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European Economics

A bailout for Spain and its banks?Market perception is that Spain is living on borrowed time. Heightened

Spanish banking uncertainty on top of Greek election uncertainty has

significantly increased the risk that Spain will have to join the programme

countries. Increasing funding costs for both financial institutions and the

sovereign are also raising doubts about Spains debt sustainability.

As Spains fourth largest bank asks for help to the tune of nearly 2% of GDP,

parallels are readily drawn with Ireland. There, the overleveraged and

property-exposed banking system ultimately dragged down the sovereign.The Irish recapitalisation of banks has by now amounted to70bn, equivalent to

45% of Irish GDP.

We assess Spanish banking sector woes and the risk to the sovereign. The

saving grace for Spain is that its public sector debt comes from a relatively low

base, but that was also true for Ireland. Recapitalising its banks combined with

a weak growth environment could see Spanish debt rising towards 100% of

GDP by 2015.

The Spanish government is trying to address the banking problem and we

briefly review the measures that have been adopted so far. The additions to the

initial measures make us believe that the government still needs to

acknowledge more realistic provisions. Our bank analysts estimate additional

provisioning needs of just over 150bn which is likely to translate into a

capital shortfall of50-70bn (4.5-6.5% of GDP).

The big question is how to finance the capital shortfall. While50-70bn is

not impossible for a country with a lower than euro area average debt ratio, the

problem is finding that amount in a risk-averse environment which shuns the

euro area periphery.

Spains preferred position is not to ask for help but it increasingly appears

as if it may not have any other option. The ECB is currently in no mood to

continue buying time for politicians. By remaining side-lined it is putting pressure

on politicians to conjure up a response. We believe that Spain might succeed

in getting an EFSF/ESM credit line dedicated to recapitalising the banking

system. The risk, however, is that this line needs to be widened to thesovereign if it is shunned by investors concerned about subordination to official

creditors. The capacity of the ESM would then be tested.

The Spanish banking crisis is likely to result in a further step towards a

more federal Europe. A banking union accompanied by a supra-national

banking supervisory body has been a long-standing item on the ECBs wish list

and is now openly being discussed.

01 June 2012Economics Research

http://www.credit-suisse.com/researchandanalytics

Research Analysts

Yiagos Alexopoulos

+44 20 7888 7536

[email protected]

Christel Aranda-Hassel

+44 20 7888 1383

[email protected]

Steven Bryce

+44 20 7883 7360

[email protected]

Violante Di Canossa

+44 20 7883 4192

[email protected]

Neville Hill

+44 20 7888 1334

[email protected]

Axel Lang

+44 20 7883 3738

[email protected]

Giovanni Zanni

+33 1 7039 0132

[email protected]

.
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2/11

01 June 2012

European Economics 2

A bailout for Spain and its banks?

Market perception is that Spain is living on borrowed time. Heightened Spanish banking

uncertainty on top of Greek election uncertainty has significantly increased the risk that

Spain will have to join the programme countries. Increasing funding costs for both financial

institutions and the sovereign is also raising doubts about Spains debt sustainability.

Exhibit 1: Spanish banks marginal funding cost Exhibit 2: Spanish yield curve

%

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Euribor

Banking Sector CDS 5y

Marginal funding cost

ECB Repo Rate

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

3m 6m 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 10y 15y 20y 30yr

May-12

Feb-12Nov-11

Source: Thomson Reuters DataStream, Credit Suisse Source: the BLOOMBERG PROFESSIONAL, Credit Suisse

As Spains fourth largest bank asks for 19bn of sovereign help, which added to the earlier

injection of 4.5bn results in a total of 23.5bn (2.3% of GDP) of sovereign funding to

recapitalise the bank, parallels are readily drawn with Ireland. There, the

overleveraged and property exposed banking system ultimately dragged down the

sovereign. The Irish recapitalisation of banks has by now amounted to 70bn, equivalent

to 45% of Irish GDP.

