Shaping Urban Futures: Challenges to Governing and Managing ...

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Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

Issues Paper Series

Shaping Urban Futures:Challenges to Governing

and Managing Afghan Cities

Jo Beall and Daniel Esser

Funding for this study wasprovided by the World Bank. March 2005

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© 2005 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). All rights reserved. Thisissues paper was prepared by independent consultants with no previous involvement in theactivities evaluated. The views and opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflectthe views of AREU.

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About the Authors

Dr. Jo Beall is a reader in development studies at the Development Studies Institute of theLondon School of Economics and Political Science. She is a development policy and managementspecialist, with expertise on urban social development and urban governance. Her otherinterests include gender, social policy and international development, social exclusion andlocal responses to crisis and conflict. Dr. Beall has conducted extensive research in southernAfrica and South Asia and has advised and consulted for a range of international developmentagencies, national governments and non-governmental organisations. She is co-author of thebooks Uniting a Divided City: Governance and Social Exclusion in Johannesburg and FundingLocal Governance: Small Grants for Democracy and Development.

Daniel Esser is a Ph.D. candidate and scholarship holder of the German National AcademicFoundation and the Economic and Social Research Council in the Development StudiesInstitute at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Previously, he was a Fellowof the Special Programme for Urban and Regional Studies in the Department of Urban Studiesand Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He also has worked as a consultantand trainer for the International Labour Organization and CARE International, as well as inthe private sector. He has published and presented papers on urban governance, violenceand forced migration in conflict cities, local economic development in Asia and the applicationof ethics in strategic management.

About the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit(AREU)

The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent research organisationthat conducts and facilitates action-oriented research and learning that informs and influencespolicy and practice. AREU also actively promotes a culture of research and learning bystrengthening analytical capacity in Afghanistan and by creating opportunities for analysisand debate. Fundamental to AREU’s vision is that its work should improve Afghan lives. AREUwas established by the assistance community working in Afghanistan and has a board ofdirectors with representation from donors, UN and multilateral organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Current funding for AREU is provided by the European Commission (EC), the United NationsAssistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the UK Department for International Development(DFID), the World Bank, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),Stichtung Vluchteling, and the governments of Sweden, Switzerland and Denmark. Fundingfor this study was provided by the World Bank.

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Acknowledgements

We are grateful to all of those who provided us with time, information, guidance andhospitality in Afghanistan. Particular thanks go to the household-level respondents in Kabul,Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat for their welcome, trust and openness when telling us about theirlives and the problems they face.

We also thank all key informants for the time, knowledge and insights they were willing toshare with us, particularly the municipal staff of the three cities in which we worked andthe Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MUDH), as well as members of the UrbanAdvisory Group in Kabul, who deserve special thanks for their commitment, knowledge andadvice. Much appreciated input also came from Jolyon Leslie and Anna Soave of the AgaKhan Trust for Culture; Yasin Safar, Senior Advisor on Cadastral and Land Administration inMUDH; Katharina Lumpp at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) andJennifer Escott from the Norwegian Refugee Council.

In Mazar-i-Sharif, ActionAid was a wonderful host organisation. We are also deeply gratefulto Engineer Zia Radyar from UN-Habitat for his advice. The UNHCR guesthouse in Herat wasa welcoming and comfortable place to work and stay and we are grateful to its long-termresidents for sharing their “home away from home” with us. Thanks also to the SanayeeDevelopment Foundation and Tim Williams for sharing important regional data with us.

The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) provided excellent guidance and aconducive environment for the research; Alexia Coke, Aftab Opel, Sarah Lister, Elca Stigterand Jo Grace provided helpful feedback and support. Tom Muller and Brandy Bauer kindlyedited the text, bringing to the task a keen eye and professional approach, which has richlyenhanced this paper. The field level interviews and focus groups would not have been possiblewithout the translation and interpretation by Aimal Ahmadzai, Faraidoon Jawed Shariq,Sohail Aziz Shariq and Zuhal Atmar, who proved to be talented researchers.

Finally, the authors would like to thank the peer reviewers and particularly Robin Rajackand Soraya Goga at the World Bank, whose feedback, project coordination and expertisewas crucial to ensuring the successful completion of this study.

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Table of Contents

Map of Afghanistan .....................................................................................i

Glossary of Dari Terms................................................................................ii

Executive Summary ...................................................................................1

1. Introduction and Background ................................................................5

1.1 Rationale and relevance.................................................................6

1.2 Study methodology .......................................................................8

2. The Urban Context in Contemporary Afghanistan .....................................10

2.1 Kabul — capital city challenges .......................................................11

2.2 Mazar-i-Sharif — provincial capital and service centre............................12

2.3 Herat — the "Dubai of Afghanistan" ..................................................14

3. Urban Development and the Legacies of War ...........................................17

3.1 The physical and social impact of conflict ..........................................17

3.2 The political and bureaucratic inheritance .........................................20

3.3 Municipalities and urban management ..............................................21

3.4 National government and urban policy and planning..............................24

3.5 The role of international development agencies...................................26

3.6 Socially embedded institutions .......................................................28

4. Critical Challenges for Urban Management in Afghanistan ...........................33

4.1 Insecurity of tenure, affordable housing and urban land management ........33

4.2 Extending and sustaining urban services ............................................45

4.3 Planning and managing Afghanistan's urban future ................................49

5. Moving Forward: Addressing the Challenges to Urban Governance ................51

5.1 Creating links between state and society ...........................................51

5.2 Creating links between actors involved in urban managementand governance..........................................................................54

5.3 Recommendations.......................................................................55

Bibliography ...........................................................................................59

Appendix A: Interview Guide for Key Informants ............................................61

Appendix B: Key Informants Interviewed......................................................62

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Appendix C: Interview Guide for Household-Level Informants............................65

Appendix D: Distribution and Location of Household-Level Interviews .................68

Abbreviations and Acronyms.......................................................................70

Figures, Boxes and Tables

Figure 1. Methodology: triangulation of primary and secondary data collection.............9

Box 1. Vulnerability on the urban periphery: examples from Herat District 9 ...........15

Box 2. An example of intra-district inequalities: Hazaras in Mazar District 10 ..........31

Box 3. Insecurity of tenure among the Kuchis of Shadayee Refugee Camp...............40

Box 4. Insecurity of tenure on the part of vulnerable family members ...................42

Box 5. Post-conflict land management: lessons from Kosovo and Timor-Leste ..........43

