DECLASSIF I ED AND RELEASED BYCENTRAL I NTELL !BENCE AGENCYS OURCESMETHODSEXEMPT ION 3820NAZI WAR CR IMES 1:1 IS CLOSURE ACTDATE 2007

•

Studies in Intelligence (1997)

Significant Military Support

The OSS and Italian Partisans in World War 11(u)Peter Tompkins

66The partisans' success waslargely attributable to the

arms and suppliesparachuted to them by theBritish Special OperationsExecutive (SOE) and the

OSS and to the brilliance ofthe intelligence networksdeveloped by members ofthe Resistance in constanttouch with Fifteenth Army

Group headquarters viasecret radios.

,9

Peter Tompkins served in the OSS,and he spent five months behindGerman lines in Italy. He is theauthor of two books on OSSactivities in Italy.

The contribution of Italian anti-Fas-cist partisans to the campaign inItaly in World War II has long beenneglected. These patriots kept asmany as seven German divisions outof the line, and they also obtainedthe surrender of two full Germandivisions, which led directly to thecollapse of the German forces in andaround Genoa, Turin, and Milan.This pinned down the Germanarmies and led to their completedestruction. Throughout northernItaly, partisan brigades in the moun-tains and clandestine action groupsin the cities liberated every majorcity before the arrival of combatunits of Fifteenth Army Group, amixture of mostly American, British,French, and Commonwealthdivisions, to which was added asmattering of Royalist Italians.

The partisans' success was largelyattributable to the arms and suppliesparachuted to them by the BritishSpecial Operations Executive (SOE)and the OSS and to the brilliance ofthe intelligence networks developedby members of the Resistance in con-stant touch with Fifteenth ArmyGroup headquarters via secret radios.

Intercepted German signals and theUltra deciphering at Bletchley Parkin England went far towards assuringfinal victory, but little credit has beengiven to the vast amount of detailedintelligence collected and rapidlytransmitted by individual partisanspies in Italy. Strategically, Ultra mayhave saved the day, but tactically itsinformation was far slower in gettingto where it was needed in the fieldthan agent signals. For example,

during the crucial battles of Anzio inJanuary and February 1944, Ultra sig-nals warning of Hitler's plans and of'Field Marshal Albert Kesseliing'sattacks would arrive regularly atAllied headquarters in Caserta asmany as three days after the attackshad already taken place. On the otherhand, extremely accurate informationgathered by the partisans, oftendirectly from Kesselring's own head-quarters, was sent via a secret OSSradio in Rome, on the air as many asfive times a day, to be received simul-taneously in Caserta and on thebeachhead in time to repel theseattacks.

After Rome's liberation, as Kessel-ring retreated to his mountaindefenses straddling the Apenninesfrom Carrara on the Tyrrhenian toRimini on the Adriatic, a barrierknown as the Gothic Line, intelli-gence became a priority for FieldMarshal Sir Harold Alexander, whowas intent on launching an attackagainst these defenses. Gen. MarkClark, whose Fifth Army would havethe job of cracking Kesselring'smountain strongholds, exhorted par-tisans operating further north toincrease their activities.

To organize such operations, OSSinfiltrated individual Italian partisanagents by submarine behind the Ger-man lines, landing them along theAdriatic coast at the mouth of the PoRiver. One agent, 20-year-old MinoFarneci, set up a secret radio in thefoothills to the Apennines, just southof his native city of Ravenna. Fromthere, he organized parachute dropsof weapons to pinpoints in the

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of theauthor. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying USgovernment endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations. 37

Italy, 1944 (u)

.0ongoTrieste

Milan •SaloVenice.