We assess Spanish banking sector woes and the risk to the sovereign. The saving grace

for Spain is that its public sector debt comes from a relatively low base. But recapitalising

its banks combined with a weak growth environment could see Spanish debt rising

towards 100% of GDP in 2015.

When it comes to comparisons with Ireland, we reiterate what we stated nearly two years

ago: the difference between Spanish and Irish banking difficulties is one of

magnitude. But even smaller magnitude difficulties can quickly engulf a country in

problems in a risk-averse environment.

The Spanish government is trying to address the banking problem and we briefly review the

measures that have been adopted so far. The additions to the initial measures leave us with

the feeling that the government still needs to acknowledge more realistic provisions. Our

bank analysts estimate additional provisioning needs of just over 150bn which islikely to translate into a capital shortfall of50-70bn (4.5-6.5% of GDP).

The big question is how to finance the capital shortfall. While50-70bn is not a large

amount for a country with a lower than euro area average debt ratio, the problem is finding

that amount in a risk-averse environment which shuns the euro area periphery.

Spains preferred option is not to ask for help but it might not have any other option

in our view. The ECB is currently in no mood to continue buying time for politicians and

by remaining side-lined exerts pressure on politicians to conjure up a response. We

believe that Spain might succeed in getting an EFSF/ESM credit line dedicated to

Christel Aranda-Hassel

+44 20 7888 1383

[email protected]

Yiagos Alexopoulos

+44 20 7888 7536

[email protected]

Steven Bryce

+44 20 7883 7360

[email protected]

Axel Lang+44 20 7883 3738

[email protected]


3/11

01 June 2012


recapitalising the banking system. The risk, however, is that this line needs to be

widened to the sovereign if it is shunned by investors concerned about subordination to

official creditors. The capability of the ESM would then be tested.

The Spanish banking crisis is likely to result in a further step towards a more

federal Europe. A banking union accompanied by a supra-national banking supervisory

body has been a long-standing item on the ECBs wish list and it is now openly being

discussed.A relatively low starting base for the sovereign. Spains public sector debt has

increased sharply since the start of the financial crisis. For Spain, the saving grace has

been that it came from a relatively low base, but this was also the case in Ireland. Spains

public sector debt amounted to less than 40% of GDP in 2007 but this level will have more

than doubled by the end of this year. While in a euro area context Spains debt is still

among the lowest, the rate of deterioration has accelerated and significant downside risks

to this years deficit target of 5.3% of GDP prevail in the European Commissions view.

Exhibit 3: Spains general government debt Exhibit 4: Euro area general government debt

% of GDP, 2012 estimates

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

-5

0

5

10

15

20

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Annual change, pp, lhsDebt, % of GDP, rhs

e

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

FIN NL AT DE ES FR EA BE PT IE IT GR

Source: Thomson Reuters DataStream, Credit Suisse Source: Thomson Reuters DataStream ,Credit Suisse

Additional bank recapitalisation needs

are likely to see Spains sovereign debt

surpassing the euro area average,

estimated at just over 90% of GDP this

year. Assuming a banking recapitalisation

of70bn (nearly 7% of GDP) the higher

end of our bank analysts 50-70bn

estimate combined with our growth

forecast which is weaker than the official

one and assuming Spain stays in

recession next year while the government

anticipates positive growth results in the

countrys debt stabilising at 100% of GDP

in 2015.

A worst case scenario assumes bank

recapitalisation needs of 100bn (around

10% of GDP) and GDP growth 1pp below

our base scenario. This years 1.7%

Exhibit 5: Spanish debt sustainability

% of GDP

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

Worst case scenario

CS scenario

Government scenario

Source: Thomson Reuters DataStream, Credit Suisse


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01 June 2012


downturn would be followed by another steep decline of 1.3% next year, raising Spanish

debt to 110% of GDP by 2015 and in the absence of more stringent fiscal austerity

continuing to rise thereafter.

