Corruption with Regard to Two Case Studies in the UK Amongst Six Focus Groups: Politicians, Judiciary, Police Media, NGOs and Businesses

The Process of Data Generation

35 Jefferey Chinnock, ‘In Whose Benefit? The Case for Untying Aid’, ed. Sarah Collinon, Action Aid, April 1998 <www.actionaid.org.uk>.36 ODI, p.14.37 ODI, p.14.

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As advocated by the grounded theory that was the basis for the project’s methodology, research materials were collected randomly apart from the requirement that they reflect the six different focus groups in their source and ideally expressed opinions that demonstrated perspectives on corruption. Sources that could not fit into any of the target groups or which did not easily offer examples of perspectives of corruption were used as background material that could inform the analysis of other materials or the understanding of the case itself.

Materials for some sources were harder to find than others. In particular, regarding material from the police for the first case study, this was particularly hard to locate because of the ongoing police investigation into the affair and the fact that police responses were recorded second hand by the media and were not accessible from the police directly (at this stage, although it is anticipated that statements will be sought from the police during the second stage of the Project). Nevertheless, an attempt has been made to balance the input from the different target groups so those which generate a great deal of material – such as the media and politicians – do not flood the analytical section with their generation of codes. Also, the guidelines of the Project were followed, so that where directly pertinent material was unavailable, material from the same target group on the most closely relating issue was used.

The quality of the data was generally good, in that it often proved rich in perceptions and arguments explaining why the perceptions were held. Many basic assumptions were not stated but these were not too hard to evince.

Regarding the generation of data via the software programme Atlas-ti, there were a number of hurdles that arose, only some of which were overcome by the time of this report.

In the early stages of the data analysis procedure using Atlas-ti, a number of documents and accompanying analysis were lost as a result of some facet of the software. This setback was primarily one of time that was lost. At the Project’s research meeting in Istanbul, it was discovered that this problem was one that almost all of the participants had experienced with the software.

One aspect of the software which appeared deficient was that it was not possible to easily transfer documents from PDF format to the Atlas-ti programme, and interesting and useful data such as graphs became nonsensical streams of numbers when transferred.

A related deficiency has been that, because the Atlas-ti software alters the structure of the documents it reads, its line references do not correspond to those of the original document, meaning that they are self-referential and therefore of restricted use.

One considerable frustration has been a difficulty in constructing hierarchies and trees of codes. This obstacle has been overcome by abandoning the software for this stage of the analysis, and constructing the code groupings without the use of the software.

3. Analysis, Methodology and Methods

Coding

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Codes were created by collecting from the texts the perceptions they contained relating to the subject of corruption. The codes, listed below, were formulated from the materials with the help of the Atlas-ti software. Some codes were found to be common to several texts, while others were not. Despite this point and the difference of their origins, the codes have here been arranged into ‘families’ according to the topic or approach they appeared to embody with regard to corruption. Though some codes could be placed in several families, the families in which they have actually been placed here are attempted to best reflect the context in which they were used within the texts from which they were taken. After the list of codes follows an elaboration of some of the most pertinent connections between the codes and significant codes.

Code Families

1. Perceptions that Corruption is the Exception to the Norm of High Standards of Public Life in the UK

Positive Relations with BusinessWith regard to businesses and politicians, access does not equate to influence; this is a myth propounded by lobbyists. There has been a decline in business donations to political parties in the hope of influencing them over the past 20 years; businesses use lobbying firms for that instead. Given the amount of lobbying in the UK one might expect UK politics to be quite corrupt. The low number of prosecutions in UK reflects positive corporate behaviour and practice (rather than weakness in the law).

Government routinely gives special access to lobbyists and their clients of policies in advance of them being made public, in order to receive their advice and comments. Since influence is not generated by access, however, there is less corruption than one might expect. Business donors that do still give large sums are genuinely trying to donate without expectation of return. Suspicions about motives of large political donors are commonly unjustified; nearly all give because their either support the aims of the party or want to minimise the risk of the opposition party gaining power.The media’s perspective is unfairly negative and suspicious regarding those donating to political parties. There was an expression of sympathy for Lords who have legitimately and openly donated money but who were nominated as peers due to their lifetime of public achievement and service, from amongst those in public office.

Negative Assumptions Generated by the Media are UnfoundedIn the recent survey of public opinion about standards of conduct in public life, examples given by respondents invariably involved alleged misconduct of those in public office and reflected media coverage, implying that the media is a key (negative) influence on public perceptions of standards in public life. This was recognised in the material gathered (especially by politicians).

Allegations of misconduct in the recent past have widely been believed to be true, even if not true or the evidence has been lacking, and this has been corrosive of public confidence in the political process and damaging to political parties. Social capital in the UK is strong and active but people no longer want to be involved in politics and increasingly see no point in voting. Increasing disengagement from formal democratic politics in the UK has not been caused by the supposedly low calibre and probity of politicians. Media reporting of 'sleaze'

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and 'spin' have also probably fed public disenchantment but have not led to direct disengagement from politics

Positive Popular Perceptions of Standards of Public Conduct in the UKMost people nevertheless believe overt corruption to be the exception rather than the rule. A number of reforms by government have meant greater regulation and scrutiny of politicians that is helping restore public trust (formerly diminished by years of scandal about 'sleaze'). Since 2004, the key public concern with regard to standards in public life appears to have shifted from sleaze to spin; most people believe MPs and government ministers are particularly bad when confronted by their own mistakes - they try to cover them up.

The general public has high expectations of its elected and appointed representatives. While high standards of behaviour are demanded and regulated within public bodies in the UK, the possibility of corruption taking place still exists. No system is perfect, but reform of the party-financing arrangements would improve perceptions of undue influence, ensure higher democratic accountability and control. It is unacceptable to apply different standards abroad to those that apply within the UK; petty corruption, such as facilitation payments, is unacceptable within the UK and should be considered so with regard to British actions abroad. Patronage is nevertheless a major and accepted source of the Prime Minister's power within the British political system.

Honour, Innocence and Naiveté within British Political CultureThe pursuit of politics is considered to be an honourable profession by those within it. Positive perceptions of standards in British public life were expressed more widely in comparison with other states in Europe. The UK’s political cultural difference (in comparison with other countries) was hinted at with reference to the requirement for Members of Parliament to publicly declare gifts; this, it was suggested, embarrasses them and makes them feel obliged to be neutral or oppose the source of the gift. The existence of a loophole concerning the disclosure of loans to political parties that allowed the furore over the loans for peerages affair to develop was due to naiveté; MPs did not realise that loans would be used to evade duty of disclosure. Again, the argument at heart is that MPs are honourable in pursuit of their work and that corruption, if it happens, happens by mistake than by intention.

No-one in the Foreign Affairs Select Committee at the time of the Pergau Dam affair shared the World Development Movements' perspective on the British payment as illegal; the illegality of the payment was not perceived as such more generally at the time, this perception only stemmed from one source (the NGO), and was therefore something of an anomaly. In other words, politicians were innocent of purposefully supporting an illict act; they had acted in good faith and public opinion on the subject was influenced and transformed at a faster pace on the subject. Additionally, it was argued that the Pergau Dam affair was the result of bad communication and poor oversight between different ministries and individuals. Any illegality was unintentional on the part of the public officials involved.

2. Perceptions of the Pressures that Have Effectively Developed Anti-Corruption Policies and Practices in the UK

Lobbying and NGOs

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Anti-corruption NGOs have successfully counter-lobbied the UK government to strengthen anti-corruption measures (after successful industry lobbying for relaxation); lobbying can be an effective method of political influence- both for businesses and NGOs. The NGO that took the Foreign Secretary to the High Court over the Pergau Dam affair was perceived as worthy of great credit for holding politicians to account over corrupt acts.

The MediaAlthough mistrust of the media is relatively widespread amongst the general public, the media is also acknowledged to be an effective channel for policing public office-holders.

Domestic Public PressureThe 2006 anti-corruption bill was a response to the public concern that anti-corruption legislation was out of date, obscure, and inadequately enforced. The use of loans to evade public disclosure of donations horrified the public and increased public disdain for politicians and the political process. The loans for peerages affair undid public confidence in the political system.

