Project contract number: TIP5-CT-2006-031406

FLAGSHIP

European Framework for Safe, Efficient and Environmentally-friendly Ship Operations

Instrument type: IP Specific programme: Sustainable Surface Transport

D-C1.3 Cost/Benefit analysis

Start date of project: 2007-01-01 Duration of project: 48 months

Due date: 2008-09-01 Actual delivery date: 2009-01-20

Lead contractor: MARINTEK

Revision: 1.0

Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Sixth Framework Programme (2002-2006) Dissemination Level

PU Public

PP Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services)

RE Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services)

CO Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services) Confidential

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Document summary information

Authors and contributors

Initials Author Organisation Role

ØJR Ørnulf Jan Rødseth MARINTEK Editor, contributor

ÅT Åsmund Tjora MARINTEK Contributor

RD Rory Doyle BMT Contributor

PNO Per Norman Oma AFS Contributor

GB G.Balzano CONSAR Contributor

CV Christos Vazouras Minoan Contributor

RG Rocco Gargiulo CONSAR Contributor

GF Gisle Fiksdal Lodic Contributor

Revision history

Rev. Who Date Comment

0.1 RG 2008-02-27 Draft table of contents

0.2 ØJR 2008-03-06 Revised during telephone conference

0.3 ØJR 2008-03-12 Revised during telephone conference

0.4 All 2008-05-30 Prepared during Athens meeting, previous input from CONSAR

0.5 ØJR 2008-06-01 Clean up for further work

0.6 ØJR 2008-06-10 Additional after telecon

0.7 ØJR 2008-06-20 Accident statistics, new material from AFS

0.8 ØJR 2008-08-26 After TeleCon Aug. 26th.

0.9 ÅT 2008-11-15 Added material on Bayesian networks

0.10 ØJR 2009-01-05 First draft version 1, added description of prognosis tools

1.0 ØJR 2009-01-20 First version

Quality Control

Who Date

Checked by lead partner ØJR, MARINTEK

Checked by SP PNO, Autronica Fire and Safety AS

Checked by internal reviewer NN, TEMIS

Company internal coding (if any)

Main responsible Internal reference number

Disclaimer

The content of the publication herein is the sole responsibility of the publishers and it does not necessarily represent the views expressed by the European Commission or its services.

While the information contained in the documents is believed to be accurate, the authors(s) or any other participant in the FLAGSHIP consortium make no warranty of any kind with regard to this material including, but not limited to the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.

Neither the FLAGSHIP Consortium nor any of its members, their officers, employees or agents shall be responsible or liable in negligence or otherwise howsoever in respect of any inaccuracy or omission herein.

Without derogating from the generality of the foregoing neither the FLAGSHIP Consortium nor any of its members, their officers, employees or agents shall be liable for any direct or indirect or consequential loss or damage caused by or arising from any information advice or inaccuracy or omission herein.

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Executive summary This document is revision one of the cost-benefit analysis for an integrated emergency management system (ISEMS). The document provides a methodology for determining the cost-benefit based on Bayesian network technology coupled to existing statistics for damage probability. As the ISEMS is mostly useful for passenger ships, the analysis has been made mainly for that, but a section has also been included on the implications for having a simpler system onboard a merchant vessel.

The cost benefit analysis concentrates on fire and stability problems as that are the most relevant large-scale issues for passenger ships, which again are the most likely candidates for advanced ISEMS type systems.

This version of the document only contains the methodology and the detailed model used for the cost-benefit analysis. It is published now to get input on the approach before interviews with experts commences.

It has proven a very challenging task to produce the cost benefit analysis due to the lack of statistically significant data on ship accidents and by what they are caused. Thus, the work has had to restart several times when initial assumptions were found to be unverifiable. Finally, it was decided to use a Bayesian network to mdodel the main components of the emergency management process and to use the little statistical data that is available to calibrate the model.

In the next stages, when this approach has been accepted by the project partners, experts will be used to enter probability data into the model. Currently, there are also some details missing on the cost aspect, but this will be inserted as soon as deliverable D-C1.4 is finished where the actual system topology is described.

Thus, the current version of the document contains the basic methodology only. The next and final version of the document will be published at the end of February.

Final quality control will be deferred to the next version.

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List of abbreviations B4 – Sub-project B4 of flagship (Alarm filtering) C1 – Sub-project C1 of Flagship (The sub-project responsible for this deliverable) CEFOR – The Central Union of Marine Underwriters CAM – Centralized Alert Management system (developed in subproject B4) CBA – Cost-Benefit Analysis FSA – Formal Safety Assessment HTTP – HyperText Transfer Protocol (Internet protocol for web contents) HVAC – Heat Ventilation and Air Condition IMO – International Maritime Organization (www.imo.org). ISEMS – Integrated Safety and Emergency System PDA – Personal Data Assistant RCO – Risk Control Option ROPAX – RORO Passenger ship (typically car and passenger ferry) RORO – Roll On, Roll Off ship SAR – Search and Rescue (Organization) SOLAS – International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (IMO convention). VSAT – Very Small Aperture Terminal (for satellite communication – commercial system).

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Table of contents

1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................9 1.1 Scope ...........................................................................................................................9 1.2 Overview of previous works ..........................................................................................10 1.3 Potential benefit of work ................................................................................................10 1.4 Structure of document ....................................................................................................10

2. Methodology .........................................................................................................................11 2.1 Introduction and simplicity principle .............................................................................11 2.2 Formal Safety Analysis ..................................................................................................11

2.2.1 Structure of FSA .............................................................................................11 2.2.2 Scope of work .................................................................................................12

2.3 Ship types .......................................................................................................................12 2.3.1 Passenger ship – large overnight ferry ............................................................13 2.3.2 Cargo ship – container/RORO carrier.............................................................13

2.4 Incident types .................................................................................................................13 2.5 Functions analysed .........................................................................................................15 2.6 Cost calculation ..............................................................................................................16

2.6.1 Factors considered...........................................................................................16 2.6.2 Calculation method .........................................................................................17 2.6.3 Ship, wireless and shore ..................................................................................18

2.7 Benefits calculation ........................................................................................................18 2.7.1 Bayesian network model .................................................................................18 2.7.2 Calculation method .........................................................................................20 2.7.3 Interview method ............................................................................................21

3. Description of ISEMS functions for CBA..........................................................................22 3.1 Physical topology for different ship types......................................................................22 3.2 Baseline functions ..........................................................................................................24

3.2.1 General overview ............................................................................................24 3.2.2 Fire management .............................................................................................24 3.2.3 Evacuation support and situation assessment .................................................24 3.2.4 Stability and strength.......................................................................................25 3.2.5 Prognosis functions .........................................................................................25

3.3 Reference ISEMS functions ...........................................................................................25 3.3.1 General status overview functions ..................................................................25 3.3.2 Fire management .............................................................................................28 3.3.3 Evacuation support and situation assessment .................................................33 3.3.4 Stability and strength.......................................................................................37 3.3.5 Prognosis functions .........................................................................................38 3.3.6 Ship-shore coordination and management ......................................................39 3.3.7 Wireless ISEMS ..............................................................................................39

4. General benefit analysis ......................................................................................................40

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4.1 Overview ........................................................................................................................40 4.2 Incident statistics ............................................................................................................40

4.2.1 Number of ships ..............................................................................................41 4.2.2 Casualties ........................................................................................................41

4.3 Incident cost statistics.....................................................................................................42 4.4 Additional beneficial factors not included in quantitative analysis ...............................45 4.5 Other types of benefits ...................................................................................................46

4.5.1 Reduction in stress level..................................................................................46 4.5.2 More efficient emergency management organisation .....................................47 4.5.3 Maintenance (higher reliability)......................................................................48 4.5.4 Incident/accident reduction .............................................................................48 4.5.5 Insurance costs ................................................................................................48 4.5.6 Environmental benefits ...................................................................................49 4.5.7 Safety benefits .................................................................................................49 4.5.8 Security benefits analysis ................................................................................50

5. Bayesian network model .....................................................................................................51 5.1 The network model.........................................................................................................51 5.2 General about the variable descriptions .........................................................................51 5.3 Variables describing the incident ...................................................................................52

5.3.1 IncidentType ...................................................................................................52 5.3.2 CollisionSize ...................................................................................................53 5.3.3 StrikingStruck .................................................................................................53 5.3.4 InitialFatalities.................................................................................................53 5.3.5 Fire ..................................................................................................................54 5.3.6 Flooding ..........................................................................................................54 5.3.7 FireInitLocation...............................................................................................54

5.4 Variables describing training and quality of crew, and bridge assessment....................55 5.4.1 Training ...........................................................................................................55 5.4.2 CrewQuality ....................................................................................................55 5.4.3 TechExperience...............................................................................................55 5.4.4 BridgeAssessment ...........................................................................................56

5.5 Variables describing initial response and local containment of situation ......................56 5.5.1 OOWAssessment ............................................................................................56 5.5.2 InitialMustering...............................................................................................56 5.5.3 LocalAssessment.............................................................................................57 5.5.4 FireLocalManagement ....................................................................................57 5.5.5 FloodingLocalManagement ............................................................................57

5.6 Variables describing handling of the situation after the initial stages............................58 5.6.1 OnSceneAssessment .......................................................................................58 5.6.2 DmgCtrlPerformance ......................................................................................58 5.6.3 FireContainment..............................................................................................59 5.6.4 FireNeutralization ...........................................................................................59

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5.6.5 FloodingContainment......................................................................................59 5.6.6 FloodingNeutralization ...................................................................................60 5.6.7 SinkingMode ...................................................................................................60 5.6.8 Containment ....................................................................................................60

5.7 Variables describing evacuation operations ...................................................................61 5.7.1 EvacCrewAssessment .....................................................................................61 5.7.2 EvacCrewPerformance....................................................................................61 5.7.3 EscapeRouteAvailability.................................................................................62 5.7.4 PassengerPerformance ....................................................................................62 5.7.5 LocalEvacuation..............................................................................................62 5.7.6 FullMustering..................................................................................................63 5.7.7 Evacuation.......................................................................................................63

5.8 Variables describing the outcome of the emergency......................................................64 5.8.1 EvacuationFatalities ........................................................................................64 5.8.2 Fatalities ..........................................................................................................64 5.8.3 FireDamage .....................................................................................................64 5.8.4 FloodingDamage .............................................................................................65 5.8.5 ShipDamage ....................................................................................................65

5.9 ISEMS related variables.................................................................................................66 5.9.1 ISEMS .............................................................................................................66 5.9.2 ISEMSMain.....................................................................................................66 5.9.3 ISEMSToShore ...............................................................................................66 5.9.4 ISEMSWireless ...............................................................................................67 5.9.5 PrognosisTool .................................................................................................67

6. Questionnaire used in investigation ...................................................................................68 6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................68 6.2 Questions about training, crew and officer quality, and situation assessment – without ISEMS .........................................................................................................................69

6.2.1 Training ...........................................................................................................69 6.2.2 CrewQuality ....................................................................................................69 6.2.3 BridgeAssessment ...........................................................................................69 6.2.4 OOWAssessment ............................................................................................70 6.2.5 InitialMustering...............................................................................................70 6.2.6 LocalAssessment.............................................................................................70 6.2.7 OnSceneAssessment .......................................................................................71 6.2.8 DmgCtrlPerformance ......................................................................................71 6.2.9 EvacCrewAssessment .....................................................................................71 6.2.10 EvacCrewPerformance....................................................................................72 6.2.11 PassengerPerformance ....................................................................................72

6.3 Questions about training, crew and officer quality, and situation assessment with ISEMS – Experienced users ...............................................................................................................74

6.3.1 Training ...........................................................................................................74

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6.3.2 BridgeAssessment ...........................................................................................74 6.3.3 OOWAssessment ............................................................................................75 6.3.4 LocalAssessment.............................................................................................75 6.3.5 OnSceneAssessment .......................................................................................75 6.3.6 EvacCrewAssessment .....................................................................................76

6.4 Questions about training, crew and officer quality, and situation assessment with ISEMS – Inexperienced users.............................................................................................................77

6.4.1 TechExperience...............................................................................................77 6.4.2 BridgeAssessment ...........................................................................................77 6.4.3 OOWAssessment ............................................................................................78 6.4.4 LocalAssessment.............................................................................................78 6.4.5 OnSceneAssessment .......................................................................................79 6.4.6 EvacCrewAssessment .....................................................................................79 6.4.7 MusteringOverview.........................................................................................80

6.5 Questions about situation containment and damage control ..........................................81 6.5.1 FireLocalManagement ....................................................................................81 6.5.2 FloodingLocalContainment.............................................................................82 6.5.3 FireContainment..............................................................................................83 6.5.4 FireNeutralization ...........................................................................................83 6.5.5 FloodingContainment......................................................................................84 6.5.6 FloodingNeutralization ...................................................................................85

6.6 Questions about evacuation operations ..........................................................................86 6.6.1 EscapeRouteAvailability.................................................................................86 6.6.2 LocalEvacuation..............................................................................................87 6.6.3 FullMustering..................................................................................................89 6.6.4 Evacuation.......................................................................................................91

7. Analysis results.....................................................................................................................93 7.1 Basic methodology.........................................................................................................93 7.2 Results of interviews ......................................................................................................93 7.3 Benefit calculation in terms of reduced fatalities...........................................................93

8. Costs analysis........................................................................................................................94 8.1 General principles...........................................................................................................94 8.2 Baseline system ..............................................................................................................94 8.3 Ship ISEMS....................................................................................................................94 8.4 Land ISEMS...................................................................................................................95 8.5 Wireless ISEMS .............................................................................................................95 8.6 Prognosis functions ........................................................................................................95

9. Quantitative cost/benefit comparison ................................................................................97

10. Conclusions and recommendations....................................................................................98

11. References .........................................................................................................................99

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1. Introduction

1.1 Scope

ISEMS (Integrated Safety and Emergency Management System), in its basic concept, is a system able to increase the general efficacy and efficiency in the management of an emergency on board a ship. Compared with existing solutions, the ISEMS will basically give to the operator and to the decision makers a more powerful tool by integrating existing functions and add new functions that can make use of the greater amount of available information. The standardized safety system analysed is described in the previous works of the sub-project C of Flagship and reported in the relevant deliverables ([D-C1.1] and [D-C1.2]).

The purpose of this deliverable is to investigate the cost-benefit trade-off represented by the introduction of an ISEMS on board a ship and on shore. An ISEMS will require some additional equipment, it will require some additional engineering and it may require more training and maintenance. This represents the cost side. On the other hand, it will give benefits in being able to respond more efficiently to an emergency, in effect and efficiency of drills and training and also in day to day operations. This represents some of the issues on the benefits side.

This deliverable will give a detailed analysis on the cost-benefit aspects of introducing an ISEMS on a passenger ship. A qualitative assessment of a simpler system for a merchant ship will also be included.

The analysis will be broken down into four cases:

Non-integrated system: No integrated emergency management, basic SOLAS requirements satisfied. This is the baseline case and is used as reference for existing statistics.

Integrated on board: An integrated system is fitted on board with functionality as described in chapter 3.

Integrated to shore: As in the previous case, but with additional functionality in owner's office to access integrated emergency management system.

Wireless on board: As in case two, but with functionality to let central persons on board access information from the integrated emergency management system. This applies to on scene commander (OSC) and possibly to people responsible for mustering.