Box 6. Connecting the "urban village": Chahar Asyab and Shawaki in Kabul'sDistrict Seven..............................................................................47

Table 1. Areas of concern and sequencing of recommendations...............................3

Table 2. Formal municipal relations in Afghanistan ............................................22

Table 3. Sample responsibilities of municipalities ..............................................23

Table 4. Current NRC land dispute cases in Kabul ..............................................41

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Map of Afghanistan

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) i

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gozar neighbourhoodjihad holy warkalantar elderKuchis nomadic peopleloya jirga “grand council” similar to shuras, or consultative assembliesmujaheddin fighters in the jihad, or holy warqanoon madari civil lawrawaj customary lawsafayi municipal service charge and property taxShari’a/Shariat Islamic jurisprudencesharwali wolayat provincial municipalityshura local/community counciltashkeel staffing establishment or list of sanctioned postswakil-e gozar (wakil) neighbourhood representativewasita personal relationships through which political/other favours may

be obtained

Glossary of Dari terms

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Afghanistan is facing tremendous challengeson its way to peace, democracy andprosperity. Its fast-growing and vibrant cities,which host roughly a quarter of the country’spopulation, pose particular developmentproblems but also carry significant potentialfor advancing social and economic well-beingif they are diligently managed and inclusivelygoverned. Against a background discussionof widespread urban vulnerability inAfghanistan, this paper explores the criticalchallenges for urban governance and urbanmanagement. The analysis draws on researchconducted in three Afghan cities — the capitalcity, Kabul, in the central east; Herat Citynear the western border with Iran; and Mazar-i-Sharif, close to the northwestern borderwith Uzbekistan — as well as on interviewswith informants from Afghan ministries,municipalities, international developmentagencies and local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involvedin urban programmes and projects.

The overall analysis suggests that there is anacute need for a more coordinated approachto urban management and greater focus onurban governance. Both require flexibleapproaches as well as enhanced cooperationbetween government departments as well asbetween those departments and cityresidents. This is particularly critical in thecontext of land administration and housing.Insecurity and inaccessibility of tenure arecurrently very important causes of urbanvulnerability. Housing shortages and highland prices, strict building standards andregulations deriving from the days of masterplanning, as wel l as burdensomeadministrative procedures based on idealnorms rather than the realities of localcircumstances have made a rise in informalconstruction inevitable. Informal settlementsnow account for the larger part of houses in

Executive Summary

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Afghanistan’s urban centres. High rents,diminished housing stock and the influx ofreturnees, internally displaced people andexpatriate development workers allexacerbate the problem. The absence of aneffective and coherent land managementsystem in growing urban centres has providedopportunities for illicit dealings, whether bypoliticians, government officials, privatemilitias or unscrupulous land developers.

Vast service delivery backlogs exist, alongsidegaps between serviced and unservicedhouseholds and areas. These need to beurgently closed, with a particular focus onthe interconnection between water supply,sanitation and solid waste management butalso electricity, education and healthfacilities. Community management of informalservice provision needs to be acknowledgedand the potential of community participationstrengthened to ensure greater involvementof and responsiveness to local demand andto ensure better downward accountability,particularly in the face of local-levelcorruption. Furthermore, governmentinstitutions need to increase their capacityto work with civil society organisations andto coordinate and regulate initiatives by non-governmental actors. However, cooperationwith municipal employees and coordinationwith government and other actors is essentialnot only for urban community developmentbut citywide development strategies as well.When this works well, NGOs can be a linchpinin urban management, helping to combatcorruption, promoting information exchangeand communication and fostering localempowerment in urban governance.

The urgency of addressing urban vulnerabilityis underscored by the alarming degree ofhorizontal social disintegration in cities. Thisis evidenced by fragile networks and lack of

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trust, conditions that make issue-basedgrassroots level collective action difficult.This works against citizen involvement inurban management. Similarly, local structuresof representation vary in terms of theireffectiveness and the extent to which theyare representative, particularly of womenand younger people. Lastly, the researchsuggests that there is still much to be donebefore Afghan ownership of current urbanreform processes is achieved.

Policy implications in brief

Local policymakers and officials clearly facea difficult challenge to change both theirmindsets and practices in a fast changingcontext and within a system where for many,skills are outdated and where investmentcomes primarily from sources other thangovernment. Government departmentsresponsible for urban development need toknow the amount of financial support theycan expect and have at their discretion andwhich areas and services will be prioritisedby funders and to be consulted in both. Thissuggests in turn increasing the degree ofdonor coordination and of the urban sectormore generally. A wider range of skillsassociated with urban planning andmanagement are also required in a contextwhere the future of urban development inAfghanistan is likely to rest less with a narrowperspective on urban design and more withstrategic urban management, driven by multi-sector partnerships involving not onlygovernment and the private sector but alsorepresentatives of communities and donors.This can be addressed immediately in thecontext of area-based urban developmentand in the medium and longer term throughrelated capacity building efforts that createthe basis for sustainable urban managementcapacity and inclusive and accountable urbangovernance.

Achieving effective urban management inAfghanistan means balancing and prioritising

limited resources against overwhelming needs.This is largely a political process and onethat requires attention to re-building trustin the mechanisms and structures of urbangovernance. Above all, channels ofcommunication between governmentagencies, international and bilateral donors,and agents and organisations of civil societyneed to be reviewed and improved. It isimportant to work with what exists, as iteasier to destroy than to build institutions.Thus a fine balance needs to be struckbetween challenging and capitalising onexisting organisations and systems of deliveryand accountability. Towards this end, thevisibility and responsiveness of government-administered services needs to bestrengthened; grassroots level collectiveaction needs to be fostered; andinstitutionalised platforms need to bedeveloped to increase the voice and leverageof citizens.

Recommendations

Key recommendations brought forward onthe basis of this comparative analysis havebeen divided into city-specific priorities andmore holistic longitudinal measures.

• In Kabul, security of tenure should begiven first priority. A second key concernis to clarify the relationship betweenKabul Municipality and the Ministry ofUrban Development and Housing (MUDH)and to enhance communication andcoordination between them.

• In Mazar, large sections of the city waitto be connected to water and seweragesystems and rely on private generatorsfor energy. Furthermore, employmentgeneration is critical in a provincial capitalwhere years of conflict saw thedecimation of industrial production andin a province where poppy production isa profitable alternative to limited legaleconomic opportunities.

