Sharing the Space: A Study on Education and Training for Complex Operation

Prepared by:Jon Gundersen and the Education and Training Survey Team

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACEIn partnership with

THE CONSORTIUM FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS

Sharing the SpaceA Study on Education and Training for Complex Operations

About the United States Institute of Peace

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) is an independent, nonpartisan, national

institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve

violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and democratic

transformations, and increase peacebuilding capacity, tools, and intellectual capital

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and

resources, as well as by its direct involvement in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.

For more information, please visit www.usip.org.

About the Consortium for Complex Operations

The Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO) is a

developing network of civilian and military educators,

trainers, and lessons learned practitioners dedicated to

improving education and training for complex operations.

Principal roles of the CCO are to serve as an information

clearinghouse and to cultivate a civil-military community

of practice for complex operations training and education.

The CCO is a Department of Defense led collaboration

with the Department of State and the United States Agency

for International Development.

About the Team

This study was conducted by the United States Institute of

Peace in partnership with the Consortium for Complex

Operations. The USIP team was lead by Jon Gundersen,

and included the following individuals:

Ingrid Harder, Program Officer

William Story, Senior Consultant

Gregory Maly, Consultant

E. Jill Parlett, Consultant

Brian Rose, Program Assistant

Researchers

Timothy Bertocci

Adriana Brazelton

Elizabeth Detwiler

Kimberly Formo

Charles Wesley Gould

Alexander Johnston

Christopher Jonas

Jon Newstrom

Thomas Oakley

Emily Siegel

Kyana Woolridge

Natalie Zajicova

Acknowledgements

The United States Institute of Peace study

team would like to thank all of the

participants of the workshops and focus

validation groups that USIP hosted in

support of this effort. In addition, we would

like all of the individuals and institutions,

both civilian and military that participated

in our survey. Finally, we wish to thank, in

particular, the leadership and staff of both

the United States Institute of Peace and the

Consortium for Complex Operations

Support Center for their continuous support

and guidance throughout this process.

The views expressed in this report do not

necessarily reflect the views of the United

States Institute of Peace or the Consortium

for Complex Operations, which do not

advocate specific policy positions.

http://www.usip.org

3

Table of Contents

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTRODUCTION................................................................ 5

II. METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................................... 11

III. OVERVIEW OF COURSES: INVENTORY RESULTS ..................................................... 13

IV. INTERACTIVE WEB PORTAL..................................................................................... 21

V. KEY ISSUE AREAS..................................................................................................... 23

Whole of Government / Whole of Community ..................................................... 23

Leadership and Management ................................................................................ 25

Situational and Cultural Awareness ...................................................................... 27

Local Capacity Building .......................................................................................... 29

Information and Public Diplomacy ........................................................................ 31

Lessons Learned Processes .................................................................................... 33

Professional Development .................................................................................... 34

VI. NEXT STEPS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................. 37

VII. APPENDICES ............................................................................................................ 41

Appendix A. Institutions and Organizations Surveyed and Consulted .................. 41

Appendix B. Training and Education Survey Questions ........................................ 48

Appendix C. References Consulted........................................................................ 51

Appendix D. Previous Studies and Surveys ........................................................... 53

Appendix E. Portal Fact Sheet ............................................................................... 54

Endnotes ................................................................................................................ 56

4 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations

5

Deft diplomacy and directed development must go hand in hand with strong defense

to promote and defend American interests.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTRODUCTION

A nation that makes a great distinction between its

scholars and warriors will have its thinking done by

cowards and its fighting done by fools. –Thucydides

New World For most of the Cold War, the United States was engaged in an existential struggle with

the Soviet Union. The international environment was dangerous, but relatively

straightforward, at least for American policymakers. Our diplomatic and defense policy

was designed for a long Cold War with a competing superpower and for conflict between

sovereign states.

Today we face a new world – a world of fragile and failing states, sectarian and civil

wars, insurgents and terrorists, famines and contagions, human rights violations and

ethnic cleansing and (not always distinguishable) good guys and bad guys. Americans are

currently engaged in complex operations in this chaotic and often ambiguous

environment throughout the world – from Iraq and Afghanistan to Somalia and Haiti.

These operations occur in the gray area between conventional warfare and traditional

peacemaking. They require “soft” non-

kinetic power as well as hard power. In

other words, deft diplomacy and directed

development must go hand in hand with

strong defense to promote and defend

American interests. And the United States

will be involved in this world and in these

operations for the foreseeable future.

Americans will be sharing this complex stage with numerous actors from

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and allies to international civil servants and

private contractors. Therefore, we need a better understanding of other nations and

institutions, their interests and capacities and how they prepare their personnel to operate

in this shared space. Finally, we will continue to be engaged on the ground in some

capacity in sovereign states far beyond our borders. These states have their own history,

culture, and expectations for the future. We need to factor in host country interests and

ownership as we promote and protect American interests overseas in the 21st century.

The CCO and the USIP Study This new world has challenged policy makers not only to rethink the nature of warfare,

but how to prepare for – and how to prevent – armed conflict in the future. With this in

mind, the Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO) was created to foster unity of

effort in how the U.S. Government (USG) educates and trains its personnel for complex

operations.i As a first step, the CCO asked the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) to

survey U.S. educational and training institutions and to develop an inventory of courses

relevant to complex operations. To do this properly, we surveyed not only educators and

trainers, but also experts and practitioners. Consequently, this project is as much an

environmental scan as a course inventory.


Recent policy directives … have recognized the need to elevate the status of stability operations, to enhance civilian capacity, and to better prepare U.S. personnel for complex operations.

The scope of this study did not include rewriting doctrine or addressing resource issues.

Nevertheless, as noted frequently by Secretary Gates, there is a real and recognized need

to increase civilian capacity to conduct complex operations. Clearly, enhancing the

quality and availability of education and training in the civilian sector would improve our

ability to conduct complex operations

more effectively. In fact, recent policy

directives such as National Security

Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 to

Department of Defense Directive

(DoDD) 3000.05 have recognized the

need to elevate the status of stability

operations, to enhance civilian

capacity, and to better prepare U.S.

personnel for complex operations.

From Workshops to Web Portal Over the course of the past six months, USIP visited key educational and training

facilities, surveyed more than 200 institutions, both military and civilian, representing

over 600 courses, interviewed more than 500 experts, participated in 25 conferences, and

hosted 30 focus and validation groups. The issues and gaps identified by the workshops,

focus groups, and validation groups were then cross-walked with the data collected by

USIP’s team of surveyors. Data from the surveys have been entered into an interactive

web portal that will be available to the CCO community. While the survey and website

cannot claim to be all-inclusive, it is, we believe, the most comprehensive catalogue of

relevant civilian and military courses available to USG stakeholders. We encourage the

community to participate actively in populating the portal and in future CCO activities.

Survey Overview There is a growing cast of actors involved in complex operations sharing the stage with

American personnel throughout the world. Recognizing this, our survey focused on eight

distinct yet overlapping types of institutions:

U.S. Military

U.S. Government Civilian Agencies

U.S. Academic Institutions – public and private

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)

Civilian Police

Private contractors

International Organizations

Close allies

Section III includes a series of charts and narratives based on our survey of over 200

institutions from the above sectors. The information and analysis contained in this section

represents a snap shot rather than a finished documentary of the field. In other words,

this report and portal are more of a departure point than a destination.

7

The survey identified a number of key issues. First, the majority of the courses are

available to personnel across the sectors. However, often, these courses only have a small

number of slots available for outside participants, many of which regularly do not get

filled. Second, while there are numerous courses offered, there may not be enough

capacity to accommodate a surge of students, particularly on the civilian side. Finally, the

majority of courses are lecture based, and are taught in a classroom environment, whereas

practitioners have recommended that case studies, field-based and experiential learning

are critical for preparing to work in a complex environment.

Recurring Issues and Recommendations Based on numerous surveys, workshops and focus groups, as well as extensive discussion

with members of the key sectors presently involved with complex operations, the study

team identified a number of key issues and recommendations. Some of these may inform

follow-up CCO activities, such as workshops, conferences, or academic dialogue; while

others might be addressed by policy makers and others in the field. These findings are

presented across the following issue areas:

Whole of Government / Whole of Community

Issue:

Recent policy directives have recognized the need for a “whole of government” approach

to complex operations. Furthermore, participants in the study reinforced the need to go

beyond a “whole of government” to a “whole of community” approach, i.e., including the

spectrum of operators involved on the ground. However, institutional stovepipes,

differences in organizational cultures and even the lack of a common lexicon present

barriers to developing fully integrated training opportunities.

Recommendations:

Support efforts to increase “jointness” between military and civilians and

between civilian agencies involved in complex operations;

Harmonize civilian-military doctrines and also doctrine/guidelines among

civilian agencies;

Conduct training exercises driven by civilian objectives with the U.S. military in

a supporting role, e.g., humanitarian relief, prevention of genocide;

Coordinate U.S. and allied programs to increase civilian capacity for stability

operations, e.g., share best practices;

Sustain and increase portal content with fresh data, new features and continuous

outreach to consortium members;

Utilize survey data to analyze each sectors’ approach to education and training

with a view to harmonizing with other agencies and institutions;

Clarify and coordinate qualification standards and training requirements for

private contractors in complex operations.


Leadership and Management

Issue:

Leadership and management courses are available to both military and civilian personnel.

However, they need to be adapted to take into account the skill sets required to operate

effectively in a complex, ambiguous and often chaotic environment.

Recommendation:

Introduce the latest management techniques into education and training for

complex operations, e.g., flexible and adaptive business models attuned to local

conditions.

Situational and Cultural Awareness

Issue:

While there is no shortage of courses on cultural awareness in general, these courses

frequently boil down to “tourism 101”. Practitioners need guidance on how to interact

within the culture at a professional level, which requires a more nuanced and even

interactive approach.