Although the technical annex suggests performing a full FSA (Formal Safety Assessment), the subproject has decided against that, as we are not primarily interested in comparing the ISEMS against other risk control options (RCO). However, the methodology employed is based on the FSA and uses much of the same terminology. An FSA can be performed if other RCOs are analysed in the same manner as the ISEMS.

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1.2 Overview of previous works

This work is a continuation of the previous work performed in the sub-project C1 of Flagship. In particular, in C1.1 where an assessment of the emergencies has been done and in C1.2 where the specific functions and requirements for a standardized ISEMS have been recognized through a safety analysis.

Previous projects that are relevant for this work are mainly [ITEA-DS], [SWAN] and [DSS_DC]. However, neither of these projects did a cost-benefit analysis of ISEMS and most of the relevant use of material from these projects were done in the first part of C1 that led up to [D-C1.1].

Use has also been made of other research, particularly on the use of Bayesian network technology in formal safety analysis and on probabilities for passenger ship accidents. References to previous work have been made where appropriate.

1.3 Potential benefit of work

Although we do not expect to provide a fully accurate and very detailed cost-benefit analysis, the intention is to provide a rough and robust comparison that can aid future ship owners in assessing the benefit of an ISEMS. The methodology may also serve as a template for doing similar in-house exercises to more accurately look at specific needs and constraints in a certain company.

This deliverable is also important as basis for the design work in C1. This document contains a list of functions that may be implemented in the Flagship demonstration and the CBA will aid in determining what of these functions to prioritize.

In the long term, one can also envisage that this document will aid in deciding what complexity level ISEMS will be appropriate for different ship classes if at all any, This can in term aid in providing more standardized approaches to computer assisted emergency management.

1.4 Structure of document

Chapter 2 describes the methodology and the reasoning behind certain decisions that was made regarding the methods used.

Chapter 3 describes the proposed ISEMS system and its components. This is background for the experts that have contributed data to the analysis.

Chapter 4 contains the general benefit analysis in terms of benefit indicators.

Chapter 5 contains the Bayesian model used in the analysis.

Chapter 6 contains the questionnaires used to get input from the experts.

Chapter 7 contains the analysis results.

Chapter 8 contains the cost model.

Chapter 9 contains the conclusions and the actual cost-benefit analysis. This also includes a qualitative analysis on the application of such a system for a merchant vessel.

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2. Methodology

2.1 Introduction and simplicity principle

It is clear from previous literature studies and workshop discussions internally in C1 that it will be extremely difficult to get accurate figures representing the benefits of an ISEMS. To compare benefits to financial costs (which are the most relevant for this type of system) one need to convert all benefits into monetary gains and that is next to impossible. Thus, we have opted for a relatively simplistic methodology with regards to benefits. This includes using the loss of lives over the ship's life time as the main metric.

The simplicity principle also means that this document does not contain any statistical analysis of the sensitivity of the figures or a more dynamic approach to cost range comparisons, e.g., by including probabilities. As the basic figures are uncertain and to some degree subjective, it was believed that doing more complex analysis would only obfuscate the underlying data. This principle will be further elaborated in the coming sections.

2.2 Formal Safety Analysis

This report will not perform a full FSA (Formal Safety Analysis). Rather, it will use the FSA framework and a selection of the steps of the FSA to provide a simplified analysis, based on the ISEMS as the only risk control option. A passenger ship was selected due to the relatively high criticality of the safety systems on board. A short discussion on the implications for a container ship will be done afterwards.

2.2.1 Structure of FSA

The FSA process is schematically described below [SAFEDOR-4.1.1] from which Figure 1 I is taken. A formal safety assessment consists of five main steps:

1. Hazard identification: What are the potential problems one needs to consider in the analysis?

2. Risk analysis: What can go wrong?

3. Risk control options: What means do we have available for reducing or alleviating risks?

4. Cost benefit assessment: Comparisons between different risk control options against a quantitative cost and benefit of each.

5. Recommendations for decision making

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Definition of Goals, Systems, Operations

Hazard Identification

Cause and Frequency Analysis

Consequence Analysis

Risk Summation

Risk Controlled?

Options to decrease Frequencies

Options to mitigate Consequences

Cost Benefit Assessment

Reporting

NoNo

Yes

Scenario definition

Preparatory Step

Step 1Hazard Identification

Step 2Risk Analysis

Step 3Risk Control Options

Step 4 Cost Benefit Assessment

Step 5 Recommendations for Decision Making

Figure 1 - Structure of a Formal Safety Assessment

As this work will focus on analysing the effects of ISEMS, it is mainly the 3rd step of the FSA that is described. Works on hazard identification and risk analysis for Cruise and RoPax vessels have been performed in other projects [SAFEDOR-4.1.1], [MSC85/INF2], [MSC85/INF3], and the data from these works will be used in the models for evaluating ISEMS.

2.2.2 Scope of work

The purpose of this exercise is to study ISEMS as a risk control option and analyse the mitigating effect an ISEMS will have in an emergency situation. The situations studied are fire and collision on a passenger ship.

Three groups of operations related to the handling of the emergency are studied:

Initial handling of the situation, i.e. attempts to contain and neutralize the situation in its early stages.

Damage control, i.e. containment and neutralization attempts after the initial handling.

Evacuation of crew and passengers, both local evacuation from affected zones and a possible full mustering and evacuation from the ship.

2.3 Ship types

Two ship types have been selected for the analysis. One type represents passenger ships, although the analysis will specifically use a large ROPAX ferry as example. The other type is a cargo ship exemplified by a container ship or a RORO carrier.

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The latter ship type will not be covered by the Bayesian network method. It will be handled by a quantitative comparison of the two ship types and the effects of the different ISEMS variants.

2.3.1 Passenger ship – large overnight ferry

Statistics for this category will cover all passenger ships, but crew interviews will be made only for a large passenger ferry with overnight passengers. Although there are significant differences between general passenger ship (e.g., cruise vessels) and passenger ferries, these differences are of two main categories:

Cruise vessels tend to be larger and are mainly used in the leisure industry. Thus they may get a higher impact on market reputation from accidents and they may require more investments in crowd management support and particularly for evacuation. Thus, there may be a higher benefit of investing in an ISEMS.

Although typically smaller than the large cruise vessels, passenger ferries may be more complex in that they also have to consider dangerous goods and in general flammable material on the cargo decks. They may also have a greater problem with overnight passengers as these tend to be less familiar with the ship, staying onboard for perhaps less than 24 hours. So, also in this case, there may be special benefits in investing in an ISEMS.

We will come back to these issues during the analysis, but the starting hypothesis is that the differences will create the same bias in opinions so that the restriction of interviewing ferry officers may be justified.

2.3.2 Cargo ship – container/RORO carrier

One version of the ISEMS that is analysed in this paper is intended for "advanced" cargo ships. Advanced in this context means that it is large enough and of sufficient value both in terms of ship and cargo to warrant the consideration of safety management systems above what the minimum SOLAS requirements specifies.

Container and/or RORO ships were picked as case to consider as there is specific availability of statistics for these ships on casualties and value of insurance payouts. However, many other advanced cargo ship types will also be good candidates for an ISEMS and even less advanced cargo ships may make good use of such a system.

Note that the insurance data used uses the combined class "Container, car carrier and RORO". As car carriers are a special form of RORO, it will normally be referred to as just "Container/RORO".

2.4 Incident types

The incident types investigated are limited to hull damage after collision, contact or grounding and fire and/or explosion. The reason for this is again to get as accurate statistics as possible and also to focus on incidents where the ISEMS may be of particular use, i.e., fire fighting and stability and strength analysis. In addition, both incidents will in many cases lead to evacuation of

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the ship. This is a critical part of emergency management that are of significant interest in the analysis.

One should in particular notice that machinery related incidents is by far the largest in current statistics, but as these incidents normally does not cause immediate danger for people or environment, they are less suitable for inclusion in an ISEMS CBA. Thus, this incident type is left out of the discussions.

Due to the restrictions of existing statistics, there will not be made any differentiation about incidents in port or at sea. Thus, the interview objects will be asked to state their overall opinion of the benefit of the presented functions. For the same reason, there will neither be made any differentiation between minor or major incidents. The interview objects will again be asked of the overall benefits.

Table 1 shows the incident types defined in [D-C1.1] and what incidents are of interest in this particular analysis.

Table 1 – Cross reference to incident types

Code Incident Hull Fire

1.0 Fire

1.1 Fire/explosion in port x

1.2 Fire/explosion at sea (engine or accommodation) x

2.0 Damage to ship

2.1 Stranding or grounding (powered, drift) x

2.2 Collision with other ship or object x

2.3 Flooding/hull leakage, structural failure x

2.4 Main engine fails, emergency stop, blackout

2.5 Steering fails

2.6 Heavy weather damage (superstructure)

3.0 Pollution

3.1 Pollution on board/SOPEP

3.2 Pollution of environment

4.0 Unlawful acts (Security/ISPS)

4.1 Unlawful acts (assault etc.)

4.2 Hijack/Terrorism

4.3 Bomb threat/foreign object

4.4 Piracy/Robbery

5.0 Personnel accidents

5.1 Medical emergency (one or few person) on ship

5.2 Medical epidemic/multiple injuries on ship

5.3 Man overboard

6.0 Cargo related (see also group 3)

6.1 Leakage of flammable material

6.2 Physical movement of cargo, stability hazards

6.3 Dangerous change in cargo condition

6.4 Danger of loss of deck cargo

7.0 Emergency assistance to other ship

7.1 Assisting OSC Ship/MRCC

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Code Incident Hull Fire

7.2 Acting as OSC Ship

8.0 Heavy weather (see also group 2)

8.1 Heavy weather at sea

8.2 Heavy weather in port

9.0 Other incidents

9.1 Evacuation (common outcome of several) x x

9.2 Helicopter operations

All incidents will be assessed on the following aspects by being explicitly represented in the Bayesian network:

Manageability: How much easier it is to manage the incident on board in terms of determining status, giving instructions to damage control teams and to assess the outcome of the incident.

Shore assistance: How much easier it is to coordinate any assistance that is required from shore side specialists in the owner's office.

Prediction: How much a prediction tool for stability and fire spread will help in handling the incident? Note that stability has been selected as this is of main interest to passenger ships. Strength issues are of less importance.

2.5 Functions analysed

Table 2 shows the functions that will be considered for the two incident types. The functions most relevant for collision and fire respectively are indicated in the corresponding single cell while functions relevant for both are indicated as two merged cells. The table is based on the corresponding functionality index in [D-C1.1].

Table 2 – Function cross reference

Class Incident Hull Fire

Mandatory safety and emergency management functions

1.1 Fire control plan / General safety and damage control plan 3.5.3

1.2 Fire detection and alarm system 3.2.1-3

1.3 Extinguishing systems monitoring

1.4 Evacuation control (low location lights, directional sound and similar) 3.3.4

1.5 Passenger and crew accounting 3.3.1

1.6.1 Dangerous cargo data registration systems 3.3.3

1.6.2 Passenger data registration systems 3.5.2

1.7 Ventilation control 3.3.2

1.8 Fire door and damper control 3.2.4

1.9 SSD - Safety Shut-Down

1.10 Water tight and shell doors 3.4.1

1.11 Water ingress and bilge monitoring 3.4.2

1.12 Patrols

1.13 CCTV Control 3.3.5

1.14 Alarm system integration 3.1.2

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1.15 Cargo condition monitoring systems

1.16 Tank level monitoring 3.4.2

1.17 ISM checklists (SMS) 3.5.2

1.18 ISM support functions

1.19 Reporting systems

1.20 SAR Cooperation

Additional basic functions

2.1 Hull stress monitoring

2.2 Electronic plotting table 3.5.3

2.3 Evacuation monitoring

2.4 Messaging module 3.5.4

2.5 Task tracking

2.6 Duty roster

2.7 Logistics and resource management decision support

Prognosis functions

3.1 Stability calculator 3.4.3

3.2 Strength calculator

3.3 Evacuation 3.3.3

3.4 Fire 3.2.5

3.5 Manoeuvrability

3.6 Constrained ship routing - weather routing

Integrated functions and systems

4.1 Passenger ship safety centre

4.2 Monitoring of systems for safe return to port

4.3 Integrated monitoring system

4.4 FMS - Fire Management System Implied in last.

4.5 EMS - Emergency Management System Implied in last.

4.6 ISEMS - Integrated Safety and Emergency Management System All above

2.6 Cost calculation

2.6.1 Factors considered

Table 3 lists the cost factors that has been identified by C1 and shows what factors will be considered in the analysis. The note gives additional information where necessary. The CM column gives the cost model applied, l (lifetime), c (computer lifetime) or y (yearly) – see next section.

Table 3 – Overview of cost factors

Cost factor Inc. CM Note

Equipment, engineering, commissioning – considering lifetime X l+c 1

Additional costs to existing equipment 2

Operational costs, technical X y 3

Operational costs, operations X y 4

Additional space requirements 5

Upgrades to system in terms of functions X y 6

Upgrades to system due to ship changes 7

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Security related costs 8

Environmental costs 9

The following notes apply:

1. The cost is based on installation in a new building where existing equipment (navigation, fire, stability, automation) is able to provide a suitable digital interface to the ISEMS. The costs are based on a certain lifetime for various parts of the system. This is discussed further in section Error! Reference source not found..

2. It is assumed that no additional costs will be required to modify exiting equipment as a new building is assumed. It is also assumed that the ship equipment will include the Central Alert Management (CAM) module as specified by subproject B4.

3. Technical operational costs are power costs, ship-shore communication costs, spare parts replacements and maintenance. Power cost is negligible and the additional communication cost should be zero as it is assumed that the ship normally use a VSAT link that has a fixed price per month, independent of usage. Maintenance and spare parts will be included.

4. Training costs are included in this component. It is not assumed that the ISEMS will increase or reduce the need for personnel on board or on shore. A lower work load is expected, but this will be included in the benefit analysis as a qualitative component.

5. It is not assumed that the ISEMS will require additional space neither for crew nor for system.

6. A yearly cost is estimated for upgrades and maintenance of software in the system.

7. Costs associated to changes in the ship (detector installations, changes in accommodation or cargo spaces, etc.) are not included.

8. Security related costs are costs required to ensure that the system cannot be tampered with or used by unauthorized persons. It is assumed that the system is designed according to general best practice for safety systems and that no special costs beyond normal engineering and equipment costs are required.

9. Environmental costs are related to emissions to environment during production, operation or decommissioning of equipment. These costs are similar to what one has for other computer systems onboard and is not covered in the analysis. The additional burden on the environment from the ISEMS system is assumed to be low.

2.6.2 Calculation method

The cost model consists of the following main components:

1. Cl: Costs over the lifetime of the ship (assumed to be Tl = 25 years). This typically includes cables, engineering and system interfaces.

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2. Cc: Costs associated with upgrades of computer components. This mainly includes the workstations including displays. It is assumed that the lifetime of these is Tc =5 years.

3. Cy: Yearly costs associated with operation and maintenance.

A simple cost model is applied where total costs per year C is calculated as follows:

(Eq. 1)

2.6.3 Ship, wireless and shore

In addition to the grouping described above, costs will also be categorized according to where it is applied. The categories used are:

- Ship equipment: Fixed equipment on ship, including wires and installations on bridge and engine control room.