Turin.Piacenza' Ferrara.•Genoa Bologna. „Alfonsin°

'Ravenna•Carrara Imola •Cervia

de RiminiLucca San

Marino

•Siena

ItalyCorsica(Franca)

Monaco

Zara

•-Lagosta

Mehl

*ROME

Anzio'•Caserta

Sardinia

5,0 100 Kilometers

100 Wes

Unclassified 743255 (F101816: 7•37

Sicily

Italian Partisans

38

Italian Partisans

mountains, enabling growing groupsof partisans to attack the Germansbehind their lines and in Ravennaand other lowland towns.

The Gothic Line

As Alexander prepared to launch hismajor attack in September of 1944,his G-2 thirsted for intelligencedetails of the Gothic Line. One ofFarneti's colleagues, who had alreadymanaged to protect and smuggleback across the fighting lines fiveAllied general officers captured bythe Germans, obtained a key piece ofinformation. Reconnoitering behindthe Gothic Line, his men interceptedand shot a German major travelingby sidecar; the major's briefcase con-tained a complete set of plans of theeastern half of the Gothic Linedefenses. To get the plans to theAllies, another agent took them toMilan, where they were forwardedby courier to Allen Dulles, head ofthe OSS in Switzerland.

Meanwhile, another young OSSagent, Ennio Tassinari, was informedthat partisans in Lucca, close to theTyrrhenian, had obtained a compli-mentary set of plans of the westernhalf of the Gothic Line. He person-ally smuggled a copy of the plans inthe soles of his shoes to the OSS inSiena, and from there the plans wererushed to General Clark's G-2. Theplans showed that the weakest spot inKesselring's defenses was at II GiogoPass, at the juncture of his Tenth andFourteenth Armies. Clark thereforeshifted the main attack of his IICorps eastward to the area indictedby the partisan intelligence. If Clarkwere to break through to the foot ofthe mountains, he would be in posi-tion to trap and destroy Kesselring'sforces by cutting the flatland Route 9from Bologna to Milan.

44From June to August,

Kesselring's intelligenceofficer reported that the

partisans had killed 5,000Germans and woundedfrom 25,000 to 30,000

others.

99On 17 September, II Corps brokethrough the Gothic Line, causing thewhole German line to fall back.Clark then brought forward his 88thInfantry Division, considered thebest American division in Italy, andAllied commanders became confi-dent that the Fifth Army would soonsweep into the Po Valley, whereGen. Sir Oliver Leese's Eighth Armyattacking along the Adriatic couldroll back the whole German TenthArmy past Bologna.

Partisan Attacks

By dawn of 21 September, the US350th and 351st Regiments wereadvancing up narrow mountain trailsthrough intermittent rain and fog toattack Monte Battaglia, the lastremaining obstacle. Ahead of them,behind the German lines, the 36thGaribaldi Brigade, armed by severalOSS drops, had become a disciplinedgroup of 1,200 men commanded byan artillery lieutenant codenamedBob, renowned for his courage,astuteness, and the red shorts healways wore into battle. Because ofthe partisans' daring and courage inthe area immediately behind the Ger-mans' main Apennines battleline,German units were unable to movefreely without danger. From June toAugust, Kesselring's intelligenceofficer reported that the partisans hadkilled 5,000 Germans and woundedfrom 25,000 to 30,000 others.

Bob was determined to attack theGermans on Monte Battaglia, themost sensitive area, where Kessel-ring's 4th Parachute Division was allthat blocked Fifth Army.

The night of 25 September, 400 par-tisans reached Monte Battaglia just asthe Germans were beginning to for-tify it. They killed an unspecifiednumber of Germans, while the restfled back down the mountain. Toclear the way to Monte Battaglia forthe Americans, the partisans then sawthat they first had to remove the Ger-mans from neighboring MonteCarnevale. The partisans came underheavy mortar and machinegun firefrom retreating Germans and fromAmerican artillery protecting itsadvancing troops, unaware that parti-sans had already liberated Battaglia.Pressed along the crest of Carnevale,the Germans, caught between twofires, realized their predicament andbroke.

