Shocks, Crises and Crashes in Nature and the Economy · SCEC, 1985-2003, m≥2, grid of 5x5 km,...

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D. SORNETTE ETH-Zurich Chair of Entrepreneurial Risks Department of Management, Technology and Economics http://www.mtec.ethz.ch/ Shocks, Crises and Crashes in Nature and the Economy Man-made Terrorism, Global Warming, Pollution, Financial Crises, Riots, Overpopulation Entrepreneurial Operational, Market, Credit, Cultural, Economic, Political Technological Nuclear Meltdown, Aircraft Crashes, Oil Spills, Computer Failure, Explosions Natural Earthquakes, hurricanes snowstorms, floods, locust plagues, meteorite impacts, volcanic eruptions, forest fire

Transcript of Shocks, Crises and Crashes in Nature and the Economy · SCEC, 1985-2003, m≥2, grid of 5x5 km,...

  • D. SORNETTE

    ETH-ZurichChair of Entrepreneurial RisksDepartment of Management,Technology and Economicshttp://www.mtec.ethz.ch/

    Shocks, Crises and Crashes in Nature and the Economy

    Man-madeTerrorism, Global Warming,Pollution, Financial Crises,Riots, Overpopulation

    EntrepreneurialOperational, Market,Credit, Cultural,Economic, Political

    TechnologicalNuclear Meltdown,Aircraft Crashes, OilSpills, ComputerFailure, Explosions

    NaturalEarthquakes, hurricanessnowstorms, floods,locust plagues, meteoriteimpacts, volcaniceruptions, forest fire

  • Heavy tails in pdf of earthquakes

    Heavy tails in ruptures

    Heavy tails in pdf of seismic rates

    Harvard catalog

    (CNES, France)

    Turcotte (1999)

    Heavy tails in pdf of rock falls, Landslides, mountain collapses

    SCEC, 1985-2003, m≥2, grid of 5x5 km, time step=1 day

    (Saichev and Sornette, 2005)

  • Heavy tails in pdf of Solar flares

    Heavy tails in pdf of Hurricane losses

    1000

    104

    105

    1 10

    Damage values for top 30 damaging hurricanes normalized to 1995 dollars by inflation, personal

    property increases and coastal county population change

    Normalized1925Normalized1900N

    Dam

    age

    (mill

    ion

    1995

    dol

    lars

    )

    RANK

    Y = M0*XM1

    57911M0-0.80871M10.97899R

    (Newman, 2005)

    Heavy tails in pdf of rain events

    Peters et al. (2002)

    Heavy tails in pdf of forest fires

    Malamud et al., Science 281 (1998)

  • 0

    200

    400

    600

    800

    1000

    1200

    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

    After-tax present value in millions of 1990 dollars

    DBC

    1980-84 pharmaceuticals in groups of deciles

    Exponential model 1dataExponential model 2

    OUTLIERS OUTLIERS

    Heavy-tail of Pharmaceutical sales

    Heavy-tail of movie sales

    Heavy-tail of price financialreturns

    Heavy-tail of Firm sizes

  • Heavy-tail of pdf of war sizes

    Levy (1983); Turcotte (1999)

    Heavy-tail of pdf of health care costs

    Rupper et al. (2002)

    Heavy-tail of pdf of book sales

    Heavy-tail of pdf of terrorist intensityJohnson et al. (2006)

    Survivor Cdf

    Sales per day

  • Market Risk + Intrinsic NON-diversification RiskHeavy distribution of firm’s capitalizations, lack of diversification and the pricing anomalies

    Most risks can be diversified away but NOT the MARKET RISKS(CAPM, APT, Factor models…)

    Yannick Malevergne and D Sornette (2006)

  • (Axtell, Science, 2001)

    P(S)~1/S1+µ µ=1

    (Axtell, 2001)

  • ⇒ New Internal consistency factor (ICC)

