Sheldon Wolin, Hannah Arendt Democracy.pdf

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1/18

Hannah Arendt: Democracy and The PoliticalAuthor(s): SHELDON S. WOLINSource: Salmagundi, No. 60, On Hannah Arendt (Spring-Summer 1983), pp. 3-19Published by: Skidmore CollegeStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40547750.

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2/18

Hannah

Arendt:

Democracy

and

The Political

BY

SHELDON

S.

WOLIN

The

question

of

democracy

s not one

that has received much

attention

rom hose

who have written

bout Hannah

Arendt.This

omission

seems understandable

because Arendt herself

never

systematically

ddressed he

topic

n

any

of her

writings.

et it s not

difficulto show

that

many

f the

major categories

hat

ompose

and

distinguish

er

political

utlook were

ither ritical f

or

incompatible

with emocratic

deas. This believe o be thecase

with hedistinction

on which

her

political

deals were

grounded,

he distinction etween

thepolitical nd the social. Her critical ttitude oward emocracy

rested n a correct

ntuition hatthe

mpulse

of

democracy

has been

to override

hatdistinction. or

historically, emocracy

as

been

the

means

by

which

he

many

have

sought

ccess to

politicalpower

n

the

hope

that tcould be used

to redress heir conomic nd social lot. The

natural stateof

society

ontains

mportant

istinctions f

wealth,

birth,

nd education

hatare

typically

xtended nto

political

power.

Thus

social

power

s translatednto

politicalpower

which s thenused

to increase ocial

power.

Democracy

s the

attempt

f the

many

to

reverse

he

natural

ycle

of

power,

to translate ocial weakness

nto

politicalpower n orderto alleviatetheconsequencesof what s not

so much

their ondition s their

ot-tery.

Democracy

would

lso obliterateheseArendtian

istinctionsecause

itwants o extend

hebroad

egalitarianism

f

ordinary

ives

nto

public

life. t s at odds

with

he

emphasis

n

authority,

mbition,

lory,

nd

superiority

hat

figured

o

importantly

n

Hannah Arendt's

onception

of authentic

olitical

ction. It was not accidental hat she

excluded

the

entimentsf

fellow-feeling compassion,

ity,

nd love

-

from

the

political

realm,

or,

more

important,

hat she was silent

about

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3/18

4 SHELDON S. WOLIN

friendship so

central o herancient

Greeks)

nd

fellowship

so

basic to Hebraic and Christian

onceptions

f

community).

hese

democratic entimentsnd virtues o not accord withthe

agonistic

conception

of

action she extolled.

Democratic

action

is,

perforce,

collective;

ts

mode s

cooperation;

nd its

presupposition

s not small

audience of heroes but

shared

experience.

In

what

follows

propose

o

explore

he

origins

f the ntidemocratic

strain

n

Arendt's

hought, racing

t from ts

beginnings

n

herclassic

studyof totalitarianismo its apogee in her nextmajor work,The

Human Condition,

Then

I

want to show that

n

her ater

writings

change

s

evident.

t

appeared

first

n

the ast

chapter

f On

Revolution

(1963)

and more

strikingly

n

the collection f

essays,

Crises

of

the

Republic

1969).

While

on the

way

to whatcan

fairly

e described s

a leftward

osition,

she

modified ome of her most characteristic

categories.

Within

imits,

nd

in

herown

way,

she

was,

in

the course

of

reflecting pon

the

political

vents

f

the

1960s,

radicalized.

Hannah Arendt'sfirst

major

work,

The

Origins f

Totalitarianism

(1951),

was

completely

ilent

bout

democracy.

Although

rima

acie

there eems o be nonecessaryeasonwhy nanalysis f totalitarianism

should discuss

democracy,

he historical nd

political

context

f the

subject-matter

nd thebook

suggest

therwise. he book was written

in

the mmediate ftermath

f World War

II.

During

hewar

years

n

the United

Kingdom,

he

British

ommonwealth,

he United

States,

and

in

a

significant

art

of

Nazi-occupiedEurope,

the

single,

most

universal

heme hat et

the

nterpretation

f the

war

n

the minds f

ordinary

eople

everywhere

as of a

struggle

etween

democracy

and

dictatorship.

The

books,

newspapers,magazines,

radio

and

moviesof the timeconveyed pretty nanimousviewpoint hat the

nature f totalitarianism

as

to be

grasped

almost

entirely

n

terms

of the

political

antitheses

etween

democracy

nd totalitarianism:

between

emocratic reedom

f

speech

nd education nd

totalitarian

thought-control

nd mass

manipulation;

etween

emocracy's ystem

of free

olitical arties

nd

government

y

consent

nd the otalitarian

one-party

tate with ts

use of terror

nd intimidation.

While it would be an

exaggeration

o

argue

that the

Origins of

Totalitarianism

eversedhe

ccepted erspective,

t s no overstatement

to

say

that he

work

dopted

viewpoint

hat

nterpreted

otalitarianism

bymeans fcategorieshatweredrawn rom ntellectualraditionshat

were

deeply

anti-democratic.

One tradition

was associated

with

Nietzsche,

he

otherwith

ocqueville.

A fundamental

ategory

f both



4/18

HannahArendt:Democracyand ThePolitical 5

traditions as the mass. For

Nietzsche

emocracy

was

primarily

he

political

xpression

f the

atomistic,

nheroic,

ecurity-loving

ulture

which

ad

emerged

fter hedefeat f the

gonistic,

ristocratic

olitical

culture of

antiquity

by

the slave

morality

of

Christianity.