Kesselring failed in his efforts toretake Monte Battaglia, and Clarkcould now push down the SanternoValley. The Fifth Army's historianexpressed the opinion that if GeneralClark had chosen to pour in freshtroops to expand the salient into abreakthrough to Imola and Highway9, he could have posed a genuinethreat to the Germans. But Clarkfeared that the narrow valley roadthat snaked its way down along theSanterno River to Imola would notcarry more than a single division at atime. According to the historian,Clark failed to understand that "theGerman command was unable toafford more troops, and those thathad been doing the fighting wereclose to collapse."

Kesselring took advantage of theunexpected respite to reinforce hisfront, thereby eliminating any chance

39

Italian Partisans

for an Allied breakthrough. Kessel-ring then launched an all-our attackon the partisan formations which hadso nearly cost him defeat, inflictingreprisals on the civilian population asbrutal as any in World War II.

Stalled Offensive

On the Adriatic front, just as Leese'sEighth Army was on the verge of asimilar vital breakthrough, Leesemade an error in judgment as disas-trous as Clark's. The San FortunatoRidge, the last ridge protecting thelast German defenses before the flat-land of the Po—the Rimini Line—rose southwest of the coastal summerresort of Rimini. German GeneralHerr, defending the Rimini Line,could see no other solution but towithdraw. But Kesselring orderedHerr to stay put. A brigade of theBritish 1st Armored Division, follow-ing textbook policy to defend thisflank, turned away from the reelingGermans and headed toward heavilydefended San Fortuna° Ridge,where it ran into a hail of high-veloc-ity antitank fire.

In short order, 24 Shermans wereknocked out and 64 crewmen laykilled or wounded. Once more, Kes-selring was saved as a series ofrainstorms turned the whole areabetween Rimini and Bologna into animpassable swamp. From the moun-tains, torrents surged down to sweepaway bridges and roads. Leese's infan-try and armor on the plainfloundered in a sea of mud. WithAlexander's concurrence, Clark andLeese decided to call off their offen-sive towards Bologna until spring.

There is no better textbookexample of cooperation

between mainline troopsand partisan auxiliariesthan the liberation of

Ravenna.

99

Liberating Ravenna

There is no better textbook exampleof cooperation between mainlinetroops and partisan auxiliaries thanthe liberation of Ravenna. To holdthis ancient city, renowned for itstreasures of Byzantine art, the Ger-mans had formed defense lines alongits two rivers manned by three infan-try divisions supported by tanks and88mm guns. This meant that if theAllies were to bombard from air, sea,and land, as was their practice beforeattacking with men and tanks, theywould destroy much of the city'sincomparable art.

Meanwhile, Mino Farneti, whoseradio operator had been caught andshot, obtained another parachutedrop 10 miles north of Ravenna. Itincluded two radios, a new operator,and a large consignment of weaponsfor the 28th Garibaldi Brigade. Thistough unit was commanded by a bril-liant partisan incongruouslycodenamed Bulow, who had sent amessage by secret OSS radio to OSSat Eighth Army headquarters in Cat-tolica suggesting a way to save the city.

Such a brazen move by a partisanleader might have been discountedhad it not been for the presence withthe Eighth Army of Col. WladimirPeniakoff, the daredevil commanderof his own special unit known as Pop-sky's Private Army, a highly selectgroup of commandos used for raidsbehind the German lines. During

several raids north of Ravenna, Pop-sky's forces had been greatly helpedby Bulow and his men, and he enthu-siastically recommended them.

Intrigued, the Canadians sent a sub-marine to pick up Bulow for furtherdiscussion, but the impatient Bulowtook off in his own boat accompa-nied by two downed American pilots,a few pistols, and a large keg of wine.He and his companions were rowedby a dozen fishermen through amoonless night some 30 miles downthe coast to the Canadian commandpost at Cervia.