International CommitmentsThe Pergau Dam affair questioned the credibility of the UK's aid policy to such an extent that a review was necessary. Subsequently, the anti-corruption effort of recent years has been driven in UK by requirement to implement OECD norms against businesses bribing foreign officials. It is in the interests of the UK to be seen to be playing an effective part in the growing international movement to combat corruption, not least because of its preeminent position in world financial markets.

3. Perceptions that the Unfair Promotion of British Business has Been Against the Best Interests of the General Public (in the UK and Abroad)

Financial CostsArms sales in return for aid was a bad policy in financial terms; in the case of the Pergau dam, it was against the interests of both the UK taxpayer and the Malaysian electricity consumer. It was argued that British aid has been used to 'lubricate' business deals with other countries too. With regard to the specific case of the Pergau Dam affair and the British company Balfour Beatty, Balfour Beatty has not operated to the benefit of the general British public even within the United Kingdom; it has a poor record in terms of health and safety and value for money. It should not therefore be unquestioningly supported by the British tax payer in its attempts to win contracts abroad. The Pergau dam would not have created more jobs or orders for British industry in any case.

Promotion of Good Governance AbroadRule-breaking by international institutional governance elites with regard to anti-corruption standards is detrimental to the development of good project governance

4. Perceptions that View Sympathetically Businesses’ Approach to Corruption

The Role of Lobbyists and of Politicians in Soliciting Business Involvement in Policy-Making

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Businessmen desire certainty about state policies so they can plan ahead; lobbyists exploit this desire by encouraging the belief that political decisions are both predictable and can be shaped by influence/access to politicians. Lobbyists’ clients do not appear to have asked or paid for inside information, however, or used any such. The claim that lobbyists can find seats on government task forces for clients is challenged by some clients who deny the role of lobbyists in achieving such positions. In any case, the demand for business' role in policy (e.g. on task forces) has come more from government rather from business. Moreover, lobbying is described as a different and lesser form of political corruption in the UK than that which is ‘top-down’, where money does buy influence.

Industry’s Support for Anti-Corruption EffortsUK defence companies are not sufficiently aware of the details of new anti-corruption rules and need to formulate their views on international initiatives against corruption and engage with recognised specialists on the subject. The creation of the UK Defence Industry Anti-Corruption Forum reflects the shared determination of key industrial partners to promote anti-bribery/corruption practices in the international defence market. They support policies that meet high ethical standards and compliance procedures to ensure employees observe the law in all countries The UK defence industry already has in place ethical policies and processes and this new forum demonstrates their continuing commitment to fighting corruption in the international defence market. The UK defence industry supports international anti-corruption initiatives because so doing strengthens the reputation of the UK defence industry.

Industry’s Difficult Position Facing Demands for BribesBribery and corruption are problems faced by multinational companies (they are not indifferent to the issue and see it as a negative). Businesses are faced with a dilemma: to uphold ethical standards and at the same time execute business in contexts where extra payments are expected, if not lawful. However, it was also argued that facilitation payments do not offend justice or the public interest; facilitation payments are a normal means (in some countries) of obtaining low-level actions or approvals and are not meant to influence anyone to do anything improper. Material gathered from the judiciary indicated that the crown prosecution service does not expect to prosecute cases against British businesses involving small payments made as a result of extortion abroad. In the past, the paying of bribes by British businesses abroad has also been seen by some politicians as demonstrative of patriotic competitiveness.

5. Sceptical Perceptions of the Practice and Approach to Corruption in the UK

Politicians are Hypocritical and DeceitfulThe government is considered by some to be hypocritical in its approach to corruption. The view was aired that New Labourites valued undogmatic types, but this trait nevertheless made them more susceptible to lobbying because they didn’t know what they thought on issues. In general, the perception was raised that the government(s) has been unwilling to enforce anti-corruption norms against British firms like Balfour Beatty. With regard to the Pergau Dam affair, it was argued that the interests of British companies and of trade relations with Malaysia took precedence over the needs of the developing world in the practical implementation of British policy. Officials claimed ignorance or naiveté. It was also suggested however that it was very unlikely that the protocol with Malaysia was not signed with the knowledge of the Prime Minister. Others alleged that racism is an underlying feature

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of excuses made by some British politicians and businesses for corruption that lay the blame on foreigners.

Apathetic Media Elite Support Corrupt British Elite PracticesMaterial from the media itself criticised respectable editors in the media for exhibiting a blasé attitude towards corruption and fraud between UK arms companies, arms of the state, and foreign governments.

The Lack of Ethics in Lobbying: Rules Are Not FollowedEven where a firm of lobbyists may have a praiseworthy code of conduct, this does not mean that its employees follow it or that management knows whether or not they do. Certain lobbyists offer clients advance drafts of confidential government papers.

MPs Do Not Exert Adequate Self-OversightThe argument was raised that if a case of misappropriation took place in local government, the penalties would be more extreme than were demonstrated in the Pergau dam affair (the Foreign Secretary carried on in his position “almost regardless” of the High Court decision that he illegally pursued the Pergau Dam agreement, according to some MPs).

The Motivations Behind Large Political DonationsCynical arguments for the motives behind large political donations were the following: i) the purchase of access to Ministers or to Shadow Ministers, ii) the purchase of influence over policy, iii) consideration for an official honour, iv) enhanced prospects of selection for public position or appointment, v) assistance in return for defence procurement contracts abroad or similar.

6. Perceptions of Relating to the Structures behind Corruption in the UK

UK’s Formal Democratic Structure Provides Inadequate Popular Democratic Oversight

In recent years, a trend towards popular disengagement with formal democratic process (i.e. voting) has been witnessed in the UK. The cause of this trend was found (by the Power Inquiry) to be caused firstly by the sentiment felt by citizens that formal democracy does not offer them enough influence over political decisions, and secondly, by dissatisfaction provoked by the perception that the main political parties are too similar ideologically and lacking in principle. Material from the NGO group suggested that the political system in the UK no longer satisfies the requirements of an increasingly demanding citizenry. The conception of formal politics as the business of an unprincipled clique or set of cliques is valuable in contextualising both common concerns about corruption and the translation and communication of these perceptions by civil society movements (such as the Power Inquiry) into the political arena, who argue that 'politicos' have no conception of the alienation felt by the general public from politics. Politicians nevertheless also demonstrated some awareness of this popular perception in debates within Parliament.

Powers of the Executive Are Too Great and Propel PatronageMore specific perceptions regarding the structures which give rise to perceptions of corruption or corruption itself, relate to the lack of sufficient accountability, transparency or clarity between the executive, supra-national bodies, ‘quangos’ (government-appointed committees that advise on policy-making on particular subjects), business and interest groups.

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It is argued that too much Prime Ministerial and governmental power goes unchecked, and this propels patronage practices. There is a popular belief that an elitism operates within parliament; MPs have little real influence over policy, decisions are made by a handful at the centre of power. Civil society highlights the popular concern that politicians use their position to further their personal interests, and that corruption is an activity from which certain individuals benefit.

System of Party Funding Generate Suspicions of CorruptionPolitical parties in the UK need money for election campaigns (mainly for advertising). According to the perceptions of NGOs and the media, political parties do not believe that the party that spends the most on campaigning will necessarily win the election, but they do believe that if they spend less than their competitors in an election then they will be disadvantaged. A spending race between the parties thereby generates pressure on them to accept large donations and develop strategies, which have the unintended consequence of fuelling public perceptions that money buys access to the process of policy-making and this access can translate into influence. Political parties have become increasingly reliant on large donations from individuals and organisations. NGOs and the media recognised that the way in which political parties are funded is more widely perceived as offering opportunities for the wealthy to buy influence over policy-making. In the past, for example the Pergau Dam affair, companies which had donated large sums of money to the party in government were seen to have been awarded tenders for contracts, the national aid budget to have been manipulated so as to further the sale of British arms and the financial interests of some in the government's family and friends.

A significant proportion of the public believe that companies have more sway over policy-making than the public itself. For this reason, NGOs and the judiciary argued that political parties have sought and should continue to seek to demonstrate more transparency about the source of their donations. At the same time, however, they have found ways of securing and accommodating benefactors that have sought to remain anonymous. The British public is nevertheless also viewed as partly responsible for the causes at the root of the loans/peerages scandal by the media and NGOs: opinions polls report they don't like large donations to be made by individuals or companies to political parties, but they don't want the state to fund them either, and this finding is commented upon by civil society groups and politicians.