Spanish banks are under pressure.As in Ireland, Spains debt woes mainly stem from

the bursting of the real estate bubble which saddled banks with bad loans and is having

severe repercussions on the solvency of the financial sector. While not to the same extent

as at the Greek banks, Spanish banks have seen deposits flowing out persistently sincesummer last year. The outflow accelerated to32bn in April this year, amounting to a loss

of 0.6% of Spanish banking assets in the three months to April. Spanish banks have

become more dependent on ECB funding as a result. In April, they borrowed nearly

320bn from the ECB, triple the amount borrowed in the last quarter of 2011. While still

significantly lower than the dependence of Greek and Irish banks on central bank funding,

Spanish banks central bank borrowing has gone up steeply, from 3% of their total

liabilities at the end of last year to nearly 9% in March.

Exhibit 6: Deposit flows Exhibit 7: Eurosystem loans to periphery

3-month rolling sum as a % of total bank assets, sa % of bank liabilities

-3.5

-3.0

-2.5

-2.0

-1.5

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

Jan-11 Apr-11 Jul-11 Oct-11 Jan-12

Spain

Greece

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2008 2008 2009 2009 2010 2010 2011 2011 2012

Greece

PortugalIrelandSpainItaly

\Source: European Central Bank, Credit Suisse Source: European Central Bank, Credit Suisse

Another Ireland? Although bank problems as a result of property loans going sour is the

common theme when looking at Spain and Ireland, the difference between the two is

one of magnitude,as we have pointed out in the past.

The Spanish banking sector is not disproportionately large relative to the size of the

Spanish economy and compared to the euro area. Total banking assets in Spain

amount to just over three times the size of the economy compared to more than five times

in Ireland at the peak.

When it comes to the construction and real estate sector, Spanish banks did not

overstretch themselves as much as their Irish counterparts. At the peak, Irish bank lending

to the sector reached nearly 70% of GDP while the Spanish banking system remained wellbelow that level at marginally above 40%.

As a result, non-performing loans in Ireland peaked at nearly 70% of GDP while in Spain,

although on an upward trend, they currently amount to 8.2% of total credit or 14% of GDP.
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01 June 2012


Exhibit 8: Total banking sector assets Exhibit 9: Lending to construction% of GDP % of GDP

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Spain

Euro area

Ireland*

0

10

20

30

40

5060

70

80

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Ireland

Spain

*For Ireland we have used Irish domestic credit institutions.Source: European Central Bank, Credit Suisse

Source: Thomson Reuters DataStream, Credit Suisse

Attempting to address the Spanish banking problem. An important consolidation of the

Spanish financial sector is well underway. Former saving banks have decreased from 45

to nine and further consolidation is planned. But the authorities were slower to address

problem assets.

Real estate assets linked to developers amounted to 307bn (30% of GDP) at the

end of last year. Of these, nearly two-thirds (184bn) were deemed as problem

assets. At the end of December, banks had only provisioned for one-third of these

problem assets. Attempts to provide additional provision for these problem assets came in

two successive royal decrees in February and May.

We are aware that the figures above only relate to real estate linked to commercial

property. In addition, banks hold560bn (52% of GDP) of mortgage loans. But five years

into the bursting of the Spanish construction bubble which saw a steep decline in

construction investment and significant job destruction mortgage problem assets only

amount to a tiny 3% of total mortgage loans, equivalent to 18bn or 1.7% of GDP. At first

glance this also stands in sharp contrast to Ireland where non-performing mortgage loans

amount to 9% of GDP.

Some of the difference can be explained by the small exposure in Spain to the buy-to-let

market, relatively low LTV ratios (65% on average) and the specifics of the Spanish

housing market where borrowers are personally liable for the loan. Our bank analysts,

however, estimate that the true figure is probably double the current 3% problem

mortgages. But this should not translate into an upward revision of total non-performing

loans as this would result in double counting. The reason for this is that in Spain banks are

swift to foreclose and when that happens, the non-performing mortgage loan becomes a

non-performing commercial loan.