  • Market factor

    Market Factor +

    f

    Market Factor +

    EW

    Market + Under

    Diversified

    Market factor

    Market Factor +

    f

    Market Factor +

    EW

    Market + Under

    Diversifiedµ=2 94% 94% 95% 94% 99% 99% 99% 99%µ=1 80% 95% 95% 86% 88% 99% 99% 93%µ=0.5 56% 97% 97% 79% 56% 99% 99% 83%

    N=1000 N=10000

    P(S)~1/S1+µ µ=1

    Simulation on Synthetic stock markets

  • Group 1 Group 4

    CAPM ICC Cap Value GrowthValue +

    Cap ICC + CapICC + Value

    All Four Factors

    Consumer Non Durables 75.9% 94.1% 88.4% 79.7% 91.8% 94.1% 94.3% 94.3%Consumer Durables 74.4% 92.3% 87.9% 76.9% 90.2% 92.4% 92.3% 92.4%Manufacturing 82.2% 96.7% 92.0% 85.9% 95.4% 96.8% 97.0% 97.1%Energy 58.3% 67.8% 63.7% 63.4% 68.5% 68.1% 69.3% 69.3%Business Equipment 74.5% 87.4% 86.2% 74.8% 86.6% 88.0% 91.6% 91.8%Telecom 62.7% 68.2% 68.1% 63.9% 69.4% 68.6% 72.6% 73.0%Shops 71.8% 90.1% 86.7% 72.8% 87.6% 90.3% 90.4% 90.5%Health 65.1% 74.5% 75.9% 66.4% 77.4% 76.2% 80.5% 80.5%Utilities 58.3% 60.8% 58.9% 65.9% 66.5% 61.7% 66.3% 66.5%Others 71.9% 92.8% 83.6% 81.6% 92.7% 93.4% 95.2% 95.2%

    Average 69.5% 82.4% 79.1% 73.1% 82.6% 82.9% 84.9% 85.0%

    Best of the groupWorst of the group

    10 equally-weighted industry portfolios

    Group 2 Group 3

    Comparison with Fama-French three-factor model

  • • Self-organization?Extreme events are just partof the tail of power lawdistribution due to“self-organized criticality”?(endogenous)

    •“Catastrophism”: extreme events require extreme causes that lie outside the system (exogenous)

    •A mixture? How would it work?

    Origin of LARGE RISKS?

  • Guidelines from Physics: perturb and study the response

    Problem: Fluctuation-dissipation theoremfar from equilibrium is not expected to hold

  • Fluctuation-dissipation theorem far from equilibrium is not expected to hold

    Externally imposed perturbations may be different from spontaneous fluctuations (external fluctuations lie outside the complex attractor)

    Attractor of dynamics may exhibit bifurcations

    D. Ruelle, Physics Today, May 2004

  • Endogenous versus ExogenousExtinctions -meteorite at the Cretaceous/Tertiary KT boundary -volcanic eruptions (Deccan traps) -self-organized critical eventsFinancial crashes

    -external shock-self-organized instability

    Immune system-external viral or bacterial attack- “ internal” (dis-)organization

    Brain (learning)-external inputs-internal self-organization and reinforcements (role of sleep)

    Recovery after wars?-internally generated (civil wars)-externally generated

    Aviation industry recession-September 11, 2001-structural endogenous problems

    Volatility bursts in financial time series -external shock -cumulative effect of “small” news

    Commercial success and sales -Ads -epidemic network Social unrests -triggering factors -rotting of social tissue

    Discoveries -serendipity -maturation

    Parturition -mother/foetus triggered? -mother-foetus complex?

    Earthquakes -active triggered seismicity -passive "witnesses"?

