Sikorski_RussoPolishCampaign1920_SmithTrans

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CHAJPTBR IV BNKUY SITUATION OK THB VISTULA. IK 1920CHARACTER AND AIMS OF TUCHAOZJSWSXI: PURSUIT

I n r e g a r d t o sw >h v a r i e d h y p o t h e s e s , wo w i l l t r y t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e e x a b t d i s p o s i t i o n of th e R u s s i a n t r o o p s , a s w asr e a l i s e d o n t h e 1 3 t n o f A u g u st o n t h e P o l i s h f r o n t . Jf&? t h i s w em u s t f a l l ba c k o n t h e h l s t o r i o p u b l i c d o cu m e n ts an d t h e l a s t < - -.worky on the war drawn up by the c h i e f s o f the S o y ie t army, a sw e l l a s on o u r own d o c u m e n t a t i o n w h l o h n a y f r e q u e n t l y r e o t i f y t h ef a c t s a s p r e s e n t e d b y th e h i s t o r i a n s . I n f a c t th e o r d e r s p u b l i s h e dt o d a y h a ve n o t a l w a y s b e e n e x e c u t e d c o m p l e t e l y . The e x p o s e' o fe v e n t s , b y t h o i r a u t h o r s c a r r i e s a s u b j e o t i v e merle v e r y o o m nr ei :e n e i b l e from a human p o in t o f v ie w . These documents muat be co m pl et e d by t h e i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h e j n e m y , t o g i v e a t r u e p i c t u r e o f t h es i t u a t i o n o f t h e t r o o p s o f T u oh a os ew e lc i o n t he e v e o f t h e b a t t l ew h l o h d o o i d ed t he e n t i r e R u s s o - P o l i s h w a r.

A f t er h a v in g w on th e v io t o r y o f th e A u ta in J u ly , th e Com m an der o n t h e w e s t e r n R u sB i an f r o n t u n d e r t o o k h i s h i s t o r i c m a rc ho n W a rsa w, m a k in g th e b es t o f th e d i s p o s i t i o n o f I i i s t r o o p s a t th ee nd o f t h e b a t t l e , n a t u r a l l y , t o t hr ow b i s a r m i e s b y t h e s h o r t e s t r o u t e on t h e o a p i t a l of P o l a n d . The h a n d l i n g o f t h i s e n o r m ou s a s se m b ly o f t ro o p s su ch a s h a d b een g a th e red a t th e g a tew a yo f S m o len sk i n th e a w aiter o f 1 9 2 0 w a s in f a c t v er y d i f f i c u l t d ue


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-2to tho defeotiv9 state of communications in this region. It wasproportionately unrealizable, to a greater degree, to the east ofthe Hitmen and the Bug. & ^

Those ooneiderationa partially justified the oonoeptions ofthe Oomnvander of the western front who held in hand a powerfult v-up of forces to be the means to oontinue, with rapidity andenergy the pursuit of the beaten Polish armi es. The war o f 1920was in fact a classic of open warfa re. The inroads of Tuohaosewskion the Auta provoked, in a ver" short time, the displacement ofalmost half of the Polish troops from tbs North Eastern front.To take advantage of the results of this dislocation of the entirePolish front was to gain suocess. If Tuohaozewski could not haverecourse to out flanking movement, for the reasons treated inanother part, tbo best guarantee for suooess which remained to himwas to move rapidly forward. If he marohed to the right of theenemy, his movements in the first phase of the comba^ wa& possibleand even easy, in view of the fact that the Polish plans for thedefsudive gave no consideration to the elaatio defense of thofront. Thus the Polish army falling back from position to position,would wear itself out and destroy itself in the oourse of a retreat of many bunarod kiuneters.

Moreover, Tuefcaozewskl was afraid of any suspension of oporations which permitted his adversary draw breath, to reorganizehis forces and Attempt to reseize 'the initiative^ lost on the Auta.The uninterrupted advanoe which was assured after his viotory onthe 4t h of August demoralised us to a high degree and hurt our


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- 3 aorale as well, it waa under theee given oiroumstancoa, the oondition neoessary for suooess of hia plan based on the continuityof the of fens ive on tte .Yeatern front with a powerful l ig h t wing*

It was not in this that he erred, the boldness and the Vigorof tho pursuit which he organised showed that he had the ^ualitioafo r high command. He began to blunder awkwardly, when, impatientof a tta in in g the end that he had sat for h im self, bs forgo t comp le te ly the means at h is d isp osa l, parting with the prudeuoe neoogoary to all military oooraandors, */hen he ceased to be groundedon p os it iv e information; pursuing blind ly and r e o t ie s s ly withoutmanouver, straight aiiaad.

Xamieniew suggested manouver to him at the time of thebattle on the Bug but Tuobaoaewsfcl tonic no heed of this suggestion.

Presuming; on the higher moral of his soldiers, oonfident iuthe ir role as v icto r a, and above a l l yie ldin g io the p,~038u?e ofpolitical Influenoeo affecting hla aimy, he desired ardently tone glec t nothing of that whioh he belioved u sefu l in exp lo iti ng uvict or y won. He refused to out flank, w ide ly, tho P o li s v latand was aot in position to out their natural linos oZ retreat, hepursued therefore the Northern Polish troops straight ahead (byd ireo t pr es su re ), Hastening h is pace , he did not modify in printolp le his d is p os iti on s, and was no t at a l l d isturbed that a pursuit thus directed lacked strategio surprise, ftrom vhis last pointof view TuohaQzewsfci figured that our intelligence agenoies wouldnot be able to funotion normally in the midst of the general rout.In this, he erred grievously, as lator developements were to show.


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- 4 Tho rapid f all oi' the fortified plaoes of Ossoweio, Lomza andCstrolenlca defended by units of our Volunteer army made a greatIEore88ion on the Russians although these plaoes were out ot dateand Qonstruoted facing north. It oonfirmed Tuohaoaewsfci in hiserror. Ho oonoluded from it that the Polish Volunteer Army whiohhad been the terror ; ' tbb Russian Bolshevio, was not ablo todisturb the lied army.

The quick f a l l of the northern fortified plaoes caused theRussians to forget our destruction of bridges and communications,i t counterbalanced the resistanoe offered by the Polish troopsin the oenter and on the South east front.

Under those conditions the evident suooesses of Comrade liadelcand the emphatic talks of the revolutionary diotatoxg was so Ifexplanatory. These doouruents as well as the communist communiquesof the period affirmed, in ooaoert, that the Polish army was oompletely beaten,,

Half of Poland was already oooupied by 3oyiet troops* l"hflother half, in truth, is materially and morally stronger, i t spatriotism undaunted, 8la is rebellious to ooramuniam. ifhat doesit matterl She will hurl her numerous but unorganized forces into the teeth of the resistance. She will be subdued by TuohaoseW3ki. The capture of Warsaw, and -following that of a l l of Polandwill be simply a matter of time.

The ftolsbevio leaders were also desirous of cutting off Poland from Dantr,igv from whence came the flow of munitions andmilitary material, incut.speasible to the continuance of an


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- 6 t b e p u r s u i t .

Th9 e xe cu ti o n of t h is d eo ia lo n depended aa alw ays on tbothr ee prime fa ot or a; The enemy, the s it u a t io n of the R ussian tro op son the Western front, and the terrain where the ganw would bep layed out . These t hree d em en t s co un se l l ed , ea r l y , t to execut ionof a de c i s iv e o f t ens ive 'oy a powerful r igh t wing .

In e f f e o t , Tuohaoaeweki deoidod to end the war by a de oi oi vef i n a l o f f e n s i v e , r e l y i n g u po n, a o oo r di ns to h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e ,f i n d in g the mass of the P o li s h foro e in ar ea : Gieohanow-Modllnflaraaw. He ev alu ate d the se fo r c es an 70,00 0 bay one ts and sab ers *He was then persuaded that the enemy s i t u a t i o n , f u l l y ju s t i f i e dthe assembly of the for ces co n st i t u t i n g tbe r i gh t Russ ian wing .

The seoond factor influencing the decision of the Commanderof the we stern fro nt , arguod eq ua l ly on .raking hi s pr inc ipl e e f f o r tw i t h h i s r ig ht w ing . His d i s p o s i t i o n rem ained then una l t ered ing e n e r a l, from tb& 4t h of J u ly . Tuohaacewalri roarohed on the V is tu ladisposed on his right f lunk: in thrss armies which coula be iwede i t h e r to at tack: fr o n ta l l y or to oat i 'lank, widoly , the Pol i sh l e f t f

IHFLUiCHOE OP THE TiSRRAIH ON THIS DS013I0NOP TUCHACZEffSZI IN 1920

In ord er to under stand the manouvor of Tuohaozew ski i t i snecessary to examine the third factor which inf luenced the makingof h i s d e c is io n , that i s to say the s t ra te g i o inf lu en ce of thete r r a in , suoh as we have out l i * e d a propoa of th e th ea te r ofope rat ion s a t Vfarsaw and i t s f o r t i f i o a t i o n s .


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- 7 Our la s t natural Una of defense toward the ea st had f a l l e n ,

when Tuohaozewsk* marching on Yfarsaw in 1920, took Grodno, oroesing the middle Miemen, paeged through the forest of Bielowiejeand appeared at Wolkowysk ju st as B rest on the Bug f o i l , wherethe Bolshevio troops on the 3outU ea.st tfront ha* possession ofthe middle st retohes of tha Bug. The enemy a A* open before himthe routes lead ing to the In te rior of Poland, of which we havespoken at tho beginning of our study*

Tuohaozewski aarohing on the Capital of Roland, had an exaggerated idea of the field works that we had thrown up, since themiddle of July, on the bridge head at Warsaw; he over estimate*}th e ir oapaoity for re el sta nc e. This i s why he deolared him selffor thfl outflanking of the bridge load in order to avoid the diff-*iodlt redoubt'!.

He favored th is pr oject for another reason. An onemy advancing from tie ea st or north on WSOTSQV p.uit first of all foroe thopowerful strategic barrier of tho Vistula, ao operation perhapsf u l l of dangers* In fa o t, as i t appears from our des cr ip tio n ofthe the ate r, the terra in below .Vareaw len t it s e lf very l i t t l e toa forced passage from eadt to v/est, v/hile the bridges a t tfyszogrodand ^/loclawek gave to thdlp possessor co ntrol of tbu r ivo r . It iathen ea si er to reduce )hQ re si stance of the o it y by attac king fromthe rear according to the ojuass:lo example of the canpaign of 14&1.

S t i l l other topographic con sid er at io ns , we know, inducedTuobaozew8ti to dlreot his attention to tYe bridges at .Yyssogrod,Plook and Wloolawek. His troops mu .u in g on V/arsaw from the rig ht


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. 8 wing had tho oho ioe of two so lu ti o n s only:

d it h e r a s - - I hav9 alread y inc&oated in analys ing tha ordor ofthe 6th August, of the Polish Commander in ohiefto piaoe hims e l f to the South of th e Bug by tbe permanent bri dg es at Ma ikin,Brok or f i n i a l l y y/yaakow and at ta ck 7/arsaw from e a s t to v/ es t.

