THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION IN ETHICS:THE GOOD REEXAMINED

by John R. Silber, Austin

/. The Primacy of the Moral Law in the Determination of the GoodKant's predecessors generally believed that ethical enquiry should

begin with the definition of the good from whidi the moral law and theconcept of Obligation are- to be derived. But from his revolutionary pointof view, Kant saw that this was precisely the isooirce of

all the confusions of philosophers concerning the supreme principle of morals.For they sought an object of the will in order to make it into the materialand foundation of a law, ... instead they should have looked for a law whichdirectly determined the will a priori and only then sought an object suitableto it.')

The "analytic" of the Critique oi Practical Reason demonstrates that allattempts first to define the good s the object of the will and to derivefrom it the moral law and duty make the good into a material concept,and that all material principles are inoapable of grosunding the supremeprinciple of morality.2) Kant's argument is not systematic; it comes inodd places and from many van tage pointsj sometime it is implicit and atother times repetitiously explicit. But the argument is presented and it iscapable of systematization.

At this point a few basic definitions will help to clarify Kant's ar-gument. First, we must understand what Kant means by a practical prin-

*) KdpV, p. 71: Bede, pp. 172-3. In order to simplify references, I haveabbreviated the titles of the books cited s will be shown below. I have usuallycited both the German text and an English translation. Unless otherwise indicatedtranslations are my own.IKW . . . . Immanuel Kants Werke, ed. Ernst CassirerKdrV . . . . Kritik der reinen Vernunft, IKW, vol. 3Kemp Smith . Kemp Smith, A Translation oi Kant's Critique of Pure ReasonKdpV . . . . Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, IKW, vol. 5Bede Bede, Critique oi Practical Reason and other Writings in Moral

PhilosophyGr Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, IKW, vol. 4Paton . . . . Paton, The Moral Law or Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic

of MoralsMdS Die Metaphysik der Sitten, IKW, vol. 7Abbott . . . Abbott, Kants Critique of Practical Reason and other Writings on

the Theory of EthicsRel Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloen Vernunft, IKW, vol. 6Theorie undPraxis . . . ber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein,

taugt aber nicht fr die Praxis, IKW, vol. 6Greene . . . Greene and Hudson, Religion Within the Limits oi Reason Alone

*) Ibid., pp. 47, 119: pp. 152, 214.85

ciple. "Practical principle" is a generic terra referring to the class of allpropositions which contain a general determination of the will. 3) The willis the power of a rational being to act in accord with its own idea of lawrather than in mere conformity to law. 4) This idea of law in tenns ofwhich the will acts is the principle of the will, that is, a practical prin-ciple. A being possessed of will in an act of willing does not simplyrespond to a Stimulus; rather he consciously projects an intention. Thisintention is again the practical principle. But practical principles may beof two kinds: either subjective, in which case the principle of volition isregarded by the subject .s valid for himself alone, or objective, in whichcase the principle is regarded s valid for all subjects. The subjectivesort of principle is called a maxim, whereas the objective sort is calleda practical law. 5)

We must also bear in mind Kant's distinction between "formal" and"material" s these terms relate to concepts and knowledge. Knowledge,or a concept, is material when it refers to some object; it is formal whenit refers merely to the form of understanding and reason, that is, when itrefers only to "the universal rules of thinking s such without regard todifferences in its objects".6) Thus, the presence or absence of referenceto a specific object determines whether or not concepts and knowledgeare formal or material.

It follows analytically from these definitions that the traditional con-cept of the good is a material concept. A formal concept is one whichmakes no reference to an object. But the traditional concept of the good,defined prior to the moral law, is the concept of an object for which thewill is to strive. Hence, because of its reference to an object, the goodis a material concept.

Kant's insistence that the moral law and duty can never be groundedon material concepts does not follow analytically, however, from thesedefinitions. As Kant sees it, the problem is this: for the good to be ameaningful ethical concept it must be related to the moral agent s theObligation of the agent to embody the good in the practical principle ofhis will.7) But the good s a material concept cannot be related to thewill in this fashion. For if it is related to the will at all, then the goodwill be related to the will either empirically and contingently, and hencewithout Obligation; or it will be compulsive upon the will s the naturalcause of the .effects of the will, and hence the freedom of the will, andthereby the will itself, will be destroyed. Thus, the attempt to groundthe principle of morality on a previously defined material concept of thegood founders on this dilemma: either the good Stands in no relation orin a contingent relation to the will or the good itself has the power to

8) Ibid., p. 21: p. 130.4) Gr, p. 270: Paton, p. 80.) KdpV, p. 21: Beck, p. 130; Gr, p. 257n: Paton, p. 69n.e) Gr, p. 243: Paton, p. 55..

7) Kant takes for granted that moral Obligation is categorical, i.e. necessary,inescapable Obligation. And he also holds that Obligation presupposes freedom ofthe will. We will assume these points for the present and hold that a soundmoral theory must give an account of Obligation on these terms.

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detennine the will to action and thereby destroys the will. In neither casetan the moral law be derived from the good and, therefore, no relationof Obligation can be effected between the good and the will.

