SIA in support of an investment protection agreement...

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Prepared by DEVELOPMENT Solutions [June – 2016] The views expressed in the report are those of the consultant, and do not present an official view of the European Commission. Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) in support of an investment protection agreement between the European Union and the Republic of the Union of Myanmar Final Report

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  • Prepared by DEVELOPMENT Solutions [June – 2016] The views expressed in the report are those of the consultant, and do not present an official view of the European Commission.

    Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) in support

    of an investment protection agreement between the European Union and the

    Republic of the Union of Myanmar

    Final Report

  • EUROPEAN COMMISSION

    Directorate-General for Trade

    Directorate B — Investment Unit DG Trade B2 — Investment

    E-mail: [email protected]

    European Commission B-1049 Brussels

    mailto:[email protected]

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    SIA on the EU-Myanmar Investment Protection Agreement 2016 EN

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    Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) in support

    of an investment protection agreement between the European Union and the

    Republic of the Union of Myanmar

    Final Report

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    LEGAL NOTICE

    This document has been prepared for the European Commission however it reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

    More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://www.europa.eu).

    ISBN 978-92-79-57841-0 doi: 10.2781/101037

    © European Union, 2016Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016

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    Abstract

    This SIA seeks to analyse the extent to which the EU-Myanmar Investment

    Protection Agreement (IPA) may affect the economy and sustainability

    issues, including social and labour standards, environment, and human

    rights, in Myanmar. The SIA finds that the IPA may largely have positive

    economic impacts, however social and environmental impacts are more

    difficult to predict, as they will be dependent on how increased EU

    investment is directed, and the practices of related EU firms. The project

    team has proposed policy recommendations to increase potential positive

    impacts of the agreement and address negative externalities that could

    arise from increased investment by European investors as a result of the

    IPA.

    ဤ SIA - (IPA) IPA SIA

    Résumé

    Cette EIDD (Évaluation de l'impact sur le développement durable) vise à

    analyser dans quelle mesure l'Accord sur la protection des investissements entre l’UE et la Birmanie (API) pourrait affecter l'économie et les problèmes

    de durabilité, notamment les normes dans le domaine social et du travail,

    ainsi que les droits de l'homme, en Birmanie. L'EIDD a conclu que l'API peut

    largement contribuer à des impacts économiques positifs, mais que les

    impacts sociaux et environnementaux sont plus difficiles à prévoir, car ils

    dépendront de l'orientation des nouveaux investissements de l'UE et des

    pratiques des sociétés européennes concernées. L'équipe du projet a

    proposé des recommandations politiques afin d'augmenter les impacts

    positifs potentiels de l'accord et de prendre en compte les externalités

    négatives pouvant découler d'investissements accrus de la part

    d'investisseurs européens à la suite de l'API.

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    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    The European Union (EU) and Myanmar began negotiating a bilateral investment

    protection agreement (IPA) in March 2014. The proposed EU-Myanmar IPA represents an

    ambitious step for both parties, as there are currently no bilateral investment treaties

    between Myanmar and any EU Member State. Negotiations for an EU-Myanmar IPA aim

    to encourage investment and to secure core protections against discrimination,

    uncompensated expropriation, and unfair and inequitable treatment.

    The Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade) of the European Commission (EC) has

    mandated this Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) on the IPA to be carried out by

    DEVELOPMENT Solutions Europe Limited (DS). The project consists of two

    complementary components of equal importance: first, an assessment of how this

    investment agreement will impact a range of economic, social, environmental and

    human rights factors, conducted through desk research, including qualitative and

    quantitative analysis. Second, a thorough consultation process, involving a diverse range

    of relevant stakeholders, aimed to generate genuine and reflective feedback and provide

    further opportunities for information gathering on the potential impacts of the

    agreement.

    A central function of the SIA has been to facilitate consultation with civil society

    stakeholders in the EU and Myanmar. The Project Team has intermediated between input

    from civil society stakeholders and the EC throughout the SIA. This has facilitated a

    continuous flow of information between stakeholders and the EC that has informed the

    negotiation process.

    Stakeholder outreach included 49 face-to-face interviews with relevant stakeholders on

    the ground in Myanmar, a stakeholder workshop held in Yangon on December 17th

    2015,1 a website, two civil society dialogues in Brussels and an online questionnaire. A

    summary of the stakeholder outreach activities is presented in the methodology section

    of the report. An analysis of findings can be found in annex Inputs from stakeholders

    have been incorporated throughout the analysis.

    Trade and investment between the EU and Myanmar have more than doubled since the

    latter had trade restrictions lifted and was reinstated to the Generalised Scheme of

    Preferences (GSP) in 2013. Commercial engagement is seen as a capable instrument for

    ensuring that political and economic reforms stay the course as the EU develops

    relations with Myanmar. However, after more than a decade of limited economic

    engagement, and given Myanmar’s existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with

    China, India, Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, and investment agreements

    concluded at the ASEAN level, EU investors are currently at a comparative disadvantage

    in terms of legal protection for their investments in Myanmar.

    The aim of the negotiation process is to conclude a standalone investment protection

    agreement, which would provide EU investors in Myanmar and Myanmar investors in the

    EU with a predictable and secure investment environment, reflecting:

    non-discrimination;

    protection against uncompensated expropriation and unfair treatment while

    preserving the right to regulate;

    transfer of returns;

    investment dispute settlement; and

    1 Workshop report available in Annex II

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    a level-playing field with other foreign investors currently benefitting from

    bilateral investment protection agreements.

    The agreement is also expected to help Myanmar to move up value chains and promote

    transparency and sustainable development (including environmental protection, core

    labour standards, and corporate social responsibility). The objective is to increase

    bilateral investment flows and, ultimately, trade activity and economic development.

    This Final Report presents the key findings of the research and analysis of key

    sustainability issues related to the specific provisions of the IPA. This includes an

    analysis of the economic, social, environmental and human rights impacts which have

    been assessed by drawing on a tailored modelling approach and carefully selected

    qualitative indicators.

    The below sections present the key conclusions, identified opportunities and challenges,

    and the policy recommendations that have resulted from this Trade SIA analysis and

    accompanying stakeholder outreach process.

    Key conclusions

    The economic impact assessment finds that successful conclusion of the IPA could

    expand the share of EU-sourced FDI in Myanmar and bring it closer to levels of

    current leading foreign investor countries.

    It is difficult to predict the quantitative effects of IPAs on FDI, and there remains

    disagreement in the literature as to whether IPAs cause FDI growth.2 The lack of

    reliable available data in the case of EU-Myanmar trade and investment

    compounds the difficulties. To compensate for this the project team has made

    reference to some of the findings of the 49 interviews and 15 questionnaires

    conducted with relevant stakeholders under this SIA, which included interviews

    with EU business. Numerous EU company respondents expressed the view that

    increased investment protection would incentivise greater EU investment in

    Myanmar.

    Based on this qualitative research and the EU’s current FDI volume and share in

    Myanmar (approx. 10 per cent), the economic impact assessment of the EU-

    Myanmar IPA considers a descriptive scenario wherein this amount would

    increases by 5 percentage points (to approx. 15 per cent) when compared to the

    baseline, over the course of a decade. This does not factor in additional increases

    in FDI which would likely result from underlying market opening. Given the level

    of uncertainty about such estimations, the economic impact assessment does not

    aim to predict a particular per cent increase, rather it highlights that an increase

    is likely against the baseline. Any increases against the baseline would offer a

    reference point for how selected sustainability indicators might be affected in a

    scenario where the EU’s share of FDI in Myanmar increases towards 2025.

    2 Cf. Neumayer, E. and Spess, L. (2005). Do Bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct

    investment to developing countries? London, UK: LSE. Available: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/627/1/World_Dev_%28BITs%29.pdf; Hallward-Driemeier, M. (2003).

    Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a bit…and they could bite. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-3121; Franck, S. (2007). Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and Rule of Law. Lincoln, NE: UNL. Available; http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=140021013065021108098065093125000120105018010061023037119087114064086010000027018000035020062104054111107010083005

    110108026118025011081022124113120025078118073062012032021026122031098118097066012070096087091010024098005126096028078123115087107029&EXT=pdf.

    http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/627/1/World_Dev_%28BITs%29.pdfhttp://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-3121http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=140021013065021108098065093125000120105018010061023037119087114064086010000027018000035020062104054111107010083005110108026118025011081022124113120025078118073062012032021026122031098118097066012070096087091010024098005126096028078123115087107029&EXT=pdfhttp://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=140021013065021108098065093125000120105018010061023037119087114064086010000027018000035020062104054111107010083005110108026118025011081022124113120025078118073062012032021026122031098118097066012070096087091010024098005126096028078123115087107029&EXT=pdfhttp://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=140021013065021108098065093125000120105018010061023037119087114064086010000027018000035020062104054111107010083005110108026118025011081022124113120025078118073062012032021026122031098118097066012070096087091010024098005126096028078123115087107029&EXT=pdfhttp://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=140021013065021108098065093125000120105018010061023037119087114064086010000027018000035020062104054111107010083005110108026118025011081022124113120025078118073062012032021026122031098118097066012070096087091010024098005126096028078123115087107029&EXT=pdf

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    The baseline is derived from current political and economic trends in Myanmar -

    including recent reforms and existing trade and investment relations - which are

    surveyed in Section 4.1 and applied in Section 4.2.4.1. In the IPA scenario, total

    gross value added (GVA) per capita and labour productivity respectively increased

    by 0.2 and 0.1 per cent more per annum than otherwise expected under the

    baseline.

    The social impact assessment finds that an increase in FDI from the EU could

    promote economic stability and growth, increase employment and as a result lead to

    better living standards and reduced poverty. The cumulative effects of increased total EU FDI flowing into Myanmar are

    expected to have moderately positive effects on labour demand.

    EU companies are more likely to apply codes of conduct, which integrate

    corporate social responsibility (CSR) and responsible business conduct (RBC)

    practices, including for labour standards. As a result a net improvement in labour

    standards could be expected.

    Due to weak governance structures and poor implementation and enforcement

    capacity in Myanmar, labour standards and social protection are generally inadequate

    to offer full protection to all of the labour force.

    Possible measures to address any risks that EU companies might cooperate with

    local enterprises with poor labour standards could be addressed by a robust

    chapter on labour standards in the IPA. This could be reinforced with reference to

    appropriate implementation measures facilitated though the Myanmar Labour

    Rights Initiative and/or the grievance mechanism facilitated through the OECD

    Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 3 Furthermore, future EU cooperation

    projects in Myanmar could address the importance of enforcement of labour

    standards.

    The environmental impact assessment concluded that reliable estimation of

    potential impacts was not feasible, as increased EU investment could be positive or

    negative for the environment of Myanmar depending upon how it is directed.

    A key uncertainty in terms of environmental management will be the extent to

    which environmental legislation and governance will improve. It is expected that

    legislation and governance will improve, both due to domestic efforts and

    international support (e.g. from UN agencies, EU policy support and bilateral

    assistance); however, progress will likely depend on the outcomes of the broader

    reform process underway in Myanmar, including efforts to tackle corruption and

    mismanagement in areas such as illegal logging and mining.

    With regard to environmental management, EU companies may bring high

    internal environmental standards to their overseas operations and moreover call

    on their local suppliers to provide good environmental management as a

    precondition for commercial engagement. 4 Due diligence on the part of EU

    investors will be key in ensuring that investment is not directed to companies

    engaging in unsustainable practices.

    3 More information on the EU’s participation in the Myanmar labour rights initiative is available here: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1304

    4 UNCTAD and the European Business School, Making FDI Work for Sustainable Development, UN, 2004. The study focused on case studies of EU companies investing abroad. See also: Liang,

    F.H., Does Foreign Direct Investment Harm the Host Country’s Environment? Evidence from China, 2006.

    http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1304

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    In several sectors, such as textiles, food and beverages, it may be the case that

    the scale effect leading to greater environmental pressures will outweigh

    improvements from better environmental management by individual operators.

    Overall, however, it is difficult to predict the outcomes clearly.

    This result underlines the importance that complementary measures can play:

    these could include, notably, direct technical assistance to the Myanmar

    government to support better environmental governance, as well as support for

    multilateral efforts via the UN and other international bodies.

    The human rights impact assessment projects that increased EU investment as a

    result of the IPA is more likely to deliver positive than negative impacts in terms of

    human rights. This conclusion is corroborated by input received from stakeholders;

    60 per cent of all interviewees and questionnaire respondents considered that the

    EU-Myanmar IPA will have “positive” human rights impacts.

    An increase in FDI from the EU could promote economic stability and growth,

    increase employment and as a result lead to better living standards and reduced

    poverty.

    Furthermore, EU companies often have a human rights approach in their codes of

    conduct, which integrate CSR and RBC practices. As a result, better protection for

    labour standards and human rights could be introduced in Myanmar.

    A greater commitment to, and reinforced performance of, due diligence from EU

    investors should be encouraged, including (for example) analysis of potential

    human rights issues in supply chains, so as to ensure that land for investment is

    made available through legal means.

    Investors in sectors where the risk of human rights violations is higher,

    particularly the energy, agriculture and telecommunications sectors, should be

    especially diligent. The energy industry is linked to risks regarding violation of

    property rights, livelihood and minority rights. The telecommunications industry

    could be a driver of important processes like democracy and passing of

    information with the potential to open up society, but could also raise concerns

    about surveillance and censorship.

    Through stakeholder consultation and general research, the project team has identified a

    number of opportunities and challenges for the IPA, summarised below. These are

    expanded in Section 8 of the Final Report.

    Opportunities

    The IPA, by strengthening the protection and decreasing risks of investors is

    likely to lead to increased outward investment by both the EU and Myanmar,

    particularly investment from the EU into Myanmar.

    Increased investment could promote economic stability and growth, increase

    employment and as a result lead to better living standards and a reduction in

    poverty in Myanmar.

    Increased investment could have the dual effect of exporting capital and CSR and

    RBC practices. This would contribute to an improvement of labour standards and of the social environment in Myanmar by providing better and safer jobs,

    reducing child labour and increasing female labour market participation within the

    overall increase in employment. These are considered as positive impacts with

    respect to the baseline scenario.

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    Access to healthcare for local workers could be improved through the presence of

    foreign companies following CSR and RBC guidelines in Myanmar. 5 Medical

    insurance and healthcare for job-related injuries or health issues have been

    covered by certain foreign companies investing in Myanmar.

    Greater investment by companies with strong CSR and RBC practices could

    enhance the levels of inclusion and of equal treatment of women or minorities by

    abiding by international standards regulating the labour or education sectors,

    where the inequalities are the most striking.

    EU companies may bring corporate environmental standards to their Myanmar

    operations and may call on their local suppliers to ensure good environmental

    management as a precondition for commercial engagement.

    An EU-Myanmar IPA could provide investors from both Parties with easier access

    to investment dispute resolution while protecting Myanmar’s interests by setting

    safeguards in this regard.

    An agreement would ensure a level playing field for EU investors (given the BITs

    that Myanmar has already concluded with China, India, Japan, Korea, the

    Philippines and Thailand, and the investment protection provisions agreed to in

    the framework of ASEAN).

    Potential to include provisions supporting sustainable and responsible investment.