Colonel Tiehle of the OSS wasamazed to see in Bulow a scrawnylieutenant in his late twenties, the sonof Romagna peasants. Tiehle never-theless whisked the shavetail partisanto Eighth Army headquarters, wherethe young partisan's plan to save

Ravenna was so professionally tracedon operational maps he was soon con-ferring with the Army's chief of staff,its chief of operations, and its newcommanding general, Sir Richard L.McCreery.

Bulow counted on a surprise attackby his partisans from the rear ofRavenna while his Garavini detach-ment led an Allied attack from thesouth and Popsky's pirates came infrom the east. More partisans wouldattack across the flatland north ofRavenna. Meanwhile, townspeopleled by clandestine action groups inneighboring cities would harass theGermans' flank along their only routeof escape.

McCreery approved the plan. Twodays later, Bulow was back with hisfrog-like units in the swamps northof Ravenna accompanied by an offi-cial Eighth Army observer, CanadianCaptain Healy.

40

Italian Partisans

On 29 November, Bulow split hisforces into three sections and beganmoving them by night along pre-arranged routes where the peasantshad locked up their dogs and lefttheir doors open for emergency ref-uge. Bulow's plan called for theconcentration of 650 partisans in thevalley north of Ravenna, and of1,250 more near the Reno River,supported by local action squadsfrom Alfonsine and Ravenna armedby the OSS. On 3 December, EighthArmy radio broadcast another mes-sage to warn Bulow of anotherparachute drop that night. The nextmessage Bulow received over the OSSradio was simple and direct: "Attack.Good luck!"

At 3 a.m. on 4 December, 823 parti-sans of the 28th Garibaldi Brigadearmed with one 47mm antitank gun,four mortars, and a dozen heavymachineguns set off along sandy foot-paths to their jumping-off positionsto attack 2,500 Germans holed up inconcrete bunkers, protected by tanksand artillery.

At 5:30 a.m., Bulow's men took theenemy by surprise. All across the areanorth of Ravenna, various partisanunits went after different Germanstrongholds, many of which surren-dered after finding themselvessurrounded.

The Germans in Ravenna movedforces out of the city to counterattackin greater strength. At that point,Canada's 12th Royal Lancers, led byone of Bulow's detachments, enteredthe city from the south as Popsky'spirates stormed in from the east cofind the Germans fleeing. With theexception of one section of blownaqueduct, the city was intact.

At 4:30 p.m. the OSS radio was ableto send a succinct message: "Britishin Ravenna. Regards to all."

The Germans, as Bulow envisaged,evacuated along the road to Ferrara,their exposed flanks "massaged" byBulow's happy warriors. From EighthArmy, Bulow obtained official per-mission for his 800-man brigade tojoin the line as a regular Fighting unitunder his own command, armed andequipped by the Allies.

Two Key Cities

By this time in northern Italy, a newform of partisan warfare was beingdeveloped by another OSS missionacross the country in Piedmont's foot-hills to the Alps around the industrialcenter of Turin.

On 17 March 1944, a three-manteam had been dropped high into theAlps close to the French border. Their35-year-old leader, Marcello de Leva,was the son of an Italian admiral, anda great-grand-nephew of the poetShelley. His number two, RiccardoVanzetti, had, like de Leva, served inthe war as an Air Force engineer. Theteam's third member, a young radiooperator, was a southerner who hadnever been in Pied-mont, and he hadtrouble with his skis on the Alpineglaciers.

Arriving in Turin at the end ofMarch, de Leva set about creating anintelligence network while Vanzetti,remaining in the country, placed theradio in a flourishing beehive. Fromthat unlikely hiding place, the opera-tor transmitted safely until the end ofthe war, often with the Germans inthe same farmhouse. Vanzetti, withtime on his hands, trained teams ofsaboteurs to disrupt German commu-nications in the flatland. He also

developed a novel system of partisanwarfare based on mobile units in theflatland, equipped first with bicycles,then with cars, then with trucks, and,finally, with tanks, all captured fromthe enemy.