Or e l s e to con tinue to the v e s t . t o or o ss the llarew and theOrzyt, to furoe baofc the enemy from these rivers and make his wayas quick ly as po ss i b l e to the p lateau x of Ua rsov ie , favorable tomass man ou ve r, to win tbe re at one stro ke the ea sy p as sa ge s and theb ri d ge s of tbe V is tu la , then advance on Warsaw, dem oralised bythis manouver, or on tho railroads of Poroerania.

In sumoing up, s in ce Tuobaozewski renounced from tha f i r s tthe at to olc on the br idge : htad a t Tfarsaw, he muat avoi/?. the impasaat the unot,ure of the Nare*-Aug- Vistula, , naturally dangerousand weXl pr ot ec ted by f o r t r e s s e s , to raaroh to the w est , in thefo o ts te p s of Paakiewitoh and, taking advantage of the te r r a in , e x eoute h is pr inc ip al e f fo rt on the r i g h t .

0 ? M B UU33IAM AKMIJS3 BJSLO.Y ;)

In this man**';.- were the Hussian troops dfispoaad on the western front in mid-August 1920 along tha Polish-Crezuan frontier atDremblin (See sfcetoh }Z )

On th e extreme Huss ian r ig h t opera ted than th e IV Army of Comrade Chouwaiew. I t was composed of I I I Ca valry 03orpa of Gay-Khan(10th and 15th oavalry divisions) and the 12th, 16th, 33rd and 54th


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- 9 Divioions of chasseurs a pied ; i t had be sid es, the 164th InfantryBrigade at 3rodno and the 143rd infa ntry brigade at V iln a. Thoseunit8 were marching on the objectives whioh had boen assigned themby orders No.'1479/ issued the 13th August by tho Oonmander of theIV army. The Cavalry Corps reacted Sierpt the 13th august, fromwhence i t threw out detachments toward Thorn, Uoolawetc and tflook,the 18th and 53rd found them selves in the v ic in i ty of CUinnoJeofc*Szrensk; the 13th d iv is io n ooo ipied Dzialdowo extended along thePrussian f ro n t ie r , covering tt e IV army on the north; the 54thDivision in army reserve extended toward Gleohanov?.

On the l a f t of the IV army waa the XV army (Comrade Hoik)whioh contained four divisions of ohaaaeura (the 4th, 11th, 16thand 33rd ). The 4th and 33rd marched from the north and northeaston i'lonsk, the 4th in the first line and the 33rd in the secondl i n e . Howe Uiaoto having been taktm the 16th divM ion made pre parations to oroe the .'kra in the direction of Popieloeyn ani the11th division toward 1'aeielatc.

The III army (Comrade Lazarewilon) contained the 5th, 6th,S is t and 56th Divisions of ch asseu rs . It was maintaining olo seli a so n with the le f t of the XV army. Our reoonnrlrtanoe verif ie dthe presence of the 6th division as early as the 13th of August inthe v io in it y of Naaielstc: the fth and 66th D ivi sio ns were operating then in the vicinity of 3erock, the 21st division was preparingto attack 3adzym!n with the 27th Division*

The XVI army (Comrade Dowoyno-Solohub) with the 27th, and,17th, 10th and 8th Divisions o Gi-ieoeura, in this order, found


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- 1 0 I t s e l f co nfro nting the 1s t Po lish Army, loea the 8th D iv is io n whlobwas on the fr on t of our 2nd Army,

The Mosyr CJroup (Comrade Ohrep in, the 67 th and 6 8th ChasseurDivisions and nixed detaohmenta continued aooording to Husaianaouounts, to advance v/ith one part in the region Zeleohow-Koolc andwith the other one Lubartow.

Fu rther 3o u th , on the Sou th .Vest fr ont was the X II Army (Comrade


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-11diviaions engaged the 60th Division at Jeziarna while tbo 41itdivision helrt tha 3trypa do Zletnifc on the Dnelster.

Suoh was the s it '\ a ti on on tba northwest front; his armieswere to attack In the following directions.The IV Army with the I II Cavalry Corps d irected by Tuohaozewsici along an axis PszasnysB-itaoiaz raarotod on Plook to QXQZQthere the bridge and orosa the V is tu la , onoe on tbo l e f t banic ofthe river it would reoleve later directions depending upon thes itu a t io n . The Cavalry Corps was to orcae the Via tu la a t rtloolaw ekand Bobr^vuiki, i t was to raaroh on Pomerania passin g around Thorn,to oeoupy this province and out the railroads 7/arsaw-Dantzig-Odynlaanl Poseu-I'aiitzig-3dynia.

The d lr eotion of the limultar.eous of fensive of the XV armypassed by Plonak and inolined then toward .'/yszftgrod, where thisunit v/as to orosd ths Vistula to oooperate, it oaoasion presented,in the taking of the c a p it a l, in the rea r, with the Ill rd and XVIthSoviet armies, in oase 0/ tte f a l l of the ca p it a l i t would reoelvoanother mission.

The eve ntual axis of attaolc of th e I l lr d *rmy v/as to puss b etween Uasielslc and 1'odlin. Ita in i t i a l m ission cons isted of thetalcing of Zegrze and the parulyzlti^MO&lin, to support thus theoperations of the 17f and XVI armies . The I l lr d Amy was to Grosethe Vistula at Modlin and talc3 possession of the bridge, if notsuooesful i t was to pass around Modi in to the north to force theV'dtula at .Vyszogrod Join the XV Army and attaoic flarsaw from the-.Vest.


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- 1 2 The d e o ie io n o f Tuobaosewsfci t o ma Ice h is main of fo r t on h i s

ri g h t inv olv ed the d lr oo tin g toward tie oa st of the mass of theXYIth S o v ie t army on the ax le Radaymin-Praga, eo tha t th is araywould oross the Vistula to the north of Jarsaw, IT the bridgehead of fered s trong reals tanoe .

AUAX.Y3I3 Oi1 TIE HU33IA2I DfSiJ03ITI0U3The general Russ ian d ispos i t ions thus eohemaUoal ly out l ined

shows th a t the enemy was co m pl ete ly igno ran t of the deo io io ns fromthe 6th to the 9th august of the Polish Commander in ohtif and waseven incapable of understanding them*

Confidenoe in pre vio us su oo es se s had made the Uo lehevio l e a d er s lo se a l l or i t lo a l perspec t ive o f the s i tu at io n as a whole*Ju st when the fa cu lt y of J udgm ent was so neo essar y on the f i e l dof bat t l e*

The Bo ls he vi o arm ies did no t take acco un t of the re groupmentof the P ol ish d iv is io ns e f fe ct ed on the ir front at the beginningof *iugustp although their progress had been rendered painful atmany p o in ts of advan ?. The Ru ssia n le a d er s were d ea lin g comp letel y with an a bs tr ac t enemy and nevor talcing i nt o account a t a l l theev en tu a li ty of a de oia ive ba tt le on tfco r igh t bank of the V is tu la ,

If Tuohaozewsfci had s e r i o u s l y c on sid er ed our army, i f he hadadm itted that Marshal P ils ud sk i would be ab le t o retake the i n i t i a t i v e and seek a de ci siv e b a tt le on the r ig ht bank of the Vi st u l a , he would probable have stopped the forward pr og res s of h istro op s the 6th August* He would have e s ta b li s h e d himsel:* alo ng


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-13the s tr ate g ic li> e so important In th i s case* Ohoraele-Oatralenkultelkin-3okolov^.3iedlte-Iiukow-^droaev/-Lubar tow-Lublin; u t i l i s i n gthe principal parallel routes to hie axis of advance In the region 'Ualkln-3iedio9*Lulcoii toward the east, be ohould have regrouped hiefor ces af ter the si tu at io n had o la ri fi o d and prepared for a w ellcoordinated effort ugainst /areaw.

On the oontrary, he concentrated the mas* of bis troops onthe -Vest front north of the 3u#; aooor" to th* testimony of theauasians themselves he left m -.y the XVI army from the i*ug to tnetfiepra to oover 160 kilometers of .front, imposing on i'i thus a mostd if f i c u l t lesion and unoovering dangerously his l e f t flank, thre atened, we knew, by the decisive attack of the Pollgb Commander inchief.

Eventually, Tuohaozenakl strove to oheok this throat with theaid of the XIX army and the Cavalry army of 3udlenny, th is la s tdlreoted on Lublin by orders of the 12 Auguot was marching towardstbo rear of our manouverlng fordo*


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-14o infan try and. 2 of oavalry th Po les oan oppoae only 3 and 1/2d ivi sio ns of infantry and several smaller u n it s.

nen in grea t d i f f ic u l ty in the oourseof his counter of fen siv e; in fa c t he wasn't reaching the oer torof the Bolshevio masses


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CHAPTER VDISPOSITIONS AND SITUATIONS RESPECTIVELYOP THE ADVERSARIES AT THE BATTLE OP WiCKA

AT THE TEE OP THE ATTACK PRESCRIBEDPOR THE 6TH ARMY

THE ATTACZ OP THE 6TH ARMY IS HASTENEDThe 13 August toward noon ra di o o rd er s, add ressed to the

Russ ian armies f i g h t i n g in the northern se ot or , were in t er cep teda t V/arsaw. On or de rs of the command or of the XVI S o v i e t army, i tdevelo ped t h a t at day break the 1 4th August th is e n t ir e army wouldat ta ok th e br idg e head at .'/arsaw w it h a m issi on of roaoh ing by thef o l l o w in g day the l i n e Jablonna-Marki-Y7olomin-V/awer-Okuniew-K&roi3ewO s i e c k - X o l b i e l .

This news l e f t .Yarsaw th un de rs tr uc k. It put an end to a l ldoubt; there no longer exi s t ed the fe ar s d ic ta ted by an xie ty onthe su bje ot of the Ca pi t a l , th at i s t o say of a s imul taneous andoo no en trio a ttaok of tho three 3o lsh ev lo ar m ies , oonv erging 6n .7araaw. ThiB hy po th es is presented t o the ooman der of the f ro n t ,IMNM&U to have more foundation oinoe it agreed to oortain degreew it h es tim at e of the oommander i n o h ie f of the 11 th Augu st; (a o oo rd ing to l a t t e r throe armies f the XVIth, I l l r d , and XVth) wereto a ttao k fr o n ta l l y the bridge head a t far a aw1 the only ohange

1 . I n te l l i g en oe 3u l l e t i n 0 . .H . Q, 10 ^u gu st 1920


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-16being that now the XVth army must oooperata with tins other *wo onthe nor th .

According to Oolonol ::agorski 8"a ll of tho I l l r d and XVI Bo lshev io arm ies would at ta c k tho ./arsaw b rid ge head the 14 Augustat day break".

2 . Inte rview reco rded by Hughes between- 3e ne ral H al ler incommand of the north frcnt and Colonel Zagorski his ohief of staff,with General Sifcorski commanding the Vth Army on August 13, 1920.