The

democratic

movement,

Nietzsche

wrote,

is

not

only

heform

f the

decay

of

political rganization,

ut a form f

the

decay,

namely,

he

diminution,

f

man,

making

him

mediocre nd

lowering

is value. 1

Tocqueville,

whose

general

nfluence n

Arendt,

articularly

n

her

understandingf thefounding f the Americanrepublic nd of the

nature f the French

Revolution,

has

not been

fully

ppreciated,

not

only

nticipated

ietzsche's

ostalgia

or

politics

n an

heroic

cale,2

but

was thefirst

ineteenth-century

heoristo

revive he ncient otion

that

ertain orms

f

tyranny ight

ave a

popular

basis.3

Tocqueville

envisioned

an

immense

rotective ower,

operating

enignly

ather

than

brutally,

hat

hinders, estrains,

nervates,tifles,

nd

stultifies

by

a network f

pretty omplicated

ules that

covers thewhole of

social

ife. Democratic

equality,

Tocqueville

held,

has

prepared

men for all

this,

encouraging

hem

to

pursue

petty

and banal

pleasures, to exist in and forhimself, solated and politically

passive.4

The echoes of these writers an be

heard

in

the main

themesof

Arendt's

nalysis

f totalitarianism....

totalitarian

movements,

she

wrote,

depended

less on the

structurelessnessf

a mass

society

than on the

specific

onditionsof

an atomized

and

individualized

mass.

. . . 5

Mass man was

characterized

y

isolation and

lack

of normal ocial

relationships

aused

in

part

by

the breakdown

f

the lass

system. 6

otalitarian

movements,

he

continued,

were

built

on sheer numbers f

indifferent

eople.

. .

who

never eforehad

appeared

on the

political

cene. 7Totalitarian

eaders,

uch as

Hitler

and

Stalin,

had the

confidence of the

masses and

enjoyed

indisputable opularity. 8

he

triumph

f totalitarian

movements,

she

concluded,

shattered the

illusion that

the existence

of

1 Cited in

Tracy

B.

Strong,

Friedrich

Nietzsche

nd

the

Politics

of

Transfiguration

(Berkeley

nd

Los

Angeles,

1975),

p.

201.

2

See,

for

xample,

Democracy

n

America,

tr.

George

Lawrence

Garden

City,

New

York. 1969). d.

15.

3 A.

Andrewes,

The Greek

Tyrants London, 1956).

4

Democracy

n

America,

p.

692.

5 The

Origins f

Totalitarianism

New York, 1951), p.

312.

6 Ibid. pp. 310, 308.

7

Ibid., p.

305.

8

The

Origins f

Totalitarianism

New York,

1951),

p.

301.



5/18

6 SHELDON S. WOLIN

democracy

had

been made

possible

because

the

majority

ad taken

an active

part

and had

positively

upported

emocratic

overnment.

In

reality

he

majority

had

been indifferent.

his

proved

that a

democracy

could

function

ccording

to

rules

which are

actively

recognized

y only

a

minority.

nsofar s

democracy

ested

n the

masses

at

all,

it had

rested on

the silent

pprobation

nd tolerance

of

the ndifferent

nd

inarticulate

ections

f the

people.

The moral

was

that

while emocratic

reedoms

ight

e defined

n

terms f

formal,

legalequality, heywereviable onlywhere he citizens elongto or

are

represented

y

groups

or form

social

and

political

hierarchy,

that

s,

where

here

was

political

nd

social

inequality.9

The

Origins

oncluded

with

warning,

hat

unless human

beings

resolved

o undertake

fresh

olitical

tart

a

planned

beginning

f

history )

hatwould

nclude

he reation

f a new

polity,

he

future

was

bleak.

There are

plenty

f ndications

hat he

mob.

. .

will

ake

over

and

destroy

wherewe were

unable to

produce. 10

She

undertook

hat

project

herself

n The Human

Condition

1958),

and

offered

er

onception

f

a new

beginning

hat

would

furnish

he

ground orwithstandinghemasses.Therewas ittlen theOrigins hat

would

have

prepared

reader

or he

rchaic

vision

f a new

polity

that

was

inspired

y

the version

f

pre-Socratic

ellenism

ssociated

withNietzsche

nd

Heidegger.

The

Human

Condition

id not

present

a

sketch

f

a

political

onstitution

s

Plato had

done,

but

t did

offer,

in

the

Platonic

sense,

an

idea

that embodied

an

ideal.

And like

Plato's,

her

deal

owed

virtually othing

o the

facts f

history

nd

only

slightly

ore

o the

history

f

political

deas.

The

political

was

the

ideal.

The

intention

ehind

t was

to combat

different

ersion

f the

masses han

heone

which

ad

figured

n

her

nalysis

f totalitarianism.

Although

mass

society

emained

he

danger,

he

nalysis

wasfocused

on

the

phenomenon

f

work

and

on the

transformation

f

society

and

politics

ffected

y

the

modern

mphasis

upon

productivity

nd

economic

growth.

hese

and other

notions

were

ssembled

under

he

idea of

the

social ;

and

behind

hat

dea

was her

main

opponent,

arl

Marx,

who

symbolized

he

destruction

f the

Western

radition

f

politics.

Arendt's

onception

f

the

political

had several

spects.

t

signified

not

a state

or a

society

but

a determinate

ublic

space,

a

forum,

n

agora,setaside, ealouslydefended o that hosemenwhowished o

9

Ibid.,

p.

306.

10

bid.,

pp.

438,

439.



