PRE-BAR REVIEW NOTESIN POLITICAL LAW

by Judge ESTELA ALMA A. SINGCO

ARTICLE INATIONAL TERRITORY

-Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:A group of islands, including parts of the islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and other natural resources form an intensive geographical, economic, political entity or to have historically regarded as an archipelago.

-Archipelagic State- means a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands.

-Archipelagic Baselines- basis: UNCLOS: how to treat Kalayaan Group of Islands (KGI) and Scarborough Shaol: whether to include or to exclude them from the baselines; and/or consider as part of the regime of islands.

-Kalayaan Islands (constituted under RA 1596)- part of Region IV-B, Province of Palawan but under the custody of DND. Found some 380 miles west of the southern end of Palawan.

-Scarborough shaol (Bajo de Masinloc)- also known as scarborough reef, panatag shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found in the South China Sea or West Philippine Sea, part of the province of Zambales. A shaol is a triangle shaped chain of reefs and islands (but mostly rocks. 55 kilometers around with an area of 150 square kilometer. Its 123 miles west of Subic Bay. Basis: terra nullius; 200 EEZ

-Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the entire archipelago wherein the Kalayaan chain of islands is located. The Philippines essentially claims only the western section of Spratlys, which is nearest to Palawan.

-RA 9522 (March 10, 2009)- It defines the general configuration of the archipelago, including the extended continental shelf and exclusive economic zone to make it more compliant with the UNCLOS.

-It redrew the countrys baseline to comply with the UNCLOS requirements for archipelagic state, in the process excluding the disputed Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough shoal from the main archipelago and classifying them instead as regime of islands. They excluded from the baselines. The national territory constitutes a roughly triangular delineation which excludes large areas of waters within 600 miles by 1,200 miles rectangular enclosing the Philippine archipelago as defined in the Treaty of Paris.

-Regime of islands (Art. 121 of UNCLOS) consists of islands or naturally formed areas of land surrounded by water that remain above water during high tide. The principle forces claimant states over a certain territory to maintain peace in the area because no country can claim exclusive ownership of any of these islands.

-Magalona, et al. vs. Exec. Sec., GR No. 187167, August 16, 2011- Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KGI and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KGI and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.

-Constitutional issues:

Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters EEZ; claims over Sabbah and Spratly islands Delineation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris vs. RA 9552 -Right of innocent passage- archipelagic sea lane passage and right of overflight

-200-Economic Zone (includes Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zone) READ: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

-Contiguous Zone (12 nm from the end of territorials seas)-Teritorial seas/maritime domain (12 nm from baseline)-Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters

-Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968- An exception to the full and complete power of a nation within its territories is by virtue of the consent of the nation itself. The embassy premises of a foreign power are within the territorial domain of the host State. The ground occupied as embassy premises is not the territory of the foreign State to which the premises belong.

-Kalayaan Island Group a) historic right b) P.D. No. 1596, dated June 11, 1978 c) effective occupation d) principle of contiguity because of proximity e) part of the continental shelf c) RA 3046 & RA 5446 c) RA 9552

-Freedom islands to which Spratly islands belong- basis: terra nullius

ARTICLE IIDECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

-Republicanism

- Separation of Powers- Principles of Blending of Powers and Checks & Balances- under the principle of separation of powers, courts cannot interfere with the exercise by the legislature of its authority to conduct investigations in aid of legislation (Senate Blue Ribbon vs Majaducon, GR # 136760, July 29, 2003; Executive privilege -Neri vs. Senate Committee, GR. No. 180643, Mach 25, 2008)

- Judicial Review: Requisites (Francisco, et al. vs. HR, et al., November 10, 2003; ABAKADA Guro Party List, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, September 1, 2005; David et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006).

Local governments: With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of legislative and executive powers in the office of the local chief executive under the BP Blg. 337 has been disbanded, so that either department now comprises different and non-intermingling official personalities with the end in view of ensuring a better delivery of public service and provide a system of check and balance between the two. The avowed intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan independence in the exercise of its legislative functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the Governor of the executive functions. (Atienza vs. Villarosa, May 10, 2005).

Non-Delegation of legislative power ( Abakada Guro Party List vs. Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005; Epira case-Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007).