Kant's arguinent in support of this Position is provided in connectionwith bis exposition of the theorems of The Critique of Practical Reason.Suppose one defines the good s the object (material) of the faculty ofdeisire. The good then becomes an object whose reality is desired. Assuch the good Stands in relation to the will8) s that which the willdesires. The practical principle of the will then expresses the desire of thewill for the desired object, namely the good. But in this case, the practicalprinciple oan never be an objective practical law for all wills but onlythe subjective maxiin of the particular will s it empirically encounter-sa desire within itself. The relation of the will to the good, therefore, iscontingent because the decision of the will either to pursue or not pursuethe good

consists in the conception of an object and its relation to the subject, wherebythe faculty of desire is determined to

the will, it is only binding on a particular will s Ms subjective maximand is in no wise -binding upon all wiils s a practical law or even uponhis at all times. u)

JFrom this argument we can confidently deduce theorem I: "All prac-tical principles whidi presuppose an object (material) of the faculty ofdesire s the determining ground of the will are without exception em-pirical and can furnish no practical laws.41 12)

Some moralists prior to Kant saw this difficulty and sought to avoidit by distinguishing between a higher and a lower faculty of desire. Thedistinction was made on the basis of the origin of the pleasures enter-tained by the faculty of desire. Accordingly, pleasures belonged to thelower faculty of desire if they had their origin in the senses, whereasthey belonged to the higher faculty of desire if they had their origin inthe understanding. Now, it was argued, if the good s the object of thewill were related to th$ will through the higher faculty of desire, that isby means of a pleasure of the understanding, then it could be related tothe will s a law.

But Kant finds that this attempt to solve the difficulty is unsuccessful.We must note at once that even with this modification the good is stillrelated to the will contingently; the good is binding on the will only ifin fact there is a feit desire on the part of the will to attain the realityof the good. And this desire will be present only if the faculty of desire,whether higher or lower, encounters within itself pleasure in the anti-cipation of the reality of the good. Thus the concept of duty cannot bederived from the definition of the good even though the good is madethe object of the understanding s the higher faculty of desire.

Furthermore, we find that this distinction between higher and lowerfaculties of desire does not enable ILS to regard objects of the higherfaculty of desire s laws. Whether or not an object of the will stems fromthe understanding, whether or not the good is defined in tenns of senseor in tenns of the understanding, whether or not the good is definedrationally or empirically, the consequences on this point are the same.If the only way in whidi the good can detennine the dioice of the willis by means of desire, then the principle of the will whidi is so determinedwill be subjective. No matter how one defines good,

However dissimilar the concepon of the objects, be they proper to the under-standing or even to the reason instead of to the senses, the feeling of pleas-ure, by virtue of whidi they constitute the determining ground of the will(since it is the agreeableness and the enjoyment which one expects from theobject which impells the activity toward producing it) is always the same. Thissameness lies not merely in the fact that all feelings of pleasure can be knownonly empirically, but even more in the fact that the feeling of pleasure alwaysaffects one and the same life-force which is manifested in the faculty of desire,and in this respect one determining ground differs from any other only indegree.13)") /dem., cf. ibid., pp. 29-30, 42: pp. 137, 148.l*) Idem.l3) Ibid., pp. 25-26: p. 134. Mill's failure to heed this passage points graphically

to the importance of the history of philosophy s a guide and measure for fruit-ful philosophical inquiry.

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Since the determining ground of the will is always desire, whether fromhigher or lower faculty, the practical principle of the will so determinedcan never be a practical law. As we ,saw earlier, feit desires or aversionsare individual, and pnactical prinoiples which -are based upon them canonly be subjective maxims.

When we add to our conclusion the reminder that Kant calls the prin-ciple of choice whidi is based upon the desire for that which is pleasantthe principle of self-love or the principle of personal happiness, thededuction of the second theorem becomes clear: "All material practicalprinciples are, s such, of one and the same kind and belong under thegeneral principle of self-love or one's own happiness11, and its corollary:"All material praotioal ml es place the ground of the determination of thewill in the lower faculty of desire, and if there were no purely formallaws of the will adequate to determine itr we could not admit [theexistence of] any higher faculty of desire.1114)

Kant's first Theorem seems obvious enough for no one can responsiblyargue that the good can be defined merely s the object of actual desireif one hopes to give meaning to inoral Obligation. But Kant's secondtheorem and its corollary out mudi more deeply, since they strike downnot only the Claims of moralists like Hutcheson and Shaftebury, thosewho ground the moral law on the moral feeling directed toward the good,but also strike down the Claims of Wolff, the Stoics, and theologicalmoralists who ground morality on the idea of perfection. The empiricismof the first group exposes its weakness. But since the latter group basetheir theories on the rational idea of perfection, it would seem that bydefining the good in this manner they would have escaped the difficultybesetting the others. The difficulty remains, however, for when the con-cept of perfection is used in its practical sense it does not refer to theperfection of a substance, whether of a particular substance or of beingin general. When used in the practioal sense, the idea of perfection refersto the sufficiency of an act or a being to a given end. The p4erfection ofa knife, for example, is determined by its competence for cutting. Untilthe end is given, however, one cannot give meaning to the practical con-cept of perfection. The idea of perfection, even though it is developed byreason, cannot determine the will to action, nor -even guide mudi lessobligate the will, unless ends are antecedently given in terms of whidiperfection is to be judged. The concept of perfection cannot serve torelate the will to an end whidi must be given prior to. the concept itself.Hence we face once more the problem of relating the end to the will.And -s we have already seen, an end