6/18

HannahArendt:Democracyand The Political 1

test hemselves

y

the

highest

tandards f

excellence

might

ompete,

by

peech

nd

action,

n

the

presence

f their

eers.

t

was to be

a

politics

of

lofty

mbition,

lory,

nd

honor,

unsullied

by

private

nterest r

thematerial oncerns

n

the

arger

ociety

outside : a

politics

f

actors

rather han

citizens,

gonistic

ather han

participatory,

ncouraging

qualities

hatwould enable men to stand out

rather hanto

take

part

of,

share

(participation pars (part)

+

capio (seize)).

It was

a

combination

f Periclean

democracy,

dealized so as to

expunge

he

democratic lements f law courts nd assemblies, nd an Homeric

assembly

romwhich hemerest

uggestion

hat

Thersites

might

rise

to

quarrel

with

kings

(Iliad 2.211-78)

had

been removed.

It is difficulto

exaggerate

ither

he

severity

ithwhich

he drew

boundaries

round

he

political

n

order

o

separate

t from he

banality

and low concerns f

ordinary

ife,

or the historical

istortions

hich

had to be introduced

n order

o claim forher

construct he

authority

of

the Greeks.

Among

the distortions he

ignored

the

acute class

conflicts hatwere familiar eature f the

Greek

city-states

nd

had

generated

ontinuous

ressure

or

the

broadening

f

citizenship

nd

for he nlargementfpolitical ccess so that xcluded ocialelements

might njoy

thebenefits f

political

membership.

s a result he

gave

us a

politics

without he

divisive onflicts hathave

presented

he

main

challenge

o

politicians,

ust

as she had

given

us what was

said to be

a

Greek-inspiredonception

f action but

without

nalyzing

he vital

place

accordedviolence nd war

n

Greek

onceptions

f the

polis

and

of

noble action.

In the ame

bowdlerizing

ein,

he made

no mention f

the

periodic

efforts,

s

early

s the Solonic land

reforms,

o

expand

the

meaning

of

equality

insonomia)

o as

to include

socio-economic

ontent nd

not ustan equality f formal egal rights.11o insistent as she that

political quality

had to be confined

mong

the few

that he tried

o

maintain hat the real

meaning

of

equality

s

understood

y

the

Greeks

had

notto do

with

air reatmentr

evenwith

qual

rights

ut

with

condition

n

which he ndividualwas

free ecausehe was

neither

a ruler

or

superior)

nor a

subject

or

inferior).12

n

support

of

this

interpretation

he

claimedthat the whole

concept

of rule and

being

ruled. . was felt

o be

prepolitical

nd to

belong

o

the

private

ather

11

See G.

Vlastos, bonomia,

Classical

Philology,

ol. XLI

(1946),

65-83;

J.W.

Jones,

The Law and

Legal Theory

f

the Greeks

Oxford,

1956),

pp.

16-23,

84-90;

M.M.

Austin nd P. Vidal-Naquet,Economic and Social History fAncientGreece: An

Introduction

Berkeley,

os

Angeles,

1977),

pp.

24-26.

12

The Human

Condition

Chicago, 1958),

pp.

32-33.



7/18

8 SHELDON S. WOLIN

thanthe

public sphere. 13

he claim

s, however,

latly

ontradicted

by

Aristotle's amiliar

efinition hat

'citizens,

n

the common ense

of the

term,

re all who share

in

the civic life of

ruling

nd

being

ruled. 14

The

fragility

f her

deal was underlined

y

the condition

which

t

required.

A

politics

devoted o

the

production

f

memorable

ctions

had to be not

only

xclusive ut

ubsidized. he ancientAthenians

ad

compromised

heir

democracyby

excluding

laves,

resident

liens,

workers,nd women, hat s, practicallyheentirework force f the

polis.

Arendt

ccepted

this

notion and dressed t out

by

adopting

Aristotle's

ustification

hat

these

human ctivities

were

functions

which mbodied

he

metaphysical

rinciple

f

necessity,

hat

s,

they

were

necessary

o

sustaining

uman ife

nd,

by

extension,

he

ollective

life of the

polis.

But

because

these formsof

labor

were bound

endlessly

o

produce

nd

reproduce

hemeansof

life,

nd

because the

fate f the

products

nd

serviceswas

to be consumed nd

thus

o

pass

away

without

race,

nd

because the

aborer

depended

on

employers

or

masters,

the

activitieswere

unfree,

without choice or

lasting

significance.arenthetically,nemight ote hat his ontrast etween

freedom and

necessity

was

comparable

o theone

developedby

Marx, but,

unlike

Marx,

Arendt

wantedto

preserve

ecessity

ather

than

develop

a

complex strategy,

s Marx

did,

for

exploiting

t,

overcoming

t,

and

consorting

with t. For

Arendtfreedom

esided

essentially

n

the

political

realm

wheremen

could exercise

hoice.

In

her

yes,

Marx's exaltation f

abor,

his claimthat t

should

constitute

the

principle

round

which

ociety

hould

be

reorganized,

epresented

an inversion

f

the true

hierarchy

f values. It

meant

enshrining

n

activity

hatwas

essentially

indless,

outinizednd

repetitious

n

place

ofpolitical ctionwith tsdrivefor heunpredictablendmemorable

deed. The artof

politics

eachesmenhow to

bring

orthwhat s

great

and radiant.

.

Greatness. . can

only

ie

n

the

performance

tself nd

neither

n

its motivation or

ts achievement. 15

abor,

on the other

hand,

entails form

f

sociability

hat

nvolves the actual

oss of all

awareness f

individuality

nd

identity.

The animal

laborans is

marked

by

an

incapacity

or

distinction nd hence for

action and

speech. 16

13

Ibid.,

p.

32.

