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Christine M. Pense and Stephen H. Cutcliffe Risky Talk: Framing the Analysis of the Social Implications of Nanotechnology

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Risky Talk: Framing the Analysis of the SocialImplications of Nanotechnology

Christine M. PenseStephen H. CutcliffeLehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania

AUTHORS’ NOTE: Research for this article was partially funded under a grant from the National Science Foundation: CNS SES 0531146.Address correspondence to Christine M. Pense, STS Program, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA 18015; e-mail: [email protected]; Stephen H.Cutcliffe, STS Program, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA 18015; e-mail: [email protected].

Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society Vol. 27, No. 5, October 2007, 349-366DOI: 10.1177/0270467607306592Copyright © 2007 Sage Publications

Nanotechnology promises to amend an understand-ing of elemental properties, alter the basic techniques ofmanufacturing, and improve disease diagnosis. There isa disconnect among the positive predictions of scientistsand researchers, the fears of public interest groups, andthe developers of products. A new framework for evalu-ating the social implications of nanotechnology willpermit a dialogue among interest groups, who currentlyfail to effectively communicate with one another. Eachinstance of nanotechnology application will likely haveits own unique attributes, but this framework for evalu-ating the social implications of nanotechnology willaddress three questions: How do problems become vis-ible to the social groups that contribute to the framingof technology? What kind of language do social groupsuse to express significance? How does risk stan-dardization contribute to technology stabilization?The suggested framework compares the ways thatrisk is discussed in military applications, consumerproducts, and workplace safety.

Keywords: nanotechnology; risk; social constructionof technology; societal implications of nanotechnology

Nanotechnology promises to amend our under-standing of elemental properties, to alter the basic tech-niques of manufacturing, to improve the process ofdisease diagnosis, and to further blur the definition ofhuman. Such a sweep of possibilities attracted $6.4 bil-lion in government spending worldwide, of which theU.S. share was $1.78 billion in 2006. Worldwide cor-porate spending on nanotechnology research in 2006was $5.3 billion, of which the U.S. share was $1.93

(Lux Research, as cited in Mitchell, 2007). The poten-tial has also alerted interest groups determined onchange in the structure of federal regulations for envi-ronmental and social protection. The earliest well-publicized nanotechnology products include sunscreencreams, golf clubs, tennis balls, and stain-resistantpants. In the development wings are products witheven more wide-ranging social implications: arms andarmor, water filtration, and solar panels. Emerging fromall of this is an eyebrow-raising disconnect between thepositive predictions of scientists and researchers, thefears of public interest groups, and the developers ofproducts. Equally disconcerting is the inability of thesegroups to communicate effectively with each other.

A new framework for evaluating the social impli-cations of nanotechnology will permit a new dialoguebetween interest groups and disciplines. This articleoffers one such framework, comparing the ways thatrisk is discussed in military applications, consumerproducts, and workplace safety. Where possible, estab-lished risk measurement standards now being used willbe linked to the policy-related standard responses nowunder development. These disconcerting disconnects—the failure to discuss the meaningful implications ofnanotechnology—can best be amended when risk stan-dardization is examined as an artifact of culturally dis-tinct groups and when those social groups are madeaware of each other’s sometimes incommensurable sys-tems of measurement.

Analytical Framework

Although each instance of nanotechnology develop-ment and application will likely have its own unique



attributes, this framework for evaluating the social impli-cations of nanotechnology addresses three questions:

1. How do problems become visible to the socialgroups that contribute to the framing of technology?

2. What kind of language do social groups use toexpress significance?

3. How does risk standardization contribute to tech-nology stabilization?

The popular understanding of technology standard-ization has a familiar plotline. A person or professionalgroup develops a product or artifact. Such a productmay be in competition with preexisting products orwith other newly emerging products. After a battle, oneproducer wins. Examples that readily come to mindinclude the debate between the electric-steam-poweredcar and that powered by gasoline, the choice betweenalternating and direct current as the electric power gridwas being established, the VHS–Betamax rivalry, andthe currently incommensurate Bluetooth and HD-DVDformats.

In a rethinking of that plotline, Bijker, Hughes, andPinch’s well-known STS text The Social Constructionof Technological Systems (SCOT; 1987) proposes thedevelopment of a technological artifact as a gathering ofsocial groups around a flexible set of problems. Theauthors offer analysis through one or more frames anddiscuss the eventual “closure and stabilization” of theartifact or product. Their model, however, “highlights[the] multidirectional character of [technological devel-opment and] brings out the interpretive flexibility oftechnological artifacts and the role that different closuremechanisms may play in the stabilization of artifacts”(p. 40). In describing social groups, Bijker et al. say,

The use of the concept of a relevant social group isquite straightforward. The phrase is used to denoteinstitutions and organizations (such as the military orsome specific industrial company), as well as orga-nized or unorganized groups of individuals. The keyrequirement is that all members of a certain socialgroup share the same set of meanings, attached to aspecific artifact. In deciding which social groups arerelevant, we must first ask whether the artifact hasany meaning at all for the members of the socialgroup under investigation. (p. 30)

To demonstrate their ideas, they investigate the earlyforms of the bicycle. The relevant social groups includedtouring cyclists, women cyclists, older cyclists, and sportcyclists. The varied forms of bicycles were not so mucha kind of Darwinian trajectory toward a technologically

perfect machine as a set of negotiations between userswho had convergent and divergent needs.

Discussing Bakelite (an early form of plastic), Bijkeret al. (1987) further the model by describing a techno-logical frame: “A technological frame is composed of,to start with, the concepts and techniques employed bya community in its problem solving” (p. 168). In thecase of Bakelite, the interested parties were high-endjewelry manufacturers, billiard ball manufacturers, den-tists, and mass producers of cast industrial products—radios, combs, vulcanized rubber products. Bijker et al.argue that the “increasing stabilization of Celluloid canbe traced by following its use as an intermediate mater-ial between cheap but ugly looking plastics, such as rub-ber, and luxurious materials, such as ivory” (p. 164).They add this point about the frame: “All actors will, inprinciple, be members of more than one technologicalframe” (p. 173). Baekeland’s goals “were congruentwith the Celluloid producer’s technological frame inthat Baekeland intended mass production of plastic arti-cles; his goals were not congruent in that he was focus-ing on the production of industrial applications, ratherthan on consumer goods” (p. 174). There are, then,degrees of inclusion in a technological frame and framesthat are newly created when formerly distinct techno-logical groups join around a new problem.

Each group may bring its own set of problems andits own set of solutions to the artifact in question. Bijkeret al. (1987) describe a branching relational diagram ofbicycle users, problems, and solutions (see Figure 1):“Following the developmental process in this way, wesee growing and diminishing degrees of stabilization ofthe different artifacts. In principle, the degree of stabi-lization is different in different social groups” (p. 39).Problem closure can occur rhetorically or through rede-finition. Rhetorical closure happens when the manufac-turers of the artifact simply claim “problem solved.”Stabilization and closure can also occur by adding orredefining a feature of the artifact to address two prob-lems at once. The low-frame bicycle with the air tirewas defined as both “safe” for the general public and a“speed feature” for athletic young men who had usedthe high-wheeled bicycle but were now being drawntoward the faster low-frame bicycle. Stabilization of theartifact creates not only a social group of producers andusers but also “technological momentum” (p. 176) fora particular product in a particular form. After pro-tracted negotiation between users and producers, itsimply gets harder to change the terms of the solution.

In a critique of SCOT theory, Winner (1993) remindsus that process of stabilization is not necessarilyneutral. That is, the results of closure do not account for

350 BULLETIN OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & SOCIETY / October 2007



or equally favor all relevant or affected social groups.As well, closure does not take into account normativemeaning and hence does not apply equal risk evalua-tions between social groups. Although his critique isdirected at the theory of SCOT, Winner’s broader con-cern (1986) lies with the technological decision makingof society: “Ultimately, one has to decide what one isdealing with and why it matters” (p. 373). In so doing,Winner is wary of formalized risk assessments, whichhe believes tend to “sustain an industrial status quo rel-atively free of socially enforced limits” (p. 139).Irrespective of whether one favors formalized riskassessment procedures or prefers normative politicaldebate, it is important to recognize and care about thesocially beneficial and harmful potentialities associatedwith the seeming rush to close in on nanotechnology.