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Area ofConcern

Immediate Measures IntermediateApproaches

Forward-lookingStrategies

Planning (Local) Work with and build onexisting master planning skills(but not the master plan);encourage risk-taking behaviour.

(National) Introduceparticipatory and collaborativeplanning through a “learning bydoing” approach in the contextof project development/NUP.

(National) Ensure all urbanprojects, programmes and plansare harmonised within thecontext of the NUP, guided bya strategic urban policyframework.

SkillsDevelopment

(Provincial/Inter-city) Worktowards updating practice andcreating experience throughexisting area-baseddevelopment programmes.

(Provincial/Inter-city) Promoteeducational visits to othercountries and demonstrationprojects.

(Provincial/Inter-city) Developskills in working with informalityin housing, infrastructure andservice provision in the contextof projects and programmes.

(Supranational) Ensureinvestment in skilled staff,equipment, advisors to MUDHand other ministries.

(National) Integrate on-the-jobcapability enhancement withcurriculum development inuniversities and technicalcolleges, with a focus on urbanplanning and management butwhere relevant, still locatedwithin existing architecture/engineering faculties.

Access toHousing

(Local) Work towards immediatesecurity of tenure for vulnerableurban dwellers, alongside largerland titling exercises.

(Local) Begin to harmoniseinformal security of tenuremeasures at the neighbourhoodlevel or in the context ofprojects with formal land titlingexercises.

(Local) Introduce and monitorinfringements or violation ofland titles and security of tenurewithin an ongoing process ofland titling.

Cooperation (Provincial/Inter-city) Fosterurban partnerships throughissue-based workshops.

(Provincial/Inter-city) Conductcapacity-building workshops oncitywide imperatives.

(Provincial/Inter-city) Developintegrated area-based projectsinvolving multi-sector partnersand with tangible skillsdevelopment and capabilitybuilding dimensions.

(Provincial/Inter-city) Extendintegrated area-based projectapproaches to citywidedevelopment strategies withlocal authorities coordinating awider array of urbandevelopment partners.

National UrbanProgramme(NUP)Implementation

(Provincial/Inter-city) Createcommitment to and ownershipof the NUP through facilitateddiscussion, workshops andapplication to real-lifeproblems.

(National) Operationalise theNUP through concreteinterventions; implementthrough governmentdepartments with clearmilestones and performancebenchmarks.

(National) Work towards asustainable resource base forthe implementation of the NUPin all provincial centres; ensureinstitutionalisation ofperformance improvement.

Citizen Dialogue (Local) Set in placeorganisational mechanisms formore extensive involvement oflocal representatives.

(National) Ensure governmentstaff awareness of IndependentAdministrative Reform and CivilService Commission.

(Local) Create structures forregular consultation/communication with urbandwellers about priorities andbudgets.

(Local) Strengthen andinstitutionalise structures forregular consultation/communication betweengovernment and urban dwellers.

(National) Strengthen citizens’ability to engage proactivelywith NUP/ planning processesthrough continuous civiceducation.

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Table 1. Areas of concern and sequencing of recommendations

• Conversely, in Herat a hard look needsto be taken at the dominance of privatised(re)construction and the potentialexclusion of minorities and the lowestincome echelons from improvements ininfrastructure, services and economicgrowth. The implication here is the needfor a more cautious and inclusive urbandevelopment strategy.

In addition to city-specific issues, a set ofcohesive and sequenced recommendationsapply across all large urban centres inAfghanistan. Actions are divided intoimmediate measures, intermediateapproaches and forward-looking strategies.

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Area ofConcern

Immediate Measures IntermediateApproaches

Forward-lookingStrategies

Corruption (National) Build on publicawareness of corruption bysetting up an effective urbanmonitoring group.

(National) Assessgrowth/effectiveness of theurban monitoring group oncorruption via appraisals andconsultation with agencies.

(National) Enforce anti-corruption measures throughsufficient funding, consultationand monitoring accountabilityto citizens.

Coordination (Supranational) Work to avoidthe worst excesses of politicisedfunding of infrastructure andservices by continuing toprioritise and institutionaliseproper consultation andcoordination.

(Supranational) Strengthen thecoordinating function of MUDH;clarify the role of the MUDH vis-a-vis municipalities, especiallyin Kabul; ensure compatibilityof NUP implementation withlocal priorities, focusing onurban vulnerability.

(National) Streamline MUDH andmonitor the effectiveness ofnew structures through peerreviews and citizen satisfactionsurveys.

RevenueGeneration

(Supranational) Strengthenrevenue generation andcollection through the Ministryof Finance.

(Provincial/Inter-city)Encourage local revenuegeneration activities on the partof municipalities to foster fiscalsustainability.

(National) Extend local revenuegeneration activities for someenhanced fiscal autonomy onthe part of municipalities whileensuring returns to centralgovernment and cohesion withnational policies throughcoordination by a streamlinedMUDH.

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Urban centres are increasingly characterisedby rising poverty, vulnerability, environmentalhazards and health risks. This gives rise toinsecurity and lack of safety on the part ofurban dwellers. These problems areexacerbated in post-war contexts. In conflictcities, urban citizens are often doubtful ofthe ability of municipalities and governmentsto provide them with a safe, secure andaffordable living and working environment.The disenchantment and exclusion of urbanresidents, particularly the most vulnerableamong them, is often reinforced byinefficiency and corruption. For example, inconflict situations tight control over accessto resources and decision-making by minorityelites can be greater. This issues paper focuseson urban vulnerability in Afghanistan, exploredin the context of challenges to urban

management and governance. Research forthis study was conducted across three cities.They included the capital city, Kabul, as wellas two provincial capitals: Herat City, closeto the Iranian border to the west and Mazar-i-Sharif to the north, close to the border withUzbekistan.1 Urban vulnerability incontemporary Afghanistan derives above allfrom the physical legacy of war. This includesdestruction of infrastructure and housing andlack of investment in services. Also evidentis the social legacy of war in cities, involvingthe displacement of people, fragmentationof support and social networks, as well asthe exclusion of particular groups of peoplefrom full participation in urban life. Urbanvulnerability is framed by a broad institutionallandscape that embraces not only governmentinstitutions, such as municipalities and line

1. Introduction and Background

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1 Originally a southern city was also to be included, either Kandahar or Jalalabad. However, the deteriorating securitysituation in the run up to the 2004 presidential elections, during which time the field research was conducted, made thisimpossible.