14 Politics Ill.xiii. 1283 b 45.

15 The Human

Condition,

p.

206.

16

Ibid.,

pp.

213,

215.



8/18

Hannah Arendt:Democracyand The Political 9

The distinctive

ature f

the

political

r

public

realmwas

developed

by

the ontrasts

hich

Arendt rewbetween

t and the

oncept

f the

social.

The latter

ignified

ll of

the ctivities

nd

relationships

hich,

by

nature,

were

private.

They

ncluded

work

nd

labor,

ove, sex,

family,

nd household.

These,

she

contended,

werematters hat ould

not withstand

he

glare

of

publicity

hat attends ll

political

ctions

without

eing

distorted

r

perverted.

rivate

things,

uch

as

labor,

material

oncerns,

and

bodily

unctions,

should emain

hidden.

1

The crisis fmodernitys that hepoliticalrealmhas been nvaded

by

the ocial

realm,

specially

y

private

conomic

nterestsnd

private

values of

consumption

nd

pleasure.

The most

dangerous

nvader s

the mass

whose

power

has increased

with he

growth

f

conformity.

The

value of

equality

as been

realized

n

the

fact f sameness. olitics

has

given

way

o administration

s bureaucracies

egulate

aily

ife nd

render

t

more

uniform.

he

triumph

f

necessity,

nd of

the

abor-

principle

hat mbodies

t,

s realized

n

theform f a

society

edicated

to

the

gnoble

deal of mere

ife.She described

hat

ociety

n

a

passage

that

s

pure

Nietzsche:

Society

s

the form

n

which

he factof

mutual

dependence

or

the

ake of life nd

nothing

lse assumes

public

ignificance

nd

where he activities

onnected

with heer urvival

re

permitted

to

appear

in

public.18

In

retrospect

he

Human Condition seems

a work that

s

highly

suggestive

t the

margins

f its chosen

problems

nd

irrelevant,

ven

misleading,

t its center.

There are

marvelously erceptive

omments

about

the nature

f action

and of

work,

but the

main

construct,

the

political, couldnotcarry heburden ssigned o it. Thiswas because

two of

the

most fundamental

olitical

problems

were

either

gnored

or treated

uperficially:

ower

nd

ustice.

Power,

he

declared,

exists

only

n its actualization.

t

springs

up

between

men

when

they

ct

together

nd

vanishes

he moment

heydisperse

. . Power

is to an

astonishing egree

ndependent

f

material

factors

. .

This formulation

as

fully

onsistent

withher

discussion

f

work,

labor,

technology,

nd

private

property

which

never succeeded

in

grasping

he

basic lesson

taught

not

onlyby

Marx but

by

the classical

17 TheHuman Condition,p. 77.

18

Ibid.,

p.

46.

19

The

Human

Condition,

p.

200.



9/18

10 SHELDON S. WOLIN

economists s

well,

that an

economy

s not

merely

work,

property,

productivity,

nd

consumption:

t

s a structuref

power, system

f

ongoing

elationships

n

which

ower

nd

dependence

end o become

cumulative,

nd

inequalities

re

reproduced

n

forms

hat

are

ever

grosser

nd

ever

more

ophisticated.

t

s

a

system

f

power

whose

ogic

contains

no inherent

rinciple

f

ustice,

nd it s

doubtful

hat,

n

the

absence

f

thedevoted

abors

f

philosophers

ver he

past

wo

decades,

itwould

have

ever

cquired

ne.

But

ustice

was not

discussed

y

Arendt

atall; itsimply id notfigure orher s it had forPlato andAristotle,

as the

main

objective

of

political

ction.

Arendt's ilence

bout

ustice

was related o another

xtraordinary

omission:the state. That one could claim

to have a

politics

without

discussing

he state

s

perhaps

he result f her Greek

starting-point.

As is

well-known,

he

oncept

f the

tate

oes notmake n

appearance

until he

early

16th

entury.

ts

absence,

both

n

theory

nd

practice,

allowed her attention o be focusedon

the

political

ctor and action

itself o be treated

n

dramaturgical

erms,

ith

otmuch ttention

iven

to nstitutional

onstraints,

o thedifficulties

f

action-at-a-distance,

and to thedependencef actors pontheir wn nstrumentalities.hen

the modern tate

appears

and

acquires

its

centralized

pparatus

of

power,

he actor

anticipates

he fateof the

contemporary

uthor

n

a

structuralist

ritique:

he extno

longer

needshim.The

presence

f

the

state

has even more

mportant onsequences

for

ordinary

itizens. t

represents

ot

only

the

greatest

oncentration f coercive

power

n

history,

nd it not

only

demands

bedience,

ut tasks for

oyalty,

ven

affection,

rom ts

subjects.

The conditions

which

the modern tate

requires

enormous

evenues,

managed

conomy

nd labor

force,

a

huge

military

stablishment,

ver-moreethal nstrumentsf

violence,

a vast

bureaucracy,

nd a

compliant

citizenry

hat will

produce

legitimation

pon

demand

-

make it

increasingly lain

that the

democratic

tate has become a contradiction

n

terms.

* * *

On

Revolution

1963)

saw Arendt

xchanging

he

paradigm

f Athens

forthe

early

American

republic,

he

agonal

actor of Homer for the

revolutionary

f

1776,

and Pericles for John Adams.

Many

of the

categories developed in The Human Condition were retained,

particularly

he

dichotomy

etween

he

political

and the

social

with ts anti-democraticnd

even

anti-political mplications.