Expanding the Frame

The SCOT model allows scholars to challenge andexplore the concept of “it just works” (as in, “it justworks better”), but it also complicates the trajectory ofinvention by making that trajectory a series of pauses,negotiations, breakings, and reframings. Expanding onthat analytical framework, three areas are worthy ofattention, as suggested in the introduction—social visi-bility, social significance, and policy. A general outline

of each area follows and is then illustrated throughthree brief case examples.

Social Visibility

For a concern to attract attention in any field ofendeavor, a social group—that is, a particular groupat a particular time—must view it as a need, a threat,or an opportunity. A concern becomes visible when itunites a group that is prepared to act on its commonperception of a need. A new product or process canbecome visible as a threat to immediate security, as athreat to an established way of life, or as a threat tojustice. A new product or process can also attractattention as an unexploited opportunity. To put thisthought negatively, we ignore those things that we donot see as an opportunity or a threat. Three reasonsexplain why needs, objects, products, and processesstay out sight: They are undetectable; they areunthinkable; they are unimportant.

Undetectable. Some groups or things are invisiblesimply because they are not known to exist or theyare things for which we lack instrumentation.Consider the discovery of microbes, X rays, and thegiant squid, which is in fact giant but still the subjectof some mystery, given that the first pictures of it inaction were only generated in 2005 (see, e.g.,Kubodera & Mori, 2005). To put the matter in asimple way, someone has to have an instrument capa-ble of detection and a reason to look. There are stillmany discoveries to be made about the ocean depthsas well as the universe simply because instrumenta-tion is poor and we are not sufficiently motivated.

With relation to nanotechnology, as nanoscaleprocesses have become possible in the spectrum ofscience through instrumentation, they have become vis-ible to various social groups (Kunkle, 1995; Mody,2006). Mody’s history (2006) of scanning tunnelingmicroscopes (STM), an essential tool used in manynanotechnology applications, distinguishes the experi-mental university designs from narrow-niche corporateapplications:

Early academic STMers trained students primarily tobuild highly flexible microscopes, and only secondar-ily to use them. This led to a proliferation of micro-scope designs. . . . It also led students to testmicroscopes on readily available materials rather thanon scientifically disciplined specimens: leaves ofhouseplants, polaroids, bone from rib-eye steaks, ice,and the electrochemistry of Coke versus Pepsi, to

Pense, Cutcliffe / RISKY TALK 351

Figure 1. Social Groups and Technological Problem FramesSource: Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch (1987, p. 37)



name a few. This whimsicality was accompanied bybricolage in instrument-building. The Baldeschwielergroup made STM probes from pencil leads, forinstance, while the Hansma group made AFM tips fromhand-crushed, pawn-shop diamonds glued to tinfoilcantilevers with brushes made from their own eyebrowhairs. (p. 66)

The images produced by these varied instruments,Mody says, were hard to understand and hard to makecredible to the corporate scientific community. Thus,universities borrowed STM “experts” from industryand from each other to forward the process of makingmicroscopes and making their imagery meaningful.Mody emphasizes the personal and professional linksthat undergird knowledge, access to instrumentation,and scientific practice. These, he calls, instrumentalcommunities, and the currently growing nanotechnol-ogy programs and research follow the dispersion ofthese instrumental communities.

Unthinkable. A social group can be invisible becauseit does not exist as a conceptual category. For instance,during the mid-17th century in much of Europe, witcheswere highly visible as a social group and were viewedas an immediate threat to the health of village life.Having been recast in the 19th century as an embarrass-ing sort of social superstition, witches dropped out ofsight and out of general public concern. Now, witches asa public phenomenon are more or less visible to only aselect set of historians for this period (for a discussion of this topic, see Roper, 1994). Consider another con-ceptual category that has coalesced in the late 20th century—attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and theintense debate that surrounds treatment of such a mal-ady. As concepts change, challenges arise: Are we talk-ing about new facts about the body and psychology or anew way of seeing old facts?

With regard to nanotechnology, its fundamentaldefinition has been in debate, including which dimen-sions must be at the nanoscale and whether nanotech-nology is only a question of dimensions or must it alsoentail new properties and include processes of repli-cation. In 2004, Drexler took a side in this debate:

For nanoscale technologists to unburden nanotech-nology while claiming its prestige, the Feynmanvision had to be accepted as a slogan but rejected asa present goal and a future reality. . . . Continuedattempts to calm public fears by denying the feasi-bility of molecular manufacturing and nanoreplica-tors would inevitably fail, thereby placing the entirefield calling itself nanotechnology at risk of adestructive backlash. A better course would be to

show that these developments are manageable andstill distant. (pp. 23, 25)

A general consensus on what is possible and con-ceivable helps ground whether nano is a threat, an immi-nent threat, an opportunity, or an irrelevancy. Somepractitioners claim that the “self-replicating nanobots”scenario is unthinkable, remaining always a technologi-cal impossibility. Drexler (2004) is concerned that mov-ing nanoreplication out the realm of the possible willdeflate the genuine promise of nanotechnology—and,of course, the funding for replication. But even with adebate about what nanotechnology should do and whatendeavors should be funded, nanoscale and nanotech-nology are not particularly hard to grasp; they are read-ily conceivable.

Unimportant. A group or a problem can be invisibleeven though it is known and clearly defined, if it is notperceived as a group or a problem in need of redress andrestoration. In the case of environmental problems, wemake a choice regarding what to track, what to measure,what to count, and what to do about it. For instance, frogsare dying across the planet. Scientists are tracking thenumbers as they can, but no nation is acting on this infor-mation, because the loss of frogs is perceived as neither aserious threat nor an opportunity. To consider another,less worrisome example, house dust mites, first discov-ered by Anton van Leeuwenhoek, are unpleasant-lookingmicroscopic creatures that mostly eat shed skin flakes andcongregate, among other places, in pillows. Although dis-turbing as fellow inhabitants of one’s sleeping quarters,they were deemed harmless and so stayed out of sight andmind. However, when they were found to trigger allergies(in 1964), they moved into prominence for allergists andallergy sufferers but unfortunately turned out to beremarkably hard to eliminate. In similar fashion, a prod-uct or process is unimportant if it does not pose a threat,but it becomes visible everywhere if it does. Ceiling tiles,for example, are invisible if they are asbestos-free, butthey are the center of attention if they are not.

Nanotechnology—popularized by science fiction,brought to public attention by some media coverage,and considered the focus of next-generation industrialproducts and processes—is surely perceived as a threatand an opportunity—a threat to the public but a mili-tary and economic opportunity to the United States. Inpolitical dialogue, there exists an implied threat that ifAmericans do not stay on top, then states and enter-prising scientists and entrepreneurs will lose an oppor-tunity, and all will later regret their collectivelaggardliness. To take one example of many, ThinkingBig About Thinking Small (Blue Ribbon Task Force on




Nanotechnology, 2005), a report commissioned byCalifornia in 2003, argues that the state must seize theopportunities offered by nanotechnology. In the report,state controller Steve Westly comments,

If we don’t get in early on nanotechnology . . . we willmiss an incredible opportunity. We must aggressivelygo after research funding and business investment. . . .The nanotechnology revolution is going to happen. Thequestion is: will California lead it? (quoted inDavidson, 2005, p. A1)

We can derive two benefits from describing stages ofsocial visibility. First, we can probe why nanotechnologyremains invisible to some groups but not to others—is ita matter of access to instrumentation, one of concep-tual disagreement, or one regarding perception of threat/opportunity? Second, we can ask if there are any charac-teristic telltales in the process of becoming visible as anopportunity or threat. The process of becoming sociallyvisible probably varies among technological problems,but they may have commonalities to consider.

Social Significance

As a problem or product becomes visible, it isinvested with significance. There are identifiable and dis-tinct dimensions to the way that significance is claimed,including magnitude, permanence, potential, and loss.We choose to address those things that will affect us all,those that have a perceived magnitude, such as nuclearpower and weapons. We also respond to changes that webelieve will permanently alter our way of life, such asglobal systems for tracking time, or those that may carrygreat potential for social change, such as the printingpress. We also respond to those things that signify afalling off or a loss—something that is no longer safe oris just not as good (such as food products). The degree ofsocial visibility is registered in the language of signifi-cance. The case studies that follow highlight languageinvoking these dimensions of significance.

Regarding nanotechnology, the case for social signif-icance has been made from all quarters. Pretty mucheveryone reading the literature has noticed—and manyof those writing it have pointed out—that nanoprose isrichly purple. They share a strongly perceived sense thateveryone will be affected, an accompanying sense thatthe potential for change is unlimited, and a projectedpermanence to the processes and products of nanotech-nology. A few recent examples speak to the hyperbole ofthe language of nano.

