Sinks in the

KyotoProtocol

F E R N B R I E F I N G N OT E July 2001

A Dirty Deal for Forests, Forest Peoples and the Climate

“The amount of carbon in the fossil fuels still to be dug up and burned (over 4,000

gigatonnes) swamps both the carbon pool in the atmosphere (720 gigatonnes) and the

carbon pool in the terrestrial biosphere (2,000 gigatonnes).”

Science

“The current state of knowledge regarding carbon sources and sinks cannot

determine the levels and flows of carbon with sufficient accuracy to form the basis

for the Protocol and any viable trading scheme.” Sten Nilsson

“Forestry is an ‘insecure way of storing carbon out of harm’s way’.”

“Global warming itself will affect future carbon flows from and into

forests. Climate change, for example, is likely to increase respiration,

turning plantations into net sources of CO2...”Will Steffen

Published July 2001 by Fern, Brussels.The report can be downloaded from Fern’s web page at www.fern.orgWritten by Jutta Kill, FernDesign by Daan van Beek, Utrecht, NetherlandsPrinted by Drukkerij Macula, Boskoop, Netherlands Printed on recycled paper: Cyclus printPhotos: World Rainforest Movement, Uruguay; Fern, UK; PEFC-Watch; Ola Jennersten; Daan van Beek

Contents

1. Introduction

2. The true links between forests and climate change

3. The Kyoto Protocol

4. Why carbon sinks won’t help to stop climate change or forest destruction

4.1 Flaws in the carbon sinks concept

4.2 Carbon sinks in the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Why carbon sinks should be excluded from the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms

5.2 Recommendations

Acknowledgements

1

3

4

9

9

10

15

15

16

17

For over 150 years, industrial societies have beenreleasing carbon from underground coal and oil reserves,adding about 175 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2)to the atmosphere since the beginning of the industrialrevolution.Another six billion tonnes are being added eachyear, resulting in a 31% increase of CO2 in the atmospheresince 1750. According to the Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change (IPCC), “the present CO2 concentrationhas not been exceeded during the past 420,000 years andlikely not during the past 20 million years.” 1 The currentrate of increase is unprecedented during at least the past20,000 years. About three-quarters of CO2 emissionsduring the past 20 years is due to fossil fuel burning. Thistransfer must be halted. Signs of climate change canalready be seen in many places around the world with

impacts ranging from rising average temperatures,melting of polar ice caps, more extreme weather eventsand uncontrollable forest fires2. Now, at long last, theinternational community is waking up to global warmingand is recognizing the threat that climate change poses tohumanity’s future.

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992 as a consequence ofworldwide concern over climate change. In 1997, it wasamended by an additional legally binding commitment,the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol sets goals for reducinggreenhouse gas emissions in industrialised countries butincludes few details on how to achieve them. For some, thereduction targets governments agreed upon do not go far

3

1. Introduction

enough to stave off the dangers of global warming. It hasbeen calculated that even if the Protocol were ratified andfully implemented, it will not moderate an expectedwarming trend of 1.4˚C by 2050 by more than 0.05˚C. Incontrast, an immediate reduction of 60-80% below thelevel of carbon dioxide emissions in 1990 is needed just tostabilise atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations3.

Given these considerations, the Kyoto Protocol goes only asmall way towards halting climate change. However, eventhis small step is under threat as governments negotiatethe details of implementing the Kyoto Protocol: manygovernments are working hard to exploit the vagueformulation of the Protocol to minimise emissionreduction obligations in industrialised countries. One ofthe most controversial issues emerging in thesenegotiations is the question of whether and to what extentreductions of greenhouse gas emissions can besubstituted by planting trees.

There are two important links between forests andclimate change. First, forests play an important role inregulating the earth’s temperature and weather patternsby storing large quantities of carbon and water. Globalwarming, which on a geological timescale is occurring inthe equivalent of a split second, is significantly upsettingthe balance of carbon and water stored in forestecosystems. Disruption to this intricate and poorlyunderstood web of interactions that governs both globalcarbon fluxes and the very structure and composition offorest ecosystems is likely to be devastating. The primaryresponsibility of governments must therefore be toprotect the world’s remaining forests.

Second, global warming could negatively affect asubstantial proportion3 of existing forests: scientificevidence suggests that forests will turn from carbonstores to major sources of CO2 emissions as a result ofclimate change. Increased deforestation with all itsassociated problems is a predictable consequence of thisforecast.

The current intergovernmental debate on climate changehowever, does not address these vital links betweenforests and climate change but reduces forests to ‘carbonsinks’. The sinks concept is based on the natural capacityof forests to absorb carbon dioxide and temporarily storecarbon in trees, organic matter and soils. Fern believesthat the carbon sinks concept is fundamentally flawedand scientifically unsound (see pp 12), but even leavingthese substantial objections aside, it is evident that treeshave been given a new selling point, a new market value.

Unfortunately, the discussion so far has failed to considerthat marketing one single new commodity – carboncredits – may come at the cost of a broad range of goodsand services that forests currently provide, particularly tolocal communities and forest peoples. In these respects, afuture carbon market is likely to exacerbate the land useconflicts often associated with industrial forestry.Worsened conflicts in the wake of an emerging carboncredits market are all the more likely as governmentscontinue to treat forests and large-scale tree plantations asequal entities, while in reality, the only structuralsimilarity is that trees can be found in both. Large-scaletree plantations provide very few environmental andsocial services to local communities; on the contrary, theyare often associated with a long list of environmental andsocial problems. And protests against this type of treeplantation have been mounting around the world. Carboncredits however, are likely to act as an additional incentiveto establish such large-scale tree plantations. Unlessgovernments explicitly exclude the option of obtainingcarbon credits from large-scale tree plantations, they runthe risk of increasing the potential for land use conflictsin areas that will be covered by ‘Kyoto plantations’.

This briefing highlights and investigates some of the mostcommonly used arguments in the ‘carbon sinks’ debate. Italso aims to demonstrate that ‘carbon sink credits’ won’twork – not for forests, not for forest peoples and not forthe atmosphere – as long as the international communitydoes not address the social and environmental issuesassociated with Kyoto lands, particularly large-scale treeplantations.

4

5

There are two important links between forests andclimate change that are not addressed in the currentclimate change debate.

The first link lies in the role forests play in regulating theearth’s temperature and weather patterns by storing largequantities of carbon and water. The amount of carbonstored in old-growth forests is considerably larger thanthe amount of carbon stored in intensively managedforests: In the temperate zone, a secondary forest willneed some 150 - 250 years of undisturbed growth in orderto accumulate carbon stocks comparable to those inprimary forests4. In the tropical climate, managedsecondary forests are believed to need more than 150years to accumulate carbon stocks comparable to thosefound in primary forests5.

