SHP2016 - PSA Loss of Existing Use Position Statement

8/15/2019 SHP2016 - PSA Loss of Existing Use Position Statement

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STONE HILLPARK LIVE WORK PLAY

A brighter future for

Thanet and East Kent

SHP1-4.1

Planning StatementAddendum:Loss of Existing UsePosition Statement


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May 2016 gva.co.uk

Contents

1. Introduction................................................................................................................................................... 1

2. Site History ...................................................................................................................................................... 2

3. UK Aviation Policy ...................................................................................................................................... 10

4. UK Aviation Trends ..................................................................................................................................... 15

5. Expert Opinion ............................................................................................................................................ 20

6. RiverOak Development Consent Order ................................................................................................ 25

7. Conclusions ................................................................................................................................................. 26

Appendix 1 – UK airport baseline information

Appendix 2 – Former UK airports case studies

For and on behalf of GVA Grimley Ltd


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May 2016 gva.co.uk 1

1. Introduction

1.1 This report has been prepared by GVA on behalf of our client, Stone Hill Park Limited, in

support of the Hybrid Planning Application for mixed use redevelopment of the former

Manston Airport in Thanet District Counc il.

1.2 The purpose of this report is to set out evidence to justify the loss of the existing use in land use

planning terms. It does this by demonstrating that:

• Available evidence firmly indicates that there is no reasonable prospect of the former

airport use recommencing and being viable in the long term;

• There is no need for an airport in this location (in transport infrastructure terms); and

•

The economic impact (including hypothetical opportunity loss) of losing the existing use

will not be significant compared to the economic benefits of the proposed development.

1.3 This report is structured as follows:

• Section 2 provides a review of the site’s history, outlining the multiple attempts that have

been made since the 1990’s by numerous different parties to operate a commercially

viable airport here, all of which have failed. It also demonstrates the repeated attempts

by the local authority to identify a CPO indemnity partner to enable them to compulsorily

acquire the site (for the purposes of re-opening the a irport), which has also failed;

• Section 3 provides an overview of UK aviation policy, including the recommendations of

the Davies Review which confirms that the former Manston Airport site is not suitable to

meet UK aviation needs (and therefore not needed in infrastructure terms);

• Section 4 provides background information on UK aviation trends, which is intended to

provide helpful context to the conclusions of Sections 2 and 3. This should be read in

conjunction with Appendices A and B which provide information on existing operational

UK airports and former airports that have been re-purposed;

• Section 5provides an expert opinion from the applicant’s Aviation Advisor (Alastair Welch)

and a review of the independent ‘Falcon Report’;

• Section 6 sets out our position regarding the Development Consent Order being sought;

and

• Section 7 sets out our conclusions.


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2. Site History

2.1 This section of the report provides a detailed timeline of activities that have taken place at the

former Manston airport site from its inception in the early 20th

Century to the present day. Aswe demonstrate below, the site has a complex history, not least due to the numerous owners

who have tried (and failed) to operate Manston airport as a successful, viable business. In fact,

Kent County Council have stated that ‘since the MOD sold RAF Manston in 1998, the airport

has never made a profit and has never delivered on its promise of jobs for the area’ (KCC

Position Statement, 2015: page 3). The information provided within this sec tion of the report has

been prepared using a culmination of online sources, most notably the KCC Position

Statement (2015) and the RAF Manston History Museum website.

Early History

2.2 The former Manston airport first began being used for aviation purposes in 1915 when it was a

small grass airfield operated by the Admiralty for military operations assoc iated with the First

World War. At first the airfield was primarily used for emergency landings, however, by 1916

there were two units permanently stationed at Manston as well as a Handley Page (RAF

bombers) Training School. Consequently, the airfield experienced fairly substantial growth and

by 1917 it included barracks for c.3,000 troops, its own railway line to Birchington and a power

station. Following the end of World War One the airfield remained open and was

predominantly used for training purposes and the maintenance of military aircraft.

2.3 At the outbreak of World War Two, Manston was still an all-grass airfield. However, during the

Battle of Britain the airfield was heavily bombed and a large amount of the associated

infrastructure and buildings were destroyed. Due to the site’s strategic loc ation and

consistently favourable conditions for landing and deploying aircraft, the airfield was re-built

and equipped with a tarmac runway. Use of the airfield for military purposes continued to

intensify following its redevelopment up until the end of World War Two.

2.4 During the 1950s the Site was used by the US Air Force (USAF) as a strategic airbase in

connection with US Cold War operations. The USAF withdrew in 1960 and the airfield became

a joint civilian and RAF airbase. The RAF maintained military presence, alongside the

introduction of occasional passenger and freight flights. This dual function continued, with

intensification of the commercial use over the next three decades leading to a new civilian

terminal opening in 1989 to coincide with the Site’s rebranding as ‘Kent International Airport’.

At this time a number of seasonal commercial flights to a handful of European destinations

were operating.


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2.5 In the early 1990s, summer charter services were offered to C rete (for one summer) and Cyprus

(for two summers). In 1993 the Department of Trade and Industry identified the site as being

unsuitable for development as a major airport due to its close proximity to neighbouring towns

(which would result in noise disturbance issues).

The ‘Wiggins era’: 1998-2005

2.6 In 1998 Wiggins Group acquired Manston Airport for £4.75 million from the Ministry of Defence,

and in 1999 the RAF withdrew all military operations and vacated Manston, resulting in the site

becoming a purely commercial enterprise. The airport was subsequently rebranded as

‘London Manston Airport’.

2.7 According to Wiggins’ company accounts, between 1999-2000 the airport made an operating

loss of £1.1m, between 2000-2001 made an operating loss of £3.6m and between 2001-2002

made an operating loss of £3.9m (KCC Position Statement, 2015).

2.8 In 2002, the company stated that the airport would double its cargo traffic from 36,000 tonnes

per annum to a profitable rate of 100,000 tonnes per annum within twelve months (Transport

Select Committee, 2015). CAA statistics indicate that the most cargo traffic recorded at the

former airport was in 2003, where 43,000 tonnes were delivered – a quantum well below the

benchmark of 100,000 tonnes per annum required to achieve profitability on the basis of the

above. Please see Figure 1 below for a summary of cargo traffic at the former airport.

Figure 1: Amount of freight in tonnes delivered per annum at the airport 2000-2014

Source: CAA, 2016 Data


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2.9 In J anuary 2004, Wiggins renamed itself Planestation and later that year bought 30% of the

airline company EUJ et, a budget airline. Subsequently, Planestation made a statement that

the airport would break even if it were to achieve delivery of 70,000 tonnes of cargo per

annum. As Figure 1 illustrates above, this was never achieved.