Now,



10/18


however,

he

opposition

between the

political

and the social was

developed

by

meansof

a

contrast

etween he two

great

18th

entury

revolutions,

he

American,

whichwas

guided

by

an

authentic

olitical

impulse,

nd the

French,

which

catalyzed

the

many

who,

since

antiquity,

had remained outside

history,

hat

is,

the

history

of

memorable ctions.

The

French

Revolutionmarked hemomentwhen

those who

had been hidden

way

in

the ower

depths

of

society

had

suddenly rupted.

.

. . this

multitude,

ppearing

or

he

first ime

n

broad daylight,was actually the multitude f the poor and the

downtrodden,

hom

very entury

eforehad

hidden

n

darkness nd

shame. 20

t was

as

though,

he

continued,

the

slaves

and resident

aliens

of

ntiquity],

ho formed he

majority

f the

population

without

ever

belonging

o the

people,

had risen nd demanded n

equality

of

rights. 21

hemselves

reoccupied

with heir

needs,

they

enerated

a

type

f

physical

necessity

from

heir wn

misery

nd unleashed

it

upon

public

pace.

Thus

out of

a

primal

ecessity

evolution

merged,

not

s the

nspired

ction

of a

desperate eople

unableto secure edress

for their

grievances,

ut as an

irresistible

rocess,

a

necessity

o

overpowerings to defyhumancontrol, nd hencesignifying as

necessity lways

does

-

the denial of

freedom.22

In

the

American

Revolution,

he

maintained,

the exact

opposite

took

place. 23

The Americans

conducted

a

genuinely political

revolution,

ne that concernednot theorder

f

society

ut the form

of

government.

mong

he

reasonsfor he

difference,

s

Tocqueville

had

argued

efore

er,

was nature's

ounty

ather han olonialvirtue.

Although

herewas

poverty,

there

was little f the

misery

and

want thatwould

ater

goad

the ansculottes o revolt.

At

the same

time

therewas

just

the

right

mount of

deprivation

o

discourage

improper olitical

spirations.

The

majority

f

colonists,

he noted

approvingly, eing

occupied

with continuous

toil,

would

[be]

automatically exclude(d)

. . . from active

participation

in

government. 24

cknowledging

hatwhile

miserymay

not

have

been

the ot of

the white

majority,

t

may

have been the

experience

f the

black

slaves,

she insisted

hat the main

point

was that the social

question

was absent from

revolutionary

merica and

with

t,

the

most

powerful

nd

perhaps

the most

devastating assion motivating

20 On

Revolution,

.

41.

21

Ibid.,

p.

33.

22 Ibid., pp. 33, 41-44.

23

Ibid..

d.

44.

24 On

Revolution,

p.

63.



11/18

12 SHELDON S. WOLIN

revolutionaries,

he

passion

of

compassion. 25

The

demands

of the

miserable hat the

political

order

remedy

heirdistress ould fall on

sympathetic

ars

in

Europe

because moderns had come to feel

compassion,

not because therewas

any widespread

elief

hat social

and economic

opportunities ught

to be

open

to all. The

game

of

status-seeking,

hewrote

n

a

passage

hat s

simply istorically

ntrue,

. . . was

entirely

bsent from

the

society

of

the

eighteenth

nd

nineteenthenturies.

. , 26 And with

a fine Nietzschean side she

chidedcontemporaryocial scientists orbelieving hat the lower

classes

have,

as it

were,

right

o burst

with

resentment,

reed,

nd

envy.

.

, 27

Although

Arendtwas full f

praise

for heFramers f theAmerican

Constitution

or

having

ucceeded

n

giving

asting

nstitutionalorm

to

revolution,

omething

hichmostmodern evolutionistsave failed

to

do,

her

account of the Constitution

isplayed gain

her

antipathy

towardmaterial

uestions,

n

this

case,

the economicmotives f the

Founding

athers,

ven

hough

many

f thefounders erenothesitant

to

argue

them

openly

n

public space,

as it were.

By

ignoring

hese

matters er ccount f theConstitutioneft ninterpretedhedrive or

centralization,

he determinationo curb

the

power

of the colonial

legislatures,

nd theHamiltonian ision f

a national

conomy

resided

over

by

a

strong

tate.Her failure

o

recognize

hat heFounderswere

more concerned

o halt the democratic ocial movement hat had

captured

omeof the tate

egislatures

nd nitiatedconomic

egislation

favoring

mallfarmers

nd that heir wn

plans

ncluded

capitalist's

version f

the social

question

returns o undercut he

proposals

for

new

conception

f

the

political

or

rather,

new embodiment

advanced towardthe end of

On Revolution.

She criticized

he Framers for

having

introduced

system

of

representative overnment

which meant

that

the

people

are not

admitted

o the

public

ealm. She

charged

heConstitution

ith

aving

caused

the

withering

f the

revolutionarypirit

because

t had failed

to

incorporate

he

ownships

nd the own-hall

meetings,

he

original

springs

f

all

political

ctivity

n

the

country

nto the new

political

order.28 er

charge,

owever,

merely

ccusedtheFramers f

what

hey

openly

vowed.

The

new national

government,

s its

architects

made

clear,

had to break

the

monopoly

which

State and local

institutions

25

Ibid.,

pp.

66,

90.

26

Ibid.,

pp.

66-67.

27

Ibid..

p.

67.

28 On

Revolution,

p.

241-242.



12/18


had on theaffections f the

people.29 ncorporating

ocal institutions

was not

something

he Founders

failedto

do;

it ran

counter

o

their

political

vision.

They

made the

Constitutionnto

a

triumph

f

state-

sponsored

apitalism,

n elite

version f

the social

question

which

included hedefense f

property

ights,

he

ncouragement

f a

national

economy

through urrency

eforms,

ariffs,

axation,

commercial

policies,

state

subsidies,

military

ower

able to

extend

American

commerce,

nd an

enlightenedureaucracy

o

nurturenfant

ndustries.