In 2006, Charles Piller of the Los Angeles Timeswrote,

Some scientists believe that within a few decadesnanotechnology will produce limitless, pollution-freeenergy and supercomputers the size of a grain of salt.It will transform deserts into lush gardens withcheaply desalinated sea water, they say, and neutral-ize noxious wastes by disassembling dangerous mol-ecules into safe, reusable components. (p. A1)

Piller quotes the NanoBusiness Alliance, whichenthused, “Nanotechnology has the potential to createrevolutionary change across multiple, key areas ofhuman endeavor” (p. A1). The year before, sciencewriter for the San Francisco Chronicle Keay Davidson(2005) sketched the race for new nanoproducts:

Scientists around the world are developing variousways to arrange molecule-sized clusters of tubes,wires, gears and other components into workingmachines that might some day be programmed forspecific tasks at extremely small scales—forinstance, for cleaning up toxic spills or for reassem-bling damaged parts of the human body, maybe evenrewiring damaged spines. (p. A1)

In a 2004 interview with the Atlanta Journal-Constitution’s Mike Toner, Georgia Tech InformationSecurity Center director Ralph Merkle asserted,

Nanotechnology will let us make supercomputers thatfit on the head of a pin and fleets of medical nanobotssmaller than a human cell able to eliminate cancer,infections, clogged arteries and even old age. . . .People will look back on this era with the same feelingwe have toward medieval times, when technology wasprimitive and almost everyone lived in poverty and diedyoung. (p. 1B)

Toner, summarizing the industry’s 2004 hopes, wrote,“Futurists envision a world of individually customizedcars assembled molecule by molecule, surgery per-formed by cell-sized robots, and the molecules of oneman’s garbage reassembled into another’s filetmignon” (p. 1B).

All of these enthusiasts and their chroniclers invokethe language of significance: the potential for perma-nent change to our bodies, our energy systems, evenour garbage. They suggest the power to recover fromerrors and accidents that cannot currently be fixed.But there is also the question of possible threat. “Wecan’t afford to make mistakes,” American ChemicalSociety president Charles Casey said, citing industry’sobligation to assess the safety of nanoparticles and theinvestment at stake (quoted in Bridges, 2004, para. 18).




The threat is not only the oops of Joy’s grey dystopia(2000) but that in the process of incorporating nan-otechnology products and processes, a former way oflife, a safer life, will be permanently lost.

Policy

Some, but not all, products and processes that we cansee and that we deem important trigger legislation andregulation. By employing such, we develop a policy,which is our way to acknowledge the significance of aknown human need and to propose a fair, systematic,and standardized solution to that need. The foundationsof legislative and regulatory policy include social visi-bility and social significance. In the simplest of terms,first we see a problem; next, we measure that problem—in some fashion that all can understand—and weacknowledge, “Yes, it matters”; then, we conclude, “Wemust do something each time this problem arises.”

Policy steps are taken as and after we decide what ameaningful measure is and what a meaningful reactionmight be. Both can be and often are repeatedly chal-lenged on scientific and ethical grounds. Nanotech-nology processes and products are being described as a threat and as an opportunity but are just now beingframed as being so significant as to represent a regula-tory problem. The question before lawmakers and thepublic now becomes, what should we regulate, why, andhow? As policy is established, risk measurements, stan-dardization, and, ultimately, technological closure willbe hammered out. In other words, technical closure isbound up with choosing risk measures and developingpolicy standards.

Addressing science policy directly, nanotechnol-ogy literature has repeatedly made two points. First,risk research is too low as a proportion of the totalfunds currently being invested in nano. To note butone such claim, in “Getting Nanotechnology Right theFirst Time,” Balbus, Denison, Florini, and Walsh(2005) noted in 2005 that

of the roughly 1 billion that the federal governmentspends annually on nanotechnology, spending forenvironmental and health implications researchaccounted for only 8.5 million (less than 1 percent) infiscal year (FY) 2004 and is proposed to increaseonly 38.5 million (less than 4%) for FY 2006. (p. 67)

The second consistent suggestion—primarily madeby commentators and scientists outside of the nanotech-nology industry—is that we lack guidance on regulation.In 2005, Rick Weiss, science writer for the Washington

Post and regular reporter on nanotechnology issues, said,“An estimated 700 types of nanomaterials are beingmanufactured at about 800 facilities in this countryalone, prompting several federal agencies to focus seri-ously on nano safety. Yet no agency has developed safetyrules specific to nanomaterials” (p. A08). In his 2006 tes-timony before Congress, Andrew Maynard (2006b),chief scientist advisor for the Woodrow Wilson Projecton Emerging Nanotechnologies, said,

I see no evidence of foresight; of the governmentlooking longer-term to identify emerging risks thatmay appear as nanotechnology becomes more com-plex and converges with biotechnology. Withoutbetter foresight, there is little hope that the govern-ment will be positioned to underpin regulation withgood science, or provide solid answers to the ques-tions that the public will inevitably raise about therisks of nanotechnologies. (p. 3)

These and other policy commentators are looking forthe federal government to move from earlier regula-tory systems that were enforceable and made sense toa new set of measures for nanotechnology.

Social visibility and social significance, as sketchedabove, encourage a closer look at the SCOT model oftechnological closure. Social visibility asks how andwhen a problem becomes visible to social groups.Social significance directs attention to the kind of lan-guage employed when groups claim that a new technol-ogy will make great changes to society. A renewed focuson policy suggests, as Winner (1986, 1993) does, thatthere will be a normative debate about what to measureand that choosing scientific measures will sometimes bea site of social struggle as well as technological closure.

Cases

Examples of nano-applications and the language ofsocial significance used to introduce them reveal thesocial groups involved, their perceptions of risk, andthe developing standards for how to measure that risk.Three nanoproducts and nanoprocesses introduced in2006 (via public-oriented media) suggest the range of possible nanoproducts and the potential risks asso-ciated with them: nanotechnology in the military—particularly, liquid armor, an application for thenano–battle suit; nanotechnology in home appliances,as illustrated by the Silver Nano washing machine,from Samsung; and the production of single-walledcarbon nanotubes by Raymor, a Canadian company.The inclusion of risk issues within the language and




discussion related to technological stabilization andclosure is central to our ability to recognize, under-stand, and shape the emerging products and processeswithin the rapidly evolving nanotechnology arena.

Liquid Armor

Product background. Battle suits using nanotechnol-ogy have been featured in science fiction for a long time,but smart clothes and materials enabled by nanotechnol-ogy have received regular press since MIT received a$50 million for an Institute for Soldier Nanotechnology(ISN) in 2002. According to MIT’s Web site, its portalfor the general public, “the mission of the ISN is straight-forward: use nanotechnology to dramatically improvethe survivability of soldiers” (ISN, n.d., para. 1).Regarding the ISN’s project on the battle suit, “the ulti-mate goal is to help create a 21st century battle suit thatcombines high-tech capabilities with light weight andcomfort. Imagine a bullet-defeating jumpsuit that alsomonitors health, eases injuries, communicates automati-cally, and even augments human physical strength.” Thesame kind of enthusiastic language was echoed (perhapswith a wink) in 2003 report by the Christian ScienceMonitor on ISN researchers: “Their aim: to help create afuturistic ‘battle suit’ for America’s soldiers that’s as thinas a scuba diver’s wet suit—but fit for a superhero.Among other things, it would be bulletproof and helpsoldiers leap 20-foot walls” (McLaughlin, 2003, p. 2).However, the furthest along in nano–battle armor isapparently a group that did not even use the term nan-otechnology in its early publications. In 2002, a jointUniversity of Delaware and U.S. Army research team(Lee, Wetzel, Egres, & Wagner, 2003) was awarded thePaul A. Siple Award, the army’s highest award for scien-tific achievement, for their work on shear thickeningfluid, which has the unusual property of hardening whenstruck with force.