The UK’s Position as a Hub of Global Market Activity Generates a Bias in its Interpretation of What Constitutes ‘Corruption’The perception was put forward that the UK has been reluctant to commit to anti-corruption conventions; possibly, because of its commitment to so-called off-shore ‘tax havens’. NGOs argued that tax evasion, and much of what is labeled offshore tax avoidance, should be considered corruption. It was argued however that Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index is misleading because ignores the supply side of corruption; i.e. the role played by Western financial institutions and rules (such as those supported by the UK government) that accept and legitimise money send to it by actors known to be corrupt. It was also suggested by NGOs and the media that institutionalised racism in the West has led to the practice of Western countries (governments and companies) turning a blind eye, accepting and participating in the practice of bribery in developing countries.

British Commercial Interests Trump Ethical Concerns for British Governments

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Following from the above argument, civil society representatives and the media raised a popular concern that British governments have tended to choose realpolitik – understood as the promotion of particular business interests – over ethical concerns in foreign policy-making. This point was particularly made with regard to Britain’s promotion of its arms manufacturing industry abroad. Despite the government's assertion that the link between arms sales and aid from the UK was brief during the 1980s, the political opposition also alleged it was a long-term issue. The Pergau Dam affair highlighted problems with the way UK gives foreign aid, particularly because of the association of aid with arms (aid for arms sales). Critics viewed the affair as one in which the British national interest and those of the poorest countries around the world had been either misjudged or acted against.

7. Recommendations on How to Tackle Corruption (and Their Limits)

Corporate Law and CorruptionThe Confederation of British Industry (CBI) believes revision of UK law good for certainty but should not widen the scope of the law. The CBI has been willing to support international action against bribery and corruption, so long as rules are consistently applied amongst OECD member states.

Funding Political PartiesOne solution to the problem of funding political parties which was raised by the Power Report and the Liberal Democrat party would be to ask voters to donate £3 of their taxes for the party for which they voted.

Civil Society’s Stance on Cases of CorruptionIt was interesting that a number of British NGOs did not demand that export credits from the UK to Balfour Beatty be stopped whilst the company was being prosecuted for corruption in Lesotho; their criticism was more pointed against the fact that credits had been issued in the first place.

Transparency in procurement and working practices within parliament was not considered to be a sufficient guard against corruption; it was argued that enforcement procedures and penalties for non-compliance are needed too.

8. Definitions

Three interpretations of facets of corruption were found within the material assessed. The first was one put forward by industry and reflects the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s definition of bribery: an undue reward to someone to influence their behaviour and incline them to act contrary to the principles of honesty and integrity.

The second also concerned bribery but was generated from the politicians target group: a select committee of MPs considered facilitation payments to be as corrupt as large-scale corruption and just as illegitimate.

A third definition was found in material from the police: corruption is the abuse of a role or position held, for personal gain or gain for others.

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9. Views of those Believed to Instigate or Contribute to Corrupt Practices and Weak Anti-Corruption Measures

Industry actors as Instigators/Contributors to Corrupt Practices and Weak Anti-Corruption Measures

NGOs and media argued that the primary concern with regard to the instigation of corruption was not on the actions and attitudes of governments per se but the reality of business interests that provided a web of legal resources that in turn created an interface between illicit and licit economic activity. The supply side of corruption was also emphasised, and examples of who were considered to comprise of the supply side were the ranks of accountants, bankers, lawyers, who work in tax haven activities.

Businesses were viewed as important instigators of corruption and supporters of weak anti-corruption measures by government. Perceptions were evident that lobbying by industry had lead to a weakening of the UK's export credits guarantee department’s anti-corruption measures at the end of the 1990s. Several British companies admitted in testimony to parliamentary select committee that they had viewed it legitimate to distinguish between grand corruption and petty corruption ('facilitating payments') in their dealings abroad.

Previously, what were described by politicians as the ‘machinations’ of the consortium of contractors involved in the Pergau Dam case were also considered unhelpful in creating the circumstances of the scandal. The implication was that companies had exerted pressure in an illegitimate manner and knowingly sought to encourage corrupt practices from which they believed they would benefit.

Politicians as Instigators/Contributors to Corrupt Practices and Weak Anti-Corruption Measures

Perceptions were raised that placed the blame for the instigation of corruption on politicians more than on the business actors that paid them bribes. In the cash-for-questions scandal, it was revealed by a firm (Mobil) that a number of Members of Parliament had asked for payment from businesses in return for the promotion of their interest within Parliament. The suggestion was that this was not an unusual action for MPs to engage in and indeed instigate.

There was also concern amongst the media that those working for government may hold allegiances due to past or future relationships with private business, even if this connection is not formal in the present time. An inner circle of policy advisors, politicians and businessmen were alleged to exist who shape national policy on certain issues that affect their interests (not all ministers are part of the inner circle). NGOs considered the public expectation of selection to public office on merit, noting that the majority believe 'cronyism' has been increasing rather than declining as a practice. NGOs argued that such perceptions have been strengthened when important donors to the governing political party have been appointed to ministerial office (i.e. Lord Sainsbury). Vested interests are also thought benefit from corruption and generate immense political support to undermine anti-corruption initiatives; lobbyists can find seats on government task forces for its clients partly because the government is so keen to involve the private sector in financing and otherwise supporting government policies. The public meanwhile trusts frontline professionals more than those it believes to be politically motivated, and local politicians more than national party politics.

With regard to the prioritising of what is perceived to be British economic interest above the pursuit of ethical policies, a belief was found to exist amongst some parliamentarians and the

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media that safeguarding British jobs was or should be more important for politicians than combating corruption, where the two interests collided. Additionally, it was thought that matters of high politics such as security co-operation could propel politicians to ignore or tacitly accept corrupt activities as an unfortunate but necessary counterpart to some international agreements.

Similarly, a somewhat sympathetic interpretation of the financial constraints facing political parties given the loss of party members in recent years and decline of business contributions saw that parties had been pushed towards so-called ‘fat cat’ donors. The close relationship of political parties with a small number of wealthy businessmen was thereby characterised by NGOs and politicians as symptomatic of a wider political malaise in the UK; not totally the fault of the politicians, but they could do more to counter it and had found themselves in financial situations which were likely to be viewed as compromising by the public because of this context.

The view was raised by several target groups (including politicians) that politicians within government had not acted with good faith and the perceived corruption had not been a matter of error; politicians had known that the action was wrong at the time of the affair. It was also argued for example that the government disregarded advice that the Malaysian project was illegal because a) as usual, the companies that benefited from such Aid for Trade Provisions typically donated to Tory Party funds, b) the Prime Minister had an especially close relationship with the Malaysian Prime Minister and c) because the Prime Minister’s son was employed by one of the two firms that were awarded the contracts (no wrongdoing was ever proved relating to his position, however). There were plenty of concerns voiced at the time that the payment was illegal; it was not a judgement that came in hindsight or was uncommon, as alleged subsequently by members of the government. Indeed, observers considered the government to have admitted its guilt in having acted unlawfully in the Pergau Dam affair by failing to appeal against the High Court's decision.

The Mentality Promoted by the Governing Party is To BlameIt was proposed that the lobbyists and elite of the New Labour Party are not apologetic with regard to their promotion of illegitimate forms of accessing and influencing national policy-making on behalf of business; they believe themselves to be charging admission to the show they produced. They nevertheless voice admissions that all may indeed not be legitimate with regard to the activities in which they are involved and that eventually ‘the game will be up.’ Perceptions of such activities are founded on the assessment of the government’s strong position within parliament in comparison to the other opposition parties, and the fear that a sufficient opposition to executive power in the country is lacking.

