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T H E C A T E G O R I E S O FH U M A N E X P E R I E N C E1908

M A N K I N D HA S C R E A T E D association as its general form ofl i fe . T hi s was not, so to speak, the only l ogical possibil ity. The hu-ma n species could just as well have been unsocial; there are un-social animal species as well as social ones. Because of the fact ofhuman social ity, however, we are easily m isled into thinking thatcategories which directly or indi rect ly ?g~5ociTgica onesarethe onl y, and uni versal ly appl icable, categories ihTeTms of whi chw~my contem plate th e contents of hu man experie nce. T hi s no-t ion, however, is completel y erroneous. T hat we are social beingssubjects these contents to a certain point of view, but it is by nomeans the onl y possible one. T o name a complete ly contr asti ngpoint of vie w, one can observe, st udy , and systematize the contents which, to be sure, exist and are realized only with in societypurely in terms of their objective content. T he inner validity, co-herence, and objective significance of ali sciences, technologies,and arts are completely independent of the fact that they arerealized with in an d find their preconditions in a social l i f e , justas independent as their objective sense is of the psychologicalprocesses through which their discoverers found them. They cannatural ly also be considered under the latter psychological or theformer social poin t of view. I t is completely legit i mate to i nqu i r e

From Soziologie (Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1908), pp.771-75. Translated by Donald N. Levine.

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T h e Categor ies o f H uman Experience 37under what social circumstances the natural science we possesscan come into bei ng. Bu t questions concern in g the correctness ofits proposit ions, their systemtc cohereri ce, and the adequacy orinadequ acy of i ts methods hve' fio E5oIogM& f" Hfri on w ha tso-cver. S uch matt ers are nwhere irinhcd by t l ie fact of theirsocial historical emergence, b ut are governed exclusivel y by im ma-nent, timeless, that is, purely objective, norms.

A l i contents of l i f e , therefore, are subject to this dual catego-rization. T hey can be consider ed as resul ts of social devel opment ,as objects of human interactions, butTRey^lTwTtheq^^l ion be considered with respect to their objecti ve contenta;=| efeinents of logical, technical, aesthetic, or metaphysical continua,possessing their meaning in themselvesjand not in the historicalactualities wh ich depend on social reTtinships.

I n addition to these categories, now, we must consider twoother essential ones. A l i those contents of l i f e are directly bornely i n d i v i d u ^^Som e one persfT*h""s cnciv d them. They f i l llh e corisciousness of someone; they br ing someone pleasure or| >ain. A l th ough they are social, they are at the same t ime i nd i vidual, intel l igible i n terms of the psychic processes i n this or thatindividual . F rom the teleological point of view , they issue indeterminate meaning for this or that individual . I t is of courseIrue that they would not have come into being if this individualdi d not l i ve in society, but just as l i t t l e would they have becomesocial if they had not been borne by individuais. I f I ask whatueeds dr ive this individual to his rel igious activity, what personaldestinies have moved h i m to found a sect, what value this actionnnd experience has for the development of his psyche, this orderof questioning does not in the slightest compete with one whichsubordin ates the srrie facts to the poin t of vi ew of soci ety wh athistorical m i l i e u has produced those inner needs; what forms ofinteractions among indiv iduais and in their relat i onship to out-siders make th em into a "sect"; what enri chments or cleavages th epubl ic mind experiences through that sort of religious movement.

Ind iv idua l and society are, both for historical' understandingand for normative iu dgment,\ methodolgical coraceps. T hi s is sot;ither i n that they divide given events and conditions among

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38 P H I L O S O P H Y O F T H E S O C I A L S C I E N C E Sthemselves or in that they deal w i t h th e un i ty of the given, w hi chwe cannot directly comprehnt}by rgriizing i t under tw o differ-ent point s of view , compara ble to the wy pictu re is considerednow as a physi ological a nd optical phenomenon, now as a cu l tura lproduct, or now w i t h respect to the technique of pa in t ing , now w i t hrespect to its content an d aesthetic va lu e. T o express th is w i t hthat ra dical ism of conception w hi ch in practice is na tu ra l l y ap -proached only fra gmentari ly, al i huma n psychic events and idealconstructions are to be understood as contents and norms of ind iv idua l l i fe , and just as thoroughly as contents and norms ofexistence in social i nter acti on, as for Spinoza the cosmic-absoluteexistence is to be conceived now under the attr ibute of extension,now (an d ju st as completely) un der that of thought u n a eadem-qu e res, sed duobus modis expressa ["one and the same t h i n g ,bu t expressed i n tw o modes."]