6/11

01 June 2012


Exhibit 10: Bursting of the construction bubble Exhibit 11: Non-performing mortgage loans% of GDP

16.6

21.9

17.1

15.514

12.7

7.08.08.0

10.2

13.9

11.8

5

10

15

20

25

2000 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012E

Construction investment, % of GDP

Construction employment as % of total

-1.5 million jobs !

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Spain

Ireland

Source: INE, MEH, Credit Suisse Source: Thomson Reuters DataStream, Credit Suisse

The first and second royal decrees mentioned above were targeted at the bulk of thebanking problem, the 307bn commercial construction and real estate loans of which

184bn were problem loans at the end of December. At the close of last year, provisions

for these loans stood at61bn (nearly 6% of GDP).

Provisions for these problem loans were increased first in February and then again in May.

In February, provisioned losses for land rose to 80% from 33%, to 65% from 28% for

unfinished construction and to 35% from 25% for finished buildings. The additional

provisioning in May was done against the backdrop of increasing financial market stress

which convinced the authorities that more needed to be done to prop up confidence in the

Spanish banking system. Key measures entailed raising the provision of non-problem

assets to 30% from 7% in an attempt to provide for assets which are not a problem yet but

which could sour if the Spanish recession proves deeper than the -1.7% GDP growth

decline the government currently expects.

Overall, the measures aim to provision for 45% or137bn of the307bn total loans linked

to real estate developers, although we note that 15bn of this amount do not comprise

proper provisions but are merely so-called capital buffers. According to Bank of Spain

estimates, these measures provision for substantial declines in prices. So far, average

house prices have fallen by 20% from the peak while the provision for finished properties

allows these to fall by 56% before requiring more capital. Land prices in turn need to fall by

more than 87% before triggering higher capital needs.


7/11

01 June 2012


Exhibit 12: Coverage of real estate assets linked toloan to developers

Exhibit 13: House price declines from the peak andimplicit declines in the value of Spanish collateral

% andbn %

18%

29%

17%

7%

25%

23%

10%

0

10

20

30

40

50

60 Financial reform 2nd phase

Financial reform 1st phase

December 2011

Problem assets Performing assets TOTAL

54% (EUR 100 bn)

30% (EUR 37 bn)

45% (EUR 137 bn)

-100

-90

-80

-70

-60

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

Ireland US Spain UK Finishedproperties

Ongoingdevelopment

Land

Source: MEH, Credit Suisse Source: Thomson Reuters DataStream, Bank of Spain, Credit Suisse

The risk for higher capital needs. The Spanish authorities have clearly gone some way

to provision for problem assets. But capital needs are likely to be higher.

A key risk is that the provisions have only been made for the 307bn commercial

property loan book. The remaining 1.5tn non-property book of the Spanish banking

system currently only has provisions of 25bn or roughly 1.5% of the non-property book

in place. While much of this book is not directly related to property and construction,

collateral on this book in many instances is. This book is thus not immune to the

business cycle and to rising non-performing property loans. Our bank analysts take

guidance from the increased provisioning recently done by Spains fourth largest bank

(the additional19bn) which put the spotlight back on to the Spanish banking problems.This bank raised the additional provisioning on its non-property book from 1.5% to nearly

5%, which extended to the banking system as a whole would translate into additional

provisioning needs of around55bn (5% of GDP).

Land prices. Although these need to fall by nearly 90% to trigger more capital needs we

should not forget that in Ireland the bad bank NAMA valued some assets at zero in

several instances.

On balance, while some progress has been made on provisioning for commercial

property, the sense is that the bulk of Spains total loan book, nearly 80%, has not

been adequately provisioned for yet. As our bank analysts rightly point out, adequate

loss recognition remains a key driver for investor confidence and much scepticism remains

as a result.

In order to counter the further loss of confidence, the Spanish government has now

decided to appoint external, foreign auditors to scrutinise Spains banking books. A top-

down and a bottom-up approach is being pursued, with the first group expected to report

on the top-down findings in the second half of June. The second group is anticipated to

report its analysis in September.