These aggressive mobile units weresteadily on the attack, and they soonwere operating against enemy centersof production on the very outskirts ofTurin. Constantly collecting OSSparachute drops to widely scatteredpinpoints, Vanzetti was gradually ele-vated by his fellow partisans to com-mand a group of divisions in prepara-tion for the final attack on Turin.

But, before this could happen, eventshad to mature in Genoa. To helparm an insurrection in that seaport,and to serve as a link by secret radiowith Fifteenth Army Group, anotherOSS mission, codenamed Apple, wasparachuted into the Val Pellice to beforwarded CO Liguria. The team con-sisted of an aspirant doctor, Cippi; amedical student, Alfa; a biologist,Minetto; and a radio operator, Gar-della. All were from Genoa and allwere devout Catholics, which earnedthem in training school the sobriquetof "novices." To code and decode forthe mission, they took along Van-zetti's 16-year-old brother, Adriano,the youngest OSS agent in the field.

Their primary mission was to collectintelligence from Genoa along theLigurian coast to France, to contactand coordinate their activities withthe Committee of National Libera-tion (CNL) in Genoa, and, mostimportant, to select pinpoints forparachute drops to arm the groups ofpartisans organizing in the Ligurianhills surrounding Genoa.

The port, firmly in German hands,was heavily garrisoned with strongnaval units, but, despite a ferocious

41

Italian Partisans

gang of Nazi-Fascisr counterintelli-gence sleuths, the city remained anti-Fascist. Resistance in the city, how-ever, was a dangerous business: oneby one, heads of the CNL werepicked up by the Fascists and the SS,shot or deported, and the only groupwith a radio in touch with SOE wascaptured in its entirety. Minetto'sjob was to re-establish contact withthe underground and prepare theway for Cippi's intelligence opera-tions. He then set off with the radioand its operator in a horse and buggyto join the best partisan group in thehills, the Cichero Division, success-fully smuggling baggage, weapons,and radio right through Germanunits whose startled members merelyglanced at so strange a conveyance,letting it by unchallenged.

Finding the partisans well organizedand in harmony with the local popu-lation, Minato set up his radio in ahilltop castle and then went on aninspection tour to apprise a networkof partisan informers of just what wasneeded and how it should be speedilycouriered to the radio. Minetto alsoturned to organizing saboteurs, train-ing and arming two brigades of theCichero Division, supplying themwith 135 planeloads of material,including bazookas and 6Imm mor-tars. Elected to command the Arzanibrigade, Minetto obtained the Ger-man surrender of a whole series ofstrongpoints, capturing more than1,000 prisoners, all the time prepar-ing his men for general insurrection.

Uprising in Genoa

In Genoa, Minetto's old comrades inthe CM.. had for some time been pre-paring the citizenry politically andmilitarily for insurrection. The Ger-man general in command of the city,

44With equal speed, the

3,000 members ofclandestine action squadsmushroomed from 5,000

to 20,000 men and women,young and old, armed with

weapons seized fromFascist forces.

99Reinhart Meinhold, apprehensiveabout the partisans despite his twofull divisions, informed the CardinalArchbishop of Genoa that if hisforces were allowed to leaveunharmed, they would abandon thearea and even the province withinfour days and cause no destruction.

By this time, the Germans had placedcharges throughout Genoa and theentire port area. All main bridges andfive tunnels had been heavily mined.Water and power plants and all themain industries had been preparedFor demolition. Ships, piers, andcranes in the port had been mined torender it unusable.

The heads of the CNL, unshaken bythe threat, replied they would makeno deals with the untrustworthy Ger-mans. They decided instead toimplement their plan for insurrec-tion. By 4 a.m. on 23 April, the firstshots could be heard in the city; thenthe uprising spread. By 10 a.m., theinsurgents had seized city hall, thetelephone exchange, police headquar-ters, and the prison.