General 3 ik o rs k i: " I have ju s t retu rne d from e. tou r of i n sp e ct io n on my fr o n t. 7/hat I have seen ob lig es me to ask t h a t thea tt a o k ordered for tomorrow morning be postponed u n t i l after no onof 3 6 .August, I am profoundly su rp ris ed at the order b aate nin gth e ex eo ut ion of i t to the 14 August* beoause the Vth army i s *&frso fa r from being ready th at cata stro ph e i s c e r ta in . May I brin gyo u- to see thing s my way?"

- - Oo lonel tfagorski: G en era l, I an going to exp la in the s i tua tio n and you w il l see th a t tho launohing of th is a tt ac k a t daybreakio ab so lu te ly neoe ssa ry. The I l l r d and XVIth Bolshevio Armiesor08sod today to the south bank of. th9 Bug, they w il l a t ta ok t o morrow at day break, the bridge head at Warsaw, engaging two div is io n s on each l i n e , furthermore the XVth Army,,the com positionof which is known, has i t s lea ding elem ents a t N aaiolsk . I t w il lat ta o k from no rth to so u th , th e llarew se o to r, Zegrze-U odlin. Anyde lay of tto at taok of t he 6 th Army, even a hall* day, would haveas a oonsquenoe tha t the reserv e for th e Uorth fron t (10th d iv isi on )


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-17would not be ava ilabe to follow up the r e s u l t s , if such should bethe oa.se, of th e attaolc of the Vth army. The s ec to r of Bug~3egrseLlodlin is weak and must then be defended o ff en si v e ly . Moreover,only the off en siv e of th e Vth Army way a s s i s t the follow ing .days,the b rid ge head f ro nt a t Jarsaw whioh may have th e some fa te as somany of our preoeding defensive f ro n ts , if i t i s subjec ted to tho uninterrupted pounding of massed Bolshevio divisions on the northfl an k. I understand p e rf e c tl y th at the offen sive of tho Vth armywould carry more weight the 15th .^i-just, but there is not the leastdoubt th 'it i would be too l i t e The ne,n;ligenoe of the ga rr is o na t .7a re aw and the l i t t l e importance acoorded our no rth flank arethe oause of this s i tuat ion".

Gen eral Sifcorski: "C olon el, i t ia urnieoossiiry to oonvinoeme of i t* Meanwhile i t i s a w aste of pap or to .it t-a. v t to changea s i tu a t i o n of war. iSven if I resig ned my se lf to the los s ofthe Vth array and dooided to attaok tomorrow, thia attaolc would beinp osa ible o r ujoomjlishv.ent. The s it u a ti o n of my u n it s is a tpro oent as follow s: tho 10th 1Hvision io reassomUlln


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-18of a repulse that X would abs olute ly not be able to f u l f i l l thi sm iss io n. I am aoq uain ted w ith the s i t u a t i o n at Jarsaw , but v/araawahould be able to hold out a t le an t two day s. I i n s i s t on thefa ot th a t oven by making super human e ff o rt s I w i l l ju s t be ableto oomnenoe on the 16 th . I must a t l e a s t move the 1 0th Brigade andgot the group Barnowski in shape to move i t sel f . I think: thatthe se e xp lan atio ns w i l l modify your view s. As ye t X have not mentioned the 17 th Brigade whioh X must have fo r the a t to ok . Knowingof the se c on di tio ns in advance , mjt a tt ac k would be so weak th a ti t would oa rry no weight in the ba lan oe , i t would only be a rep et io n of our previou s unfortunate exp erie nce s. That is al l* "

- - Colonel Za gore ki: "General, X myself telegraphed yesterdaythat the armies should be ready for the morning of 14 August.Today after noon X had a long conversation about this plan withColonel 7/ollkowski. As I had reoiev ed no ob jectio n to e it h e r ofthe two com munications, the Commander of the fro nt has given ope ra t io n ord ers timed for tomorrow. The 1 s t Army a t one o' cl ockgave i t s orde rs i n oonaoquonoo, and w i l l not bo able to oanoel themwithout inoonvenionoo and confusion* As for your d is p o si ti o n forthe a t tao k , i t i s unquestionable, even under the most unfavorableoondi t ions , nothing but the direot lon of a t taok and the surpr ise . . . . " G eneral Sikorsfc i: "Oolonel, X do not know what tfolikow ekisaid but I have dearly indioated to-night that the 16th is then e a r e s t d a t e a d v i s a b l e . X pray you be lie ve th at X am no t oneto make things d i f f i o u l t , but X am not ru a ll y able to reo ono ilomycalf to a p la n whioh w i l l ru in the Vth Army and hel ps no one#


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-19The Siber ian Brigade whioh should attaok on Naslelak has soa roelyrece ive d i t s maonine guns and has not ye t had time to d is tr ib utethem, it lacks so many things that at this moment it is impossibleto enumerate them* The Cavalry Brigade has not yet reoeived i t samunition, i t must be sent for tonight . I make the most in st antand formal demands for de lay u n ti l the 15th ."

- - Colonel Zagorski: " General, I pray you to permit me a moment . . G eneral, General Hall or i s near the teleph one , he consider s th at i t is imperative to attaok during day light tomorrow,but beoause of tie co ndit ion of the m ateria l of the Vth army, heoonsents to grant a de lay (taken the day of the 14) that is to say:the Vth Army d i^ ose d fo r tho attaok in the se ver al d ir ect io n s,w i l l orosB the v/kra around noon ready to atta ok the afternoon ofthe 14th and gain the line Popowo-3wierszoze before dark."

General Sik orski: "I pray you assure the general that I w i l ldo a l l that is humanly po ssible to oomply vdth h is d e s ir e s . Ido not know however whether I w i l l ge t there at the time s o t , i fi t w i l l be able to get the 17th Divis ion to the Narew, for inthe fai lu re of th is I have re al ly nothing with whioh to attaok ."

General Ila ller: "Here i s General H al ler. I am ab so lu telysu re , ge ne ra l, that not only w il l you exeoute the entire plan butalso that tomorrow you w i l l report good r e su l t s attained* I havejust seen General RoBWadowegi; and General


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- 8 0 yourraanouveraw i l l lose you your freedom of movement. . Until to morrow your foroea have the i n i t i a t i v e : they w i l l oooperate w iththe other armies in the great oo un ter -of fen siv e, for which it isab so lu te ly neoessary that the enemy be already throwr baok fromthe VVkra on the Narew. Katurally I wish you to attack1; as soon asp o ss ib le . I am oonvinood that- t h i s i s pos sib le i f you mate yourdispositions for the situation before noon tomorrow, because allthe enemy forces are engaged in other direo ti o n s . attaok them rig htaway* At a l ev en ts I must be sure that you cross the l;'.ne v/kra-Nowe Uiasfe'a not later than neon and preferably sooner.

As for the munitions for Barnowski the most energetio instructions have already been given in this regard and in additionto yours. The 17th Brigade -will detrain, un fortu nately,tonigh t atWarsaw on aooount of the railway s it u a t io n , bat in any event i tw i l l be at Modlin tomorrow during the day; I w i l l /nak every effo rt to send them there ei th er by truck or by r a i l* Moreover yourenergetio of fe n siv e, gen eral, w i l l free for my use the foroee immobilized in tho Modlin-Zegrze sector and in particular the 10thD ivis ion . This la tt er i s ale rte d at Jablonna, it w il l be able tomove without delay in any di re ct io n neoessary , i t has disposed i t smeans to that e f f e o t . Naturally a l l depends on your atta ok , whiohw i l l blook any Russian, attaok in the dlroo tio n Degree-Warsaw andf i l oause a withdrawal of part of the foroe attack ing rtadayaiin.Tho sooner you oross the v/kra the sooner the 10th Division willbe able to make it s d is p os it io n s . If your attaok does not makei t s e l f f e l t too late the 10th D ivision may be used in aotion in


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the .'far saw bridge head to oounter the powerful enemy at tack s poss ib leon Radeymin. Yesterday I front to se e the Sib erian Brigade at Zegr ae , i t s moral is e x o e ll en t. The 16th Divis ion on the other handi s res ted and r e fi tt e d . I am oonvinoed that they w il l be ab le ,unaided , to gain the ir o bje ot iv e. The more you delay the l e s so ha roe you w il l have of suooeeding in your attac k, whioh, I repeati s a question of opportunity: If you w a it , your f oroes w i ll perhapsbe larg er but they w i l l s tr ik e in the a i r . In resume', i*' the s i t uation as it presents itself, Oeneral, I count formally on yoursuccessful offensive*11

General 3ifeoraki: "General, I present my resp ects . I understand thoroughly the s it u a ti o n . General, I pray you be lieve that Iw il l g ive my soul to f u l f i l l my mission within the given time, butl e t us take only one example, not lat er than 4 o'olook, I oa ile dthe attention of Colonel Hnsza to his delay in oooupying his newp o s it io n , the str ag gl ing of his oolumns on the maroh and the abandoment of his rear guard at Modi in; he replied to me tnat his brigade i s a bso lu te ly inoapabte of immediate operations and asked menot to throw on him the resp on si b il it y for them. It is neoessarythen to have one day of delay under pen alty of leading my army tod is a s te r . And what Is your de ois ion with rogard to the 17thDivision whioh is in the Modlin-Dembe BOO tor , r:; General? Whati s the enemy s it u a ti o n to the west of Oieohanow from your i n t e l l igence agencies. Om you assure me that the latest communiquesw i l l reaoh me?", > General Haller: ntfe11,enough, General, but the 17th Division


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-zuhas al re ad y reoeived from you n o ti fi c a ti o n of my order of rel ief ,its Beotor will be taken over by the I8t Army."

- - (Jenaral 3 ik o ra k i: " I beg your pardon , G ene ral, I have beenup at the fron t a l l day and was in ignorance of t h is ohan ge."

General H all er: IVery w e ll , you see the 17th Division i sdisposed of. I in d ic t then on the execution of th is at ta ck witha l l po ss ib le en ergy, beoause I am almost m athematioally o e rt ai nt h a t the enemy w il l a tt a o k witho ut doubt a t mid-day as te so oftendoes , perhaps even before mid-day in the directions lfasielek-Dembeand Pu ltu sk -Z eg re. Suoh ar e my co nv ict ion s and you must th enunderstand the capital importance of your actions, to take atl e a s t Hasielatc when the enemy w i l l a tt aok Eembe-Zegrze us fo r theenemy s it u a ti o n to the w es t, my chie f of st af f Is going to giveijo*1! f u l l inform ation imm ediately! because I must f l y . I oountab so lu te ly on your attuo lc tomorrow. Clod keep you . flood 3 y e ."