This fact is often overlooked in the current debate aboutcarbon sinks which focuses on forests’ capability tosequester carbon rather as on the importance of forests asmajor ‘storage rooms’ for carbon. Although sequestrationrates of young trees are very high, it will take more than acentury before these young forests have accumulated –and thus temporarily removed from the atmosphere – asimilar amount of carbon than unmanaged old-growthforests. Plantations in the tropics for example store 20-50% less carbon in above-ground biomass than doprimary forests in the same climatic zone (Fölster, 1989,FAO, 1981). In the temperate zones, production forestsstore 40-50% less carbon than unmanaged, old-growthforests6.

Given the vital role that forests play in storing carbon, it isof utmost importance that measures under the KyotoProtocol focus on maintaining and restoring the capacityof forests to store carbon. Two key issues are of centralimportance in this context: protection of existing primaryforests and restoring degraded, intensively managedforests to increase the amount of carbon stored in thesestands. Measures pertaining to both of these issues areunlikely to be successful if linked to a roller-coaster

carbon market for sink credits. Both require world powersto address the underlying causes of deforestation andforest degradation – discussion items which have to datebeen virtually absent from the climate talks.

The second link lies in the impact that changing weatherpatterns and climate change will have on forests. Atemperature increase of even one degree Celsius will havea strong impact on the composition and functioning oftoday’s forest ecosystems. Global warming is believed tonegatively affect “a substantial fraction” of existing forestsand a third of today’s forests are likely to change theirspecies composition7. A temperature increase of threedegrees Celsius until 2100 would result in forestecosystems having to move 500 km towards the poles or500 m in elevation in order to find the same climateconditions8. Such distances are far beyond the averagerate of dispersal for individual tree species, let aloneentire forest ecosystems9.

Consequently, the broader the genetic diversity withinforest ecosystems, particularly within those species withslow dispersal rates, the better the chances for forests tocope with impending climate change. Scientific evidencesuggests furthermore that forests will turn from carbonstores to major sources of CO2 emissions as a result ofclimate change10. Increased deforestation with all itsassociated problems is a predictable consequence of thisforecast. Any forest related activities in the Kyoto Protocolshould thus aim at maintaining the natural variability andgenetic diversity of forest ecosystems.

2. The true links between forests and climate change

6

In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted by the 3rd

Conference of the Parties (CoP3) as an additional legallybinding agreement to the Climate Convention. Under theProtocol, industrialised countries agreed to limit orreduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 5,2% below1990 levels by 201211. The European Union accepted areduction target of 8%, the US 7% and Japan 6%. Nationslike Australia and Norway allowed themselves emissionincreases. Russia decided its annual emission allowancefrom 2008 to 2012 – the ‘first commitment period’ forwhich emission targets have been agreed upon – shouldbe the same as it was in 199012.

To enter into force, the Protocol must be ratified by 55countries accounting for 55% of the total carbon dioxide

emissions in industrialised countries. So far, 83governments and the European Community have signed,but only 24 countries – none of which is an industrialisedcountry subject to emission reduction targets – haveratified it.

In general, the Kyoto Protocol adopted the principle ofburden-sharing (differentiated commitments for Northand South) whereby the industrialised countries, as themain polluters of past decades, are the first to startcutting their greenhouse gas emissions. It is likelyhowever, that countries in the South will have to accept alimitation of their emissions in subsequent commitmentperiods, e.g. after 2012.

3. The Kyoto Protocol

Figure 1

Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels by continent 1995Sources: Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, from: Vanessa Houlder: The Kyoto Protocol: Vital talks loom at TheHague. Energy and Utility Review 5. Financial Times, September 29, 2000. German Advisory Council on Global Change(1998): The Accounting of Biological Sinks and Sourcees under the Kyoto Protocol – A Step Forwards or a step Backwards forGlobal Environmental Protection? Special Report 1998, Chapter 5.3.1Utility Review 5. Financial Times, September 29, 2000.

7

Emissions are increasing rather than decreasing

Current emission trends paint a worrying picture:emissions in those OECD countries listed in the Protocol’sAnnex B are projected to be 16% above 1990 levels in201013. The Kyoto Protocol requires that this group ofcountries be 6.6% below 1990 levels by 2010. Based onthese forecasts, Japan for example would have to reduceits projected greenhouse gas emissions by app. 20% by theend of 2012 – the ‘first commitment period’ – in order notto exceed its agreed emission target14.

The thorny path – negotiating a ratifyable andyet environmentally and socially sound KyotoProtocol

The 6th Conference of the Parties to the UN FrameworkConvention on Climate Change (CoP 6) in November 2000in The Hague was expected to be an important milestoneon the path to ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. However,the meeting failed. The agenda for the climate summitincluded a number of contentious issues and thecontroversial views held by different parties on the issueof carbon sinks played a key role in its failure.

In an effort to forge an agreement that would bridge thewide gap of positions expressed at the climate summit,the president of CoP 6, after intensive consultations withthe various parties, proposed a new “Consolidatednegotiation text proposed by the President” as a startingpoint for negotiations at the resumed CoP 6 bis in Bonn inJuly 2001 (Text available at the UNFCCC webpagewww.unfccc.de).

The text falls short of any meaningful measures to protectforests. Worse, the provisions for carbon sinks creditsprovide perverse incentives for the establishment of large-scale tree plantations and business-as-usual industrialforestry. With regards to the scale of potential carboncredits, the president’s proposal, if adopted, would allowan overall increase of emissions from fossil fuels insteadof a reduction below 1990 levels (For a detailedquantitative analysis of the president’s consolidatednegotiation text see Greenpeace International (2001):CoP 6 President’s Text. A quantitative Analysis.www.greenpeace.org). The choice seems clear: Either thecarbon sinks provisions in the consolidated negotiationtext have to be drastically reduced or the Kyoto Protocolwill most likely be ineffective in terms of reducinggreenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere.

Figure 2 Fern, based on data from IPCC (1990): First Assessment Report, IPCC (2001) Third Assessment Report

Global carbon flows

Estimated size of annual global carbon flows between atmosphere, oceans and terrestrial ecosystems compared withemission reduction targets of industrialized countries of 250 Mt C/year for the period 2008-2012. Figures are averaged 1989-1998. The vertical bars in the diagram show the level of uncertainty at an estimated 90% confidence interval.

8

The Flexible Mechanisms

Rather than relying on domestic action to meet themodest targets contained in the Kyoto Protocol,governments of the industrialized countries decided thatthey needed ‘flexibility’ in achieving national emissionreduction targets. They therefore agreed to include threeflexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol to ‘help’ themachieve their obligations through carbon trading andemission reduction activities abroad rather thandomestically.