2.10 In September 2004 EUJ et started to operate passenger flights to destinations across Europe

and in its busiest month in early 2005 the airport carried 62,709 passengers, however, by July

2005 all EUJ et operations were suspended along with all non-freight operations including MK

Airlines, Manston’s main cargo customer, who left the airport for another site in Europe.

Consequently, Planestation went into administration as a result of the significant financial losses

incurred during ownership.

Infratil: 2005-2013

2.11 Infratil Limited acquired Manston Airport from the administrator in August 2005 for £17m (UK

Parliament Transport Committee, Case Study 3: Manston), and began to operate the airport

for passenger and freight transport again.

2.12 However, as illustrated in Figure 1 above, during Infratil’s ownership of the site (2005-2013) the

airport never achieved more than 31,000 tonnes of freight per annum, falling well short of the

previously stated ‘break-even’ point of 70,000-100,000 tonnes per annum. At this time, Infratil

regularly declared Manston airport as a specialised freight handler making a substantialcontribution to the UK’s air-transport freight capacity. However, we understand that these

statements were significantly exaggerated, and Manston actually only contributed

approximately 1.3% of national freight tonnage. Furthermore, Infratil published the Kent

International Airport Master Plan in November 2009 which forecast the following annual

passenger movements up to 2033:

Table 1: Infratil Annual Passenger Forecasts 2010-2033

Year Annual Passengers

2010 < 50,000

2011 50,000-100,000

2012 206,000

2013 295,000

2014 527,000

2015 1,268,000

2018 2,286,000


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2033 4,752,000

2.13 Despite these passenger forecasts, and as Figure 2 illustrates below, actual passenger numbers

experienced at the former airport were significantly lower than forecast year after year. In

fact, passenger numbers failed to exceed 50,000 between 2006 and 2014 when the airport

finally closed. Infratil’s peak passenger year was 2011 when 48,450 passengers used the airport

which represented 0.02% of the UK total (CAA, Airport Statistics, 2016).

Figure 2: Number of passenger movements 2000 – 2014

Source: CAA, 2016 data

2.14 In 2013 KLM started passenger flights to Schiphol Amsterdam. However, over the 12 months of

operation KLM’s seventy-eight seat Fokker planes were consistently less than half full (42 per

cent of capacity). Furthermore, KLM operations at Manston made no significant financial

contribution to the cost of running the airport. Between 2005 and 2013 the following airlines

also tried (and failed) to sustain regular and profitable services to/from the airport:

• Cargolux (for Ghana Airways) – to Accra, from April 2007

• Kent Escapes (of Seguro Travel Group) –flights to Faro and Barcelona every Thursday from

25 May to 26 October 2006, and (we believe) during the 2007 summer season

• Flybe – daily scheduled routes to Edinburgh (continuing on to Kirkwall, Orkney Islands, and

Sumburg) starting May 2010 (the first da ily scheduled routes at Manston since the collapse

of EUjet in 2005) but ceasing by 25 March 2012 due to unsustainable passenger numbers.

• Atlantic Holidays - direc t chartered flights to Funchal, 13 and 20 June 2011

• Air Southwest - seasona l Saturday charter services to J ersey

• Newmarket Holidays - irregular chartered flights to Verona, Naples and Portugal during

summer 2013.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jerseyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jersey


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2.15 Following the repetitive failure to even meet break-even levels of passenger and freight

movements, in J anuary 2012 Infratil dec ided to put Manston Airport up for sale and

commissioned PWC to handle an extensive marketing process. The marketing process carried

out by PWC is set out in further detail in sec tion six of this report, however, in short the process

resulted in an agreement to sell Manston Airport and the associated liabilities to Manston

Skyport Ltd. for £1. The sale of Manston airport was agreed in November 2013.


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2.23 On 9 August 2014 the Counc il issued a Prior Information Notice (PIN) followed by a soft market

testing document on 13 August 2014 in order to identify potential partners to be considered

(a.k.a the ‘Partner Identification Process’). We understand that four parties requested the

questionnaire and two submitted returns. The Counc il then offered meetings with both

responding partners, and only one company, RiverOak Investment Corp (RiverOak),

responded to the request and agreed to progress through to the Due Diligence stage.

2.24 Subsequently, upon receiving RiverOak’s response, the Council conducted due diligence on

the company from 18 September 2014 to 18 November 2014. In December 2014 the Counc il

released their final report outlining their conc lusions on the soft market assessment. The Counc il

concluded that, in their opinion, RiverOak did not have the necessary financial capacity to

support their plan for Manston and that RiverOak’s business plan was insufficient.

2.25

In their assessment of RiverOak’s business plan, TDC commented how “The p la n d oe s not

p rovid e fo r the CPO c om p ensa t ion c ost , and this c ould b e sub sta nt ia l . The b usiness

a ssum p t ions a p p ea r to b e op t im ist ic a s reg a rd s reve nues an d the known c osts of the

op erat ion…A 20 yea r b usine ss p la n is req uired for a p rojec t of th is sc a le to d em onstra te long -

term via bi lity , and tha t the p rop osed op erat ion is susta ina b le in the long term. Unless these

requ i rements can be c lear ly demonst ra ted there is no prospect of ach iev ing a CPO”

(Extraordinary Full Cabinet Counc il, 11 December 2014).

2.26

In addition, RiverOak’s suggested approach to transfer funds in tranches that allowed theCouncil to incur CPO costs to the value of funds in that account was quashed by TDC. In their

statement, the Council concluded that they are “not see king a C PO o n a sp ec ula t ive b a sis

a nd wo uld not wish to p ut i tse l f in a p osit ion whe reb y fu ll ac h ieve m ent a nd vest ing of the site

wo u ld d ep end on the p a rtner ’s a b i lit y to ge nera te investme nt in the p ro jec t” (Extraordinary

Full Cabinet Council, 11 December 2014). Therefore, to accept RiverOak as the indemnity

partner was deemed too high-risk, and as a result, concluded that no further action was to be

taken at the present time to pursue a CPO of Manston Airport. This decision was taken on the

basis that the Counc il were unable to identify any suitable expressions of interest that would

fulfil the requirements of the Council for a CPO indemnity partner and that they (TDC) do not

have the financial resources to pursue a CPO in their own right. Since then, the site’s Civil

Aviation Authority (CAA) operating license has been surrendered and much of the key

equipment assoc iated with the operation of the airport has been removed and/or sold.

2.27 In May 2015 the Council agreed to review its position regarding the potential for CPO after

receiving an expression of interest from RiverOak (an American investment company) for use

of the site to recycle ‘end of life’ aircraft with some cargo and potential future passenger

activity. On the 29 October 2015 the Cabinet decided that RiverOak did not fulfil the


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requirements for an indemnity partner and that no further action would be taken on a

potential CPO of Manston Airport for a second time.