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ministries concerned with urban issues, butalso what are termed “socially embeddedinstitutions” such as households, community-level organisations, as well as customaryinstitutions such as the shura and loya jirga.Important as well are wider networks andinterest groups that influence or areinfluenced by urban processes and outcomes,such as international development agenciesand non-governmental organisations (NGOs)involved in the urban sphere, profiled in thisreport.

Against this background, this paper analysesthe critical challenges for urban managementin Afghanistan. Important among the issuesto be tackled is poor access to urban landand insecurity of tenure, experienced by awide spectrum of urban residents. Anotherchallenge is the need to move beyond datedforms of master planning towards strategicdevelopment at the city level. This is renderedurgent by service backlogs and the demandson city management posed by the growth ofinformal and new unserviced areas in mosturban centres. However, urban managementis not simply a technical exercise and thechallenge of accountability is paramountacross all these areas.

These management challenges can only berealistically and effectively addressed in thecontext of improved urban governance, withthe latter understood as state–societyrelations at the city level. The challenge ofurban governance has two sides. The first isto create a sense of urban “citizenship.” Inother words, there is a challenge to createamong urban dwellers a sense of belongingin and responsibility towards the city and theurban environment. This is only possible ifall people feel as if they have a stake andvoice in urban policy and planning or thatthey can hold local government to account.The second challenge of urban governanceis to build accountable and responsive

government both within cities and withinthose higher tiers of government responsiblefor urban development. The report seeks toidentify opportunities and constraints forpursuing this agenda within Afghanistan’surban centres. The paper concludes byidentifying some forward-looking strategiesfor addressing urban vulnerability andstrengthening and reforming institutions.

1.1 Rationale and relevance

In the most recent Human Development Index,Afghanistan was reported to have the secondlowest life expectancy in the world (43.1years), the second lowest adult literacy rate(36 percent), by far the highest infant andunder-five mortality rate (165/257 per 1,000live births) and the second largest proportionof under-nourished people (70 percent). Thisstatus is among those countries not evenlisted in the main ranking due to an overallscarcity of data.2 Indeed, the absence ofreliable data and meaningful indicatorsconstitutes a real handicap in efforts tomonitor progress. In the past, poor socialindicators were seen as problems mainly ofthe countryside. Increasingly, however, socialdisadvantage and urban vulnerability arebeing recognised as key components ofAfghanistan’s contemporary experience. Inaddressing these issues a critical startingpoint must be the baseline data needed totrack urban recovery.

While accurate statistics remain elusive, itis generally agreed that the urban populationhas increased dramatically since the fall ofthe Taliban, with the current urban populationof Afghanistan estimated to be between 5.6and 6.4 million, constituting from 23.3 to 30percent of the total population of thecountry.3 Urbanisation has been largelyprompted by refugees and internally displacedpersons (IDPs) returning to the cities. This

2 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). Human Development Report. 2003. Available online:http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003 (accessed on 25th March 2004); 339.

3 The first figure derives from UNDESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs). World UrbanizationProspects: The 2003 Revision, Population Division 1. New York: UN. 2004, while the upper numbers were estimates providedby Government of Afghanistan (GoA). Securing Afghanistan’s Future. Urban Technical Annex. January 2004.

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they do to reclaim their assets or to takeadvantage of the perceived benefits andlivelihood opportunities offered by urban life.Under such conditions it is misleading to thinkof Afghanistan only as a rural country.However, around 70 percent of urban dwellerslive in only six cities: Kabul, Kandahar, Herat,Mazar-i-Sharif, Jalalabad and Kunduz. Henceurbanisation is concentrated, which placestremendous pressure on urban land, shelterand services.4

In Afghanistan’s cities urban infrastructurehas been under strain for some time due toservice backlogs in previously planned areasand the destruction wrought by decades ofwar. Political conflict also meant limitedinvestment in infrastructure and services andled to deterioration in the urban environmentand housing stock. Together these factorsmean that informal dwellings now constitutethe bulk of Afghanistan’s urban housing stock.If ignored and if services are left unattended,the quality of life and human developmentof growing numbers of urban Afghans will beadversely affected. Ignoring informalsettlements can also have a wider impact oncity management. In the face of inefficientand unresponsive government departmentspeople seek solutions for themselves. Whenthese relate to goods such as water supplyand sanitation, a level of coordination isnecessary for the good of the city at large,something that is usually absent when local“do-it-yourself” approaches prevail.Moreover, when people lose their trust ingovernment and opt out of the responsibilitiesof citizenship, for example by not payingtaxes, this can adversely affect revenuegeneration and ultimately official deliverycapacity and potential.

Afghanistan is moving from an immediatepost-war situation, in which interventionsaimed at relief and rehabilitationpredominate, towards a situation where afocus on reconstruction and development isincreasingly appropriate. The former Minister

of Finance, Ashraf Ghani, said not long beforethe study was conducted that he did not wantpeople to talk any longer about “post-conflictreconstruction” but rather “development”.It is advisable in most war-torn regions,including Afghanistan, to see reconstructionand development taking place in a contextof “conflict management” rather than “post-conflict” given that factional and othertensions continue to prevail and that in anycase, development is necessarily a contestedand sometimes conflictual process as peoplenegotiate priorities and resource distribution.In this context it is important to addressurban issues alongside rural rehabilitationand development.

Urban management is one of the twelvepillars of the National Development Plan ofthe Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.Increasingly the Afghan government is turningits attention to urban reconstruction anddevelopment and donors are beginning torespond to these challenges in a far moreconcerted manner. A critical focus is on thesupply of infrastructure. Important thoughthis is, unless urban management is effectiveand governance systems are sound,investments in physical development will notbe sustainable or evenly spread. To this endit is important that clarity is achieved overthe functional responsibilities of differentlevels of government and governmentdepartments. This in turn necessarilyprefigures effective revenue generation andexpenditure at and for the local level, aswell as the implementation of evolvingpolicies, plans and practices that emerge outof the post-war political and developmentcontext.

In Afghanistan as elsewhere, cities are hostto competing interests, many of whichcommand excessive power. As in any post-war context, such interests are inextricablylinked to the scramble for the spoils ofreconstruction, often at the expense ofweaker and more vulnerable urban dwellers.

4 UNDESA, op cit.; Government of Afghanistan (GoA). National Priority Programmes – the National Urban Programme. Kabul,May 2004. Available online: www.afghanistangov.org/npp (accessed on 12th August 2004).