    This could encourage sustainable development while promoting environmental

    protection and core labour/human rights.

    The IPA could support the policy reform process currently under way in Myanmar,

    in the following ways:

    o Ongoing reforms on labour and human rights issues could be supported

    through the transfer of EU good practices, particularly with regards to CSR

    and RBC.

    o Reforms to protect the environment could be supported by technology and

    best practices transfer in multiple sectors including sewage and waste

    management.

    o Transparency provisions could support positive developments concerning

    sustainability and responsible business conduct in Myanmar, particularly

    through improvements to stakeholders’ awareness of key issues and

    improved accountability.

    Challenges

    While economic impacts are likely to be positive, all of the related aspects of

    social, human rights and environmental impacts are difficult to predict as they

    very much depend on the sectors to which EU investment may be directed. For

    example although EU companies may bring (high) corporate environmental

    standards within their overseas operations, there is a risk that when partnering

    with local enterprises that do not operate to such standards, this could lead to a

    potential increase in human rights, social and environmental problems.

    As part of the ongoing reform process in Myanmar, many of the existing laws and

    regulations likely to be affected by the IPA are currently under revision. The

    agreement needs to avoid placing restraints on Myanmar’s government by giving

    investors protection from future laws and regulations on the basis of ‘indirect

    expropriation’, particularly laws and regulations related to labour, human rights

    and environmental standards.

    Dispute settlement mechanisms such as Investor State Dispute Settlement

    (ISDS), which aims to provide direct access to international arbitration for

    investors as an alternative to national courts of host countries, have been

    criticised due to what are seen as inconsistencies and unintended interpretations

    5 Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business. (2015). Human rights and business country guide:

    Myanmar. Available: http://hrbcountryguide.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Human-Rights-and-Business-Country-Guide-Myanmar-Final-08.04.15.pdf.

    http://hrbcountryguide.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Human-Rights-and-Business-Country-Guide-Myanmar-Final-08.04.15.pdfhttp://hrbcountryguide.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Human-Rights-and-Business-Country-Guide-Myanmar-Final-08.04.15.pdf

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    of clauses, unanticipated uses of the system by investors including challenges

    against policy measures taken in the public interest, costly and lengthy

    procedures, with limited or no transparency. The threat of foreign investors

    having recourse to such dispute settlement mechanisms might restrain

    Myanmar’s government from implementing domestic policy measures to promote

    social inclusion and labour rights, if the domestic measures envisaged may pose a

    risk to the value of a foreign investment. As a result, the EU is proposing a

    reformed approach on investment protection, including safeguards on the right to

    regulate and an alternative mechanism, the 'Investment Court System' (ICS),

    which address a number of these issues and encourages recourse to domestic

    courts.

    External factors such as instances of abuse of labour rights in Myanmar by EU

    companies or of abuses occurring within their supply chains could erode the

    reputation for integrity of EU companies.

    Myanmar at present has limited institutional capacity to implement stringent

    commitments; therefore it may fall short of effective enforcement of the IPA

    measures.

    Policy recommendations

    Recommendations aimed at maximising the potential benefits of the agreement and at

    mitigating potential negative externalities are summarised in the following section.

    1. Chapters should be included in the IPA that encourage compliance with international labour, environmental and human rights standards by EU and

    Myanmar investors. The Myanmar government’s ability to effectively

    promote and enforce international labour standards should be protected,

    following similar provisions in CETA and TTIP.

    The inclusion of sustainable development provisions, including labour aspects, within the

    EU-Myanmar IPA could encourage the government of Myanmar to further undertake

    capacity development efforts to fully implement and enforce labour standards.

    The principles and text of the agreement could draw inspiration from other relevant

    instruments such as the ILO Better Factories programme that can be useful to monitor a

    particular sector and the US-Burma investors reporting requirements.

    1.1. The general exceptions clause and the right to regulate article should be designed to allow both Parties to engage in legitimate regulatory actions

    without risk of liability to investment dispute and compensation claims. This is

    especially important given that Myanmar is currently engaged in an active

    reform process. This could be complemented by clear definition of ‘fair and

    equitable treatment’ (FET) and of ‘indirect expropriation’ to avoid excessive

    interpretations, as well as frivolous or bad-faith claims.6 This has been the

    EU's approach as can be seen from the closed list of elements constituting a

    breach of FET in the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade

    Agreement (CETA), the EU-Singapore FTA, the EU-Vietnam FTA and the TTIP

    proposal.

    1.2. To address the concerns about the lack of transparency and legitimacy within some ISDS mechanisms, the EC could extend the ICS to the EU-Myanmar

    IPA, as was included for investment dispute resolution mechanisms in the

    most recent EU FTAs.

    6 For further differentiation of direct and indirect expropriation, cf. TTIP Investment Chapter: Annex I http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/september/tradoc_153807.pdf.

    http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/september/tradoc_153807.pdf

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    1.3. The IPA should include an article expressly excluding the right of companies to claim that Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status entitles them to use the same

    provisions as IPAs in place with other countries. This is especially important

    due to the lack of human rights and environmental protections included in

    Myanmar’s BITs with other countries. Examples of articles addressing this

    issue can be found in other agreements such as CETA, article 8.7(4) and the

    EU-Vietnam FTA, article 4(6).

    1.4. Provisions on sustainable development, including labour and human rights, should not take a selective approach but rather encompass all related issues.

    1.5. Objectives of CSR/RBC for EU companies operating in Myanmar should be included in the text of the agreement, encouraging companies to adhere to

    similar CSR/RBC practices as are upheld in the EU, tailored to local conditions.

    Measures to this effect would conform with resolutions of the European

    Parliament, most notably that of 18 April 2012 on the “Annual Report on

    Human Rights in the World and the European Union’s policy on the matter”,

    which recommends that, “CSR should be binding on European companies

    operating in countries with institutional weaknesses.”7

    2. Considering the weakness of Myanmar’s implementation and enforcement systems with respect to labour, environmental and human rights standards,

    the parties to the agreement should consider what existing mechanisms can

    be utilised to strengthen implementation and enforcement of such

    standards.

    The complementary mechanism such as the OECD National Contact Points (NCP) under

    the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises could be considered in reinforcing

    Myanmar’s enforcement system. The NCPs provide a grievance mechanism for

    investigating complaints about a company operating in or headquartered in a particular

    country. They provide non-judicial assessments on violations which result in

    settlements/agreements. As such the parties to the IPA agreement could discuss how

    existing NCPs in EU Member States could be asked to look into issues concerning the

    behavior of EU companies in Myanmar when such occurrences are documented.

    Recognizing that neither Party is likely to agree to binding implementation and

    enforcement measures in this respect, parallel implementation and enforcement

    mechanisms therefore represent a pragmatic approach that allows stakeholders to flag

    ill-directed investments without breaching the legislative sovereignty of either Party.

    3. Planned EC funded ex-post social, labour and human rights impact assessments conducted with regard this IPA should focus on sensitivities

    identified by the SIA team.

    The EC is committed to conducting ex-post evaluations of its trade and investment

    agreements; including of their human rights and related impacts. When conducting these

    assessments, the analysts should remain vigilant in chapters of the assessment which

    focus on sectors where investment projects involve land acquisition, due to a history of

    land-grabbing and the customary nature of land-holding that is prevalent in Myanmar.

    Sensitivities in this regard lie in ensuring that land acquired has been transferred from

    its owner on a voluntary basis, and ensuring enforcement of adequate compensation

    7 (2012). Human rights in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter including implications for the EU’s strategic human rights policy. Available:

    http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-2012-0126+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.

    http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-2012-0126+0+DOC+PDF+V0//ENhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-2012-0126+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN

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    according to the market value of the land. Should there be any documented cases of

    abuses tied to EU company investment, the ex-post evaluation team should consider

    them.