Our bank analysts anticipate additional provisioning needs of just over150bn:

90bn (8.5% of GDP) made up of a further35 bn on the property loan book and55bn

on the non-property book, which as we have outlined has not been provisioned for

adequately yet.


8/11

01 June 2012


63bn for the commercial property loan book mandated in the February and May

decrees. This money needs to be found by the end of this year (or the end of next year

in the case of institutions engaged in mergers).

The total of just over 150bn in estimated additional provisioning is likely to

translate intoa capital shortfall of50-70bn (4.5-6.5% of GDP) in the view of our bank

analysts.

How to finance the capital shortfall. This is the big question. A50-70bn capital shortfallor even a100bn capital shortfall if the external auditors are more conservative should not

be too hard to finance for a country whose debt is still below the euro area average.

Furthermore, Spain is a country whose current government received a decisive electoral

mandate for reform and enjoys a majority that has allowed it to pass legislation swiftly.

Important public and financial stability measures together with key labour market reform

measures have been adopted as we pointed out in a recent weekly. But the problem in our

view is identifying that 100bn capital shortfall in a risk-averse environment which shuns

periphery countries and which is questioning the very survival of the common currency area.

Spains preferred position is not to ask for help but it might not have any other

option. The ECB is in no mood to continue buying time for politicians and as the bank

has done before, it is maintaining the pressure on European politicians to find ways to

recapitalise their ailing banking systems outside the ECB. In order to keep this pressure up,the ECB is unlikely to resort to further non-conventional measures in the short term in our

view. As we saw in December, the ECB only tends to step in when financial distress

becomes acute. In the meantime, the ECB is signalling to the Spanish government that it

will not favour Spanish banks being recapitalised through the use of the Eurosystems

repo lines.

This puts the onus on EFSF/ESM credit lines. The EFSF amendment of last summer

allows EFSF loans to be extended to non-programme countries to recapitalise their

financial institutions. Ideally, the Spanish government would like these lines to be

extended directly to banks bypassing the sovereign. But the current EFSF/ESM specify

that the loans are made to the sovereign for the purpose of bank recapitalisation. And

those rules are unlikely to change. We believe, however, that an alternative way is likely to

be found entailing bespoke bank lines with the attached conditionality and supervision ofthe Spanish financial sector but not necessarily the sovereign even if the sovereign is

ultimately liable.

The risk of EFSF/ESM banking credit lines, however, is that they do not remain

circumscribed to the banking system.

Seniority on any loan/credit line to Spain could be avoided in theory by starting

support through the EFSF (EFSF loans are pari passu) and/or by using one of the new

more flexible tools now available under the EFSF and the ESM. Our understanding,

indeed, is that seniority is only explicit for loans granted under a full programme, not for

credit lines or primary/secondary market interventions. However, it is unlikely that, in

practice, investors will differentiate, given precedent action in Greece, and in particular

concerning the treatment of Greek bonds bought by the ECB (implicit seniority).

If investors felt they were significantly subordinated by the official sector, they could shun

the Spanish sovereign at which point a full-blown programme would become necessary.

After the funding for bank recapitalisation we introduce an upside buffer to the50-70bn

need our bank analysts envisage and pencil in around 100bn nearly 80% of Spanish

sovereign debt would be subordinated to EFSF/ESM loans and ECB bondholdings,

according to our estimate.
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01 June 2012


Exhibit 14: Potential subordination of Spanish debt

in bn % of total

Spanish debt 2012 projection 854

o/w ECB held bonds (est.) 65 6.8%

+ EFSF/ESM bank recap (est.) 100 10.5%

Total debt 2012 954

o/w "Senior debt" (ECB+ESM) 165 17.3%Source: Credit Suisse

If the sovereign is forced into the full-blown bailout programme, our estimate

suggests that Spain on its own would pretty much take care of the 500bn bailout

capacity the ESM currently is planned to have. Assuming the sovereign has no access

to the market in the reminder of this year and until and including 2014 Spain would require

nearly500bn of financing as we show in Exhibit 15.