Shear thickening fluid, used in the 2002 ballistic teststudy by Lee et al. (2003), is “colloidal silica . . . com-posed of Nissan Chemicals (MP4540) . . . provided as anaqueous suspension at a particle concentration of about40 wt%. The particle size was characterized withdynamic light scattering and transmission electronmicroscopy” (p. 2826). They note that the “particles arebimodal in size, with a minor fraction of smaller parti-cles. The average particle diameter was determined to be446 nm by dynamic light scattering” (p. 2826). Howdoes shear thickening work? Technically “shear thicken-ing is a non-Newtonian flow behavior often observed inconcentrated colloidal dispersions, and characterized bya large, sometimes discontinuous increase in viscosity

with increasing shear stress” (p. 2825). However, theteam was specifically interested in reversible shear thick-ening: “Reversible shear thickening in concentrated col-loidal suspensions is due to the formation of jammingclusters resulting from hydrodynamic lubrication forcesbetween particles, often denoted by ‘hydroclusters’”(p. 2825). The layman’s description of shear thickeningruns this way: A stick yanked quickly through corn pastewill stiffen in place, but that same stick, when pushedgently, will move easily. The research team developedthat shear thickening property into a liquid that hardenswhen hit with a quick moving projectile, which has theobvious potential of stopping bullets before they can doserious damage or kill a soldier.

Interestingly, the Lee et al.’s initial article, publishedin the Journal of Materials Science in 2003, never usesthe word nanotechnology. Its description of the productand process likewise gives the nontechnical reader nosense that they are firmly placing themselves in the nano-technology research frame. The 2004 University ofDelaware campus publication The Daily announced theshear thickening fluid developments and described itsproperties and potential but also made no mention of theword nanotechnology (Manser, 2004). However, in thesame year, a journalist for the Army News Service,Tonya Johnson (2004), reported that liquid armor forKevlar vests was being developed at the U.S. ArmyResearch Labs. That article makes the first mention ofthe term nanotechnology—the silica particles, it says,are “nano” sized. So, liquid body armor was publiclynamed a nanotechnology but only somewhat after itsdevelopment and not by the developers themselves.

Subsequently, Armor Holdings, a company focusedon military and paramilitary gear for soldiers andcivilian law enforcement, bought the rights to marketthe technology. Through the popular and trade press,the link between shear thickening fluid and nanotech-nology was made specific. The Baltimore Sun pickedup and presented the news thusly: “In February 2006,Armor Holdings, a Florida-based company that man-ufactures security products for the military and lawenforcement, announced that it would use liquid nan-otechnology to develop enhanced body armor”(Fenton, 2006, p. 1A). NanoTechWire.com (2006b),an industry publication, positioned shear thickeningfluid as a nanotechnology issue:

[Shear thickening fluids] are special materials withnano-particles that exhibit properties normally asso-ciated with both solids and liquids, but are rarelyfound in the same material. Sometimes referred to as‘liquid armor,’ the material is actually a nanotechnology




that exists in a flexible, fluid-like state under normalconditions but adopts seemingly rigid qualities andbecomes less penetrable when impacted. (para. 2)

Other trade publications followed likewise, and shearthickening fluid is now a named nanotechnology.

Visibility and social groups. Turning to the largerissue of nanotechnology weapons development, the ear-lier mentioned Christian Science Monitor review ofMIT’s ISN indicates that there is a wide-ranging set ofinterested social groups and that the original concept forthe ISN was multidisciplinary: “When ISN is fullystaffed, it will have some 35 faculty members; 80 gradu-ate students; and specialists from Raytheon, the DuPontchemical company, two Boston hospitals, and others”(McLaughlin, 2003, p. 2). The article notes that armygenerals who reviewed ISN’s work thus far wereintrigued but still underwhelmed by proto-“nano hands”:“Call me when it can crush rocks,” one said (p. 2). Withregard to the battle suit, soldiers had a request:“Waterproof everything,” they begged, because the 140pounds that they lug around gets heavier when wet.Gathered around the vision of the battle suit, then, wereacademic researchers, corporate labs, medical practition-ers, and the U.S. Army.

In fact, the nano–battle suit is being shaped by theneeds of 21st-century armies. A 2006 Guardian arti-cle by Michael Pollitt describes the effect that thewars in Afghanistan and Iraq is having on the devel-opment of body armor:

Although body armour means soldiers are now betterprotected, it has altered injury patterns. Limbs now bearthe brunt and the most common cause of potentiallyavoidable battlefield death is external haemorrhage. . . .American figures show that almost 50% of combatfatalities before evacuation in Iraq and Afghanistan areattributed to uncontrolled bleeding; two minutes maybe all it takes. (p. 6)

The tradeoff between weight and protection is a dri-ving factor in product development in weaponry, as isthe need for flexible protection of arms and legs, par-ticularly at vulnerable joints. Thus, the battle suit hasbecome visible to various interest groups as an oppor-tunity. Of course, the primary beneficiaries will besoldiers—if and when they are issued this armor andbecome familiar with its quirks and capabilities.

When nanotechnology and homeland securitybecame a government-funded initiative, universitiestook interest, as did contractors and arms fabricators. Ina sense, nanotechnology was visible to the government

as an opportune solution to the problem of soldier sur-vivability before it was visible to most universities andcorporations. Armor Holdings, the company licensed tofollow up on shear-thickening-fluid body armor, wasfeatured in Michael Arndt’s 2006 Business Week article“Body Armor Fit for a Superhero.” Arndt’s history ofbody armor fits neatly into a SCOT problem frame,mentioning multiple sources of inspiration and multipleinterest groups.

Today’s versions of body armor are mostly composedof 20 to 30 layers of synthetic fibers. And althoughthere is no question that the death toll for Americantroops in Iraq would be far higher without it, the gear isbulky and cannot stop high-velocity bullets and bombfragments. Even as DuPont was field-testing the origi-nal Kevlar jackets in the early 1970s, researchers werehunting for lighter, tougher ballistic fabrics. Since then,companies have investigated a chemist’s kit of exoticmaterials, from cloned spider silk—a wonder of light-ness and strength—to newfangled sheets of carbon nan-otubes that are among the toughest structures in nature.Armor Holdings’s product is different from all of theabove. Developed by Norman Wagner, a professor ofchemical engineering at the University of Delaware’sCenter for Composite Materials, it is a mix of polyeth-ylene glycol, a polymer found in laxatives and otherconsumer products, and nanobits of silica, or purifiedsand. (Arndt, 2006)

The varied social problems shaping the developmentof body armor elicited an equally varied commentaryin Business Week’s Reader Response section (Arndt,2006). This social interest group included motorcycleriders, soldiers, sci-fi readers, and corporate mar-keters. Science fiction readers declared body armor tobe “old news,” whereas the motorcycle riders hopedthat the new technology would be made available tothem. Soldiers were also positive, looking for any-thing that would help protect them. Online venues forcommentary allow for interested individuals tobecome part of a social group, albeit one that isunlikely to produce action or policy.

Another group to which body armor is of strong inter-est is that of law enforcement officers. In December2006, the Baltimore Sun featured a story on the uncertainprotection offered by police vests. Most officers wear aballistic vest, said a spokesman for the Baltimore Countypolice, but he declined to discuss the design of ballisticvests that the department uses because he did not “wantto reveal what could be vulnerabilities” (quoted inFenton, 2006, p. 1A). In other words, there is an interestgroup, a social group composed of wrongdoers, potential




cop killers, who might gain an advantage in knowinghow to defeat the Kevlar vest. They will never be drawninto the dialogue except in a negative way: Having fig-ured out how to neutralize a vest, they force changes. Apossible improvement, an expensive change requiringresearch and funding, can be put off. A known andrepeatedly exploited vulnerability, however, cannot beignored. For body armor, then, there is a shadow socialgroup affecting the definition of the problem and thetechnology.

Significance and risk debate. The language of signifi-cance from the university, the army, and Armor Holdingscenters on soldier survivability. Consequently, the onlyrisk measures being applied to battle suits are loweredinjury rates for soldiers. As might be expected, ArmorHoldings advertises its products by quoting its buyers:“If it wasn’t for the vest, I wouldn’t be here. I’m so verythankful” (see Armor Holdings, 2007). Only one casualremark in Business Week suggests that there may be riskstandardization for the shear thickening Kevlar vests inthe future: “Any minuses? No one knows yet how wellthe material will hold up after years of wear and tear”(Arndt, 2006, para. 6).

In their article “Anticipating Military Nanotechnology,”Altmann and Gubrud (2004) describe a multifunctionaldynamic battle suit as a “guiding vision”; however, theyalso ask what happens when a “high tech soldier encoun-ters a low-tech grenade?” (p. 33). They argue that thereassuring scenario of the vastly superior soldier sup-ported by nanotechnology typically does not include thelow-tech knockout blow, the equally superior nanosup-ported foe, or the possibility of a new arms race based ondevelopments in nanotechnology. Altman and Gubrudsee rival nations engaging in a new nano–arms race andthen using those applications in civilian and state control.They call for cooperative international regulation, anupdating of the biological weapons convention, and theprohibition of space weapons and autonomous killerrobots. They say that regulation could indeed be difficultbut that the effort to do so would strengthen internationalcooperation.