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5 See for example: ACF (Action Contre la Faim). Kabul Vulnerability Mapping. Kabul: ACF. January 2004; Alden Wily, L. LandRights in Crisis. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. March 2003; d'Hellencourt, N. et al. Preliminary Studyof Land Tenure Related Issues in Urban Afghanistan with Special Reference to Kabul City. Kabul: UN Habitat. March 2003;Grace, J. 100 Households in Kabul: A Study of Winter Vulnerability. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.August 2003; Hunte, P. Some Notes on the Livelihoods of the Urban Poor in Kabul, Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Researchand Evaluation Unit. February 2004; Schuette, S. Urban Vulnerability in Afghanistan: Case Studies from Three Cities. Kabul:Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. May 2004; Stigter, E. “IDP families in Herat City, Afghanistan – Displacementhistories and intra-household decision-making with regard to departure, stay and return.” Forthcoming in InternationalMigration Review. 2004; World Bank. Poverty, vulnerability and social protection in Afghanistan. Washington, D.C.: HumanDevelopment Unit South Asia Region. May 2004 (draft).

6 Nevertheless, this was ultimately a small study and data are illustrative and indicative rather than allowing for generalisation.7 The interview guide for household- and community-level interviews can be found in Appendix C.8 ACF, op cit.

Critical to the present investigation and topost-war conflict management are theconditions, opportunities and challenges thatface ordinary urban citizens in Afghanistan.Also central to this analysis is how theinstitutions operating in and on cities payattention to including vulnerable urbandwellers in access to resources and decision-making.

1.2 Study methodology

The research for this study was built primarilyon qualitative data gathering techniques,notably structured and semi-structuredinterviews, observations and some focus groupdiscussions. This methodological approachwas appropriate given the size of the study,which did not allow for investigation of theextent of urban issues, challenges andopportunities so much as their nature, aswell as how they were understood by differentgroups of urban actors. The research hasbeen situated and contextualised throughreference to and review of reports fromearlier studies, policy documents and one ortwo surveys.5 The authors were able tocapture the perspectives of a wide range ofrespondents and interlocutors from local andnational government departments,international development agencies andadvisory organisations, local NGOs, as wellas urban residents and their representatives.Findings and perspectives from differentgroups of informants and across the threecities were systematically triangulated.These were integrated into the three keyarenas of investigation: urban governance,urban management and vulnerability, asrepresented in Figure 1.6

A total of 84 semi-structured interviews wereconducted with informants from Afghanministries, municipalities, internationaldevelopment agencies and local andinternational NGOs involved in urbanprogrammes and projects. Informants wereidentified through initial advice and a processof snowball sampling. The final interviewguide is provided in Appendix A, while thecomplete list of respondents is provided inAppendix B. Semi-structured interviews werealso employed when talking to members ofurban households and communities acrossKabul, Mazar and Herat.7 Every effort wasmade to ensure the voices of both men andwomen were heard as well as those of boththe elders and younger members of aparticular community. Respondents wereasked to describe their personal situationand the challenges they faced that wereassociated with urban life. These includedmovement and mobility, livelihoods andincome generation, access to housing andservices, security and safety, the nature ofsocial networks and social cohesion, contactwith governmental and municipal andinstitutions, and local representation...........

Choice of neighbourhoods was deliberate andinformed by survey data,8 consultation withthe Ministry of Urban Development andHousing (MUDH), UN-Habitat and CAREInternational. Houses were chosen from anumber of streets that together appeared torepresent the full range of residents in asettlement. Decisions were informed by takinginto account the quality and size of housing,its design, location and distance fromamenities and the settlement centre. Houses

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were then randomly picked and their residentsasked for an interview. Contrary to prioradvice and the practice of studies conductedin similar environments elsewhere, theresearchers chose not to consult with localauthorities, community organisations orneighbourhood representatives in advanceof arrival in the neighbourhood, in order toavoid bias. Nevertheless, their presence wassoon noted and if further consultation wasrequired return visits were arranged with thewakil-e gozar (appointed neighbourhoodrepresentative) or other community leaders.In Kabul interviews were conducted in Districts1 (11), 3 and 13 (7),9 16 (11) and 17 (9). InMazar, the research team interviewedresidents in Districts 2 (5), 7 (4) and 10 (4).Finally, in Herat interviews were conductedin Districts 6 (5), 7 (2) and 9 (5). The

distribution and the location of interviewareas are visualised in Appendix D.

The methodology was also designed tofacilitate a reporting approach wherebyinformants were allowed to speak forthemselves, through the use of quotationswhen views expressed represent widely heldopinions in a particular place or among aparticular group. Short illustrative case studieswere also compiled and are presented asboxed text. Those on urban Afghanistan derivefrom the research and information gatheredduring household level and key informantinterviews. Lastly, drawing on the authors’own experience, international case studiesare also included where challenges and policyresponses are of special relevance toAfghanistan.

Figure 1. Methodology: triangulation of primary and secondary data collection

9 The district boundaries were partially overlapping; however the characteristics of both neighbourhoods investigated weresimilar in terms of location (hillside), income (low), ethnicity (predominantly Tajik), and migration history (urban).

Urban governance

Mazar-i-Sharif

Urban management Vulnerability

Herat

Kabul

Existingquantitativeand qualitativedata fromsurveys andreports

84 semi-structuredinterviews withkey informantsin Kabul, Mazarand Herat

63 semi-structuredinterviewswith residentsin Kabul, Mazarand Herat

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The more than two decades of conflict thatbegan in the late 1970s in Afghanistan gaverise to urban destruction and socialfragmentation on an unprecedented scale.Displacement, the disintegration ofcommunities and the destruction of trust andsystems of support were all consequences ofthe war years.

Security continues to preoccupy many peoplein Afghan cities.10 Interestingly, however, itwas not perceived as the primary urbanchallenge faced by many of the poorest urbandwellers interviewed for this study. A blindman interviewed in Mazar put it like this:

I make a bit of money assisting peoplein the municipality, but all of my childrenare beggars. So the only thing that’s goodhere is security — we have nothing sothieves don’t come here, because theyknow there is nothing they couldsteal....We have to move to anotherhouse soon because the owner wantsmore money. This house has noelectricity, no water, no toilet — howcan anyone live here? The war is over,but also in peace surviving is difficult.

Indeed, discussions with people living inKabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat showed thatwhile respondents acknowledged the crucialrole of security from violence for enhancingeconomic and social development, moreimmediate concerns prevailed. These weresustainable shelter solutions as well as theprovision of basic services such as water,sewerage, and waste collection. The demandfor housing and services is reflective ofdramatic population increase andconcentration in and around Afghanistan’smain urban centres, including the three studycities.