Exhibit 15: Spanish financing needs

bn

2012 2013 2014 Total

Deficit 34 51 33 118Bonds 33 62 61 156

Regional debt 16 8 6 30

Other (ICO,FROB, FADE) 7 20 24 51

ESM contribution 5 5 -- 9

Bank recap (est.) 100 -- -- 100

Financing needs 195 145 124 465

Notes: Assuming rollover of T-bills. Deficit for 2012 refers to the deficit financing needs for the remainder of 2012. Bonds for 2012 include theremaining maturities for the year. Regional debt for 2013-2014 does not include any regional loans maturing (only bonds).

Source: the BLOOMBERG PROFESSIONAL service, Credit Suisse

Are EFSF/ESM lines imminent?Ideally, the Spanish government is likely to want to

wait until after the external auditors have given their verdict in the second half of

June. If, in the meantime, the Greek election confirms that a Greek exit is unlikely wehave previously written on the low probability of that and risk aversion diminishes as a

result, the Spanish government would hope to gain some more time.

But a case can also be made for requesting imminent help. This would require

European politicians to act pre-emptively, extending a significant credit line for the

restructuring of Spanish banks. For Spain, this could pre-empt any potentially negative

findings by the external auditors (should they exist). European politicians, in turn, could

show that Europe rewards member states committed to put their house in order.

A final point is that the Spanish banking crisis is likely to result in a further step

towards a more federal Europe. A banking union accompanied by a supra-national

banking supervisory body has been a long-standing item on the ECBs wish list. By staying

side-lined and allowing financial market pressure to build, the ECB is once more trying to

ensure that politicians further this agenda. It has started to go in that direction. A supra-national supervisory banking body and euro area wide deposit guarantees are now openly

being discussed.


10/11

GLOBAL FIXED INCOME AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Dr. Neal Soss, Managing DirectorChief Economist and Global Head of Economic Research

+1 212 325 3335

[email protected]

Eric Miller, Managing Director

Global Head of Fixed Income and Economic Research

+1 212 538 6480

[email protected]

US AND CANADA ECONOMICS

Dr. Neal Soss, Managing Director

Head of US Economics

+1 212 325 3335

[email protected]

Jonathan Basile, Director

+1 212 538 1436

[email protected]

Jay Feldman, Director

+1 212 325 7634

[email protected]

Henry Mo, Director

+1 212 538 0327

[email protected]

Dana Saporta, Director

+1 212 538 3163

[email protected]

Jill Brown, Vice President

+1 212 325 1578

[email protected]

Isaac Lebwohl, Associate

+1 212 538 1906

[email protected]

Peggy Riordan, AVP

+1 212 325 7525

[email protected]

LATIN AMERICA ECONOMICS AND STRATEGY

Alonso Cervera, Managing Director

Head of Non-Brazil Latam Economics

+52 55 5283 [email protected]

Mexico, Chile, Colombia

Casey Reckman, Vice President

+1 212 325 5570

[email protected], Venezuela

Daniel Chodos, Vice President

+1 212 325 7708

[email protected] Strategy

Nilson Teixeira, Managing Director

Head of Brazil Economics

+55 11 3841 6288

[email protected]

Daniel Lavarda, Vice President

+55 11 3841 6352

[email protected]

Brazil

Tales Rabelo, Vice President

+55 11 3841 6353

[email protected]

Brazil

Iana Ferrao, Associate

+55 11 3841 6345

[email protected]

Brazil

Leonardo Fonseca, Associate

+55 11 3841 6348

[email protected]

Brazil

EURO AREA AND UK ECONOMICS

Neville Hill, Director

Head of European Economics

+44 20 7888 1334

[email protected]

Christel Aranda-Hassel, Director

+44 20 7888 1383

[email protected]

Giovanni Zanni, Director

European Economics Paris

+33 1 70 39 0132

[email protected]