With equal speed, the 3,000 mem-bers of clandestine action squadsmushroomed from 5,000 to 20,000men and women, young and old,armed with weapons seized from Fas-cist forces. The Germans continuedto threaten a tough resistance if not

allowed to withdraw as planned, buttheir situation soon deteriorated.

Action squads blew up enough pow-erlines to paralyze electric—traintransport from Liguria towards Pied-mont; nor could the Germans usesteam engines from which saboteurshad long since removed essentialparts. Unable to move, the Germansdug in, firing their antitank gunspoint blank at attacking students.

Partisans Prevail

By early morning of the 24th, parti-san groups held all the neighboringboroughs. That day, the Fascistforces garrisoning Genoa chose toflee. Many areas had been cleared of

. Germans, but they still held out,especially in the highway tunnels,armed with tanks, artillery, andheavy machineg-uns. They also heldthe entire port with its heavy can-nons. Meanwhile, another dangerloomed in the form of the Germans'146th Infantry Division, reportedadvancing toward Genoa intent onrescuing its trapped comrades.

With the Americans still more than100 kilometers away, and the parti-sans moving on foot down themountains unable to reach the citybefore the night of the 25th, one orthe other of the relief forces had toarrive or Genoa risked suffering thefate of Warsaw.

At that point, the Germansannounced they had seized 20women and children whom theythreatened to kill if not allowed toleave freely. The city's CNL com-manders answered that in reprisalthey would kill the 1,000 Germanprisoners already in their hands and

42

Italian Partisans

execute all those taken thereafter aswar criminals.

As a last resort, General Meinholdthreatened to pulverize the city withheavy artillery, but the Cardinalsomehow persuaded him to delay thebombardment.

Meanwhile, a group of civilians, dar-ing the crossfire of German batteries,captured the city's radio station toinform the world that the city was inthe CNL's hands. The news boostedthe morale of the insurgents as itlowered that of the Germans, by thendreading the imminent arrival of par-tisan formations from the mountains.Worse news came when the Germandivision en route to Genoa was way-laid by partisans from the mountains,surrounded, and obliged to surrender.

At 9 a.m. of the 26th, Meinhold sur-rendered, the first time in Italianhistory that a fully equipped armycorps laid down its arms to civilians.Not all the Nazi units agreed to obey.Two naval officers from the portinformed the CNI. they were prepar-ing to bombard the city and hadcondemned Meinhold co death onHitler's orders.

At that point, the first partisan unitsfrom the mountains marched intotown. United with the citizens ofGenoa, they launched a final attackagainst the Germans, obliging themto surrender. When the American92nd Division arrived on the night of26 April, it was amazed at what thepartisans had accomplished.

The two fully armed German divi-sions in Liguira that were to fall backto the Po River to defend Turin andMilan had been neutralized for theprice of 300 partisan dead and 3,000wounded. The German forces in

Piedmont thus found themselves iso-lated and open to attack by localpartisan formations, which now camein for the kill.

Retaking Turin

In Turin, de Leva moved the secretradio and its operator from his coun-try apiary to a well-stocked apartmentto be in constant touch with theadvancing Allies. In the city, theGermans had planned to destroy thetransformer stations, the central tele-phone exchange, the radio station,and the principal factories. A battal-ion of 700 sappers, specially trainedin demolition, had been assigned byHitler to Turin.

On 20 April, the CNL in Turinordered a general strike. On the nightof 25-26 April, joint squads of civil-ians and workers attacked theGermans. Within two hours, Van-zetti's mobile forces, armed withcaptured German tanks, entered thecity, fighting street to street andhouse to house. By the night of 28April, nearly all of Turin was free,and the Germans had withdrawn tothe nearby hills, waiting to surrenderto the Allies.