Recommendations:

Offer more courses, simulations, and exercises to enhance situational and cultural

awareness;

Develop and offer mediation and negotiation courses for the interagency

community, taking into account local cultural context.

Local Capacity Building

Issue:

Capacity building as a concept has expanded beyond the transfer of technical expertise to

include a broad range of post conflict reconstruction and statebuilding initiatives. It is not

enough to be a subject matter expert or to simply expect to transfer a U.S. based model.

Practitioners need to know how to recognize and respect host-country capacity, how to do

baseline assessments and how to transfer knowledge to local counterparts.

Recommendations:

Train experts to more effectively transfer that knowledge to host country

counterparts, i.e., mentoring skills combined with technical expertise;

Identify and train a cadre of people with the specialized skills needed for capacity

building;

Increase inter-sector understanding and cooperation on issues such as local

security sector reform.

9

Lessons Learned Systems

Issue:

While the U.S. military has a well-developed tactical lessons learned process, the USG as

a whole is not as advanced in capturing and weaving lessons into the educational and

training process. The process is also not as effective on the operational and strategic level

as it is on the tactical level. Furthermore, civilian agencies are too often limited by

resource and time constraints to identify and document effective practices.

Recommendations:

Identify case studies to reinforce emerging doctrine and lessons learned/best

practices into the classroom;

Develop a capability to capture lessons from current operations and integrate

those lessons into course content across the sectors.

Information and Public Diplomacy

Issue:

Coordinated public diplomacy is critical to mission success. Different institutions,

however, often do not coordinate messages, use different means of communication and

too often do not even use the same language or lexicon, e.g., public diplomacy,

information operations. This lack of coordination in developing common communication

and operational language can lead to confusion on the part of the host population and

affect mission legitimacy.

Recommendation:

Integrate shared doctrine into education and training, including developing a

coordinated approach to public diplomacy among the military and civilian

agencies, as well as allies, NGOs, and IOs, taking into account multiple

audiences, including the host nation.

Professional Development

Issue:

Most institutions reward service in a recognized field. Yet, there are few systematic

motivations to pursue expertise in a field such as complex operations. Multi-disciplinary

expertise and “joint” assignments are not encouraged in many institutions. Furthermore,

there are few career incentives to develop an expertise in stability operations.

Recommendation:

Develop career incentives throughout the community for professional level

education and training for, and deployments to, complex operations.

The Way Forward In sum, this report is intended to offer educators and trainers, as well as policy-makers

and practitioners, a supporting foundation to better prepare U.S. personnel for complex

operations. The study reflects the need and urgency to adjust education and training to


support a whole of government approach to civilian and military complex operations.

There are, however, notable obstacles towards doing so. Challenges include ensuring

knowledge and information is current and accurate; factoring in host country interests and

expectations; achieving unity of effort through coordinated doctrine, education and

training across government; and collaborating on and sharing content and course

materials currently available to limited audiences. Finally, since we seem destined to

share the complex world with multiple players, including allies, NGOs and IOs, we need

to utilize a whole of community approach. This report, along with the supporting

catalogue of courses, highlights opportunities to help the CCO “community of practice”

target common solutions through coordinated efforts. By applying this report’s findings

and recommendations, members of the CCO, and more broadly the U.S. Government,

will be better prepared to navigate the often uncharted seas of complex operations.

11

Our survey tried to capture those courses and

programs that taught practical – not theoretical or historical – information

and skill sets needed to operate in complex, often

ambiguous, environments.

II. METHODOLOGY

Scope In order to conduct a thorough study, we included not just U.S. military and civilian

governmental institutions, but all institutions preparing personnel for deployment to

complex operations. Therefore, the study examined courses delivered by: U.S. military;

USG civilian agencies; the private sector (e.g., contractors, USAID implementing

partners); NGOs; civilian police; academic

institutions; international organizations; and,

foreign training programs. In addition to

course content, we examined the education

and training processes of each sector.

There is a vast universe of courses in both

the public and private sector, which offer

important substance and skills – language

courses, regional studies programs, etc., and

are of general interest to anyone deployed

overseas. However, our survey tried to

capture those courses and programs that

taught practical – not theoretical or historical – information and skill sets needed to

operate in complex, often ambiguous, environments. For example, we included courses

on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, but not historical overviews or theoretical

discussions of insurgencies or terrorism; we included regional study courses in areas with

ongoing complex operations (e.g., the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa), but not other

regional courses (e.g., Europe, Latin America). We also included practical courses related

to specific skill sets that have been identified as relevant to complex operations such as

leadership, mediation, negotiation and conflict analysis. Therefore, this survey is not

intended to provide a definitive compilation of all available courses, but rather a snap

shot of relevant practical courses. As such, we can always widen the lens as conditions

change. The course inventory and associated data will be available to the CCO

community through the Web Portal (see Section IV).

Activities Workshops/Focus Groups. As a first step, USIP conducted three substantive workshops

to identify common requirements and gaps in education and training for preparing

personnel in complex operations. The workshop topics included stability operations,

counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. Over 100 educators and practitioners, from both

U.S. military and civilian government institutions, and select outside experts participated

in the workshops. These groups discussed how we educate and train for complex

operations. Participants agreed that the knowledge and skills needed to conduct complex

operations cut across the above topics. Above all, they affirmed that we must move

beyond separate institutional and parochial interests; in other words, towards “unity of

effort” both within USG and with other institutions both foreign and domestic. The

workshops also identified certain core skill sets needed in a non-permissive environment

such as adaptive leadership, situational flexibility, knowledge of and cooperation with

other operators in the field and capacity building skills.


Survey of Course Offerings. Following the workshops, USIP conducted a survey of

course offerings based on the needs identified during the sessions. The survey was sent to

over 400 education and training institutions. USIP hired an experienced thirteen-member

survey team to follow up and catalog course information which formed the basis for the

study. The survey project was broken down into sectors, as referenced above.

Interviews and Focus Groups. USIP conducted close to 500 phone interviews, attended

and/or participated in 20-25 conferences, made 10 site visits to education and training

facilities, and conducted upwards of 30 focus groups with experts and practitioners. In

addition, USIP hosted a series of sector-specific focus groups to validate the initial

findings of the study. Five of the discussions were held with representatives of

institutions that provide education and training, while one discussion was held with

practitioners on the receiving end of such training.

Portal. In parallel to the survey, USIP developed an interactive portal to store and share

survey results and to serve as a hub of interaction for the CCO and its members.

Specifically, the portal includes a comprehensive database of courses and institutions

related to complex operations, interactive discussion forums, blogging capabilities for

thought leaders, a acronym glossary, subject matter expert directory, directory for

complex operations tools and resources, and a CCO calendar detailing information

regarding complex operations events, including archived files. The course database is

searchable by CCO portal members (see Section IV for more information).

Sector Analysis, Key Issues and Recommendations. Each sector team analyzed how

that sector was engaged in complex operations, the status of education and training, and

major issues and gaps in that sector. We then cross-walked the perceived gaps and needs

with the survey results. Finally, USIP identified crosscutting issues and gaps in education

and training and identified specific recommendations for courses, conferences, and future

activities for the CCO.

13

III. OVERVIEW OF COURSES: INVENTORY RESULTS

This survey is arguably the most

comprehensive collection of courses related

to complex operations available to dateii.

The following overview provides a

breakdown of 616 courses delivered by the

U.S. Military, U.S. Civilian Agencies, U.S.

Academic Institutions, Nongovernmental

organizations and institutes, as well as

foreign and international institutions.

Recognizing that this is not a clearly

defined area of study, courses were selected

based on workshop outcomes and

consultations as outlined in the

methodology section. Over half of the

courses are offered at the graduate or

postgraduate level. Nearly half are

professional or specialized in-house

courses. Only 6 percent of courses surveyed

are offered at the undergraduate level.

Given the interdisciplinary nature of

complex operations, many of the courses

cover a range of topics. Subject categories

were selected based on the main themes

covered in the course. For example, it may appear from the chart that there are no related courses on ethics and codes of conduct offered

by USG civilian agencies. However, ethics may be woven into courses on other subjects such as intercultural awareness or leadership and

management. One of the recurring themes from the study is the lack of a common lexicon or definitions across and even within

organizations. Therefore, there is some crossover in the subject categories. We did not attempt to define areas of study such as

stabilization and reconstruction vs. stability operations. Rather, courses are self-defining as much as possible based on the terminology

used by the course provider.

BREAKDOWN OF COURSES BY SECTOR

25%

14%

38%

2%

21%

U.S. Military = 152

USG Civilian = 86

U.S. Academic = 236

Nongovernmental = 12

International = 130


Breakdown of Course Subjects Offered by Sector

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

Irregular warfare

Train-the-trainer courses

Rule of Law

Communication and public diplomacy

Governance

Economic stabilization

Situational awareness

Public security

Interagency planning and coordination

Cultural/intercultural awareness

Counterinsurgency

Ethics and codes of conduct

Civil-military

Humanitarian assistance

Courses on working with other agencies

Regional courses

Reconstruction and Stabilization (general)

International/multilateral organizations

Conflict resolution/mediation/negotiation

Leadership and management

Stability operations/peace operations (general)

U.S. Military USG Civilian U.S. Academic Nongovernmental International

N.B. Courses were selected for their direct relevance to complex operations. For example, the category

“regional courses” only includes courses covering recent or ongoing operational areas.