1. Emissions Trading: The emissions trading systemwill allow industrialised countries to buy and sellemission credits. Countries that keep emissions belowtheir agreed target will be able to sell the excess emissioncredits to countries that find it more difficult or moreexpensive to meet their own targets. One of the mainconcerns is that the Kyoto targets of some countries are solow that they can be met with minimal effort. Thesecountries could then sell large quantities of emissioncredits (known as ‘Hot Air’). The rules of this tradingsystem have not yet been decided.2. Joint Implementation (JI): This mechanism willallow industrialised countries to gain credits for financingemission reduction projects in other industrialisedcountries. Reporting rules, monitoring guidelines and theextent to which credits can be gained from ‘carbon sinks’have not yet been decided.3. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): Thismechanism will allow industrialised countries to gaincredits for financing emissions reduction projects incountries without emission targets. Project screening

procedures, reporting rules, monitoring guidelines andthe list of activities and technologies that would yieldcredits have not yet been decided. One of the controversialissues is whether or not credits can be gained from‘carbon sink’ projects as the text of the Protocol isambiguous on this issue: whereas this possibility isexplicitly mentioned for Joint Implementation projects, itis neither explicitly mentioned nor excluded from theCDM text.

The Clean Development Mechanism

The Clean Development Mechanism was added at a latestage of the negotiations that culminated in the KyotoProtocol. The CDM goes back to a Brazilian proposal tocreate a “Clean Development Fund” as part of the KyotoProtocol. This proposal, supported by G-77/China, wasbased upon penalizing those industrialised countries notcomplying with the emission targets set in the KyotoProtocol. The resources of the fund were to be madeavailable to non-industrialised countries for use in climatechange mitigation projects (90%) and projects to helpcountries fight the consequences of climate change, suchas floods, droughts – the so-called adaptation projects.Industrialised countries opposed this idea. The CleanDevelopment Mechanism was created as a compromise.Unlike the fund, the mechanism is not linked tocompliance of industrialised countries with theiremission targets; rather, it aims to achieve climate changemitigation through a market-based approach:industrialised countries receive emission rights inexchange for financing emission abatement projects inthe South.

The role of forests in the Kyoto Protocol

Both the Climate Convention and the Kyoto Protocolacknowledge the role and importance of forests as ‘sinksand reservoirs’ of carbon. Article 4 of the Convention callson parties to safeguard sinks such as forests and Article 2of the Protocol adds the call for sustainable forestmanagement16.

However, during the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocolsome governments, notably the USA, insisted that they beallowed to substitute some of their emission cuts byplanting or protecting trees, linking forests to the flexiblemechanisms. This paved the way for industrialisedcountries to gain emission credits in return for forest-related activities.

The most important distinction between emissiontrading and Joint Implementation on the one hand andthe Clean Development Mechanism on the other hand, isthat the CDM allows projects in countries that are notsubject to emission targets. Any project in the CDMtherefore increases the overall level of emissions inindustrialised countries. This is of particular concernfor ‘carbon sink’ projects as these projects will onlytemporarily offset those additional emissions15.Eventually, most of the carbon stored in trees and thesoil will be released again into the atmosphere whenforests and plantations burn, trees decay, are harvestedor when the area is converted to other uses. This releaseis likely to occur well before the additionally releasedCO2 from fossil fuel burning has lost its impact asgreenhouse gas in the atmosphere.

9

How much of their reduction obligations industrialisedcountries will allow themselves to gain through ‘carbonsinks’ will depend mainly on decisions taken on threedifferent articles of the Kyoto Protocol:

Article 3 defines for which domestic emissionsindustrialised countries have to produce inventoriesduring the ‘first commitment period’ (2008-2012).The Protocol currently requires tracking greenhouse gasremovals and emissions from afforestation, reforestationand deforestation activities since 1990. Article 3.3 allowsindustrialised countries to receive credits or debits(deforestation) for these activities in their own country.The article further states that changes in carbon stockhave to be measured verifiably. Article 3.4 allowsindustrialised countries in the second and subsequentcommitment periods to include additional activities intothe inventories and make them available for crediting ifthe carbon stock changes can be measured verifiably.Exactly which activities this will involve remains to bedecided; forest management, planting windbreaks andshelterbelts, cropland management and urban landmanagement are some of the options suggested byparties. Government positions differ on whethermethodologies exist to adequately address issues ofuncertainty and verifiability and whether additionalactivities should be creditable already in the ‘firstcommitment period’.Article 6 defines Joint Implementation (JI) as amechanism for industrialised countries to meet theiremission reduction obligations.‘Carbon sinks’ areexplicitly included in this article as an eligible projectcategory, provided that the resulting reductions are“additional to any that would otherwise occur” and thatthe changes in carbon stock are verifiable.

Article 12 defines the Clean DevelopmentMechanism (CDM). The purpose of the CDM is both toachieve sustainable development and to contribute tostabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in theatmosphere at a safe level. In order for projects to beeligible under the CDM, they must meet inter alia thefollowing criteria: They must be measurable, they musthave long-term beneficial impact on climate change andbe additional to any activity that would occur in theabsence of the project. A decision has to be taken whether‘carbon sinks’ projects will be eligible as the text neitherexplicitly includes nor excludes ‘carbon sinks’. Two mainissues of discussion have been those of “leakage”(describing the possibility of shifting deforestation toanother area) and of “permanence” (describing the factthat carbon stored in vegetation and soils can be releasedat any time and carbon dioxide emissions are thereforeonly temporarily avoided).

Under the Protocol, for every tonne of carbon capturedthrough ‘carbon sink’ activities, an additional tonne ofcarbon from fossil fuel can be released to the atmosphere.To determine whether or not forest-related activities areeligible for carbon credits, the terms forest, deforestation,afforestation and reforestation have to be defined.

The definition of forests is the most contentious one, asthe other three definitions are based upon this definition.Negotiations so far suggest that parties are likely tochoose a forest definition based on the FAO definitions17,thereby ignoring the advice of the IntergovernmentalPanel on Climate Change (IPCC) on this issue, which in itsspecial report clearly describes the short-comings of theFAO definition for the purpose of carbon accountingunder the Kyoto Protocol18.

NGO criticism of FAO definition for forests and deforestation

Many NGOs have long criticized the FAO definition for forests that describes a forest based on one singlecharacteristic – crown cover. This makes the definition unsuitable to measure forest degradation and deforestationbecause any area with a canopy cover above 10% is considered a forest. Furthermore, in the FAO definition treemonocultures with exotic species are considered “planted forests”, a notion which NGOs have been challenging onthe basis that the only similarity between a forest and a tree plantation is that trees can be found in both.Structurally and in terms of their social impacts and environmental complexity forests and tree plantations areconsidered to be fundamentally different.