s an object whidi precedes and contaias the ground of determination of thewill is, if taken s the determining ground of the will, only empirical; i t couldthus serve for the Epicurean principle in the happiness theory but never s apure rational principle of ethics and duty. Thus talents and their cultivation,14) Ibid., pp. 25-26: p. 133. Here Kant does not distinguish the higher faculty of

desire from the lower on the basis of desire but on the fact that the higher facultyof desire is determined by principles and not by desires. The truly higher facultyof desire is not deterinined by either sensible or intellectual desire but has adesire produced in itself by a principle.

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bccause thcy contribute to thc advantages of life, or the will of Godr ifagreement with it (without any practical principle independent of this idea)be taken s an object of the will, can be motives only by reason of thehappincss expccted from them.15)

If the concept of perfection, which can indced be defined by reason, couldbe given practical significance apart from the antecedent determinationof an end, then it might be possible to sustain a theory of ethics whichdid define the good s perfection. But perfection has no meaning s apractical concept unless i t specifies the degree of sufficiency of an objector act or person to a given end. Hence, if the will is not already relatedto some end s its object, it cannot be judged by the norm of perfection(whether human or divine perfection). But if the will is already relatedto some object, then we face our original difficulty of relating the willto the object in a way that makes the object normative for the will. Butthus far we have found that the object is either irrelevant to the will orthat it determines the principle of the will through natural desire, withthe consequence that the connection of the will to the object is empiricaland contingent and that the principle of the will so related to the objectis subjective.

Throughout this discussion, however, an assumption has been madewhich must be questioned. We may fairly ask why the good, s theobject of the will, must be related to the will by means of desire at all?Granting the soundness of the objection to relating the will and the goodin this mann er, this objection does not become overwhelming until it hasbeen shown that when the good is defined prior to the law s the objectof will, desire provides the only way of relating the good to the will.Kant's answer is contained in Theorem III: "If a rational being can thinkof its maxims s practical universal laws he can do so only by consideringthem s principles which contain the determining grounds of the will fonn-ally and not materially." 16) As Kant states and defends this theorem itis not clear that his argument moves beyond Theorems I and II. In hisdemonstnation of it Kant says:

The material of a practical principle is the object of the will. This object eitheris the determining ground of the will or it is not. [If it is not, then the object(the good) is irrolovant to the will.] If it is, the rule of the will is subject toau empirical comiilion (to the relation of the determining notion to feelings ofpleasure or displeasure), and therefore it is not a practical law.17)

Here Kant seems to be assuming the very point at issue. Actually, how-ever, he is not, since he bears in mind the nature of the will. We havenoted previously that the will is .the faculty of a rational being to act inaccord wil;h ils own idea of law, rather than in conformity with the lawsof nature. That -is, the will is itself "a kind of causality" and "freedomwould then be the property this causality has of being able to workindependenitly of dete-rrndnation by alien causes".18) The will must be un-conditioned, independent, capable of being the cause of actions withoutitself being the product of alien causes. In short, the will must be capable

15) Ibid., p. 47: pp. 151-152.le) Ibid., p. 30: p. 138.17) Ibid., pp. 30-31: p. 138. The sentence in bradcets is my explication of a tacitpart of Kant's argument.18) Gr, p. 305: Paton, p. 114. Cf. KdpV, p. 38: Beck, p. 144.90

of responsible action. Its presence in a person must mark that person sa moral agentr s /a being "whose actions are capable of imputation".19)

Bearing this in mind, suppose now tliat such a will is related to anobject in such a way that it is determined by that object. When this isdone, the will is conditioned by that object. But the will cannot be freeand responsible unless it is unconditioned, capable of acting apart fromexternal determination by an object. Hence if the good s the object ofthe will is related to the will in this fashion it is indeed related by lawand with necessity, but it is not related to the will of a moral person. Forin being related to the subject s its causal determinant, the good des-troys the freedom of 'the subject, and hence the subject is no longer amoral person. If on the other hand, the will is related to the good s itsobject in such a way s to retain its power ito act undetermined by thatobject, then the freedom and moral signifioance of the will -s well s itsrelatedness to the good oan be maintained.