2.28 At the start of 2016 Thanet District Counc il dec ided to carry out another soft market testing

exercise to seek interest from external parties in becoming an indemnity partner for the

acquisition of the former airport. On 15 J anuary the Counc il issued a PIN and interested parties

had until 9 February to register their interest in which five expressions of interest were received

by the deadline. The interested parties then had until 12 February to submit responses to a

follow up questionnaire and a total of three valid submissions were received. We understand

that the C ounc il are currently reviewing the responses received with no further progress

published to date.

Key Messages

2.29 The following key messages have emerged from a review of the site’s history:

• Multiple airport operators have tried to run a commercially viable airport (both freight and

passenger services) at Manston since the 1990’s. All have failed;

• The Airport (whilst operational) was not a significant employer. Our research indicates that

between 2005 and 2014 the number of on-site jobs peaked at 144;

• The scale of operations at the airport in the period since 2000 peaked at 206,875

passengers and/or 43,000 tonnes of cargo. This is a fraction of what would be considered

as ‘nationally significant’ (Please also refer to Table 2 which compares the scale of

operations at Manston to other UK airports); and

• The local authority has repeatedly tried to identify a CPO indemnity partner. It has failed on

each occasion.

2.30 To conclude, this section has demonstrated how over the past 15-20 years, very significant

effort from multiple parties has gone into trying to make an airport at Manston viable –

including a willingness from TDC to use compulsory purchase power. All efforts have failed,

and we are unaware of any material change in circumstances that would suggest that thisposition would be any different in the future.

2.31 The economic harm of the allowing the change of use of the site is purely hypothetical in our

view (on the basis that the evidence indicates that an airport would not be a viable

proposition in the first case). Nonetheless, we note that at its peak, the site employed 144

people between 2000 and 2014.


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3.8 A key priority flagged within the framework is “to work with the aviation industry and other

stakeholders to make better use of existing runway capacity at all UK airports.” (Aviation Policy

Framework, 2013: 10). Furthermore, it is recognised that in the medium-long term beyond 2020

there will be a requirement to increase capacity, and the Airports Commission has been

instructed to advise on the location, timing and scale of this additional capacity.

3.9 Although the government has stated their intention to make best use of existing airport

capacity outside of London and the South East, the framework “recognises that the

development of airports can have negative as well as positive local impacts, including noise

levels.” and that “proposals for expansion at these airports should be judged on their individual

merits, taking careful account of all relevant considerations, particularly economic and

environmental impacts” (Aviation Policy Framework, 2013: 22).

Emerging Demand Forecasts

3.10 In J anuary 2013 the Department for Transport (DfT) published revised aviation forecasts to

inform the development of the Aviation Policy Framework and the Airports Commission.

3.11 In summary, demand for air travel is forecast to increase at a slower rate than has occurred

over the last 40 years, reflec ting the anticipation of market maturity and saturation across

different passenger markets. The major London and South East airports are forecast to be at

maximum capacity by 2030, and a number of non-London airports including Birmingham,Bristol, East Midlands and Manchester Airport are also estimated to reach full capacity over a

similar time scale.

The Airports Commission (Davies Review) (2013-2015)

3.12 The Airports Commission is an independent commission chaired by Sir Howard Davies that was

established in September 2013 by the UK Government. The commission was formed to

examine the need for additional UK airport capacity and make recommendations to

government on how this can be met in the short, medium and long term. The Airports

Commission were instructed with two core responsibilities which comprised:

• Submitting a report to the government by the end of 2013, identifying and recommending

options for maintaining the UK’s status as an international hub for aviation and immediate

actions to improve the use of existing runway capacity in the next 5 years; and

• Submitting a final report to the government by summer 2015 assessing the environmental,

economic and social costs and benefits of various solutions to increase airport capacity -

considering operational, commercial and technical viability.

3.13 The Airports Commission Interim Report, published in December 2013, sets out initial

recommendations for making better use of the UK’s existing runway capacity over the next


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five years following extensive research and analysis. Reflecting the forecasts made in the UK

Aviation Policy Framework, the Commission’s interim report states that by 2040, the London

and South East airports (i.e. Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Luton and City) are projected to be

at full capac ity.

3.14 Notwithstanding the above, the interim report concludes that ‘intervening to redistribute the

excess demand away from airports in London and the South East does not appear to be a

credible option’ (Airports Commission: Interim Report, 2013: 11).

3.15 Various options to foster greater use of airports outside of London and the South East were

investigated, including the potential to impose a congestion charge on the UK’s busiest

airports to incentivise airlines and their passengers to use other airports, including regional

airports that are not yet fully utilised. However, the report concludes that most of the new

services developed at less-congested airports under this policy would simply duplicate services

already available at Heathrow, such as flights between London and New York. In addition,

there is little scope for Government intervention to force airlines and passengers to use less

busy airports, and past measures of this kind have rarely (if ever), achieved their objectives. As

a result, the Commission’s interim report concludes that there is a clear case for one net

additional runway in London and the South East to come into operation by 2030 (Airports

Commission: Interim Report, 2013).

3.16

As was also argued by Mr Welch in his expert opinion (see section 5), the interim reportreinforces their conc lusions to meet the increasing demand for extra capacity by providing an

additional runway in London and the South East by stating that the ‘optimal approach is to

continue to invest in an airport system that caters for a range of airline business models’

(Airports Commission: Interim Report, 2013: 12).

3.17 However, although the emerging capacity problems for UK airports cannot be addressed

without new infrastructure, the Airports Commission does recognise that there are

opportunities to make better use of existing capacity in the short-term.

3.18 Many comments submitted during the interim report’s consultation period on making best use

of existing capacity pointed to the level of unused capacity at many UK airports. Making more

use of this capacity has been put forward as an alternative to the provision of new runway

capacity. One suggestion to improve this was to allow the Government to mandate or

provide strong financial incentives for the redistribution of traffic around the UK’s airport

network. However, the interim report concludes that mandatory measures are impractical and

strong financial incentives would have significant adverse consequences (see Airports

Commission: Interim Report, 2013, Chapter 4: 120).


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3.19 The Commission also considered other alternative measures that would potentially provide

incentives for the use of under-utilised capacity (or remove obstac les to its use) which

included enhanced surface transport links to airports and offering financial incentives to open

new routes.