15

Course subjects U.S. Military

USG Civilian

U.S. Academic

Non-governmental International Total

Percentage of total

Stability operations/peace operations (general) 30 8 36 0 79 153 25%

Leadership and management 33 28 17 4 13 95 15%

Conflict

resolution/mediation/negotiation 8 8 48 1 13 78 13%

International/multilateral organizations 8 3 18 0 40 69 11%

Reconstruction and stabilization

(general) 25 10 28 0 5 68 11%

Regional courses 44 4 14 0 3 65 11%

Courses on working with other agencies 19 13 12 0 15 59 10%

Humanitarian assistance 1 5 37 1 13 57 9%

Civil-military 19 1 13 0 11 44 7%

Ethics and codes of conduct 10 0 20 0 13 43 7%

Counterinsurgency 22 1 16 0 2 41 7%

Cultural/intercultural awareness 12 4 15 2 4 37 6%

Interagency planning and coordination 15 11 1 0 0 27 4%

Public security 9 2 1 0 14 26 4%

Situational awareness 8 9 6 1 1 25 4%

Economic stabilization 2 9 9 0 2 22 4%

Communication and public diplomacy 6 3 4 0 7 20 3%

Governance 1 5 11 0 3 20 3%

Rule of Law 0 5 8 0 1 14 2%

Train-the-trainer courses 1 1 1 0 4 7 1%

Irregular warfare 5 0 0 0 0 5 1%


Accessibility Given the recent emphasis on interagency planning and coordination, it is not surprising that most of the surveyed courses offered by the

military and the government civilian agencies are open to participants across the sectors. Ninety-five percent of courses delivered by the

military are accessible to participants beyond U.S., military personnel. Of the 86 courses offered by USG civilian agencies, 77 percent are

open to participants from other sectors. More often than not, however, courses have limited quotas set aside for outside participants. These

often go unfilled due to resource issues (either personnel time or direct costs associated with attending a course) as well as the lack of

awareness of available courses across organizations. As a result, courses are less integrated than reflected in the survey results.

(n=152)

(n=86)

ACCESSIBILITY OF COURSES OFFERED BY THE MILITARY

32%

10%

47%

5% 3%

3%

Open to U.S. Military Only

Open to U.S. Military and Civilian

Agencies OnlyOpen to U.S. and Foreign Military Only

Open to U.S. Military, Civilian Agencies,

Foreign Military OnlyOpen to U.S. Military, Civilian Agencies,

Foreign Military and Private SectorOpen to all, including I0s and NGOs

ACCESSIBILITY OF COURSES OFFERED BY USG CIVILIAN AGENCIES

23%

10%

12%26%

29%

Internal to Host Agency Only

Open to Other USG Civilian

Agencies Only

Open to Host Agency andImplementing Partners Only

Open to USG Civilian agencies and

U.S. Military Only

Open to all (including Ios, NGOs,

Private sector)

17

Target Participants The majority of courses offered by the military are available only to mid and senior level officials, whereas only 14 percent are open to

entry-level personnel. This is in contrast with government civilian agencies, where 75 percent of the courses are open to entry-level

officials. For civilian agencies, this survey considers entry level to include GS-05 through GS-09 and up to FO-05. Mid-level is

equivalent to GS-10 through GS-14 and FO-06 through FO-02. Senior level equates to GS-15 or above and FO-01 or above. For the

military courses, entry level is O-1 through O-3, mid-level is O-4 and O-5, and senior level is O-6 and above.

(n=152) (n=86)

TARGET PARTICIPANT LEVEL OF USG CIVILIAN COURSES

6%

30%

7%

8%10%

39%

Entry level only

Entry and Mid-level

Mid-level only

Mid & Senior level

Senior level only

All levels

TARGET PARTICIPANT LEVEL OF U.S. MILITARY COURSES

3% 3%

67%

16%

11%

Entry level only

Entry and Mid-level

Mid-level only

Mid & Senior levels

Senior level only

All levels


COURSE CAPACITY

1 3 16 5

10

50

100

150

200

250

1 to 10 students 11 to 30 students 31 to 100 students 100+ students

Num

ber

of

cou

rses

U.S. Military

USG Civilian

U.S. Academic Institution

Nongovernmental

International

Capacity The vast majority of courses are offered in classroom settings with capacities of 11-30 students. An additional 35 courses are offered as

distance learning online, on CDROM or by correspondence.

(n=47

0)

19

Frequency Academic and military institutions that operate on a semester schedule tend to offer courses once or twice a year. Conversely, civilian

agencies offer courses on a more regular basis to accommodate for deployment schedules. Courses provided by other sectors are offered

on an ad-hoc or as-required basis. Such courses may be self-paced online, CD-Rom based, short seminars.

(n=526)

COURSE FREQUENCY

4 051 3 03 2

0

50

100

150

200

250

1-2 times/yr 3-5 times/yr 6+ times/yr No set frequency

Nu

mb

er

of

co

urs

es

U.S. Military

USG Civilian

U.S. Academic

Nongovernmental

Internationals


Teaching Methods Courses were surveyed to determine teaching methods and the various tools used to support the learning process. Many courses use

multiple teaching methods; however, over 90 percent of the courses surveyed rely on lectures or seminars as the basic format for the

course. This corresponds to the finding that 87 percent of courses are offered in a classroom setting. Case studies are also common

although many respondents recommended the need for more quality case studies related to complex operations. Military-offered courses

provide the most instances of simulation as a method of teaching.

(n=543) (n = 590)

TEACHING METHODS & TOOLS

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Lectur

e/Se

minar

Case

Stu

dies

Simulat

ion

Gro

up S

tudy

Expe

rient

ial/In

tern

ships

USG Military

USG Civilian

U.S. Academic Institution

Nongovernmental

Internationals

COURSE DELIVERY

87%

3%6%

4%

Classroom based

Field-based

Distance Learning (Online, Correspondence, CD)

Multiple site

21

IV. INTERACTIVE WEB PORTAL

As part of the project, USIP developed an interactive web portal to store and share the

course inventory, and to serve as a virtual hub of interaction for the CCO and its

members. The portal is an essential tool for the CCO to grow and sustain a robust

community of practice. The portal is located at www.ccoportal.org.

Current features and functions include:

Comprehensive database of complex operations courses;

Expansive database of education and training institutions;

Interactive member discussion forums;

Blogging capabilities for thought leaders to debate ideologies and paradigms;

Interactive acronym glossary;

Subject matter expert member directory;

Directory of complex operations tools and resources; and

Complex operations calendar detailing information regarding complex operations

events, including archived files from previous events.

The CCO plans to develop additional portal functionality to support a growing CCO

community to include chat capabilities, conference registration, electronic journal, and a

wiki function. The CCO anticipates that new features and functions will be driven by

member needs to ensure a positive user experience.

When USIP turns the portal over to the CCO it will contain over 600 courses on complex

operations. Courses are easily searchable using a user-friendly interface that allows

members to search by numerous fields including keywords, institution type, accessibility,

and length. Both basic and advanced search functions are available.

The portal provides the infrastructure to expand. The portal and the databases that

underpin it are living tools that the CCO Support Center plans to maintain. To that end,

members are encouraged to submit content through the portal, including courses, events,

documents, queries, and discussion topics.

23

Overcoming organizational divides is critical for personnel working in the field.

V. KEY ISSUE AREAS

A number of issues regularly arose during interviews and working sessions. These

crosscutting issues are summarized below. They are relevant to each of the eight sectors

studied and form the basis of the recommendations presented in Section VI.

Whole of Government / Whole of Community Recent policy directives – NSPD-44, DODD 3000.05 – have recognized the need for a

“whole of government” approach to complex operations. USG civilian and military

education and training institutions are working to integrate these policy issues into

education and training. Throughout the course of this project, participants have reinforced

the need to (1) institute a whole of government approach; and (2) go beyond whole of

government to a whole of society or whole of community approach. Complex operations

involve multiple actors, underscoring the need for coordination at multiple levels, and for

joint education and joint training exercises. The U.S. government is making important

strides on this front, as are other governments and institutions. However, lack of

resources and cultural differences often hinder progress. And, across the sectors, there is

still more work to be done.

Sharing the Space Overcoming organizational divides is critical for personnel working in the field. Complex

operations involve multiple institutions, often including nongovernmental organizations,

international organizations, militaries and advisors from multiple countries, private

companies, host government organizations, and non-state actors. Each of these groups

has its own organizational culture, language, and interests. Additionally, it is important to

recognize and understand host country interests, cultures, sensitivities and needs. To

work effectively in complex operations,

practitioners must have an

understanding of all of the actors

working on the ground.

Once practitioners understand the range

of operators involved in a complex

environment, training is necessary to be

able to function across cultural boundaries. Our surveys noted that integrated efforts are

difficult in a shared environment, and that more work is needed to enhance inter-

organizational cooperation. Three obstacles stand out:

The need for more open lines of communication, better information sharing

practices, and synchronization of goals and objectives;

The absence of a universally agreed upon language. The lack of a common

lexicon, set of definitions, and terminology for complex operations was noted in

several surveys. Terms such as irregular warfare, stability operations, security,

stability, transition and reconstruction, and counterinsurgency are often used

interchangeably and not altogether accurately across the community.

The need to leverage the capabilities of interagency and international partners

when working in a shared space. This requires not only an understanding of other


institutions, but an awareness of the capabilities and limitations of their own

institutions, and ability to explain the institution to others.

Shortcomings in this regard cannot necessarily be linked to education and training course

curriculum. Gaps in training and education have more to do with the limited opportunities

for joint training. Enhanced cooperation and “unity of effort” between interagency and

international players, particularly between civilian and military institutions, pose

challenges for training and educating for effective planning, implementation, and analysis

of complex operations. An additional issue is that disciplinary stovepipes separate critical

experts from working together. Some areas of complex operations are outside of current

disciplines and academic structures. These intellectual stovepipes result in a lack of

ownership and no clear responsibilities for tasks that lay between them. Finally, there is a

significant knowledge gap at all levels concerning other organizations in the field, and

how they interact across the military/civilian, governmental/nongovernmental,

public/private, and cross-cultural divides.