General 3i ko rs ki : "G eneral, I ask you to d ir ec t the 1 st armyto re li ev o tie 17th di vi si on a t onoe and to dir eo t i t on I '.odlin.I have ju dt found out th a t t h i s ord er has not yot boon g iv en , oi tho rby you or by the 1s t army4 A telegram with regard to t h i s Ivis Ju stt h i s in st an t reached us from the fro nt . The 17th div isio n is s t i l li n i t s e eo to r . "

Colonel Zag crski: "Uy re sp ec ts 3e no ral. I w il l uake an in qu iry at onoe on the su bje ot of the delay of th is teleg ram . As fortk> enemy si t u a t i o n , h is IVth Army i s d ir ec te d on llieaaawa andvaoolawek. ?or> your 17 th D ivis ion I w il l r ep ea t to the 1st Armyord er s to re li e v e i t a t onc e, with regard to the onomy we know


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-as-s t i l l tliat h is 31s t Div isio n w i l l attack tomorrow from 3erook oniSegrjse; I am a l l the moro persuaded that any delay in the actionof the Vth Army may lead to a diea ter . Persona lly in my posi tionas ohlef of Sta ff of the fro nt I must st te in au emphatic mannerthat his to ry w i l l not pardon a delay in the attac k of the Vth i*rrayand that you must j us tif y yo ur self to histo ry"

Qener*! Siko rski : "Colonel, l e t me make my psaos with h i s -i;ory, you ob lig e me to respond in another fa sh ion. The order onUe front has been given in absolute ignoranoo of our si tu a ti o n ,If we were fighting and conquering paper so ld ie rs I would be readyto attack at once . But when we must fi ght w ith fl e sh and bloodso ld ie r s , I pray you take into account the st a te of tte troo ps,tiifra and sp ace. I did not* know that the ?ront was not countingon any resistance from tte fort at Zegrze even Tor a short period*I w i l l do a l l that I con; The e f fo r ts I demand from the troopsuiy la s t g enera l order, may oonvinoe you of t h i s . But I prayyou do not throw back on me, in h ist or y, the re sp on si b il it y forall the "muddling" of all the Polish authorities'.'"

- - Colonel Zagaraki: "Uy General, I w i l l not squander yourtime or nine in answering you; your words are insp ire d by yourindignation toward me for f u l f i l l i n g the dutie s oharged to me*I do not blane any one, meanwhile I must express that v4i ioh Ilee I profoundly. My re sp ec ts ."

- - General Sikorsk i: "You may oount on me."Knd of Note


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- 2 4 by engaging eaoh one two d iv is io ns on eaoh l in e , Besides the XVarmy marching on tfasielsk was to attack from north to south theNare* .-Bul-Zogrze-Demblin se otor. The oommander of tho fr ont,under the influence of this Interpretation of intelligence ordered tft hasten ing of the counter-offen sive of the 6th array andfixed the date as the morning of the 14th August*

The exaot knowlege of the Russian forces attacking from theoa st or north east d ir e c tl y against the v/arsaw bridge head andon Zegrze-Demblin, the anxiety of the Command*r of the front atthe announcement of an imminent enemy attack, the recognitionthat the badly organist! Warsaw bridge bead oould not withstand theass au lt of tla red d iv isi on s in sp ite of a sup erio rity of foroe,the rec allin g of my re sp on sib ility to history if I hesita ted toadvance the attack in oonformity with t l s desi res of the Oommander of the fr o n t - -a l l of th is oame over me sudden ly.

The offe nsive of the 6th Army was Ju st if ia b le and nec essary ,there was no need to demonstrate that, but tho orders for it wasgiven in a .aoment of fev er ish im patience. The conference on th issu bject took plwje at 6:OOP.M. 13th August. It v/as a t t h i s hour,only , th at tho order of th* Oommander of the front, to tho army,was given, prescribing the exeoutlon of the oountor offensive.The launching of the attaok of tho 6th army the 14th Augustat day break was there fore im possible , in sp.Ue of the more favo rable oondition8 of time and space entering into the si tu a ti o n ,riven if the army and d iv is io n s ta ff worked a l l night, the orderfor the attaok would only have reaohed the fighting regiments at


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-25dawn of the next day* And these la s t would have had need of timeto publish th ei r own orders and organize t h ei r resp ective a tt ac k s.

Furthermore, the extreme shortage of mater Mil, above a l l cmnitions, as I have mentioned oefore^the 13th August so that theproblem oould be se tt led w ithout a stu dy . iYe had ju st succeededby great energy in arming the Siberian Brigade, .vs for the d iv i sion of Volunteers and the 3arzyoKi group it was neoessary to bringin th eir munitions in a l l haste from Cracow, It was neoessary tobring up their oombat trains and rolling kitchens to the di/r#rmunits in order to put them in state for combat.

On these grounds, Colonel Zagorsk! assured us (see note onconference) again that evening, tha t the attack of the 6th army,fixed for the 15th august, oould not be set forward.

Before undertaking a deoisive action, it was neoessary to waita n tl l the bulk of tho Vth Army was oonoentrated at liodlin , in orderto have the means with which to attaok. But by the 13th augustthe oonoentration of divisions of the Vth army was not oompleted*The ex oesiv e slowness of the formation of th is army prodioed thennega tive r e s u lt s . At the time of my oonvorsation "4 th the oommander of the fro nt, sev era l d iv is io n s were s t i l on the maroh to the irassembly areas and after th ei r arriva l in these so nee should haveat l e a s t 24 hours in whioh to prepare for oombat. The VolunteerD iv is io n , joined to tho group Zaryoki; found i t s e l f in for a thorough period of reorganization and rearmament1.;

l . reorganization ordered at tho same time as that of thenorthern oavalry groupment, by written instruotions Ho. 16.220.E0 B.the 13th August


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-26the 17th D ivis ion exhauatud iind abaol Ital y incapable of ri g h ti n g./as slowly ga th er in g i t s e l f a t Uodlin by reason of tin delay ofthe 1st Army to relieve them in the iiembe-Zogrze sector.

*y wariness was then ins pir ed by the r e a li z a ti o n of my r e s p o n s ib il it y nu tu ru lly and not by an exoesaive d e s ir e for methodand or de r, elemen ts which otherwise play so gr ea t a ro le in thora t i o na l p r epa ra t ion fo r a b a t t l e .

The tin* f a c to r , on which the Commander of the front and hisaohief of s taf f justly layed such stress, had a prepondero importan ce in a l l op era tions of war. I t was of prims importance for asin the oat tie of the V istula in 1920. the in a c ti v i ty ot the 6thArmy e sp ec ia ll y would above a l l expose the plan to unavoidable r a injy reason cf the great superiority of the enemy und his heretoforeV icto rio us offensive* only a st ro ng a tt a c h , 3uduonly Launched,with su rp ri se .vould uo able to save the s i t u a t i o n lc r tj.o *r y onthis f ront .

Bat on the otl.or i. ind, I ho urmy would c e rt ai n ly be l o s t , i twould suffer an irredeemable oatit;tro.


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- 2 7 grave situation would be tantamount to their progressive wearingo ut , th e ir ruin v/ithout compensation; t h i s was to surrender a l l claim sto the exe cu tion of any plan of op era ti o n . To oommonco th e b-.ittiew itho ut having organized the tr o o p s, w ithou t ovon assembling them\/aa absolutely impossible.

On the b a t t l e f ifclfl. a t I' a si el sk and a t I'lons'i was to be playedout the olimax of tie mortal struggle whioh had bean going on sinceth e f i r s t days of Jul y on the north ern fr o n t. This co n te st hadbeen maintained v/ith gr eat d if f ic u lt y , w ithout hope, in th e atmosphere of a losing ight. The b a t t l e s were waged by tr o o p s , whiohaft or the exhausting fatigue of a r e t r e a t of sev era l hundred ki lo m et er s, were to coun ter atta ck w ithout d ela y, without a day ofr e s p i t e . The co un ter- off en siv e of the manouvering group launohedthe 16th of August on the ./ieprz was exoouted under better condit i o n s , by t roops re la t i v e l y f resh and in super ior s t r en gt h , wherethe enemy mass .ma immobilised on the no rth ern f r o n t. I t wouldde st ro y our l a s t hopes i f we were to be thrown v/ithout su ff ic ie n tpreparation into this supreme endeavor.

Hat i r a ll y tl/j vommander of t he 7 ron t did not know in d e t a i lthe above s it u a ti o n of the 6th army. He looked en the s i t u a t i o nfrom the point of view of his command and his responsibility,whioh very naturally were at divergence with those views of theCommander of the Army, as w itn essed by th e co nver sa tion above( r e f e r r in g to no te H). The Commander of the fr o n t had above a l lthe resp on sib i l i ty far the se cu r i t y of the C api ta l , whose f a l l hemust avoid at a l l c o s ts . He was p a rt ic u la rl y uneasy on the act-re


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- 2 8 of the vigorous* at ta ck of the XVIth 3o viat Array di rooted along th oj..:ia itedzymin-Prag*, the shortest route whioh led the Bolshevio to..'arsaw. This ro ute was blooked by the array o General Latinik,re a ll y s tr o n g ; i t was barred by the rein forc ed brid ge head a t yfaraav/.and under su rv ei lla n ce of the tv/o oomplete d iv is io n s , in r e 30rye on th is f ro nt , and s t i l l i t caused general Hal ler ser iou sap pre hen sion s. Having a fe el in g of the weakness on the fro nt ofill s 1s t ^rwy, he hu rr ie d the a tt ao k of the 6 th Army whioh wouldaavo ./arsaw i n d i r e c t l y , by d iv e rt in g the ZVth So vie t Army and drawii r; down on them the mass of the I l l r d S oviet Army, if i t engagedi t s e l f at th is t i m e, and in ge ne ra l , eased the defense of the re s tof the n o rth f ro n t. This ex pl ai ns the order of Meneral H yller tohasten the e nt ry in to a cti on of th e Vth Army w ithout w aiting fo rthe complet ion of i ts preparat ions .

Our situation moreover was more complicated by informationrec eiv ed the 13 th August, seeming to in d ic at e th at the enemy was.bo ut to over run the Vth Army, i t showed the p o s s i b i l i t y of ana tt a o k by th e XVth So vie t army and of a p a rt of the I l l r d armytoward tte sou th wast or the west r a th e r than toward the so ut h.The oalm observed in the entire Modlin-Zegrze sector, the comp le te absence of 3olsh evio p a tr o ls on the Bug confirmed the hyp o th e si s, th a t th is front would not bo at ta ck ed . This increa sedLho d i f f ic u lt y of the m issio n of the Vth army and li m ite d ourp o s s i b i l i t i e s of advanoe. In fao t the co nc en tratio n of the Vtharmy behind the 7kra thoroughly mislead the enemy, but only froma st ra te g io po int of view, and not a t a c t i c a l one. In sp ite of


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-29vvhat has been w ri tt e n In regard to t h i s , Tuohaazewakl hover countedon running afoul of an army capable of attacking him, on the


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- 3 0 THK ATTACK 01*1)33 703 THIS ilO.KTE 'MOWS

The order of the Commander of the 'front d i r e o t i n g u s t o t a k eth e off en si ve was re ce iv ed by the Com ander of the Vth army a t 7:00i3. U . th e 1 3 t h a u g u s t . I t s c o n t e n t s w e re a s f o l l o w s : 1

The IVth enemy army (1 2 th , 1 0th and 5?rd Di v is io n s and th e3rd Cavalry Corps) is marching f rom the v io in i ty of OioohanovvLtla.ra towards the we st w i th the p robab le in te n t i o n o f o u t t in g thera i l r o a d T b orn- ./ ar saw or e l se of fo r c in g a o ro es in g o f th e V is tu laa t Plook -7yszo grod and a t too t i n g our army in r e a r .The 1CV enemy army ( 4 t h , 11 th , 16 th Di v is io n s a lon g th e l i n e3 w ie r szo ze -N as ie l s k - l l a r ew , wi th th e 5 4 th D iv i s i o n in r e s e rv e a ro un dHakow) o on t inuM . : i t s a t t a c k on .Yarsaw f r aa n o r t h to s o u th .