The forest definition in recent versions of the negotiation text for the resumed CoP6 is even more problematic thanthe FAO definition because it not only includes “all plantations...” but also covers “...areas normally forming part of theforest area which are temporarily unstocked as a result of human intervention or natural causes but which are expected torevert to forest.” This implies that clearcutting is no longer considered a form of deforestation.

10

The scientific uncertainty of ‘carbon sinks’

The carbon sink concept is lacking “widely accepted definitions, methods and data for countingsinks. Even if nations could agree on the necessary procedures, there would still be enormouspotential for cooking the books – only a monitoring system larger and more intrusive thananything ever attempted under international law could settle the inevitable disputes. Moreover,the carbon content of forests and soils varies naturally – decades of monitoring would beneeded to be certain that a ‘sink’ was not merely transient and deserved full credit. Yet thecommitment periods under international law are typically much shorter, such as the five-year‘commitment period’ of the Kyoto Protocol.”David Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming (Princeton,2001), pp. 8-9.

“The amount of carbon in the fossil fuels still to be dug up and burned (over 4,000 gigatonnes)swamps both the carbon pool in the atmosphere (720 gigatonnes) and the carbon pool in theterrestrial biosphere (2,000 gigatonnes).”Science, 13 October 2000.

“The current state of knowledge regarding carbon sources and sinks cannot determine thelevels and flows of carbon with sufficient accuracy to form the basis for the Protocol and anyviable trading scheme.”Nilsson, Sten, : Options, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, Autumn2000, p.1.

“Uncertainty in estimates of the carbon balance in Canada’s forests could be greater than1000% if even seemingly small factors such as increased CO2 levels in the atmosphere are nottaken into account. That is, estimates of carbon sequestration can be affected by a factor of 10just by new discoveries. Climate change (temperature alone) and changes in CO2 concentrationsthemselves made a difference in estimations of Net Primary Production during 1980-96 of 3%and 2% annually, while taking account of the secondary climate change effect of increase ingrowing season length changes estimates of C sink over that period by 38%. Even withproposed methods uncertainty would still be up to 50%, even not counting certainuncertainties such as effects of thaw depth on soil respiration, etc.“Wenjun Chen, Jing Chen, Jane Liu, Josef Cihlar, “Approaches for Reducing Uncertainties in Regional ForestCarbon Balance”, Global Biogeochemical Cycles 14, 3, 827-838, Sept. 2000, p. 833.

“Global warming itself will affect future carbon flows from and into forests. Climate change, forexample, is likely to increase respiration, turning plantations into net sources of CO2, andchanges in the advent of the dry season may mean fires which devastate many large tracts offorest such as that of the Amazon. (Hadley Centre.) The uncertainties surrounding the likelycourse of global warming itself augment enormously the uncertainties which already surroundthe relevant numbers. This alone renders ludicrous the idea of confidently assigning in advancea single number to the long-term ‘carbon effects’ of forestry schemes”.

“Forestry is an “insecure way of storing carbon out of harm’s way.”Will Steffen, Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences, chair of the International Geosphere-BiosphereProgramme

“We cannot compare the effectiveness of fossil fuel with land-use change and forestry activitieswith respect to reduced emissions.”IIASA, “Full Carbon Account for Russia”, Interim Report IR-00-021”, 22 August 2000, p. 115.

11

Some believe that the Kyoto Protocol’s flexiblemechanisms can provide the funding that is urgentlyneeded for forest conservation and the promotion of goodforest management.Most NGOs and Indigenous Peoples’ Organisations,however, feel the problems and dangers associated withthe concept of ‘carbon sinks’ outweigh the potentialbenefits of linking forests with a mechanism for tradingcarbon emission rights.

Those who favour the inclusion of ‘carbon sinks’ in theflexible mechanisms argued in the run-up to CoP6 in TheHague that at long last,‘environmental services’ thatforests provide will be paid for. They also believed thatincluding ‘carbon sinks’ in the flexible mechanisms wouldprovide funding for forest conservation projects and theypointed out the potential benefits of forest-relatedprojects for local people. The potential negative effects onforests, biodiversity or local people of such ‘carbon sinks’projects are to be addressed by the development of clearguidelines and standards. Chances to fund conservationprojects through CDM funding however have all butvanished because the negotiating texts that emerged atand since The Hague suggest that carbon credits will begranted for afforestation and reforestation but not forconservation projects.

Those who oppose the inclusion of ‘carbon sinks’ arguethat tying up lands in the South for decades to come sothe North can continue emitting greenhouse gasesamounts to a new form of colonialism – CO2lonialism.They believe that including ‘carbon sinks’ will stifle theswitch to already existing renewable energy technologies.They point out that intergovernmental discussions haveresulted neither in the Convention on Biological Diversitynor in any other intergovernmental forum in guidelinesthat would both safeguard forest biodiversity and forestpeoples’ rights. The chances of agreeing on them in aninternational agreement that focuses on climate changethus seem slim. Furthermore, projects that safeguardforest biodiversity and respect forest peoples’ rights will in

most cases not be the same projects that deliver cheapand easy carbon credits. It is therefore very unlikely thatgovernments will reach consensus on sound criteria andat the same time maintain investors’ interest in ‘carbonsinks’ projects promising to deliver sizable quantities ofcarbon credits.

At the heart of these different positions lies the questionof whether or not deforestation can be stopped withoutaddressing the political issue of who has the right todecide how forests are being used.

Fern believes that no carbon credits should be granted for‘carbon sink’ activities in the Clean DevelopmentMechanism and should be limited in JointImplementation for the reasons elaborated on in the restof this chapter.

4.1 Flaws in the carbon sinks concept

Carbon sequestered or stored above-ground isnot equivalent to carbon stored in fossil fuelThere are several reasons why using forests or plantationsfor carbon sequestration is associated with risks (see page8). From a biological point of view, the main concernswith regards to carbon accounting are:

Carbon is only stored temporarily and can be released atany time through the natural and social processesmentioned below. This results in the lack of “permanence’’of carbon storage in ‘carbon sinks’.

The basic idea of ‘carbon sinks’ is that a given amount ofcarbon dioxide is removed from the atmosphere andstored in or on the surface of the Earth, under theassumption that this given amount of carbon dioxide willremain stored in the same stable way as the carbon lockedup in reserves of oil, natural gas or coal beneath theground – for centuries to come. But forests and treeplantations might burn, the biomass may decay, the trees

4. Why carbon sinks won’t help to stop climate change

or forest destruction

12

might be logged or the land could be converted to otheruses. All of these activities result in the release of thecarbon stored both above and below ground. They are alsoin many cases beyond government control: more than50% of the timber exported from for example Brazil,Indonesia and Cameroon has been logged illegally andthe forest fires in 2000 in the US showed that eventechnically advanced countries can often do little toprevent or stop forest fires.