Allied Advances

Alexander, who had been waiting forenough sunshine to dry out the PoValley, finally launched his springoffensive, with Clark in command ofa retrained and refurbished FifteenthArmy Group. From Tyrrhenian toAdriatic, across the rugged dorsal ofthe Apennines, 21 Allied divisionsfaced the 25 German divisions of Kes-selring's Army Group "C," perhapsthe best fighting unit left to the

German Army, supported by fivemediocre Fascist divisions.

The Fifth Army moved down theApennines toward Bologna, while theEighth Army put pressure on theenemy across the flatland northwestof Ravenna. The object was to catchthe German Tenth Army in a pincermovement that would destroy ArmyGroup "C" before it could retirenorth into the Alps. To prevent thiswould require the cooperation ofpartisan units in the Piedmont to theAlps.

The night of 15 April, preceded by75,000 rounds of artillery fired in 30minutes, Lt. Gen. G. Keyes's IICorps on Clark's front advanced intoheavily mined and strongly fortifiedterrain heading for Bologna.

In Bologna, the insurgent partisanswere handicapped by the loss of theirsecret radio, the execution of theirtop commander, and the capture ofthe liaison officer crossing from theAllies to alert them. They were leftwith no better warning than a specialmessage from the BBC: "There willbe racing at the Hippodrometomorrow."

So they rose up on their own on 19April, accounting for 1,300 Germansdead or captured, salvaging the city'selectric, gas, and waterworks. By 21April, two divisions of the FifthArmy reached the city gates from thewest as Polish forces of the EighthArmy entered from the east.

With the German lines broken southof the Po, both Allied armies nowsought to encircle as many units aspossible before Lieutenant Generalvon Vietinghoff—who had inheritedArmy Group "C" from Kesselringafter its veteran commander wascalled to the Western Front to try to

43

IItalian Partisans

44

stem Eisenhower's advance—couldwithdraw them north of the Po.

That day in northern Italy all railroadworkers went on strike, paralyzingthe rail system. Early on 22 April, allmilitary supplies and equipment onGerman trains were seized andturned against the enemy.

A String of Victories

In Milan, the CNL ordered a generalinsurrection for all of northern Italy.Partisan and action squads redoubledtheir attacks on trapped and fleeingenemy units, forcing them to fight orsurrender. Throughout the plain, bat-talions of partisans were capturingand eliminating larger and larger Ger-man groups, preventing thedestruction of bridges viral to theAllies. Soon, all the great cities of thevalley were in Allied hands, liberatedby partisans. Meanwhile, the mainbody of the Eighth Army was advanc-ing on Venice and Trieste.

On 27 April, the German commandin Venice issued an ultimatum to thelocal CNL threatening to destroy thecity's key installations, unless the par-tisans agreed to allow withdrawal ofthe German garrison of 2,300 troopsplus 1,800 Fascists. All this destruc-tion was avoided by OSS mission"Margot," which had received 23 suc-cessful parachute drops to arm andequip the local Venetian partisans.Also on 27 April, the mission's leaderthreatened the Germans and the Fas-cists with annihilation by 4,500partisans massed in the area, unlessthey rescinded their plans for destruc-tion. As a result, the Germanssurrendered the city and port intact.

Meanwhile, the moment arrived forMilan, seat of the CNL in north

Throughout the plain,battalions of partisans werecapturing and eliminatinglarger and larger German

groups, preventing thedestruction of bridges vital

to the Allies.

99

Italy, as the US 1st Armored Divisionapproached that Longobarcl capital.The OSS teamleader in Milan, EnzoBoeri, for some months had been thelink between the partisan commandand Fifteenth Army Group, transmit-ting a huge volume of intelligence,receiving instructions, and relayingmessages to partisan units in themountains.

Just before dawn on 25 April, ordersto go into action were issued by thejoint partisan command in Milan.The Germans had entrapped them-selves by occupying primarily thebusiness and residential center,entirely ringed by working-class dis-tricts with nodal strongpoints. Bynoon, the Germans were unable tomove.