The Civilian-Military Divide The gap between military personnel and civilians working on the ground in complex

operations is often a major source of friction. Both civilian and military interviewees

noted that civilians generally lack basic knowledge of military command structures.

Similarly, the military lacks knowledge on the role of USG civilian personnel, NGOs and

IOs on the ground in complex operations. More often than not, military and civilian

personnel train separately. However, recent changes in national security directives require

DoS and DoD to integrate stabilization and reconstruction plans with military

contingency plans where appropriate, and coordinate these plans with relevant

government and nongovernmental organizations.

One effort to bridge the divide between the two cultures is the Guidelines for Relations

Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations.

Spearheaded by InterAction, the U.S. military, and the U.S. Institute of Peace, these

guidelines were developed to serve as “rules of the road” for how the two entities should

operate in hostile environments. The United Nations Office for the Coordinator of

Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has undertaken similar efforts, and has even gone as far as

to offer Civilian-Military Coordination Training. This is offered at three levels to

combined civilian-military classes.

The Civilian-Civilian Divide The divide between military and civilian agencies is not the only gap. There is also a

divide between the various civilian agencies involved in complex operations. For

example, DOS and USAID and at least eight other agencies play a role in stability and

reconstruction operations. Restricted funding and cultural barriers within and among

civilian agencies limit their ability to offer and receive interagency education and training

courses. Furthermore, civilian agencies need to develop shared conceptual frameworks

and shared approaches based on best practices. Education and training should, in part,

cascade from these. USIP, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute

(PKSOI), and other agencies are currently engaged in a project to develop just this type

of civilian doctrine. There are also a number of relevant interagency education and

training efforts underway, including: the National Security Education Consortium

(NSEC), the Reconstruction & Stabilization Senior Roundtable, and the National Security

Professional Development Initiative.

25

No amount of training can fully prepare personnel for

every situation. Training programs should instead

inform participants of potential scenarios and instruct them on how to

utilize available resources.

Leadership and Management Good training is only part of what it takes to develop good leaders. The workshops held

at the outset of our study underscored the need to develop adaptive leadership as a core

skill set, particularly for working in a rapidly changing, chaotic environment. Leaders,

especially at the mid-level, must be able to assess the changing operational environment,

analyze their assessments, recalibrate and adjust objectives accordingly.

Leadership and management issues cut across all sectors involved in complex operations.

Our survey findings suggest that training and education programs across sectors are

indeed attempting to address leadership challenges specific to complex situations. The

military is arguably the most systematic of all sectors in training its cadre of leaders for a

wide range of operational challenges. However, civilian training institutions such as the

Foreign Service Institute (FSI) and USIP’s Education and Training Center, as well as a

range of universities and NGOs, offer numerous courses ranging from high-level strategic

planning to team-building and other

personal leadership skills.iii Yet, across the

sectors, we found that while this is a

priority issue, there are still “gaps.”

Teaching the Right Skills No amount of training can fully prepare

personnel for every situation. Training

programs should instead inform participants

of potential scenarios and instruct them on

how to utilize available resources.

Understanding the mechanisms of other

organizations (e.g. financial authorities,

chains of command, and human resource policies) becomes much more critical when

decisions need to be made quickly, or when official authorization is not available.

Additionally, individuals need to understand their role within the broader context in order

to ensure smooth sequencing of activities and coordination with other initiatives. This

includes knowing how to work with local authorities and other organizations working on

the ground. Critical analysis has also been flagged as key competency across all sectors.

Finally, knowledge and technical expertise must be linked up with cultural awareness and

host-country knowledge, interpersonal and communication skills, understanding local and

international legal frameworks, and adherence to standards and codes of conduct.

In addition to these adaptive leadership skills, several organizations stressed a need for

more training in basic managerial skills. One of the shortcomings of training for

management and leadership is the fundamental difficulty of planning, making

assessments and evaluating during a conflict or postconflict situation. This will be

discussed further in the section on capacity building; however, it is also a management

issue.

Teaching to the Right Level Peace and stability operations are often characterized in military terms by the

compression of traditional strategic, operational and tactical levels of decision-making.

The notion of the “strategic corporal” responds to the emerging leadership demands

presented by complex operations, in that the nature of these operations demands a higher

level of leadership from junior officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as the


ability to carry out a wider range of activities under pressure – from war fighting to civil

administration to humanitarian assistance. It is not uncommon for relatively junior level

personnel to be charged with administering programs in the field with leadership

responsibilities well beyond their rank. Within a military organization, especially at the

tactical level in the field, very young and junior-ranking personnel serve in leadership

positions that entrust them with substantial responsibilities. As such the military provides

leadership training at all levels.

At the same time, some skill sets that would greatly benefit and enhance the effectiveness

of the tactical level leaders – negotiation skills, for example – are primarily taught to

higher-level military leaders at senior officer professional development courses. Junior

military leaders need this training as well.

In contrast to military personnel, lower-ranking civilian officials lack the focused and

deliberate leadership development and experience of the military personnel serving in the

same space. Even if practitioners are not in a formal leadership or management position,

they will likely be navigating fluid or ambiguous “chains of command,” or find

themselves in situations which demand a higher level of flexibility and leadership

capabilities. For example, it is not uncommon for a lawyer to be charged with helping to

develop government legislative structures, oversight mechanisms and committee systems.

A health practitioner may be charged with helping set up a public health care system. Yet

leadership specific courses for civilian personnel are often reserved for senior levels. In

addition, civilian leadership training must be relevant for the audience. For example,

senior-level civilians may be political appointees and may not have had prior related

experience or access and/or incentives to undergo training to prepare for a specific

operation.

A renewed effort to provide the right skills at the right level, and the leadership

development at the right time would greatly enhance the effectiveness of both civilian

and military leaders at the tactical level.

27

The importance of cultural issues in training and

education for those being deployed into the field cut

across all sectors and organizations involved in

complex operations.

Situational and Cultural Awareness There is no shortage of culture or language courses offered by government, military or

academic institutions. It is widely recognized that those working on the ground in

complex operations require situational awareness, which includes an understanding of

local culture, geography, social structure and sensitivities. Cultural awareness provides

personnel with the ability to function across cultural lines in multicultural environments.

Additionally, cross-cultural communication is considered an important skill for all levels

of practitioners working in the field. This includes language training, as well as conflict

resolution and negotiation skills. USG institutions such as the Defense Language Institute

(DLI), FSI, and the National Defense University (NDU) offer negotiation, cultural

awareness and area studies courses, as well as language training to personnel being

deployed into the field. USIP also offers numerous courses and conferences on the above

topics.

The importance of cultural issues in training and education for those being deployed into

the field cut across all sectors and organizations involved in complex operations. Gaps in

education and training for issues related to culture and situational awareness primarily

relate to how nuanced courses are, and how

well personnel are able to transfer skills taught

in training courses into practice.

Cultural Awareness General cultural awareness skills are

important for teaching personnel how to live

and work effectively within a multicultural

environment, and are core skills for

practitioners at every level. This includes

providing individuals with a broadened

awareness of the similarities and differences between one’s own culture and surrounding

cultures. Additionally, cultural awareness provides practitioners with the ability to

identify and analyze the nature of cultural differences as drivers of conflict. While

courses teaching these skills exist within education and training institutions, our survey

found such courses are not as prevalent or nuanced as is necessary to work in a complex

environment.

Situational Awareness Situational awareness, as opposed to cultural awareness, provides individuals with

regional specific knowledge. Practitioners should be well versed in the societies in which

they are operating, in order to effectively engage all parts of those societies. This includes

understanding local political and social structures, as well as environmental, and

geographic knowledge of the region. This information is widely available across the

spectrum of training and education institutions accessible to practitioners. Area studies

programs are regularly offered at both USG training institutions, as well as academic

institutions. However, situational awareness also involves understanding local

sensitivities, understanding the nuances of working in conflict societies, and the impact of

one’s presence and actions on local society. When local sensitivities are ignored, a

foreign presence can have a negative impact on a mission, and what began as a welcomed

presence, can quickly become a negative relationship with a host nation.


One of the most significant gaps in training and education related to situational awareness

has to do with understanding how to transfer knowledge into action when working on the

ground. Often, training and education occur well in advance of deployment, and far from

the theater of the operation. As such, practitioners do not have the opportunity to

integrate classroom education into everyday practice until on the job. In country training,

for example, allows personnel to interact with a culture as a professional, preparing them

for future work in that environment.

Cross-Cultural Communication In addition to understanding local culture, practitioners need to understand how to

communicate across cultural lines. This includes communicating with citizens on the

ground, local leaders, and others working in the shared space. Cross-cultural

communication, including language skills, as well as mediation and negotiation, is highly

regarded as important for practitioners working in the field.

Multiple languages are often spoken in a shared environment, and can lead to

misunderstanding of intent when working together toward a common goal. Practitioners

working in a complex operation ideally speak the language of the host population;

however, this is seldom the case. To prepare practitioners for working in complex

operations, the government has identified priority languages, and offers short courses and

longer-term proficiency courses at a number of training institutions around the country.

When language proficiency is not an option for all personnel, basic operational language

skills build good will and legitimacy with host populations.

In addition to speaking the local language, it is important for personnel to be taught the

process of selecting and making use of interpreters and translators, particularly in

negotiations. Because of the multinational nature of complex operations, most personnel

cannot communicate effectively with the local population without assistance. Because of

this, the UN, for example, includes the utilization of translators as a key component in

communication and negotiation courses. Selection of interpreters is important because

they may come with their own biases, which may affect a mission’s success.

Additionally, understanding cultural sensitivities is key, so as not to put them in

uncomfortable situations.