Violante di Canossa, Vice President

+44 20 7883 4192

[email protected]

Axel Lang, Analyst

+44 20 7883 3738

[email protected]

Steven Bryce, Analyst

+44 20 7883 7360

[email protected]

Yiagos Alexopoulos, Analyst

+44 20 7888 7536

[email protected]

EASTERN EUROPE, MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA ECONOMICS AND STRATEGY

Berna Bayazitoglu, Managing Director

Head of EEMEA Economics

+44 20 7883 3431

[email protected]

Turkey

Sergei Voloboev, Director

+44 20 7888 3694

[email protected]

Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan

Carlos Teixeira, Director

+27 11 012 8054

[email protected]

South Africa

Gergely Hudecz, Vice President

+33 1 7039 0103

[email protected]

Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland

Alexey Pogorelov, Associate

+7 495 967 8772

[email protected]

Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan

Natig Mustafayev, Associate

+44 20 7888 1065

[email protected]

EM and EEMEA cross-country analysis

Saad Siddiqui, Associate

+44 20 7888 9464

[email protected]

EEMEA Strategy

Nimrod Mevorach, Associate

+44 20 7888 1257

[email protected]

EEMEA Strategy, Israel

JAPAN ECONOMICS

Hiromichi Shirakawa, Managing Director

+81 3 4550 7117

[email protected]

Takashi Shiono, Associate

+81 3 4550 7189

[email protected]

NON-JAPAN ASIA ECONOMICS

Dong Tao. Managing Director

Head of NJA Economics

+852 2101 7469

[email protected]

China, Korea

Robert Prior-Wandesforde, Director

+65 6212 3707

[email protected]

Regional, India, Indonesia, Singapore

Christiaan Tuntono, Vice President

+852 2101 7409

[email protected]

Hong Kong, Taiwan

Santitarn Sathirathai, Vice President

+65 6212 5675

[email protected]

Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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Disclosure Appendix

Analyst CertificationThe analysts identified in this report each certify, with respect to the companies or securities that the individual analyzes, that (1) the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his or her personalviews about all of the subject companies and securities and (2) no part of his or her compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed inthis report.

DisclaimerReferences in this report to Credit Suisse include all of the subsidiaries and affiliates of Credit Suisse AG operating under its investment banking division. For more information on our structure, pleaseuse the following link: https://www.credit-suisse.com/who_we_are/en/.This report is not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country or other jurisdiction where suchdistribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation or which would subject Credit Suisse AG or its affiliates (CS) to any registration or licensing requirement within suchurisdiction. All material presented in this report, unless specifically indicated otherwise, is under copyright to CS. None of the material, nor its content, nor any copy of it, may be altered in any way,transmitted to, copied or distributed to any other party, without the prior express written permission of CS. All trademarks, service marks and logos used in this report are trademarks or service marks orregistered trademarks or service marks of CS or its affiliates.The information, tools and material presented in this report are provided to you for information purposes only and are not to be used or considered as an offer or the solicitation of an offer to sell or tobuy or subscribe for securities or other financial instruments. CS may not have taken any steps to ensure that the securities referred to in this report are suitable for any particular investor. CS will nottreat recipients of this report as its customers by virtue of their receiving this report. The investments and services contained or referred to in this report may not be suitable for you and it isrecommended that you consult an independent investment advisor if you are in doubt about such investments or investment services. Nothing in this report constitutes investment, legal, accounting ortax advice, or a representation that any investment or strategy is suitable or appropriate to your individual circumstances, or otherwise constitutes a personal recommendation to you. CS does notadvise on the tax consequences of investments and you are advised to contact an independent tax adviser. Please note in particular that the bases and levels of taxation may change.Information and opinions presented in this report have been obtained or derived from sources believed by CS to be reliable, but CS makes no representation as to their accuracy or completeness. CSaccepts no liability for loss arising from the use of the material presented in this report, except that this exclusion of liability does not apply to the extent that such liability arises under specific statutes orregulations applicable to CS. This report is not to be relied upon in substitution for the exercise of independent judgment. CS may have issued, and may in the future issue, other reports that areinconsistent with, and reach different conclusions from, the information presented in this report. Those reports reflect the different assumptions, views and analytical methods of the analysts who