The temporary nature of forests as ‘carbon sinks’ alsoposes the question of liability: Who will have to make upfor credits that have resulted already in additionalemissions but are subsequently lost due to forest fires orother natural phenomena? What happens if the project isover and land is converted to other uses? In those cases,the carbon will be returned to the atmosphere as though ithad never been captured, increasing the overall emissionlevel in the atmosphere.

‘Carbon sink’ projects may increase deforestation outsidethe project area. The carbon allegedly captured throughthe ‘carbon sink’ project will be released whendeforestation activities are merely relocated to areasoutside the project boundaries. This process is describedas “leakage” in the climate context.

In many cases, lands taken over for ‘carbon sink’ projectswill have been used in one form or other before the startof the project. A logging company may have had cuttingrights for a forest that is to be dedicated to a ‘carbon sink’project. The logging company is compensated for givingup the logging concession and signs an agreement not tobuy a new logging concession elsewhere with the moneyreceived in compensation. Considering the structure ofthe logging industry, monitoring that the cut is notincreased outside the ‘carbon sink’ project boundariescould only happen if the logging company would agree todisclose the entire company cut.

Measuring biological activities, in particular carbonsequestration rates, involves methodologies with highuncertainties.

Biological activities are difficult to measure and assessaccurately. For many activities, including carbonsequestration, estimating and measuring uncertainties of50% or more are common. Uncertainties related to themethodology used could thus be bigger than the carbonstock changes measured. This poses the question of howto verifiably assess and determine how many carboncredits can be obtained from a ‘carbon sink’ project.

Climate Change may soon turn forests fromsinks into sourcesIn its First Assessment report, the IPCC estimated that onaverage, one-third of the world’s forests will be adverselyaffected by global warming. These changes will alsoinfluence many biological processes linked with carbonsequestration and the capacity of forest to store carbon.These findings have been confirmed in the IPCC’s ThirdAssessment Report, released in February 2001.Furthermore, the focus on ‘carbon sinks’ in the KyotoProtocol ignores the important role forests play in storingcarbon.

4.2 Carbon sinks in the Kyoto Protocol’sflexible mechanisms

Subsidising industrial tree plantationsIn the context of the Kyoto Protocol, millions of hectaresof land would have to be taken over in any attempt tocounteract even a small fraction of carbon dioxideemissions in the North. Negotiations to date on this issuesuggest that a substantial part of these activities would beafforestation and reforestation activities resulting in theestablishment of tree plantations, many of which are likelyto be large-scale.

There are comparatively few cases where large-scale treeplantations have been established on ‘degraded land’.Often, large-scale tree plantations replace forests and arethus a direct cause of deforestation. This means thatbefore large-scale tree plantations become a temporary‘carbon sink’ they in fact release carbon previously storedin the forests and forests’ soil they replace. This is ofparticular concern in cases where primary forests aredestroyed to make way for large-scale tree plantations, asis the case in Indonesia, Malaysia and Chile among others.The carbon balance is thus negative because most forestsand forests’ soils store significantly more carbon perhectare than any plantation. Recent reports by Friends ofthe Earth, Norwatch and the World RainforestMovement19 suggest that the ‘carbon sink’ debate isalready promoting the establishment of large-scale treeplantations in the name of climate change mitigation.

Large-scale tree plantations are a threat to communitiesthe world over. Such plantations typically are eucalyptusor pine monocultures of trees bred for rapid growth,uniformity and high yield of fiber. Planted in even-agedstands, this type of plantation requires intensivepreparation of the soil, fertilization, regular spacing oftrees, mechanical or chemical weeding, use of

13

pesticides and mechanized harvesting in short rotations.Due to the rapid growth of the species planted, they drawheavily from local water resources, which often result indrastic changes of the local water regime. Generally, large-scale tree plantations lead to loss of biodiversity on thelands they occupy because of their uniform structure andthe use of non-native species in monoculture. In manycases in the South opposition against large-scale treeplantations has also been met with violence andoppression20.

A new wave of colonialism – CO2lonialism Every ‘carbon sink’ credit is a disincentive to end fossilfuel exploration to meet Northern energy demands. Thisis likely to slow down the inevitable shift towardsrenewable energies in North and South. Decisions about‘carbon sinks’ in the Clean Development Mechanism willhave far-reaching consequences for the South for thefollowing reasons.

First, the ‘carbon sinks’ debate has already stifled progressin discussing the potential of the CDM to provide for atransfer of renewable energy technologies through the CDM.

Second,‘carbon sinks’ in the CDM will increase thehistorical carbon debt the North owes the South. Openingup the CDM to ‘carbon sink’ projects will allowindustrialised countries to continue using more than their

fair share of ‘natural resources’ and superimpose thishistoric inequality onto the land: The more greenhousegases a country emits the more land it will be entitled tooccupy to make up for its emissions – a concept regardedby many as a new form of colonialism.

Third, lands dedicated to ‘carbon sink’ projects today willnot be available to countries in the South should they wantto change the way they use the land in coming decades.These lands will be locked up in a contractual agreementsecuring the area to providing emission rights to theNorth rather than contribute to meeting the (subsistence)needs of people in the South. This is only exacerbatedwhen ‘carbon sink’ projects result in large-scale treeplantations or when a project is carried out in areas whereland use and land tenure rights are under conflict.

Last, dedicating lands to ‘carbon sink’ projects today toprovide emission rights to industrialised countries couldultimately put Southern countries at a disadvantageshould they be subject to emission targets in the future.

Undermining forest peoples’ rights andmarginalising communities

‘Carbon sink’ projects in the Kyoto Protocol will haveprofound consequences for forest peoples: Many of the

14

As it happened, two days after the Kyoto Protocol had been adopted, a Norwegian company, TreeFarms, arranged a private placement that increased the company’s capital stock from NOK 990,000 toNOK 13 million (USD 1.4 million). Five months later, the company invited outside investors to buyshares. One third of the new shares were bought by TRG, a company controlled by the Norwegianbillionnaire Kjell Inge Røkke. The potential trade in carbon credits has already become part ofpolitical brokering in industrialised countries, in Norway for example in the debate over a newconventional gas-fired power plant: Parties in favour of the proposed power plant argue that theproject will be environmentally friendly because the company will offset their emissions through thefuture purchase of carbon credits – most likely using their first-buy option for carbon credits fromTree Farms plantations in Africa. Two of the Tree Farms projects were inspected by Norwatch earlierthis year. The excerpts below are meant to give an impression of the realities of ‘carbon sink’plantation establishment in the South:

Uganda

“Everyone living and farming inside our area are illegal intruders. But we don’t want to do the dirtyjob chasing them out. We have told the forest authorities quite clearly that this is their responsibility.”Managing Director of Tree Farms, Odd Ivar Lovhaugen. Op.cit, pg 14. 8000 people are faced with eviction fromthe land occupied by the tree plantation.