But now we must inquire s to the nature of the relation between thewill and the good s its object. The good does not condition the will. Itdoes not reduce the will to an effect of external causation. But apart frointhis negative Statement, what can be said about its relation to the will?If prior to the determination of the moral law the good is presented to thewill s an object and yet is not made the causal determinant of ithe will,the good in no way binds the will. The relation between them is eithernon-existent, or, if present at all, is empirical and contingent. If the goodso defined is to be related to the will at all, without destroying thefreedom of the will, it can be related only by ithe agency of the will itself.That is, the will must freely elect the good s its object. But tjiis electionof /the good -s a previously defined object is contingent and empirical.The will may or may not elect this object. If the object appeals to thewill, arouses in the will a desire for its realization, the will and the objectare, in fact, related. But if the will does not happen to desire the object,then no relation obtains between them. Since the object is dpfined priorto the moral law, the moral law cannot serve to obligate the will to theobject. There is simply no principle or law, or universal condition, whichcan be oalled upon to relate the will to this object so long s the freedomof the will is maintained. Hence, the good so defined cannot be relatedto the will either s a law or s an Obligation, but only perchance s anobject of desire.

Thus, bearing in mind Kant's definition of the will, we see the forceof his demonstration of Theorem III.20) If the rational being thinfcs of hismaxims s being voluntarily conditioned by a subjective relation between

19) MdS, p. 24: Abbott, p. 279; cf. ibid., p. 28: p. 283; Gr, p. 303: Paton, p. 111;KdpV, pp. 105-107: Beck 202-203.

*) And it is perhaps worthy of note that this examination of the wll provideaus with the demonstration of Theorem IV which, because it is presupposed in thedemonstration of Theorem III necessitated this detour into Kant's constructivetheory. In light of our previous discussion, we can, without further examination,accept Theorem IV:

The autonomy [freedom] of the will is the sole principle of all moral lawsand of the duties conforming to them; heteronomy of-clioice [conditioneddioice] on the other hand, not only does not establish any Obligation but is

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himself and the good s his object s a result of the attraction the objecthas for him, then he cannot think of his maxims s universal laws. 21) Ifthe rational being seeks to act on maxims which are practical laws whilepreserving the unconditioned quality of his freedom, he must relate faim-self to an object by means of the practical principle itself whidi mustdetermine the will formally and not materially by reference to the pre-viously defined object. If in his practical principle the rational being hasabstracted all consideration of the object and makes the mere form ofuniversality itself the determining ground of the will, then the will isindeed determined. But in being determined the will is not conditioned.Its act is free and unconditioned because, by abstracting from all con-sideration of the object, the will disassociates itself from "every in-ducement that might -arise for it (the object)".22) When Uns is done, thewill oan be related to the object only by reference to the practicalprinciple of the will itself, that is, by reference to its own idea of lawwhich through the universality of its form is beyond all conditions and,hence, can serve s the ground of the determination of the will withoutconditioning it. 23)

Thus, in summary, we see the force of Kant's insistence that to definethe good prior to the law >as by desire. By moving on from Kant's criticismof his predessors to his positive view of freedom -and the will, we can seethe justification of the alternative he presents in Theorem III. When weconsider the character of freedom, when we recognize that freedom pre-supposes unconditionedness, we see that ein object can be necessarilyrelated to the will only if dt is related formally from the side of the lawand not materially from the side of the object. The good s an objectcannot be related to the will materially, that isr by reference to itsnature s an object, unless the good s an abject conditions the willeither 1) by forcing itself upon the will s the causal determinant of thewill's action or 2) by happening to be of such a nature that the will isimpelled to determine itself to seek the attainment of the object. Now, ifthe object conditions the will in the first way, it destroys the will. Hence,no moral theory can take this course in relating the good to the will. If,on the other hand, the abject conditions the will in the .second way byvirtue of the action of the will itself, then the relation of the good to thewill is both contingent and subjective and obtains or not according sthe will happens to desire or not desire the good s its object. Hence,no moral theory can take this second way in relating the good to the

opposed to the principle of duty and to the morality of the will. (KdpV, p. 38:Beck, p. 144.)

(The words in brackets are my additions. They are often used by Kant, however,s substitutes for the terms preceding them.)

21) KdpV, pp. 39, 65, 69 ff: Beck, pp. 145, 167, 171 ff.22) Gr, p. 258: Paton, p. 70; KdpV, p. 39: Beck, p. 145.2*) Of course Kant insists, and most of Kant's Interpreters have ignored this

point, "It is certainly undeniable that every volition must have an object andtherefore a material; but the material cannot be supposed for this reason to bethe determining ground and condition of the maxim." KdpV, p. 39: Beck, p. 145;cf. ibid., p. 40: p. 146.

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will, isince no moral law or Obligation can be derived from such a relation.And since neither course can .relate the good to the will in a mannerrequired by sound moral theory, that isf in a manner which preservesthe freedom of the agent while obligating him necessarily by the morallaw, the hopelessness of this procedure in ethical thinking is revealed.

Thus Kant has succeeded in showing that when the good is definedprior to the moral law s the object of the will, the good is either 1) inan indifferent relation to the will or 2) is related to the will contingentlythrough a decision of the will that is based on the subjective conditionsof desire, or 3) determines the will -and thereby destroys its moral sig-nificance. In .showing so much, Kant has demonstrated that the classicaltradition oan never relate the good to the moral agent with the necessityof law and Obligation. He has .shown therefore the error of the methodmost commonly employed in moral phiiosophy: that moralists who beginby defining the good prior to the moral law can never succeed in endow-ing their concept of the good with moral significance, and hence can neverhope to offer a sound theory of ethics.