The I l l r d enemy Army (6 th , 33r d , 5 6th D iv is io ns p lu s the 21 stDiv is ion in reserve) i s opera t ing on the nor th bank o f the Bugmarch ing f rom eas t to west .

The XVIth enemy Army (2 7t h , 2nd, 17 th , 10 th , 8 t h D iv is io n s)pu sh es the 27 th d iv is io n on . '/ l l ioa-Zawady , the 2nd D iv i s io n on- tadzymin-Madjan, the 17 th D iv is io n on Oku niew-B rzeziny, the 1 0t hD i v i s i o n on U i o h al ew s k - H y ni o e, t he 8 t h D i v i s i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r h asfo r a m iss ion the fo rc i ng of the V is tu la a round Praga .

Tomorrow oommenoes the b a t t l e w hic h w i l l d e c id e t he fa t e Ox.Poland.

o r d e r :With the end o f c i rcu m ven t ing the onemys in te n t i o n s and de fea t

in g h i s XVth Array, *he Vth Army w i l l a t t a c k , making i t s p r i n c i p a l

I


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ef fo rt on i t a l e f t , i t w il l oross the ./kra the 14th August a t daybrea k, i t s r i g h t on ito dli n, Blendow*, i 'okrzywnioa; I t s l e f t onGasooin, S ta ry , Solymi*. I t w il l reac h the li n e i.'okrzy*vnioa-3tanySolymin; it will push fovvard strong dntaohmenta in the direction.laoiaz-GlinnoJeok-Cieohanow; i t v/111 di sp at ch on Plook the f l o t i l l a.vhioh is at J 'odlin at i ts disposal.

Use w i l l bo made of the tanks on f l a t oa rs on the ra ilw ay .The a tt ao k of the Vth Army w i l l be executed w ith th e utm ost

energy and a l l po ssi ble sp ee d. I t w i l l hu rl baok the XVth enemyarmy on the Narew and cause the I l l r d enemy army i t s e l f to f a l lbaok with the XVth.

There is the deoision.The off en siv e must be exeouted w ith extreme energy with de

taohments co ve rin g th e l e f t flan k of the Vth Array, th la is a con dit ion indispensable to auooess*The 10th D ivis ion , in rese rve for the fr o n t, w il l be at Jab lonna a t day break pre pare d to f ig h t; as many motor omnibusseu aspossible will be sent you by the Commander of the front; an officerw i ll be kept on duty a t the telephone po rt a t a l l t im es .

The 1st Army w il l m aintain i t s p ps i t io n a t a l l co s ts , w ithoutcounting on any reinforoement, and u t i l i z in g a l l the a r t e r i a l meansat i t s d is po sa l . In so far as the s i tu a t io n perm its , i t w i l l maker a id s on Wyszkow and on th e ra ilw ay tfarsaw-Bialys tofc and on HowoMinsk, (end of orde r)

Thir- order for th9 front give s a s u ff ic ie n tl y de fi n ite ideaot th situation and intentions of the enemy: it was an advance.


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- 3 2 In tne order of b a t t l e for the west Hussian fro nt in di oa te d ,tho(54th D ivision i s assign ed w rongly to tte XVth army whilo in '\ re a li tyi t waB p a r t of the IYth army. Likev/ise th e 33rd D ivi sio n was p a rtof the XVth army and not the I l l r d . 0u t3id e of these e r r o r s theorder of bat t le g iven is subs tant ia l ly oorreot .

The movement a t t r i b u t e d , in th e orde r, to the IVth Army andto the I l l r d C avalry florps did not correspond to tte ac tu al movement of the Bolshevio Divisions on the extreme right of the Russianf r o n t . . Theae d i v i s i o n s , v/e now know, rnarohod on Plook and theorossings of the Vistula to the north of Plook.

Moreover the XVth army i s not ve ry aoo uru tely l o c a te d , i t wasnot aot ua lly , a t th is t im e, on the l i n e indic ated i n the order buta c tu a l ly on the l i n e 3aofcooin~llowe Ilia stD o- lIa sie lsk . The d ir e c ti o nof a tt a c k expeotod on this side was no more ex ac t; i t was baaed onth e theory of th e offen sive of th is army from the no rth on Jarsaw .Accordingly, the d ir e ct io n of coo pera tion of the I l l r d Army givenin the o rd er , out th e ax is of o pe ra tio n of the XVth Army a t anangle of 90.

The oper at io n o rd er s of th e Ccmmander of the f ro n t , in th*3precise, had an historio importance, because they commenced theb a t t l e of Jarsavv, the combats on the -Vkra and tte b a t t l e of Hasio lskand 'Oieohant;?.

They out li n ed for the f i r s t tirno the diffe ren ce which in thefu tu re w i l l sep ar at e th e ope ratio ns ox tlu Vth ^rrny from the operatio ns of the other arm ies on th e north fr o nt .

This same day a special o::


34/138

3 3 aaat of Itodlin a3 the boundary betvvoon the 1st and Vth Armies,th is freed com pletely the d iv is io n on the right of tho Vth Army(the 17th div isi on ) whioh was already fa l l in g baok on Modlin.

2PaiH0IPL)3 OF THii BSCI3IOH UP THE OOMHAKDEIi

OP THB V'fll AHUYIn th is manner, as thrown in r e l i e f by the expose* of e ve n ts

above, th e Vth Army prepared i t s e l f for the oou nte r-o f fen aiv e ,having before i t two d i s t i n c t masses of Russian tro op s. The f i r s twas formed by the XVth Army, in r e a r of th e r ig h t wing o f whioh wasad van cin g most of the d i v i s i o n s of the I l l r d Army* This groupmentin pr in c ip le was to take th e o ff en si v e on the Wkra exc ep t that thed iv i s io n s of the I l i r a Army must a tt ac k Zegrze aud acco rdin g t oth e s i t u a t i o n must bo ab le a ls o to move .from the n or th ea st on Warsaw . The sec ond enemy m as sw ae oomposed of the IVth Army and I l l r dCavalry Corps, it operated in the zone included between the MlawaCieekanow-Uodlln ra il w ay , the P o li sh German fr o n ti e r and t.he bendof t he V i s t u la .

These two masses thr eat en ed the Vth Army in a manner e n t i r e l yd if fe r e n t , in t ime as w e l l as in spao e. The off en siv e of the XVthArmy whioh w*s ab le to be su pported by the I l l r d was aimed d ir e o t lyat the zone of con ce n tr at io n of tte Vth Army and re st ed i t s l e f twing on our base of op er at i on s a t U od lin . I f i t suooeeded, i t wouldsiejEQ the i n i t i a t i v e from u s, de str oy in g our o ha noes fo r a c ountero f fe n s i v e on the Wfcra and thr ea te n in g Warsaw im med iately*


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- 3 4

The groupment of the IVth Army--The III Cavalry Corps wassuspended like the sword of Damooleg over the Vth Army, threatening to envelope i t , by attaolclng us quiolcly from tha re ar , i toould orush the left wing of the north front; but the a e movementsoould not be exeouted Immediately. In faot a t le a s t three dayswould be necessa ry to assemble the dispersed units of the IVthArmy and launoh a ooordinated offnaive. B esid es, at the momentof our oo un tar-of fen siv e, the IVth Army was contin uin g to displaceto the w est, an off center d ir ec tio n , whioh con stan tly inoreasedthe separation, already notioeable, the 13th August, between theIVth and XVth So viet arm ies, the two Bolshev io armies were tofind them selves sep arated, one on the Wkra and one on the lowerV i s t u l a

Utior these conditions, the Vth Army, placed between thetwo enercy groupments, oould move successively from a oentral posit ion, on ei th er of them givin g b at tle to aaoh in turn.

In conformity with the decisions already shown and the directiv es in ef f e c t , we were constrained in the fi r s t phases of thebat tle to seek victor y on the Wkra, hur ling back the Bolshevio d iv i sion s whioh were approaohing. V/e assign ed th is mission e xcl usi ve lyto a l l the d iv is io n s of the Vth Army without exoepting the Krajowatlgroups which operated apart on the le f t of the army. GeneralXraJowsKl to f u l f i l l his s pec ia l mission must engage the d iv is io nsoi the XVth Army which appeared on his fron t. In th is fashion irespent the 14th August, in order to assure ourselves of looal superiority neoeaaary from the p:int of view of material, but above


36/138

-35from the point of view of morals.

Immediately afte r th is viotory on the .Vkra we would turnag ainst the IV Sov iet Army.

In the group of Hussion forces on the Wkra it was possibleto d ist in gu ish two sub-groupment 8 of foroe s with difftrw itt m ission s.One directing itself around Uasielsk the other toward Sohooin tThe f i r s t was ab le to be aooomplished by drawing to i t the d iv is io nof So root and was ver strong. It watt th i s one which was to openthe Bolshevio of fensiv e; i t was therefore the most threa tening inpoin t of view of tim e. At Nasle lsk therefore we would seek thedeoision in the battle on the lonsk, and of the I l lrd Army on lias ielak-tfyszogrod. Bes ides;>lodlin held in oheok the Bolshevio towurd the south as well as an


37/138

* f f * o t i v

6th OhMtfiur D|T . 6,4166th " * 5,ftT91 st * " 4,19556th * " 8 , 0 6 9* o t l 16,549Srd 7 o , 4,65118th " 64M53rd n64th " 7 , 4*4*148/46 * r l p 4 1,640164/66 " 2,465

4th Ohstttiur 5,64111th * 5,65916th N 4,74755rd " 5,150

2d 4,5008th 4,77710th 4,60017th 6,6847th 6,690

57th HY. 5,116l,tO4

6,020

0*i*r*l 98,826

UBLB I o . 1

ooari>tt*&tt s T l ry

677 7,846 6,346WO 6,610105 4,081970 28,524

4,6946,654220 7,0051,950

2,(V652,652

860 8,254200 6,6066,4874,426660

6*1806,795406 9,194866 7,91766S 88^8746 5,?642,404116164 7,668

7,498 116,189

gun*

1411191*26*

59611194056

111127

66t9977671482666729642

1582,675

29802 /24

11026406

14429174?26

12852262970581892ft6

27598


38/138

UBLB BO. *B#pert of offtotiTOi of * Tth i n y at ai4-Aati 19SO.

u&as uuw ror UOM00 I , T M 1,041 w i , u o

18vh iftftBtanr DiTtio 1*6 7,wo t,0M so s9ooo 1 aS1AJOUAV Byigtdt IM 4.TC0 1.6C 4T ft,860 190V O U K i i t t D i r i i i o a t S16 T,6M 16664 1?2 4 , 8 0 0 T69*sh laftmtry I>lTlf loa 260 1,600 E.000 160 8 , 4 0 0 60lT t t i In f - mt r j D l r l 8 l o m 169 6VS8 ,801 M 8^400 60VB&&& Oyvwp ts) 76 , 6 6 8 1,067 68 660 044M0WJI Oyovp 90 8 , 6 0 0 * , 0 0 0 66 1,160

TISIDU Oyoupl i ) 106 4 , 6 4 6 , 6 7 0 96 l,fttO 008( h r o u p ( p i m z j 100 860

fOfiU, Of fSit TXB 48UX I,t51 U,076 16,C69 ' 696 2*,010 #,68ft

( l ) Ocwploto firom th 16th i a j u t 19SO,rgii&jiMitlom &4 briaslaf w> tofro* tb 17lh *tt*03t, 1990*

(4) pM#4 lo tlM ^th ^ngr tht 16th **gu% 19to.(ft) 'roa tho 81st *%&*% 1990*


39/138

1UJ SO. t (OOITIKUD)

*ttik

49

108 - tO

49 , 490 M U80 U

4K 91 HI 9(l)


40/138

-36attaok toward tto west; i t gave us an opportunity Tor if! an icingcounter attaofc in either oaso.