Altmann and Gubrud (2004) are among the very few to propose a pause for rethinking the impact ofnanoweapons. In fact, nothing has been suggestedregarding controls on the battlesuit—perhaps because itis inherently a defensive piece of equipment? The mili-tary should, or probably will, develop risk measuresrelating to nanotechnology weapons—but will the bat-tlesuit be included? As a follow-on question, is the mili-tary likely to supply a standard or a measure of risk thatwill be useful to motorcyclists, police officers, and so

on? Survivability is, after all, a somewhat uncomfortableword, encompassing improved chances of coming hometo friends and family and improved chances of survivingmassive and lasting injury. Precisely because it is con-ceptually defensive rather than offensive, the commen-tary on the battle suit will be an interesting nexis to watchwithin the larger policy debate on nanoweaponry.

Silver Nano Washing Machines

Product background. Turning from battlesuits tonanotechnology for the average consumer, an interest-ing case study involves Samsung’s Silver Nano wash-ing machine, introduced to the United States in 2006.In the product brochure in which a smiling babyappears, Samsung (2006) says,

Sense the Safety of Silver

Since ancient times, silver has been used for medi-cines and household goods the non-toxic preciousmetal has the power to sterlise and deoderise. Recentadvancements in technology and increased consumerdemand for health-promoting products are giving riseto many new products for silver for highly effectivesterilization, so Samsung has developed a silverspoon for your appliances.

Whether “silver spoon” is intended as a weird punimplying one’s appliances will suddenly gain an aristo-cratic background or merely a technical term, Samsungincludes the concepts “long-established,” “non-toxic,”and “many new products for silver for highly effectivesterilization.” This product, though new in the market-place, is somehow already established (perhaps becauseof the long-recognized sterilization capabilities of sil-ver) and thus not “out there” on its own. The brochurecontinues,

Samsung has developed and patented a technologyusing a 99.9% sterling silver plate located inside thewashing machine. Through electrolisation, 400 bil-lion nano-sized silver ions are emitted, directly pene-trating into fabrics during the wash and final rinsecycles, creating an amazing anti-bacterial and steril-ization effect on clothes.

Readers encounter three forms of the word steril-ization within the first two paragraphs, indicating theangle that Samsung wishes to emphasize. A closerlook at these benefits includes this:

The anti-bacterial coating on your clothing inhibits thegrowth of germs for up to one month. No longer is there




a need to worry about the blankets that cannot bewashed everyday. Moreover, Silver Wash actually pro-tects sensitive skin and helps prevent dermatitis. . . .Without the bacteria, sweat can’t decompose to emit anunpleasant odour.

Consumer Reports (“Testing SilverCare’s Mettle,”2006) tested one version of the SilverCare washer,priced at $1,200, and reported,

We washed T-shirts 10 times using the SilverCare set-ting drying the shirts between each wash. Next we cutthe shirts in half and sewed them together with halvesof shirts cleaned in a conventional washer. Volunteerswore those shirts while exercising, then tore them inhalf and stowed each section in separate zip-top bags.We let the shirts “ferment” over a weekend. (p. 9)

Beyond the intriguing test procedures themselves,Consumer Reports found that the Samsung washer “per-formed very well overall,” with the T-shirts washed on the SilverCare setting coming out “less malodorous”(p. 9) than those washed normally.

In sum, it appears that SilverCare works as adver-tised. Above and beyond the question of whetherSamsung’s washer works in the technical sense, how-ever, it is important to assess for which social groups itworks and for which it may work less well or not at all.

Visibility and social groups. What social groupshave been included, excluded, or ignored, yet may beaffected, are at issue in analyzing SilverCare washersand potential like white goods. Who might Samsungbe aiming for, and who has in fact joined the frame-work of the nanosilver antibacterial products? On thesurface of things, odorous sweat, bacteria, and healthare the problems that Samsung hopes that consumerswill try to solve with its new washer. This may be botha technology in search of a problem and a problem insearch of a social group.

Who might Samsung be aiming for, and who has infact joined the framework of the nanosilver antibacterialproducts? Clearly, homeowners—families or singleswith cash for a luxury/safety item—are a target marketfor Samsung. Typically, the Silver Nano washer sells forseveral times the lowest-priced washers in the local mar-ket. Are those who are unable to purchase at the higherend or, perhaps, renters whose landlords do not see therent-enhanced benefits of odor-free sweat socks or, evenif they do, have not yet amortized the cost of existingwashers, thus dooming their tenants to a life of less-sterilebaby blankets and increased odds of bacteria-induceddermatitis? On the surface of things, initial advertising

is at least reminiscent of the interwar-years approach toselling and promoting household technology, whichtended to appeal to ideals of domesticity and play on theguilt feelings of women homemakers (Cowan, 1983). Itimmediately becomes evident that the social groupsinvolved with this washing machine include not onlythose who can afford to purchase one but those who can-not, as well as those who choose what types of washersto install in rental units and public Laundromats and thebuilders of tract or so-called spec houses. In the lattercase, the decision to install such washers, should it bemade, will involve people in the use of, or at least theoption to use, the SilverCare setting.

A second group, one related to the above group ofend users, might comprise product designers, mar-keters, retailers, and builders, each looking for a newline of machines to sell or install. Third, by reflexiveextension, is the Samsung company itself. Havinglaunched a whole new line of products called SilverNano Home Collection, including refrigerators andfreezers, Samsung places the washing machine as partof its Silver Nano Health Systems and has no doubtstaked business and marketing plans as well as researchand development on the success of this framework withthe public. Samsung presumably does not manufacturethe silver bars themselves, so one needs to add thenanosilver supplier as well.

To Samsung’s presumed dismay, one must includeamong the social groups interested in the SilverCarewasher those operating from the perspective of anenvironmental health frame. Australian, European,and U.S. environmental activist groups have raised thespecter of nanosilver as a threat to healthy watersources. In early 2006, the German group BUND, abranch of Friends of the Earth, weighed in early withconcerns about water quality. The issue was whethersilver ions released into wastewater systems mightjust as readily kill the good bacteria utilized in bio-logical water treatment facilities as it does in steriliz-ing sweaty clothing.

The U.S. government initially declined to join thefray from February to October 2006, but then inNovember, the Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) agreed to regulate nanosilver as a pesticide.The EPA chose to do so under the Federal Insecticide,Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, an action required forany product that makes a “pesticidal claim,” such asSamsung’s antibacterial silver wash in this case. OnNovember 22, the Natural Resources Defense Councilsent an open letter to the director of the EPA Jim Jonessaying that council “commends the EPA Office ofPesticide Program’s recent decision to regulate the use




of nanosilver as a pesticide under the FederalInsecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act . . . asreported in the Daily Environmental Report” (para. 1).Clearly, the set of interested social groups was expand-ing to include the EPA, Friends of the Earth, and theNatural Resources Defense Council, as well as sani-tary engineers and managers at wastewater treatmentfacilities, potentially from across the globe. Nanosilverwash was now visible to a range of interested socialgroups in ways that it had not been initially envisioned.

Significance and risk debate. How did this newfoundnanovisibility affect perceptions of risk, and in whatways was it expressed publicly? The Christian ScienceMonitor (“Thinking Tiny While Playing It Safe,” 2006)struck a tone of alarm and measured approval:

But real concerns remain. The unique surface areas,chemistry, solubility, and shape of nanoparticles makethem potential hazards. The known trouble with tinyasbestos particles suggests that the shape of nanotubes,nanowires and nanofibers might make them dangerousas well if set free in the environment. . . . If the publicloses confidence in the safety of nanotech, or if itbecomes subject to lawsuits, progress in this ground-breaking science could grind to a halt. That needn’t happen. . . . Last week the Environmental ProtectionAgency took a first step toward regulation. It asked thatmanufacturers of “nanosilver” conduct studies to provethat these miniscule silver particles won’t harm bodiesof water or human health. Nanosilver is being used tokill harmful bacteria in products such as air fresheners,washing machines and shoe liners. (p. 8)

In essence, the Monitor took a conservative stance: Astrouble looms, consumers can relax; the governmentis on the job.