The visionoftheFounderswas nationalrather han ocal, expansive

rather

han

tationary.

onsequently,

orArendt

o

praise

he

Founders

for

having ept

herabble nd

their ocialconcerns

rom

nvading

ublic

space,

and then o tax that

ame

elite

for

being

nsensitiveo

the

value

of local

participatory

nstitutions as

to strain t

a

gnat

and

swallow

the camel.

Arendt's

riticism f the Framers

was an

expression

f

her

unease

at the

spectacle

presented y

modern

representativeovernment

nd

its

ystem

f

political

parties: hey

had made

politics

he

monopoly

f

a

professional

lite nd closed t

off o natural

liteswho

are

inspired,

notbycareers,butby genuine ove of politics.Her solutionwas to

resurrect

n

obscure

proposal

advanced

by

Jeffersonn

a

private

etter

written

nearly

a

quarter century

after the

ratificationof

the

Constitution.Jefferson ad

envisaged

a

system

of

elementary

republics

ocated

n

the

wards,

counties,

nd

states nd

forming

gradation

of

authorities,

ach

with

share of

power,

that

would

serve

o check nd

balance each other.30

lthough

efferson's

roposal

suffered rom some of

the

same

shortcomings

s

ancient

Greek

democracy

n

making

o

provision

or he

political

dmission f

women,

slaves,

nd

aliens,

herewere

enuinely

emocratic

eatureso t.

Every

man in the State was to be an

acting

member f the Common

government,

ransacting

n

person

according

o

his

competence.

Each would

thusfeel

himself o be a

participator

n

the

government

of

affairs,

not

merely

t an

electionone

day

in

the

year,

but

every

day

31

Arendt then

proceeded

to

integrate

Jefferson's

roposal

with

a

tradition f

participation

which extended

back to

the likes

of

the

Committees f

Correspondence

uring

he

American

Revolution

nd

forward

o the

revolutionary

ouncils nd

committeeshathad

sprung

29 See Hamilton'sremarksnFederalist 7 ad finem.

30

On

Revolution, . 258.

31

Cited,

On

Revolution,

p.

257.



13/18

14 SHELDON S. WOLIN

up spontaneously

ith he outbreak f

revolutions.

he foundthem

in

the

French

Revolution,

he Paris

Communeof

1871,

the

Russian

revolutions f 1905and

1917,

nd

the

Hungarian

Revolution f 1956.

And doubtless he

would

have

included he

Solidarity

movement

n

contemporary

oland.

Most of these

xamples

fulfill

er

xacting

riteria f heroic

politics

and

spontaneous ppearance.

Whether

hey

were

purely

olitical

nd

unmarred

y

ocial and

economic

bjectivesmay

be more

ontestable.

Butgrantingheirmportance,tmaystillbe the case that he factof

their xistenceastsdoubton her

ntire hesis

oncerning

he

orrupting

effects f the ocial

question,

f

material

misery

pon

the

capacity

f

ordinary

itizens o act

n

a

genuinely olitical

way.

f

modern

ocieties

were

mass

societies,

how is

it

possible

for

ordinary

itizens o

escape

the

deadening

effects f routinized abor and

the

corruptions

f

consumer

ociety

nd to

display

n

appetite

for

politics

nd

political

action?How is it

possible,

first,

o

congratulate

heelites

for

keeping

the

masses

t

bay

and, then,

o welcome

hese ommittees

nd

councils

as the

political

lite

f the

people ?

Arendt id

not

ttempt

o

answer

thequestion,but it is not difficulto finda plausibleexplanation,

although

t

involves

getting

ehind the

darkness

which Arendt

repeatedly

ound o be

surrounding

he ives f

aboring eople.

Thanks

to

social

historians nd cultural

nthropologists

e earn hat he

poor

are notwithout

ich

ultures f their wn.

Once

this s

appreciated

heir

capacity

o act ceases to be

inexplicable

nd

the

suspicion

rises that

the

concept

of the

mass

may

be of

limited

tility.

t

may

even be

primarily

n intellectual

onceit,

displacement

f

the

ntellectual's

resentmentt what

apitalist

ulture oes to

the tatus f

ntellectuals:

It

restricts

high

culture o thefew nd then ubsidizes

he ntellectual

to protect he fewfrom heculturalbanality f capitalism.

Arendt's

ndifference,

o

put

t

blandly,

o the culture f

ordinary

and

poor

citizens

produced

a

severely

mpoverished

otion

of the

historical

meaning

f

the

political.

Here

I

have

n

mind

whathas

been

one of themost

mportant, erhaps

he

most

mportant,

ources f

the

popular understanding

f a wide

range

of

political

notions,

uch as

equality,

ustice,

community,

uthority,

nd

power.

The

historical

contributionf

Western

eligions

o

the

political

ducation f

ordinary

and

poor

people

s almost

mpossible

o

exaggerate.

Religion

upplied

a first and

xperience

n

what tmeant o be a member f a

community,

to sacrifice nd share,to be an

object

of

power,

to make not

ust

promises

ut commitmentsf

ong

duration,

o refuse o

conform or

conscience's

ake, and,

not

least,

to found new

communities.



14/18

Hannah Arendt:Democracyand The Political 15

At the end of On Revolution

there

was an element f

pathos

to

Arendt's

project.