- Wireless: Additional equipment related to wireless use on board.

- Shore: Additional costs associated with installations in shore office.

Note 1: The main cost associated with wireless installations is the network infrastructure. As cost figures are not available for this type of installations on a ship, only a qualitative assessment is provided in this area.

Note 2: Cost of shore system is assumed to be limited to additional software and training of personnel. This is included in the overall analysis.

2.7 Benefits calculation

The benefit will primarily be related to reduction in lost lives over a ship's lifetime. This is based on statistical data on typical consequences of incidents.

Secondarily, it will also be possible to derive reduction in damage consequence in that an incident leads to "minor damage" as apposed to "major damage". It is assumed that this indicator is more sensitive to inaccuracies in the models so it will be given a lower weight than lost lives.

2.7.1 Bayesian network model

The benefits model will be based on the Bayesian network. The Bayesian network is also called a belief network and is used here to capture the maritime experts' beliefs on how the different aspects of emergency management interact and how these aspects can be influenced by the introduction of an ISEMS.

Bayesian networks have been used in several similar applications related to formal safety assessments, see, e.g., [DNV03] and it is also suggested used in the FSA guidelines from IMO in the form of the somewhat more general influence diagram [MSC/Circ1023].

The use of a Bayesian network model is motivated by the requirements we have for the model. The model must have a level of detail that shows the effect of ISEMS; a too coarse model will

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either drown out or overestimate this effect. The model must be able to handle “hard” statistical data, but as it is difficult putting hard numbers on factors like an ISEMS’ influence on the quality of assessments and crew performance, the model must also be able to handle belief and rough estimates. A properly designed Bayesian network model will meet these requirements.

The idea for the model has been to first create a model describing the emergency handling, and then “plug in” the effect of different versions of ISEMS in the model. By changing the status of ISEMS in the model, the change in the outcome variables due to the effect of ISEMS can be studied. The results will be used to create an estimate of the change in the expected loss of life and the expected material damage (and by this the expected change in risk level) as an effect of using ISEMS.

The Bayesian network model is described in Chapter 5, but a simplified overview of the network structure is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 – Simplified structure of Bayesian network model

The Incident Description part of the network describes the incident and contains variables that describe the type of incident, secondary effects (e.g. fire or flooding caused by a collision), the initial location of a fire, and so on.

The Initial Handling part of the model contains variables that describe the OOWs assessment of the situation, the early emergency management, and attempts to contain the situation locally.

Incident Description

Initial Handling

Damage Control Evacuation

Outcome

ISEMS

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The Damage Control part contains variables that describe the on-scene assessment and damage control performance after the initial management, as well as results of containment and neutralization attempts.

The Evacuation part contains variables that describe the assessment and performance of the crew assisting with evacuation, the performance of the passengers, and the results of local evacuation, full mustering, and the evacuation from the ship.

There are also variables describing factors that will affect all three parts of the emergency management, like the training and quality of the crew, the bridge’s assessment of the situation, the crew’s experience with ISEMS-like technology, and the availability and quality of external support.

The outcome part of the model contains variables describing the likelihood of loss of life and damage to the ship.

The ISEMS part of the model contains variables describing the type of ISEMS (if any) that is used on the ship. The variants considered are

A ship that does not use ISEMS

A ship using the basic ISEMS functionality

A ship using an ISEMS variant where data is available to the on-scene crew using wireless terminals

A ship using an ISEMS variant that communicates situation data to on-shore facilities. This variant have two sub variants; with or without the use of a situation prognosis tool.

The parts of the model that are affected by the ISEMS variables are those describing the training of the crew, as well as the variables describing the quality of situation assessment at the bridge, on-scene and on-shore. Most of the variables affected by ISEMS are also affected by a technical experience variable that describes how familiar the crew is with ISEMS or ISEMS-like technical systems.

2.7.2 Calculation method

The Bayesian network basically consists of four types of nodes:

There are some on/off nodes that are used to control the existence of an ISEMS system on board or on shore.

There are some incident nodes which contains appropriate probabilities for various incidents. These nodes have also second level nodes that contain probabilities for incidents evolving into more serious situations. Probabilities in these nodes are taken from literature and specifically

a number of nodes where some nodes (typically leaf nodes) have built in probabilities from the literature. The ISEMS existence nodes is used to control the calculation of Intermediate node will have to be filled in based on expert opinions. These opinions will be collected.

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By turning ISEMS existence nodes on and off, the Bayesian network will calculate new probabilities for the specified outcome nodes. These new probabilities will then be used together with cost estimates as discussed in the following section.

2.7.3 Interview method

The interviews will be performed to determine weighting factors in the relevant nodes in the network. The detailed questions are discussed in section 6. Weights are not determined from interviews alone. Basically, there are four types of weights:

Input based on known incident statistics. This is typically input nodes representing casualty statistics and some internal nodes representing escalation of incidents.

Outcome based on known outcome statistics. The outcome nodes have known values based on available statistics (casualty rates, etc.) and the weights in these nodes will be calibrated to match outcomes after expert weights have been added to internal process oriented nodes.

Process nodes with expert weights based on interviews. These nodes and weights will typically describe how different process oriented stages of the incident management is relatively assessed by the experts.

On off nodes representing different ISEMS functionality. Some nodes are used just to turn ISEMS functionality on and off.

As the outcome nodes are calibrated to known outcomes from statistics, it should not be necessary to assign very accurate absolute weights to internal nodes. It is sufficient if the relative weights are correct. However, this does require a linear relationship between node outcomes.

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3. Description of ISEMS functions for CBA

This section will describe the reference system solution for respectively the container ship and the passenger ferry. Other ships in the respective classes of cargo and passenger ships may use variants of the described solutions, but the descriptions here are the reference for the cost and benefit analysis.

The first section will give a brief introduction to the typical system topology, with weight on the requirements for subproject C1. However, also a possible installation for a merchant ship will be discussed.

Sub-section two will give a short description of the baseline system that is used to compare new functions to. This is divided into sub-sections in the same manner as the following section that describes the new ISEMS.

Sub-sections three will go through the basic functionality of an ISEMS installed on the passenger ship. The intension of these sections is to give the experts an idea about the functionality they can expect from the system. This overview is not complete. As an example, the integrated alert display as discussed in B4 has not been included. The reason for this is to limit the overview to the most relevant functions for emergency management and to functions that are "easy" to use in normal emergency management scenarios as they are known to the authors.

3.1 Physical topology for different ship types

Figure 3 shows a typical system topology for a container ship. The concept that will be used in Flagship is to make use of the graphic capabilities of the stability computer (Lodic, see sup-project C2) to also present fire and other relevant information. The latter is selected data from the automation system. This particular structure is dealt with in subproject C2 and will only be qualitatively analysed in this deliverable.

Figure 3 – Simple ISEMS for merchant ships

It is possible to transfer data from the ISEMS to shore if that is desired, but that is not included in the Flagship demonstrations for this system.

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Figure 4 – Advanced ISEMS for passenger ships

Figure 4 shows a full ISEMS system for a passenger ship with relevant connections to shore entities. The stability computer will not be part of the demonstrations so it has a dotted boundary line.

The system consists of a number of safety workstations:

Main safety workstation: This is the primary station for safety operations, normally located in the safety centre on the bridge.

Secondary safety workstation: This is the main backup workstation. It can, e.g. be located in the Engine Control Room (ECR) or in another dedicated backup safety workstation. Note that for new ships under the legislation on safe return to port, it may be necessary to have secondary workstations in more than one location.

Tertiary station: This is a third level workstation that can provide all functionality. This can be located as backup stations in the hotel or in other compartments of the ship. Note that the tertiary station as indicated here will have limited redundancy. Thus, it may or may not satisfy safe return to port requirements, dependent on overall safety strategy.

Shore station: This is the main shore slave to the onboard systems. This will typically be located in the owner's office. The link between ship and shore may be simple VSAT links or redundant links, making use of VSAT in addition to, e.g., Inmarsat C, B or Fleet services.

External stations: Several other HTTP based displays can be used on shore, using the shore station as HTTP server. This would enable, e.g., SAR services to be on line to the emergency related information.

Mobile stations: Internal ship wireless communication (about same as above). On scene to bridge/ECR. This should be extendable to ship-ship, for rescue operations.

The main focus of the Flagship C1 demonstration will be on fire as that is arguably the most critical incident for most passenger ship operators. This means that the interface to the stability computer will not be used in this demonstration. However, one should keep in mind that stability

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is also a very important issue for this ship class and the cost-benefit analysis will take that aspect into consideration.

3.2 Baseline functions

3.2.1 General overview

The fire safety plan is a poster typically on the wall of the safety centre and in any other relevant location onboard.

ISM checklists are typically paper based and is maintained by a separate log writer or is used directly by those responsible for the management of the incident.

The plotting table on larger passenger ships are typically located as wall or table mounted GA drawing where a plastic cover allows writing with special pencils. One will normally also use moveable markers to indicate, e.g., damage control teams or damage locations.

The CCTV control station is a small console with buttons and possibly a joystick which control the display of CCTV images on a number of screens mounted in the safety centre of the ship. Secondary control stations will also be available, e.g., in the hotel section or the engine control room.

3.2.2 Fire management

The baseline case is a fire detection system with a simple led based mimic showing what section a fire alarm belongs to and an alarm list giving more detailed information about what addressable detectors are activated. One may also consider a screen based system where alarms are indicated in a simple ship general arrangement, but where smoke density or heat indication is unavailable.

Fire door control is similarly based on a simple led mimic on a dedicated console in the safety centre. One will normally not be able to easily compare fire extent with local fire door or damper status.

Dangerous good locations are based on paper lists available in the safety centre. They are not plotted into the ship general arrangement.

3.2.3 Evacuation support and situation assessment

Most of the functions described in this section are manually available either in the form of paper lists (passenger lists, muster lists and check lists) or as stand alone systems (HVAC control). Directional low level lighting will not normally be available at all unless integrated in a relatively advanced management system.

Low location lights will normally be controlled via one or more switches to turn all lights on or off.

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3.2.4 Stability and strength

Stability and strength functions will be available in a stand alone stability and strength computer. This will also for an ISEMS be necessary and an important part of the overall systems, but the ISEMS will be able to present some of the information from this system on the general emergency situation display.

It is expected that ballasting, pump start and stop etc. still will be managed from the stability computer or the automation system with the help of the stability computer, even if an ISEMS is in use.

3.2.5 Prognosis functions

In real life, the prognosis functions may or may not be part of a conventional emergency management system. For the analysis, the prognosis functions are defined to be a separate module that is added to the ISEMS. Thus, one should consider prognosis as not part of the baseline system.

3.3 Reference ISEMS functions

3.3.1 General status overview functions

3.3.1.1 Fire safety plan / general damage control plan

The fire safety plan is normally a general arrangement type drawing of all decks of the ship with additional coding for life saving appliances, fire related equipment and possibly other systems that can be indicated on a geographic oriented mimic.

For the purposes of the ISEMS discussed here, this mimic will be used as basis for most fire related functions as well as for the electronic plotting table (see 3.3.1.3). Examples are shown in the corresponding sections.

3.3.1.2 ISM checklists

An electronic checklist manager replaces the paper based checklists that are currently used. The benefit of using electronic lists is that the status of the list can be shown to more than the log writer, also to shore organisations, and that the time at which an action was started or stopped is recorded in an electronic log together with other incident information.

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Figure 5 - ISM Checklist manager

The ISM checklist manager can also be connected to the ISEMS, including the electronic plotting table, for automatic filling of checklists, e.g. the checklist for fire can check out Close fire doors when the FMS detects that all fire doors in all fire zones has been closed, and with a connection to the electronic plotting the ISM checklist manager can at all times be updated with the state of all Mobile Fire groups, e.g. action or on air.

3.3.1.3 Electronic plotting table (EPT)

An electronic plotting table (EPT) is an electronic replacement for the standard plotting table that is placed in the safety centre of most large passenger ships. Instead of indicating position of assets and other objects with pencils and markers, this can now be done by placing electronic icons on the general arrangement drawing.

In addition, the EPT will also be able to show other information from the ISEMS as discussed in the following section.

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Figure 6 - Electronic Plotting Table

The EPT can be used by the operator as a tool to keep track of the different actors during an emergency situation and register the on-board actions. The operator can visualize where the fire groups are boundary cooling, where the stretcher teams are, if there are any casualties etc.

The information registered using the EPT can then again be transferred to shore and be presented on the on-shore ISEMS workstation reducing the voice communication between ship and shore as the shore office have all the available information.

3.3.1.4 CCTV control and display

Most larger ships have a number of closed circuit television cameras available for day to day operation as well as incident management. Control and monitoring of these cameras can be integrated with the ISEMS to provide better coordination of incident information with visual inspection.

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Figure 7 - CCTV control and display

The main purpose of the integration function is to give a graphical presentation for CCTV control as well as facilities for viewing CCTV visuals in conjunction with the ISEMS displays.

In the main detailed diagram it is possible to control the CCTV cameras onboard. To access the cameras the operator can select Show CCTV button in the section in the diagram forcing all CCTV cameras to be visible for the operator. The operator then can select every camera in the diagram and from its menu present the video feed either on the ISEMS or on a dedicated CCTV monitor beside it. Using the buttons in the overlay section the operator can select the next CCTV camera or clear the diagram of CCTV cameras.

The main benefit of this function is that the user is able to see where the camera is located and in what direction it points. It is also easy to relate the camera to ongoing activity or events that need to be observed.

3.3.2 Fire management

3.3.2.1 Fire detection and indication

This function gives a graphical presentation of the location and status of fire detectors on the ship. The following functions are available:

- Information bar: The information bar in the upper left corner shows the following information about a selected object in the mimic:

o Date the object status was last changed

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o Unique customer text identifying the object

o Object status (e.g. normal, fault, alarm)

o Detector sensitivity

o Temperature

- Overview diagram: The area in the lower right corner shows any active and unacknowledged alarm as well as where in the general arrangement the current detailed diagram is taken from. It also allows navigation by clicking to select a new area for the detailed diagram.

- Main detailed diagram: This is the actual mimic, based on the general arrangement, showing the location of all fire detectors, manual call points and any other electronic or passive equipment that may be of the interest to the users. Each detector shows its alarm state (fault, pre-warning or alarm) as well as the acknowledgement state. The area covered by the detector will also show smoke density and/or heat level by being colour filled. Thus, it is possible to show both alarm status as well as actual status.

- Overlay selections: Buttons on the upper right allow the user to select various overlays or mimics. The button will be coloured orange or green if there are active (unacknowledged) warnings or alarms associated with that overlay or mimic.

Figure 8 - Fire detection and indication mimic

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3.3.2.2 Smoke spread and heat

Figure 9 -Smoke spread and heat

This function gives a graphical presentation of the smoke spread and heat during a fire incident. The functionality of the Overview diagram, Main detailed diagram and Overlay selections are the same as in 3.3.2.1, in addition the following functions are available in the Main detailed diagram:

- Smoke spread: In addition to presenting the state of the detectors, the Main detailed diagram presents the spreading of smoke in the mimic, even before the detectors has entered an alarm state. The smoke spread is indicated with yellow, dark yellow, orange (pre-warning) dark orange and red (alarm).