    4. An EU-Myanmar IPA should work in tandem with EU technical cooperation and capacity development initiatives. This would contribute to a

    strengthening of Myanmar’s implementation and enforcement systems with

    respect to ensuring international labour and environmental standards, and

    social inclusion. Synergies should be built between the above

    recommendations and the mechanisms already in place at the EU-Myanmar

    bilateral level.

    As a result of current weak governance structures and poor domestic implementation

    and enforcement capacity, the Myanmar government may fall short of effective

    enforcement of the IPA measures. This may include the sustainable development

    provisions which could lead to negative impacts for labour rights, the environment and

    social inclusion. In addition, lack of enforcement and the resulting lack of legal certainty

    required to protect their reputation or investments might prevent EU companies from

    investing.

    There are many EU funded projects currently underway to support institutional capacity

    building and encourage adherence to international labour and environmental standards

    in Myanmar, such as a € 10 million trade and private sector development programme,

    the multi-partner Myanmar Labour Rights Initiative, and sector specific projects which

    currently include: SMART (support to sustainable garment sector), a project in the

    Aquaculture sector and a Civil Society Roadmap. Other mechanisms or resources include

    political dialogues, including the EU-Myanmar Human Rights Dialogue, which has met

    annually since its creation in 2014.8

    8 (2014). Regional Programming for Asia Multiannual Indicative Programme. Available: http://eeas.europa.eu/asia/docs/rsp/regional-asia-mip-2014-2020_en.pdf.

    http://eeas.europa.eu/asia/docs/rsp/regional-asia-mip-2014-2020_en.pdf

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    Table of contents

    ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................... 5

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................... 6

    Policy recommendations ................................................................... 11

    ACRONYMS.................................................................................................... 17

    1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 19

    2. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................... 21

    2.1. EU – Myanmar trade and investment relations .................................... 21

    2.2. Developments at a regional level ....................................................... 23

    2.3. Content and likely provisions of an IPA between the EU and the

    Republic of the Union of Myanmar ..................................................... 24

    2.3.1. Protection against uncompensated expropriation ..................... 25

    2.3.2. Fair and equitable treatment (FET) and non-discrimination ....... 26

    2.3.3. Transfer of capital (returns related to an investment) ............... 26

    2.3.4. Investment dispute resolution ............................................... 27

    2.3.5. Transparency ...................................................................... 28

    2.3.6. Right to regulate ................................................................. 28

    2.3.7. Sustainable Development ..................................................... 28

    2.4. Status of the IPA negotiations and next steps ..................................... 28

    3. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................... 30

    3.1. Presentation of the conceptual framework of the sustainability

    assessment analysis ........................................................................ 30

    3.2. Stakeholder consultation .................................................................. 32

    3.2.1. Stakeholder Interviews ......................................................... 37

    3.2.2. Questionnaire ...................................................................... 39

    3.2.3. Meetings and Workshop ....................................................... 40

    3.2.4. Other activities .................................................................... 41

    4. ECONOMIC IMPACTS ................................................................................ 43

    4.1. Current state of economic development and FDI in Myanmar ................ 44

    4.1.1. Political and economic state of play ........................................ 45

    4.1.2. Myanmar FDI regulatory framework and trends ....................... 46

    4.1.3. Regional comparison of selected macroeconomic indicators....... 52

    4.2. Descriptive Model ............................................................................ 56

    4.2.1. FDI and Logic Chain Theory Analysis ...................................... 56

    4.2.2. Data selection ..................................................................... 61

    4.2.3. Descriptive analysis ............................................................. 65

    4.2.4. Scenario Analysis Results ..................................................... 67

    4.2.5. Potential impacts of the IPA for EU investors ........................... 71

    4.2.6. Potential impact of the IPA for EU SMEs.................................. 72

    4.3. Potential Impacts on the Myanmar Government .................................. 73

    4.4. Sectoral analysis, economic impacts .................................................. 75

    4.4.1. Agriculture and Fisheries ...................................................... 76

    4.4.2. Extraction ........................................................................... 77

    4.4.3. Manufacturing ..................................................................... 78

    4.4.4. Tourism.... .......................................................................... 78

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    4.4.5. Finance and Business Services .............................................. 79

    4.4.6. Energy..... .......................................................................... 79

    4.4.7. Garment.. ........................................................................... 80

    4.4.8. Automobile and Electronic Consumer Goods ............................ 81

    4.4.9. Food and beverages (F&B) .................................................... 81

    4.4.10. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) ................ 82

    5. SOCIAL IMPACTS ..................................................................................... 84

    5.1. Current state of social welfare in Myanmar and development in

    absence of the investment protection agreement between the EU and

    Myanmar ........................................................................................ 85

    5.1.1. Social dimension in Myanmar’s existing investment

    agreements ........................................................................ 85

    5.1.2. Effects on labour induced by foreign investments .................... 87

    5.1.3. Effects on education induced by foreign investments ................ 90

    5.1.4. Effects on public health induced by foreign investments ........... 93

    5.1.5. Effects on inclusion induced by foreign investments ................. 94

    5.2. Sector Specific: Development without an EU-Myanmar IPA ................... 96

    5.2.1. Energy and mining ............................................................... 96

    5.2.2. Textiles... ........................................................................... 97

    5.2.3. Agriculture ........................................................................ 100

    5.2.4. Automobile and Electronic Consumer Goods .......................... 101

    5.2.5. Manufacturing ................................................................... 102

    5.2.6. ICT......... ......................................................................... 102

    5.3. Potential social impacts of the IPA on Myanmar ................................. 103

    5.3.1. Labour rights, social inclusion and sustainable development .... 103

    5.3.2. Potential Labour and Social Impact of the IPA for Myanmar .... 104

    5.4. Sector-specific analysis of the EU-Myanmar IPA and the social impacts

    of its provisions............................................................................. 108

    5.4.1. Energy and mining ............................................................. 108

    5.4.2. Textiles... ......................................................................... 108

    5.4.3. Agriculture ........................................................................ 108

    5.4.4. Automobiles and electronics ................................................ 109

    5.4.5. ICT......... ......................................................................... 109

    5.4.6. Food and beverage ............................................................ 109

    5.5. Corporate social responsibility ......................................................... 109

    5.5.1. Consultation responses on CSR ........................................... 110

    5.5.2. Key issues for CSR in Myanmar ........................................... 110

    6. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ..................................................................... 113

    6.1. Specific IPA provisions and the environment ..................................... 114

    6.2. Consultation responses on environmental impacts ............................. 117

    6.3. Impacts on key areas of environmental management ........................ 118

    6.3.1. Forest resources ................................................................ 118

    6.3.2. Biodiversity ....................................................................... 120

    6.3.3. Land degradation ............................................................... 121

    6.3.4. Water resources ................................................................ 122

    6.3.5. Solid and hazardous waste management .............................. 124

    6.3.6. Air pollution ...................................................................... 125

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    6.3.7. Climate change ................................................................. 126

    6.4. Sectoral analysis, environmental impacts ......................................... 127

    6.4.1. Energy....... ...................................................................... 127

    6.4.2. Textile industry ................................................................. 128

    6.4.3. Automobile and Electronic Consumer Goods .......................... 129

    6.4.4. Food and Beverages ........................................................... 129

    6.4.5. Fisheries 130

    6.4.6. Agriculture ........................................................................ 132

    6.4.7. ICT........... ....................................................................... 133

    7. HUMAN RIGHTS .................................................................................... 134

    7.1. Current state of human rights in Myanmar and development in absence

    of the investment protection agreement between the European Union

    and Myanmar ............................................................................... 136