Though the public feel that appointments to public office should be based on the principle of selection on merit, there is a widespread perception that formal procedures are often bypassed in favour of cronyism. Most believe this practice is increasing but those with higher educational backgrounds, readers of broadsheet newspapers and the young tended to express less cynical views about the subject

Individuals rather than Systemic Faults Lead to CorruptionThere were perceptions evident that Lord Levy, the head of Prime Minister Blair's high level donor unit, pressured the Prime Minister to not disclose donor names, on the threat of his (Levy's) resignation. The implication of such perceptions was that the problem of illegitimate

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action was not instigated by the highest level of government (i.e. the Prime Minister) but was a combination of an individual’s instigation of a wrongful act and a lapse of judgment on the part of the Prime Minister.

With regard to the Pergau Dam affair, it was suggested (by politicians from the government) that the arrangement that had provoked the corruption scandal had been a mistake created by an individual who had acted without sufficient guidance. To have reneged upon the agreement to fund the dam would have had a very negative impact on UK-Malaysian political relations and on the significant trade from UK to Malaysia. Blame for the corrupt act itself was firmly placed with the individual – although it was recognised that the individual had been acting in good faith, as had the government subsequently. The government had also been acting responsibly by not undermining the illegitimate agreement’s outcome (i.e. not reneging on the project).

Civil Servants are to Blame for Not Stringently Applying Anti-Corruption Regulations

Some critical views were raised regarding the perceived failure of civil servants to oversee high standards in public life. It was suggested that public bodies can be unwilling to investigate corruption allegations relating to companies because they may implicate their own officials in negligence. Furthermore, official UK agencies may be too realpolitik in outlook – i.e. support political and economic interests more than the promotion of ethical policies – and are suspected of not sufficiently vetting the corruption records of British companies bidding for contracts abroad before providing them with funding.

Comparing the Relationships of Codes

The nub of the Project is to highlight areas where perceptions about corruption between different target groups conflict or agree. Areas where codes converge or compete is therefore of central relevance in this study. Below are listed the findings, aided by the Atlas-ti software, of the code-relationship generation, demonstrating which interpretations generated significant connections or controversy. These nubs were highlighted (with the aid of the software) where the logic of perceptions relating to corruption in the texts, identified as a code, appeared to be related, whether in supporting argument, similar argument, or in direct contrast or opposition to another code.

1. Anti-Corruption and Transparency Reforms in Recent Years have Helped Restore Public Trust in the Political System

a. A number of reforms by government have meant greater regulation and scrutiny of politicians to help restore public trust (formerly diminished by years of scandal about 'sleaze'). This code (argument) was associated with that arguing that access does not equate to influence in policy-making, that such a connection is a myth propounded by lobbyists.

b. Given the amount of lobbying in the UK one might expect UK politics to be quite corrupt; however, because influence is not generated by access, there is less corruption than one might expect. This argument also supported the view that access does not equate to influence.

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c. No system is perfect, but reform of the party-financing arrangements would improve perceptions of undue influence, ensure higher democratic accountability and control. This perspective appeared to be similar to that made (by the police) that despite the existence of high standards of public conduct in the public body concerned, the possibility of corruption taking place needs to be recognised.

2. NGOs Have Been Important Motors of Perception and Practical Change Against Corruption

a. Anti-corruption NGOs have successfully counter-lobbied the UK government to strengthen anti-c measures (following successful industry lobbying for relaxation). This positive interpretation of anti-corruption developments in the UK was echoed by suggestions that a number of reforms by government have meant greater regulation and scrutiny of politicians to help restore public trust in standards of conduct in public life and that access does not necessarily equate to influence with regard to business’ influence in policy-making.

b. An argument was made with regard to the Pergau Dam affair that (by government politicians) at the time of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee hearing, the illegality of the payment was not perceived as such, was not commonly recognised to be such. It was argued that noone in the Foreign affairs Select Committee at the time shared the World Development Movements' perspective on the payment as illegal. The action of the NGO was portrayed (by the government politicians) as pioneering and highly influential over the public and judiciary’s interpretation of what constituted corruption.

3. Businesses Are The Victims of Negative Stereotypes, They Do Oppose Corruption, But…

a. Bribery and corruption are problems faced by multinational companies (they are not indifferent to the issue and see it as a negative). This perspective appeared to be a supportive argument behind that which suggested that businesses are faced with a dilemma: to uphold ethical standards and at the same time execute business in contexts where extra payments are expected, if not lawful.

b. In an elaboration of the sympathetic arguments towards the role of British business and corruption abroad, the view that businesses are faced with a dilemma: to uphold ethical standards and at the same time execute business in contexts where extra payments are expected, if not lawful appeared to be supported by the Confederation of British Industry’s (CBI) point that it was willing to support international action against bribery and corruption, so long as rules are consistently applied amongst member states of the OECD. This argument reinforces industry portrayal of bribery and corruption as problems that they face and against which they are not indifferent but do indeed view it as a negative. Furthermore, however, there was an argument that businessmen desire certainty about state policies so they can plan ahead; lobbyists exploit this desire by encouraging the belief that political decisions are both predictable and can be shaped by influence/access to politicians. This argument about consistency from government policy corresponded with the business position pertaining to the application of anti-bribery norms amongst OECD countries.

c. The CBI argued that a revision of UK law would be welcome because it would increase certainty about the law and would help companies identify and avoid illegal actions or behaviour. However, the CBI opposed any widening of the scope of the law. This argument

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was bolstered by one which they also used, that bribery should be narrowly defined as an undue reward to someone to influence their behaviour and incline them to act contrary to the principles of honesty and integrity.

d. It was argued that so-called ‘facilitation payments’ are normal means (in some countries) of obtaining low-level actions/approvals and are not meant to influence anyone to do anything improper. This argument illustrated that earlier cited, regarding the dilemma faced by businesses in upholding ethical standards but at the same time executing their affairs in contexts where such extra payments are expected, if not lawful. Again, both these arguments are based on the proposition that bribery and corruption are problems faced by multinational companies (they are not indifferent to the issue and see it as a negative).

e. Additionally, the argument that facilitation payments are normal means (in some countries) of obtaining low-level actions/approvals and are not meant to influence anyone to do anything improper was associated with the argument that facilitation payments themselves do not offend justice or the public interest. This latter argument was not widely promoted and appeared to be opposed by the majority of the politicians target group.

f. It was noted that the arguments that industry lobbying had led to a weakening of the UK's export credits guarantee department's anti-corruption measures contradicted the argument that access does not equate to influence and is simply a myth propounded by lobbyists. It also contradicted the argument that lobbyists inflated the influence that could be created by gaining access to policy-making. On the other hand, the argument about the success of business in lobbying against the UK’s anti-corruption measures supported the argument that lobbying is an effective means of influencing policy-making in the UK – both for business and for NGOs.

g. A sympathetic position towards industry that supported the view that lobbyists do exaggerate the potential of lobbying to influence policy-making was that lobbying is an insignificant form of accessing and influencing policy-making in comparison to top-down political corruption in the UK, where money does buy influence. In other words, illegitimate influence and corruption is significant where it is politicians (the implication was that this was pertinent more to those in government than those without) that are seeking and instigating corrupt relations with business, rather than vice versa.

j. The proposition that a number of reforms by government have meant greater regulation and scrutiny of politicians to help restore public trust (formerly diminished by years of scandal about 'sleaze') is supportive of the contention that was made that the low number of prosecutions in UK reflects positive corporate behaviour and practice (rather than a weakness in the law).

k. Reflecting the degree of contention about the subject of the relationship between business and politics, the argument was raised again that there is a popular perception that money buys access to politicians, and this access translates into influence. Certain individuals benefited from corruption and this was supported by the argument that industry lobbying had led to a weakening of the UK’s anti-corruption measures in the past. These arguments obviously contrasted with the argument that access does not equate to influence and that such a suggestion is a myth commonly propounded by lobbyists.