- Heat: During a fire incident, smoke spreads fast, and large areas can indicate alarmed areas without a real fire as fire detectors detects smoke rapidly. The indication of heat in the Main detailed diagram will show where the fire is located and where action needs to be taken. Heat is indicated with purple and pink colours.

3.3.2.3 Fire door and damper monitoring and control

The fire door related functions will often come in two forms. One form is illustrated in Figure 10 where individual fire doors are shown with their status. This mimic may also allow operator to close individual doors if the doors allow individual control.

Heat

Smoke spread

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Figure 10 - Fire door and damper status indicator mimic

Another fire door control mimic is the one shown in the next figure where the conventional hardware panel for door control is transferred to the ISEMS. This allows the operator do close all doors in a zone and also to inspect the collective status of doors in that zone.

Figure 11 - Fire door and damper monitoring and control mimic

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This function gives a graphical presentation for monitoring and control of the fire doors and dampers.

The switches on top monitors the hard mimic for the fire doors, presenting if they are switched to open or closed, in addition the switches can be used to open or close all doors in that specific zone.

With the side view, the operator can monitor at a glance the state of the fire doors in that zone for each deck, if they are open or closed.

The switches below the side view of the vessel monitors the hard mimic for the dampers, and if it’s on or off. In addition, using the switches the operator can open or close them.

3.3.2.4 Dangerous goods location

This function gives the operator information about the location of dangerous goods and detailed information about the hazardous materials.

With graphical symbols in the main detailed diagram the location of the goods are marked, the detailed information is available from the menu button for that symbol.

Figure 12 - Dangerous goods location

The input to the function would be an electronic list, e.g., an Excel sheet, with the corresponding list of dangerous goods. The information need type, quantity and location. Location can be in various formats, e.g., standard position format for the ship (e.g., deck, frame, centre line offset), position on car deck or room number.

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3.3.3 Evacuation support and situation assessment

3.3.3.1 Passengers needing assistance and searched areas

Figure 13 - Passengers needing assistance

This function gives a graphical presentation of passengers needing assistance.

For each stateroom onboard a passenger vessel it is possible to place a symbol indicating that in this stateroom the passengers are in need of assistance during an emergency, e.g. wheel chair users or users in need of special medication.

This information is available to the operator graphically in a main detailed diagram for the operators to direct help where needed.

The wheel chair symbol in the main detailed diagram represents passengers needing assistance in that given stateroom. Selecting that symbol gives detailed information about which room and where it is located as well as the type of assistance the passenger needs.

The input to the system would be the standard lists of passenger needing assistance, but these lists would need to be in electronic form, e.g., as Excel sheets.

Note that this function may have certain privacy problems as not all passengers may want that this information is generally available on the bridge.

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Figure 14 - Evacuation status

This function gives a graphical presentation of evacuated status.

When checking out if an area has been evacuated it is possible for the operator to mark off in the main detailed diagram which stateroom has been checked and cleared when reported. With this information the officers during an evacuation is at all times informed.

The evacuated areas are marked off with a green-hatched colour fill; the non-evacuated areas have no colour. It is possible to connect the status update to the corresponding checklist item as discussed in section 3.3.1.2.

3.3.3.2 Muster status

This function gives a graphical presentation of muster status at each muster station. In the main detailed diagram there is a graphical symbol for each muster station giving information about the state of the muster station (mustering, mustered, waterborne).

Input to the symbols can be given automatically or manually from the persons responsible for mustering. If automatic input is given, one could also provide the mustering lists as pop-ups from the symbols.

It is also possible to connect the status update to the corresponding checklist item as discussed in section 3.3.1.2.

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Figure 15 - Muster status

3.3.3.3 Smoke extraction status and control

Many HVAC systems implement standard smoke extraction strategies for critical areas like stairways, important escape routes, galleys etc. An ISEMS can automatically or manually start such strategies based on certain conditions, e.g., specific fire alarms. One can also allow manual control of the strategies from the ISEMS.

Figure 16 – Smoke extraction status and control

A control mimic will also obviously be a status display as indicated in the above figure.

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3.3.3.4 Evacuation control - directional evacuation signs

Some directional evacuation light systems are available today, but they are not commonly in use on passenger ships. One prerequisite for such systems is that the control function is clear and unambiguous so that misunderstandings cannot happen.

If the purpose of directional light is to instruct persons rather than making them take decision based on their local observation and guidance from PA systems and crew, it is critical that the directional guidance is correct.

Figure 17 – Directional light indication

The directional light can be controlled in many ways. Some examples are listed in the following:

Direct control of the directional segments is probably not feasible as it will be too detailed for the operator.

Control of predefined primary and secondary escape paths in each compartment/deck/fire zone is possibly the most likely manual control mechanism.

Specifying incident areas (see figure above) and let these definitions switch direction to secondary routes where incident areas inhibit primary routes. This can be done automatically, based on manual incident area definition with manual override as described in the previous section.

The display should in any case show the current status of the lights. In the above figure, this is shown as arrows that can change direction.

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3.3.4 Stability and strength

3.3.4.1 Indication of watertight and shell doors

With a graphical ISEMS it is relatively easy to integrate status of watertight doors, hatches and shell doors in the situation display.

Displays will be similar to the ones used for fire doors, but different symbols can be used if one needs to have overlays consisting of both fire doors and watertight doors.

Currently, regulations does not allow control of water tight doors from other stations than the dedicated control station so control is normally not part of the functionality.

Note also that some watertight doors double as fire doors.

3.3.4.2 Water ingress and tank levels

Show potential problems in water ingress or tank levels. This should include bilge and water ingress alarms.

Figure 18 – Water ingress and stability

Even without connection to the stability computer, it will be possible to present a simple overview of filled tanks. In the context of an ISEMS one would probably use this to assess damage so it is not necessary to also present the stability situation for this function.

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3.3.4.3 Stability

Stability is also indicated on Figure 18 and will be useful, particularly when the information is also sent to shore.

This information must be got from a separate or integrated stability computer which will not be part of the Flagship C1 demonstration. However, it is fairly easy to provide a display as that shown above, if the appropriate interface is in place.

3.3.4.4 Strength

The strength issue is normally of limited interest to passenger ships, but for other types of ships the function should be an integral part of the ISEMS. The functions would then rely on an interface to an integrated or external strength/stability computer. Display examples are not included here, but it may typically be curves showing remaining longitudinal strength for various sea or tide conditions.

3.3.5 Prognosis functions

3.3.5.1 Fire prognosis

The fire prognosis system will continuously read fire alarm information as well as available fire door, damper and HVAC status from the ISEMS and update a prognosis on how the fire will spread.

Currently, it is assumed that the fire prognosis system is located on the shore side due to relatively heavy computing requirements and that results are reported back to the ship through chat functions (see next section) or via voice.

3.3.5.2 Evacuation overview

The evacuation overview function is experimental and is based on electronically tagging and tracking each passenger. This has various challenges both technically and from a privacy aspects and it is not yet clear if this will be a viable concept in the short term.

However, with sufficient technical investments it should be possible to implement. In that case, the system will provide the following information:

Congestion (density of people).

Immovable people (possibly unconscious or dead).

Cabins or areas that are still occupied.

Location of all assets, including damage control teams and other personnel.

This system should be placed on board as it is mainly dependent on rapid updates of peoples' position. Some calculation capabilities are required, but not much compared to fire prognosis.

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3.3.5.3 Flooding prognosis

The flooding prognosis tool is similar to the fire prognosis tool, but requires updates on tank status, damage extent and other relevant data for water ingress. It will provide advice on likely time for flooding and, hence, also an indication of remaining time to live for the ship.

This tool should be interfaced to the strength and stability calculator to provide prognosis also on these aspects.

The tool will likely be placed on shore.

3.3.6 Ship-shore coordination and management

This section discusses functionality that is added when the ISEMS functionality is extended to shore.

3.3.6.1 Duplication of ISEMS on shore

The shore side will have an ISEMS system that is a slave of the ship system and which will be able to show the same status information as that on the ship.

The shore side system will not normally be allowed to control ship systems (one way status update only). The exception from this may be updates in ISM check list where a shore side action is expected.

3.3.6.2 Ship shore messaging or chat function

The ISEMS will include a chat function that can be used to transfer written messages or status updates. A minimum function is a request/acknowledge system where requests to one side will be flagged as pending until acknowledged.

3.3.7 Wireless ISEMS

The wireless ISEMS is a PDA or tablet type PC where the on scene commander (OSC) can get an overview of the ISEMS functions. The system will allow the OSC to update the situation display as well as checklist entries. One should also include the OSC in the chat function.

Functionality will be as described above, but possibly adapted for a smaller screen.

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4. General benefit analysis

4.1 Overview

Ultimately, the benefit measure used in the analysis will be limited to reduction in expected fatalities per ship year. The statistics used and which has been incorporated into the Bayesian model discussed in section 5 has been taken from [MSC85/INF.2]. Thus, the same statistical base has been used here as in that FSA. The reader is referred to the above paper for details on calculation of risks and fatality likelihoods.

For reference some other analysis has been included below. This has not been used in the analysis, but is included to show the difficulty in getting accurate figures for this type of probability. The reading of these sections is not required for understanding the analysis results.

4.2 Incident statistics

Incident statistics have been based on figures in the Lloyd's Register Fairplay Sea-Web™ registry.

Sea-web provides online access to Lloyd’s Register of Ships, combining comprehensive ships, owners, shipbuilders, fixtures, casualties and real-time vessel movement data into a single application. It also provides a powerful search facility and the ability to export data. It is possible to perform detailed searches on ships, companies, builders and casualty [LFS-W].

The aim is to calculate the average number of incidents per ship-year for the two selected ship classes. Thus Sea-Web was used both for providing number of incidents and number of ships.

The ship classes were defined as follows for reference in Sea-Web:

- Container/RORO: This was defined as the ship type "Container" or "RORO" in Sea-Web. This includes the following sub-classes of ships:

o Container Ship

Container Ship (Fully Cellular)

Container Ship (Fully Cellular with Ro-Ro Facility)

o Passenger/Container Ship

- Passenger: This ship type corresponds to the types "Passenger" and "Passenger/ro-ro cargo" ship types in Sea-Web. This includes the following sub-types:

o Passenger/Ro-Ro Cargo Ship

Passenger/Ro-Ro Ship (Vehicles)

Passenger/Ro-Ro Ship (Vehicles/Rail)

o Passenger/Landing Craft

Passenger/Landing Craft

o Passenger (Cruise) Ship

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Passenger/Cruise

o Passenger Ship

Passenger Ship

4.2.1 Number of ships

The ship search facility was used to find the total number of ships in each class (container and passenger). Sea-Web could only provide the number of ships in service by querying for ships in service within range 1 to 400 m length overall in each class. This is the registered number of vessels in service at the moment of the query (June 2008) as shown in Table 4.

Table 4 – Ships in service

Ship type Sea-Web June 2008 Adjusted 1987-2097 Adjusted 1997-2007

Container 4835 3103 4170

Passenger 7451 6748 5536

By investigating other statistics, e.g., [Equasis] and [DoT] one will find different figures. This is in part due to differences in classification of ship types, size constraints and also nationality registered. However, as Sea-Web is used also for incident counts and as the figures are converted into relative measurements, these differences should not matter.

As the fleet size in general is increasing, we have selected to adjust down the fleet sizes somewhat to get a better estimate of the mean fleet size over the period. The factors chosen are respectively 3% yearly growth for container and 2% yearly growth for passenger ship counts. According to available statistics [SSB] and [DoT] this is on the conservative side and should underestimate the incident rate, giving a somewhat lower benefit that actual.

4.2.2 Casualties

The two casualty types investigated correspond to the ones used in Sea-Web and no special aggregation or adjustments were made. A search was made on the respective ship types and the incident types for the years in questions and the aggregated figures are listed in xx.

The casualty search facility was used to find information on the number of casualties classified as collision or fire & explosion, for the ship type passenger. Passenger includes cruise ships, ferries and RORO vessels. The numbers that were summarised and presented in the table are:

The number of fatalities (lost lives) 1987-2007 per 1000 ship years

How many total losses (total loss means that the ship was lost)

Without making too many assumptions from the graph, one can probably conclude that fire/explosion and stability/buoyancy are the most critical issues for large passenger ships. Inability to handle either of these issues can easily result in serious accidents.

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Annual fatalities and ship loss (per 1000)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Hull/M

achin

ery

Conta

ct

Fire/E

xplo

sion

Collis

ion

Wre

cked

/Stra

nded

Found

ered

Total loss

Fatalities

Figure 19 – Ship loss and fatality statistics

4.3 Incident cost statistics

Incident cost estimates are based on figures from insurance statistics. In general one can list the most important incidence related insurance types as in Table 5, where some of the explanatory text is taken from [FPM]. The P&I insurance will normally also cover pollution, crew and passenger insurance where this is applicable.

Table 5 – Insurance types

Insurance type Explanation

Hull and Machinery

Physical loss or damage covers for all types of vessels. The scope, basis and extensions of cover provided are adapted to suit individual client's requirements.

Protection and Indemnity (P&I)

Third party liability covers for all types of vessels. Arranged with International Group Clubs, Independent Clubs or commercial underwriters. Designed to 'dovetail' with a vessel's Hull and Machinery Insurance.

Cargo Specific insurance of cargo where not covered elsewhere

Loss of Hire Insurance designed to protect a ship owner for potential loss of earnings of a vessel (either freight or charter hire) resulting from a casualty. Cover is usually stipulated to respond in the event of a peril insured under the vessel's Hull and Machinery Policy.

Crew Personnel Accident (PA) Cover

Personnel Accident cover designed specifically for ship's officers and crew. Often arranged in circumstances where the vessel is not entered with a P&I Club, or arranged under contract by owners or managers for the benefit of crew and their dependents.

Statistics from the "The Central Union of Marine Underwriters" (CEFOR1) contain data from most of these insurance types and presents overall statistics for insurance costs for a variety of

1 http://www.cefor.no

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incident and ship types. The below material is taken from CEFOR sources and mainly from [CFAR07] and [NOMIS07]. Other sources are referenced when used.

One should note that the CEFOR fleet is slightly skewed in comparison to the world fleet composition as listed, e.g., by Equasis [Equasis]. The respective fleet compositions are listed in Table 6.

Table 6 – Comparison of CEFOR fleet to world fleet

Equasis CEFOR General Cargo Ships 26,0 %Specialized Cargo Ships 0,3 %

13,5 %

Container Ships 5,7 % 17,9 % Ro-Ro Cargo Ships 2,3 % 5,3 % Bulk Carriers 10,4 % 22,6 % Oil and Chemical Tankers 15,3 % 22,4 % Gas Tankers 1,9 % 3,8 % Other Tankers 0,5 % Passenger Ships 9,0 % 3,8 % Offshore Vessels 6,1 % 7,0 % Service Ships 5,9 % Tugs 16,5 % Other 3,7 %

These differences are to some degree due to different ship classifications. The categories do not match completely and there are also most likely some differences in how certain ships are categorized. More probably, the differences reflect the general composition of Scandinavian international shipping, where CEFOR has most of its business, with a high number of bulk, RORO and container ships.