    7.1.1. Myanmar’s judicial system .................................................. 138

    7.1.2. Property rights .................................................................. 139

    7.1.3. Minority rights and conflict areas ......................................... 141

    7.1.4. Freedom of expression, assembly and association.................. 143

    7.1.5. Data protection ................................................................. 145

    7.1.6. Right to livelihood .............................................................. 145

    7.1.7. Right to an adequate standard of living ................................ 146

    7.1.8. Lack of access to remedy .................................................... 146

    7.1.9. Gender equality ................................................................. 147

    7.1.10. Laws and commitments to responsible business conduct ........ 147

    7.2. Sectoral analysis of Human Rights Impacts without IPA ..................... 150

    7.2.1. Energy...... ....................................................................... 150

    7.2.2. Telecommunications .......................................................... 151

    7.3. Potential human rights impacts of the IPA on Myanmar ...................... 152

    7.3.1. Impact of specific IPA clauses on human rights ..................... 156

    8. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................... 160

    ANNEX I. CIVIL SOCIETY DIALOGUE I MINUTES (NOVEMBER 2015) ................... 166

    ANNEX II. MYANMAR LOCAL WORKSHOP MINUTES (DECEMBER 2015) ................ 171

    ANNEX III. CIVIL SOCIETY DIALOGUE II (APRIL 2016) ..................................... 191

    ANNEX IV: SUMMARY OF STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS ............................... 195

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    Acronyms

    ACIA ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement

    ADB Asian Development Bank

    ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nation

    BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty

    CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against

    Women

    CETA Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement

    CMP Cut, Make, Pack

    CSR Corporate Social Responsibility

    CTMU Confederation of Trade Unions of Myanmar

    DAE Digital Agenda for Europe

    DICA Directorate of Investment and Company Administration of the

    Myanmar Government

    EC European Commission

    EEA European Environment Agency

    EEA European Energy Agency

    EIB European Investment Bank

    EU European Union

    F&B Food and Beverages

    FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations

    FDI Foreign Direct Investment

    FET Fair and equitable treatment

    FIDH The International Federation for Human Rights

    FIL Foreign Investment Law

    FTA Free Trade Agreement

    GDP Gross Domestic Product

    GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH

    GSP Generalised Scheme of Preferences

    GVA Gross Value Added

    GVC Global Value Chain

    HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus

    HR Human Rights

    IA Impact Assessment

    ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

    ICT Information and Communication Technology

    ICJ The International Commission of Jurists

    IFC International Finance Corporation

    ILO International Labour Organisation

    IMF International Monetary Fund

    IPA Investment Protection Agreement

    IPR Intellectual Property Rights

    ISDS Investor-State Dispute Settlement

    ISSG Inter-Service Steering Group

    IT Information Technology

    ITUC The International Trade Union Confederation

    IUU EU regulation on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing

  • 18

    LCTA Logic Chain Theory Analysis

    LDCs Least Developed Countries

    MCRB The Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business

    MDGs Millennium Development Goals

    MFPEA Myanmar Food Processors and Exporters Association

    MIC Myanmar Investment Commission

    MNE Multinational Enterprise

    MS Member States

    MSY Myanmar Maximum Sustainable Yield

    MtCO2 Million metric tonnes of CO2

    MtCO2e Million metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent

    NCEA National Commission for Environmental Affairs

    NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

    OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

    PRIA Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture

    RBC Responsible business conduct

    SEZ Special Economic Zone

    SIA Sustainability Impact Assessment

    SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises

    SPS Sanitary and Phytosanitary

    SWIA Sector-wide Impact Assessment

    S&D Special and differential treatment

    TTIP Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

    UK United Kingdom

    UMFCCI Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and

    Industry

    UN United Nations

    UNCHR United Nations Convention on Human Rights

    UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

    UNDP United Nations Development Programme

    UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

    UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

    UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

    UNG United Nations Global Compact

    UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council

    UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

    UNWTO United Nations World Tourism Organization

    US United States

    USAID US Agency for International Development

    USD US Dollar

    VPA FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA)

    WB World Bank

    WTO World Trade Organisation

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    1. INTRODUCTION

    The European Union (EU) and Myanmar launched negotiations for a bilateral investment

    protection agreement (IPA) in March 2014. The proposed EU-Myanmar IPA represents an

    ambitious step for both parties, as there are currently no bilateral investment treaties

    between Myanmar and any EU Member State (MS). Negotiations for an EU-Myanmar IPA

    aim to encourage investment and to secure core protections against discrimination,

    uncompensated expropriation and unfair and inequitable treatment.9

    Trade and investment between the EU and Myanmar has grown more than 100 per cent

    since the latter had trade restrictions lifted and was reinstated to the Generalised

    Scheme of Preferences (GSP) in 2013. Commercial engagement is seen as a capable

    instrument for ensuring that political and economic reforms stay the course as the EU

    starts relations anew with Myanmar. However, after more than a decade of relative

    absence, and given Myanmar’s existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with China,

    India, Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand and through ASEAN, EU investors are

    currently at a comparative disadvantage in terms legal protections for their property in

    Myanmar.

    The SIA for the EU-Myanmar IPA was launched in September 2015, following the start of

    the negotiation process in February 2015. As the SIA is conducted in parallel with

    negotiations, its findings are intended to inform and guide policymakers as they devise

    the agreement itself. The SIA is the second of three assessments required by the

    European Commission (EC) during the course of all new trade and investment

    agreements; it is preceded by an internal Impact Assessment (IA) done before seeking

    the negotiating mandate is proposed and followed by an ex post Integration Assessment

    wherein the EC details its work to apply the SIA’s results into its policymaking.

    Launched shortly before the third round of negotiations, the EU-Myanmar IPA SIA

    combines stakeholder input with independent research to assess how new rules on

    investment protection are likely to affect economic, social and environmental conditions

    in both parties.

    A central function of the SIA has been to facilitate consultation with civil society

    stakeholders in the EU and Myanmar. The Project Team has intermediated between input

    from civil society stakeholders and the EC throughout the SIA. This has facilitated a

    continuous flow of information between stakeholders and the EC that has informed the

    negotiation process.

    Chapter 2 details the EU-Myanmar IPA SIA process and provides background information

    on relevant historical developments regarding the EU-Myanmar IPA; chapter 3 presents

    the conceptual framework and methodological approach underpinning the SIA, including

    an overview of the stakeholder outreach conducted; chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 present the

    results of the projected economic, social, environmental and human rights impact

    analyses, respectively; finally chapter 8 presents policy recommendations and

    concluding remarks.

    The SIA was carried out with the input and engagement of the relevant EC Directorate

    Generals (DGs). An Inter-Service Steering Group (ISSG) was established by the EC to

    allow for the range of relevant institutional perspectives to be shared with the

    implementing project team in one forum. The EU-Myanmar IPA ISSG is comprised of the

    following EC DGs:

    9 European Commission. (2014). EU and Myanmar/Burma to negotiate an investment protection

    agreement. Brussels, BE: EC. Available: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-285_en.htm.

    http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-285_en.htmhttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-285_en.htm

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    Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI)

    Budget (BUDG)

    Climate Action (CLIMA)

    Communications Networks, Content and Technology (CNECT)

    Competition (COMP)

    International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO)

    Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN)

    Education and Culture (EAC)

    Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (EMPL)

    Energy (ENER)

    Environment (ENV)

    Eurostat (ESTAT)

    Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (FISMA)

    Health and Food Safety (SANTE)

    Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (GROW)

    Justice and Consumers (JUST)

    Legal Service (SJ)

    Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MARE)

    Migration and Home Affairs (HOME)

    Mobility and Transport (MOVE)

    Research and Innovation (RTD)

    Secretariat-General (SG)

    Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI)

    Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD)

    Trade (TRADE)

    European External Action Service (EEAS)

    Engagement with the ISSG consisted of the following:

    Kick off meeting providing initial ideas and information to the project team;

    Determination of materials to be shared on the website;

    Provision of feedback on the questionnaire used for interviews and surveys;

    Updating on meetings, dialogues and workshop preparation and outcomes;

    Timeline adjustments to ensure more civil society engagement and participation;

    Attendance of ISSG members at:

    o 1st civil society dialogue meeting in Brussels: A first meeting was held in

    Brussels on November 5, 2015 to discuss the draft inception report;

    o Local workshop in Myanmar: the SIA project team organised a day-long

    local workshop in Yangon, Myanmar on December 17, 2015. During the

    local workshop, the SIA team leader presented the SIA process and

    interim findings;

    o 2nd civil society dialogue meeting in Brussels: A second meeting was held

    on April 5, 2016 to discuss the draft final report.