Currently, 23.3 percent of Afghanistan’spopulation is estimated to live in urbanagglomerations although some sources seethis as an underestimate, putting theproportion of urban dwellers closer to 30percent. Projected annual changes in“percentage urban” (1.98—2.34 percent forAfghanistan) are above regional averages(1.16—1.42 percent for Asia).11 Thisdevelopment is put down to three trends:self-generated growth (urban naturalincrease);12 net in-migration fuelled byeconomic scarcity, unemployment andenvironmental hazards (mainly droughts) inrural areas;13 as well as refugee return flows(both assisted and spontaneous). Respondentsfrom the United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees (UNHCR) as well as internationalagencies and NGOs dealing with refugees andIDPs, such as the International Organizationfor Migration (IOM), emphasised that refugeesand IDPs returned to their villages of origin.However, the qualitative evidence suggeststhat due to a lack of livelihood and otheropportunities in the countryside, a significantnumber of assisted returnees immediatelyleft the countryside for the city. This impliesthat Afghanistan’s urban population may beunderestimated, constituting an importantarea of further research.

A male English teacher who lived with histwo brothers and their families in KabulDistrict 17 illustrated the incentives for urbansettlement:

We live in here because it is close toParwan where we are from originally.Still, we are not planning to go back toParwan due to the risk of droughts andfloods. We also chose to live in Kabulbecause here we have a school for ourchildren and better job opportunities.

2. The Urban Context in Contemporary Afghanistan

10 The situation may have been exacerbated by heightened security problems associated with the pre-election period, duringthe summer of 2004, when the field research for this paper was conducted.

11 UNDESA, op cit., 26,103.12 That is, urban births exceeding urban deaths.13 Urban in-migration exceeding urban out-migration.

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Similarly, a father of six in Herat District 6explained:

It is two months that we have been livingin this district; originally we are fromPushton Zarghon, a village in HeratProvince...I had been going back andforth for years because there were nojobs in Pushton Zarghon. We used to workin agriculture, but because there was ashortage of water we had bad harvests.Now we are renting this house for 2,000Afghanis [US$40] per month. We live herewith 12 people, but fortunately startedbuilding a newhouse for which wehad bought theland before wecame from thevillage.

S u c h a c c o u n t srepresent the history and experience of manyAfghans. They also indicate how rural andurban vulnerability and livelihood systemsare crucially intertwined in patterns that aredynamic and connected rather thandisconnected and fixed. A humanitarian aidspecialist suggested that “in Afghanistan,disaster drives urban growth.”14 The findingsof this study suggest that it also drives theagency, resilience and self-help strategies ofv u l n e r a b l e p e o p l e . T h u s , t h erecommendations are concerned to point toways of facilitating and supporting theirefforts rather than undermining or exploitingthem.

2.1 Kabul — capital city challenges

Kabul is by far the largest city in the countryand one of the fastest growing cities in theregion. The population is estimated to haveincreased from around two million in 2001to around 3.5 million people today.15 This isunprecedented in recent history, even when

compared to fast-growing cities such as Dhaka,Lagos, Karachi, Jakarta, or Mumbai.16 It wasestimated by a number of key informantinterviewees that over 60 percent of peoplelive in “informal” areas, with many underconstant threat of eviction due to insecurityof tenure. This might be because they do notpossess title deeds or because steadily risingrents lead landlords to seek better-off tenantsor members of their own families to occupytheir houses.

Planning for such a fast-changing urbanenvironment is clearly a challenge. The master

plan for Kabul wasdeveloped in the mid-1970s and approved in1978. It caters for acity of 700,000 peoplerather than 3.5 millionand has now beenofficially suspended

through a presidential decree.17 However,its legacy remains on the walls and in theheads of many planners and implementers.Neighbourhoods within the city are stillclassified as “formal” or “informal” accordingto the parameters of the master plan, withthe effect that infrastructure provision, suchas a citywide water project funded by abilateral donor, neglects the most needyareas. Adherence to the master plan and thetendency to only recognise developmentwithin it has allowed political factions andelites who control access to opportunitieswithin the master plan area to determinethe direction of urban development in Kabul.

Kabul Municipality has the status of a ministryand reports directly to the president.However, it has recently lost all authority toapprove plans to the MUDH. This has causeda great deal of frustration among municipalbureaucrats. They argue that they themselvesshould be in charge of the city and havedemanded a massive increase in funding in

14 Personal communication in April 2004. See also UN-Habitat, op cit., 4.15 Hunte, op cit. and ACF, op cit.16 Growth rates in these cities vary between 6.17 and 3.13 percent; UNDESA, op cit., 8.17 Personal communication, UN-Habitat Kabul, July 2004.

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Adherence to the master plan and the tendency toonly recognise development within it has allowedpolitical factions and elites who control access toopportunities within the master plan area todetermine the direction of urban development inKabul.

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order to develop neighbourhood byneighbourhood. In this they would be guidedby the old master plan or, as they argue, anew plan that has yet to be developed.

Private investment exists but is largelyunrestricted by municipal regulation.Construction rules and regulations are notenforced. This suggests that governmentinstitutions will have to gradually build upthe capacity to provide incentives, andcoordinate and regulate initiatives by non-governmental actors. The need for flexibleapproaches as well as cooperation andcoordinat ion between governmentdepartments and between government andresidents is particularly acute in the contextof land administration and housing, wherelocal commanders, some allegedly with thebacking of central government, have beeninvolved in large land grabbing operations inthe west and the north of the city.

None of this is helpful to Kabul’s vulnerablecitizens. Provision of safe drinking water,sanitation systems and sewage canals werethe services that respondents in all Kabuldistricts prioritised over alternatives such aselectricity, education, and even the creationof more susta inable employmentopportunities. For instance, in some districtswater has become a commodity and itspurchase absorbs a large proportion of theincomes of low-income households. Privatelyowned tankers currently provide it, withresidents paying around 60 Afghanis(approximately US$1.20) per drum. As ashopkeeper in District 17 said:

The water tanker comes every four days.They aren’t from the government; richpeople own them. You can see somemodern houses around here [pointstoward some large construction sites anda recently finished two-story buildingnearby]; these are the houses of the

people who own the water tankers. Theyearn 1500 Afs [US$30] per day and tanker.