Figure 20 – Average claim value per insured vessel and year (USD)

0

10.000

20.000

30.000

40.000

50.000

60.000

70.000

80.000

90.000

100.000

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

>=30MUSD

10-30 MUSD

5-10 MUSD

1-5 MUSD

<= 1MUSD

The diagram in Figure 20 shows the average payout per vessel and year (underwriting year). The payout is also divided into claim size categories (MUSD is Million USD). The overview of claim frequency per ship type group is shown in Figure 21.

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Figure 21 – Claim frequency per vessel type group

0,000,050,100,150,200,250,300,350,40

Bulk

Cargo

Cont./

Car/R

oRo

Passe

nger

Tank

Supply

/Offs

hore

2001-2003

2004-2006

The mean claim value per ship type category and year can also be extracted and is shown in Figure 22. Note in particular that the mean claim value for passenger ships is 196 500 USD while for a bulk carrier it is about 60 000 USD. The corresponding figure for the combined container and RORO group is USD 88 900.

Figure 22 - Claims per vessel per vessel type group and year

0

50.000

100.000

150.000

200.000

250.000

300.000

Bulk

Cargo

Cont./C

ar/R

oRo

Passe

nger

Tank

Supply

/Offs

hore

2001-2003

2004-2006

The documents are also looking into the costs associated with different types of incidents and this is listed in Table 7.

Table 7 – Cost division for different incident types, period 2002-2006

Incident type Number Cost ACPI Engine 36 % 28 % 225 Fire & Explosion 2 % 11 % 1 588 Collision 12 % 13 % 313 Contact 19 % 8 % 122 Grounding 11 % 25 % 656 Heavy weather 4 % 4 % 289 Ice 1 % 0 % 0 Other 15 % 11 % 212

The table lists respectively percentage of total claims over the period, percentage of claim costs over the period and the average claim cost (in 1000 USD) for each claim incident (ACPI). The reason why ice related costs are zero is that no figure for ice related claims was available in the report.

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A search for incidents was also performed on Lloyd's Fairplay Sea-Web. The search used about the same criteria as the above statistics, i.e., time frame 2002 to 2006 inclusive, passenger ships, RORO/Container and all type ships respectively. Sea-Web does not distinguish between car carriers and other RORO ships. Also, only "Severe" incidents were searched for in Sea-Web. The results are listed in Table 8. The grey areas are groups that cannot easily be compared due to some differences in definitions.

Table 8 – Comparison between Sea-Web and NOMIS figures

Incident type NOMIS Report SW Passenger SW Cont/RR SW All shipsEngine 36 % 44 % 32 % 33 %Fire & Explosion 2 % 11 % 12 % 10 %Collision 12 % 10 % 25 % 17 %Contact 19 % 15 % 8 % 8 %Grounding 11 % 16 % 19 % 23 %Heavy weather 4 % Ice 1 % 5 % 4 % 9 %Other 15 %

There are significant differences in the figures, particularly on fire/explosion. Other differences can probably be explained by different categorization. The Sea-Web "All" group included a total of 5049 incidents so the figures should be fairly representative. Although there are differences, the study will use the CEFOR figures as basis for further work.

4.4 Additional beneficial factors not included in quantitative analysis

In this chapter an assessment of the positive aspects relative to the introduction of an integrated emergency management system, as it has been previously described, has to be performed. There will be considered the main advantages that the integrated system brings in terms of economic, environmental, safety and security matters. There are several peculiar aspect of the proposed standardized system to take into consideration for this kind of analysis, for example:

- Monitoring: the monitoring of the parameters associated to some critical aspects which can lead to an emergency allows to control the operational state of various systems and to promptly detect potential abnormal functioning;

- Automation of corrective actions: the possibility to set some automatic response to correct detected abnormal functioning, results in lower levels of danger and allows to take all possible measures to correct the situation and return in a safe state;

- Prompt detection and intervention in case of an emergency: the use of an ISEMS, with the possibility to have an overview on various functions and operative states onboard, allows to promptly detect a potential dangerous state, suggests corrective manual actions (if automation is unavailable) and shortens the time of intervention.

In the assessment of the items of benefits (and of costs) we can take into consideration the following aspects:

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- the only certain information that we can provide regards the direct C/Bs because they concern to the items connected to the engineering and installation of the proposed system, to the management aspects (personnel, maintenance) that are the only items we can quantify and consider in a general way;

- concerning the assessment of the indirect C/Bs we risk making only academic considerations, not based on any real data. Indirect C/Bs are all the items connected to the effects brought by the standardized emergency system. To make a quantitative, and not only a qualitative, analysis about the positive (and negative) aspects, we have to work on a more realistic scenario: it can be extracted from statistics of incidents occurred by foreseeing in what percentage the introduction of the proposed solution could impact on the current data. For this purpose an investigation on the causes of the incidents occurred might be useful to clarify how many of them are due to technological aspects (breaks of systems, bad-functioning of specific pieces, etc.) in order to assess the level of reduction of these problems thanks to the new integrated system.

4.5 Other types of benefits

This section lists some additional benefits that may be gained from the introduction of an ISEMS. They are not quantified and will not be used in the quantitative analysis, but are included for reference. This section does not include all relevant benefits, but highlights some of the more obvious ones.

4.5.1 Reduction in stress level

Current regulations about the minimum safe manning take into consideration modern and new technologies only if they prove their efficiency in performing particular operations which are usually charged to seafarers, in order to reduce their fatigue. In the composition of the crew for the minimum safe manning, ship-owners and administrations have to take into account the minimum number of people that assure an optimal coverage of all the main safety functions in an emergency situation: in fact, on board there is the so called “Muster List” which defines to all the agents in an emergency where to go and what to do. We can make a distinction among different types of new technologies: in fact some of them have functionalities that effectively substitute members of the crew for the performance of some operations while others are not necessary to allow a reduction of the crew composition onboard, even if they give a help to the operators. One of the former is, for example, the UMS: its introduction onboard ships allows to have some unmanned premises (e.g. machinery room and others) in comparison to the past where some crew members where charged to regularly control all the operational parameters and to make a certain number of routine actions. Today, the presence of a centralized monitoring, which allows to have a general vision of the overall state of all the devices of the machinery station, and the automatic functionalities regarding routine operations (greasing, etc.) make the reduction of the number of the people necessary for the good management of the ship possible.

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Another piece of technology which allowed the reduction of the crew if the GMDSS which is able to broadcast emergency calls and information in an automatic way: before of its introduction the presence on deck of a dedicated wireless operator was mandatory. There are also some technologies that have not an impact in regards to the reduction of the crew: for example, the introduction of ECDIS have changed the way to make the nautical charts, from a manual to a digital one, but it always requires to have an operator on deck who can make it.

4.5.2 More efficient emergency management organisation

From the above point of view, the introduction onboard of a standardized emergency system can effectively have an impact about the composition of the crew, due to its main peculiarities. For example, the centralization of monitoring and the automation of certain types of corrective actions allow to have more unmanned premises onboard and this would result in a review of current regulations in terms of minimum safe manning and would lead to a reduction of crew members needed for operations, which, on the other hand, must always be sufficient to satisfy the emergencies requirements. Training: the introduction of an emergency management system, as previously described, can also have an impact about the aspect of training. We can analyse two different levels of benefits that there could be.

1) Nautical school: the general training of the young cadets about the management of emergencies can be optimized in regard of the standardized solution;

2) Shipping companies: they can have a direct economic benefit for their fleet thanks to the introduction of such a system. In fact there could be a reduction of the training cost due to the standardization of this solution (a unique training course for all the officials of the fleet) also connected to the possibility to buy an unique type of simulator for the emergency operations.

The optimization of training, and the associated reduction of costs, is also linked to the aspect of the modularization of the proposed system which would allow to arrange training courses that are not connected to the particular type of ship the crew have to work on, but are characterized by a standard training concerning the baseline system (composed of the main systems always required onboard) with some additional hours of the course dedicated to some particular modules needed for the more advanced ships. Today the training is different for the members of the crew according to the ship they will work on. So, officers of a cargo ship receive a different training from the officers of a cruise ship, because of the different types of systems they have to manage with. The introduction of the modular system, instead, will allow in the future the arrangement of standard training courses for officers of all types of ships, with some additional hours to explain them the use of particular additional modules they can find according to the type of ship.

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4.5.3 Maintenance (higher reliability)

The aspect of maintenance of a system is strictly connected to its level of reliability. The proper use of the ISEMS requires a high level of reliability of the system. This aspect can be fulfilled both with a higher robustness of the single parts installed for the integration of the emergency system or with redundancies of the most critical items of the overall system. The higher reliability of the whole emergency system leads to a lower number of interventions for breaks and repairs resulting in lower costs associated to maintenance and repair operations. Integration of functions and centralization of monitoring may also be connected to a reduction of specific pieces of technology (e.g. monitors, etc.), compared to the actual solution, resulting in a lower need for spare parts available for the maintenance operations. In addition, the opportunity to have similar (if not the same) systems on board ships, due to the standardization, can also have an impact on the market of spare parts. In fact, producers of this new type of emergency system have to make and sell their products that are very similar each other. This aspect would increase the competitiveness among the parties, which could result in the cutting of costs of the spare parts bringing an economic benefit to the ship-owners.

4.5.4 Incident/accident reduction

The high reliability of the integrated system results in a reduction of the occurrence of dangerous situations and accidents on board. This is mainly due to the following peculiar aspects of the proposed system:

- Monitoring: this aspect allows the control of all the parameters of the different types of sub-systems which might lead to emergency situations;

- Automation: the possibility to set some automatic action to cope with an anomaly or an abnormal state, would reduce the level of risk avoiding worst situations;

- DSS: if automation is absent, the ISEMS would be able to give, in the case of an emergency, a list of possible ways of managing the situation helping officers to take the better solution in order to avoid the escalation of the emergency (incident/accident);

- Integration: the issue of integration may also be useful to reduce the risk of accidents, because the officer on the watch would also be able to assess the impact that a particular action by the side of one of the sub-systems of the integrated system could have on the others. So he could take appropriate decisions in order to avoid the birth of unwanted hazards.

4.5.5 Insurance costs

The higher reliability of the standardized integrated emergency system and the consequent reduction of accident occurred onboard, would also lead to economic benefits in reference to insurance costs that can result to be lower. The possibility of a lower number of incidents would be also connected to a reduction of costs that the ship-owner have to pay to third parties involved in specific types of incidents (e.g. collisions, etc.) to repair eventual damages.

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4.5.6 Environmental benefits

The introduction of an ISEMS can lead to eventual environmental benefits if the system is built in a more environmental-friendly way. In fact, if the various parts composing the system are built with materials that are more easily recycled, this could bring to certain levels of environmental benefits. In addiction, if the centralization of the system is connected to a reduction of some components (e.g. monitors, etc.), in comparison to the current not integrated solution, this could result in a reduction of the environmental impact of the system. These kinds of benefits have to be assessed together with the producers of these systems, who could have some requirements and constrains to fulfil for their production. Moreover there could also happen that, in order to assure the higher reliability of the system through the introduction of some redundancies and duplications, the overall integrated system would result to be less environmental-friendly in comparison to the actual separated solution. The occurrence of an emergency onboard a ship could have an impact on the environment. We can distinguish two different cases:

- Internal environment: some emergencies can affect life conditions in particular premises of the ship. For example, the occurrence of a fire onboard can result in some sections of the ship filled with smoke and fire, and this situation would be a serious threat for the health of the crew and passengers and can damage rooms and goods. In this case, the opportunity to monitor the situation and to foresee the evolution of the emergency allows all the agents in the situation to take the appropriate decisions to fasten the corrective interventions and to avoid major damages.

- External environment: there are also some emergencies that can have a negative impact on the marine environment and the atmosphere. This is the case of fire, breaks and machinery damages that can result in spills, leakage, emission of pollutant gases or liquids, etc. The possibility brought by the presence of the standardized integrated emergency system (mainly due to its characteristics of centralized monitoring and integration) is to promptly detect anomalies and abnormal parameters, giving the opportunity to avoid the occurrence of these environmental hazards.

4.5.7 Safety benefits

A standardized emergency system on board means a lot of pros in relation to safety aspects. The presence of such a system, as already remembered elsewhere, leads to a better management of ship’s operations with a subsequent reduction in the occurrence of accidents: in fact the installation of a standard solution on ships allows the crew to better familiarize with it obtaining an increased safety in ship operations. There are several aspects which could cause the increased safety of the ship and of people (both crew members and passengers) on it:

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- monitoring: the ISEMS gives the possibility to control the actual status of the most critical parameters of the ship in order to promptly detect abnormal situations and take corrective actions to return to a safe state. The aspects of centralization and integration due to the ISEMS also give the possibility to assess how a certain corrective action could affect other aspects or systems of the ship;

- automation: the possibility to set some automatic actions to cope with certain abnormal situations allows to avoid more serious damages to the ship and reduces hazards for people and goods;

- communications: the installation of a reliable communication system among all the agents involved in emergency operations, can allow having a real-time knowledge of the current situation, leading to a better organization of the emergency teams and faster interventions.

4.5.8 Security benefits analysis

Regarding security aspect connected to the introduction of the ISEMS, there are no benefits but only (major) somewhat higher costs.

Currently, if we have onboard separate subsystems, threats brought by terrorist attacks or viruses could be bordered to the specific system. For example, if someone cuts a cable of the navigation system, it could result only in the loss of the functioning of the specific system.

In an integrated and centralized solution, instead, where all the different subsystems are arranged to be strictly connected each other, through a more complex communication system, an eventual threat to one of the subsystems could result in problems for the overall system.

A solution to this situation is to arrange duplication of some subsystems and of connections between them so that an eventual attack for the security of the system can be overcome in an easier way.

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5. Bayesian network model

5.1 The network model

The Bayesian network used in this analysis is shown in Figure 23.

Figure 23 - The Bayesian network model

The lines show relationships between the individual variables. Each variable will provide an output "likelihood" that is dependent on internal weightings of input "likelihoods". The variables are described in the next section.

5.2 General about the variable descriptions

This document contains a list of the variables used in the Bayesian Network for the collision model.

The entry for each variable will be in the format shown below:

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VariableName

Description of the variable

State 1 Description of state

…

State K Description of state

ParentVariable 1 Number of input states

…

ParentVariable N

ChildVariable 1 … ChildVariable M

Assessment Method

The fields are:

VariableName: Name of variable as it appears in the high level diagram in section 5.1.

Description of the variable: Prose description of the purpose of the variable.

State: A list of the possible states of the variable with prose descriptions.

Parent variables: List of input variables, with the corresponding number of input states. This is included to make it easier to control the complexity.

Child variables: Variables that use the states of this variable.

Assessment method: This gives a description of how the variable works in the system.

The number of input states of each parent is important; the input domain will have the same size as the product of the parents’ input states.