    A full timeline of the EU-Myanmar IPA SIA is found below:

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    2. BACKGROUND

    Political reforms, democratisation and economic opening of Myanmar since 2011 have

    allowed the EU to begin a new chapter in its relationship with the country following a

    long period of estrangement. This section details the process for the EU-Myanmar IPA SIA, providing background information on the history and development of the IPA. This

    is presented in the context of the developing commercial relationship between the EU

    and Myanmar. The intention of this section is to provide readers with the necessary

    background information on the negotiations.

    Chapter 2.1 provides an overview of recent events leading up to the current

    negotiations; chapter 2.2 presents relevant regional developments; chapter 2.3 presents

    the project team's evaluation of the likely provisions of the agreement, based on

    publically available information including past agreements; and chapter 2.4 provides

    information on the current status of the negotiations.

    2.1. EU – Myanmar trade and investment relations

    The proposed EU-Myanmar IPA represents an ambitious step for both parties, as there

    are currently no bilateral investment or trade agreements between Myanmar and any of

    the 28 EU MS. While some European companies have well-established operations in

    Myanmar, the commercial relationship has remained underdeveloped due to political

    instability and the Myanmar government’s record regarding treatment of labour and

    human rights. As a result of serious and systematic violations of core international

    conventions on forced labour, the EU withdrew Myanmar's status of preferential access

    to the EU market under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) in 1997.

    In June 2012, the Myanmar government committed to work with the International

    Labour Organisation (ILO) to eradicate forced labour. In consideration of the

    internationally recognised progress to this end, the EU reinstated Myanmar’s GSP status

    in July 2013 under the Everything but Arms (EBA). 10 The EBA is an arrangement under

    the EU’s GSP that provides least developed countries (LDCs) with duty-free and quota-

    free access to the EU market on all products, except for arms and ammunitions. By

    providing access to the EU market, the arrangement aims to create an engine for

    development through trade, export-led growth and poverty reduction and to facilitate

    the integration of LDCs into the global economy.11 An EBA country has to ensure that

    there is no serious and systematic violation of the principles enshrined in the core human

    rights and labour rights conventions.

    In 2013, the EU and Myanmar held discussions on investment via the dialogue on trade

    and investment, also known as the EU-Myanmar Forum, which encompasses a Trade and

    Investment Working Group. The parties agreed in 2013 to “explore the feasibility of an

    investment agreement,” in order to assist the political reform process as well as socio-

    economic development in Myanmar. 12 On July 22, 2013, the Foreign Affairs Council

    adopted The Comprehensive Framework for the EU’s policy and support to Myanmar,

    10 European Commission. (2013). EU re-opens its market to Myanmar/Burma. Brussels, BE: EC. Available: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=946.

    11 European Commission. (2013). Revised EU trade scheme to help developing countries applies on 1 January 2014. Brussels, BE: EC. Available: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/december/tradoc_152015.pdf.

    12 European Commission. (2013). Joint statement by the President of the European Council, Herman Von Rompuy, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, and the President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, U Thein Sein: Building a Lasting EU-

    Myanmar Partnership. Brussels, BE: EC. Available: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-176_en.htm.

    http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=946http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/december/tradoc_152015.pdfhttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-176_en.htmhttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-176_en.htm

  • 22

    confirming its commitment to negotiate and conclude a bilateral IPA.13 At the same time,

    Myanmar stated that it was ready to negotiate an IPA.

    As illustrated in Figure 1, as of 2015, only a few EU member states are among the most

    significant investors in Myanmar. The most significant source of FDI as of December

    2015 was China, followed by Singapore and Thailand.

    Figure 1. Foreign investment by partner country, as of December 31, 2015

    Source: DICA

    Bilateral trade between the EU and Myanmar reached €1.2 billion in 2015, more than

    doubling from €404 million in 2012. Exports to the EU have quadrupled between 2012

    and 2015, from €165 million to €675 million. Garments represent more than 60 per cent

    of Myanmar exports to the EU. EBA has the potential to encourage EU investments in

    Myanmar’s garment and manufacturing sectors, subsequently boosting exports to the EU

    market.14

    While this appears as a step towards strengthening trade and investment ties between

    the EU and Myanmar, several issues continue to deter prospective EU investors in the

    country. In the context of a workshop organised for this SIA, Filip Lauwerysen, Executive

    Director of EuroCham Myanmar, emphasised that the uncertain investment climate,

    outdated legislation, copyright issues and the issue of unequal treatment are among

    prospective investors’ most serious concerns.

    13 Council of the European Union. (2013). Council conclusions on the Comprehensive Framework for the European Union’s policy and support to Myanmar/Burma. Brussels, BE: EC. Available: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/138272.pdf

    14 European Commission. (2013). EU re-opens its market to Myanmar/Burma. Brussels, BE: EC. Available: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=946.

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    The EC published its internal IPA Impact Assessment in February 2014. 15 This

    assessment recommended the opening of negotiations for a bilateral IPA between the EU

    and Myanmar. It found that such an agreement would have a positive overall impact,

    achieving the specific objectives of the EU. In March 2014, the Council of the European

    Union granted authorisation to the EC to start the negotiations.

    The outlook from Myanmar is also positive. According to U Aung Naing Oo, Director

    General of Myanmar’s Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA),

    the expected increased foreign direct investment (FDI) “creates jobs for [Myanmar]

    citizens, allows us to export more and will transfer technology to our citizens, but the

    firms must have quality ethics. We predict we will attract this kind of company. Most EU

    firms usually match with the local criteria we need.”16 The agreement will also protect

    Myanmar investors who wish to enter the EU market.17

    With general elections having been held in Myanmar in November 2015, the overall

    climate is perceived as one promoting democracy with a heightened commitment to

    economic and developmental reform.18

    2.2. Developments at a regional level

    Trade and investment relations between the EU and Myanmar are also shaped by

    developments at the regional level. Myanmar’s increasing global engagement was most

    evident in early 2014, when the country took over the rotating chairmanship of the

    Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the first time. Myanmar’s economy is

    strongly focused on Southeast Asia, benefitting from free trade and regional integration

    under the ASEAN framework.

    In 2009, the ASEAN countries expanded previous agreements by concluding a modern

    investment treaty, the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), which

    entered into force in March 2012.19 Besides benefitting from the ASEAN+1 free trade

    agreements (FTA) that includes investment provisions, inter alia with China, Korea,

    Australia and New Zealand, Myanmar also signed BITs to ensure investment protection

    for foreign investors and further attract FDI. However, only five BITs are in force to this

    date, namely with China, India, Japan, the Philippines and Thailand.20

    Regionally, the EU has concluded FTA negotiations with Singapore 21 and Vietnam. 22

    Negotiations are also under way with Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines23, while

    preparatory talks are ongoing with Indonesia.