Permissible delegation: 1. tariff powers of the President (Sec. 28 (2) Art. VI) 2. emergency power of the President (Sec. 23 (2) of Art. VI 3. people (Sec. 32 of Art. VI; Sec. 10 of Art. X, Sec. 2 of Art. XVII; RA 6735) 4. local governments (Art X) 5. administrative bodies (power of subordinate legislation) Tests of valid delegation:1.completeness test * Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17, 2007 2. sufficient standard *Santiago vs. COMELEC, 3/19/97; Abakada Guro Party List vs. Exec. Sec. -Incorporation Clause -By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.[Tanada vs. Angara, May 2, 1997]

-Incorporated: 1. Treaties duly ratified (Pimentel vs. Ermita, 462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005) 2. norms of general or customary laws 3. treaties which have become part of customary Law (Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons; Kuroda vs. Jalandoni

-Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005- There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. -Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines, vs. Duque, et al., GR No. 1703034, October 9, 2007- Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. A mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

-Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002 generally accepted principles of International Law, the provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State.

-The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution [Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion]

- Civilian Supremacy (IBP vs. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)-The calling of the marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian enforcement. Notwithstanding the conduct of joint visibility patrols by the members of PNP and the Philippine marines, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader and it is the local police forces who are in charge at all times.

-Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our representative system of government. The Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil in nature. Civilian supremacy over the military also countermands the notion that the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such as conducting warrantless searches and seizure. The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. The President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief.

-Gonzales, et al vs. Gen. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 10, 2006- Courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrops Military Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinary system that ensures the Presidents control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this disciplinary system is the President who exercises review powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted

-Maintenance of Peace & Order and the protection of the people against violence are constitutionsl duties of the State and to bear arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties (Chavez s. Romulo, G. R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004).

-Separation of the Church and State- Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006- It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution. Benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interest.

-Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, July 9, 2003. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.

-Balanced & Healthful Ecology- The right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. This right implies, among other things, the judicious management and conservation of the countrys resources, which duty is reposed in the DENR. ( Prov. of Rizal vs. Exec. Sec., December 13, 2005)

-Local Autonomy ( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law. The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local governments sovereign within the state of an imperium in imperio (unlike in a Federal System). The matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.

-Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, (GR No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008)- The Constitution does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of the Philippine territory for independence.

-Equal access to opportunity for public service Pamatong vs. COMELEC, April 13, 2004- the provision does not bestow a right to seek the presidency; it does not contain a judicial enforceable constitutional right and merely specifies a guideline for legislative action. It is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accomodate as many as possible into public office.

ARTICLE IV CITIZENSHIP

-Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543- Having a Filipino father at the time of birth makes one a Filipino. Having an Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship and does not militate against the claim of Filipino citizenship.

-Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a persons citizenship may be done through a direct action for its nullity.

-Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions in order that the election of Philippine citizenship is effective:1.the mother of the person making the election must be citizen of the Philippines; and2.said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority.-Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010, GR No. 183133 - the evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973 Philippine Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-born citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of registration of the documents of election should not result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship.-The Court concluded that, having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. -Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: 1) desertion of the AFP; 2) served in the armed forces of the allied forces in WWII; 3) service in the AF of the US at any other time; 4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and economic necessity.

-R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, the children must be of minor age at the time of the petititon for repatriation was filed by the parent [Angat vs. RP, September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs. CA, GR. No. 125793, August 29, 2006- no showing that Tabasas parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity].

-Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

-Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to the taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.

-Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of ones application for repatriation. Supra.

-Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. If he was originally a natural born citizen before he lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as natural born Filipino.

-NATURAL BORN- Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9225, amending CA 63, otherwise known as Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act (August 29, 2003)- including citizens repatriated and unmarried children, whether legitimate or illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age of those repatriated.

-DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630- The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance (especially for naturalized citizens). In filing a certificate of candidacy, the person with dual citizenship effectively renounces his foreign citizenship. The oath of allegiance contained in the certificate of candidacy constitutes sufficient renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

-Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19, 2009- The Supreme Court recently ruled that a natural-born Filipino, who also possesses American citizenship having been born of an American father and a Filipino mother, is exempt from the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before running for public office. The Supreme Court En Banc held that that it has applied the twin requirements to cases which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in RA No. 9225 do not apply to him.

-LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 Valles and Mercado Doctrines do not apply is one reacquires his citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for public office. To comply with the provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is necessary that the candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

-Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008 Mercado case was decided under Section 40 of LGC re dual allegiance, and that time RA 9225 was not yet enacted.

-Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088, January 19, 2009- It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen. Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office. Under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

-Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180048, June 19, 2009- R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office, as follows: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

-x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.

-BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, December 17, 2007- Dual citizens may practice law in the Philippines by leave of the Supreme Court and upon compliance with the requirements, which will restore their good standing as members of the Philippine Bar.

-Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)- The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows: Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected. Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.

*Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23, 1989-AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11, 2007- It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including the Supreme Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

-Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and Fornier vs. COMELEC, March 3, 2004- Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

-As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish between legitimate child and illegitimate child of a Filipino father, we should not make a distinction. The civil status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not determinative of the Philippine citizenship.

-Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA 292- When citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered as res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same.

-Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248- EXCEPTIONS (to res judicata principle) 1.) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where the person is a party; 2.) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.

-Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139) grants Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings to aliens born and residing in the Philippines. They have the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.

-Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 . The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.

-JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179120, April 1, 2009- Clearly, under the law and jurisprudence, it is the - State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization proceedings. It is not a matter that maybe raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizens descendant.

-Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino citizens acquisition of permanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. The green card status in the USA is a renunciation on ones status as a resident of the Philippines.

ARTICLE V (SUFFRAGE)

-READ: RA 9225 and RA 9189 (Absentee Voting)

-AKBAYAN-Youth vs. COMELEC, March 26, 2001- where it is both impractical and illegal to conduct a two-day special registration for new voters, the COMELEC cannot be compelled to do so.

-The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law.

-The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo, among others the process of registration under RA 8189 (Voters Registration Act of 1996).

-Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation of residence is synonymous to domicile. An absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines, as residence is considered synonymous with domicile. Domicile means an individuals permanent home or a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.

-Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC- Three basic rules on domicile: 1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) domicile, once established, remains until a new one is validly acquired; (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at any given time.

-Absentee voting under Section 2 of RA 9189 is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency requirement.

-Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006- There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189 (election for president, v-pres., senators). It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.

ARTICLE VI(LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)

-Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008- in elections for President, V-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass are prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to he prohibition namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition of proceeding of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and the due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of RA 7166, as amended by RA No. 9369.

-Non delegation of legislative power

-Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 - Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. xxx In the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "interest of law and order;" "adequate and efficient instruction;" "public interest;" "justice and equity;" "public convenience and welfare;" "simplicity, economy and efficiency;" "standardization and regulation of medical education;" and "fair and equitable employment practices." Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power and watershed rehabilitation and management meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice- Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule making authority under RA No. 8177. -EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533-Power of Subordinate Legislation with this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by filling the details which Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by DOLE on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

-ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, September 1, 2005- No undue delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive.

-Congress did not delegate the power to tax to the President.- The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is simply to execute the legislative policy.

-Abakada Guro vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251- The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule of presentment. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers. It can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers.

-The Presidents Ordinance Power is the Executives rule-making authority in implementing and executing constitutional or statutory powers. Indisputably, there are constitutional powers vested in the Executive that are self-executory.

-Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar, GR No. 166498, June 11, 2009- Unless expressly granted to the BIR, the power to reclassify cigarette brands remains a prerogative of the Legislature which cannot be usurped by the former.

-Review Center Assos. of the Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No. 180046, April 2, 2009- The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722.

-SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008- Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts. The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is vested exclusively in Congress.

-PARTY-LIST SYSTEM- BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR No. 1777271, May 4, 2007- No national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. xxx The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: [T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the Certified List the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.xxx Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups.-Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244, October 6, 2000; Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC, March 15, 2006 Section VI 5(2) of Article of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable parameters: (1) the 20% allocation: the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives; (2) the 2% threshold: only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system are qualified to a have a seat in the House; (3) the three seat limit: each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional; and (4) proportional representation: the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.-BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009- 2% threshold in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is declared unconstitutional. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.-In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:-(1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (2)The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. (3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.-In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.-In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. -Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections: The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list elections.

-Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

-Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.

-Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

-However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

-Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 203646, April 2, 2013- In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

-1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

-2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.

-3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

-4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

-5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

-6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

-The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the marginalized and underrepresented. Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

-Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 7, 2010- There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes 250,000 minimum population that must compose legislative district. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative with nothing mentioned about a population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly situated.

-Aldaba, et al. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010- In this case, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected prior to the May 2010 elections. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislation district of its own under Section 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution.

-Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010 - that Ang Ladlad, an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs), has satisfied the exacting standards that the marginalized and underrepresented sector must demonstrate (1) past subordination or discrimination suffered by the group; (2) an immutable or distinguishing characteristic, attribute, or experience that define them as a discrete group; and (3) present political and/or economic powerlessness.

-The Court said that Ang Ladlad has shown that the LGBT sector has been historically disadvantaged and discriminated against because of negative public perception, and has even alleged acts of violence perpetrated against members of the LGBT community by reason of their sexual orientation and gender identity. It added that the magnitude of opposition against petitioners participation in the party list system is, by itself, demonstrative of the sectors lack of political power; so, too, is the fact that proposed legislations seeking to prohibit discriminatory treatment against LGBTs have been languishing in Congress.

-LEGISLATIVE PERKS (PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689) The history of the provision granting Senators and Congressmen immunity from arrest and detention shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense.

-Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008- presumption of innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.

-Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecnoming of a member thereof (Osmea vs. Pendatun).

-Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009- Richard Gordon did not relinquish his Senatorial post despite his election to and acceptance of the post Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. PNRC is a private organization merely performing public functions, and that the PNRC Chairman is not a government official or employee. Not being a government office, the PNRC Chairmanship may be held by any individual, including a Senator or Member of the House of Congress. NRC is autonomous, neutral and independent of the Philippine Government. It is a voluntary organization that does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is not a part of any of the government branches. PNRC Chairmanship is not a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in the 1987 Constitution. Senator Gordon can validly serve as the Chairman of the PNRC without giving up his senatorial position.

Avelino vs. Cruz- When the constitution declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, it does not mean all the members. The base in computing majority is normally the total membership of the body, within the coercive power of the House.

Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)- The term majority simply means the greater number or more than half. Who shall sit as officers is the sole prerogative of the Senate. (Note: splitting of term between Senate President Drilon and another Senator). When the Constitution provides that the Senate President shall be elected by the majority it does not delineate who comprises the majority or the minority. The defeated senator (s) in the election for the Senate presidency are not necessarily the minority.

-RULES OF PROCEEDINGS- Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268- Courts cannot inquire into the allegations that in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules in the absence of showing that there was violation of a constitutional provision or private rights. Parliamentary rules are mere procedures which may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.

-DISCIPLINING MEMBERS- Osmea vs Pendatun, The House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior. The courts will not assume jurisdiction in any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature.

-People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689- His election as congressman did not thereby amount to a condonation of his offense; neither does it entitle him, pending appeal of his case, to be free from confinement and to be allowed to attend sessions of congress, for the people elected him with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action and movement.

-It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to shield a member of congress from the consequences of his wrongdoings. A member of Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrests for relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by correctional penalties.

Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan- suspension imposed by Congress to a colleague is distinct from suspension spoken in Section 13 of RA 3019 which is not a penalty but a preliminary preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed for misbehavior as a member of Congress.

-ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS- Vera vs. Avelino- The members of the Senate validly suspended the oath-taking of the 3 senators elect. This does not fall within the powers of the electoral tribunal. The latter has jurisdiction only over electoral contests in which contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also have himself inducted into office.

-LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles; Paras vs. Nograles & Villando vs. COMELEC, April 1, 2009- once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over the election contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications, ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. The proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the timeof the proclamation.

-Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidates in the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may assail ones eligibility or ineligibility, qualification or disqualification is to file before the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the HRET Rules.

-Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10, 2002- Since petitioner (Codilla) seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending the proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the 2nd Division. The said Order was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality, the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends the execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent (Locsin) as the duly elected representative of the 4th District of Leyte.