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4. Standards of Public Life in the UK are Generally High; Corruption is Rare and, When it Does, Happens Unwittingly vs. Complicit Politicians Are Just That

a. There was a disagreement in perceptions relating to the Pergau Dam affair, whether or not corruption was carried out wittingly or not. On the one hand, it was argued by some politicians, NGOs and media, that it was unlikely that the protocol with Malaysia was not signed with the knowledge of the British Prime Minister. On the other, government ministers defended themselves by arguing that the affair was the result of bad communication and poor oversight between different ministries and individuals; it was unintentionally illegal.

b. A further argument in defence of the government with regard to the Pergau Dam affair was that perceptions that the payment was illegal, at the time, only stemmed from one source (the NGO), i.e. were anomalous. Indeed, it was argued that at the time of the foreign affairs select committee hearing, the illegality of the payment was not perceived as such, was not commonly recognised to be such. No-one in the foreign affairs select committee at the time shared the World Development Movements' perspective on the payment as illegal. This perception of the moral context of the time was strongly contested by other politicians, NGOs and the media. They argued instead that there were plenty of concerns voiced at the time that the payment involved in the dam affair was illegal; it was not a judgment that came in hindsight or was uncommon.

5. Corruption Protects British Jobs By Allowing British Firms to Win International Contracts vs. Corruption is Bad for The British Taxpayer

An argument that was raised both by politicians, by NGOs and the media was that the Pergau dam would not have created jobs or orders for British industry. This perspective corresponded to arguments extant amongst these target groups that arms sales for aid was a bad policy economically both the UK taxpayer and the Malaysian electricity consumer.

6. Access Does (or Does Not) Equate to Influence

The claim was made in the media that lobbyists can find seats on government task forces for business clients. This was challenged by arguments also made in the media that some clients deny the role of lobbyists in achieving such positions.

7. The Loans for Peerages Affair Increased Public Disdain for Politicians and the Political Process

Arguments were made by NGOs, politicians and the media, that the loans for peerages affair undid public confidence in the political system; the use of loans to evade public disclosure of donations horrified the public and increased public disdain for politicians and the political process. This perspective clashed with that suggesting that anti-corruption efforts in the UK in recent years had improved public trust in standards of public life in the UK (point 1).

Interpretation

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Of interest from the results displayed above are the following points:

1. Although public perceptions of the British political process had been negatively affected in the 1990s by allegations of sleaze, perceptions relating to the structural faults and potential for improvements are believed to have since improved; a prevalent view expressed was that access did not equate to influence (with regard to private interests influencing public agendas) and it was believed that greater transparency and regulations to guard against corruption had or would help(ed) restore public confidence.

2. There was consensus that NGOs have played an important role in the development of official UK anti-corruption efforts and in shaping perceptions and attitudes towards corruption; regarding the latter point, however, this was not universally seen in a positive light.

3. Reflecting the impact of the significant legislative and discursive developments that have taken place in the British political arena since the 1990s on corruption, one area where perspectives differed was on whether or not an act could reasonably have been identified as corruption at the time it took place. NGOs were portrayed by some as pioneers of new understanding of the detail of what constitutes corruption; politicians were thus not to blame for their shortcomings in not correctly identifying cases of corruption.

4. While there was much concern expressed about the relationship between business and political life, a counter argument defended the position of industry. Business should not be considered the primary instigators of corruption; corruption and bribery are problems with which they are confronted, as much as they are considered by critics to be the principal beneficiaries of such practices. As may be noted, the relationship between business and politics was the most controversial and the most referenced issue in the texts. This relationship can therefore be considered to be central to British perceptions of corruption (a connection which, it is posited, appears likely to be found equally in other states).

4. Perceptions of Corruption

In the section below are outlined the perceptions of corruption found from the material for each of the target groups. Summaries of the main perceptions are provided, preceded by a reference to the code family and, if relevant, the specific code to which the perception was linked using the Atlas-ti software.

4.1 Target Group Politics

A Positive View of Standards in British Public LifeCode Family 1 (Perceptions that Corruption is the Exception to the Norm of High Standards of Public Life in the UK): all codes

The material from the Politics target group showed a very homogeneous positive perspective of standards of public life in the UK, particularly when compared with other states, even to

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those within Europe. Records of debates from Hansard shows that both Houses of Parliament, especially the House of Lords, however, are eager to defend their reputations for being honourable institutions, even when criticising certain actors amongst them for corrupt or seemingly-corrupt behaviour. Lords were overwhelmingly in favour of an elected second chamber and opposed proposals for reform of their House which prolonged the use of Prime Ministerial patronage. Nevertheless, Lords appeared to support those who had already been nominated (via patronage) and took on good faith that they had justly merited their position. Members of both houses are eager to condemn actions that ‘bring the House into disrepute’; the eyes of the public are frequently mentioned and public perceptions of corruption are thought important, if not always justified. Public scandals – whether or not the crime of corruption had ultimately been proved – were considered to be important motors in the development of better and stronger legislation and related policies.

Despite the faith in the calibre and good intentions of members of both Houses, there was nevertheless an absence of total satisfaction with the way in which politicians suspected or found guilty of corrupt behaviour acted after the issue had arisen. Penalties for elites believed to have been found guilty of involvement in corruption were not believed to be sufficiently punitive by some Members, whilst some Members of Parliament defended their rights to privacy and privileges of autonomy as Members of Parliament.

When and where corruption did arise, it was largely seen to be the result of close connections between high-level politicians and their personal or party business interests. In such cases, politicians and businesses were alternately held to blame.

Explaining What Makes Britain Relatively Corruption-FreeCode Family 1: all codes; Code Family 2 (Perceptions of the Pressures that Have Effectively Developed Anti-Corruption Policies and Practices in the UK): all codes

It was suggested that Britain’s pre-eminent position in the world’s financial markets have led her to have a strong and genuine interest in playing (and being seen to play) an effective role in the growing international movement to combat corruption.A difference of political culture was cited (by Boris Johnson, MP) to partially account for the difference; MPs were constrained by having to declare their interests and gifts given to them by lobbyists or other individuals and this was so embarrassing as to make them steadfastly neutral, if they even accepted the gifts at all.

Connected to this perspective was the general assumption, usually put forward by those implicated or close to those implicated in corruption scandals, that politicians were well-intentioned individuals and the arrival of a scandal was due to negative media interpretation of what was really a case of misunderstanding and muddle between different departments or individuals. It is suggested that politicians act in good faith and if they act illegally or in a corrupt fashion they do not realise that they have done so.

Another explanation that arose in the material was the strength of civil society in Britain (their activism was lauded in contrast to the limitations of regulation within Parliament. The role of NGOs in demanding political and judicial accountability was widely (though not universally) acknowledged as an important means of combating corruption within the UK.

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Additionally, the way in which NGOs were able to influence public opinion, with the help of the media, was also considered to be an important cause of pressure on politicians that demanded accountability and clean government.

Addressing the Relationship between Business and PoliticiansCode Family 2: NGOs, public opinion, the media; Code Family 3 (Perceptions that the Unfair Promotion of British Business has Been Against the Best Interests of the General Public (in the UK and Abroad)): both codes

Nevertheless, politicians recognised that popular opinion believed that money bought access to politicians, and that this access translated into undue influence. It was understood that the way in which political parties are funded was popularly believed to provide an opportunity for the wealthy to buy influence over policy-makers and thereby corrupt the political process.

Politicians nevertheless did not accept the popular belief that access equates to influence. The reason for the popular strength of this view, it was suggested, lay in the propaganda spun by lobbyists themselves. Businesses were to a certain extent portrayed as victims of the lobbyists’ claims, because of their requirement to plan ahead in the course of carrying out their trade. Collusion between politicians and business (with reference to the Pergau Dam Affair) was described as a relationship that harmed both the interests of the British tax payer and the consumer (whether based in the UK or abroad).

In contrast to the views of the business community, politicians appeared staunchly against the argument that different standards could be applied to British activities when carried out abroad than when taking place in the UK; bribery and corruption should not be deemed acceptable, regardless of the different conditions in which it might take place. Some tacit sympathy was nevertheless shown for companies with regard to the problem they faced of ‘facilitation payments’ being demanded by corrupt officials abroad, as it was suggested that companies were unlikely to be prosecuted for petty forms of corruption. The harm caused by perceptions that British trade interests took precedence over political or developmental concerns was acknowledged to be detrimental (for all concerned).

4.2 Target Group Judiciary

From the Documents Representative of the legal system, the perceptions outlined below regarding corruption were noted. Further information in this field will be generated in the coming months of the Project.