Mediation and negotiation skills are also generally recognized as essential for

practitioners working in the field. While these strategic skills are important in any

environment, they are particularly needed in a chaotic conflict situation. Consensus

building, negotiation, and dispute resolution are essential in shared environments when

multiple parties are involved. These skills are particularly relevant to one’s ability to

recognize and analyze the elements of conflict situations. Cultural issues need to be tied

into these courses as cross-cultural negotiation has its own set of nuances and

sensitivities. Courses on mediation and negotiation are available to personnel through a

variety of institutions, including USG, NGO, and academic institutions. USIP is

integrating its series of critically acclaimed handbooks on cross-cultural negotiation

behavior into its negotiation training (i.e., books on French, Russian, German, North

Korean, Chinese, Japanese, Israeli and Palestinian negotiating styles). In addition, the

Combined Arms Center includes an introduction to negotiation and mediation in conflict

management as a core course for senior officials.

29


Capacity building has become a catch-all label for a host of initiatives designed to

support and develop host-nation organizations, e.g., local civil society organizations,

militaries, police forces, businesses, and governments. The concept is not new:

developing the capacities of poor countries has long been the cornerstone of development

aid. As a reconstruction process, capacity building often refers to the methods used by

interveners to help national institutions and/or to improve their performance. Therefore,

beyond the provision of basic short-term security and humanitarian assistance, most

postconflict stabilization and reconstruction activities in the areas such as security sector

reform, rule of law, governance, or economic sustainability are essentially capacity

building. Furthermore, the development of local capacity – to the degree to which this

can be assessed – underpins the ability of the intervener to define an exit strategy. It

follows that capacity building should be a key element of preparing practitioners across

all sectors for working in complex operations, particularly stabilization and

reconstruction.

In some areas, the U.S. and other donor countries have become proficient at delivering

capacity building programs. The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance

Program (ICITAP) helps countries develop professional civilian-based law enforcement

institutions. The State Department’s African Contingency Operations Training and

Assistance (ACOTA) is designed to enhance the capacity of African partner nations to

participate in multinational peace support operations in Africa. To date, ACOTA has

provided training and non-lethal equipment to over 52,000 peacekeepers from African

partner militaries. In addition, the Treasury Department offers technical assistance and

mentoring in a number of areas, including finance and tax collection, preventing money

laundering, and tracking terrorist financing.

The military also has a long history of working with other countries to enhance their

military skills through individual training courses as well as international programs such

as NATO’s Partnership for Peace. The International Military Education and Training

(IMET) program provides over 2,000 courses at 150 military schools and installations to

military members of friendly and allied countries. The courses enhance and promote

regional stability, defense cooperation, democratic values, the rule of law, and human

rights. The Foreign Internal Defense (FID) program assists nations that need to curb

lawlessness or that need protection from rogue nations.

Participatory Approaches and Partnerships However, capacity building goes beyond a menu of trainings or skill sets to be delivered.

“Capacity building” proposes a set of practices that put the emphasis on participatory

approaches and partnership. In this sense, capacity building requires the ability to

recognize and build on effective local approaches and contextual awareness. This should

be incorporated into planning as well as the way practitioners conduct their work. On the

planning side, assessing and recognizing existing capacity should lay the foundation for

follow on efforts and future evaluation. Interveners should not start from zero when

planning a development strategy but rather focus on building on what already exists – on

strengthening pre-existing capacities. What we found, however, is that baseline

assessments are either not being done, or are not being done well.


Interveners inevitably attempt to transplant their own systems, procedures and values to host nation

institutions. As in medicine, transplantation

of a non-indigenous organ or model may well result

in transplant rejection.

Local Ownership Nurturing local “ownership” is an important element of capacity building and in many

ways is its primary goal. Capacity building programs aim at developing local

competences, in order to prevent or end dependency. In practice, however, interveners

inevitably attempt to transplant their own systems, procedures and values to host nation

institutions. As in medicine, transplantation of a non-indigenous organ or model may well

result in transplant rejection. A more collaborative and customized approach may take

more time, but is far more likely to succeed.

It is not enough for practitioners to be experts in subject matter; they need to recognize

their role in developing local expertise and to support local training, mentoring and

technical transfer of know-how. Unlike the

military, civilian agencies do not consider

teaching or mentoring skills an integral part of

professional development. Military officers

can expect to spend approximately one third

of their professional time either being trained

or training others. Even civilian institutions

with a strong training component do not

always develop teaching, mentoring and

advising skills in a systematic way. As a

result, practitioners selected for their expertise

may have no experience in training or

mentoring others. There is no single formula

for this and it can be a very personal

experience. However, there are effective

practices that require knowing how as well as when to teach, mentor and advise. This

demands an understanding of the local culture and context. Practitioners also need to

understand their role within the broader capacity building effort.

Specialized Knowledge In addition to “soft” skills such as collaborative skills and training and mentoring skills,

advisors and capacity builders need relevant specialized skills to be effective and

credible. An advisor cannot successfully advise a justice minister, for example, without

strong rule of law expertise. However, there is a lack of subject matter expertise in a

number of key capacity building areas and only limited corresponding education and

training programs in areas such as security sector reform. Agencies responsible for

capacity building programs need to identify and develop a cadre of individuals with the

prerequisite skills in this area. In particular, the interagency team needs to recruit a deeper

“bench.” The Civilian Response Corp is a step in the right direction.

31

Public diplomacy and information operations are critical to mission success.

Information and Public Diplomacy Public diplomacy and information operations are critical to mission success. Moreover,

gaining the trust of both the host population, and the population back at home, is

necessary for building mission legitimacy, managing spoilers, and building constituencies

for peace. Maintaining a common message and successful communication with the host

population is often difficult due to the complex nature of the environment. Because the

work of various players is often difficult to coordinate, let alone integrate, they frequently

use different means of speaking with a host population, including using different lexicons

and communication outlets. This lack of coordination in developing common

communication practices and operational language can lead to confusion on the part of

the host population.

Even individual agencies often do not convey the same message, both vertically at all

levels of command within an organization and horizontally to other organizations

working on the ground. Effective public diplomacy involves implementing a consistent

message at all levels of operation – whether it be when interacting with people on the

street or mass communication via television and/or radio – and choosing communication

outlets that are most appropriate for that particular working environment. In other words,

good public diplomacy requires situational awareness. Training should include lessons

learned and best practices on what communication methods and types of messages are

most effective among difference audiences.

Military and civilian personnel often use the terms information operations and public

diplomacy interchangeably. However, they are different terms of art. For the purposed of

this report, we have chosen to use the term “public diplomacy.”

Staying on Message Public diplomacy involves all efforts to communicate a message to the public, from

speaking to individuals on the ground, to utilizing media outlets. These skills are

considered core skills for both civilian and military personnel, and are offered at

government education and training institutions. However, in the field, public diplomacy

messages are too often not coordinated between institutions. For messages to successfully

permeate all aspects of society, consistent messages must be delivered across all chains of

command. To stay “on message,” all levels of command, and all organizations, must

make every attempt to coordinate efforts from the classroom to the field.

Knowing the Environment Complex operations include a number of actors, each with their own methods of

communications and cultural sensitivities.

Those conducting information operations and

public diplomacy must know the multiple

audiences to whom they are conveying

messages. This is necessary to determine what

resonates with what population, including how

they interpret messages, pictures, and other

forms of expression. As such, cultural awareness must be woven into training and

education on media management and public diplomacy.

Finally, different actors have their own forms of media and information sharing practices,

which need to be understood to effectively communicate with a host population.


Additionally, the nature of conflict situations can complicate efforts to communicate with

the public. Because media outlets that are readily available in the U.S. may not be

accessible in a conflict environment, situational awareness is necessary to identify the

capabilities and limitations of mass communication mechanisms within host countries.

33

More often than not, however, lessons that could be shared with others remain lessons noted or worse, lessons lost.

Lessons Learned Processes Practitioners regularly demonstrate the ability to make “ingenious adaptations” in the

field. More often than not, however, lessons that could be shared with others remain

lessons noted or worse, lessons lost.

The military is renowned for its lessons learned capacity at the tactical level. The Center

for Army Lessons Learned, for example, has a sophisticated and timely feedback loop for

troops operating in the field. Joint Forces Command maintains an extensive database of

lessons and resources on past and ongoing joint

operations. Lessons learned are also systematically

identified unit by unit. However, these lessons do

not always percolate vertically or horizontally.

Moreover, the process reportedly falls short at the

operational and strategic levels.

Civilian institutions simply do not have the same

feedback mechanisms to conduct systematic lessons

learned. While agencies recognize the need to

gather lessons from the field, there is a constant

struggle to turn these into valuable information for future deployments. When it comes to

conducting complex operations, civilian agencies are too often limited by time and

resource constraints to focus on identifying and documenting effective practices.

The bottom line is that lessons learned are hard to systematize at the operational and

strategic levels. The further someone is from the impact of their actions, the harder it is

for them to connect a unique experience to generalized lessons for the future. Personnel

need to be trained to recognize an experience as something that could be converted to a

lesson. Equally important, practitioners need to learn how to report lessons back to their

superiors effectively.

Organizations also have to be willing and able to absorb and process lessons learned from

the field and to adapt when lessons point to the need for a course correction. This can

demand substantial resources. For example, even if relevant interviews are conducted,

there may not be funding available for transcription and conversion into lessons learned.

Increasingly, with the help of new web and cell-phone technology, practitioners are

making use of reach-back resources as way to access expertise and lessons learned from

the field. Practitioners point out that it is more useful to know where to find information

when needed than to try and get trained on everything they would need to know ahead of

time.

That said, if training and education programs are to reflect ground truth, effective

programs that incorporate lessons learned into complex operations’ education and

training curricula are vital.