5.3 Variables describing the incident

5.3.1 IncidentType

IncidentType

Describes whether the initial incident is collision or fire Fire may also occur as a secondary incident after a collision

Collision Initial incident is a collision

Fire Initial incident is a fire

No parents

CollisionSize Fire FireInitLocation

Values are always observed

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5.3.2 CollisionSize

CollisionSize

Describes the size of the collision event

NoCollision No collision (i.e. initial event is fire)

Minor A minor collision event

Major A major collision event

IncidentType 3

InitialFatalities Fire Flooding FireInitSize FloodingInitSize EscapeRouteAvailability ShipDamage

Statistical data (available)

5.3.3 StrikingStruck

StrikingStruck

Describes if the ship is the striking or the struck ship in a collision

Striking Ship is the striking ship

Struck Ship is the struck ship

No Parents

InitialFatalities Fire Flooding SinkingMode

0.5/0.5

5.3.4 InitialFatalities

InitialFatalities

Describes if there are unavoidable fatalities due to the impact

No No fatalities due to impact

Yes Fatalities due to impact

CollisionSize 3

StrikingStruck 2

Fatalities

Statistical data (available)

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5.3.5 Fire

Fire

Describes if there is a fire

No No fire

Yes Fire

IncidentType 2

CollisionSize 3

StrikingStruck 2

FireInitLocation FireDamage

Statistical data for collision (available) Always Yes for fire

5.3.6 Flooding

Flooding

Describes if the collision causes flooding

No Collision does not cause flooding

Yes Collision does cause flooding

CollisionSize 2

StrikingStruck 2

FloodingLocalManagement FloodingDamage

Statistical data (available)

5.3.7 FireInitLocation

FireInitLocation

Describes the initial location of the fire

NoFire No fire

Machine Fire starts in machine spaces

VehicleDeck Fire starts on vehicle deck

Accommodation Fire starts in accommodation areas

IncidentType 2

Fire 2

FireInitSize FireLocalManagement LocalEvacuation

Statistical data for fire (available) Statistical data for collision (currently unavailable) or judgement

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5.4 Variables describing training and quality of crew, and bridge assessment

5.4.1 Training

Training

This variable describes the quality of training of the crew

Good Quality of training is good

Poor Quality of training is poor

ISEMSMain 2

CrewQuality TechExperience

Judgement

5.4.2 CrewQuality

CrewQuality

This variable describes the quality (experience and training) of the crew.

Good Crew quality is good

Poor Crew quality is poor

Training 2

BridgeAssessment OOWAssessment LocalAssessment OnSceneAssessment DmgCtrlPerformance EvacCrewAssessment EvacCrewPerformance

Judgement

5.4.3 TechExperience

TechExperience

This variable describes the experience the crew have with technical systems like ISEMS

Experienced Crew is experienced with ISEMS-like technical systems

Inexperienced Crew is not experienced with ISEMS-like systems

Training 2

BridgeAssessment OOWAlertness OOWAssessment LocalAssessment OnSceneAssessment EvacCrewAssessment

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MusteringOverview

Judgement

5.4.4 BridgeAssessment

BridgeAssessment

This variable describes the quality of the bridge’s assessment of the situation

Good The bridge has a good assessment of the situation

Bad The bridge does not have a good assessment of the situation

CrewQuality 2

TechExperience 2

ISEMSMain 2

ISEMSToShore 2

PrognosisTool 2

OnSceneAssessment EvacCrewAssessment

Judgement

5.5 Variables describing initial response and local containment of situation

5.5.1 OOWAssessment

OOWAssessment

This variable describes how well the OOW is able to assess the situation

Good The OOW has a good assessment of the situation

Poor The OOW has a poor assessment of the situation

CrewQuality 2

TechExperience 2

ISEMSMain 2

InitialMustering LocalAssessment

Judgement

5.5.2 InitialMustering

InitialMustering

This variable describes how fast the initial emergency response teams can be mustered

Fast The teams muster quickly

Slow The teams muster slowly

OOWAssessment 2

FireLocalManagement

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FloodingLocalManagement

Judgement

5.5.3 LocalAssessment

LocalAssessment

This variable describes the quality of the assessment of the initial emergency response teams

Good The local assessment is good Bad The local assessment is bad

CrewQuality 2

OOWAssessment 2

TechExperience 2

ISEMSWireless 2

FireLocalManagement FloodingLocalManagement

Judgement

5.5.4 FireLocalManagement

FireLocalManagement

This variable describes if the fire is contained and handled locally

NoFire There is no fire

LocalContainment The fire is contained locally

Delay The fire is not contained locally, but the escalation of the situation is delayed

No The local management have little effect on the escalation of the situation

FireInitLocation 3

InitialMustering 2

LocalAssessment 2

FireContainment

Statistical data (currently partly available) and/or judgement. Possible calibration variable

5.5.5 FloodingLocalManagement

FloodingLocalManagement

This variable describes if the flooding is contained and handled locally

NoFlooding There is no flooding

LocalContainment The flooding is handled locally

Delay The flooding can not be handled locally, but the initial teams manages to delay escalation

No Local management have little effect on the escalation of

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the situation

Flooding 2

InitialMustering 2

LocalAssessment 2

FloodingContainment

Statistical data (currently unavailable) and/or judgement Possible calibration variable

5.6 Variables describing handling of the situation after the initial stages

5.6.1 OnSceneAssessment

OnSceneAssessment

This variable describes the quality of the on-scene crew and commanders’ assessment of the situation

Good The on-scene teams have a good assessment of the situation

Bad The on-scene teams do not have a good assessment of the situation

BridgeAssessment 2

CrewQuality 2

TechExperience 2

ISEMSWireless 2

DmgCtrlPerformance

Judgement

5.6.2 DmgCtrlPerformance

DmgCtrlPerformance

This variable describes how well the on-scene crew performs with the containment and neutralization of the situation

Good The on-scene crew performs well

Poor The on-scene crew does not perform well

CrewQuality 2

OnSceneAssessment 2

FireContainment FireNeutralization FloodingContainment FloodingNeutralization

Judgement

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5.6.3 FireContainment

FireContainment

This variable describes the success of containing the fire to a fire zone

LocalContainment The fire is handled locally, or there is no fire

Zone The fire is contained to a fire zone

SlowEscalation The fire is uncontained and escalates slowly

RapidEscalation The fire is uncontained and escalates rapidly

FireLocalManagement 3

DmgCtrlPerformance 2

FireNeutralization Containment FireDamage

Statistical data (currently partly available) and judgement Possible calibration variable

5.6.4 FireNeutralization

VariableName

This variable describes how fast the neutralization of the fire is performed

Rapid Rapid neutralization of the fire

Slow Slow neutralization of the fire

None Fire is not neutralized

DmgCtrlPerformance 2

FireContainment 4

FireDamage

Statistical data (currently partly available) and judgement Possible calibration variable

5.6.5 FloodingContainment

FloodingContainment

This variable describes the result of the flooding containment attempts

LocalContainment The flooding is handled locally, or there is no flooding

Contained The flooding is contained to one or more zones

Uncontained The flooding is uncontained

FloodingLocalManagement 3

DmgCtrlPerformance 2

FloodingNeutralization SinkingMode Containment FloodingDamage

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Statistical data (currently unavailable) and judgement Possible calibration variable

5.6.6 FloodingNeutralization

FloodingNeutralization

This variable describes if the flooding is neutralized

Yes Flooding is neutralized

No Flooding is not neutralized

DmgCtrlPerformance 2

FloodingContainment 3

SinkingMode FloodingDamage

Statistical data (currently unavailable) and judgement Possible calibration variable

5.6.7 SinkingMode

SinkingMode

This variable describes if the ship is sinking and the sinking mode

RemainsAfloat Ship does not sink

SlowSinking Ship is sinking slowly

RapidCapsize Ship capsizes and sinks rapidly

StrikingStruck 2

FloodingContainment 3

FloodingNeutralization 2

Containment PassengerPerformance EvacuationFatalities FloodingDamage

Statistical data (available) Calibration variable

5.6.8 Containment

Containment

This variable gives a summary of flooding and fire containment. This variable is used for reducing the number of input combinations in other variables

LocalContainment Situations are contained locally, or no situation to contain

Zone Situations are contained to a single zone

SlowEscalation Slow escalation of at least one of the situations

RapidEscalation Rapid escalation of at least one of the situation

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FireContainment 4

FloodingContainment 3

SinkingMode 3

FullMustering EscapeRouteAvailability LocalEvacuation Evacuation

Mathematically dependent on parent variables

5.7 Variables describing evacuation operations

5.7.1 EvacCrewAssessment

EvacCrewAssessment

This variable describes the quality of assessment of the crew that assists with evacuation of passengers. This includes the overview of mustered persons.

Good The evacuation crew has a good assessment of the situation

Bad The evacuation crew does not have a good assessment of the situation

BridgeAssessment 2

CrewQuality 2

TechExperience 2

ISEMSWireless 2

EvacCrewPerformance

Judgement

5.7.2 EvacCrewPerformance

EvacCrewPerformance

This variable describes the performance of the crew that assists with evacuation of passengers

Good The evacuation crew performs tasks well

Poor The evacuation crew does not perform tasks well

CrewQuality 2

EvacCrewAssessment 2

PassengerPerformance LocalEvacuation FullMustering Evacuation

Judgement

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5.7.3 EscapeRouteAvailability

EscapeRouteAvailability

This variable describes the availability of escape routes

High High availability of escape routes

Low Low availability of escape routes

CollisionSize 2

Containment 4

PassengerPerformance LocalEvacuation FullMustering

Judgement

5.7.4 PassengerPerformance

PassengerPerformance

This variable describes how well the passengers perform in the evacuation operation. The variable is meant to describe situation awareness, panic and apathy, passengers getting lost etc.

Good The passengers perform well

Poor The passengers do not perform well

SinkingMode 3

EvacCrewPerformance 2

EscapeRouteAvailability 2

LocalEvacuation FullMustering Evacuation

Judgement

5.7.5 LocalEvacuation

LocalEvacuation

This variable describes the result of evacuating passengers from zones that are affected.

Unnecessary There is no need for local evacuation

Successful The local evacuation is performed without fatalities

Unsuccessful The local evacuation is performed with some fatalities

Catastrophic The local evacuation fails catastrophically, resulting in many fatalities

FireInitLocation 3

Containment 4

EvacCrewPerformance 2

EscapeRouteAvailability 2

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PassengerPerformance 2

Fatalities

Statistics (currently partly available) and judgement Possible calibration variable

5.7.6 FullMustering

FullMustering

This variable describes the result of the full mustering of the passengers

NotPerformed Full mustering is not performed

Complete The full mustering is complete

Delayed The full mustering is complete after delays (e.g. search for missing passengers)

Incomplete The full mustering is incomplete

Containment 4

EscapeRouteAvailability 2

EvacCrewPerformance 2

PassengerPerformance 2

Evacuation EvacuationFatalities

Statistics (currently unavailable) and judgement Possible calibration variable

5.7.7 Evacuation

Evacuation

This variable describes the results of evacuation (entering and launching lifeboats) The variable does not describe results of incomplete mustering; incomplete mustering will be handled in the EvacuationFatalities variable.

Unnecessary Evacuation is not necessary

Successful Evacuation is performed successfully

Unsuccessful Evacuation is performed with some fatalities and/or persons in water

Catastrophic Evacuation fails catastrophically

Containment 4

EvacCrewPerformance 2

PassengerPerformance 2

FullMustering 4

EvacuationFatalities

Statistics (currently partly available) and judgement Possible calibration variable

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5.8 Variables describing the outcome of the emergency

5.8.1 EvacuationFatalities

EvacuationFatalities

This variable describes the likely number of lost lives during evacuation and rescue The variable is used to reduce the number of input combinations for the Fatalities variable

0 Injuries only 1 Under 10 fatalities

10 Tens of fatalities

100 Hundreds of fatalities

1000 More than a thousand fatalities

FullMustering 4

Evacuation 4

SinkingMode 3

Fatalities

Statistics (mostly available) Calibration variable

5.8.2 Fatalities

Fatalities

This variable describes the number of lost lives due to the emergency

0 Injuries only

1 Under 10 fatalities

10 Tens of fatalities

100 Hundreds of fatalities

1000 More than a thousand fatalities

InitialFatalities 2

LocalEvacuation 4

EvacuationFatalities 5

No Children

Mathematical dependence on parent variables Calibration variable

5.8.3 FireDamage

FireDamage

This variable describes the material damage from fire The variable is used to reduce the input combinations for the ShipDamage variable

None No fire damage

Minor Minor fire damage

Significant Significant fire damage

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Major Major fire damage, but no total loss

TotalLoss Total loss

Fire 2

FireContainment 5

FireNeutralization 3

ShipDamage

Statistics (currently partly available), some judgement Calibration value

5.8.4 FloodingDamage

FloodingDamage

This variable describes the material damage due to flooding The variable is used to reduce the input combinations for the ShipDamage variable

None No flooding damage

Minor Minor flooding damage

Significant Significant flooding damage

Major Major flooding damage, but no total loss

TotalLoss Total loss

Flooding 2

FloodingContainment 3

FloodingNeutralization 3

SinkingMode 3

ShipDamage

Statistics (currently partly available), some judgement Calibration variable

5.8.5 ShipDamage

ShipDamage

This variable describes the material damage to the ship

Minor Minor damage

Significant Significant damage

Major Major damage, but not total loss

TotalLoss Total loss of ship

CollisionSize 2

FireDamage 5

FloodingDamage 5

No Children

Statistics (mostly available), mathematical dependence on parents Calibration variable

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5.9 ISEMS related variables

5.9.1 ISEMS

ISEMS

This variable describes the availability of an integrated safety and emergency management system on the ship

None No ISEMS

OnBoard A basic system ToShore An ISEMS system that communicates with external

entities

ToshorePT As ToShore with on-shore tools for situation prognosis

Wireless Availability of wireless terminals with access to ISEMS

Full A combination of Toshore and Wireless

FullPT A combination of ToShorePT and Wireless

No Parents

ISEMSMain ISEMSToShore ISEMSWireless

Always observed

5.9.2 ISEMSMain

ISEMSMain

This variable describes if basic ISEMS functionality is in place. The variable is used to reduce the number of input combinations for variables that are dependent on ISEMS

No No basic ISEMS system

Yes Basic ISEMS system

ISEMS 7

OOWAlertness OOWAssessment BridgeAssessment

Logical dependence on parent

5.9.3 ISEMSToShore

ISEMSToShore

This variable describes communication of ISEMS information to shore. The variable is used to reduce the number of input combinations for variables that are dependent on ISEMS

No No external ISEMS communication

Yes External ISEMS communication

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ISEMS 7

BridgeAssessment

Logical dependence on parent

5.9.4 ISEMSWireless

ISEMSWireless

This variable describes if the emergency management teams have access to the ISEMS system with wireless terminal The variable is used to reduce the number of input combinations for variables that are dependent on ISEMS

No No wireless terminals

Yes Wireless terminals available

ISEMS 7

LocalAssessment OnSceneAssessment EvacCrewAssessment MusteringOverview

Logical dependence on parent

5.9.5 PrognosisTool

PrognosisTool

This variable describes the availability of an on-shore tool for fire, flooding and evacuation prognosis.

No Prognosis tool unavailable

Yes Prognosis tool available

ISEMS 7

BridgeAssessment

Logical dependence on parent

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6. Questionnaire used in investigation

This section contains the questionnaires that are used to collect the experts' opinions to determine weights in the Bayesian variables.