3.20 Enhanced surface transport links: The Commission recognises that passengers do not think of

their journey only in terms of its airborne component. The length of time it takes to reach the

airport, the cost, quality, comfort and convenience of the journey are all important

considerations. Therefore, meeting passengers’ needs in terms of surface transport often

means offering a range of options with a range of prices. The interim report states:

3.21 “Airline s resp on d to the ne ed s of the ir c ustom ers; if p a ssen g ers d o n ot w a nt to tra vel to a n

a irp ort b ec a use of t he q ua lity o f its surfa c e tran sp ort, airlines w ill be less likely to sc he d ule fl ig hts

to o r from it . Poo r surfa c e transp ort ca n send the m essa g e tha t a n a irp or t is ‘sec on d b est ’ o r

‘no t the c ity ’s m a in a irp or t ’ . For lon g -haul pa sseng ers, pa rt ic ula rly those w ith a c hoic e o f

a irline s, th e se a re sig nific a nt issue s.” (Aiports Commission: Interim Report, 2013: 158).

3.22 In the case of Manston, although transport connectivity is slowly improving, the site’s location

and proximity (or lack of) to local transport hubs does not foster an attractive and high-speed,

well-connected service to the origin/destination of a significant critical mass of passengers.

There is a strong case for attaching greater strategic priority to transport investments which

improve surface access to our airports, however, schemes of this nature will take significanttime and costs to plan and deliver.

3.23 Financial incentives to open new routes: The Commission considered option to use ‘APD

holidays’ (i.e. tax free routes) to encourage the development of routes to new destinations.

Under this proposal, new routes would benefit from an initial period (probably two years)

during which they would be exempted from APD. This would enable new routes to develop

their market and help to offset some of the commercial risks assoc iated with opening them.

However, the Commission highlight two potential pitfalls with this option:

•

If the proposal were non-discriminatory (in other words, if it applied to every new route

equally) then there would be substantial potential to game the system, for example via

airlines switching between airports in the same regions of their origin and destination

countries to ensure that they would always benefit from the holiday. This behaviour would

reduce the UK’s tax income from APD without generating connectivity benefits.

• If the proposal introduced measures to counter these perverse incentives, then it would run

a substantial risk of being challenged on the basis that it was distorting competition by

favouring particular routes in favour of others.

3.24 Therefore, the Commission concluded that they cannot recommend the use of ‘APD

holidays’. In summary, despite a number of options being investigated as outlined above, the


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Commission’s interim report concludes that intervening to redistribute the excess demand

away from airports in London and the South East does not appear to be a credible option. As

a result, the C ommission made the decision to focus the second phase of their work, and final

report, on determining the most suitable location and design for new airport capacity for the

airports in London and South East (as specified above).

Key Messages

3.25 The following key messages have emerged from a review of UK aviation policy:

• In summary, Government policy supports the UK aviation sector; and

• There is a critical need to increase capac ity in and around London. The Airports

Commission, appointed by Government to investigate potential solutions to this issue

concluded that this need can only be satisfied by expanding the capacity of airports in

and around London (i.e. Heathrow, Gatwick, City, Stansted, Luton). The potential role of

Manston in meeting this need was tested and it was concluded that the site was

unsuitable (in locational grounds). On this basis, we conclude that in transport

infrastructure terms there is no need for the airport to be retained.


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4. UK Aviation Trends

UK Regional Airports

4.1 As previously stated, the Airports Commission’s interim report published in December 2013

stated that demand would increase in/around London and that no regional airport option

could replace the need for extra capacity in that area. The Aviation note prepared by the

House of Commons further supports the Airports Commission’s position by arguing that

demand for air travel is not spread evenly across the UK and alleviating capacity demands

should be foc ussed on London and the South East (i.e. Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Luton

and City) (House of Commons, Aviation: Regional Airports, 2014).

4.2 A subsequent report by the House of Commons Transport Committee notes that although

smaller airports can be important assets to communities due to a range of enablers such as

employment and the import and export of goods and people, they are fragile commercial

entities (House of Commons, Smaller Airports, March 2015). Part of this is due to the fac t that

whilst the airport operates from a fixed location and catchment area, airlines and other

aviation businesses are highly mobile and can swiftly adjust or relocate their services in line with

demand.

4.3

Since the recession in 2008, numerous airports including Bristol Filton, Blackpool, Coventry,

Plymouth, Penzance and Manston have all closed either completely or to commercial traffic.

Although the precise circumstances varied between those cases, the closures were ultimately

a result of a irport owners and/or airlines concluding that commercial services were no longer

viable in that location.

4.4 The UK contains a relatively large number of airports in a small geographical area. In fact, it

contains more airports ‘per person’ than comparable European countries. The Charted

Institute of Logistics and Transport (CILT) outlines the practical consequences of the UK’s

aviation situation:

“Sm a lle r a irp orts va ry in te rm s of fina nc ial via b ili ty, b ut the re a re a

num b er which a re no t , and p rob a b ly never wi ll be , pro f itab le . There a re

som e regions wh ere there a re m ore airp or ts tha n a re real ly nee d ed ,

a nd wh ere the c a se fo r p ub lic f ina nc ia l sup p ort is no t stron g . An a irp or t

c a nno t survive if airline s a nd oth er airc ra f t op erato rs d o no t w a nt to use

it” (Source: CILT, UK Smaller Airports, 2014).

4.5 As such, the House of C ommons consider that there is no case for a general policy of state

intervention to keep all smaller airports open. Rather, the range of consumer and operator


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choice provided by the number of airports in the UK is welcomed. Obviously however, this puts

airports that are not deemed attractive or viable at risk of closure.

4.6 This brief analysis of current policy and recommendations surrounding regional a irports in the

UK demonstrates how their future is far from secure and subject to numerous external factors.

In fact, judging by the recommendations made in the latest reports, it seems unlikely that any

smaller airports outside of London and the South East will benefit from substantial investment or

growth going forward unless perceived as attractive by airline operators and associated

aviation service providers (as discussed further below).

Hub Airports

4.7 It is argued that the UK is suffering from a shortage of ‘hub airport’ capacity rather than a

shortage of general airport capacity at present (House of C ommons Transport Committee,

Smaller Airports, 2015). As aforementioned, the UK contains a high proportion of a irports

relative to its geographical size, but few ‘hub’ airports. Hub airports serve both their own

catchment areas and incoming traffic from other airports. The volume of traffic handled by

hub airports enables them to serve additional destinations and to maintain high service

volumes. The UK currently has one hub airport, Heathrow. Heathrow’s significantly constrained

capacity issue has damaged domestic air connectivity from smaller airports to Heathrow, and

the number of UK destinations served from Heathrow has steadily declined over the past

decade. In 2015, the only smaller airports with an air route to Heathrow were Aberdeen, Belfast

City, Leeds-Bradford and Newcastle. We understand that services between Inverness and

Heathrow have also just been re-instated as of 3rd May 2016.