Professional Development The effort to enhance education and training for complex operations at the professional

level becomes a much less meaningful exercise unless it is linked up with career

progression and other incentives. Yet, a common theme across all sectors surveyed in this

study is that there are few systemic motivations to pursue expertise in the field of

complex operations. The disjuncture is in part due to the current status – or lack of status

– of “complex operations” as an area of practice. It also has to do with institutional

approaches to professional-level education and training.

Most institutions, both within and outside the government, reward service in a recognized

field. Developing expertise as an infantry officer or a professor of Asian studies, for

example, rather than in an interdisciplinary area such as stability operations, is seen to be

more career enhancing. The military has taken steps to address this tendency to specialize

by rewarding “joint” assignments. However, multi-disciplinary expertise and “joint”

assignments are not encouraged in many institutions. Even in the military, heretofore,

there have been few career incentives for personnel to develop an expertise in stability

operations.

Learning Cultures The organizational cultures of military and civilian institutions further influence their

disparate approaches to professional development. Quite simply, civilian government

agencies do not have the entrenched learning culture that exists in the military, where

training is an integral part of professional development. Military personnel spend up to

one third of their time in training and it is seen as mission essential. Conversely, civilian

organizations generally view expertise as something that comes with a new hire or can be

learned on the job. Civilian agencies have begun to take steps to remedy this, e.g., former

Secretary of State Powell’s Diplomatic Readiness Initiative. These steps have only

partially addressed the real need to enhance the ability of civilian agencies to participate

effectively in complex operations. The lack of a “training float” in USG civilian agencies

is still largely a factor of lack of resources. Budget constraints also contribute to and

exacerbate the lack of a training culture on the civilian side.

Furthermore, in the civilian government sector, honing an expertise while employed too

often is either done on one’s own time or at the expense of active job duties. The

increasing use of private contractors underscores this reality. Government agencies claim

that one of the benefits of using the services of outside contractors is that they can tap

into existing expertise, rather than develop it in-house. This then places the onus on the

private sector to screen for and/or develop expertise to fit the bill. Moreover, civilian

agencies often treat education and training as an administrative function. When learning

programs are offered, they are often not considered “mission essential.” This is reflected

in the reliance on “elective” and even ad hoc courses offered through government

agencies.

Career Incentives The lack of career incentives around education and training within civilian agencies also

extends to deployments to complex operations. Recently, the State Department had

difficulties filling all Iraqi assignments. While there are numerous reasons for this, one

stated reason is scepticism that such an assignment would be career enhancing.

Furthermore, previous deployments to zones of conflicts were done without requisite

35

There needs to be an increased emphasis on professional development and incentives for those engaged in complex operations.

training, so as to fill immediate requirements. This is beginning to be rectified by FSI and

other institutions.

Government agencies are by no means alone in not adequately rewarding service in

complex operations. However, these deployments are far from career enhancing within

the police force. There are no provisions within policing organizations to allow officers to

participate in such operations while maintaining active duty status – let alone take time to

train for such missions. As a result,

civilian police deployed abroad are either

retired or have had to quit the force and

treat international policing as a new

career.

In short, there needs to be an increased

emphasis on professional development

and incentives for those engaged in

complex operations. Clearly, an

understanding about the importance of training, i.e., a training culture, would benefit

from increased resources, particularly on the civilian side. In addition, an assignment to

complex operations, should promote, not sideline, career advancement.

37

VI. NEXT STEPS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This report has identified a series of crosscutting issues and “gaps” common to most of

the sectors we surveyed. Based on the wide array of inputs, we have highlighted a

number of these. We believe they are ripe for follow-up. They speak to the need to

expand our definition of “jointness,” to capture lessons learned in our education and

training process, and to increase civilian and military cooperation. In order to identify

concrete outcome-based projects, the CCO may consider workshops, conferences,

exercises, research, or other activities to address the following issues.

“Whole of Government” to “Whole of Community”

Expanding the Concept of “Jointness” In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act reworked the

command structure of the U.S. military, increasing the powers of the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs, and bringing together the services of the armed forces. This concept of

“jointness” needs to be expanded beyond the military. Complex operations involve

multiple actors sharing the space and not always working toward a common goal.

Interagency coordination has been improved in recent years to increase the U.S. capacity

for working in conflict zones. However, work is needed to create a “whole of

community” approach to working in complex operations. This includes USG, NGOs,

IOs, the private sector, and foreign governments working and training together for work

in complex operations, where appropriate.

Best Practices from Other Governments The U.S. is not alone in its efforts to create a civilian operational capacity for

stabilization and reconstruction efforts. A number of allied governments have their own

programs and are currently in the process of reviewing how to recruit, train and deploy

civilians to conflict zones. The multinational character of stability operations also

demands interoperability between partner countries. The USG has an ongoing dialogue

with allied government interagency entities on a range of issues related to stability

operations. However, more pressing operational demands often subsume inter-

governmental dialogue on training and preparing personnel for deployment in these

operations.

Exercises and Simulations Training exercises are effective for preparing military and civilians for fieldwork. The

military conducts training exercises more regularly than civilian agencies. These

exercises often include interaction with other types of organizations, but the emphasis,

understandably, is normally on military operations and objectives. At the same time,

more exercises and simulations are needed that are driven by non-military objectives (e.g.

humanitarian crises) and include the multitude of actors involved in complex operations.

In these cases, the military will most likely play a supporting role. Civilian players must

be involved in designing and planning, and not only playing in, these exercises.

Civil-Military Doctrine Historically, civilian and military agencies have difficulty coordinating efforts,

communicating effectively on the ground, or even speaking the same language. Steps

have recently been taken to develop common doctrine and guidelines; however, more


needs to be done. Civilian and military actors must train together, have open lines of

communication, and speak the same language to operate effectively on the ground.

Portal In addition to the features and functions noted in Section IV of this report, the Portal

should consider adding such features as chat capabilities, conference registration,

exercise calendars, electronic journals, and wiki functions.

Sector Papers The USIP survey team has collected an enormous amount of information on each of the

sectors involved in complex operations. This includes information on where personnel

from each sector (e.g. military and civilian personnel, allies, NGOs, international

organizations and the private sector) are deployed as well as their approach to education

and training for complex operations. The study team has drafted a “gaps” analysis for

each sector. This work formed the basis for this report. In addition, it might be useful to

analyze and present this information from a sector-perspective and to explore how a

particular sector could more effectively integrate its education and training with other

sectors.

Contracting Contracting in complex operations has increased in recent years; however, oversight and

coordination with contracting agencies have been minimal and sporadic, often with

unforeseen political results. Private contractors have differing qualification standards and

training requirements. Due to the ever-growing number of contractors working in

complex operations, increased coordination is necessary both at home – in terms of

education and training – and in the field.

Leadership and Management

Applying Business Models to USG Training and Education In today’s fluid foreign policy environment, the hierarchical, highly centralized

organizations, which were prevalent during the Cold War, have difficulty understanding

and responding to complex crises that require multi-faceted, cross-functional approaches.

Globalization, rapid worldwide transfers of information, and technological innovations

have forced highly centralized business enterprises to re-organize in order to be flexible,

adaptive and attuned to local markets throughout the world. Tiger teams, open source

business development models, and other de-centralized approaches to business planning

and operations have helped companies adapt to doing business in rapidly changing,

ambiguous environments. U.S. companies know how to operate effectively in different

cultural environments and mentor partners in other countries to advance corporate

interests and build corporate capacity. These skills may be highly useful to U.S. educators

and trainers, as well as practitioners in complex operations.

Situational and Cultural Awareness

Including Host-Country Interests into Training and Education Host countries have their own sets of interests, values and sensitivities. While U.S.

personnel are rightfully charged with promoting and defending American national

interest, this cannot be done without understanding the interests and culture of the host

country. There are numerous survey, area study, and culture courses available. However,

39

these are often tailored to the generalists and not the practitioners. Course content should

include integration of lessons learned and case studies in order to better understand the

impact of one’s actions on the local society.

Mediation and Negotiation Mediation, negotiation and cultural awareness courses are readily available to

practitioners. However, such courses should take into account cultural context to better

prepare personnel to work in intercultural environments. Simulations and exercises can

also be used to enhance cultural awareness, offering practitioners a more realistic

experience.


Mentoring Field personnel are quickly rotated in and out of positions without working with others

who have held the same position. Similarly, mentoring and capacity building is about

understanding difference between being the expert and helping develop the expertise of

others. There is a real need to train experts to more effectively transfer that knowledge to

host country counterparts and to understand their role in developing host country

capacity. Moreover, there is a need to develop and utilize reach-back resources that can

be accessed from the field.

Civilian Police Civilian police forces working in complex operations come from multiple nations, and

have different training methods and approaches to working on the ground. Furthermore,

UN police are recruited from different pools (e.g. from national police in France and

Italy, to local law enforcement in the U.S.). These are often retired personnel, especially

in the U.S. There is a need for increased training, cooperation, and synchronization

among these groups before working in zones of conflict. Additionally, consideration

needs to be given to the police-military interface in peace and stability operations. This

could include the development of guidelines, doctrine or joint training around issues such

as intelligence gathering and sequencing from the provision of short-term and longer-

term public security.

Civilian Reserve Corps NSPD-44 has identified the need to develop a cadre of individuals in the civilian sector to

be able to deploy quickly to complex operations. This ambitious program is a national

priority. The CCO should work closely to assist the Office of the Coordinator for

Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) wherever possible, and particularly on the

education and training side.

Cross-Disciplinary Issues (DDR & SSR) Issues, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector

reform (SSR), that are not the primary responsibility of a single agency or organization

often fall through the cracks and are not adequately addressed through training and

educational programs. Overall, there is a need for increased training in DDR and SSR,

and other cross-disciplinary issues, for both security and civilian forces.