Others in the mainstream media, including WashingtonPost staff writer Rick Weiss (2006), were less enthusedwith the EPA’s stance, however:

The EPA oversight will apply only to products adver-tised as germ killing—a detail that at least one majorretailer has apparently noted. . . . The Sharper Image,which until recently advertised as anti-microbial sev-eral products containing nanosilver, has dropped allsuch references from its marketing materials. (p. A01)

Weiss was skeptical, giving space to the governmentbut unconvinced that enough had been done.

There was a fairly immediate and quite interestingresponse to Weiss’s article in the Post by LawrenceTamarking (2006), CEO of CytImmune Sciences:

The Nov. 23 front page story “EPA to RegulateNanoproducts Sold as Germ-Killing” said that“nanoparticles of gold can burn up bacteria and otherliving cells.” That is misleading. . . . Nanoparticles ofgold, otherwise known as colloidal gold, have beenused safely in medicine, with oversight from the Foodand Drug Administration, since the 1930s. . . . Mycompany, CytImmune Sciences, has worked to create apipeline of nanomedicine candidates. . . . To suggestthat nanoparticles of gold have biologically toxiceffects, similar to nanoparticles of silver, could severelyhurt the real scientific progress being made in the devel-opment of nanomedicines that hold promise forimproving cancer patients’ outcomes. The anticipatedbenefits far outweigh any risks involved. (p. A28)

The sensitive term here appears to be burn up. Tamarkinseems to have been working on damage control, hittinga tone of outrage that his company’s lifesaving and per-fectly safe products had been called into question byWeiss’s terms for nanosilver.1

Independent of this nanometals-spillover dispute, themajor unresolved issue is what happens to water that isable to sterilize bacteria when it is released from a wash-ing machine—what else does it kill downstream?Exactly what are we opening the door to? Beyond this,one might ask, how much more or less water is used?The SilverCare cycle can utilize cold water, hencerequiring less energy, but according to ConsumerReports (“Testing SilverCare’s mettle,” 2006), it takesmore time per load, perhaps offsetting some of the sav-ings. How much bleach usage is offset? Other suchquestions might be asked as well.

For its part, Samsung appears to be downplaying thewhole issue. Chemical Engineering News carried the fol-lowing Latest News “Regulation” update: “Samsung hasand will continue to work with EPA and state regulatorsregarding regulation of the silver washing machine”(Morrissey, 2006, p. 14).2 On its side, the EPA servednotice to Samsung that it must register its “silver ion gen-erating washing machine” as a pesticide, rather as a non-regulated, physical, or mechanical “pesticidal device.” Indoing so, the EPA was explicit in taking note that thisregistration requirement “does not represent an action toregulate nanotechnology,” for which it has no evidence.Hence, the washer would be evaluated “in relation to thesame regulatory standards as any other pesticide” (EPA,2006, para. 4). In February 2007, the EPA publishedwhat it called its “final nanotechnology white paper,”designed “to inform EPA management of the scienceissues and needs associated with nanotechnology, . . .and to communicate those issues to stakeholders and the




public” (p. 1). The white paper notes that the Office ofPesticide Programs is “forming a largely intra-officeworkgroup to consider potential exposure and risks tohuman health and the ecological environment that mightbe associated with the use of nano-pesticides” (p. 20).Presumably nanosilver washing machines would fallunder the aegis of this group. As well, the paper calls forresearch on “treatment methods used for removing nano-materials from wastewater” (p. 84).

Before the nanosilver ruling and in the absence ofstrong regulation for processes and products, proxy riskmeasures and risk management techiques have beendeveloped by the public, by activists groups, and bybusinesses. One measure of risk has been a runningcount of unregulated products on the market that containnanoparticles. The Woodrow Wilson Center’s Project onEmerging Nanotechnologies maintains a growing data-base comprising (as of 2007) 381 consumer productsusing nanotechnology, and the Environmental WorkingGroup has an online listing of 256 cosmetics and per-sonal care products that use nanotechnology.

Labels and labeling, another method to signify andmanage risk, are gaining ground as well. The activistETC Group of Canada held a nanolabel contest thatelicited 482 designs from 24 countries. In business-to-business transactions, two Australian companies havejointly designed and used customized nanolabels (seeFigure 2). In addition to calling for listing and labeling,Andrew Maynard (2006a) of the Project on EmergingTechnologies has proposed a “control banding” using ananomaterial “impact index” (p. 10). The index would bea template to measure risk based on particle size, shape,and activity; the amount of material used; and its dusti-ness. Clear communications between manufacturers andconsumers about risk are just now coalescing, and it willbe interesting to see if a simple tripartite label system—ultrafine, fine, and coarse—will obtain or if somethingmore complex will emerge.

In sum, washing machines (in this case, silverion–dispensing washers)—which in the course of theirwidespread adoption during the 20th century hadbecome nearly ubiquitous and hence “unimportant,”unless the consumer needed to replace one—have sud-denly become visible again in the early 21st centurybecause of the implied potential for nanotechnology-induced water issues. Social interest groups ranging fromSamsung, the press, the consumer, the EPA, and waste-water treatment engineers to environmental lobbyistgroups such as the Natural Resources Defense Counciland Friends of the Earth, have joined together, willinglyor not, in an intertwined network that seeks to stabilizeand find closure on what a final product might look like.Along the way, they will consider what risks the machine

poses to the environment and to the public, how to mea-sure such risk, who should label and regulate it, and, ulti-mately, how best to label and regulate it.

Single-Walled Carbon Nanotubes

Product background. Unlike Silver Nano washingmachines and battle suits, which have been spot-lighted by the media, carbon nanotubes have receivedsomewhat more low-key attention. Industry and acad-emia, however, have been and remain excited. Carbonnanotubes could help researchers shrink machines,transmit electricity, imitate clingy gecko feet, powerfuel cells, and serve as probes for DNA identification.They have been proposed for use in brake discs,advanced aerospace composites, conductive tires,conductive inks, and so on. As early as 2001, distin-guished physicist Alex Zettl, who holds a jointappointment with Berkeley Lab’s Materials SciencesDivision and the Physics Department at the Universityof California, Berkeley, said of carbon nanotubes,“These are things that are crying out to be exploited inthe near future. Nanotubes are on a venture-capitaltimescale” (quoted in U.S. Department of Energy,2001, para. 18). Among industry enthusiasts areRaymor Corporation of Canada, which has focused onmass-producing single-walled carbon nanotubes: “Weat Raymor are trying to position ourselves as themajor player in the carbon nanotube area,” said TomWhitton, Raymor’s business development manager(quoted in Davis, 2006, p. 23).

Carbon nanotubes were brought to internationalattention in 1991 by the imaginative investigative workof Dr. Sumio Iijima of NEC Corporation, a specialist in


Figure 2. Nanoparticle Labels Showing the EnhancedDegree of Respiratory Hazard With Decrease in Particle SizeSource: Sample of nanoparticle labels designed and used byQyantek and Nanotechnology Victoria Ltd.



electron microscopy. He showed that multiwalled nan-otubes could be produced by an arc evaporation process,and he later showed that single-walled carbon nanotubescould be produced by varying the original arc evapora-tion process. Looking something like a long tubular fishtrap or a roll of chicken wire, carbon nanotubes, with adiameter of close to 1 nm, are the fifth known form ofsolid carbon (the other forms are represented by dia-mond, graphite, coal, and soccer-ball shaped buckmin-sterfullerenes). Because of the conductive propertiesand strength of carbon nanotubes, other methods forproducing them were quickly developed, including laserablation; chemical vapor deposition; catalyst-inducedgrowth in a pressure chamber; and Raymor’s method,which uses methane gas, a ferrous catalyst, a plasmatorch, and high temperatures. Because carbon nanotubesare so beneficial and suitable for so many applicationsand because they can be produced by a variety of meth-ods, why are they not already in general use, and whyhave the media covered them at so low a key?

Before 2006, the production of carbon nanotubes,especially, single-walled carbon nanotubes, had beentechnically difficult and prohibitively costly. In thetrades press in August 2005, Raymor, glossing its suc-cessful contact with many future customers through a July, Washington, DC, defense conference, reiter-ated its determination to economically mass-producesingle-walled carbon nanotubes. In the followingApril, Kathleen Davis (2006) put her finger on theproblem, in an article entitled, “Tiny Dreams for theFuture of Transmission Capacity”: “The experts at the [Smalley Institute for Nanoscale Science andTechnology] put carbon nanotube products in a cate-gory more precious than gold or platinum, at about$200,00 a pound” (p. 22). Echoing these numbers, TomWhitton of Raymor expressed the issue most present tothe company as it got ready to launch the new produc-tion facility: “It’s a great new material, but dollar andcents is what matters to the end-user. . . . The economicshave to change” (quoted in Davis, 2006, p. 22).