II. The Heterogeneity of the GoodKant's case against the classical tradition does not rest, however, on

these theoretical difficulties alone. As a result of defining the good priorto the inoral law, the classical tradition emerged with a homogeneousconcept of the good, a concept in which no distinction was made betweenmoral and non-moral good. This conclusion has serious consequences forethical theory even if we ignore the devastating objections already men-tioned: happiness and virtue can not be distinguished, freedom of thewill is denied, and the experience of Obligation is impossiible. Since onthis view the good is defined prior to any consideration of the moral law,this concept can be brought into effective relationship with the moralagent (allowing for the sake of the argument that the conditions of moralagency are not destroyed) only by making the good itself compulsivefor him. It must, therefore, be defined s the object of the agent's desire.But when this is done, the good becomes a homogeneous concept whoserelation to the will can be measured by the agent's desire. Although anethical theory based on this conception might begin with a distinctionbetween what is desired and what ought to be desired, this distinctioncan not be maintained. The good is related to the agent only by desire,and there is no distinction in the faculty of desire between good des-ires and bad desires.24) Desires are not quelled simply because they areillicit in terms of this concept of the good; for the only ineans whereby thegood can influence the will is through the fact of desire or aversion itself !Hence, the independence of the good from desire (which is essential if thegood is to be normative for desire) can be achieved only at the price of theirrelevancy of the good. In spite of the finer sensitivities of the authorsof sudi theories, the good becomes a homogeneous concept which sanc-tions all desires or is merely silent.

**) KdpV, pp. 25-26: Beck, p. 134.

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The classical ethicists were aware of this problem to some extent,since their thcories culminated in moral paradoxes whidi they were hardprosscd to explain. Socrates found that bis theory led to the paradoxesthat a man would pre/er to suffer injustice than to do it; that he wouldbe happier than the man who was unjust with impunity; that the unjustman is the most miserable of rnen while the just man, however mistreated,is a happy man. The Epicureans were led to the paradox that the happyman is a virtuous man. And the Stoics shared with Socrates the paradoxthat the virtuous man even in misery is a happy man.

But Kant insists that these are not unavoidable paradoxes of the morallife. They are the reductio ad absurdum of ethical theories based upon themistaken analysis of the good s a homogeneous concept. Nothing is moreobvious, Kant thinks, than that we do not make a man good by makinghim happy, Nor do we live in so blessed a world that we can fail to seemen brought to ruin s a direct result of their fidelity to duty.23) It is un-fortunate, Kant adds, that philosophers so often strive "to overcomeessential differences in principle, which can never be united, by seekingto translate them into a conflict of words and thus to devise an apparentunity of concepts with other terms".26) Nothing can be gained but ab-surdity and the decay of all moral sensitivity from the habit of "diggingup an identity between such extremely heterogeneous concepts s thoseof happiness and virtue".27)

Surely, Polus, Callicles, Thrasymachus, and Kant are right in thinkingthat it is silly to appeal to a man's seif interest, to his desire for happiness,in order to persuade him to be blinded, castrated, and then buried alivein punishment for a crime he has committed.28) Socrates can answer, ofcourse, that one's seif interest and one's happiness are not to be under-stood merely in terms of bodily appetites and physical health. He caninsist, rather, that they must be understood in terms of the health of thesoul. But when Socrates does this he falls into an inconsistency. He pre-dioates this distinction on a genuine heterogeneity in the concept of thegood. He makes justice (or the moral law) the basic ethical principle interms of which the good and happiness are defined. By this tack, Socratesreveals the genuine confusion in his 'ethical theory. When he says thatone should seek justice s the health of the soul and suffer injury to thebody rather than incur a disease of the soul, he identifies morality withthe welfare of the soul and prudence with the welfare of the body. ButSocrates then blurs this important distinction by saying that one cangenuinely pursue his happiness, his self-interest, by permitting injury andeven destruction to his body when the health of the soul cannot otherwisebe maintained. Instead of sustaining his distinction between prudence andmorality by going on to distinguish happiness from moral contennent,Socrates combines these two mental states under the term "happiness11

25) KdpV, p. 40 ff., 137-138: Beck, p. 146 ff., 230; pass/m.) Ibid.. p. 122: p. 216.*

7) /dem. Cf. p. 101: p. 198; pp, 137-138: p. 230.w) Plato, Gorgias; 473 cf. 522. See KdpV, pp. 43-44: Beck, p. 149.

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and, s a result, falls into direct conflict with human experience.29) Fortun-atelyr it is not completely foreign to human experience for a person tobe aware of having refused to violate the dictates of his conscience eventhough this refusal has resulted in great personal misfortune. Such aperson, in the midst of his misfortune, may be possessed of a certain seifrespect in that he has been faithful to the moral law which is the law ofhis personality. But, Kant insists, "this comfort is not happiness, noteven the smallest part of happiness; for no one would wish to haveoccasion for itr not even once in his life, or perhaps even would desirelife itself in such circumstances".30) The Kantian analysis of the awarenessof having fulfilled one's duty thus appears to comport better with moralexperience than the Socratic analysis.