Information and Public Diplomacy

Messaging and Audience Coordinated public diplomacy is critical to mission success. Different institutions,

however, often do not coordinate messages, use different means of communication and

too often do not even use the same language or lexicon. Education and training for

complex operations needs to address how to develop a coordinated approach to public

diplomacy among the military and civilian agencies, as well as allies, NGOs, and IOs,

taking into account multiple audiences, including the host nation.

Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned Capacity and Processes The U.S. military has a well-developed tactical lessons learned process unequal to the

civilian sector. However, operational and strategic lessons learned processes are less

developed within both the military and civilian agencies. Furthermore, training and

education programs often do not have systematic feedback loops or evaluation

procedures to draw lessons from the field in a timely manner. Best practices and issues

from the field are therefore slow to work their way into course content. There is a need to

develop a community-wide approach to, and tools for, evaluation and lessons learned

which is linked up with course development.

Case Studies Most educators identify the value of case studies as teaching tools, but claim that there is

a lack of quality case studies in the areas of practice that make up complex operations.

The CCO is well place to help facilitate the development of relevant case studies that

integrate emerging doctrine, concepts and lessons learned/best practices for use in the

classroom.

Professional Development

“Incentivizing” the Field Deployments to complex operations are not systematically linked up with professional

development and career enhancement for personnel working within and outside of

government. It would useful to provide a forum to address these concerns and identify

common sense incentives to attract and retain the best personnel to the field.

41

VII. APPENDICES

Appendix A.

Institutions and Organizations Surveyed and Consultediv

Institution Name School/Department City State/

Country

Africare Washington DC

Air University Air Command and Staff College

Maxwell AFB AL

Air University Air War College Maxwell AFB AL

Air University U.S. Air Force JAG School

Maxwell AFB AL

American Red Cross Washington DC

American University International Peace and Conflict Resolution Program

Washington DC

American University Peacebuilding and Development Institute

Washington DC

American University Washington College of Law

Washington DC

Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre

Williamtown Australia

Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre

Williamtown Australia

Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution

Stadtschlaining Austria

Booz Allen Hamilton McLean VA

Boston University Boston MA

Brandeis University

Alan B. Slifka Program in Intercommunal Coexistence, The

Waltham MA

Brookings Institution Washington DC

Business Executives for National Security

Washington DC

Camber Corporation Washington DC

Canadian Forces Centre of Excellence for Peace Support Operations Training, The

Ontario Canada

CARE Atlanta GA

Catholic Relief Services Baltimore MD

Catholic Relief Services Nairobi Kenya

Center for a New American Security

Washington DC

Center for Global Solutions Washington DC


Center for International Peace Operations (Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze)

Berlin Germany

Center for the Study of the Presidency

Washington DC

Centre for Intercultural Learning

Quebec Canada

Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto Para Operaciones de Paz (CAECOPAZ)

Buenos Aires Argentina

Centro Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz de Chile (CECOPAC)

La Reina Chile

Columbia University Arnold A. Salzman Institute of War & Peace Studies

New York NY

Columbia University Center for International Conflict Resolution

New York NY

Columbia University International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution

New York NY

Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs

New York NY

Congressional Research Service

Washington DC

Development Alternatives, Inc. Washington DC

DynCorp Reston VA

Eastern Mennonite University Conflict Transformation Program

Harrisonburg VA

Eastern Mennonite University Summer Peacebuilding Institute

Harrisonburg VA

European University Center for Peace Studies

Stadtschlaining Austria

Foreign Service Institute Leadership and Management School

Arlington VA

Foreign Service Institute School of Professional and Area Studies

Arlington VA

Fund for Peace Washington DC

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

Garmisch-Partenkirchen

Germany

George Mason University Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Fairfax VA

43

George Mason University Peace Operations Policy Program (POPP)

Fairfax VA

George Mason University School of Public Policy

Fairfax VA

Georgetown University Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service

Washington DC

Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government

Cambridge MA

Harvard University Law School Cambridge MA

Harvard University School of Public Health

Cambridge MA

Henry L. Stimson Center, The Washington DC

Initiative for Inclusive Security Cambridge MA

Institute for Defense Analysis Washington DC

InterAction Washington DC

International Human Rights Network (IHRN)

Oldcastle Ireland

International Medical Corps Washington DC

International Peacekeeping Operations Association

Washington DC

International Republican Institute

Washington DC

International Rescue Committee

New York NY

International Resources Group Washington DC

James Madison University Mine Action Information Center

Harrisonburg VA

Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)

Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Center (JKDDC)

Suffolk VA

Joint Forces Staff College Norfolk VA

Joint Special Operations University

Hurlburt Field FL

Kings College London Department of War Studies

Strand UK

Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, The

Accra Ghana

Marine Corps University Marine Corps War College

Quantico VA

Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting

Quantico VA

Marine Corps University Senior Leader Development Program (SLDP)

Quantico VA

Mercy Corps International Washington DC


Monterey Institute of International Studies

International Policy Studies

Monterey CA

MPRI Alexandria VA

National Defense University

Interagency Transformation, Education and Analysis

Washington DC

National Defense University School for National Security Executive Education

Washington DC

National Democratic Institute Washington DC

Naval Postgraduate School Graduate School of Business & Public Policy

Monterey CA

Naval Postgraduate School Graduate School of Operation & Information Sciences

Monterey CA

Naval Postgraduate School School of International Graduate Studies

Monterey CA

New America Foundation Washington DC

Noetic Washington DC

Northern Virginia Mediation Service

Fairfax VA

Oxfam America Boston MA

Oxford Brookes University Centre for Development and Emergency Practice

Oxford UK

Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping

Washington DC

Peace Corps Washington DC

Pearson Peacekeeping Centre Ottawa Canada

RAND Pardee RAND Graduate School

Santa Monica CA

RedR International Edegem Belgium

Refugees International Washington DC

RONCO Consulting Corp. Washington DC

Rutgers University Camden NJ

Save the Children Washington DC

Stanford University

Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law

Stanford CA

Syracuse University Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs

Syracuse NY

The Ohio State University Department of International Studies

Columbus OH

The Ohio State University The Mershon Center for International Security Studies

Columbus OH

45

Tufts University ALLIES Program at Tufts University

Medford MA

Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Medford MA

Tufts University Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy, The

Medford MA

Tufts University Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies, The

Medford MA

U.S. Agency for International Development

relevant divisions Washington DC

U.S. Air Force Special Operations School

Hurlburt Field FL

U.S. Air Force Academy Colorado Springs

CO

U.S. Army Headquarters Department of the Army, G-3/5/7

Washington DC

U.S. Army Medical Stability Operations

Washington DC

U.S. Army Combined Arms Center

Center for Army Lessons Learned

Ft. Leavenworth KS

U.S. Army Combined Arms Center

U.S. Army Command & General Staff College

Ft. Leavenworth KS

U.S. Army War College

U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

Carlisle PA

U.S. Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Center

Ft. Leavenworth KS

U.S. Coast Guard Academy New London CT

U.S. Department of Commerce Washington DC

U.S. Department of Defense Washington DC

U.S. Department of Education Washington DC

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington DC

U.S. Department of State Washington DC

U.S. Institute of Peace Education and Training Center

Washington DC

U.S. Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning

Quantico VA

U.S. Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare

Quantico VA

U.S. Marine War College Quantico VA

U.S. Merchant Marine Academy

Kings Point NY

U.S. Military Academy Social Sciences Department

West Point NY


U.S. Naval Academy Annapolis MD

U.S. Naval War College Newport RI

U.S. Office of Personnel Management

Washington DC

U.S. Treasury Washington DC

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

New York NY

United Nations Integrated Training Service

New York NY

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

New York NY

United Nations Peacebuilding Support Unit

New York NY

United Nations UNITAR-POCI New York NY

United Nations University and the University of Ulster

International Conflict Research

Londonderry UK

United Service Institute of India Centre for UN Peacekeeping

New Delhi India

University of Calgary

Peacebuilding, Development and Security Program, The

Alberta Canada

University of California, Irvine International Studies Program

Irvine CA

University of California, Irvine International Studies Program

Irvine CA

University of Chicago Department of Sociology

Chicago IL

University of Chicago Human Rights Program

Chicago IL

University of Colorado Conflict Information Center

Boulder CO

University of Colorado Conflict Information Consortium

Boulder CO

University of Connecticut Storrs CT

University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies

Denver CO

University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS)

Denver CO

University of Maryland

Center for International Development and Conflict Management

College Park MD



College Park MD

47



College Park MD

University of Maryland, University College

College Park MD

University of Massachusetts Department of Political Science

Amherst MA

University of Massachusetts Criminal Justice Department

Lowell MA

University of Massachusetts Criminal Justice Department

Lowell MA

University of Miami Miami FL

University of Michigan Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy

Dearborn MI

University of North Carolina Institute for Defense Business

Chapel Hill NC

University of Washington Seattle WA

USAID University Washington DC


Appendix B.