In fact, Raymor’s intent did not go unnoticed bystock analysts and the trade press. Steve Edwards(2006), author of The Nanotech Pioneers: Where AreThey Taking Us, and a blogger who runs a nanotechstock index, has been tracking Raymor and so featuredits production launch in June 2006, when the companyannounced that it had begun production of single-wallednanotubes. In the following July, NanoTechWire.com(2006a) carried the story, featuring the essential jolt con-tained therein: production capacity. “Raymor nanotechhas begun producing single-walled carbon nanotubesfrom its high-production capacity unit, which is

designed to produce 10,000 grams/day” (para. 1). BySeptember, Raymor had a press announcement: It hadacquired a customer—whom, it could not say. “Theclient, whose name can not be disclosed at this time dueto confidentially agreements in place, has the capabili-ties and experience to help integrate Raymor’s [single-walled carbon nanotubes] into end-use products, such ascomposite components for aircraft.” Raymor’s release(2006) quoted its president and CEO Stephane Robert atlength:

There is a clear market for the supply of single-walled carbon nanotubes to enhance the properties ofpolymer-based composite components for aircraftand other applications. Clients with knowledge andexperience in polymer processing are critical ele-ments in the supply chain in order to fully integrateRaymor’s nanotubes into end-use commercial prod-ucts. Large, multidisciplinary, international clientssuch as the client from today’s announcement willallow Raymor’s products to be exposed to a widespan of industries including aerospace and defense.Negotiations continue with other potential clients,and [we] hope to bring our shareholders up to date ondevelopments here shortly. (para. 3)

If that last phrase sounds a bit like recovery, it seemsclear that Raymor had taken on a tall order and hadjumped in feet first. In November 2006, the same or,perhaps, an additional client, identified only as beingpart of the orthopedic implant business, had placed a$600,000 order for carbon nanotubes; in other words,Raymor’s products could contribute to body implants aswell as putative airplane parts.3

In late 2006, Raymor’s production subsidiary,AP&C (Advanced Powder and Coatings), placed itsnew product in a positive light indeed:

AP&C produces Single-Walled Carbon Nanotubes,futuristic materials which are 100 times strongerthan steel at 1/6th the weight. Single-Walled CarbonNanotubes can be used for countless technology innova-tions, such as chemical sensors, fuel cells, portable X-raymachines, artificial muscles, as well as next-generationcomposite materials.

Raymor’s unique process produces . . . large quantitiesof high quality Single-Walled Carbon Nanotubes basedon methane as the raw material. This process is at least25 times more efficient, less dangerous, and less costlythan any other existing technologies in the world.

This revolutionary process is highly sustainablebecause it uses methane . . . [and] the destruction of




methane enables Raymor to support Canada’s efforts inmeeting its commitment to the Kyoto Protocol.(emphasis added)

AP&C’s website was later absorbed into Raymor’sredesigned main website, and the claims, reduced fromsentences to phrases, were made slightly less positive.

Visibility and social groups. One oddity for Americanreaders is Raymor’s positioning of carbon-based nan-otubes in relation to methane use and the Kyoto accords.It may be that Canadians are more likely to put newproducts into the energy-saving problem framework andthat Americans are less likely to do so. It certainly seemsthat Raymor, with its steady stream of announcements,has and had been trying hard to make single-walled car-bon nanotubes visible to as many potential clients aspossible.

The production of nanotubes, a robust field with mul-tiple methodologies, is an area highly visible to univer-sity researchers as a place to patent and commercializenew discoveries. There is also a robust debate on whothe first discoverer of carbon nanotubes really is, withhonors being given to a Russian team. Most, however,agree that Sumio Iijima made significant contributionsto the field and that he deserves the acclaim he enjoys(see Iikima, 1991). In a secondary way, nanotubes arevisible to stock analysts and those who make a hobby orliving following the nanomarket because they may well,in the near future, undergird many other nanorelatedproducts. Those who follow the industry have followedthe development of cost-effective mass production tech-niques for nanotubes.

Carbon nanotubes were even for sale in small quan-tities on eBay from 2004 to April 2006 throughNanocraft. The semitransparent nature of eBay salesputs the carbon-nanotube problem frame into a new con-text: Small quantities are required by a self-selectinggroup of heterogeneous customers. Ostensibly, botheBay product commentary and the sellers regulate thequality of eBay transactions, but in some sense, the rat-ings conflate the risk of buying the product from theseller and the risk of the product itself being less thangood or even dangerous. Commentary for Nanocraftwas uniformly good, focusing on the speed of shipping:“Awesome product, great quality, fast delivery,” saidone user about Nanocraft (eBay, 2005). In the case ofcarbon nanotubes, which are a fine powder, carefulpackaging is necessarily part of the product’s features,but the assumption seems to be that not spilling and notinhaling the fine powder is a matter for the customer tomanage. Caveat emptor?

Significance and risk debate. Raymor’s subsidiaryAP&C has made some interesting claims for its produc-tion methods and product (Raymor, 2006). The productis “100 times stronger than steel at 1/6th the weight,”and the process is at least “25 times more efficient, lessdangerous, and less costly than any other existing tech-nology in the world.” Although these are, of course,marketing claims, they are claims of a particular sort;they suggest that the product will improve industrialproducts and practice. They echo the kinds of claimsmade by the nascent green-energy industry. “Less dan-gerous” to whom or what? Raymor suggests that thisprocess will somehow lower the ambient risk of makingcarbon nanotubes or, by extension, making things withindustrial practice.

Expanding the language of significance is Dr.Iijima. Recalling his 1997 Friday Evening Discourseto the Royal Institution in England (founded byMichael Faraday in 1826), he tells an anecdote abouthimself that speaks to his idea of the importance ofcarbon nanotubes.

During my discourse, I made the following comment:“When I am asked about the practical value of carbonnanotubes, I respond with the same reply that the greatEnglish scientist Michael Faraday gave to theChancellor of the Exchequer (the Minister of Finance atthe time): ‘One day, Sir, you may tax it.’” This com-ment also won a rousing response. I used this metaphorto make the point that carbon nanotubes offer so manymerits that one day there may be a tax levied on theiruse, but I think perhaps the idea is even more appropri-ate now than it ever was. (Iijima, n.d., para. 4)

In short, the claims for the significance of single-walled carbon nanotubes right now mirror the claimsmade for the entire industry—good for just abouteverything.

Despite the environmental encomiums made byRaymor, carbon nanotubes, single and multiwall, havereceived some negative press regarding toxicology. Themost frequent journalistic comparison involves the prob-lems with asbestos. According to Dr. John M. Balbus,director of nanotech research for EnvironmentalDefense, a New York–based nonprofit watchdog,“inhaled nanoparticles can cause lung tumors in rats.Some of the particles are virtually indestructible, muchlike asbestos fibers that cause lung disease” (quoted inPiller, 2006, p. A1). But the science community is alsocautious, and the National Institute for OccupationalSafety and Health (NIOSH, 2007) has begun to compileand make public peer-reviewed toxicity studies on




carbon nanotubes. A study on mouse lungs and carbonnanotubes concludes,

It can be inferred from the exposure-risk estimationinformation presented here that, if workers were chron-ically exposed to respirable NT [nanotubes] dust at afraction of the PEL concentration for syntheticgraphite, they would likely develop serious lunglesions. . . . In conclusion, this study shows, for the testconditions described here and on an equal-weight basis,that if NTs reach the lungs, they are much more toxicthan carbon black and can be more toxic than quartz,which is considered a serious occupational health haz-ard in chronic inhalation exposures. If fine NT dusts arepresent in a work environment, exposure protectionstrategies to minimize human exposures should beimplemented. (Lam, James, McCluskey, & Hunter,2004, p. 133)

Other researchers suggest that exposure to unrefinedsingle-walled carbon nanotubes may lead to dermaltoxicity and, ultimately, skin diseases. Because theseearlier carbon-nanotube toxicology studies werebeing pursued in tandem with the development ofnanotechnology products—and, thus, evidence hadyet to be accumulated—most warnings have beenhedged using the words may and might. Joining earliercalls by journalists and researchers for regulations, a fewcompanies, such as Nanotox of Texas, are advocatingfor the development of general standards. Dave Hobson,chief scientific officer, argues, “We either make theeffort to learn clearly the implications and consequencesof using these materials now, before something unpleas-ant happens, or we gain that knowledge afterwards as alesson learned at a greater cost” (NanoTox, 2007, p. 1).