One might argue that if the Socratic analysis were sound, if Socrateswere genuinely happy in drinking the hemlock, why would not people soorder society that great numbers of them could share this fate? Ifhappiness were a simple concept referring to the mental state of a personwhose action comports with a homogeneous concept of the good, whyshould men so overwhelmingly prefer quiet death in bed to death in theexecution chamber? We cannot avoid the embarrassing consequences ofthe Socratic analysis of the good and of happiness by arguing thatSocrates was not positively happy while drinking the hemlock but thathe would have been very unhappy had he avoided this draught by escape.Socrates would not have been unhappy choosing the alternative of escapeunless prior to his acceptance of the good s the object of his desireshe had accepted the moral law not merely s the descriptive law of hisdesires but s the prescriptive law of what he should desire and madehis happiness and the satisfaction of his desires contingent upon the ful-fillment of this law. As Kant states it,

One must already value the importance of what we call duty, the respect forthe moral law, and the immediate worth which a person obtains in his owneyes through obedience to it, in order to feel satisfaction in the consciousnessof his conformity to law or the bitter remorse which accompanies hisawareness that he has transgressed it. Therefore, his satisfaction or spiritiialunrest cannot be feit prior to the knowledge of Obligation, nor can it be madethe basis of the latter*1) Only the virtuous person, or one who is on his wayto becoming so, is capable of this pure moral dissatisfaction (which does notstem from consequences of the action in question which are disadvantageousto him, but from the action's very Opposition to the law). Accordingly, thedissatisfaction is not the cause but the effect of the fact that he is virtuous;and the motivation to be virtuous cannot be derived from this ^unhappiness(if one so wishes to call the pain resulting from such a misdeed).32)

Socrates, consequently, could not claim to have done his duty (the good)because it made him happy nor that he was happy because he had donehis duty without doing violence to human experience. The fulfillment ofone's duty could not be recognized s an essential condition of one'sspiritual contentment unless there were a prior recognition of the morallaw. Similarly, the avoidance of mental discontentment could never be

*9) KdpV, p. 126 ff.: Bede, p. 219 ff.30) KdpV, p. 97: Bede, p. 194. Cf. ibid.f p. 129: p. 122.31) KdpV, p. 45: Bede, p. 150 (italics are mine). Cf. ibid., p. 126 ff.: p'. 220 ff.

32) Theorie und Praxis, p. 366. Italics are mine.

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the motive for the fulfillment of duty, since there would be no mentaldiscontentment at all were not the law respected antecedently and forits own sake.

When the principle of one's action is a form of self-love prudenceor happiness one's action is determined according to a principle whichis fundamentally different from that by which action is determined accord-ing to duty. The principle of happiness or self-love, or indeed any singleprinciple, is insufficient to account for such a common human experiences that of delighting in having won a prize while despising oneself forhaving dieated to do so. For when one has to say to himself, "I am aworthless man, though I've filled my purse," he must have a differentcriterion of judgment than if he approves himself and says, "I am aprudent man, for I've enriched my treasure." 33) A philosopher who lumpsthese extremely disparate judgments together by saying "theman is simplyunhappy" contributes only to confusion. "So distinct and sharp are theboundaries between inorality and seif love that even the commonest eyecannot fail to distinguish whether a thing belongs to one or the other." 84)

The classical tradition was not mistaken in regarding the desired ob-jects of self-love s good. But it was imperceptive in failing to see thatthe concept of the good is complex and that it has a moral s well s anatural usage.35) The ancients did mudi sound work in defining thenatural concept of the good. Such programs for the harmonious realizationof natural values s that which is recommended in the Republic are amongthe greatest achievements of thought. But a philosophioal system must notseek simplicity at the cost of making impossible the very experiencewhicii it is trying to articulate. Moral experience is far more complexthan the account given of it by the classioal tradition. Man is a beingwith many natural desires such s the desire for health, food, compan-ionship, sex, or the summation of all natural desires-happiness. But heis likewise a rational being capable of taking an interest in the enactmentsof his free moral nature which may often be attained only at the expenseof his natural desires. The object of man's intention in this case is themoral good s opposed to the natural good.36)

It is, thus, in the moment of moral decision that the confusions oftraditional philosophical analysis fall away. The moral individual findshimself torn between that which he desires to do and that which he oughtto do and ought to desire to do. He dqes not behold the good s thehomogeneous object of his faculty of desire. Instead, he frequently en-counters the good s disastrously heterogeneous such that he is unableto fulfill the moral good apart from the sacrifice of the natural good, orvice versa.37)

33) KdpV, p. 43: Becfc, p. 149.34) Ibid., p. 41: p. 147.35) Ibid., pp. 137-138: pp. 229-230.3e) Ibid., pp. 95-96: p. 193.37) KdpV, pp. 68-69: Bede, p. 170; Gr, p. 311: Patonf p. 119. To indicate this

difference in kinds of good, Kant nks it is wise to refer to the natural good s'das Wohl" and the moral good s 'das Gute", to natural evil s 'dos bel"and to moral evil s das Bse". (KdpV, p. 67: Bede, p. 168).