4.8 For enhanced hub capacity to benefit smaller regional airports such as Manston, they would

need security and comfort that a certain number of the new slots created at the hub airport

would be secured for their services. The benefit and value of regional links to hub airports is

demonstrated by the fall in passenger numbers at smaller airports where such services have

been withdrawn. For example, Durham Tees Valley airport experienced a 75% reduction inpassenger numbers following the withdrawal of its Heathrow service in 2009 (DfT, Enquiry into

smaller airports, SMA0039, 2014).

Airline Operator’s Perceptions of Regional Airports

4.9 As the size of a ircrafts has grown, resulting in a need to fill more seats, airline operator’s

commercial strategies have changed ac cordingly. Operators such as British Airways and

Lufthansa have adopted the US model of developing ‘hub and spoke’ networks (Falcon

Report, Stage 1, 2014). This model has ultimately led to regional airports becoming relegated


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into ‘hub feeders’, with the opportunity for them to attract lucrative long haul flights almost

entirely removed.

4.10 In response to this trend, regional airports found new revenue opportunities by attracting

seasonal traffic and freight services, as was the case for the former Manston airport. For a short

period of time, regional airports profited from a relatively niche concept of airline operation –

low cost carriers (LCCs). LCCs provide a short-medium distance a ir travel product at a low cost

by eliminating all unnecessary costs whilst maximising the capacity of the aircraft. When LCCs

first arrived on the market they chose to base the bulk of their operations from regional airports

where they could negotiate virtually free operating costs with a willing airport operator –

arguing the case that the airport could generate compensating revenues from car parking,

retailing and other associated services. For a short period of time this model was successful

and satisfied both airline and airport operators, however, many regional airports struggled to

generate sufficient profit to suitably maintain and modernise their facilities.

4.11 As competition between airline operators has continued to increase, the trends indicate that

LCCs are moving back towards the larger airports, including hub airports. When the previous

owners of Manston airport, Manston Skyport were asked to comment on the discussions had

with airline operators, they confirmed that conversations were had “with a number of airlines.

No passenger airlines with any current activities had any interest to start operations at the

airport” (Falcon Report, 2014). Furthermore, KLM, which was the company operating

commercial flights at Manston, confirmed that they would not return to the airport even if it re-

opened. It would appear, therefore, that there is little confidence or willing from airline

operators to run services from Manston should it be re-opened. It is highly probable that the

airport’s history of consistently failed passenger operations and low-quantum of airline activity

will undoubtedly dissuade most carriers.

The UK Airport System and Statistics

4.12

The UK aviation market is served by a diverse system of airports, from a global aviation hub atHeathrow through large sca le point-to-point airports, such as Manchester, Birmingham and

Gatwick, down to small airports primarily focusing on maintaining lifeline routes, for example in

the Highlands and Islands. There are also important freight operations at Stansted and East

Midlands, and bellyhold freight services are provided from other locations, of which Heathrow

is by some distance the most significant.

4.13 Passenger demand and connectivity are highly concentrated on the four largest airports:

Heathrow, Gatwick, Manchester and Stansted, which accounted for over 60% of passengers

served last year and each served more than 140 destinations weekly, compared to fewer than

100 at any other airport.


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4.14 The fact that three of these four airports are close to the capital indicates the central role

played by the London system in supporting UK aviation connectivity. As shown in Appendix 1,

London benefits from a very large and strong aviation market in global air transport, reaching

close to 150 million passengers in 2015 (Source: CAA Statistics, 2016). A summary of a irport

statistics is provided in Table 1 below, as well as statistics for the former Manston Airport in its

final full operational year (2013) for comparison purposes. Please see Appendix 1 for a

complete set of statistics for UK airports.

Table 2: UK Airport Statistics, 2015

Airport Air Transport

Movements

Passenger

Movements

Freight (Tonnes) Employees (Direc t)

Heathrow 469,658 74,814,273 1,460,531 66,000

Gatwick 242,213 36,155,343 67,501 21,000London City 79,250 4,319,281 24 2,000

Luton 80,808 11,806,102 4,101 9,400

Southend 8,913 894,287 - N/A

Stansted 142,833 21,909,281 52,255 10,200

Total London

Area Airports

1,023,675 149,898,567 1,584,414

Edinburgh 101,163 10,863,412 1,363 600

Manchester 145,544 19,174,159 89,148 19,000

Newquay 5,971 249,794 - 185

Cardiff 10,755 633,143 - N/A

Bristol 49,234 5,958,476 - 200

Exeter 10,904 576,281 - 1,450

East Midlands 31,310 3,650,045 26,254 N/A

Manston (2013) 1,086 36,474 29,306 144

Source: CAA, Airports Data, 2016

Re-Purposed Airports

4.15 As aforementioned, numerous regional airports in the UK have c losed since 2008, including

Bristol Filton, Blackpool, Coventry, Plymouth, Penzance and Manston. Almost all of these have

undergone successful re-developments (or these are being planned) to use the vacant and

redundant airport sites for alternative uses.

4.16 For example, the former Blackpool Airport site has been granted ‘enterprise zone’ status by the

Government which is forecast to create c.3,000 new jobs by 2030. The new enterprise zone

came into effect in J anuary 2016.


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4.17 Similarly, an outline application at the former Coventry Airport was granted permission in

December 2015 which secured planning for the creation of a modern manufacturing and

distribution hub called ‘Imperial Park’. Recent press has indicated that there has been a strong

level of interest in the development and it is expected that Reserved Matters applications

which are currently pending for the site will be granted in J uly 2016 (CoStar, March 24 2016).

4.18 Bristol Filton Airfield, a c .140ha site, received outline planning permission in J une 2015 for

redevelopment plans comprising approximately 2,600 new homes, employment space, a

hotel, schools and a supermarket. The owners, BAE Systems, have forecast that the

development will generate up to 7,700 new jobs.

4.19 For full details of the various former UK airports that are undergoing re-development, please

refer to Appendix 2.

Key Messages

4.20 A review of UK aviation trends has demonstrated the following:

• There is a comparative ‘over-supply’ of airports in the UK commensurate with the

population size. Accordingly, the Government considers there to be no case for state

intervention to keep regional airports open;

• The industry is increasingly focussed on hub airports (both passenger and airline operator

preference) as a means of better meting needs; and• There are numerous examples of smaller, non-viable regional airports closing ac ross the UK,

and being re-purposed as mixed-use developments which have made a significant

contribution to their local economies and other needs (leading to a net benefit over the

former airport use).