Positive View of PatronageCode Family 1: Negative role of the media in spreading mistaken assumptions of corruption, Positive perception of Standards of conduct in public life

As with the politicians, so even more with the judiciary; the basic acceptance and support of the system of patronage governing appointments to the Second Chamber of Parliament, the House of Lords, was evident from the material. This was unsurprising, given the fact that the public heads of the legal profession also sit in that House.

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The Law as a Source of Solutions As Well As ProblemsCode Family 1: Positive perception of standards of conduct in public life; Code Family 6 (Perceptions of Relating to the Structures behind Corruption in the UK): Inadequate oversight structures in place to ensure transparency and high standards of public conduct.

This approach to the issue of patronage was bolstered by what appeared to be an implicit support for norms of appropriate and rational behaviour that would be encouraged by the formulation of better laws on the subject. To an extent, therefore, this perspective accorded with that evident in the material from the politicians’ target group that suggested corruption was likely to be committed in error because the crime had not been perceived as such, as well as the notion that a political culture exists in which honourable conduct is the rule rather than the exception.

The perception was put forward in the Law Commission’s consultation report on corruption for the government that a significant cause of corruption in the UK was opportunism stimulated by deficiencies in the relevant prohibitive regulations. This situation had arisen over time because legislation against corruption and bribery had tended to be created as ad hoc responses to particular problems or scandals, which had led to loopholes and irrationalities in the law governing these subjects.

4.3 Target Group Police

From the police material, the following perceptions regarding corruption were noted:

A Positive View of Standards in British Public LifeCode Family 1: Positive perception of standards of conduct in public life; Code Family 6: Inadequate structures in place to ensure transparency and high standards of public conduct; Code Family 8 (Definitions): definition of corruption

As with the material from the two target groups above, the perception was raised that that British public institutions have high standards in which corrupt practices are not countenanced. Furthermore, the police recognised themselves as British standard bearers, and highlighted the role they have played in exporting best practice in fighting corruption to other countries via their links with other police forces internationally. It is nevertheless cautioned that the existence of high standards can encourage passivity or a blindness with regard to the possibility that corrupt acts are actually taking place. In contrast, then, to the legal perspective, the police demonstrated a more disbelieving attitude towards the protection afforded by good regulatory structures against corrupt activities.

The police also demonstrated a wide but blunt conception of what constituted corruption (in comparison to the above target groups) and were confident in formulating their own definition of such rather than simply adopting the definition provided by another branch of government, as might have been expected. The police material defined corruption as “the abuse of a role or position held, for personal gain or gain for others’.

The Law as a Source of Solutions As Well As ProblemsCode Family 6: Inadequate oversight structures in place to ensure transparency and high standards of public conduct.

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Confirming the perceptions gathered from the legal system, the police perspective was evident both that the law constricts the opportunity to prosecute and investigate cases of corruption – although the phenomenon itself is also inherently difficult to investigate and to prosecute – but also that the belief that reform of the law will enhance the capacity of anti-corruption efforts.

Meriting of Corruption as a Significant ProblemCode Family 6: Inadequate oversight structures in place to ensure transparency and high standards of public conduct.

This latter belief was accompanied by an effort to encourage law reform that would increase the ability of police to engage in anti-corruption efforts, suggesting that the police believe corruption to be a significant problem and one that deserves greater attention than it has previously been accorded.

Corruption as a Problem with International DimensionsCode Family 6: Inadequate oversight structures in place to ensure transparency and high standards of public conduct.

The international dimensions of corruption were significant in police perceptions of corruption, as were their perceptions of the routes by which they would combat it. International police co-operation to combat corruption was highlighted as a requisite element in anti-corruption efforts.

4.4 Target Group Media

From the material from the Media target group, the following perceptions were noted:

A Sceptical Approach to Claims of a Political Culture of ProprietyCode Family 2: International commitments as a successful source of anti-corruption pressure; Code Family 5 (Sceptical Perceptions of the Practice and Approach to Corruption in the UK): Inadequate parliamentary oversight; Code Family 9 (Views of those Believed to Instigate or Contribute to Corrupt Practices and Weak Anti-Corruption Measures): Businesses, Individuals, Politicians as instigators of corruption.

Businesses were not regarded as singularly to blame in the corruption of parliamentary life; it was pointed out some scandals demonstrated that some MPs had taken an active role in corrupting the nature of their relationship with business and parliament. The implicit acceptance of an anti-corrupt political culture amongst MPs was therefore absent in the Media group material.

Politicians were also portrayed as being reluctant reformers with regard to anti-corruption practice; it was suggested that external/foreign developments created a considerable pressure on politicians to press ahead with the development of anti-corruption policy in the UK. Nevertheless, the view that the other countries faced more severe problems with regard to corruption than experienced in the UK was also apparent.

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Addressing the Relationship between Business and PoliticiansCode Family 5: Politicians hypocritical and deceitful; Code Family 6: Inadequate oversight structures in place to ensure transparency and high standards of public conduct; Code 9: Business, Politicians as instigators of corruption.

The links between business and political elites was highlighted as a concern, the nexus of the corruption problem involving the award of contracts, the promotion of British industry abroad, the role of businesses in providing funding for political parties, and the so-called ‘revolving door’ of consultancies with business and the holding of political office. This created a context in which policy did not adequately reflect practice, and politicians were viewed as being guilty of hypocritical stances on the issue of corruption. The way in which the use of corruption appears to have been used to support British business interests abroad was a matter that provoked distaste in the media commentaries.

Belief in the Effectiveness of LobbyingCode Family 2: NGOs as a successful source of anti-corruption pressure

The media samples demonstrated an interesting confidence in the effectiveness of lobbying of politicians, with both its negative and positive connotations. NGOs as well as business interests were regarded as having been able to influence British anti-corruption policy by lobbing politicians.

Critiquing the Role of the MediaCode Family 1: Negative role of the media in spreading mistaken assumptions of corruption, Positive perception of Standards of conduct in public life

The media criticised itself on two fronts. On one side, the ‘realism’ of some media editors was believed to be too casual when confronted with potential or proved cases of corruption. The implication was that a sense of the norm was adopted by senior media players, leading them to downplay the issue of corruption, because such a stance implied that they were not naïve about the way in which politics really works and were privy to the dark secrets of its workings.

In contrast, an opposing suggestion was evident that the media could be scurrilous in their assumptions and creation of scandals without sufficient evidence and indeed without legitimacy. The power of the media in stimulating public concern and political pressure was, from this angle, seen as a negative force in further peeling away the general public’s faith in the standard good faith of politicians (and business donors).

Deficiencies in the Anti-Corruption System and RecommendationsCode Family 2: Public opinion as a successful source of anti-corruption pressure; Code Family 6: Inadequate oversight structures in place to ensure transparency and high standards of public conduct; Code Family 9: Civil Servants as negligent in implementing anti-corruption measures

Public bodies were also suggested to be not as enthusiastic as they should be to combat corruption because of fears that they could be criticised for negligence should it be found to have taken place.

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A significant concern of the media was that transparency and accountability amongst different political bodies be increased. The implication was that it is believed that where such attributes apply, either politicians are discouraged from becoming involved in corruption, or public scrutiny would ensure they would be found out and suitably punished.

4.5 Target Group Civil Society

NGO PerceptionsCode Family 5: Politicians hypocritical and deceitful; Code Family 6: Inadequate oversight structures in place to ensure transparency and high standards of public conduct

One of the most interesting features of the perspectives raised in the civil society material was the tendency of their anti-corruption demands to be highly moderate, the lack of radicalism with which they confronted potential corruption scandals and in the types of address for such situations that they advocated. There certainly seemed to be a distinction in the approach to the subject of corruption amongst different NGOs. In particular, statements produced by Transparency International UK provided focused sets of practical recommendations for reform and kept critique of existing policies and scandals equally tight, reflective possibly of their importance as consultants to the government on the subject. Other NGOs that have had weaker relationship with government and official policy formulation produced documents in which critique of existing policy and scandals was more severe, elaborated and generalised as to the causes of corruption; the views expressed from such tended also to be more cynical with regard to the intentions of politicians in addressing the issue.