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When, in the moment of moral decision, the heterogeneity of the goodis recognized, the na'ivete of the Socratic thesis that to know the goodis to do it is clearly seen. In order to develop with consistency the con-sequenoes of his assumption that the good is homogeneous, Socrates didnot even try to give an account of Obligation and of the apparent freedomof the will to rebel against that which it knows to be good. Instead herejected such views s the mistaken opinions of the multitude.88) Fromthe assumption of the homogeneity of the good it follows, s we haveseenr that virtue and happiness are identified and are realized togetherin the attainment of the good.39) Since all men seek happinessr and sincevirtue and happiness are realized together, all men seek virtue; hence,there can be no motive or ocoasion for evil action. On this view, withthe good so defined s to comprise the greatest self-interest of the indi-vidual, ignorance alone could lead a man to act in Opposition to the good;

j therefore, Socrates concludes consistently, and with the assurance con-| sistency brings, that if a man knows the good he will do it.; But Socrates' assumption regarding the good deceived hiin. While he

held fast to this assumption it was impossible for him to observe the factsof the moral Situation which his theory needed to explain. He was thusnot able to see the untenable consequences of his assumption becausethe assumption itself reduced all the evidence which could refute it toerroneous opinion. It is this characteristic of the assumption of the good'shomogeneity, namely, that it blinds one to contravening evidence, whidiundoubtedly has accounted for its staying power.

Once, however, this assumption is questioned long enough to pennitan uncensored look at the moral Situation, its plausibility vanishes. Inthis Situation, we confront the good in the experience of Obligation, notin the experience of simple self-fulfillment. In the moinent of moraldecision a man not only knows the good, he knows two different goods.In the moment in which he recognizes the natural good s his personaladvantage, he also recognizes the moral good s his duty. He is not grop-ing for knowledge of the personal Utility of the moral good. If the moralgood were to be understood in these terms, he would never encounterit at all except s a redundant expression for the natural good of whichhe is already aware. The inoral agent does not seek a Socratic or Stoicargument to prove either that the health of his body and mind is of noconsequence to him or that his moral well-being is the. condition ofworthiness to have physical and intellectual well-being. He knows thefirst proposition to be false and the latter to be true; otherwise, he wouldnever have experienced the temptation to reject the moral good. Hisawareness of duty testifies to the reality of the goodness of both thenatural good s happiness and the moral good s the condition of hisworthiness to attain happiness. The Socratic concern for knowledge inthe moment of moral decision is a misguided concern resulting from hismistaken view of the good, The crucial concern of the moral agent is tofind the strength of will to do that whidi he knows to be his duty (and

*8) Plato, Protagoras, 352bff., passim.

*) Plato, Republic, 392b, passim.

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the moral good) even though he knows that to do bis duty may cost himhis happinessand self-fulfillment (which he knows to be good also). To besure, the moral agent needs to know the good, both in its moral andnatural dimensions. But this problem of knowledge precedes the momentof moral decision which is a moment not of speculation but of action.40)If this knowledge of the good is not attained prior to the moment ofdecision then the conditions for moral decision are not met. It is theknowledge or awareness of the good in its heterogeneity that poses themoral problem for the will. In confronting the good s heterogeneous,the moral agent confronts in addition to the good s the object ofdesire the moral law. In this encounter, the moral law does not teilhim what he must do s a member of the natural world; it teils him whathe ought to do s a self-legislating member of the intelligible world.41)In this experience the moral law relates itself to the will "under thename of Obligation" 42) and thereby reveals to the moral agent both hisduty and his freedom "which without the moral law would have remainedunknown to him".43)

To recapitulate: We now see additional objections to the method ofethical inquiry which begins by defining the good prior to the moral laws the object of the will. We have seen that when the good is definedin this way, it becomes a homogeneous concept and is related to the willat the object of its desire. But if the good is the object of desire the goodis always sought, and virtue and happiness become identified since t othe extent that one attains the good he is both virtuous and happy.Furthermore, since the good is naturally the object of the will, the willis not free; it merely does that which it believes to be the good. Hencethere are no moral problems: there is no awareness of conflicting goods,no awareness of temptation, no awareness of Obligation, no awareness offreedom. To know the good then becomes the critical problem in ethicssince the good, by its very attractiveness, determines the will to striveafter it once it is known. On this view we seem to be living in the bestof possible worlds where all men strive after the good, whether withknowledge or in ignorance, and where those with knowledge strive toteach those in ignorance, and where all that ought to be done is done.When, having traced out all tiiese consequences, we confront this theorywith the facts of moral experience which a -sound ethical theory is obligedto explain, we find that, far from explaining the facts of moral experience,this theory either faces paradoxes and falls into inconsistencies or ex-plains away the data of moral experience s the -erroneous opinion of themultitude.