Beyond these last two standpoints, there is a t h i r d one1 w h i chis methodologicall y coordina te w i t h them, even though our meansto develop i t w i t h respect to the to ta l i ty of i nd iv idua l problemsare much more incomplete a nd its theoretical generali ty is re-stricted i n actua l cogniti on to very few considerations. I haveal ready stressed that association was only the historical-social formwh i ch the hum an species gave to its l i f e and w hich is by no meansident ical w i t h th e ltter when i t comes to scientific conceptualanalysis. One can therefore examine the givens and contents ofhistor ical rea l i ty independent of their specifAc social gnesis andsignificance according to the valu e and meanin g wh ich they pos-sess as elements of the l i f e of hu man ity , as stages of its development.

T o say that this " h u m a n i t y " possesses no concrete context, nouni f ied consciousness, no conti nu ous development is by no meansa va l i d objection to using the concept. "H u man i t y" i s , i f you w i l l ,an " idea, " just l i k e "nat ur e, " perhaps also l i k e "society." I t i s acategory un der w hi ch i nd iv idua l phenomena can be observed w i t h -1 Actually, at this point Simmel introduces a fourth category. A litogether, the fundamenta] categories in terms of which human experiencemay be viewed are: (1) society; (2) objective culture; (3) individualpersonality; and (4) humanity.ED . ? - '

The Categor ies of Human Expe r ience 39out saying that what is designated thereby leads an isolated existence or is to be dist i l led as a special qual i ty . We can, however, askof every human condition, qua l i t y , or action: What does th is meanns a stage of the development of hu man it y? W ha t precondit ionsmust the entir e species have att ain ed for th is to be possible? W h a tlias humanity as a biological , ethical , and psychic type therebyvvon or l ost i n value? I f these questions can be answered i n arc r ta in wa y, i t is by no means excluded that they can be answeredin a completely opposite way from the standpoint of the societylo w hich the acting i nd iv idua l belongs. That may as a rule notlie true. I t may be that what affects the entire history of humanityfor better or for worse usually has the same significance for theuarrower, socially bound circle; what is socially essential maywithout fur ther consideration even be something essential for thedevelopment or for the system of humani ty . Be al i that as i t may, i tdoes not affect the fact that the ordering and evaluation of anygiven content of l i f e accordi ng to the view point of the whole ofhumanity is in principie different from that w h i c h proceeds f romlhe view point of society, and that both viewpoints are independentof one another in their underlying motives, however much theymay consider one and the same fact, or human being, or cu l tura lcontent in terms of their respective hierarchies.

A l t h o u g h the category of the valu es and developments of thehuman type is methodologically as disti nct fr om the category oflhe being and action of the i nd iv idua l as from that of the l i f e ofsocial i nter acti on, the first two of these categories nonethelessstand in an inner relationship which places them as i t were as on eparty over against th e social category as a second par ty. Th e mater ial of the idea of humanity and the questions based on it areI nd iv idua l . I t i s nlya rnatter of secondary interest whether theactivities of these indi vidu ais contri bute to the condit i on and development of humanity in the form of sociation or in that of apurely personal activity in thought, sentiment, or art ist ic works,in the biological improvement or deterioration of the race, or inlhe rel igious relationship to gods and idols. The existence andconduct of the i nd iv idua l must of course occur i n some such.form, w hi ch provides the technique or the connecting l i n k through

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which i n d i v i d u a l i t y can b.goiBgJ M }ratcaU y._ effeti ve el ement ofhuma ni ty. "But for a l i th e ind is putab le ind ispensabi l i ty of these i n d i v i d u a l forms, among w hi ch soc ia l i ty s tands uppermost, hu man i t y and th e i n d i v i d u a l r e ma i n t h e p ol a r concepts frthe oBserva-t i i ff Kumn l i fe . Object ivly"and'h s correlat ionmay n ot b f v ery extensive importa nce when cont rasted w i t h th efact of soc ietyal though th is chapter 2 has shown its efncacious-ness i n a series of his tor ica l epochs, and modern i n d i v i d u a l i s mhas been t ra ced back t o it more than once. B u t at the very least i tremains the ideal a u x i l i a r y const ru ction by means of w hi ch "soc ie ty" is shown i ts place i n the series of concepts w h ic h meth od-i c a l l y order the study of l i fe . J u s t a s w i t h i n societal developmentthe na rr ower, "more soc ia l i zed" group at ta ins i ts counterpart( i n t erna l l y or h is t or i c a l l y , on a cycl ical or s imultaneous basis) inthat it expands to the larger group and is special ized to the i n d i v i d u a l element of societyso from th is u l t imate point of viewsociety as a whole appears as a special form of aggregation beyondw h i c h , s u b o r d i n a t i n g their contents to other forms of observationan d eval ua ti on, there stan d the ideas of h u m a n i t y and of thei n d i v i d u a l .2 T he earlier sectionsof the chapter to which Simmel alludesappearas chapter 16 of the present volume.ED.