    15 European Commission. (2014). Impact Assessment: Report on the EU-Myanmar/Burma Investment Relations. Brussels, BE: EC. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2014/swd_2014_0041_en.pdf.

    16 Lynn Aung, H. (2015). Myanmar-EU investment treaty talks to spill into next year. Available:

    http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/business/16767-myanmar-eu-investment-treaty-talks-to-spill-into-next-year.html

    17 Barbour-Lacey, E. (2015). Myanmar Investment Update: Financial Incentives, Myanmar-EU Investment Protection Agreement, and a New Stock Exchange. Available: http://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2015/10/05/myanmar-investment-update-financial-

    incentives-myanmar-eu-investment-protection-agreement-and-a-new-stock-exchange.html. 18 BBC. (2015). Myanmar election: Suu Kyi’s NLD wins landslide victory. Available:

    http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34805806. 19 Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (2009). ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement.

    Available: http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20140119035519.pdf. 20 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2016). International Investment

    Agreements Navigator: Myanmar. Available: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/144#iiaInnerMenu.

    21 European Commission. (2015). Countries and regions: Singapore. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/singapore/: The negotiations

    http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2014/swd_2014_0041_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2014/swd_2014_0041_en.pdfhttp://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/business/16767-myanmar-eu-investment-treaty-talks-to-spill-into-next-year.htmlhttp://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/business/16767-myanmar-eu-investment-treaty-talks-to-spill-into-next-year.htmlhttp://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2015/10/05/myanmar-investment-update-financial-incentives-myanmar-eu-investment-protection-agreement-and-a-new-stock-exchange.htmlhttp://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2015/10/05/myanmar-investment-update-financial-incentives-myanmar-eu-investment-protection-agreement-and-a-new-stock-exchange.htmlhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34805806http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20140119035519.pdfhttp://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/144#iiaInnerMenuhttp://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/singapore/

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    A regional agreement with ASEAN as a whole remains the EU’s long-term ambition.

    Discussions on the feasibility and added value of resuming region-to-region negotiations

    began in January 2016 and are expected to continue in the future.24

    2.3. Content and likely provisions of an IPA between the EU and the Republic of the Union of Myanmar

    The aim of the negotiation process is to conclude a standalone IPA, which would provide

    EU investors in Myanmar and Myanmar investors in the EU with a predictable and secure

    investment environment, including:

    protection against uncompensated expropriation and unfair treatment while

    safeguarding the right to regulate;

    non-discrimination;

    transfer of returns;

    investment dispute resolution; and

    a level-playing field with other foreign investors currently benefitting from

    bilateral IPAs.

    The agreement is also expected to help Myanmar to move up value chains, promote

    transparency and sustainable development (including environmental protection, core

    labour standards, and corporate social responsibility). The objective is to increase

    bilateral investment flows and, ultimately, trade activity and economic development.

    This section presents an analysis of provisions likely to be included in the IPA. As EU

    negotiating texts and proposals have not been made public at this stage, the project

    team has used publically available investment and sustainable development chapters

    from contemporary agreements as a benchmark. These reference agreements include

    the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the EU-

    Singapore FTA, the EU-Vietnam FTA and the EU’s reform proposals in the framework of

    the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations with the United

    States (US).

    It must be noted that the investment chapters of the aforementioned trade agreements

    do not explicitly mention sustainable development. Rather, CETA and TTIP are

    systematically supported by chapters on sustainable development, labour and

    environment, while the EU-Singapore and EU-Vietnam FTAs are supported by a chapter

    on sustainable development which makes reference to labour and environment. The

    investment chapters focus on investment liberalisation, investment protection and a

    comprehensive dispute settlement system, referring to the ICSID Convention, UNCITRAL

    Arbitration Rules and the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of

    Foreign Arbitral Awards.

    The scope of CETA applies narrowly to covered investments, which is defined, with

    respect to a Party, as an investment “(a) in its territory; (b) made in accordance with the

    for a comprehensive FTA with Singapore were completed on October 17 2014. However, on October 16, 2015, the EC requested the opinion of the European Court of Justice to clarify

    whether the Union has the requisite competence to sign and conclude alone the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore.

    22 On December 2 2015, EC President Juncker and Vietnamese Prime Minister Dung announced the formal conclusion of the negotiations for an EU-Vietnam FTA. See: European Commission and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. (2015). Declaration: A new era in EU-Viet Nam relations. Available: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/december/tradoc_154012.pdf.

    23 European Commission. (2015). EU and the Philippines launch negotiations for a free trade agreement. Available: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1429.

    24 European Commission. (2016). Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations. Available: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf.

    http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/december/tradoc_154012.pdfhttp://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1429http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf

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    applicable law at the time the investment is made; (c) directly or indirectly owned or

    controlled by an investor of the other Party; and (d) existing on the date of entry into

    force of this Agreement, or made or acquired thereafter.”25 However, the performance

    requirements included in CETA relate to all investments, with a few sectoral exclusions.

    CETA follows a negative list approach to investment liberalisation. In the case of the EU-

    Singapore and EU-Vietnam FTAs, a positive list approach was used.

    2.3.1. Protection against uncompensated expropriation

    An expropriation provision protects foreign investors and investments against

    dispossession or confiscation of their property by the host country without

    compensation. This usually includes indirect expropriation and applies to changes in

    regulation. The expropriation clause should clarify the notion of indirect expropriation

    and introduce criteria to distinguish between indirect expropriation and legitimate

    regulation that does not constitute expropriation.

    CETA, the EU-Singapore FTA and the EU-Vietnam FTA have clarified this, where they

    establish that neither Party may nationalise or expropriate a covered investment either

    directly or indirectly through measures having an effect equivalent to nationalisation or

    expropriation unless they are for a public purpose and taken under due process of law in

    a non-discriminatory manner and, significantly, against payment of prompt, adequate

    and effective compensation.26

    As highlighted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

    in its Investment Policy Review for Myanmar, protection against expropriation without

    fair compensation is among the most crucial rights of investors and must be granted in

    the regulatory framework for investment through provisions for transparent and

    predictable procedures.27 Although Article 36 (d) of Myanmar’s Constitution provides that

    the Union shall not nationalise economic enterprises, there is no specific provision in

    Myanmar’s legislation against expropriation without compensation (except certain

    chapters in the Foreign Investment Law [FIL] and the Special Economic Zone Law).28

    Private sector and civil society representatives have expressed concerns over current

    nationalisation provisions and the lack of protection against expropriation risks.29 It can

    therefore be expected that the inclusion of robust provisions ensuring protection for EU

    investors against expropriation, both direct and indirect, will play a major role in

    fostering increased FDI into Myanmar.

    Although it imposes a constraint on the Myanmar authorities’ discretionary power,

    Myanmar has already agreed to rules against expropriation with several counterparts in

    its existing IPAs. However, concerns have been raised that this provision, if not qualified,

    could empower investors to claim compensation for legitimate public policies. For

    example, if an investor were to have their assets confiscated for breach of national law,

    they could seek compensation from the government of Myanmar through an IPA’s

    expropriation provisions, thus multiplying the host country’s risk of costly lawsuits.30

    25 CETA Article 8.1 26 See Articles 8.12, 9.6, and 16 of the CETA, EU-Singapore FTA and EU-Vietnam FTA,

    respectively. See also CETA Annex 8-A which provides guidance on the interpretation of

    expropriation. 27 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2014) Investment Policy Reviews:

    Myanmar 2014. Available: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Myanmar-IPR-2014.pdf

    28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 The Transnational Institute. (2014). Briefing: EU – Myanmar Bilateral Investment Treaty.