The crux of the problem is this: The good must be heterogeneous inorder to account for the awareness of Obligation and freedom. But so

40) Gr, pp. 261, 315: Paton, pp. 73, 123; passim. We note Kant's Statement: "Onthe other hand, practical reason i s not concerned with objects in order to knowthem but with its own capacity to make them real (according to knowledge ofthem}." (KdpV, p. 98: Beck, p. 195.)

41) KdpV, pp. 33-36: Beck, pp. 140-143.42) Ibid., p. 36: p. 143.43) Ibid., p. 34: p. 142; cf. ibid., p. 4n: p. 119n; Gr, p. 319: Paton, p. 127.

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long s the good is defined prior to the moral law, the good must remainhoinogeneous, because it is the moral law, ias the ratio cognoscendi offreedom, which provides the principle of distinction between the twobasic types of good that together constitute the good in its heterogeneity.That concept of the good (or evil) which is defined prior to the moral lawis the concept of the natural good (das Wohl), whereas that concept ofgood (or evil) which is defined subsequent to

object must be determined by the will, and it must be unconditional sothat thc Obligation of the will to that object is likewise unconditional.47)But free will alone has the property of being unconditioned. It alone isundetermined and unqualified by anything external to it. Therefore, onlythe free will can be the unconditioned object of the will. And since freewill is unconditioned and free only in relation to itself and not in relationto other free wills, which by virtue of their own freedom conditionthemselves in independence of outside wills, the only object that aparticular will can determine for itself unconditionally is its own freewilling. Now to this object, its own free willing, the will can be relatedwithout being conditioned or without having its freedom destroyed. Forthis object is determined by the will itself. And in determining itself tothis object the will determines itself merely to be free, that is to beunconditioned. Its unconditionality is maintained in the act of willingonly if it wills according to the universality of law, thereby transcendingthe conditioning effects of subjective inclinations. Willing according tolaw is ingredient, therefore, in the act of free willing in whidi the free-dom of the will is not conditioned but is actively maintained in itsunconditionedness. Thus free willing itself, the good will, is the soleunconditioned object to which the will can be related unconditionallywithout destroying either the unconditionality of the object, or the un-conditionality of the will, or the unconditionality of the will's relatioato the object. And since moral Obligation requires the unconditionalityof both the will and the object in addition to the unconditionality of therelation between them, the good will is, therefore, the sole moral good,the sole object that can be given with necessity by the moral law.48) Torestate the argument: the moral good must be unconditionally good; themoral good must be the moral will itself projected -s its own object sinceonly the will, by virtue of its freedom, has the requisite unconditionalitywhen projected s its own cxbject.

If something is to be, or is held to bef absolutely good or evil in all respectsand without qualification (whidi is essential to the moral concept of the good),it could not be a thing, but only a manner of acting, i.e. it could only be tliemaxim of the will, and consequently the acting person himself s a good orevil man.49)We see, then, how Kant proceeds to define the good. He rejects the

attempt to begin with the good s a previously defined object to whichthe will must be related. This method, he finds, can never relate the ob-

47) "Amongst these ends", Kant says, "there must be some whidi are at thesame time (that is, by their very notion) duties. For if there were none such,then since no actions can be without an end, all ends which practical reason[the moral law] might have would be valid only s means to other ends, anda categorical imperative would be impossible; a supposition which destroys allmoral philosophy." (MdS, p. 194: Abbott, p, 295.) The moral law must command"categorically because it is unconditional". (KdpV, p. 36: Beck, p. 143.)

48) KdpV, pp. 65, 67: $eck, pp. 67, 69.49) KdpV, p. 67: Beck, p. 169. We see, therefore, that morality "has for ats ob-

ject not nature but freedom of dioice". (MdS, p. 17: Abbott, p, 272.) Or agaio,"For analysis finds'that the principle of morality... commands nothing more orless than precisely this autonomy." (Gr, p. 299: Paton, p. 108; see also ibid.,pp. 287, 305: pp. 96, 114.)

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ject (the good) to the will s an Obligation. Such a concept of the goodis not merely related to the will irrelevantly, contingently, or compul-sively, and is thus unable to account for the theoretical conditions ofObligation namely, for the freedom of the will and at the same timethe necessitation of the good upon it. The good when so defined is, inaddition, a simple, homogeneous concept and thus makes impossible thehuman experience of Obligation in which duty is encountered in thetension between the natural and moral aspects of the good. Consequently,Kant, in keeping with his critical method, begins his ethical inquiry withan examination of the experience of Obligation. By searching for the con-ditions of the possibility of this experience he ddscovers that the goodmust be heterogeneous and that the moral concept of the good, insteadof being defined prior to the moral law, must be determined by that lawand posed by it s the ob ject of the will. As the ob ject of the will, themoral good may indeed conflict with the natural good s the ob ject ofpersonal desire. The good is thus encountered in its heterogeneity. Byfollowing his original method of inquiry in ethics, Kant thus succeeds indetermining the good in such a way that he can account for the moralexperience from which he began.

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