The Commander of the Vth Army took great care to dis tr ibutehis d iv is ions uniformly in the front occupied, an er ror in whichwould have been f a t a l . He strove not to be completely absorbedin the danger of the over running of his l e f t , v/hioh had alreadyled him to reinforoe himself in the vicinity of ^lonsic; he reserved for himself the poss ib i l i ty of moving his reserves rap id lyto the threatened region, limiting in this way the risk: taken,while s t i l following the exeoution of. hia main idea of manouver.

These taotios were made possible by the Modlin-Oieohanow r a i l road i t s branching li ne s and ro ll in g 8took: being held av ail ab le ,but above a l l by the autobusses from ./araaw which the Commanderof the front had placed at the disposal of the rth Army.

( Table 1 and Table 2 (go in here) Pages 145-146-147)

RESPECTIVE 3ITUATI0H3 0? 0PP0HEHT3 CN THE WXRATable 1 gives the ef fect ive oombattant st rength of the armies

in the ./est Russian front the 1st August x90; th?oe effectives badnot var ied much between th is date and that of the ba t tle of theVistula.

Yl Information obtained from page 485 of the v/orks Joinza zBlelopoliakami (i:urin-L!ielilcow). This aorlc is too op timis tic underthe heading "effect ives for r it ions ." ilever did the Solsheviodivis ions on our front a t ta in a percent i~o of oonij it t ;r.ta J.B highas ths repeated ef fect ives for ra t ions . On the contrary the ji-ooorticnof combattants and ra tioned were less sa ti sf acto ry in the Sovietthan in the Polish Army


41/138

- 3 7 The p a r t of tba forces which were fotnd in fron t of tte Vth

Army during the b a t t l e of th e V is tu la numbered in th e neighborhoodof 6Q,000 bayonets, 6,67a sabres, 1406 heavy moohine guns and 327f ie ld gun s.


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- 3 8 and the instructions frcni tho Jommander of tho .'roitt decided toooploy his forces in the following manner; 1

With a view to oiroum venting the in te n ti on s of the enemy andof d ef ea ting hi s XVth Army, the Vth Army a t ta c k s tomorrow, on the./kra to tho ea st and no rth ea s t. Vith a primary objective, ofreaching the line of the Karen and Orzyo Hivers.

IV. Orders givenThe troo ps of th e Vth Army w i l l be in thefollowing places at 10 o 'clock 14th august .

1 . The garrison of the ontreuohed camp: in its sector v/itha mission of holding at all costs the entrenched oarap.

2 . The Idth Infantry Brigade and the Volunteer Division (reorganized according to the special order) will assemble in thev i c i n i t y ozf dorkov under command of Colonel Luozyiislci commandingthe 9 th Divis ion.

3 . The 3 ib er ie n Brigade of Colonel Humsza: in tte v i c i n i t yof Zawada on tho dlcra.

4 . The 18th In fa n tr y D ivis ion and the Cavalry Brigade ao cor cling to the s i tuat ion wil l group themselves at this t ime infantry,at least , in the vioinl ty of Saohooin, Cavalry in the vicini ty ofSmarzew.

The thr ee groups above have an of fen siv e m iss ion .5 . In army reserve: the 17th Infantry Bivision with the

1 . Operations ord er 4313/3 of tho Vth army signed General3 iko r sk i . .


43/138

- 3 9 excep tion of a resriwent of infuitry l o f t on tho Uarew front andp ro v is io n a ll y undor or de rs o Colonel U alewioz, oommanding thefortress of l iodlin; the 17th Infantry Brigade and the ar t i l leryof the 9 th Divioton w i l l bo en rou te from .Yarsavr to Uofllin; theyth Cavalry Brigade en route likewise to Liodlin.

t>. The group Osikowski: w il l have the war f l o t i l l a underita ordora from 14th August, i t will insure the aeourity of theaeotor . /yaaogrod to tfloolawek inclusive, devoting ita attentionprii>oipally to the bridges at I'look and .Yloolawefc.V--Attaok The army disp osed thus w il l at ta c k on the 14 thAugu3t: (a) The Group Luoaynski w il l march s t e a d i ly on Ka sie lskof whioh it . w i l l taice p os se ss io n a t Hour Hz 12. I oount on thecap ture of N asielsk by 12 noon a t the l a t e s t . ?urth ar m ission ofthis group to cover itselr strongly to the south and toward Soroot,tc attaotc with greatest vigor on rultualc and take possession ofthi? important oenter of communications.

(b) The S ib eri an Brigade w i l l att uok from ^awada on Kowehliaatf. and take possession of th i s p lace t I t w i l l^ d i r o o t t h o ntho major pa rt of i ta for ce s on Stary-Qolymin and ./ i ll take p o ss es sion of and 08 tab liah i t s e l f as soon as possible on the r ai lro ud;. odlin-Mlawa in the v i o i n i t y (3asooin-3itlustow9. Hour H = 1 1 .Count on tho objeotive indioatod bein^ tuken at 12 o'olook.

furth er m ission: to support tl4J attnok of Oolonel Luozynakifrom i'rzewodowo on -'u ltuek, to take 3 ta ry Oolymin.

(o) The 18th Inf on try Di vi sion : to defou t tho onemy advancing on .l c n s k t to push w ith it r e n ti r e forco on Cieohanow, to take

I


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- 4 0 und bold en er g et ic al ly th is pla oe , H hour w i l l depend on the l o ca l s i tu a t io n , i t w i l l bo se t a s ea r ly as po ss ib le .

(d) 'Jho Cavalry D ivis ion of iforn iok i, whloh w i l l un ite w ithth e JJlonsk squadron of the re se rv e of the 4th Lanoers w i l l oovervtho lef t of General Xrajgakl during the entire aotion, i t wil l ass i t t him dur ing the f i g h t ; a ft e r the talcing of Oieohanow and thees tab lish m en t of li a so n w ith th3 Mlawa group in the v io in it y ofUlinnojeok it will reassemitle to assure the seourity of the rearof the 18 th D iv is io n; i t w il l oonduot uotive reoonnaisunoo in thedirection of Breaun, 3ierpa und J?look.

fe) The group of O olo rel U ab ioh t: ao tu a ll y on the J)ziuldowka,w i l l a tta ok a t 10 o'oloo k in the d ir e o ti o n of Mlawa and w i ll makethe gr ea te s t e f fo r t to take possess ion of tha t p laoe .

The attaok: orde red must be d riv en home w ith g re a t energy bym ain tain ing the cohesion of the tr o o p s . The troo ps w il l bo formedin order on the line Oieohanow-Hasielsk and must be prepared tocontinue the off en sive . During th is talcing of s t a t io n s , i t w il lbe neoessary for the Luoaynaki group to protect itself on theline Poniaty -Yielfcle (on the Hasielaic-Palfcusk road) and 2abosynto tho so ut he as t of Na sie lsk . In oase of need, i t oun oount onstrong cooperation from i.Iodlin en the roar of any enemy whloh mightuttuok them from the slopes ot Serockc-Dembe* Uy in te n t io n i s to t f i rs tlouvo tho Oiec hanow front iminobiloAund to puah the following dayto the lino Sttvry ^olymin-Pultuslc-Bledowo. A ll u n it s w il l si ez eovory occasion to strike the enomy in rear and to doi'c :>i his troops*un tho rosulta of the offoneivo of tae V Army r e s t s th e fa te of


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- 4 1 the war, no one w il l he si ta te to make the gr ea te st aa or if i ca s toassure our oomplete suooess.

VI--Liasona-- I ins is t again on the necess i ty for mainta in ingthe o lo se st l iaa on w ith the Army and w ith neighboring u n i t s . Rep o rt s w il l be se nt in from the beginning of the ao tion and a t l e a s ta t 18 ho urs, 16 hours and 20 ho urs, a l l ex ce ptio na l happenings . . i l lbe th e au bjeo t of sp ao ia l r e p o r t . The Commandor of the 18 thD ivis ion w il l organize a t I 'lonsk a oonter of information Tor the18th D ivisio n and the Cav alry D ivi sio n. The inform ation c en te rfo r th e army w il l be at the cr os sin g of the roads .iakroozyin-Plonsfcarid llasielslc-Jorny.

In the d is p o si ti o n for the jump off in di ca ted for the VthAway, we see in tha can to r tho ;;roup Luoaynski (1 8th I n fa n try B ri gade and the Volunteer Jivision) and the Siberian Brigade; on theleft wing of tte army; the group Xrajowskl (18 Infantry Divisionand ie th Cavalry B ri gade . These two groups the same as theJi b er ia n Brigade had an offensive m issio n.

On the right wing of tho army the sootor Modlin and Bug.,/araaw must remain in the defensive, it v/ould loavo, moreover,only a sin gle in fa n try b a t ta l io n the day a f te r tomorrow on the Bug.In Army rose rvo the 17 th D ivi sio n and the 17 th Inf an try Brigadea t i.todlin, tho 4t h In fan try Kegiment of Pomerania and a b a t t a l i o nof Marina fusiliers near Gorny; the 9th Cavalry Brigado on routeto i.iodlit..

.i ll of 330 troo ps were grouped w ith in a rad iu s of 46 k i l o mote rs .


46/138

-42The or de r of the Vth Army diro oto d the d i v i s i o n toward the

north and not toward the east by reason of the expectation of thea t ta c k of the XVth So viet nnny on Plon sk and of the I l l r d Army onN asi els k, by reason als o of tbo strong enemy group whioh t h re a te n ed our left flank in the vicinity of Cieohanow.

To o f fs e t t h i s t h re a t and to oheok the danger of an enemyadvanoe from Raoiaz on the rear of the Vth Army, the Krajowskigroup was directed on Cieohanow, this might seem to be an exoessivedisp ersio n of troops In r e a l i t y i t was noooaaary th at the 18thDiv ision at ta ok in th is off oe nte r d ir e o ti o n . This was of primeimpo rtanoe; i t showed i t s e l f efflotMOUtand in sh or t f o r t m ate wit hregard to the resu l t s a t ta ined .