prepared them and CS is under no obligation to ensure that such other reports are brought to the attention of any recipient of this report.CS may, to the extent permitted by law, participate or invest in financing transactions with the issuer(s) of the securities referred to in this report, perform services for or solicit business from suchissuers, and/or have a position or holding, or other material interest, or effect transactions, in such securities or options thereon, or other investments related thereto. In addition, it may make markets inthe securities mentioned in the material presented in this report. CS may have, within the last three years, served as manager or co-manager of a public offering of securities for, or currently may makea primary market in issues of, any or all of the entities mentioned in this report or may be providing, or have provided within the previous 12 months, significant advice or investment services in relationto the investment concerned or a related investment. Additional information is, subject to duties of confidentiality, available on request. Some investments referred to in this report will be offered solelyby a single entity and in the case of some investments solely by CS, or an associate of CS or CS may be the only market maker in such investments.Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future performance, and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made regarding future performance. Information, opinionsand estimates contained in this report reflect a judgement at its or iginal date of publication by CS and are subject to change without notice. The price, value of and income from any of the securities or financialinstruments mentioned in this report can fall as well as rise. The value of securities and financial instruments is subject to exchange rate fluctuation that may have a positive or adverse effect on the price orincome of such securities or financial instruments. Investors in securities such as ADRs, the values of which are influenced by currency volatility, effectively assume this risk.Structured securities are complex instruments, typically involve a high degree of risk and are intended for sale only to sophisticated investors who are capable of understanding and assuming the risksinvolved. The market value of any structured security may be affected by changes in economic, financial and political factors (including, but not limited to, spot and forward interest and exchangerates), time to maturity, market conditions and volatility, and the credit quality of any issuer or reference issuer. Any investor interested in purchasing a structured product should conduct their owninvestigation and analysis of the product and consult with their own professional advisers as to the risks involved in making such a purchase.Some investments discussed in this report may have a high level of volatility. High volatility investments may experience sudden and large falls in their value causing losses when that investment isrealised. Those losses may equal your original investment. Indeed, in the case of some investments the potential losses may exceed the amount of initial investment and, in such circumstances, youmay be required to pay more money to support those losses. Income yields from investments may fluctuate and, in consequence, initial capital paid to make the investment may be used as part of thatincome yield. Some investments may not be readily realisable and it may be difficult to sell or realise those investments, similarly it may prove difficult for you to obtain reliable information about the

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investor clients of CS should seek the advice of their independent financial advisor prior to taking any investment decision based on this report or for any necessary explanation of its contents. Thisresearch may relate to investments or services of a person outside of the UK or to other matters which are not regulated by the FSA or in respect of which the protections of the FSA for privatecustomers and/or the UK compensation scheme may not be available, and further details as to where this may be the case are available upon request in respect of this report.CS may provide various services to US municipal entities or obligated persons ("municipalities"), including suggesting individual transactions or trades and entering into such transactions. Any servicesCS provides to municipalities are not viewed as advice within the meaning of Section 975 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. CS is providing any such services andrelated information solely on an arms length basis and not as an advisor or fiduciary to the municipality. In connection with the provision of the any such services, there is no agreement, direct orindirect, between any municipality (including the officials, management, employees or agents thereof) and CS for CS to provide advice to the municipality. Municipalities should consult with theirfinancial, accounting and legal advisors regarding any such services provided by CS. In addition, CS is not acting for direct or indirect compensation to solicit the municipality on behalf of an unaffiliatedbroker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, or investment adviser for the purpose of obtaining or retaining an engagement by the municipality for or in connection with MunicipalFinancial Products, the issuance of municipal securities, or of an investment adviser to provide investment advisory services to or on behalf of the municipality.

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