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5. Expert Opinion

Mr Alastair Welch

5.1 The opinion expressed below has been prepared by Mr Alastair Welch who has worked in the

operations of airports and aerodromes for 20 years up until 2015. His experience in the aviation

industry includes, but is not limited to, the following:

• Airport operations, finance and strategy at Heathrow;

• General Manager at Stansted Airport with responsibility for engineering and the operation

of the passenger terminal (at the time, the UK’s largest);

• Managing Director of Southend Airport from 2007-2013, leading the redevelopment of the

airfield into London’s defacto 6th Airport – with the delivery of a runway extension in a

highly complex environment, a new control tower, passenger terminal, railway station and

hotel. With the introduction of regular passenger flights from Aer Lingus and EasyJet, the

airport moved from carrying fewer than 30,000 passengers per annum to around one

million during the period between 2008 and 2013.

• Business advisory role to firms on matters of a irport resilience (for the CAA) and airfield

operations (for the UK MOD). This advisory practice has grown and includes aviation

service development activity for airports around the world in addition to transac tion

support and strategic advice; and• In addition, he has been the Interim Chairman of Manston airport since 29 November 2013.

At Manston airport he was part of the team which led the consultation process over the

possible c losure of the airfield. This process commenced in March and the c losure of the

site subsequently took place on 15 May 2014.

5.2 As is evident from Mr Welch’s extensive experience of aviation matters, including at Manston

airport specifically, he is particularly well placed to provide an expert opinion on the prospects

of the site resuming its previous use as a viable airport. A summary of his opinion on this matter

is set out below.

Mr Welch’s Opinion

5.3 Following the decision by the MOD and RAF to cease their operations, there have been a

number of owners of the site. All of which have tried to create a fully-functioning, successful

and viable airport business but all have failed. The airport has been operating at a loss since

the RAF’s vacation of the site in 1998.

5.4 Regional airports that are successful have generally become so because they operate as

‘balanced’ businesses. This typically comprises a diverse series of income streams from a range


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of activities including passengers, freight, general aviation, flying clubs/flight training, and

airport tenants generating rental income.

5.5 Many comparable airports have developed balanced and very resilient businesses over a

substantial period of time. Airports such as Norwich, Southend and Bournemouth have very

diverse income streams, particularly from a significant number of successful airport tenants,

which makes them resilient to any spec ific market changes.

5.6 Airports which have become available following RAF disposal more recently have found this

diversification and resilience much harder to achieve. There is no strong foundation of tenants

and other activities on which to base a business, whilst other airports have developed very

strong positions around diversified and reliable income streams.

5.7

There are a number of reasons for this, but fundamentally, any successful, balanced airportneeds strong connections and a 360 degree catchment area. At the former Manston airport

site, whilst connectivity is improving (including the introduction of a highspeed rail station at

Thanet Parkway expected imminently), the site is simply too far east of the key catchment

areas, with journey times from London approximately taking just over an hour at best. In

addition, the local catchment area is simply not sufficiently populated for a passenger airport

to succeed. Furthermore, in physical terms, the former airport’s location means that it is

effectively cut off on two sides (North and East) by the English Channel which automatically

limits its catchment.

5.8 Further to the above, the site is too close to Gatwick to capture critical mass and the

propensity to fly from the immediate catchment area around the airport is low. Whilst niche

services to/ from the former airport operated recently (a KLM service to Schiphol, Amsterdam

and a handful of occasional summer charter services), the income from these services alone

could not cover the marginal costs of the operations, and certainly could not contribute to the

wider costs of the site.

5.9

Cargo activity is even more price sensitive than passenger related activity and whilst it would

not be good business acumen, in a highly competitive environment, to predicate a business

on cargo alone, volumes would have to be many times greater than the former airport

previously experienced in order to generate a profit.

5.10 The former airport’s relative advantage to turning cargo aircraft around rapidly was directly a

function of how quiet the airport was. If the cargo volumes were to grow, so would the direct

cost of operations, making profit no more likely than was the case before. All this in an

environment where an ever increasing amount of air cargo is transported in the belly hold of

passenger aircraft, rather than in specific freight aircraft that were previously used at the site.


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5.11 Other income streams from tenants, general aviation and flying clubs/flight training remain

limited and simply not enough to make a difference at a site as large and expensive to

operate as the former Manston Airport site.

5.12 Following the failure of the site around 2005, it was purchased by infrastructure spec ialists

Infratil. Whilst they invested heavily in the site, by the time their ownership came to an end the

business had consumed c.£50m and they simply saw losses increase exponentially.

5.13 In 2013, following a globa l search by Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) which lasted almost

two years, not a single credible organisation was prepared to pay more than £1 for the site as

there was simply no value in the site functioning as an airport.

5.14 When the site was sold to Manston Skyport Limited in November 2013, a business plan was put

together to assess the degree to which the site could progress as a ba lanced airfield with workin hand to secure both passenger and cargo business.

5.15 This business plan was well documented, but the potential for these new income streams

quickly dried up and the hope that the Davies commission would recommend making best

use of current runways in the South East (instead of building new runways) was dashed in

December 2013. With more long term capacity scheduled for the London airports system,

passengers were simply not going to migrate to the former Manston Airport. Its long term fate

was sealed with its closure in May 2014.

5.16 Following the airport’s closure, the site was sold in September 2014. Much of the key

equipment which had been used when the site operational has been removed and/or sold.

The aerodrome and air traffic licences have been revoked.

5.17 Whilst it is technically possible to open a new airport on the site, this would involve very

considerable amounts of time, money and expertise. In addition, the previous process of C AA

licencing has become EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) certification, which adds to

both complexity and cost.

5.18 Therefore, even if an organisation which owned the site today chose to recommence

operations, it would take at least a year and tens of millions of pounds to sec ure that

outcome. Even then, there is no evidence (both from our own and national authorities

research) that a profitable business would result, but quite the contrary, as all of the evidence

available suggests it would, again, fail.

The Falcon Report

5.19 In July 2014, Falcon C onsultancy Limited was commissioned by Thanet District Counc il to

provide their expert opinion on the viability of the airport at Manston.