“Please ask the Norwegian owners to allow us to continue to live here by making our subsistence fromfishing and farming. We have nowhere else to go. Tell them that we are human beings.” RatifNakumunsana, fisherman and farmer. Op. cit., pg 16.

“We just have to admit that we know nothing about the trade in CO2 credits, neither how it willfunction not how much the foreign investor will profit from it.” Acting Deputy Commissioner for Forestry,Ignatius Oluka-Akileng. Op. cit. pg. 11.

Tanzania

“Some would claim, I guess, that the annual rent of USD 1.9 per hectar is quite low, but of course, wewish to run profitable business. Preferably, we would like the land rent to be reduced even more,thereby minimalising the risk of the project.” Managing Director of Tree Farms, Odd Ivar Lovhaugen. Op.cit,pg. 11.

“When the company arrived, many inhabitants were sceptical about giving away our land areas. Butafter being told about all the benefits of the project, the village council agreed to cede the lands wewere not cultivating.” Mapanda Village Council. Op. cit., pg. 14. Evidence from similar experiences of localcommunities the world over suggests that it is very unlikely that the village council was provided with impartialinformation or was informed about the impacts associated with large-scale tree plantations.

“When we asked about the salaries, the company told us that the money came from a place far awayand that it was nothing that could be done about it.” Op. cit., pg 15; Villagers of Uchindile working as casualworkers for Tree Farms at less than the governments minimum wage. They earn one US dollar per day at the timeof the visit in May 2000 and had been waiting for several months for these unpaid salaries.

Excerpts from “CO2lonialism: Norwegian Tree Plantations, Carbon Credits and Land Conflicts inUganda”, and “Carbon Upsets: Norwegian Carbon Plantations in Tanzania,” two reports published byNorwatch in April and July 200021.

15

‘carbon sinks’ projects will be located on lands whereforest peoples’ land rights and customary land use havenot been recognised to date.Yet, forest peoples are noteven mentioned in the Climate Convention. Neither theConvention nor the Protocol or the current negotiatingtext on ‘carbon sinks’ include any direct reference toIndigenous Peoples, forest dwellers or local communities.It seems likely under these circumstances that ‘carbonsink’ projects will not guarantee or strengthen forestpeoples’ or local communities’ rights to their lands andnatural resources.

Declaration of the First International Forum ofIndigenous Peoples on Climate Change:…“Our intrinsic relation with Mother Earth obliges us tooppose the inclusion of sinks in the Clean DevelopmentMechanism (CDM) because it reduces our sacred landand territories to mere carbon sequestration which iscontrary to our cosmovision and philosophy of life. Sinksin the CDM would constitute a worldwide strategy forexpropriating our lands and territories and violating ourfundamental rights that would culminate in a new form ofcolonialism. Sinks in the CDM would not help to reduceGHG emissions, rather it would provide industrialisedcountries with a ploy to avoid reducing their emissions atsource.”22…

Furthermore, land that policy makers perceive asdegraded or unproductive is often an important resourceto the poorest members of rural society. Experience inmany countries in the South has shown that large-scaletree plantations, often backed by foreign capital, result inthe displacement of local people. Because large-scale treeplantations generally create fewer jobs than theagricultural activities they replace, local people who usedto live off the land are left with the choice between

becoming plantation workers or migrating to the cities’shanty towns.

Further forest loss and the loss ofbiodiversity

One of the basic concerns about reducing forests to‘carbon sinks’ is that the types of forest that allegedly yieldmaximum absorption of carbon are not optimal forbiodiversity and vice versa. For maximum sequestrationthe imperative is to plant fast-growing trees, denselypacked and typically monocultures of eucalyptus, acaciaor pine. This is not what is needed to maintain andsafeguard biodiversity.

With regards to afforestation and reforestation activities,choosing the wrong species and establishing even-agedstands of trees can – and often does – gravely affect thelivelihoods of local communities and biodiversity. Withregards to forest conservation, the inclusion of forests intothe carbon market has so far failed to address theunderlying causes of forest loss. Inequality of landownership, the lack of recognition of forest peoples’rights, unsustainable consumption levels of forestproducts in the North, the inequality in the world tradingsystem, and the dominance of timber values in forest usehave been identified as the main underlying causes ofdeforestation and forest degradation23. Despite severalinitiatives to halt deforestation during the past twodecades, forests are disappearing at an ever-increasingrate and the failure to address the underlying causes andmacro-economic conditions of forest loss is seen as one ofthe main reasons why so many initiatives that set out tocurb deforestation, failed.

Governments at the 5th meeting of the Conference of theParties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CoP5 ofthe CBD) expressed their concern about the potentialnegative impact of decisions taken regarding forests and‘carbon sinks’ in the context of the Kyoto Protocol. Theparties to CoP5 of the CBD “urge the United NationsFramework Convention on Climate Change, including itsKyoto Protocol, to ensure that future activities of theUnited Nations Framework Convention on ClimateChange, including forest and carbon sequestration, areconsistent with and supportive of the conservation andsustainable use of biological diversity”. It is imperativethat governments who have signed both the ClimateConvention and the Convention on Biological Diversity24

ensure coherence between those agreements.

“This [‘carbon sinks’] may develop into a new form ofcolonialism. Tree planting in Uganda and other poorcountries must primarily seek to meet the needs of thecountry and its people, not the needs of the‘international community’. If this can be combined, it’sok, but experience from similar initiatives shows thatlocal interests, local needs, and traditional land rightsare easily pushed aside, and that land conflicts emergeas commercial interests from the outside enter.”Visiting Advisor to the Uganda Forest Authorities, TrygveRefsdal. In: Harald Eraker (2000): CO2lonialism: NorwegianTree Plantations, Carbon Credits and Land Conflicts inUganda. Norwatch, Oslo. Page 30.

16

To date, governments have neither adequately consideredthe impact of potential forest-related activitiesundertaken in the context of the Kyoto Protocol on forestbiodiversity and forest peoples nor have they conductedan evaluation of ‘Activities Implemented Jointly’ to ensurelessons from forest-related projects during this pilotphase are taken into consideration.

Special report on ‘carbon sinks’ givesinadequate advice to policy makers

In 1998, governments requested the IntergovernmentalPanel on Climate Change to examine the scientific andtechnical state of understanding of issues relevant to‘carbon sinks’. In 2000, the IPCC presented a voluminousspecial report on “Land Use, Land Use Change andForestry”25. However, a number of issues central to‘carbon sinks’ were not considered by the panel, remainedunanswered or were dealt with in a highly controversialmanner.

The most important short-coming of the report is that itdid not consider the social impacts of land use andforestry activities. The 377-page report contains merelythree short paragraphs stating the importance of

assessing the social implications of ‘carbon sinks’ projectsbut then fails to assess these impacts. Governments haveconsequently been provided with only part of theinformation and analysis needed to ensureenvironmentally and socially sound decisions will betaken in relation to ‘carbon sinks’.