6.1 Introduction

The goal of this questionnaire is to get input to an emergency management model that shall be used to evaluate ISEMS. The model is in the form of a Bayesian Network (BN), and the results from this questionnaire will be used to get probabilities for the model. The questions are mainly in the form “What is the probability of <this variable> being in <state> if <input variables> are in <state>.” Probabilities can be given as a value between 0 and 1, or as a percentage. If the probabilities are given as a percentage, use the “%” symbol. In section 2, questions about the quality of crew and officers, the quality of assessment and performance on a ship that does not use ISEMS are asked. Section 3 repeats some of the questions from section 2, but this time for a ship that uses ISEMS, and where the crew and officers are experienced with this kind of technology Section 4 will again repeat questions from section 2, but this time for a ship that uses ISEMS, but where the crew and officers are inexperienced with this kind of technology. In section 5, questions about the containment and neutralization of the situation are asked. Section 6 contains questions about the evacuation of passengers.

Please answer all the questions. If you are uncertain about values, mark the uncertain values (e.g. by writing “uncertain” in the margin). When the values "good" / "poor"; "fast" / "slow" etc. are used it is relative to expected range within a crew or organisation that has implemented the ISM code as expected by the class. Thus, it does not cover sub-performance or super-performance.

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6.2 Questions about training, crew and officer quality, and situation assessment – without ISEMS

The questions in this section are about the quality of the crew, how well the situation is assessed, and other “human factors”.

First, we would like the assessment of these variables on a ship that does not use ISEMS. Most of the variables that we ask about do only have states for the extremes, e.g. a variable describing the quality of an assessment may have the states “Good” and “Poor”, but no states describing values between these. These variables can be in both states at the same time, e.g. the quality of an assessment can be “30% Good and 70% Poor”. A variable in a “100% Good” state will typically mean that there are no serious mistakes in an assessment, or that the performance of the crew is flawless; while a variable in a “100% Poor” state will typically mean that there are a lot of serious mistakes. In most of the questions for these variables, we will only ask for the probability that the variable is in the “Good” state. It is assumed that the probability for being in the “Poor” state is 1-P (Good). There will be some calibration of the model afterwards, using statistical data.

6.2.1 Training

Describes: Crew’s training in emergency handling Input variables: ISEMSMain States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the crew’s training is good?

6.2.2 CrewQuality

Describes: The quality of the crew at the time of emergency, including results of training, experience, and tiredness. Input variables: Training States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the quality of the crew is good if

The training of the crew is good?

The training of the crew is poor?

6.2.3 BridgeAssessment

Describes: The quality of the bridge’s assessment of the situation.

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Input variables: CrewQuality, ISEMSMain, PrognosisTool, TechExperience States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the bridge’s assessment of the situation is good if

The quality of the crew is good? :

The quality of the crew is poor? :

6.2.4 OOWAssessment

Describes: The quality of the assessment of the officer of watch at the initial stages of the situation. Input variables: CrewQuality, ISEMSMain, TechExperience States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the OOW’s assessment of the situation is good if

Officer’s quality is good?

Officer’s quality is poor?

6.2.5 InitialMustering

Describes: How quick that the first emergency response teams can be mustered. Input variables: OOWAssessment States: Fast, Slow What is the probability of a fast/timely mustering if

The OOW has a good assessment of the situation?

The OOW has not a good assessment of the situation?

6.2.6 LocalAssessment

Describes: The quality of the situation assessment of the first emergency response teams. Input variables: OOWAssessment, CrewQuality, ISEMSWireless States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the first emergency response teams get a good assessment of the situation if

The teams have a good quality and o The OOW’s assessment of the situation is good?

o The OOW’s assessment of the situation is not good?

The teams have a poor quality and o The OOW’s assessment of the situation is good?

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o The OOW’s assessment of the situation is poor?

6.2.7 OnSceneAssessment

Describes: The quality of assessment of the on-scene commanders and the damage control teams Input variables: BridgeAssessment, CrewQuality, ISEMSWireless States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the on-scene commander and damage control teams get a good assessment of the situation if

The teams have a good quality and o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is good? o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is not good?

The teams have a poor quality and o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is good?

o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is poor?

6.2.8 DmgCtrlPerformance

Describes: The quality of the performance of the damage control teams Input: OnSceneAssessment, CrewQuality States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the damage control teams performs well in their tasks if

The on-scene assessment of the situation is good and o The crew’s quality is good?

o The crew’s quality is poor?

The on-scene assessment of the situation is poor and o The crew’s quality is good?

o The crew’s quality is poor?

6.2.9 EvacCrewAssessment

Describes: The quality of the assessment of the crew assisting with evacuation Input variables: BridgeAssessment, CrewQuality, ISEMSWireless States: Good, Poor

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What is the probability that the crew assisting with evacuation get a good assessment of the situation if

The teams have a good quality and o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is good?

o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is poor?

The teams have a poor quality and o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is good?

o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is poor?

6.2.10 EvacCrewPerformance

Describes: The quality of the performance of the crew assisting with evacuation Input variables: EvacCrewAssessment, CrewQuality States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the teams assisting with evacuation performs well in their tasks if

Their assessment of the situation is good and o The crew’s quality is good?

o The crew’s quality is poor?

Their assessment of the situation is poor and o The crew’s quality is good?

o The crew’s quality is poor?

6.2.11 PassengerPerformance

Describes: The performance of the passengers in an evacuation situation. This variable models factors like sleepiness and the reaction to the emergency.

This variable does not describe the actual ability to evacuate; the effects of escape route availability and sinking ship on this variable are meant to be the psychological effects on the passengers. Input variables: EvacCrewPerformance, EscapeRouteAvailability, SinkingMode States: Good, Poor In a non-sinking ship with high escape route availability: What is the probability that the passengers perform well if

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The crew assisting with evacuation has a good performance?

The crew assisting with evacuation has a poor performance? In a non-sinking ship with low escape route availability: What is the probability that the passengers perform well if

The crew assisting with evacuation has a good performance?

The crew assisting with evacuation has a poor performance? In a sinking ship with high escape route availability: What is the probability that the passengers perform well if

The crew assisting with evacuation has a good performance?

The crew assisting with evacuation has a poor performance? In a sinking ship with low escape route availability: What is the probability that the passengers perform well if

The crew assisting with evacuation has a good performance?

The crew assisting with evacuation has a poor performance?

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6.3 Questions about training, crew and officer quality, and situation assessment with ISEMS – Experienced users

In this section we will repeat the questions in the previous for variables that can be affected by the ISEMS system.

This time we want the assessment to include the effect of using ISEMS For many of these variables, the crew’s experience with ISEMS or ISEMS-like technology may have an influence. In this section, it is assumed that the crew is experienced in the use of

ISEMS or similar systems. There are four “parts” of ISEMS that we would like to study. A basic system that is available on the bridge, a system that automatically transfers situation data to on-shore facilities, a system that automatically transfers situation data to on-shore facilities that use situation prognosis tools, and a system that is available through wireless terminals for the on-scene commander.

6.3.1 Training

Describes: Crew’s training in emergency handling Input variables: ISEMSMain States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the crew’s training is good if ISEMS is used on the ship and as a training tool?

6.3.2 BridgeAssessment

Describes: The quality of the bridge’s assessment of the situation. Input variables: ISEMSMain, ISEMSToShore, TechExperience, PrognosisTool States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the bridge’s assessment of the situation is good if ISEMS is used on the bridge, the bridge is experienced with the use of ISEMS and

The quality of the crew manning the bridge is good and o A version of ISEMS that does not communicate data to the shore is used?

o A version of ISEMS that does communicate data to the shore is used, but there

are no prognosis tools used?

o A version of ISEMS that does communicate data to the shore is used, and the onshore facilities use prognosis tools?

The quality of the crew manning the bridge is poor and

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o A version of ISEMS that does not communicate data to the shore is used?

o A version of ISEMS that does communicate data to the shore is used, but there are no prognosis tools used?

o A version of ISEMS that does communicate data to the shore is used, and the

onshore facilities use prognosis tools?

6.3.3 OOWAssessment

Describes: The quality of the assessment of the officer of watch at the initial stages of the situation Input variables: CrewQuality, ISEMSMain, TechExperience States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the OOW’s assessment of the situation is good if ISEMS is used, the OOW is experienced in using ISEMS and

The officer’s quality is good?

The officer’s quality is poor?

6.3.4 LocalAssessment

Describes: The quality of the situation assessment of the first emergency response teams. Input variables: OOWAssessment, CrewQuality, ISEMSWireless States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the first emergency response teams get a good assessment of the situation if the teams have access to ISEMS with wireless terminals, are experienced in using this system and

The teams have a good quality and o The OOW’s assessment of the situation is good?

o The OOW’s assessment of the situation is not good?

The teams have a poor quality and o The OOW’s assessment of the situation is good?

o The OOW’s assessment of the situation is poor?

6.3.5 OnSceneAssessment

Describes: The quality of assessment of the on-scene commanders and the damage control teams Input variables: BridgeAssessment, CrewQuality, ISEMSWireless, TechExperience

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States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the on-scene commanders and damage control teams get a good assessment of the situation if they have access to ISEMS with wireless terminals, are experienced in using this system and

The teams have a good quality and o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is good?

o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is not good?

The teams have a poor quality and o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is good?

o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is poor?

6.3.6 EvacCrewAssessment

Describes: The quality of the assessment of the crew assisting with evacuation Input variables: BridgeAssessment, CrewQuality, ISEMSWireless States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the crew assisting with evacuation get a good assessment of the situation if they have access to ISEMS with wireless terminals, are experienced in using this system and

The teams have a good quality and o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is good?

o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is not good?

The teams have a poor quality and o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is good?

o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is poor?

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6.4 Questions about training, crew and officer quality, and situation assessment with ISEMS – Inexperienced users

In this section we will repeat the questions in the previous for variables that can be affected by the ISEMS system.

This time we want the assessment to include the effect of using ISEMS, but with the assumption that the users are inexperienced with this kind of technical system.

6.4.1 TechExperience

Describes: The crew’s experience with ISEMS or ISEMS-like technical systems Input variables: Training States: Experienced, Inexperienced

If ISEMS is used on the ship, what is the probability that the crew is experienced with the use of the system (or ISEMS-like technical systems) if

The training of the crew is good?

The training of the crew is poor?

6.4.2 BridgeAssessment

Describes: The quality of the bridge’s assessment of the situation. Input variables: ISEMSMain, ISEMSToShore, TechExperience, PrognosisTool States: Good, Poor

What is the probability that the bridge’s assessment of the situation is good if ISEMS is used, but the bridge is inexperienced with the use of ISEMS (or similar technology) and

The quality of the crew manning the bridge is good and o A version of ISEMS that does not communicate data to the shore is used?

o A version of ISEMS that does communicate data to the shore is used, but there

are no prognosis tools used?

o A version of ISEMS that does communicate data to the shore is used, and the onshore facilities use prognosis tools?

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The quality of the crew manning the bridge is poor and o A version of ISEMS that does not communicate data to the shore is used?

o A version of ISEMS that does communicate data to the shore is used, but there

are no prognosis tools used?

o A version of ISEMS that does communicate data to the shore is used, and the onshore facilities use prognosis tools?

6.4.3 OOWAssessment

Describes: The quality of the assessment of the officer of watch at the initial stages of the situation Input variables: CrewQuality, ISEMSMain, TechExperience States: Good, Poor

What is the probability that the OOW’s assessment of the situation is good if ISEMS is used, but the OOW is inexperienced in using ISEMS (or similar technology) and

The officer’s quality is good?

The officer’s quality is poor?

6.4.4 LocalAssessment

Describes: The quality of the situation assessment of the first emergency response teams. Input variables: OOWAssessment, CrewQuality, ISEMSWireless States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the first emergency response teams get a good assessment of the situation if the teams have access to ISEMS with wireless terminals, but are inexperienced in using this system and

The teams have a good quality and o The OOW’s assessment of the situation is good?

o The OOW’s assessment of the situation is not good?

The teams have a poor quality and o The OOW’s assessment of the situation is good?

o The OOW’s assessment of the situation is poor?

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6.4.5 OnSceneAssessment

Describes: The quality of assessment of the on-scene commanders and the damage control teams Input variables: BridgeAssessment, CrewQuality, ISEMSWireless, TechExperience States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the on-scene commanders and damage control teams get a good assessment of the situation if they have access to ISEMS with wireless terminals, but are inexperienced in using this system and

The teams have a good quality and o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is good?

o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is not good?

The teams have a poor quality and o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is good?

o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is poor?

6.4.6 EvacCrewAssessment

Describes: The quality of the assessment of the crew assisting with evacuation Input variables: BridgeAssessment, CrewQuality, ISEMSWireless States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the crew assisting with evacuation get a good assessment of the situation if they have access to ISEMS with wireless terminals, but are inexperienced in using this system and

The teams have a good quality and o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is good?

o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is not good?

The teams have a poor quality and o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is good?

o The bridge’s assessment of the situation is poor?

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6.4.7 MusteringOverview

Describes: The overview of mustered persons when performing a full mustering Input variables: EvacCrewPerformance, ISEMSWireless States: Good, Poor What is the probability that the crew assisting with evacuation operations has a good overview of the mustered persons if they have access to ISEMS with wireless terminals, but the crew is inexperienced in using this system and

The crew has a good performance?

The crew has a poor performance?

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6.5 Questions about situation containment and damage control

6.5.1 FireLocalManagement

Describes: The results of the initial attempts to contain a fire locally. Input variables: Fire, FireInitLocation, FireInitSize, InitialMustering, LocalAssessment. States: NoFire, Yes, Delay, No If there is a fire on the ship, what are the probabilities of local containment of the fire, delayed escalation of the fire, and escalation without delay if

The mustering of the initial emergency management teams is fast and o The local assessment of the situation is good

Fast mstr. Good asmnt.

Fire starts in machine spaces

Fire starts on vehicle deck

Fire starts in accommodation spaces

Local containment

Delayed escalation

Escalation w/o delay

o The local assessment of the situation is poor

Fast mstr. Poor asmnt.

Fire starts in machine spaces

Fire starts on vehicle deck

Fire starts in accommodation spaces

Local containment

Delayed escalation

Escalation w/o delay

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The mustering of the initial emergency management teams is slow and o The local assessment of the situation is good

Slow mstr. Good asmnt.

Fire starts in machine spaces

Fire starts on vehicle deck

Fire starts in accommodation spaces

Local containment

Delayed escalation

Escalation w/o delay

o The local assessment of the situation is poor

Slow mstr. Poor asmnt.