Training and Education Survey Questions

PART I. Institutions/Programs

1. Institution/Program Name

2. Institution Type

a. USG Civilian

b. USG Military

c. International Organization

d. Non-governmental Organization

e. Academic Institution

f. Other

3. Website URL

4. Contact Information

a. Institution Mailing address

i. Address 1

ii. Address 2

iii. City

iv. State/Province

v. Zip Code

vi. Country

b. Institution Phone Number

c. Institution Fax Number

d. Institution Email Address

5. Description

6. Institution/Program Director Information

a. Director Name

b. Director Phone Number

c. Director Email Address

7. Does your institution provide training and education programs?

8. Where are graduates from this institution/program employed?

9. What are your program completion rates?

10. Point of Contact Information

a. POC Name, title

b. POC Phone Number

c. POC Email Address

PART II. Courses

1. Institution/Program

2. Course Title

3. Course Number

4. Course Instructor

5. Instructor Contact Information

6. Course Description

7. Course Goals/Objectives

8. When was this course developed? (Date)

9. Course Level (check all that apply)

a. Undergraduate

b. Graduate

49

c. Post-Graduate

d. Professional/Continuing Education

e. Other (fill in the blank)

10. Course delivery (check all that apply)

a. On-site classroom

b. Off-site classroom

c. Field-based

d. In-country

e. Distance learning (online or correspondence)

f. Multiple site

g. Other (fill in the blank)

11. Teaching Method (check all that apply)

a. Lecture Seminar

b. Group Study

c. Self-taught

d. Simulation

e. Case studies

f. Guest experts/speakers/lecturers

g. Internships/fellowships/experiential learning

h. Other (fill in the blank)

12. Course length (check all that apply)

a. Academic term

i. Full year

ii. Half year

b. Intensive (fill in the blank)

c. Self-paced

d. Total hours of course (required)

13. Course capacity (choose one)

a. 1-10

b. 11-30

c. 31-100

d. 100+

14. How often is the course offered?

a. 1-2 times per year

b. 3-5 times per year

c. 6+ times per year

d. Other (fill in the blank)

15. Cost/fee (choose one)

a. Yes

b. No

c. Amount (fill in the blank)

16. Prerequisites (choose one)

a. Yes

b. No

c. If yes, list prerequisites (fill in the blank)

17. Course accessibility (check all that apply)

a. Internal only

b. USG civilian agencies

c. USG military

i. Available to a specific service branch (fill in the blank)

ii. Available to joint service


d. Foreign military

e. International organizations

f. Non-governmental organizations

g. Private sector

h. Public (fill in the blank)

i. Registered student body

j. Partner institutions

k. Other (fill in the blank)

18. Target participants/audience (fill in the blank)

19. Target participant level (check all that apply)

a. Senior officials

b. Middle-level officials

c. Entry-level officials

d. All

e. Other (fill in the blank)

20. Course type (check all that apply)

a. Stand alone course

i. Mandatory

ii. Elective

b. Part of a certificate program

i. Mandatory

ii. Elective

c. Part of a degree program

i. Mandatory

ii. Elective

21. What evaluation tools do you use for your course? (Fill in the blank)

22. Course orientation (check all that apply)

a. Interdisciplinary – approaching a subject from various angles and

methods in order to form new methods for understanding the subject

b. Multidisciplinary – crossing disciplinary boundaries to explain one

subject in terms of another

c. Survey or Overview

d. Oriented to specific discipline/program

23. Course update (check all that apply)

a. Incorporation of lessons learned

b. Incorporation of current events

c. Incorporation of latest theories/policies/discoveries in the field

d. Incorporation of real-life cases

24. Course completion rates (fill in the blank)

PART III. Additional Comments

1. If you were talking to the U.S. Government about how to train for complex

operations, what are the key points you would want to address?

For example: What would you recommend be taught?

How would you recommend it be taught? Whom would

you recommend be in that course?

2. In your view, what gaps or areas of weakness, if any, are there in training and

education (in general) for complex operations?

3. Additional comments?

51

Appendix C.

References Consulted Arnas, Neyla, Charles Berry, and Robert B. Oakley. “Harnessing the Interagency for

Complex Operations.” Washington: Center for Technology and National Security Policy,

National Defense University, 2005.

Carreau, Bernard. “Transforming the Interagency System for Complex Operations.” Case

Studies in Defense Transformation. Number 6. Washington: Center for Technology and

National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2007.

Center for International Cooperation. Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008.

Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008.

Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds. Leashing the Dogs of

War: Conflict Management in a Divided World. Washington: United States Institute of

Peace Press, 2007.

Crocker, Chster A., Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds. Grasping at the Nettle.

Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005.

Davidson, Janine. “Toward a Unity of Effort: The Case for the Consortium for Complex

Operations (CCO).” Unpublished manuscript.

Gompert, David C. and John Gordon IV. War by Other Means: Building Complete and

Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency. Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2008.

McCausland, Jeffrey D. Developing Strategic Leaders for the 21st Century. Carlisle, PA:

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2008.

Office of the President of the United States. Management of Interagency Efforts

Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. National Security Presidential

Directive/NSPD-44. December 7, 2005.

Perito, Robert M. ed. Guide to Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations.

Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007.

Perito, Robert M. Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?. Washington: United

States Institute of Peace Press, January 2007.

Scully, Megan. “RAND Study Says U.S. Lacks Resources to Defeat Insurgencies.”

CongressDaily. February 11, 2008.

[http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=39265&dcn=e_tma]

Tierney, Dominic. “America’s Quagmire Mentality.” Survival 49.4 (2007): 47-66.

U.S. Department of Defense. Headquarters Department of the Army. Counterinsurgency.

FM 3-24. 2006.


U.S. Department of Defense. Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and

Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. Directive Number 3000.05. November 28, 2005.

U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006. February 6,

2006.

U.S. Department of Defense. Report to Congress on the Implementation of DoD

Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction

(SSTR) Operations. April 1, 2007.

U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Counterinsurgency for

U.S. Government Policy Makers: A Work in Progress. Department of State Publication

11456. October 2007.

U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Essential Tasks. 2005.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve

DoD’s Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning. GAO-07-549.

May 2007.

Yates, Lawrence, A. U.S. Military’s Experience in Stability Operations. Global War on

Terror Occasional Paper 15. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press,

2006, www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/yates.pdf

53

Appendix D.

Previous Studies and Surveys Several surveys, studies, and initiatives have been undertaken in recent years to examine

training and education tools, practices, and needs related to complex operations. The

following list and accompanying summaries elaborate on some of these efforts, which

have informed this study.

Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, Office of the Secretary of State.

Final Report of the Workforce and Training Working Group, 29 January 2008.

BearingPoint. Management Study for Establishing and Managing a Civilian Reserve

Corps. 2006.

BearingPoint. Plan for Establishing and Delivering Training for a Civilian Reserve

Corps, 2007.

Carstarphen, Nike, Craig Zelizer, Robert Harris, and Senior Partners of the Alliance for

Conflict Transformation. Bridging the Gap: Graduate Education and Professional

Practice in International Conflict Work. Washington: United States Institute of Peace

Press, 2005.

Linder, Rebecca. Wikis, Webs, and Networks: Creating Connections for Conflict-Prone

Settings. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006.

National Defense University. Interagency Training, Education, and After Action Review

(ITEA) program. International Organization Education and Training Practices: Review

and Analysis.

Schoenhaus, Robert M. “Training for Peace and Humanitarian Relief Operations:

Advancing Best Practices.” Peaceworks, 43. United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002.

Stabilisation Unit. Operational Management and Delivery Group. United Kingdom.

Compendium for Training & Development Delivery Resource.

U.S. Congressional Research Service. Report for Congress. Peacekeeping and Conflict

Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities. RL32862,

updated September 2006.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are

Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian

Reserve Corps. GAO-08-39. November 2007.

U.S. Institute of Peace. Peace and Conflict Studies Programs in North America. 2002.

www.ccoportal.org

For additional information or for assistance with complex operations training

and education questions, please contact the CCO Support Center.

Phone: 703.602.3431 Email: [email protected]

*The CCO Portal was created in collaboration with the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Interactive forums allow

members to discuss and

develop thought and theory

With information on more

than 600 courses from over

200 institutions, the CCO

portal is the most

comprehensive listing of

complex operations course

data available on the web

A blogging feature provides

an environment for thought

leaders to debate on

ideologies and paradigms

The CCO calendar contains

detailed information

regarding complex

operations events

CCO Portal Instructions

To become a member of the CCO Members Portal:1. Visit www.ccoportal.org2. Click the “Request New Account” button3. Fill in the Member Profile Form including contact details,

professional experience, and areas of expertise4. Click “Request new account” to submit your request5. The CCO Support Center will review your membership

request6. Once approved, you will receive an email with further

instructions on how to login to the members portal using atemporary password

To manage your account as a member:1. Visit www.ccoportal.org2. Click the “Login” button3. Login using your username (firstname.lastname) and

password4. Click the "My Account" link at the top right corner of the

members homepage5. You may change your password by clicking the “Change

Password” tab above your name6. You may edit your member profile by clicking the “Edit” tab

above your name. In edit mode you may add a professionalpicture or modify your personal information using the“Account Settings, “ Expertise” and “My Details” tabs

If you forget your password:1. Visit www.ccoportal.org2. Click the “Request New Password” button3. Enter your username (firstname.lastname) OR email address4. A temporary password will be sent to your email address

April 21, 08


Endnotes

i While there is no standard definition of complex operations, for the purposes of this

study, the term encompasses stability operations, counterinsurgency, and irregular

operations, as well as humanitarian, postconflict reconstruction and state-building

activities.

ii Previous and ongoing surveys (within the U.S. and internationally) have focused on

particular aspects of complex ops. For example, a Bearingpoint survey recently

catalogued courses related to R&S, the military has surveyed for courses on Stability

Operations, the UN is currently conducting a survey of courses on peace operations, and

other governments are going though similar exercises.

iii We did not survey the numerous business and executive programs available through

academic institutions, but there is clearly scope for incorporating elements of these

programs into leadership development for complex operations.

iv Surveys were sent to over 400 institutions worldwide. This list represents over 100

institutions that our staff has met with or that have courses cataloged on the CCO web

portal. While the authors recognize that there are many additional institutions and courses

that are highly relevant to this study, this sample has provided a solid basis for our

analysis, and the starting point for the development of a comprehensive catalog of

education and training institutions on the CCO web portal.

Sharing the Space: A Study on Education and Training for Complex Operation

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