Beyond

extolling

he value of these

new

forms f

elitism,

othing

s said

about how

theymight

e maintained ecause

institutionalizing

hem

would

destroy

he

spontaneity

hichwas an

essential lementof

their

political

authenticity.

heir

appearance,

therefore,

s

accepted

s one would

accept

the

nexplicableworkings

of

DivineGrace. These elites

re chosen

by

no

one,

they

onstitute

themselves.

Politically they

re the best and it

is the task of

good

governmentnd thesignof a well-orderedepublic o assure them f

their

ightful

lace

n

the

public

realm. To be

sure,

she

added,

the

recognition

f theseelites

would

spell

the end of

general

uffrage

for

ecognition

ouldmean

hat he litehad

won the

right

o be heard

in the conduct

of the

businessof the

republic,

and that

they

ared

for

more hantheir

rivate

happiness.

As for hose who

would be

excluded,

hey

had not

only

chosen theirfate

by

remaining assive,

but

they

had,

unconsciously,

ffirmed

one of the most

mportant

negative

ibertieswe

have

enjoyed

ince the end of

the ancient

world,

freedom

rom

politics. 32

This last remark llustrates rendt'sprofound quivocality bout

politics,

n

equivocality

hat ed

her o welcome

pontaneous olitical

action

but

to distrust ction

when the

stakes

became

so

large

as to

threaten

o

ncorporate

he oncerns

hat re ocated loser

o

or

within

private

life. She

wanted a

pure

form of

politics,

one that was

consistent

with the claim that

power

is to an

astonishing egree

independent

f material

actors. 33 olitical

nstitutions,

he declared

flatly,

hould

be made

independent

f economic forces.34t was her

vision

f

purepolitics

hat ed

her

during

he ate 1960s o

oppose

the

VietNam

War,

to defend

ivil

disobedience,

o criticizehe nvolvement

of universitiesnthewarbusiness, nd,withinimits,owelcome ome

aspects

f

the tudent

rotest

movements.

n

all of these ommitments

one can

see a common lement:

support

f actions

hatwere

primarily

political,

r at least could

be seen

that

way,

and without conomic

motives

r broad

social aims.

* * *

In

closing

et me offer ome

remarks

ntended s a contributiono

an

alternative,

emocratic

onception

f the

political.

Whatwould uch

32

On

Revolution,

.

284.

See

also

Crises

of

the

Republic,

pp.

231-233.

33 The Human

Condition,p.

200.

34 Crises

of

the

Republic,

pp.

212-213.



15/18

16 SHELDON S. WOLIN

a

conception

ook like? How

can

it

escape

being merely

nother

arbitrary

onstruction? ne answer s

that,

historically,

he

dea of

the

political

nd

the idea of

democracy

have

shared so

many

common

meanings

s to seem almost

synonymous.

his

cannot be

said of the

relationship

etween he

dea of the

political

nd,

say,

the dea

of a

political

rder hatwould be

controlled

y

or

responsive

rimarily

o

the

wealthy.

Marx

expressed

his

point

n

one of

his

early

writings:

... it is evident hat ll forms f thestatehavedemocracy or

their

ruth,

nd for

thatreason are false

to the

extent hat

they

are not

democracy.35

Marx's

point

an

be renderedike his: t

s the

nature f the

tate

hat,

insofar s it claims

to be

political,

t will

govern

for

the

good

of

the

entire

ommunity

nd not serve

primarily

he

nterests f

a

particular

class

or

group:

this s the

democratic truth.

But

nsofar s

the tate

in

question

akes

particular

orm,

ay,

one

mainly

ontrolled

y

the

wealthy

r

by

corporations,

t will

by

virtue f

its actual

nature

rule

inthe nterestsf a part fthe ociety,hat s,befalse o thedemocratic

principle

f

the

good

of the

whole

community.

t

follows hat

only

a

democratic

tatehas the

possibility

f

acting

s a

genuine

olitical

tate.

It

might

e added that

most

political

heorists,

rom

ntiquity

o

the

present,

have

accepted

the

premise

of

this

point

and resisted

he

conclusion.

They

have

accepted

he

principle

hat he

political

defines

a distinct ind

of association hat

ims at the

good

of

all,

depends

on

the

contributions,

acrifices,

nd

loyalties

f

all,

but

they

have

then

bent their

ngenuity

o

devising

tructureshat

would allow

the

few

(whether ings,

ristocrats,

epresentatives,

r

bureaucratic

fficials)

to use collective

power

for the

good

of all while

exacting

from he

population

t

large

the

various contributions

eeded for

that

task.

These

are,

however,

mainly

ormal

onsiderations,

nd while

they

help

to

identify orrectly

he

principle

hat

the

political

means

the

common

well-being

s the end and

the definition

f what s

authentic

political

ction,

t

does not

specify

what he

political

has to

include o

that he

common

well-being

s

furthered.

or does it

tell us what

the

nature f the common

well-being

s:

is it

something

hat s

made

or created ?

and,

if

so,

out

of what?Or

is it disclosed?

s it a

pure

good,

or

equivocal,

ven ronic?What

re the

onditionshat re

needed

35

Critique f

Hegel's 'Philosophy

f

Right',

tr.

JosephO'Malley

(Cambridge,1970),

p.

31.



16/18


for the

political

to

come

into

being

so that the common

well-being

becomes

possible

and

how do these conditions ntail

democracy?

We can

begin

not

by gnoring

he tatebut

by

avoiding

he

error f

assuming

hatthe state s identical

r coterminouswith he

political.

The state s a modern

henomenon

nd

its

raison

d'trewas to

develop,

or

better,

o

capitalize

the

power

of

society

the

power

resident

n

the

human

ctivities,

elationships,

nd transactions hat sustain ife

and its

changing

eeds.