We foresaw de cis iv e oombat in the v i c i n i t y of W aslelakj th a tis why the KrJow8ici group by its independent and very delicateop era tion covered the thre aten ed flan k, and coop erated with i t inseeking a vi cto ry at Hasiolsk. This group ope rating ex oe nt rio all ymust gain dis tan ce ; at ta ck in g in a fashion to threate n the rea rof the IV Sovie t Army i t would demora lize th e enemy and deoievehim as to our weakness on th is fla nk t

Besides it is around Cieohanow from our previous estimutos tth a t the e n ti r e front of the V army must wh eel. In fao t a rt o r havingbouten the enemy on tbo tfkra and taken Gioohanow we had the in te n tio n of c le a ri n g out the e n t ir e te r r a in between tho Wkra and theNarew, the n o pe ra tin g by a wheeling movemont by the ri ft h t, aroundOioohanow and confront ing the Russian groupment whioh was murohing on the Lowor V is tu la . In oonso^uonoe, the f i r s t lin o to bereached by tho Vth Army was the Gioohuuow-HasielBk r a il w ay , the


47/138

-43noxt was Cieohanow-Pultusk.

In our plan of battle on the Vkra we should have been ableto take into consideration more, our oounter offensive from tfiepri,whioh oould in two days bring theraanouveringmass of the Commanderin Chief on the rear of the Russian troops attack ing Warsaw andthe rear of the Vth Army. This oa lo ula tion would have been oorreotunder normal circumstances, but it was not so under those (oiroumstanoes) whioh the Vth Army entered the b a tt le . The attaok ofthe Commander in Chief freed immediately our 1st Army. In fao tthe distances were short enough on this side so that the attack:of the manouvering group on the XVI Soviet Army had immediate repercussions in the theater of operations of the lit Army,

This was abso lu te ly the contrary as far as the Vth Army wasoonoerned, whose seotor was too remote from the base of departureof the manouvering group, for the attack of the latter to nuke its e l f f e l t ^uiokly on the rear of the XVth and I l lr d Sov iet Armies.

In examining these d if fi o u lt ev en tu al iti es i t is advisablefor us to plaoe ourselves in the spirit of the times in order forus to form a true estim ate of the situ at ion* Thus we w i l l ascerta in how many of the elements of the Polish counter attuotc wereyet uncertain the 13 August, with what general impatlenoo waaawaited the f i r s t su cc es se s of the b att le of


48/138

- 4 4 of a se pa r a t a i nde pe nde nt a c t i o n .

MORALE JPR3PARATI0N FOR 'IHB BAlTTLB 0 ? THE WKRAAn e l o que nt t e s t i m o n i a l of the s t a t e o f a f f a i r s i s f ur n i she d

by th e pre l iminary orders of the Commander of the Vth Army; datedt h i s d a y , t he y c o ns t a nt l y a ppe a l e d t o morale fa o to rs . L ikewisei n the genera l order of the 14th August , t h e o f f i c e r s w e r e s t e r n l yo a ut l o ne d not to delude themaelvas on tho one my s i t u a t i o n or toinfer from i t c a u s e s f o r r e t r e a t ; i t was formal ly forbidden t o a l lCommanders t o f a l l baolc wi th out expre ss orders)

I am n ot aooustomed to s uo h p r a o t i o e s , s t a t e s t h i s o r d e r l andw i l l n o t to lerate them in my urmy.

M i l i t a r y dut y is in war a r u t h l e s s n e c e s s i t y w hioh p r e s e n t s adi l e m m a : e x e o ut e s t r i o t l y the orders rece ived or die on the f i e l do f b u t t l e .Determine t o hold under o f f i cers to t he i r dut y , I w i l l o o u r t rnart ial any o f f i c e r who in an hour a s s e r i o u s a s t h i s , sho ws anyfa i lu re in h i s duty .

On the actu al po s i t i o n s , a l l un it s must hold t i l l the la s tman, oven to the point of being surrounded ut least until orderedto the contrary.The eva cuatio n of u p os it io n w i l l be the cause for le g a lin v es t i g a t i o n ag uin st the oommandor res po nsi ble Tor i t s do T e n s e . . .

1 . 3.900iul ord er to o rf lo ox* Vth Army 14 August 1930 eign od}onerul 3 i k i


49/138

-45I w il l have shot any s o ld ie rs who abandon th ei r po sitio ns

in the face of tte enemy. To a gr eu te r degree I w i l l render l i able to the same punishment officers responsible for the conductof their troops*In th e be otor of t he Vth Army r e s t s the fa te of Warsaw and.the des t iny of a l l Poland. I w il l not al low the oare lessn ese orthe in sa n it y of o er ta in offio ar3 to endanger the Pa the rlau d. Iw il l break the bad o ff ic e rs . I w il l remain to the good cnes tha twhioh I have always been, and I will win.

I demand then t h a t a l l o f fi c e r s of the Vth Army coopera tesin ce rely with my plan s, th at they grant no th e ir en tiro confidence as they have mine, th at they ex ert th e i r e n ti r e energyin our oomtnon tus lc. A ll of fi oe rs under my o rd e r s , i f they performth ei r whole d u ty , may be o e rt a in th at I w i l l uphold thorn with a l lmy power and defend them if need be w ithou t r e s e r v e .

As the comparison of the opposing for008 has shov/n, the VthltU'tlOB

.*riny kid to do with a very su pe rio r enemy, f h t , stasis was so muohthe more grave by reason of the fa c t t h a t hal f or the troops of tlwV Army were improvised un it s or V olu nte ers , in d if fe re n tl y equippedand fee l in g the effoots of the ir too recen t c re at io n .

Besides the Vth Army, born in the l u s t few d ay s, had not y e tany t r a d i t i o n s of .mr, they did iwt have t . a t 0 oho si on, iuv isa bl euat unshak able , of the rec ip ro ca l confidence .vhioh must un ite offioo ru and mon, in ordor to w in. In th e course of my in sp ec ti o n s,louviug out f e a ts 0:! oxoe^M onal heroism , I found u n it s resem blingH ho I'd subjoot to panic, rather thai t roops discipl ined andfor combat*


50/138

- 4 6 In th is m a l ^ u s t e d human th ro ng , I t v/aa ne ce ss ary to awaken

the w i l l to d ie , the ou re , to o r oa te in them the do a i re to s t r i v oand win. deforo e n te r i n g upon the supreme b a t t l e , i t v/aa ne ce ss aryt o i n s t i l l in t he s o l d i e r s th e c e r t a i n t y and c o n fi d en c e of v i c t o r y ,in s p i t e of th e n u mer io a l s u p e r i o r i ty o f th e enemy. I a ro u sed th i sf a i t h by p u b l i sh in g th e 14 th of Au g us t th e fo l lo a i n ^ p ro c lam a t io n :

OiiDKtt3 OLD IE.131Today se es the begin ning of the co un te r- of fe ns iv e which the

- o l i s h Army and the e n t i r e na ti o n Luc looked forward to so lo ng .To the 7 th .rmy iius l' a ll e n the auolinra m is si on of making t he

f i r s t a t t ac k and o f b r i ng ing abou t the duo is ion of ti.o ^ o l i s h . .uss ian . fa r .

3 o ld ie r s In h u r l i n g y o u r se lv es to th e a s sa u l t u n de r a d e lu g eof machine gun f i r e , remember tha t you f i g h t not on ly for in / . ior ta l; lo ry b ut fo r th e l i b e r t y and ex i s t e n c e of o ur Co u n t ry .

At the p oi nt of your bayon ets you c a rr y to day, th e fu tur eof Po land .

A l l the na t i on i s wi th you h e a r t and s p i r i t . A l l Po land hopesand be l i e v e s . On to ba t t l e which commences, w ithou t mercy and youw i l l need no ot he r ro .vavd.

V ic to ry and triumifc-h to t h e a m le a oi' the i 'o li o h ttopublio.T en ac i ty an d s t r en g th !The i l l u s o r y power of th e Jo lsh ov io w il l ^rlvo away undor you r

ahouk . -Uth the sword , wo w i l l r e s to re the o ld f r o n t i o rs o f Jo lan d .Forward! 3o ld le re l ForwardJ


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-47Looic dea th in the fao e, what i s dea th, i t is glo ry , i t is

viotory, i t i s our lUture .forward, until the enemy is destroyed ILong li v e Jola nd l

Sikoraki


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CHAPTiSS VIOSTiilJSIVi) Oi' xnlfci YTH AHllY

C0UBAT3 0 ? TH3 I3T AKL1Y AT

OP TH3 BAT'fldSS OF TKiS .VIn d i r e c t i n g th e l ir a j o * 8k:i group to the v io in l ty of Saohooin ,

the 13 th August we took in to aooount the d i f f i c u l t i e s of h ie m is s i o n . Thrown f u l l ce n te r on the assem bly of enemy fo rc es i t wasgo ing to s t i r up a l i v e l y re a c t i o n . Meanwhile the na t iv e o f thoRu ss ian r e ao t i o n in th i s s e c to r co u ld h a rd ly bo d e te rmin ed in ad vanoo , because the enemy had in t h i s d i r e o t i o n , very va r ie d po ss i b i l i t i e a of tnanouver. That i s why the m issio n of the i l ra jowskigroup could only be a general one, i t depended in p r in o ip le o n th eu t i l i s a t i o n o f the gap in th e enemy d i s p o s i t i o n s , o b se rv ed in th eneig hbo rho od of Cieohanow. J e n e r a l Krajov/sSci sh ou ld op or at ev i g o r o u s l y f o l l o w i n g t t e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of t h e s i t u a t i o n w hio h w eroin od ss an tl y ohangin g; he would a i d us thu s, in the 1s t phase oftho bat t le on the . ' tcra , to have super ior i ty a t Kaaielgk and topropure to envelop the Russian group operating then on tho LowerV i s t u l a .

w m iss io n as hard as th is one demandod g r ea t re s o lu t i o n ,initiative and energy on the part of the general oor.ununding our


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-49l e f t win s. In gi vi ns him as an ob je ct iv e, Ciechano.7, i n s is ti n gon th is d ir e c ti o n of manouver afte r.va rds , I had not only a ta o tioal end in view, I obeyed also morale dictates.

Jeneral Krajowski discovared the 13th August, an unusualmovement of Huaslun tro op s on the li no Jieohanow -^aoiaz. Afterhaving repulsed, during the ni^ht, lied units vvhioh crossed the./kra at 31ep*vony, he threw ou t, a t day break: 14 ^Agust five (6)oa t ta l ions , four0 (4) batteries and the Cavalry brigade in thedireotion of 3obszowo-3arbie//o, subsequently L'ystkowo-nze.vin (Skotohllo. 4 ) . He reaohed these l o c a l i t i e s , the same day abound noon,a f t e r some li g h t en co un te rs w ith th e enemy. The movement of thelo th Div ision menaoed the l e f t fla nk of ti e IV Army and the I I ICavalry oorps of the 3oviot .kXtny, which was operating then in thevicini ty s ierpa, Biezun, J l innojeok, with the exception of the12th Foot Chasseur D ivi sio n cove ring the IV Army to the no rt h , I twas not surprising then that th) enemy countered this diversion byan energetic) counter-attack on the left of the Krajowski group resting on the ./(era. These engagements were talcing plao e in consequencethe 14th august in the vioinity of Saohooin-Jonieo did not givethe enemy any p o s it iv e lo c a l suooess* They, however, foroed General;:rajo.V8tci to abandon his first direction of attack and to face aboutto a tt a c k the ri ^ h t of the XVth 3ov ie t Army*

On the remainder of the fr on t of th e Vth .*rmy the .Russianstook tl orfonaiv e on ti o morning of the same day, they endeavoredto c ro ss the Jk ra around 31edowo-3orkowo but w ith ou t su ccess . Thoyuttuoked Modi in from the north am guinod possession oi the t.vo


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- 6 0 i n t e r i o r fo rt a of U iek osz yn and Torun w hich we h-id ID I d l i x h t l y .This oauaed u moment ojf disorder at llodlin, v/hich Colonel L'alev/iozqu ieted q ui ck ly , ;*ut the 3o lsh ev io at tac k on th is si d e was notcontinu ed w it h v ig o r, we regarded the f a l l of tte so tv/o fo r ts usof secondary importance and we engaged there not a s i m l e r e in fo r c i n g b a t t a l i o n .