However, NGOs in general appeared agreed that adequate legislation and transparency in themselves were inadequate means of combating corruption; the way in which rules were put into effect and the existence of penalties for misconduct were perceived to be important tools in an effective anti-corruption system. While Transparency International suggested that the implementation of the Act in 2006 (in the drafting of which they had played a consider part) would bring the UK up to speed on anti-corruption, other NGOs emphasised the need for on-going review for there to be progress towards higher standards in public life. Indeed, some NGOs demonstrated more mistrust of politicians than others and consequently less faith in the potential of rules (e.g. legislation) and penalties to combat corruption. One of the greatest threats to the effective implementation of anti-corruption policies was deemed to be vested interests and their influence on powerful politicians.

Pressure to Combat CorruptionCode Family 2: NGOs, Public opinion, as a successful source of anti-corruption pressure

With regard to the effective combating of corruption, it was recognised that despite the trend of recent years of increasing popular disengagement from formal democratic politics, social capital has remained strong in the UK and the public have demonstrated their interest and activism with regard to political issues. Public pressure is thereby perceived to constitute and important source of anti-corruption pressure on the political system and politicians specifically, even though their concerns have often been whipped up over ‘scandals’ without legitimacy.

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Lobbying was, obviously, supported as a means by which actors could try to influence official policy on subjects and was viewed as a successful method of doing so, for NGOs as well as for business.

Public OpinionCode Family 2: Public opinion as a successful source of anti-corruption pressure

The findings of public opinion surveys were raised and influenced the descriptions of the subject of corruption in the material gathered, particularly from the NGO and politicians target groups. The information below was cited in the NGO material such as the Power Inquiry’s report as justification for its perceptions of the standards of public life attained in the UK and problems being faced. The basic suggestion is firstly that public concerns about corruption are valid to the extent that they need to be addressed (though they may be illegitimately stimulated by the media) and secondly that public pressure plays an important role in generating anti-corruption efforts in the UK. The Inquiry’s stance is broader than that evident from politicians from the Hansard records, but also takes a positive, reformist and institutionalist perspective with regard to remedies (i.e. it believes practical and non-radical measures may be taken to improve the existing political framework in the UK to make it more accountable, less susceptible to scandal, and more trusted by the general public).

Although the survey of public opinion carried out by BMRB Social Research between 2003-2004 on the behest of the Committee of Standards in Public Life showed that the key public concern had shifted from sleaze (dominant in the 1990s) to spin (political propaganda), the findings also suggested that public opinion of standards appeared to be significantly and negatively influenced by the media. For the most part, however, public opinion believed the standards of conduct of public office holders in the UK to be as high or higher than the average in Europe (those with higher education backgrounds and readers of broadsheet newspapers tending to express a higher than average confidence in national politicians and standards of public life in the country).

Public opinion demonstrated less trust in those believed to be politically motivated than in other frontline professionals, and more trust in local politicians than in political parties at the national level. Nevertheless, the public demonstrated a belief that overt corruption in public life was the exception rather than the rule. Their primary criticism of MPs and ministers in particular was their perceived tendency to try and cover up their mistakes.

Although the general public were strongly supportive of the principal of selection on merit in appointments to public office, the opinion was widely expressed that formal procedures were often bypassed by cronyism, and that this practice was increasing. Those with higher educational backgrounds, broadsheet newspaper readers and younger respondents to the survey, however, tended to express less cynical views on the subject.

4.6 Target Group Economy

From the world of business, the following perceptions were noted:

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A Positive View of Standards in British IndustryCode Family 1: Positive perception of relations with business, and of standards of conduct in public life; Code Family 4 (Perceptions that View Sympathetically Businesses’ Approach to Corruption): Industry’s support for anti-corruption efforts

With regard to the prevalence of corruption, the business world argued that the low number of prosecutions in the UK was reflective of positive British corporate practice and behaviour rather than of a weakness in the law. Consequently, they urged that the reform of anti-corruption legislation in the UK should not be driven by a desire to see more convictions, because there should/would not be such an increase.

Perception of Standards of Public LifeCode Family 9: Politicians, Individuals as instigators of corruption

Business’ positive view of the ethical standards held by British industry did not stretch to the entirety of standards of public life in the UK; perhaps this was because most official statements on corruption from the world of commerce were found in instances where they were defending themselves against a particular allegation of negligence or complicity with regard to corruption. In cases where corruption had come to light, businesses implicated tended to portray themselves as victims that were for bribes by politicians or public officials (both in the UK and abroad), and out of necessity, ill-preparedness for such contingencies, or lack of obvious source for advice, companies had reluctantly become complicit in corruption. Standards of public life were rarely discussed in depth and when they were, the subject was treated with considerable caution and evidence of disillusion with the conduct of some MPs was voiced in cases where cases of corruption were being investigated.

In public statements, industry groups tended to shy from in-depth discussions about the broader nature of corruption in Britain. However, the generation of new UK legislation on corruption and the broader context of strong international and domestic pressure to combat corruption appeared to propel defence companies in particular (as the subject of possibly the most intense public suspicions regarding their business ethics and relations with politicians) to publicly announce in June 2006 the creation of a UK Defence Industry Anti-Corruption Forum. The stated purpose of the Forum was be to promote anti-corruption practices in the international defence market and support both policies that meet high ethical standards and compliance procedures to ensure employees observe the law in all countries.

Business Motivations in Promoting Anti-Corruption InitiativesCode 2: International commitments as a successful source of anti-corruption pressure

As suggested by the framing of the Forum’s purpose, the business world in general has not only been led to generate a pro-active approach to combating corruption by public opinion. Equally important, if not more so, has been the necessity for UK business to make efforts to ensure the application of anti-corruption strictures internationally, so that British business does not suffer in the competitive international market from adhering to anti-corrupt practices.

While it was suggested that businesses already had in place ethical policies and practices, it was recognised that the advancement of official UK policies on the subject meant that businesses might need to seek the advice of anti-corruption experts in devising their own standards and positions on the issue.

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5. Specific Issues

One significant challenge that has arisen in collecting perceptions of corruption has been that the absence of discussion or reference to the subject – equally important in suggesting perceptions – has been hard to record and analyse. This was most evident in the gathering of material from the economy target group. Were such absences due to the lack of necessity for such, the lack of sophistication of corporations in addressing the subject, or discomfort or tacit complicity in corrupt practices?

A further important challenge to the analysis of research material has particularly related to the pluralism of approaches evident from some focus groups. With such diverse expressions of opinion, especially with regard to the world of civil society and media, the question arises whether categorisation by political approach rather than by professional affiliation is more apt in assessing perceptions of corruption.

While not pre-empting the results of the next stage of the research, with regard to perceptions of how to combat corruption several approaches appear to be delineated within the materials already gathered that traverse the various focus groups (these will be outlined in the conclusion, below). It is as yet unclear how obvious, politically delineated perceptions about the value and potential of ant-corruption efforts are to be avoided in formulating the policy recommendations expected at the end of the research.

6. Conclusions

Specific Conclusions

Despite the time difference between the two case studies, considerable overlap of logic and concerns were apparent between them. This appears to be a positive finding for the study that enriches the construction of a network of logic of perceptions of corruption in the UK.

Amongst all target groups (but less so from the media), a strong sentiment was evident that high standards of public office generally pertained in the UK. The media tended to add its support to this view when the situation in the UK was being compared regionally or globally.

Strong variation in views on corruption was evident especially within the media and politics target groups (unsurprisingly), and limited variation from the NGO group and judiciary. No variation was found in the documents from the police target group. The constraints of their position and remit, and the source of the documents (as official sources in the case of official bodies), clearly limited the types of arguments that were put forward from the politicians, judiciary and police; wide-ranging structural and cynical arguments were most likely to be made by the media, followed by NGOs.

The area of most concern amongst all target groups was the relationship between business and politicians. The details of the concern varied; whether the relationship was rightly or wrongly viewed with suspicion, when corruption took place which party was more likely to be the instigator (i.e. more culpable than the other), to what extent were either party sincere in their anti-corruption pronouncements or what other possible self-interest or pressures motivated them to make them.

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As suggested by the Project’s initial outline, the media was widely acknowledged as playing an important role in mobilising public opinion and thereby generating pressure in support of anti-corruption efforts. However, the media were also the subject of criticism for being perceived to be more interested in whipping up public fervour over the issue than ensuring substance to their allegations of scandal. The integrity of the media in its role as informer and stimulator of public opinion and reaction was in other words called into question. Furthermore, it was pointed out that sometimes the media is often credited for being a more active and effective anti-corruption tool than it can legitimately claim, since its reports of investigations are often mistakenly read as the work of the media organisation itself.