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5.20 Within the report, comments are made on Manston’s historic performance as an airport:

“The a irp or t ha s ne ver susta ine d g row th. Now , the d ou b ts surroun d ing

Manston’s survival have become a sel f - fu l f i l l ing prophesy” (Falcon

Consultancy Ltd, 2014: 7)

“Ma nston Airp or t wa s up for sa le fo r som e t ime . Tha t the re wa s no

interest reflec ts its p oo r b usiness rep uta tion, (it ha s ne ve r m a d e a p rofit in

al l the years since the RAF moved out) and the general industry

p erce p t ion tha t i t is not in a n ide a l loc a t ion. It ha s fai led to fulf il its

p erce ived ro le a s a reg iona l a i rp ort” (Falcon Consultancy Ltd, 2014: 9)

5.21 The report also provides commentary on the likelihood of the former airport re-developing into

a successful cargo and/ or low-budget business operation:

“…f ie rce c om p et it ion be twe en a ll the a i rlines is red ra wing the m a p

onc e a ga in an d fo rc ing the low c ost a i rlines b a c k towa rd s the large r

a irp or ts. Ever la rg er a irc ra f t d el ivered to the m a jor a irline s of fe r ma ny

m ore sea ts to b e f illed f rom the m a jor a irp or ts a nd the c a p a c ity and

p er form a nc e of these a i rc ra f t is so great that , for the m om ent at lea st ,

the g row th in a ir c a rgo c a n b e a b sorbed in the b e l ly ho lds of p asseng er

aircraf t” (Falcon Consultancy Ltd, 2014: 3)

“Ca p a c ity is growing a t a fa r faster p a c e tha n de m a nd for a i rf re igh t

a nd a s sea freig ht yields a re fa lling the re is a lso a shift from a irfreig ht to

sea fre ight . The c lim a te for ca rg o-only airc ra f t op erat ions c ould no t be

m uc h w orse.” (Falcon Consultancy Ltd, 2014: 21)

5.22 In addition to the above, the report states that Falcon consider “Manston has no natural

sustainable passenger market…its catchment area and its propensity to travel is insufficient to

generate for the airlines enough traffic on one route to sustain a twice daily operation – the

minimum required to risk launching a service” (Page 8).

5.23 Falcon’s overall assessment of Manston’s viability concludes:

“No b usiness p la n w ith a c red ible investm en t p lan o f less tha n 20 yea rs is

like ly to d ef ine the c om m itme nt nec essa ry to reb u ild c onf id enc e. Pha se

1 investme nt req u ired c ou ld b e in the o rde r of £ 100m w ith no

g ua ra nte es of suc c ess.” (Falcon Consultanc y Ltd, 2014: 7).

5.24 In conclusion, the Falcon report states that “there is no commercial justification for re-opneing

and marketing the airport in the same configuration as it was upon closure” and should


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therefore “remain c losed” (Falcon Consultancy Ltd, 2014: 14). They recommend that if there is

to be any discussion around the former airport re-opening, one of the fundamental issues that

needs to be addressed is reducing the journey time to/from the London area because there

are so many alternative airport options which can be accessed more easily. Even the

proposed Thanet Parkway station (which is yet to be confirmed anyway) would require some

additional mode of transport to connec t passengers from the terminal to the station.

5.25 As such, although much of the Falcon report identifies that the chances of Manston airport re-

emerging as a successful and profitable operation are slim, it does conclude that commercial

aviation operations at Manston would be a viable option, provided that a suitable long-term

operating model for the airport was developed. We note that the Falcon report makes no

suggestion or attempt to provide any such long-term operating model for former airport.

However, in light of this conc lusion set out in the report, the Counc il made a dec ision to assess

the option of acquiring Manston from its current owners under the Compulsory Purchase

Powers.

5.26 As part of this assessment, it was dec ided that the compulsory purchase of the former airport

by the Council could only be possible if a suitable operating partner for the airport could be

identified and such a partner could indemnify the Council from the costs of issuing a

Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) as TDC do not have the finances to pursue a CPO in their

own right.


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6. RiverOak Development Consent Order

6.1 We understand that following an unsuccessful attempt to be appointed as TDC’s indemnity

partner to compulsorily acquire the former Manston Airport, RiverOak have since decided topursue obtaining a Development Consent Order (DCO). A DCO is the means of obtaining

permission for developments categorised as Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIP),

including transport projects.

6.2 We also understand that RiverOak’s objective is to reinstate the site as a “specialised aviation

agglomeration centre” which would provdie a range of facilities and services including; a

major internationa l centre for air freight; a reliever for the major airports of London; a base for

at least one passenger carrier and a fixed base operation for executive travel (RiverOak

Investment Corp., LLC Website).

6.3 We note that for an airport proposal to achieve NSIP status it would need to handle at least 10

million passengers per year or 10,000 air cargo movements per year. We note that from a

passenger number perspective, this would require an increase of 4,800% over the previous

peak number of passengers achieved at Manston, and a 600-3,200% increase in freight

aircraft movements*.

6.4 To put this in further perspective this scale of traffic would be commensurate with some of the

UK’s biggest airports (Source: C AA Airport Data, 2015):

• Luton: 12,263,505

• Birmingham: 10,187,122

• Edinburgh: 11,114,587

• Glasgow: 8,714,307

6.5 Clearly this is very ambitious and we question whether this is genuinely achievable (noting that

there is no business plan in the public domain).

6.6 Accordingly, it is our view that at this point in time, there is limited/no evidence to suggest that

the DCO proposals have any prospect of being realised.

*Footnote: Ca lculations made using typica l Boeing airplane cargo capacities which range from 138 tonnes at their largest to

26,300 kg at their smallest (Source: http://www.boeing.com/commercial/freighters/)

http://www.boeing.com/commercial/freighters/http://www.boeing.com/commercial/freighters/http://www.boeing.com/commercial/freighters/http://www.boeing.com/commercial/freighters/


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7. Conclusions

7.1 This report has been prepared by GVA on behalf of our client, Stone Hill Park Limited, in

support of the Hybrid Planning Application for mixed use redevelopment of the formerManston Airport in Thanet District C ounc il. The information set out within this report has been

collated to justify our argument that:

• Available evidence firmly indicates that there is no reasonable prospect of the former

airport use recommencing and being viable in the long term;

• There is no need for an airport in this location (in transport infrastructure terms); and

• The economic impact (including hypothetical opportunity loss) of losing the existing use

will not be significant compared to the economic benefits of the proposed development.