The statebecame

a

coercive

gency, eclaring

and enforcinglaw, punishing miscreants of all descriptions,

systematizing

axation,

ncouraging

ommerce nd manufacture

n

the

direction

f national

conomies,

onducting iplomacy,waging

war,

and

seeking mpire.

ts

characteristic

orm f action s the decision

which t

*

'makes

with elentless

egularity;

ts

ypical xpression

s

the

announcement

f a

policy,

and itsmode of

governance anges

rom

inducements

o force.

The

appearance

f the tate

ignifies

hat

urplus ower

s

available,

that

ollectiveifehas succeeded

n

producing

more

power

han

he

daily

needs

of themembers

equire.

The existence f

surplus ower

s a

sign

that hepoliticalhas come intobeing nthe common ifethatmakes

the state

possible.

Common

life resides

in

the

cooperation

and

reciprocity

hat

human

beingsdevelop

n

order o

survive,

meet heir

needs,

nd

begin

o

explore

heir

apacities

nd

the remarkableworld

into which

hey

have been cast. The

political

emerges

s the shared

concerns

f human

beings

o take

care of themselves

nd

the

part

of

their

world hat

they

laim

as their

ot. The

political merges,

n

the

literal

ense,

s a

culture,

that

s,

a

cultivating, tending, taking

care

of

beings

nd

things.

The

common

ife

and the

political

ulture

emerge

o the

accompaniment

f

power.

Shared

concerns

do

not

eliminate he need forpower;theydepend upon it. This was partly

glimpsed

n

a remark

y

the

late

Roland Barthes:

One must

naturally

nderstand

olitical

n

its

deeper meaning,

as

describing

he whole of human relations

n

theirreal social

structure,

n

their

power

of

making

he world.36

There

is,

of

course,

an

irony

here

in

that the skills of social

cooperation,

which

human

beings acquire through xperience

nd

apprenticeship,

nd

which enable them

to

settle

their

existence,

eventually

re made to

work

gainst

hem.

Their

kill

produces

more

36

Mythologies,

r. Annette avers

New

York,

1972),

p.

143.



17/18

18 SHELDON S. WOLIN

power

han

hey

eed.

Surplus

ower

nables

hem o

project:

o control

more of the future nd so to

develop plans

and

expectations,

.e.,

projects.

The

dynamics

f

collectivity

hen ake hold. The search

for

surpluspower

then

gets

nstitutionalized,

hich s

the

organizational

language

or

alking

bout theroutinized anufacturef

surplus

ower.

Surplus

thenbecomes the

province

f

administration;

t

is

managed

and administered

n

the

form f

programs,ncluding rograms

or he

deployment

f

power

converted nto

weapons

and

man-power.

n

all

of this the political,whichhad emergedas shared concernsand

involvements,

as

disappeared.

The loss of the

political

s a clue

to

its nature:

t

is a mode of

experience

ather

han

a

comprehensive

nstitution

uch

as

the

state.

The

thing

bout

experience

s thatwe can lose

it and

the

thing

bout

political xperience

s thatwe are

always

osing

t and

having

o recover

it. The nature f the

political

s that t

requires

enewal. t

is renewed

not

by

unique

deeds whose excellence ets some

beings apart

from

others,

ut

by rediscovering

he

common

being

f human

beings.

The

political

s based on this

possibility

f

commonality:

ur

common

capacity oshare, o sharememories nd a commonfate.Ourcommon

being

s thenatural oundation f

democracy.

As

beings

whosenature

displays

ommon

elements,

we have an

equal

claim to

participate

n

the

cooperative ndertakings

n which hecommon ife

depends.

We

are

not

equal

in

power

or

ability,

nd that s

precisely

why

equality

is

crucial. The

development

f

power upon

whichthe common ife

dependsrequires

ifferent

ualities

nd it

produces

different

eings,

differences

hich re

nterpreted

s

inequalities.

At the ame

time,

nd

stated omewhat

ifferently,

ur human

being

s

not exhausted

y

ts

common

being.

It

is,

as Hannah

Arendt so often

and

eloquentlyreminded

s,

a

being

hat s

capable

of

expressing

hemostremarkable

and

glorious

iversity.

hat

diversity

as

mportantmplications

n how

power

s exercised

emocratically.

Each of us is a contributoro the

generation

f

power

withoutwhich

human

ife annot

ndure.The

problem

f the

political

s

not to clear

a

space

fromwhich

ociety

s to be

kept

out but

t

s rather

o

ground

power

in

commonality

while

reverencing

iversity

not

simply

respecting

ifference.

iversity

annot

be reverenced

y

bureaucratic

modes

of

decision-making.

iversity

s the

nightmare

f

bureaucracy.

The bureaucrat's esponse o it seither o inventnother lassification

or,

in the

corporate

world,

o manufacture

7 varieties.

he mode of

action

that s consonant

with

equality

and

diversity

s deliberation.



18/18

Hannah Arendt:Democracyand ThePolitical 19

Deliberation

means o

think

arefully.

We

must

hink

arefully

ecause

what s

at

stake

s the

exercise f

human

power.

To exercise

power

democratically,

hat

s,

with hefullest

ossibleparticipation

y

equals,

far

from

eing

n

exercise

f

crude

mass

power,

s the most sensitive

way

f

handling ower.

Democratic

eliberation

mplicates

ur common

being

n

decisions

which re

bound,

n

a

complex ociety,

o threaten

harm o our

diverse

eings.

t

requires

ot

thatwe come to terms

with

power

representatives

nd bureaucrats

an do that

orus

-

butthat

we face t.

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