How industrialised countries will sink theKyoto Protocol

Recent analysis by Greenpeace on the various optionsrelated to ‘carbon sinks’ that are under discussion in theclimate negotiations suggests that “in the case of fullparticipation by all Annex B Parties the inclusion of sinksunder Articles 3.4, 6 and 12 is likely to result in anincrease in the allowed emissions in 2008-2012 of about3.6%” 26.The assessment comes to the conclusion thatthis would result in an overall emissions increase of about0.6% above 1990 levels and that for the OECD group ofcountries in Annex B of the Protocol, there is likely to bean increase in the allowed emissions by about 3.9% due tothe inclusion of sinks. This would reduce the effectivetarget from a 4.7% reduction to about a 0.8% reductionrelative to 1990 emissions.

Figure 3 Greenpeace International (2001): CoP-6 President’s text. A Quantitative Analysis. Amsterdam, June 2001

Reduction targets Kyoto Protocol 1997

Reduction targets from 1990 to 2008 – 2012 for industrialised countries for fossil fuels and other industrial greenhouse gasemissions due to the inclusion of sinks.

17

5.1 Why carbon sinks should be excludedfrom the Kyoto Protocol’s flexiblemechanisms

Fern urges governments not to include ‘carbon sinks’ inthe Clean Development Mechanism and limit credits from‘carbon sink’ activities elsewhere in the Protocol to thosethat are verifiable with narrow uncertainty limits because

The concept of carbon sinks is scientifically unsound:– the uncertainties related to current methodologiesresult in margins of error that are often larger than theactual change in carbon uptake and release that is beingmeasured– natural climate variability alone appears to haveresulted in the carbon balance between carbon uptakeand release in terrestrial ecosystems oscillating over morethan 1Gt C during the past 60 years (total emissionreduction obligations of Annex 1 countries in the firstcommitment period (2008-2012): 250Mt C)– it assumes without credible proof that methodologiesexist that can distinguish between human-inducedchanges in carbon stock (the only ones for which carboncredits could be claimed) and those changes in carbonstocks resulting from natural phenomena (effects ofincreased nitrogen and CO2 fertilization etc.)– it assumes without credible proof that social variablesaffecting the carbon balance of terrestrial ecosystems incases of changes to land use can be measured, monitoredand controlled.

The current negotiating text provides perverse incentivesthat are likely to exacerbate the global forest crisisThe proposed forest definition continues to confuseforests with tree plantations. This is a major shortcominggiven that large-scale tree plantations are alreadyexpanding, often associated with the destruction ofprimary forests. Any incentive to further accelerate thepace of establishment of large-scale tree plantations willonly exacerbate deforestation.Climate talks have up to this point ignored the underlying

causes of deforestation and forest degradation. Takingdecisions pertaining to land use, land use change andforestry without consideration of these underlying causesand of the lessons from more than a decade of failedintergovernmental initiatives to halt the forest crisis willdo little to reverse this worrying trend. On the contrary,the proposals discussed under the Kyoto Protocol mayeven worsen the situation because they provide perverseincentives for the establishment of large-scale treeplantations and fail to put in place adequate measures toprotect forests from the expected negative impacts thatclimate change will have on forests.Within the context of the Kyoto Protocol, only human-induced activities warrant carbon credits – ecologicallyadvantageous natural regeneration may be replaced byplanting even in those areas where forests already existand natural regeneration should be the method of choice.Even if governments agreed to include biodiversityprovisions into the agreement, these provisions might bedifficult to implement and monitor effectively.

Carbon credits will only increase the threat climate changeposes to forestsCarbon credits will further increase CO2 concentrations inthe atmosphere because they justify the continued releaseof carbon stored in fossil fuels in exchange for temporarysequestration of carbon in biomass. Attempts to addressthe lack of permanence associated with above-groundcarbon sequestration fail to recognize that CO2, oncereleased into the atmosphere, remains active as agreenhouse gas for about 100 years.Perverse incentives are likely to reduce the geneticdiversity of tree species (planting instead of naturalregeneration, potential use of genetically engineeredvarieties that are bred for maximum carbon uptake butpotentially ill-suited to adapt to a changing climate). Thiswould further reduce the capacity of forest ecosystems toadapt to climate change.Granting credits for carbon sink projects in the CleanDevelopment Mechanism will allow an increase of overallgreenhouse gas emissions in industrialised countries.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

18

Carbon sinks concept likely to lead to a new wave ofcolonialism – CO2lonialismLand in the South would be locked up in long-term landleases to provide carbon credits so the North can continueto pollute. The consequences for continued over-consumption and pollution by the North are born firstand foremost by forest peoples and local communities inthe South.Should countries in the South have to commit to emissiontargets in a future commitment period, they will havegiven away the cheapest options to fulfill their obligationsto companies in the North. Once they accept emissiontargets, countries can automatically trade carbon creditsthrough Joint Implementation projects and fulfill part oftheir obligations through Land Use, Land Use Change andForestry activities (Art. 3.3 and 3.4), but as space forcarbon sink projects is limited, many of the potentialcarbon sinks lands will have been signed over in long-term agreements to Northern interests during the firstcommitment period - most likely for a fraction of thevalue that carbon credits might render on the emergingcarbon market (see examples of Uganda, Tanzania).The Kyoto Protocol lacks any direct reference to forestpeoples’ rights and there is do date no guarantee that‘carbon sink’ projects will respect forest peoples landrights and land use rights.

Forests play a vital role in mitigating weather extremesand, as major stores of carbon and water, in the globalcarbon cycle. Maintaining and restoring intact forests isthus of utmost importance to stem the extremes ofclimate change. Achieving this task requires substantialadditional financial commitments from industrialisedcountries as the main actors responsible for the increaseof greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. These fundsshould be provided without link to the flexiblemechanisms as this would, among others, require relianceon scientifically unsound methods of measuring andmonitoring changes of carbon uptake and release fromforest ecosystems. In the case of the Clean DevelopmentMechanism, it would also allow industrialised countriesto release additional carbon from fossil fuels above andbeyond their emission targets while the carbonsequestered in exchange would be stored onlytemporarily.

5.2 Recommendations

The Kyoto Protocol must ensure that measures toaddress climate change will not further threatenforests nor rely on planting trees to fix the man-made crisis of global warming.

Given the vital role forests play in the formation ofglobal climate patterns, maintaining and restoringhealthy forests is of utmost importance toaddressing climate change. The safest way to avertthe danger that climate change poses to forestsworldwide is to address the root cause of this threat:excess greenhouse gas emissions in industrialisedcountries. Drastic reductions of greenhouse gasemissions in industrialised countries must thus beat the heart of any credible agreement to addressclimate change.