NGOs were also recognised for their important role in the shaping of opinion within Parliament and amongst the public, although it was evident that amongst NGOs themselves quite different attitudes towards the issue of corruption were evident.

An interesting preliminary finding from the NGO and politicians focus groups in the first case study regarding the perceived acceptability of a certain degree of patronage in politics and conceptions about where the ideal limits to it were to be drawn.

It was nevertheless evident that British perceptions and discourse on corruption have been undergoing a significant period of evolution since the mid 1990s, and many of these changes are still underway in the UK (including, for example, the issue of patronage in political life) and outcomes still as yet unclear.

The activism of the past decade or so has itself been described as a positive step by all but the more cynical of the observers (who proposed that such transformations were superficial but powerful forms of propaganda, clothing the reality of ‘business as usual’) that were found in the material gathered.38

The under-use of the word ‘corruption’ in the material collected also appeared to be a significant issue to which comments were addressed within the material. The word ‘corruption’ tends to be is avoided in the material, while and others such as ‘standards in public life’, ‘sleaze’ and ‘cronyism’ preferred. While these certainly are imbued with a negative imagery, ‘corruption’ appears to be a term associated with more severe conditions of corruption perceived to be bedevilling other countries. The paucity of documents relating to the subject or cases of corruption, amongst the target groups was the subject of analysis by far fewer (somewhat evidently) amongst the target groups. Existing in-depth literature, particularly academic, on the causes of this lack, were not included in the target groups; this omission is likely to be remedied in the proceeding period of research.

The most significant divisions of perspective concerned prognoses for change; the more cynical views expressed considered the problems of corruption to be systemic and therefore implied that an overhaul of the political system would be necessary to alter the realpolitik nature of policy and allow ethical policies to be genuinely prioritised. The majority of views expressed were more moderate; that more regulation and better enforced oversight practices would go a long way to dissuading would-be corruptors from perpetrating their crime. A minority again characterised corruption as a rare act committed by individuals; this perspective encouraged a maintenance of tradition and was evident in the business and

38 For an elaboration of the cynical standpoint on this matter, see for example Mark Curtis, Web of Deceit: Britain’s Real Role in the World (London: Vintage, 2003).

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politicians’ target groups, from those seeking to maintain the contemporary limits of their autonomy and anxious not to incur greater incursions into their freedom of movement or invasion of their private business.

Broader Issues Raised

One of the central aims of the UK case study is to answer the question ‘what makes the difference in the UK?’ Why is public life in Britain commonly perceived as relatively corruption-free? Moreover, can the answers to these questions be replicated elsewhere?

A negative interpretation for the reasons behind the perception that corruption is uncommon in Britain is that corruption may not be overt, making it harder to expose and people more cautious in applying the term. It has been underlined that the UK has been experiencing an increasingly serious problem of malaise as growing numbers have felt disenfranchised by the formal political system (falling and low voter turnout is typically given as evidence of this trend). A popular perception is that a tight elite spanning the political and business worlds have wrenched a tight grip over public decision-making, and in so doing have undermined the value of formal democratic procedures. Evidence regarding the strength of this perception in the UK was collected amongst the research material.

There are also, however, several positive reasons why Britain might be perceived to be a country in which corruption is a relatively rare occurrence affecting public life. The most obvious possibility is that it may be rare for people to have direct experience of corruption; petty corruption may be uncommon. This seems likely given that Britain, one of the world’s wealthiest states, can afford to pay its public sector workers a sufficient salary so they do not feel the necessity to demand ‘facilitative payments’ (despite successive cuts in public service provision in the past thirty years and occasional demonstrations of public sector worker dissatisfaction).

Another factor that may have nourished the perception that the standards of public life in Britain are high is the recent emergence of the effort to promote a more transparent and engaging approach to the issue, both legally and politically. This has helped to engender the perception both that there are more safeguards and punishments in place to dissuade would-be perpetrators of corruption, and that corruption is an issue that is taken seriously by those in public office. This argument was one that appeared popular in the materials collected for the research.

To what extent may the British example, that of widespread perceptions that high standards pertain to the conduct in public life, be replicable elsewhere? This is very hard to judge, but two factors would imply significant grounds for caution.

Firstly, as suggested in the description of the Project’s rationale, the unique political culture of each state has a conditioning impact on the perceptions of corruption held by its citizens. It was posited at the beginning of this case study report that the particular cultural legacy that is based on the country’s relatively stable recent history, continuity of political traditions, and post-colonial experience, has been extremely significant in framing public perceptions of corruption in the UK. Secondly, the privileged contemporary role and power of Britain in global political and financial affairs appears to have been equally powerful in shaping British interpretations of corruption.

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One indicator that was found (by the survey commissioned by the Commission on Standards in Public Life, 2004) to be correlated with the positive perception of standards of public life in the UK, was socio-economic; those with higher educational backgrounds, broadsheet newspaper readers and the young, were the most likely to hold such a perception. What could be hypothesised from this information is that the more one is able to succeed in a society, to reap the available benefits or aspire to do so, the more positive is likely to be one’s perception of the general and standards fairness of the system. If, as this suggests, perceptions relating to corruption and standards in public life are related to the socio-economic position or aspirations of the opinion-holder, influencing perceptions might be a more viable endeavour if approached via socio-economic change, rather than by attempting to shape cultural attitudes head on.

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Appendix A – Documents Collected by Target Groups

Cases:

FOCUS GROUPS:

1. Political Party Financing: The Cash for Peerages Scandal, 2006

2. Bribery in the Promotion of British Business Interests Abroad: Balfour Beatty and the Pergau Dam Affair (1990s)

1. Politics - Fifth Report, Committee on Standards in Public Life: Party Financing (October 1998)

- Committee on Standards in Public Life: Commissioned report into public perceptions of standards of conduct in public life (September 2004)

- House of Lords debate on the Funding of Political Parties, Hansard, 20 March 2006

- House of Lords and House of Commons, Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption Bill, Report and Evidence (2002-3)

- Boris Johnson (Member of Parliament), ‘Corruption in the UK, USA, European Parliament’, (January 2006) (article)

- House of Commons debate on the Pergau Dam Affair, Hansard, 25 January 1995

2. Judiciary - Law Commission, Final Report, ‘Consultation on Legislating the Criminal Code – Corruption’ (1997)

- Law Commission, Final Report, ‘Consultation on Legislating the Criminal Code – Corruption’ (1997)

3. Police - Association of Chief Police Officers of England and Wales (ACPO), ‘Corruption Prevention Strategy’ (2005)

- Serious Fraud Office: Evidence to the Select Committee on International Development (2001)

4. Media - newspaper articles - newspaper articles

- Richard Norton-Taylor, Mark Lloyd and Stephen Cook (journalists at The Guardian newspaper), ‘The Scott Report and its Aftermath’ (London: Victor Gollancz, 1996) (background)

5. Civil Society

- The Power Inquiry (general issue of party financing and faith in politicians). Independent inquiry sponsored by a charitable trust to review public perceptions of democracy in the UK (March 2006).

- Transparency International UK

- World Development Movement

- Transparency International- Friends of the Earth

- IRN Lesotho Campaign

- Corporate Watch magazine article

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(statements and analysis)

- Transparency International UK: statement on newly proposed anti-corruption legislation

- Ilisu dam campaign

- Tax Justice Network

- The Corner House

6. Economy - Defence Manufacturers Association: Evidence to Select Committee on International Development (April 2001)

- Contract Journal, construction industry news article (background)

- Defence Manufacturers Association: Evidence to Select Committee on International Development (April 2001)

- Confederation of British Industry (CBI), Comments on the Home Office Consultation Paper, ‘Bribery: Reform of the Prevention of Corruption Act and SFO Powers in Cases of Bribery of Foreign Officials’ (March 2006)

- Society of British Aerospace Companies (‘SADC’), statement on the UK Defence Industry Anti-Corruption Forum) (June 2006)

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