Everywhere, Fascists were fleeing fortheir lives. By afternoon, CNL policeunits were patrolling the city whileCommittees of Justice were meetingto maintain a continuity of judicialprocedures.

• The situation was becoming criticalfor the Germans. In the afternoon of25 April, the German Consul Gen-eral informed the CNL that ifGerman forces were allowed to leaveMilan and all of Lombardy unmo-lested, they would not cause anydamage. The CNL demanded thatthe Germans lay down their weapons.

Enter Mussolini

That same afternoon, Mussolini—who had arrived from his Salo head-quarters a week earlier, along with hiscop henchmen—appeared at the resi-dence of Milan's Cardinal Schuster,accompanied by Marshal RodolfoGraziani, head of all Fascist forces,hoping to negotiate some sort of deal.Mussolini was told by the CNL's del-egated lawyer, Marazza, that onlyunconditional surrender wasacceptable.

Graziani reminded Mussolini thatnegotiating would mean betrayingthe Germans. Marazza, with a smile,inquired if Mussolini was not awareof the secret negotiations carried outby SS Gen. Karl Wolff with AllenDulles in Switzerland. Stunned, Mus-solini muttered angrily, "They havealways treated us as slaves. I will nowresume my freedom of action."

Although the city already was firmlyin the hands of the partisans, the situ-ation for the partisan commandremained potentially critical. If theGermans were to erupt from theirstrongholds, they might still over-whelm their opponents with superiorfirepower.

The partisan command could notunderstand why the leader of theCommunist brigades in the moun-tains northeast of Milan had not yetappeared at the gates with his divi-sions heavily armed by the OSS.Some months earlier, an OSS mis-sion consisting of an Italian AirForce engineer, Luigi" Vestri, accom-panied by his girlfriend and a radiooperator, had been accepted by therenowned Communist partisanleader, Vincenzo Moscatelli, com-mander of all the Garibaldi Brigadesin the north, Together they had orga-nized a vast intelligence service. They

44

Italian Partisans

also developed a foolproof system forreceiving drops without losing a sin-gle weapon; they directed battery-operated car headlights at the sky, vis-ible only from above.

Two of Moscatelli's brigades set offfor Milan, but they encounteredstrongly armored German forces try-ing to retreat to the border. By theafternoon of 25 April, they had man-aged to defeat these German forces,but this left them far from Milan justas Mussolini, outraged at being aban-doned by the Germans, secretlyheaded for escape across the Swissfrontier.

Playing his last card, Mussoliniattached himself, along with his girl-friend, Claretta Petacci, to a strongGerman convoy of 30 SS trucks pro-tected by armored cars heading forthe Brenner Pass. Trapped by a Mos-

catelli roadblock near the lakesidetown of Dongo, Mussolini was dis-covered and executed with hisgirlfriend on unanimous orders fromthe partisan high command.

The Battle Ends

On 28 April, after neutralizing sev-eral thousand Germans, Moscatellireached Milan at the head of 2,000well-armed troops, riding in cap-tured trucks and protected bycaptured tanks and armored cars.The partisan leader, who was tobecome the first minister of defensein liberated Italy, paraded into thecity to be welcomed by the partisanhigh command.

That same morning, Piacenza, thelast big city just south of the Po, was

liberated by its partisans. On 29April, the entire 6,000-man German232nd Division was captured, includ-ing its commanding general and hisstaff. Allied forces entered Milan on29 April, the day Hitler killed him-self in his Berlin bunker.

On 2 May, at noon, hostilities ceasedofficially in Italy, with Alexanderclaiming that almost a million Ger-mans had surrendered with all theirequipment and accessories. Thatsame day in Berlin, the garrison laiddown its arms and the German capi-tal passed to the Red Army.

Two days later, General von Sengerund Etterlin, after fighting from Sic-ily to Bologna, arrived at Gen. MarkClark's headquarters to sign theunconditional surrender. May 4 thebattle for Italy was over.

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