Housing and service delivery shortages haveattracted considerable attention frominternational donors and agencies, and anumber of projects have been initiated andcompleted during the past three years. Theyhave included projects for water andsanitation rehabilitation and projects helpingthe city’s residents cope with health risksand a volatile employment situation.However, donors and NGOs alike complainabout the low degree of coordination amongthemselves with regard to reconstruction,upgrading and service provision. The extentto which the National Urban Programme,developed with assistance from UN-Habitat,can achieve this goal remains to be seen.18

2.2 Mazar-i-Sharif — provincialcapital and service centre

Mazar-i-Sharif (hereafter Mazar) is acommercial centre that serves as a hub forsmall and larger traders, with a populationbetween 500,000 and 700,000 inhabitants.19

The master plan for Mazar is based on 16,000families, yet because of insecurity andunemployment in the surrounding rural areas,current informal estimates suggest a city ofup to 80,000 families, including IDPs andlabour migrants who commute betweencountryside and city. Hence, as with Kabul,the master plan bears little relationship tothe urban reality of Mazar. Displacement hasgiven rise to an above-average representationof a nomadic group (Kuchis) who live mainlyin two of the ten districts making up the city.Profoundly vulnerable, they co-exist withlocal communities but have no formal orinformal relationship with them. Employmentopportunities in the city are neverthelesslimited. Although once a thriving centre ofproductive activities no factories remain, asentrepreneurs left the country, dismantlingtheir plants and production sites in the face

18 GoA, National Priority Programmes, op cit.19 The Afghanistan Information Management Service places Mazar’s population at around half a million residents, but several

others, included those interviewed for this study, stated that 700,000 was a more likely estimate.

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of the Soviet invasion and subsequenthostilities. What was left was destroyed duringthe Taliban regime. Likewise, ongoinginsecurity as a result of commander activitystands as a disincentive to economicinvestment. As a result, it is generally believedthat about half the population is unemployed,although reliable statistics are not available.

Contrary to Kabul with its large numbers ofpeacekeepers, the potential for an outbreakof large-scale violenceis significantly higherin Mazar where thereis less oversight andwhere the city ischaracterised as aregional centre withtwo competing commanders. One of them,Atta Mohammed, has recently become theprovincial governor, a move apparentlyapproved by the other, Rashid Dostum, whostood in the recent presidential elections andsecured 10 percent of the overall vote.Although they have developed a modusoperandi between them, the security situationremains tense, with occasional clashesbetween factions working with or alongsidethese two or other local military commanders.Such conflicts affect urban life not only byrestricting freedom of movement but also inrising prices for basic foodstuffs every timethere is an outbreak of violence. Landgrabbing in Mazar is also more concentratedthan in the capital city. At the time of theresearch a large area just outside the citycentre was in the news. Here a localcommander was in dispute with 498 claimantsover a piece of land he occupied during thewar against the Taliban in late 2001. Acrossthe city it is estimated that about 90 percentof property development is in private handsand totally unregulated.20 Respondentsexpressed frustration over the lack ofbureaucratic accountability and the highlevels of corruption in the city.

Atta Mohammed, along with his close ally,the mayor, has failed to ensure significantinvestment in municipal service provision, sothat it is even worse in Mazar than in Kabul.The municipality has only a limited numberof engineers, administrators and planners,all of whom operate without resources. Dueto budget limitations the number of workersis equally constrained; for example, municipalwaste collectors were reduced from 150 tenyears ago to 60 today. During this time the

urban population hasnearly tripled.21 AMazar shopkeeper fromDistrict 10 reportedthat:

The waste collectorsfrom the municipality

come here once per month and take awaythe litter, but they would have to comemore often — every ten days or so. Butbecause they don’t ask us, they don’tknow that we want them to come heremore often.

A young woman in Mazar explained furtherthe impact of poor service delivery on ordinarypeople:

There is nobody to collect the waste ofthis neighbourhood. Only when there iselectricity there is water, otherwisewater stops. I don’t know why. We haveelectricity but it is not reliable; duringwinter we use gas and wood for heating.

UN-Habitat introduced into Mazar a wastecollection system known as “the KarachiSystem.” Based on experience elsewhere inAsia the system involves communitycontracting of a micro-entrepreneur to engagein house-to-house waste collection and streetcleaning, leaving secondary waste collectionand removal to the municipality. However,when the funding ceased, this was notsustained. This is indicative of a widely held

20 Personal communication, Eng. Radyar, UN-Habitat Mazar, July 2004.21 Ibid.

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Contrary to Kabul with its large numbers ofpeacekeepers, the potential for an outbreak oflarge-scale violence is significantly higher in Mazarwhere there is less oversight and where the city ischaracterised as a regional centre with twocompeting commanders.

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attitude among local officials in Mazar thatin the absence of resources from the centre,investment in urban infrastructure andservices should be the responsibility ofinternational donors. It is difficult to discernwhy this might be. One possible explanationis that certain donors have circumventedefforts at donor coordination in the urbansector and have made individual approachesto the municipality in Mazar, for instance inrelation to road construction. Anotherexplanation is the very success of earlierdonor-funded initiatives in the city andpossible resentment at the withdrawal offunding, for example in relation to thecommunity development councils or theKarachi system of primary waste collection.Another explanation might relate to relationsbetween the centre and Mazar and the factthat any surplus generated locally is requiredto be transmitted to Kabul, with littlereturning from the centre.

2.3 Herat — the “Dubai ofAfghanistan”

The third city analysed in this study in Herat.It is the main Afghan border city with Iranand Turkmenistan and a bustling provincialcentre. It is a key entry point into the countryand straddles important trade routes, as wellas being the country’s most active borderpoint in terms of trade interactions. As a keyentry point for imported and exported goods— crucial to consider in the context of nationalrevitalisation — customs revenues areestimated at US$1 million a day. Cross-borderflows are not restricted to goods and manyof the massive influx of returning refugeesfrom Iran right after the fall of the Talibancame through Herat. Although this has nowalmost reached a halt, according to informantsworking with refugee populations, thousandsof people still pour into Herat during thewinter from the two neighbouring countriesin order to find shelter, food and employment.