  • Multifractal scaling of thermally activated rupture

    Example for the Landers

    aftershock sequence

    (1992, M=7.3, California)

    Temporal decay of the rate N(t) of aftershocks

    after a mainshock at t=0

    N(t) = K/(t+c)p

    p is in the range [0.3, 2], often close to 1

    [Omori, 1894; Utsu, 1960]

    Landers28 june 1992M=7.3

    Big-Bear, M=6.4 28/06 8:05

    Big-Bear, M=6.4 28/06 8:05

    Joshua Tree, 22/04 M=6.1 Joshua Tree,Joshua Tree, 22/04 M=6.1 22/04 M=6.1

  • Krau

    sz a

    nd K

    raus

    z, 19

    87

    Mechanics of Triggered Seismicity

    A B

    One class of models to explain triggeredseismicity is slow crack growth : under theeffect of applied stress and thermal agitation,cracks within rocks grow subcritically bybreaking successive atomic bonds (representedby springs). After they reach a critical length,they propagate critically : this is the seismicevent.

    σNτ

    The second class is state and rate-dependent friction, which predicts atime shift between a stress perturbationand the possible slip instability. Thisprocess is also activated by stress andtemperature.

  • λ0 ~ mean seismicity rate

    λ(t) : seismicity rate

    σ0 : strength

    σ(t) : applied stress

    V : activation volume

    T : temperature

    k : Boltzmann’s constantTime

    Cumulative nb of EQ

    slope ~ λ0

    The Physics of Stress-Aided Thermal Activation of Rupture

    ( ) ( )

    −−= VkT

    tt σσλλ 00 exp

    Poisson Intensity (average conditional seismicity rate) At position and time t

    (Zhurkov, 1965)

    p(M) = aM + bN(t) ~ 1/tpPrediction:

    V

    Σ

  • D. Sornette and G. Ouillon, Multifractal Scaling of Thermally-Activated Rupture Processes, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 038501 (2005)

    Multifractal hierarchy of Omori laws N(t) ~ 1/tp

  • Rib eir o e t al, 2 00 6

    For Southern California (SCEC catalog):

    p(M) = 0.10M + 0.37

    For Japan (JMA catalog):

    p(M) = 0.07M + 0.54

    For the World (Harvard catalog):

    p(M) = 0.14M + 0.11

    p(M) = aM + bN(t) ~ 1/tp

    Southern California

    Macro signature of kBT amplifiedby exponential of long-memoryprocess and multi-scaleheterogeneity

  • Financial shocks and Forecast of Financial Volatility

    (Sornette, 2003)

  • scale

    time

    Arneodo, Muzy and Sornette (1998)

    Causal cascade of volatility from large to small time scales

    The Multifractal Random Walk (Bacry, Muzy, 2000)

  • D. Sornette, Y. Malevergne andJ.F. Muzy,Volatility fingerprintsof large shocks: Endogeneousversus exogeneous,Risk Magazine (2003)

    Response to an external shock

  • Real Data and prediction of Multifractal Random Walk model

  • D. Sornette et al., Phys. Rev. Letts. 93 (22), 228701 (2004); F. Deschatres and D. Sornette, The Dynamics of Book Sales: Endogenous versus ExogenousShocks in Complex Networks, Phys. Rev. E 72, 016112 (2005)

    PREDICTING COMMERCIAL SALES

  • 20:00 4 March. 2005

    Updated every hourAMAZON BOOK SALES

  • The Original “Crisis”

    • On Friday January 17, 2003,WSMC jumped to rank 5 onAmazon.com’s sales ranking (withHarry Potter as #1!!!)

    • Two days before: release of aninterview on MSNBC’sMoneyCentral website

    (2003)

  • Epidemic branching process of word-of-mouth

  • endogenous

    Exogenousrelaxation

    Exogenous precursor

    θ=0.3±0.1

    Real data averaged over +100 books

    Exogenousrelaxation

    Exogenous precursor

    endogenous

  • Predicting the rise and fall of social and economic interactionsby monitoring and modeling internet activities and commercial sales

    • Book, CD music sales…

    • Internet searches

    • YouTube

    • Open source software projects

    • Ethical Hacking security

    • NATO (National Association of Theatre Owners)

    Survivor cdf

    Nb views

    (R. Crane, G. Daniel, Nov 06)