To the degree that a federal organization such asNIOSH is able to enforce standards in America, it mayalso be able to frame production methods. In addition topublishing its list of toxicity studies, NIOSH has repub-lished its online nanotechnology safety page.4 However,its concerns, which include toxicity, controls, measure-ment methods, exposure and dose, and safety, include alist of questions to be answered rather than a list ofestablished measures. As noted in the previous section,the EPA is becoming a central player in nanotoxicityregulation. Reporting on the EPA and its premanufac-turing notices, Charles Choi (2006), a science writer andclose follower of the nanotech industry, remarks,

Expectations are mixed when it comes to governmentactivity. The NanoBusiness Alliance’s Murdockexpects to see the rollout of the basic level of EPA’s vol-untary stewardship program in 2007, under which man-ufacturers would alert officials about the nano-products

they are producing and tests they are running on themto understand the materials. . . . However, Kulinowski[Kristen Kulinowski, director of the InternationalCouncil on Nanotechnology] said the relevance of thevoluntary program may be challenged by reviews of 15nanomaterials the EPA has conducted during the lasttwo years that were reported via pre-manufacturingnotices. . . . They ruled that one of those nanomaterials,a carbon nanotube, had unique properties that made itdifferent from its bulk counterpart and that it thereforerequired more testing. (paras. 47, 49)

The EPA nanotechnology white paper, published in afinal version in February 2007, has received ongoingcommentary. A joint response to an earlier version of itin 2006 notes that the EPA has yet to take account ofthe well-documented lung toxicity of single-walled car-bon nanotubes. In fact, this documentation has beenaccumulating relatively rapidly across a short timeframe, 2004 to 2007. The EPA’s February 2007 whitepaper does list a series of toxicology studies and thealarming possibilities for worker damage by carbonnanotubes.

In the case of Raymor’s single-walled carbon-nanotube production facility, discussion of significanceand of risk has been dominated by its press releases. Itseems that no independent observer is yet following thiscompany in the media. Possibly, there is no devoted mediadiscussion of carbon nanotubes because the eventualclients and the products are as yet unclear. Tennis rack-ets might end up in landfills, but what about airplaneparts or factory-reject hip joints? It is a little surprisingthat there appears to have been no overt linkage betweenthe known carbon-nanotube toxicology studies and oneof the important customers for Raymor, makers oforthopedic implants. It seems that medical research hasdeveloped a risk dialogue that runs parallel to, but notnecessarily overlapping with, the industry risk dialogueabout carbon nanotubes.

In March 2007, Raymor had a follow-up announce-ment about its anonymous orthopedic implant client:

This client is exclusively using AP&C’s titanium pow-der in a process which has received approval from theUS Food and Drug Administration. . . . The companyexpects the long-term relationship with this client togrow, and fully expects monthly order levels to increasein the coming years.

By referencing the Food and Drug Administration inits press release, Raymor has taken its first public steptoward a medical–industrial risk dialogue. Perhaps,the focus on risk is still somewhat unclear, notbecause the production process is unclear, but because




the eventual clients and products are unclear. It is alsopossible that the people most likely to be setting thestandards for industry are those most engaged in theneed for financial success.

Conclusions

In the course of three case studies, we have consid-ered the process of nanotechnology’s becoming visi-ble to social groups; we have noted the language ofsignificance; and we have described proposed riskmeasures as nanotechnology policy is formed, closed,and stabilized. The following conclusions ideally tran-scend the individual cases and may prove useful forthose anticipating risk in their nanoventures andinstructive for those considering risk regulation.

In particular, we suggest that the affected, or relevant,social groups may well involve individuals or groups notnecessarily expected by decision makers to have a stakein decision making. Social groups in nanotechnology areas heterogeneous as the field itself. Nanotechnology isthus a disruptive technology because there are soldiers,researchers, doctors, patients, sci-fi readers, bikers, andpolice officers at the table—and, as we might expect, theproblems and potentials with nanotechnology are notvisible in the same way. Unless or until a problem comesinto focus for more than one group, the process of stabi-lization may be slow. Some social groups have coalescedin the newer venues of blogs, eBay customer response,article commentary, and so on: So, the level of trans-parency among various social groups is perhaps higherthan that of the past. But transparency of interest does notnecessarily translate into power or influence in policy. Inthe end, it will be important for nanotechnology investorsand developers, as well as risk regulators, to cast theirrisk nets far and wide in consideration of exactly who hasa stake and who may be affected by their efforts, therebyrecognizing that although each case will, of necessity, bedifferent, there may be revealing and significant parallelsacross cases and fields from which to learn.

As one might expect, the language of significancetends to be most sweeping where the product andprocess are least stabilized. For instance, single-walledcarbon nanotubes are, right now, good for everythingand likely to solve many problems because clients andproducts are still in flux. In contrast, for the case of silver-ion washing machines, where the traditional mar-ket for such devices seems, at least on the surface ofthings, more stabilized, the language of significancereflects a toned-down stance. Nonetheless, risk asses-sors, whether within the industry or the EPA, need to beattuned not only to the clean-water implications that

have surfaced to date but to the broader social issues, assuggested in this article.

In the absence of formal governmental regulatory pol-icy, which is now just emerging, as suggested by therecent EPA white paper (2007), informal and paragov-ernmental groups develop measures for controlling risk.For instance, a science-oriented site called Nanotox hasbeen established to exchange informal information aboutthe toxicity of nano-engineered materials. In Europe, aEuropean Union–funded project called NANOSAFE2was created in 2005 for the purpose of developing riskassessment and management. The first report wasreleased in 2006. In March 2007, France’s NationalConsultative Bioethics Committee for Health and LifeSciences proposed a European Union–wide mandatoryregistration of all new nanomaterials, indicating theirpotential impacts on human health (Speer, 2007).

One characteristic telltale of visibility involves anysort of proposed risk measurement; furthermore, onetelltale that no intersocial group dialogue existsinvolves side-by-side incommensurate measurementsfor risk, as in the case of the medical community andRaymor. To this last point, risk standardization is anartifact of culturally distinct groups. Only when twogroups come into conflict does the artifactual natureof risk become obvious. In nonmilitary cases—nanosilver and carbon nanotubes—it seems that thereis a product in search of a customer, and so for the producers of such technology, the issues of environmentand health may be clouded by other kinds of risk—bankruptcy and expensive regulation. In the case of themilitary, the primary risk involves immediate death,besides which, other kinds of problems seem less impor-tant. Risk measures are being developed and proposedby advocacy groups, government regulators, and insur-ance companies—in some senses, those outside theindustry, although industry is also taking part in thisprocess. As such, a process of outside-in imposition andinside-out response may lengthen the time that it takesto stabilize a risk measurement, although that debatemay ultimately be good for the quality of the regulation.

Notes

1. In one sense, Weiss (2006) was correct, and Tamarkin(2006) potentially misleading. That is, cancer treatments currentlyunder development and testing at Rice University’s Center forBiological and Environmental Nanotechnology utilize goldnanoshells—each a silica core with a thin gold shell—which,because of their size and bonding capabilities with targeting anti-bodies, can be selectively delivered to a tumor site. Designed toabsorb near-infared wavelength light, these gold nanoparticlesheat up when exposed to an infared laser beam and fry the tumor




cells while adjacent healthy cells with no attached nanoshells staycool and unaffected. For a lay summary of these developments,from which the above is drawn, see Williams and Adams (2007).

2. It is interesting to note from a global perspective thatSamsung has apparently withdrawn its Nano Silver washingmachine from the Swedish market in response to public concern(Friends of the Earth, 2006).

3. Over the last 2 years, Raymor appears to have performedwith mixed results, with lowered earnings representing the cost ofa new facility, but with some growth in their stock price and con-siderable growth in sales. See Raymor’s third quarter report athttp://www.raymor.com/investors.php?investors=share_information&top=null&smartmenu=show&lang=eng.

4. See http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/nanotech/strat_planAPPXa.html.

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Christine M. Pense is a graduate student at Lehigh Universitystudying the history of technology, and she is also the assistantdean in humanities and social sciences at NorthamptonCommunity College.

Stephen H. Cutcliffe is director of the Science, Technology,and Society Program at Lehigh University, where he teachescourses in the history of technology and U.S. environmentalhistory.




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