Even if most of the outstanding technical issuespertaining to carbon sinks in the Kyoto Protocolwere resolved, there are a number of reasons not toinclude forests any further in the Kyoto Protocol’sflexible mechanisms and limit their use where theyare already listed as an option. Many things can –and probably will – go wrong with ‘carbon sink’projects:

Where forests have been included already as anoption to achieve emission reduction targets, creditsfrom ‘carbon sink’ activities should be limited tothose that are verifiable with narrow uncertaintylimits.

Large-scale tree plantations should be explicitlyexcluded from providing carbon credits due to theirnegative impacts on many local communities andbiodiversity.

Governments should use the precautionaryapproach and not include ‘carbon sinks’ in the CleanDevelopment Mechanism because in addition to thegeneral concerns listed above, temporary storingcarbon through a CDM project leads to additionalpermanent emissions in industrialised countries.

19

Acknowledgements

Writing this Briefing Note would not have been possiblewithout access to the wealth of material already publishedby NGO colleagues on this subject. We have made anattempt to give credit where we have relied directly ondata – particularly the technical analyses and calculationspresented in reports available to us. Where we havemissed to give credit where credit is due: Thank you tothose who have stayed abreast the attempt by somegovernments to make the Kyoto Protocol so complicatedthat no lay person would be able to grasp the far-reachingimplications it is bound to have. Data sources have beenverified and researched with due care. Given theuncertainties inherent in the subject matter of thispublication however, data is indicative rather than exactfor many of the calculations related to carbon stocks.

1 Vellinga, P & W.J.Versefeld (2000): Climate Change and ExtremeWeather Events. WWF International, Gland, Switzerland; Friends ofthe Earth International (2000): Gathering Storm. Report on theHuman Cost of Climate Change.2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1990): FirstAssessment Report. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland.IPCC (2001): Third Assessment Report of Working Group I.Summary for Policy Makers. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland.3 Harmon et al. (1990): Effects on Carbon Storage of Conversionof Old-growth Forests to Young Forests. Science 247.4 Fearnside, P.M. (1996): Amazonian Deforestation and GlobalWarming: Carbon Stocks in Vegetation Replacing Brazil’s AmazonForest. Forest Ecology and Management 80.5 “a substantial fraction of a global average of one-third, varyingby region from one-seventh to two-thirds”. IPCC (1990): FirstAssessment Report. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland.6 The main reason why intensely managed forests contain somuch less carbon than unmanaged old-growth forests is thattimber is harvested in these production forests before theecosystem has reached its maximum storage capacity. The lowerbiomass is further attributable to the continual extraction ofbiomass by thinning where forests are under intensive silviculturemanagement.7 “a substantial fraction of a global average of one-third, varyingby region from one-seventh to two-thirds) of the existing forestedarea of the world will undergo major changes” and “entire foresttypes may disappear.” IPCC (1990): First Assessment Report. IPCC,Geneva, Switzerland.8 Pro Regenwald (2001): Klima, Bäume und das Geld.Dokumentation Nr. 2.9 Based on average dispersal rates, spruce species would need anaverage 4.000 years to move 1000km northwards, hazelnut wouldneed 670years to move 1000km northward.10 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change:Third AssessmentReport. Summary for Policy Makers Geneva, Switzerland. February2001.11 More precisely, those countries listed in Annex 1 of theUNFCCC. Their emission reduction targets are listed in Annex B ofthe Kyoto Protocol. The terms ‘Annex 1 Party’ and Annex B Party’are therefore often used synonymously in climate negotiator’sjargon.

12 Because Russia’s actual emissions plunged during the economiccrisis of the early 90s, the allowance created a significant surplus inpollution “rights” - so-called ‘Hot Air’ that might be sold to thehighest bidder through emission trading, one of the three flexiblemechanisms.13 Greenpeace International (2000): Cheating the Kyoto Protocol:Loopholes and environmental effectiveness. Greenpeace,Amsterdam.14 Source: Vanessa Houlder (2000): The Kyoto Protocol.Vital talksloom at The Hague. Energy and Utilities Review 5. Financial TimesSeptember 29, 2000.15 In climate negotiator’s jargon this is called the ‘permanence’issue.16 Article 4 of the Climate Convention calls on governments to “promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, asappropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases […]including biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial,coastal and other marine ecosystems”.17 In the last version of the negotiation text, FCCC/SBSTA/2000/12,deforestation is direct human-induced conversion of forest land tonon-forest land, reforestation and afforestation are the directhuman-induced conversion of non-forest to forest throughplanting, seeding [and/or the promotion of natural regeneration]on land that was forested, but that has been converted to non-forestland, resp. land that has not been forested for a period of at least 50years.18 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2000): SpecialReport on Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry. IPCC.Cambridge University Press.19 Friends of the Earth International (2000): Tree Trouble. Acompilation of the negative impacts of large-scale monoculture treeplantations. Sobrevivencia, Paraguay; World Rainforest Movement(2000): Climate Change Convention: Sinks that Stink. WRM,Uruguay.20 For more information on the negative social and environmentalimpacts of plantations see: Carrere, R. and L. Lohmann (1996):Pulping the South: Industrial Tree Plantations and the World PaperEconomy. Zed Books, London. Further material on the WorldRainforest Movement webpage (www.wrm.org.uy).21 As a consequence of among others the Norwatch investigation,the Ugandan project has recently been withdrawn from a carboncredit. It was started however with the explicit aim of entering intothe carbon market should governments at decide to give credits to‘carbon sink’ projects in the CDM.22 Declaration of the First International Forum of IndigenousPeoples on Climate Change. Lyon, France. September 2000. The fulltext is available on the WRM web page (www.wrm.org.uy).23 For a detailed analysis of the underlying causes of forest loss seeVerolme, H., M. Folley and J.Moussa (1999): Addressing theUnderlying Causes of Deforestation and Forest Degradation. CaseStudies, Analysis and Policy Recommendations.24 With the notable exception of the US, this applies to all of theindustrialised countries with emission reduction targets.25 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2000): SpecialReport on Land use, Land-use change and Forestry. CambridgeUniversity Press.26 Greenpeace International (2001): CoP 6 President’s Text. AQuantitative Analysis. Greenpeace, Amsterdam.

Published July 2001 by Fern, Brussels, Belgium

“The requirement that countries ‘precisely calculate net changes in GHG

emissions and removals based on changes in carbon stocks’ is an ‘unrealistic

expectation’ in the countries examined.” M. Jonas, B. Mayr, S. Schidler et al.

“If we are trying to value future carbon sinks, this could be incredibly

important in the sense that future carbon sinks may not be as large as we

have anticipated based on shorter-term studies and modelling

activities,” Ellsworth