    R. Crane, G. Daniel, G. Harras, Y. Malevergne, DS + ….

  • Predicting Financial Crashes

    Each bubble has been rescaled vertically and translatedto end at the time of the crash

    time (~2 years)

    price

  • A. Johansen and D. Sornette, Stock market crashes are outliers, European Physical Journal B 1, 141-143 (1998)Johansen, A. and D. Sornette, Large Stock Market Price Drawdowns Are Outliers,Journal of Risk 4(2), 69-110, Winter 2001/02

    Outlier or King effect -material rupture-hydro turbulence-finance…

    Drawdown Drawup

    Ln(Survival CDF)

  • 950C

    1Kg

    1cm

    97

    1cm

    1Kg

    99

    1Kg

    101

    The breaking ofmacroscopiclinearextrapolation

    ?Extrapolation?

    BOILING PHASE TRANSITIONMore is different: a single molecule does not boil at 100C0

    Simplest Example of a “More is Different” TransitionWater level vs. temperature

    (S. Solomon)

  • 95 97 99 101

    Example of “MORE IS DIFFERENT” transition in Finance:

    Instead ofWater Level:-economic index(Dow-Jones etc…)

    Crash = result of collective behavior of individual traders(S. Solomon)

  • Mechanisms for positive feedbacks in the stock markets

    • Technical and rational mechanisms for positive feedbacks1. Option hedging2. Insurance portfolio strategies3. Trend following investment strategies4. Asymmetric information on hedging strategies

    • Behavioral mechanisms for positive feedbacks1. It is rational to imitate2. It is the highest cognitive task to imitate3. We mostly learn by imitation4. The concept of “CONVENTION” (Orléan)

    Feedbacks: negative but also POSITIVE

    Herding in finance

  • Disorder : K small

    OrderK large

    Critical:K=criticalvalue

    Renormalization group:Organization of thedescription scale by scale

    Scale invariance

  • Our prediction system is now used in the industrial phaseas the standard testing procedure.

    J.-C. Anifrani, C. Le Floc'h, D. Sornette and B. Souillard "Universal Log-periodic correction to renormalization group scaling for rupture stressprediction from acoustic emissions", J.Phys.I France 5, n°6, 631-638 (1995)

    Strategy: look at the forest ratherthan at the tree

  • Red line is 13.8% per year: but themarket is never following the averagegrowth; it is either super-exponentiallyaccelerating or crashing

    Patterns of price trajectory during 0.5-1 year before each peak: Log-periodic power law

    Psychology of Investors and EntrepreneursThe “principle of Galilean invariance” in human psychology

  • Results: In worldwide stock markets + currencies + bonds

    •21 endogenous crashes•10 exogenous crashes

    1. Systematic qualification of outliers/kings in pdfs of drawdowns2. Existence or absence of a “critical” behavior by LPPL patternsfound systematically in the price trajectories preceding thisoutliers

    Endogenous vs exogenous crashes

    +C

    Demonstration of universal values of z and ω across many different bubblesat different epochs and different markets

    ω

    z z

    z

    Probability of crashes; alarm index–Successful forward predictions: Oct. 1997; Aug. 1998, April 2000–False alarms: Oct. 1997

    The bubble andCrash of Oct. 1987Continuous line:first-order LPPLDashed line: second-order LPPL

  • Transversal analysis of credit risk, firm network risk,asymmetric information risk and bubble risk:

    towards a "Crisis Observatory"

    • Added-value strategies / expected returns1. Asymmetric information between managers and investors2. Reverse engineering of hedge-funds and derivative strategies3. Combining portfolio and investment strategies

    • Risk measure and control1. Scenario and crises analyses2. Robust statistical methods to address model error

    • Bubbles, crashes and extreme risks of unsustainable regimes1. The “Crisis Observatory” and crash alarm index2. Robust multivariate scanning of world assets3. NL models with positive and negative feedbacks

    • Macro and micro economic analyses1. Separating information from “noise’’ and false consensus2. Endogenous vs exogenous extreme risks

    G. Daniel, G. Harras, S. Hu, Y. Malevergne, V. Pisarenko, DS, A. Saichev, S. Yukalov ….