-At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner (Codilla) in his motion for reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

-Barbers vs. COMELEC, June 22, 2005- The phrase election, returns and qualifications should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestees title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that election referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; returns to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and qualifications to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

-Chavez vs. COMELEC- While the COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, V-President, Senator and Members of the House of Representatives.

What is allowed is the correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns. To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings. Where the petition calls for the correction of manifest errors in the certificates of canvass, COMELEC has jurisdiction. If it calls for the re-opening and appreciation of ballots, the Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction.-This Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility (Angara vs. Electoral Commission; Pena vs. HRET).

-Bondoc vs. Pineda- Members of the HRET as sole judge of congressional election contests are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution. -Robles vs. HRET- Jurisdiction of HRET once acquired is not lost uponthe instance of the parties bu| continues until the case is terminated.

-Abubakar vs. HRET, March 7, 2007- The Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. It is absent in this case.

-Abayon vs. HRET; Palparan vs. HRET, GR 189466 & 189506, respectively, February 11, 2010- Since party-list nominees are considered as elected members of the House, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.

-Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 193808, June 26, 2012- RA 7941 (Party-List System Act) vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing the qualifications of each nominee and that no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the COMELECs First Division and COMELEC En Banc which had declared President Villanueva the proper party to submit CIBACs Certificate of Nomination instead of Perla, who allegedly served as acting secretary-general. As provided in Atienza v. Commission of Elections, COMELEC also possesses the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a necessary tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to enforce election laws and register political parties. The power to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident to its enforcement powers, the Court declared

-Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, Zubiri, March 13, 2008 - It is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of Pimentel involving, as it does, a contest relating to the election of Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.

-DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496- The House of Representatives is authorized to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. The changes must be PERMANENT and do not include temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.

-The provision on Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard. A political party must have at least two senators to be able to have a representative in the Commission on Appointments, so that any number less than 2 will not entitle such party a membership in the CA. (Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789).

-Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, 11/19/02- Even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners direct recourse to this Court is premature. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.

-APPROPRIATION- Gonzales vs. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733, - The Presidents creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform through an executive Order involves no exercise by Congress of its taxing power or spending power.

-The appropriation for the PCCR was authorized by the President, not by Congress. In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that the money may be paid out of the treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.

-IMPORTANT: LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY- Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon (203 SRCA 76)- An investigation that seeks the determination whether a law has been violated is not in aid of legislation but in aid of prosecution, and therefore, violative of separation of powers. To allow the Committee to investigate the matter would create the possibility of conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiceable controversy would be an encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier (investigation was not in aid of legislation).

-Subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice (Romero II vs. Estrada, GR No. 174105, April 2, 2009).

-Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, GR No. 167173, December 27, 2007- the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative inquiry, otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint.

-The exercise by Congress or by any of its Committee of the power to punish contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation as the branch of government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it. Except only when the Congress and/or its Committee exercise the power of contempt, it cannot penalize violators even if there is overwhelming evidence of criminal culpability. It can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a recommendation for the criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable.

-EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- is the implied constitutional power of the President to withhold information requested by other branches of the government. The Constitution does not expressly grant this power to the President but courts have long recognized implied Presidential powers if necessary and proper in carrying out powers and functions expressly granted to the Executive under the Constitution. xxx In this jurisdiction, several decisions have recognized executive privilege starting with the 1995 case of Almonte v. Vasquez, and the most recent being the 2002 case of Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and the 2006 case of Senate v. Ermita.As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief Executive, the President is ultimately responsible for military and national security matters affecting the nation. In the discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it necessary to withhold sensitive military and national security secrets from the Legislature or the public. As the official in control of the nations foreign service by virtue of the Presidents control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the President is the chief implementer of the foreign policy relations of the State. The Presidents role as chief implementer of the States foreign policy is reinforced by the Presidents constitutional power to negotiate and enter into treaties and international agreements. In the discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it necessary to refuse disclosure of sensitive diplomatic secrets to the Legislature or the public. Traditionally, states have conducted diplomacy with considerable secrecy. There is every expectation that a state will not imprudently reveal secrets that its allies have shared with it. There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of the internal deliberations of the President with his Cabinet and advisers. To encourage candid discussions and thorough exchange of views, the Presidents communications with his Cabinet and advisers need to be shielded from the glare of publicity. Otherwise, the Cabinet and other presidential advisers may be reluctant to discuss freely with the President policy issues and executive matters knowing that their discussions will be publicly disclosed, thus depriving the President of candid advice. Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The interest of protecting military, national security and diplomatic secrets, as well as Presidential communications, must be weighed against other constitutionally recognized interests. There is the declared state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, the accountability of public officers, the power of legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to secure testimonial and documentary evidence in deciding cases. The balancing of interests between executive privilege on one hand and the other competing constitutionally recognized interests on the other hand - is a function of the courts. The courts will have to decide the issue based on the factual circumstances of each case. This is how conflicts on executive privilege between the Executive and the Legislature, and between the Executive and the Judiciary, have been decided by the courts. Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 -Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.xxx Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.