Ii| the immediate neighborhood of the 7th .^nny, the 7th ReserveJrigade, of Jolonel Ualaohowski. ropulaad the 3clshevio attacksto the north of Zegrze.

?ALL OP :UiXlYLf.IH All) TH ?I1HT TO THii 30UTHI t was no t the same on the Sast f r o n t of our 1s t army where

things turned out unhappily as predicted by General Haller and hisChief of 3taff Colonel Zagorski.

In this aeotor the 21st and 27th 3oviot Divisions attacked.iadzymin a t duy break , lo ca te d in the marshy V a ll ey of the Hzondaa.The 3ol8hevio8 hurled themselves hero against our 46th Infantry.:o,^iment, disposed in line Bleeping them by fire, according to theRussian expression, took possession of Vco Viliu.?e and pushed theiruuvanoe guards to the line 3orki-^lnk3ai tdDo w-H elenoir. Cur 11thdivision was .veakenod by all the recent changes of personnol; ooatcered on a li n e of alm ost 25 k ilo m et er s, i t did not have uny unitso plaoed as to be able to oo un to r-a tta ck . . i ls o t ic enemy withids oulk in tho fight to the -.vest of .tadzymin ourrioj tho second

last line or defenses of the ./araaw bridge head, the lino rvhlah


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- 5 2 by reason of the s t a t e of unpreparedness of the nanouverin^ group.The Commander i n Chief however kept to t h e date of 16 August as hadbeen prev iou s ly s e t .

it the center of the P o li s h fr o n t on the con trar y the 3rddivis ion of Legions defe t ted t l ie 7 th 3ov le t Div i s ion 14th .-tug us tat .Lrubieszow; it foroed the sî i t of the 12th .-ted .tuny to withdraw and ga ined th e time and space ne ce ss ar y fo r i t s a tt a ck in ano rthe rn di r e c t i o n . The same day our so ut h fr o n t had to withdrawon Lvrow under pressuro from 3udienny Cavalry Army*

DBSîUTS ?IOHT3 FOH CONTROL 0? TH3 ./iLUThe precipitation with whioh the Vth army hftd b9en engaged

h*d already made f e l t i t s bad e f f e c t s , above a l l at the cen ter ofVia army. In fa c t the or ga ni za tio n of the cen ter of the army, wherethe Luozynsfci group and the 3iberian 3rigade were to cooperate,httd not beon ab le to ao hi ev e any d e la y . Our lac k of m a te ri a l p.baolutely forbade us to give this group the naoessary means to oonuj ct these ope rat ion s; the reor gan izat ion of the Volunteer D ivi s io n:.ud no t been able to be achieve-*, in so sh or t a tim o. This D iv is io nhid been formed by the union of the Volunteer group of iar^nowsklund .:oo ( two distinct groups whose ooheaion was diminished by theiroombiit 108808 in th ei r l a s t f i g h t s . To matce a d iv is io n roudy for,:o:.:oat, i t would have been neo essa ry to rein fo ro e i t , v/hKh wasi. pos s ib le in 24 hours , in sp i te of fev er i sh a c t i v i t y .

The attack of the 18th Infantry 3ri :ûde, whioh had beon


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-63su bst itu te d for tho Luozynski group suffered equally a cer ta in delay.

Accordingly there remaind a t the center of the army only Colonel.luinsza with his 3 iberian irigude.Without aw aiting tho a r r iv a l ofthe 10th Infantry 3rigade Colonel Humsza oommenood hia atta ck a tthe presc ribed ti;'.e; he direo ted one Sibe rian Itegiinant from 3awadyon Nowe-LIiastoo and the other from 3orkowa on llasie ls k, The exoessconfidence which .vaa indioated by this separation of columns, andthe delay of the unita v/hioli were to cooperate with the Sibe rian3rigade wus reg re t tab le . The resu l ts were only v/hat v/ere to beexpeoted. The Russians rep lied by a vigorous coun ter-a ttack whichtie Siberian 3rigade succeeded at fi ra t in beating off vi ct or io us ly .His 1s t Regiment beat off the Russian un its which attacked the br idgehead at Borkov.., while the ^nd Regiment even crossed tho


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-54Thi.8 roe ulte d in a very grave s it ua ti on for th e le f t wing

group, while at tha can tor of the army tho -Sussi un troora crossedthe .lk.ro. on a .vide front.

On our le f t wing, general Krajowaki moved at daybreak tho14th August again st the flank of the Russian column marching onj^look; but ha had l i t t l e inform ation of the 8 it nut ion of hia opponent, ills offensive movement on -tooiass vor i^bd for us that wehad l i t t l e to fea r on thi s s id e , uecause the IV 3ov iet Army wascontinuing to push on euerg otios lly to tho west aril to oover themse lves toward i'lonak with woak un i ts only#

The gap which inoonaGquenoe of th is movement oponod bet.voentlB IV and XV 3oviet armies offered us a favorable oppo rtuni ty ,provided v/o oou^d take advantage of i t . There v/as in rea l i ty nol iu s ion bet.veen tho In te r io r v/in^a of the two armiec v/hioh v/ereopposing us , a o that the r i g h t v/ing of tho IVth ^r^iy v/us in thoa i r . The Commander of th is .ii*my reacted against tho uovG'nont ofour Id ft which t hr et iterjd him as wel l as his neighbor to the v/ost;.vith his 4 th t>nd 16th Divisions i n the le t l ine and tho 33rd Division in reserve lie moved to meat the attaok of fraotions of oner18th Infantry Division urxl our Oth Cavalry Brigade v/hioh found thomse lvea around 3aohooin and in the .'/fcra. I t turnod out then by chanceto benefi t the froedom of manouver |thtt the gap in tho Jjolsheviofront gave to the offensive group of our 18th Division corning fromHzewin.

General Krajowski escaped from this situation; he directedthe 8-:h Cavalry Brigade on Slinnojeck to cover him against the IV


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-55the Soviet Army; v/ith two infuntry regimont3 supported by his divi si ona l a r t i l l e r y ho nurohod on the 14 ^ugust in tla oar ly af to rnoon on Saohooin and J.Ilook to attack the ri .^ht of tho IVth *irriy.ground oaohooin he oame aorosa numerous groups of the 4th and 16thiov ie t Divis ions and surp ri se d them at th o moment when they v/erepreparin g to take the offensive against i'lonsk. At 1.11 oo5c on thecontrary ha fell into tho gap.

Hard fighting took place in consequence in the v ic in i ty ofJachooin; they impeded the enemy's freedom of manouver so dangerousfor ua on th i s Bide. They permitted is to occupy th is town of te rse ver al hours of f ig h ti ng; the 145th Infan try .teginiont took i t v/iththe bayonet toward the end of the day, i t captured hero muoh mate rialand many prisoners.

The import of t h i s success of ouv le f t wag lessened by theoheok suffered tho same day by the Sibe rian 3rig ad e. In fac t theJo lshovic u n i ts , v/hioh had crossed the Vkra u.t 3awajty on the heelsof the 2nd 3ibe ria n Hegiment, faced north , t'ttaoked the r ig h t of our18th Division and tr ie d to reach i t s re a r. This atta ck gavo b i r t hto engagements where we had var iable luok , in sp i te of tho remarkable stead iness of the 144th Infantry itegiment, flank guard forthe rip-ht of our Div is ion. The cVove diver sion of the Russianshindered the movements of the left wing of our army; it almostcaused" the separat ion of our front in to two IUIIVOB, v/hioh wouldhave ruinod all of our plans and led perhaps to the dostrnotionof the army in d e t a i l .

KB./ PALL OJThe si tu at io n was rendered s t i l moro tinoortain by the grave


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-56news of the 2nd f a l l of :*adzymin: the 19th Division seemed tohave beon destroyed there and the 10th Divis ion which v/as coveringour r igh t and rear a t Jablonna had beon sent to itodzymin. TheBolshevio pa tr o ls had a f te r t i e 2nd fa l l of ^adzymin reaohod theli ne .Valomin-lzabolin-llieporety; the unfounded rumor sproudors,always ac tiv e in suoh circumstances , had them already at the baseof the fort8 at Howy Dwor and in the s t r e e t s of Pragu.

The advance of the Bolshevio patro ls on Prog a mude us fe arbeing out off from Jarsaw. I t was necessary hen above a l l tocl ea r up the situ at ion on our ri g h t, A strongoffi oer s reooaaailanoepatrol, sent out at night to Benjaminow verified that this fort washeld by Colonel Lukowski commanding the 48th in fantr y I?egii:.ent;i t es tabl ishe d the fact th a t Nieporety v/u8 held by the Bolshevicin unknown s tr eng th . In consequence, i t was necessary for us todrive in further to re est abl is h a solid fron t then retake theoffensive.

1112)3013 r/ii BATILU Oil 'iHi: .7KIUAt f i r s t Colonel Luczynaki reooived an order to operate with

gr ea tes t energy, in sp ite of the exhaustion of the 18th InfantryBrigade and without regard to the losses tha t th is mission wouldcause him.

Thia Brigade, reassembled near the fo r t of 31edowo must at taokfrom the south again st t he l e ft flai k of the 11th Soviet divi sio nwhich held Borkowo, to immobilize them here and to prevent theenlargement of the breaoh in our front on the /k ra .


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- 5 7 The 10t h Briga de put in m otior t ha t af tor no on , oould not

completely j f i i l f i l l th is mlaaion beoauae i t oould i .o t roach Jor towoand Vron. However i t J oro sd tho enemy to dop loy p u r t of hi a i'orooafa ci ng so ut h vviiioh took: from Via: t em po ra ril y hiu l i b e r t y of ciovonont so threatening to us i ' t th is t i ino and plaoe.

,le u t i l i z e d th i s b reak to o rg an ize a v /ol l co o rd in a ted o p e ra t io n ,ord er was re e s ta b l i s h e d in rear of the S ib er ia n 3r l /5de. Jy aovoromea&ures I out an end to the confusion whiuh had aiozod tho ror.roi' the ata y. I went th i s same ni&ht to )orne ./rony , in o rd e r tog e t under v/ay the

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