    Available; https://www.tni.org/files/download/eu-myanmar_bit.pdf.

    http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Myanmar-IPR-2014.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Myanmar-IPR-2014.pdfhttps://www.tni.org/files/download/eu-myanmar_bit.pdf

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    2.3.2. Fair and equitable treatment (FET) and non-discrimination

    Non-discrimination can also be embodied within a FET clause. The FET provision assures

    due process of law when discrimination is claimed and can help “protect legitimate

    expectations of foreign investors and incorporates principles of transparency, good faith

    and guarantees against denials of justice.”31 This suggests that the inclusion of these

    provisions in an IPA would be perceived as a guarantee by EU investors, who may in turn

    be willing to consider (further) investments in Myanmar. In Vietnam, for example, the

    introduction of non-discrimination provisions during the mid-2000s is considered to have

    increased the amount and quality of FDI inflows into the country.32

    The OECD does emphasise, however, the risks associated with this provision, noting

    that, “there is no clear definition in customary international law and in arbitral

    jurisprudence of what the FET standard encompasses,” and recommending that

    governments wishing to include a reference to this principle in their investment

    legislation “should define clearly its scope and content so as to avoid giving excessive

    leeway to arbitral interpretations of its legal provisions and to protect against potentially

    costly arbitral awards”.33

    The risks identified by the OECD, however, are likely to be mitigated by the EU’s

    approach to FET, which has included a closed list of instances wherein a party would be

    in breach of their obligations. Specifically, these are:

    Denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings;

    A fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamental breach of

    transparency, in judicial and administrative proceedings;

    Manifest arbitrariness;

    Targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race or

    religious belief;

    Abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and harassment.34

    This closed list approach can be found in CETA (Article 8.10), the EU-Singapore FTA

    (Article 9.4) and the EU-Vietnam FTA (Article 14). It is likely to be further applied to the

    EU-Myanmar IPA.

    2.3.3. Transfer of capital (returns related to an investment)

    This provision is conceived to guarantee the “free transfer of funds of capital and

    payments by investors”.35 As such, its inclusion in an IPA will be important to ensure the

    viability of EU investments in the long run and thus to secure support from shareholders

    regarding prospective FDI by EU companies in Myanmar.

    Inclusion of this provision could entail particularly risks for a capital importing country

    like Myanmar, as it “would allow the investor to always withdraw all investment-related

    monies”, thus reducing its ability to deal “with sudden and massive outflows and inflows

    31 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2014). Investment Policy Reviews: Myanmar 2014. Available: www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_3.pdf.

    32 Ibid. 33 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2014). Investment Policy Reviews:

    Myanmar 2014. Available: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Myanmar-IPR-2014.pdf

    34 European Commission. (2016). Investment provisions in the EU-Canada free trade agreement (CETA). Available: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf.

    35 The Transnational Institute, Paung Ku. (2014). Briefing: EU – Myanmar Bilateral Investment Treaty. Available; https://www.tni.org/files/download/eu-myanmar_bit.pdf.

    http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_3.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Myanmar-IPR-2014.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Myanmar-IPR-2014.pdfhttp://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdfhttps://www.tni.org/files/download/eu-myanmar_bit.pdf

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    of capital, balance of payments and other macroeconomic crises”.36 In the EU-Singapore

    and CETA agreements, this risk has been averted by allowing either Party to temporarily

    take safeguard measures in case “capital movements cause or threaten to cause serious

    difficulties for the operation of monetary policy or exchange rate policy”.37

    2.3.4. Investment dispute resolution

    As highlighted by the OECD in its Investment Policy Review for Myanmar, there is

    currently no provision in Myanmar’s legal framework for investment that provides for a

    unilateral consent to go through arbitration to resolve investor-state disputes. This

    provision would, according to some of the stakeholders consulted for this SIA, contribute

    to a neutral and more transparent resolution of potential conflicts - all the more since,

    according to the OECD, “legal and procedural requirements for enforcing contracts

    remain complex and uncertain” in Myanmar. Access to justice is reported to remain

    rather inefficient despite recent improvements, and there seems to be “a structural issue

    of corrupt courts.”38

    The OECD also highlights that, by referring cases to international arbitrators, the

    provision of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) may achieve somewhat fairer

    competitive conditions between certain groups of enterprises, such as among different

    enterprises from a given country, or among enterprises from countries with differing

    levels of influence.39 The success of this effect, however, depends on the quality of

    arbitration rules.

    ISDS was originally expected to provide finality and enforceability, while de-politicising

    disputes. However, serious criticisms have been directed at how ISDS sometimes

    operates: inconsistent and unintended interpretations of clauses, unanticipated uses of

    the system by investors including challenges against policy measures taken in the public

    interest, along with costly and lengthy procedures offering limited or no transparency.

    Such abusive and wrongful functioning of ISDS could detract the government from

    implementing domestic instruments to promote social inclusion and labour rights not to

    risk any ISDS claims due to negative impact on a foreign investment caused by the

    legislation.

    To address this, the EU has recently adopted a new approach to investment dispute

    resolution. Instead of relying on the ISDS mechanism, the EU is proposing an

    Investment Court System (ICS). This new system seeks to address concerns about the

    lack of transparency and legitimacy in ISDS. The EU's approach also reaffirms the right

    of governments to regulate in the public interest. This new approach has been included

    in CETA, the EU-Vietnam FTA and has been proposed for TTIP; it is likely to be proposed

    by the EU for inclusion in the IPA with Myanmar.40

    36 The Transnational Institute, Paung Ku. (2014). Briefing: EU – Myanmar Bilateral Investment Treaty. Available; https://www.tni.org/files/download/eu-myanmar_bit.pdf.

    37 EU-Singapore Article 9.7 (3). Available: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961; see also CETA Article 28.5.

    Available: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf. 38 OECD (2014) Investment Policy Reviews: Myanmar 2014.

    http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Myanmar-IPR-2014.pdf 39 Gordon, K. and Pohl, J. (2015). Investment Treaties over Time – Treaty Practice and

    Interpretation in a Changing World. OECD. Available: http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2015-02.pdf.

    40 European Commission. (2016). CETA: EU and Canada agree on new approach on investment in trade agreement. Available: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1468

    https://www.tni.org/files/download/eu-myanmar_bit.pdfhttp://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Myanmar-IPR-2014.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2015-02.pdfhttp://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1468

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    2.3.5. Transparency

    According to the Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business (MCRB), the transparency

    provision could support positive developments concerning sustainability and responsible

    business conduct in Myanmar. Particular benefits are likely to be derived from increased

    transparency in the legislative process. However, similar requirements in the Myanmar-

    Japan Investment Agreement (Article 8) have not yet significantly contributed to

    increased transparency in Myanmar law-making.41

    Contemporary agreements like the EU-Singapore FTA, CETA and the EU-Vietnam FTA

    include provisions on transparent law-making. This mainly entails the requirement that

    measures affecting trade and investment between the parties must be developed and

    administered in a transparent manner, with due notice and opportunities for interested

    persons to submit their views before enactment.42

    2.3.6. Right to regulate

    Because several facets of Myanmar’s public policy framework are still in the nascent

    stages of development, there is particular concern for the protection of its right to

    regulate. According to the MCRB, provisions on the right to regulate are particularly

    important as a means to allow coupling of local content or employment requirements

    with FDI. Therefore, the MCRB recommends that, before completing the negotiations,

    the Myanmar Government should ensure it undertakes a cross-government assessment

    of the risk of litigation and ‘regulatory chill’ posed by an EU-Myanmar IPA. This should

    include examining, in consultation with existing investors, the effect on existing laws,

    contracts and licences.

    2.3.7. Sustainable Development

    The EU agreements with Singapore, Vietnam and Canada all include articles on

    promoting sustainable development, especially in the area of environmental and labour

    protection. These agreements include provisions whereby Parties renounce reducing