-Operational Proximity Test (Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)- The communications elicited by the three (3) questions [a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project? b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe?] are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.-Conduct of legislative inquiries must be in accordance with publish rules.

-In the matter of the petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus of Camilo Sabio- GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class. xxx So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it is their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation

-Miguel vs. Gordon, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress in the absence of constitutional basis.

-Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006- Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.

-Varieties of Executive Privilege1. state secrets invoked by Presidents, if disclosed would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objective.2. informers privilege- not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law.3. generic privilege for internal deliberations- attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

-Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is executive privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected.

-When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

-The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its appearanceof department heads in the question hour contemplated in Section 22 of Article VI, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.

-The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered; (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority; and (e) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.

-The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny; investigation and supervision.

-ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE Abakada Guro Party List, et al. vs. Ermita, ed al., October 18, 2005 the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.

-A bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole, a distinct bill may be produced. The power of the Senate to propose amendments, it can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.

-BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE- The Supreme Court recognizes the long standing legislative practice of giving said conference ample latitude for compromising differences between the Senate and the House. It can propose amendment in the nature of a substitute, so long as the amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department.

-Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160 in order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are actually, directly, and exclusively used for charitable purposes. Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or enjoyment, and exclusively is defined, in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively. The words dominant use or principal use cannot be substituted for the words used exclusively without doing violence to the Constitution and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively

-Suplico, et al. vs. Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July 14, 2008- Any government expenditure without the corresponding appropriation from Congress is unconstitutional. There can be no dispute that the proceeds of foreign loans, whether concluded or not, cannot be obligated in a procurement contract without a prior appropriation from Congress. When the executive branch secures a loan to fund a procurement of goods or services, the loan proceeds enter the National Treasury as part of the general funds of the government. Congress must appropriate by law the loan proceeds to fund the procurement of goods or services, otherwise the loan proceeds cannot be spent by the executive branch. When the loan falls due, Congress must make another appropriation law authorizing the repayment of the loan out of the general funds in the National Treasury. This appropriation for the repayment of the loan is what is covered by the automatic appropriation

-ARTICLE VII(PRESIDENT)

-PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a sitting president evolved through case law.

Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President by virtue of the office. There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative.

Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that the immunity of the President extends to the end of the term to which he was elected notwithstanding his resignation. It is clear that the immunity of the President from suit is concurrent only with his tenure (representing the period during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right).

Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President.

David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. -SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL- Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 755- When the law grants the Supreme Court the power to resolve an election contest between or among presidential candidates, no new or separate court is created. The law merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

-The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for President and/or Vice-President has obtained the largest number of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by RA 1793. Congress merely acts as national board of canvassers, charged with the ministerial and executive duty to make said declaration, on the basis of the election returns duly certified by provincial and city boards of canvassers. Upon the other hand, the Presidential Electoral tribunal has the judicial power to determine whether or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with or reflect the true results of the elections in the areas covered by each and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has no power to do.

- In assuming the Office of Senator protestant Santiago has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest to the election protestee Ramos as President. (Santiago v. Ramos, 253 SCRA 559).

-Citing Defensor Santiago v. Ramos, the PET stressed that Legarda effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest when she ran in the Senate, which term coincides with the term of the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010. (Min. Res., PET Case No. 003, Legarda v. De Castro, February 12, 2008.

-Macalintal vs. PET, G.R. No. 191618 | 2011-06-07- A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."

-It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.

-The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules. It provides,

Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner. -Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.-The Supreme Court ruled t