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Bibliography

• Airports Commission, Final Report, J uly 2015

• Airports Commission, Interim Report, 2013

• Civil Aviation Authority, Data and analysis, UK Airports, Online source:

https://www.caa.co.uk/Data-and-analysis/UK-aviation-market/Airports/

• CoStar, Funding Deal at Coventry Airport, March 24 2016, Online source:

http://www.costar.co.uk/en/assets/news/2016/March/MG-takes-off-with-505m-funding-

deal-at-Coventry-Airport/

• Department for Transport, Enquiry into smaller airports, SMA0039, 2014

• Department for Transport, The Future of Air Transport, December 2003

• Falcon C onsultancy Limited, Viability Study of Manston Airport: Stage 1, 16 July 2014

• House of Commons, Aviation: Regional Airports, 6 March 2014

• House of Commons Transport Committee, Smaller Airports, 13 March 2015

• Kent County Counc il, Manston Airport under private ownership, Position Statement, March

2015

• RAF Manston History Museum, History in Brief, Online source: http://www.rafmanston.co.uk/

• The Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport, UK Smaller Airports, 2014

• UK Government, Aviation Policy Framework, 2013

.

https://www.caa.co.uk/Data-and-analysis/UK-aviation-market/Airports/https://www.caa.co.uk/Data-and-analysis/UK-aviation-market/Airports/http://www.costar.co.uk/en/assets/news/2016/March/MG-takes-off-with-505m-funding-deal-at-Coventry-Airport/http://www.costar.co.uk/en/assets/news/2016/March/MG-takes-off-with-505m-funding-deal-at-Coventry-Airport/http://www.costar.co.uk/en/assets/news/2016/March/MG-takes-off-with-505m-funding-deal-at-Coventry-Airport/http://www.rafmanston.co.uk/http://www.rafmanston.co.uk/http://www.rafmanston.co.uk/http://www.rafmanston.co.uk/http://www.costar.co.uk/en/assets/news/2016/March/MG-takes-off-with-505m-funding-deal-at-Coventry-Airport/http://www.costar.co.uk/en/assets/news/2016/March/MG-takes-off-with-505m-funding-deal-at-Coventry-Airport/https://www.caa.co.uk/Data-and-analysis/UK-aviation-market/Airports/


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Appendix I

UK airport

baseline

information


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Appendix II

Former UK

airports case

studies


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Appendix 2

Former UK Airports Baseline Information

Introduction:

This note provides case studt examples of former UK airports which have undergone (or are

undergoing) re-development to use the vacant and redundant former airport sites for

alternative uses.

Bristol Filton Airport, South Gloucestershire

Site Area: 143 ha

Site History: The a irport was first used to manufacture aeroplanes in 1910. Also used as the

UK base for the construction and testing of Concorde. The site played an important role inBristol's aviation history, from the establishment of a Royal Flying Corps aerodrome to the

final Concorde landing in 2003. After its official closure in December 2012 the airfield hascontinued to be a home for police and ambulance helicopters.

Prior to c losure, BAE systems, the owner of the airport, undertook a review of the

commercial viability of the site and then began extensive discussions with South

Gloucestershire C ounc il to look at alternative uses for the site. BAE submitted an outline

application for a mixed use development on the site in October 2014 and permission was

granted in J une 2015 (ref: 14/05445/K).

Summary of proposed mixed-use redevelopment: As currently planned and when

complete, the site will provide a total of 2,675 homes, 24.95 ha (61.65 acres) ofemployment land comprising B1a, B1b, B1c, B2 and B8 uses Extra Care, Secondary and

Primary Schools, Community Facilities together with significant improvements ininfrastructure and the provision of open space. It is estimated that the development will

generate nearly 8,000 new jobs during its lifetime.

Full outline application details: Mixed use development on 143.13 hec tares of land

comprising: residential development for up to 2,675 dwellings and apartments (comprising

2,635 x Use Class C3 and 40 x Live Work Units – Sui Generis); up to 24ha of stand-aloneemployment land (comprising up to 17ha Use C lass B1a and up to 7ha Use C lass B1b/c, B2

and B8); Retail/Food and Drink facilities in Employment Hub up to 900sqm (Use Class

A1/A3/A4); 120 Bed Hotel up to 3,800 sqm (Use Class C1); Rail Halt (0.45ha Use Class SuiGeneris); Education provision to include a Secondary School (8.28ha) (to incorporate Built

Sports Centre up to 1,550sqm Use Class D2), 2 no. Primary Schools (total 5ha) and 2 no.

Children's Nurseries (total 0.8ha) (all Use C lass D1); Mixed-Use Centre to comprise

Community Facilities up to 3,000sqm; Dental Surgery up to 800sqm; Health Centre up to

2,100sqm (All Use Class D1); 70 Bed Extra Care Facility up to 12,500sqm (Use Class C2);

Public House up to 800sqm (Use Class A4); Opticians up to 600sqm (Use Class A1/A2);

Retail/Services/Food and Drink fac ilities up to 500sqm (Use Classes A1, A2, A3 and A5);Business Offices up to 500sqm (Use Class B1) and Retail Supermarket up to 2,787sqm gross

(Use Class A1); together with; supporting infrastructure and facilities including demolition,

ground works and remediation, highways, utilities, landscaping, sustainable urban

drainage system, wildlife water basins and public open space. Outline applicationincluding access, with all other matters reserved.

Bristol Filton Airport Outline Masterplan:


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Coventry Airport, Warwickshire

Site History: Coventry Airport opened in 1936, and began its use as an aircraft

manufac turer. During WWII the airport was utilised as a fighter station, and post-war was

returned to civil use as a passenger and freight terminal. Airline operators lost confidence

in the airport in the early 21st century and by 2008 all commercial passenger operations

had ceased, and in 2009 the airport closed.

Outline planning permission has since been secured for the creation of a modern

manufac turing and distribution hub - Imperial Park - granted in December 2015 (ref:

W/12/1143). In early 2016, a planning application for reserved matters was submitted with

the intention to transform the airport’s former passenger fac ilities into a new manufacturing

and distribution hub on 30 acres of land on the south side of the airport. .

It is estimated that the development could bring up to 600 new jobs to the local

community. The work will also transform an area of land that has lain unused for almost

eight years following the closure of Coventry Airport’s passenger terminal and assoc iated

buildings.

Plymouth Airport

Site History: The airport officially opened in 1931. As well as transporting mail and

passengers, the airport was used as a bad weather training base for the Royal Air Force as

RAF Roborough as well as other services of the armed forces. By 2007 Air Southwest was

operating routes to Gatwick, Newcastle, Dublin, Cork, Chambery and G lasgow. The airportofficially closed in December 2011.

We understand that no redevelopment applications have been submitted, however,

discussions underway for its redevelopment. For example, Arup were commissioned by

Plymouth C ity Counc il in 2014 to prepare an options assessment to inform the Plymouth

Plan, having spec ific regards to the long term future of Plymouth City Airport. The report

concludes that re-commencing aviation uses on site is theoretically possible but, in a similar

light to the former Manston Airport, would require a credible and robust long-term business

and investment plan to work (which we understand is yet to emerge).

In 2015, Regeneris published a report stating that the closed airport could meet 10% of

Plymouth’s housing need and play a vital role in the city’s economic and social future if it

were to be redevelopment. We understand the current proposals comprise a new

community which would include approximately 1,600 homes, a hotel, gym, restaurants,

shops, a park, a school and a ‘cycling hub’ velodrome, creating around 360 new jobs and

adding c.£60m to the cty’s economy.

SHP2016 - PSA Loss of Existing Use Position Statement

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