Fire starts in machine spaces

Fire starts on vehicle deck

Fire starts in accommodation spaces

Local containment

Delayed escalation

Escalation w/o delay

6.5.2 FloodingLocalContainment

Describes: The results of the initial attempts to contain a flooding locally. Input variables: Flooding, FloodingInitSize, InitialMustering, LocalAssessment. States: NoFlooding, Yes, Delay, No If there is a on the ship, what are the probabilities of local containment of the flooding, delayed escalation of the flooding, and escalation without delay if

The mustering of the initial emergency management teams is fast and o The local assessment of the situation is good

Local Containment

Delayed Escalation

Escalation w/o delay

o The local assessment of the situation is poor

Local Containment

Delayed Escalation

Escalation w/o delay

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The mustering of the initial emergency management teams is slow and o The local assessment of the situation is good

Local Containment

Delayed Escalation

Escalation w/o delay

o The local assessment of the situation is poor

Local Containment

Delayed Escalation

Escalation w/o delay

6.5.3 FireContainment

Describes: The results of the attempts to contain the fire after the initial attempts Input variables: LocalFireContainment, DmgCtrlPerformance. States: LocalContainment, Zone, SlowEscalation, RapidEscalation If there is a fire that is not handled locally, what are the probabilities of containment of the fire to one or a few zones, slow escalation of the fire or rapid escalation of the fire if

The performance of the damage control teams is good and o The initial handling of the situation managed to delay the escalation of the fire

Zone containment

Slow escalation

Rapid escalation

o The initial handling of the situation did not manage to delay the escalation of the fire

Zone containment

Slow escalation

Rapid escalation

The performance of the damage control teams is poor and o The initial handling of the situation managed to delay the escalation of the fire

Zone containment

Slow escalation

Rapid escalation

o The initial handling of the situation did not manage to delay the escalation of the fire

Zone containment

Slow escalation

Rapid escalation

6.5.4 FireNeutralization

Describes: The results of the attempts to neutralize the fire

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Input variables: FireContainment, DmgCtrlPerformance States: Rapid, Slow, None If there is a fire on the ship, what are the probabilities of rapid neutralization, slow neutralization or no neutralization if

The performance of the damage control teams is good

Fire contained locally

Fire contained to zone

Fire escalates slowly

Fire escalates rapidly

Rapid Neutralization

Slow Neutralization

No Neutralization

The performance of the damage control teams is poor

Fire contained locally

Fire contained to zone

Fire escalates slowly

Fire escalates rapidly

Rapid Neutralization

Slow Neutralization

No Neutralization

6.5.5 FloodingContainment

Describes: The results of the attempts to contain the flooding after the initial attempts. Input variables: LocalFloodingContainment, DmgCtrlPerformance. States: LocalContainment, Contained, Uncontained If there is a flooding that is not handled locally, what are the probabilities of containment if

The performance of the damage control teams is good and o The initial handling of the situation managed to delay the escalation of the

flooding?

o The initial handling of the situation did not manage to delay the escalation of the flooding?

The performance of the damage control teams is poor and o The initial handling of the situation managed to delay the escalation of the

flooding?

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o The initial handling of the situation did not manage to delay the escalation of the flooding?

6.5.6 FloodingNeutralization

Describes: The results of the attempts to neutralize the flooding Input variables: FloodingContainment, DmgCtrlPerformance States: Rapid, Slow, None If there is a fire on the ship, what are the probabilities of rapid neutralization, slow neutralization or no neutralization if If there is a flooding on the ship, what are the probabilities of rapid neutralization, slow neutralization or no neutralization if

The performance of the damage control teams is good

Flooding contained locally

Flooding contained (non-locally)

Flooding not contained

Rapid Neutralization

Slow Neutralization

No Neutralization

The performance of the damage control teams is poor

Flooding contained locally

Flooding contained (non-locally)

Flooding not contained

Rapid Neutralization

Slow Neutralization

No Neutralization

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6.6 Questions about evacuation operations

6.6.1 EscapeRouteAvailability

Describes: The availability of escape routes Input variables: CollisionSize, FireContainment, FloodingContainment States: High, Low If there has been no collision, but there is a fire on the ship, what is the probability of a high escape route availability if

The fire is contained to a fire zone?

The fire is escalating slowly?

The fire is escalating rapidly? If there has been a major collision resulting in fire on the ship, what is the probability of a high escape route availability if

The fire is contained to a fire zone?

The fire is escalating slowly?

The fire is escalating rapidly? If there has been a major collision resulting in flooding on the ship, what is the probability of a high escape route availability if

Flooding is contained?

Flooding is uncontained? If there has been a major collision resulting in both flooding and fire on the ship, what is the probability of a high escape route availability if

Both flooding and fire contained?

Flooding is contained, fire is escalating slowly?

Flooding is contained, fire is escalating rapidly?

Flooding is uncontained, fire is contained?

Flooding is uncontained, fire is escalating slowly?

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Flooding is uncontained, fire is escalating rapidly?

6.6.2 LocalEvacuation

Describes: Results of evacuation from affected areas on the ship Input variables: FireInitLocation, Containment, EvacCrewPerformance, PassengerPerformance, EscapeRouteAvailability

The effect of EscapeRouteAvailability and EvacCrewPerformance on this variable is meant to be the direct effect of blocked escape routes and assistance from the crew. The psychological effects on passengers are handled in the PassengerPerformance variable. States: Unnecessary, Successful, Unsuccessful, Catastrophic Unsuccessful implies that some lives are lost, while Catastrophic implies the loss of many lives. For contained situations, the catastrophic results should only be possible if the situation is contained to an area with a high density of people. What are the probabilities of successful or unsuccessful evacuation results if there is a contained flooding and

The escape route availability is high

Successful

Unsuccessful

The escape route availability is low

Successful

Unsuccessful

What are the probabilities of successful or unsuccessful evacuation results if there is a fire contained to a zone in the machine spaces and

The escape route availability is high

Successful

Unsuccessful

The escape route availability is low

Successful

Unsuccessful

What are the probabilities of successful or unsuccessful evacuation results if there is a fire contained to a zone in the vehicle deck and

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The escape route availability is high

Successful

Unsuccessful

The escape route availability is low

Successful

Unsuccessful

What are the probabilities of successful, unsuccessful or catastrophic results if there is a fire contained to a zone in the accommodation spaces and

The escape route availability is high

Performance of crew assisting with evac.

Good Poor

Performance of passengers

Good Poor Good Poor

Successful

Unsuccessful

Catastrophic

The escape route availability is low

Performance of crew assisting with evac.

Good Poor

Performance of passengers

Good Poor Good Poor

Successful

Unsuccessful

Catastrophic

What are the probabilities of successful, unsuccessful or catastrophic local evacuation results if there is a slowly escalating situation (fire or flooding) and

The escape route availability is high

Performance of crew assisting with evac.

Good Poor

Performance of passengers

Good Poor Good Poor

Successful

Unsuccessful

Catastrophic

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The escape route availability is low

Performance of crew assisting with evac.

Good Poor

Performance of passengers

Good Poor Good Poor

Successful

Unsuccessful

Catastrophic

What are the probabilities of successful, unsuccessful or catastrophic local evacuation results if there is a rapidly escalating situation and

The escape route availability is high

Performance of crew assisting with evac.

Good Poor

Performance of passengers

Good Poor Good Poor

Successful

Unsuccessful

Catastrophic

The escape route availability is low

Performance of crew assisting with evac.

Good Poor

Performance of passengers

Good Poor Good Poor

Successful

Unsuccessful

Catastrophic

6.6.3 FullMustering

Describes: The results of full mustering of passengers and crew Input variables: Containment, EscapeRouteAvailability, EvacCrewPerformance, PassengerPerformance, MusteringOverview States: NotPerformed, Complete, Delayed, Incomplete For a slowly escalating situation, what are the probabilities that a full mustering of passengers and crew completes without delays, completes with delays or is incomplete if

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The escape route availability is high

Performance of crew assisting with evac.

Good Poor

Performance of passengers

Good Poor Good Poor

Complete w/o delays

Complete with delays

Incomplete

The escape route availability is low

Performance of crew assisting with evac.

Good Poor

Performance of passengers

Good Poor Good Poor

Complete w/o delays

Complete with delays

Incomplete

For a rapidly escalating situation, what are the probabilities that a full mustering of passengers and crew completes without delays, completes with delays or is incomplete if

The escape route availability is high

Performance of crew assisting with evac.

Good Poor

Performance of passengers

Good Poor Good Poor

Complete w/o delays

Complete with delays

Incomplete

The escape route availability is low

Performance of crew assisting with evac.

Good Poor

Performance of passengers

Good Poor Good Poor

Complete w/o delays

Complete with delays

Incomplete

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6.6.4 Evacuation

Describes: The result of evacuation (entering and launching lifeboats) of the mustered persons Input variables: Containment, EvacCrewPerformance, PassengerPerformance,

FullMustering States: Unnecessary, Successful, Unsuccessful, Catastrophic For a slowly escalating situation, what is the probability of a successful, unsuccessful or catastrophic result of the evacuation of the mustered persons if

There is no delay in mustering

Performance of crew assisting with evac.

Good Poor

Performance of passengers

Good Poor Good Poor

Successful

Unsuccessful

Catastrophic

The mustering is delayed

Performance of crew assisting with evac.

Good Poor

Performance of passengers

Good Poor Good Poor

Successful

Unsuccessful

Catastrophic

For a rapidly escalating situation, what is the probability of a successful, unsuccessful or catastrophic result of the evacuation of the mustered persons if

There is no delay in mustering

Performance of crew assisting with evac.

Good Poor

Performance of passengers

Good Poor Good Poor

Successful

Unsuccessful

Catastrophic

The mustering is delayed

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Performance of crew assisting with evac.

Good Poor

Performance of passengers

Good Poor Good Poor

Successful

Unsuccessful

Catastrophic

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7. Analysis results

7.1 Basic methodology

The benefit analysis is performed in the following steps:

The interviews are performed and judgements are collected. Currently, the expected method will be to calculate the mean values for the different weights and use that in the variables.

The known fatality numbers for normal ships are known. The statistics used by the passenger ship FSA (see section 4.1) fits existing statistics and that includes mostly ships without ISEMS fitted.

The weights on the output variables will be scaled to fit existing statistics for the case where no ISEMS is used.

The different types of ISEMS will be enabled in the model and the changes in output fatalities will be recorded.

The recorded data will be used as estimates for reduction in fatalities with the use of ISEMS.

The cost side will be the marginal cost of adding an ISEMS to a ship that has all the other required systems. With new rules for safe return to port, this also includes most of the redundant cabling that is used to interconnect the various ISEMS components. Thus, the cost is mainly related to the software of the ISEMS and the required number of workstations.

Although the workstation count is included in the cost, this may be to overestimate the system cost as the ISEMS actually may reduce overall equipment costs. Some ISEMS have been approved as replacements for fire alarm centrals, fire door mimics and may also replace some control stations for CCTV systems. However, this is not included in the cost side.

Later, the cost benefit analysis will estimate the equipment cost per reduced fatality over the ship's lifetime. The latter is set to 25 years for a ship of the examined type.

7.2 Results of interviews

TBD.

7.3 Benefit calculation in terms of reduced fatalities

TBD.

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8. Costs analysis

8.1 General principles

With reference to the technical requirements defined in D-C1.2, we can make an assessments of the costs associated to the fitting of all the sub-systems needed for the implementation of the standardized system.

Costs and benefits are defined for the following categories of systems:

1. Baseline system: The general equipment already onboard. This includes fire alarm system, automation system, stability computer and navigation system.

2. Ship ISEMS: Cost of adding an integrated safety and emergency management on the bridge and in one other location on board.

3. Land ISEMS: Additional cost (compared to item 2) to add a land based ISEMS with necessary communication facilities.

4. Wireless ISEMS: Additional costs (compared to item 2) to add a wireless infrastructure and corresponding equipment for mobile teams.

5. Prognosis functions: Additional costs (compared to item 2) of adding prognosis functionality to the system.

The analysis will be performed for a passenger ship only. All cost estimates are in Euro (EUR).

8.2 Baseline system

The baseline system is a passenger ship with all required systems onboard, but no ISEMS. Required systems will include necessary cabling and redundancy to safely return to port. Thus, no additional costs are assumed for this is the other cases.

8.3 Ship ISEMS

Equipment costs that are one-off costs only.

Software cost

Engineering cost

Interfacing to fire, stability, automation, navigation

Equipment costs that need to be reinvested each time the system is renewed. First investment when system is commissioned.

6 computer workstations

Software update cost

Yearly costs.

Additional training

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8.4 Land ISEMS

Equipment costs that are one-off costs only.

Software cost (additional licence)

Interfacing to networks etc.

Equipment costs that need to be reinvested each time the system is renewed. First investment when system is commissioned.

1 computer workstation

Software update cost (additional licence)

Yearly costs.

Additional training

8.5 Wireless ISEMS

Equipment costs that are one-off costs only.

Software cost (additional licence)

Wireless network additional cost

Note: The wireless network needs to have a high degree of redundancy to be used in such settings as safety and emergency management. It is probably not cost effective to invest in such a network for this application only. Equipment costs that need to be reinvested each time the system is renewed. First investment when system is commissioned.

1 computer tablet / PDA

Software update cost (additional licence)

Yearly costs.

Additional training

8.6 Prognosis functions

Equipment costs that are one-off costs only.

Software cost

Note: The wireless network needs to have a high degree of redundancy to be used in such settings as safety and emergency management. It is probably not cost effective to invest in such a network for this application only.

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Equipment costs that need to be reinvested each time the system is renewed. First investment when system is commissioned.

1 high capacity computer

Software update cost (additional licence)

Yearly costs.

Additional training

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9. Quantitative cost/benefit comparison

TBD.

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10. Conclusions and recommendations

TBD.

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11. References

[CFAR07] CEFOR Annual report 2007, The Central Union of Marine Underwriters, P.O. Box 2550 Solli, N-0202 Oslo, Norway.

[D-C1.1] TIP5-CT-2006-031406/Flagship - Deliverable D-C1.1: Standard on emergency management.

[D-C1.2] TIP5-CT-2006-031406/Flagship - Deliverable D-C1.2: Safety analysis for technical systems.

[DNV03] DNV Research: Risk Assessment of Cruise Navigation, Report No. 2003-0277, Revision No. 01.

[DoT] U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, World Merchant Fleet 2005.

[DSS_DC] TCT3-CT-2003-506354/DSS_DC – Decision Support for Ships in Degraded Condition.

[Equasis] The world merchant fleet in 2005, Statistics from Equasis: Statistical overview of the world's merchant fleet, prepared by EMSA and Equasis.

[FPM] Text is an excerpt from list at web site of FP Marine Risk (http://www.fp-marine.com/).

[ITEA-DS] IST-1999-20254/ITEA-DS – Intelligent Tools for Emergency Applications & Decision Support, EU Contract.

[LFS-W] Lloyds Fairplay Sea-Web, see http://www.sea-web.com.

[MSC85/INF.2] MSC85/INF.2, Maritime Safety Committee, FSA – Cruise ships: Details of the Formal Safety Assessment, July 2008

[MSC85/INF.3] MSC85/INF.3, Maritime Safety Committee, FSA – RoPax ships: Details of the Formal Safety Assessment, July 2008

[MSC/Circ1023] MSC/Circ.1023, MEPC/Circ.392, Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for Use in The IMO Rule-Making Process, 5 April 2002

[NOMIS07] The 2007 CEFOR NoMIS Report, Nordic Marine Insurance Statistics Underwriting Years 1995–2007, as of 31 December 2007.

[SAFEDOR 4.1.1] SAFEDOR-4.1.1 FSA for Cruise Ships – Subproject 4.1: Task 4.1.1 – Hazid identification. 2005

[SSB] Statistics Norway, World fleet by number and ship type. http://www.ssb.no/emner/10/12/40/nos_handelsfl/nos_c741/tab/7.html

[SWAN] IST-1999-14124/SWAN - Deliverable D02.3: Interconnection and Decision Support Systems - State of the art and proposed functionality, 04/10/02.