Foreign, local and returnee investment intocommunications, transport and property isremarkable. There are now more than 25

industrial plants in the greater urban area,mainly producing cement and textiles. Themayor at the time of the study, a visionaryand close ally of the suspended formergovernor, Ismail Khan, exhibited a clear focuson grand projects in line with his long-termvision of Herat as “the Dubai of Afghanistan”.This he hopes to achieve through investmentin income-generating initiatives that willrender municipal finances more sustainable,for example, wedding halls, hotels and otherpremises for rent. The municipal bureaucracyfunctions comparatively well. Here it is helpedby a strong regional resource base. For a cityroughly the same size of Mazar, the numberof municipal staff — about 700 plus 400 day labourers — is impressive, made possible bythe fact that the city, under Khan’s reign,did not submit any significant resources tothe centre.

Relative to other Afghan cities the physicalinfrastructure of Herat is extremely good,with asphalted roads and increasingly reliableelectricity from Iran and Turkmenistan servingthe better-off neighbourhoods. The publictransportation system works well, assistedby donations from the Indian government andIran. With the help of donors and theprovincial government, the municipality has

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purchased a dozen well-maintained second-hand vehicles for solid waste collection fromGermany. However, the emphasis is onsecondary collection and cleaning of mainroads, commercial centres and better offneighbourhoods. Lower-income areas andless influential communities remain under-serviced. For instance, an unemployed malerespondent in District 6 explained:

Waste is piling up and the streets aredirty, but the municipality does not doany work in this area; the centre is sobeautiful but they don’t pay attentionto District 6 where the poor live! We alsohave nothing to do with the shura; theydon’t listen to us. There is a wakil butwe don’t have any communication withhim because he does not work.

Despite major achievements with regard toservice provision, services such as education,health and water are not yet adequate tocope with present growth. The same holdstrue for housing, in particular in the outskirtsbut also in the centre where housing priceshave risen substantially over the last twoyears.22 If urban investment and growth arereaching the vulnerable citizens of Herat itis only slowly. To the extent that poverty isbeing addressed, this is through confiningvulnerable groups to the villages and to

peripheral settlements surrounding HeratCity (see Box 1).

The municipality has rehabilitated parks inan attempt to create public spaces andemphasises a policy of including andprotecting women in public life and discourse,yet both women’s rights groups and humanrights activists reported abuses andintimidations backed by local authorities.Another area of concern underlined by severalrespondents was severely restrained freedomof expression. There has been a particularlyarm’s length relationship between Herat Cityand Province and the centre that saw variousepisodes of brinkmanship between Kabul andthe former governor. It remains to be seenthe extent to which the formerly tight linkbetween local bureaucracy and the provincialauthority under Ismail Khan will loosen underthe new governorship of Sayed MohammadKhairkhah. It also remains to be seen whetherthe latter will be able to better encouragepowerful interests in Herat towards a widerprocess of nation-building, for examplethrough more assiduous resource flows fromthe city towards the centre and vice versa.Local–central power relations are likely toremain tense until the local political situationis stable, while the city’s future cannot beconsidered without taking into accountregional geo-politics, particularly in relationto Iran.

22 See, for example, Schuette, op cit. and Stigter, op cit.

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Box 1: Vulnerability on the urban periphery: examples from Herat District 9

Herat is rightly lauded as the most livable city in Afghanistan due to the rapid speed of reconstructionfinanced by both local and international capital. However, some of the city’s areas continue to harborpoverty and social exclusion. District 9, located in the southwest of the city, is a mixed area with moderndwellings and mud houses next to each other. The street that leads to the district is not asphalted, eventhough promises have been made recently that the municipality would act on this issue, a decision mainlyinformed by the district’s glorious history as the place where the jihad against the Soviet occupantsbroke out.

Malika (name changed) had moved to her new house from Islam Qala (on the border between Iran andAfghanistan) only two days before being interviewed in July. As a response to the Soviet retaliation toinsurgency operations in this area, her family had migrated to Iran and stayed there for 14 years. After whatMalika called “Ismail Khan’s victory against the occupation” they came back to Herat in the mid-1990s. Yetduring the reign of the Taliban, the family decided to again flee to Iran. The Taliban then martyred herhusband on the Herat—Kandahar road in 1999 after he had joined a mujaheddin commander earlier thatyear. Now they have come to Herat “because we had no shelter in Iran anymore. The Iranian governmentforced us to leave.”

The widow and her four children lived in a small mud brick house with three rooms, constructed on top ofthe leftovers from another building. The rent for this place with no windows, no water, no electricity andno sanitation was 700 Afghanis [US$15], but Malika did not know whether she would be able to pay thismuch. She hoped to make some money with tailoring and doing the laundry for neighbours, which couldearn her about 20—30 Afs [US$0.40—0.60] per day. In Iran she was doing some carpet weaving, but herfingers began to hurt, her eyes got weaker, and she was increasingly unable to concentrate. Her oldest sonwas 14; he used to work part-time in a tailoring shop, making the equivalent of 15 Afs [US$0.35] per garment.He had yet to find better employment in Herat. If it turned out that she could not pay the rent, then Malikasaid, “We will have to move into one of the ruins because we have no other alternative.”

Malika herself had five brothers and three sisters. Three of her brothers had been jailed under the Taliban;two of them were now drivers travelling the road between Kabul and Herat. “They don’t help us becausethey are poor themselves,” said Malika. “But we hope they will invite us to their houses sometime so wecan eat together.” Malika was also very concerned about the health of her children. Her daughter’s nosewas often bleeding. Before she arrived in Herat Malika went to the hospital in Mashad. The doctor told herto come back after two months, “but now I am here and I cannot go back to Mashad. So I went to the clinicin Herat yesterday, but it wasn’t of any use. They refused to treat my daughter when I said I couldn’t pay.I wish I had a good life again with my husband,” she said, “but everything was destroyed when he died.”

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3.1 The physical and social impactof conflict

More than two decades of war have left adaunting footprint on Afghanistan’s cities. InKabul, 63,000 private homes were ravagedby fighting and about 60 percent of its roadsdestroyed.23 Mazar-i-Sharif suffered lessphysical destruction but certain groups ofcitizens suffered particularly badly. Heratwas heavily affected during the early 1980swhen the mujaheddin insurgency forcesstarted their activity on its outskirts; its roadnetworks are in need of reconstruction, andbasic services have not been extended to alldistricts.24 To varying degrees, in each ofthe cit ies the provision of urbaninfrastructure, housing and services poses animportant challenge in reconstruction and

the demands being made on local authoritiesin this regard are enormous.

Few countries can claim a history of forcedmigration that would be comparable to thatof Afghanistan. Some respondents living inKabul Districts 1 and 3 had moved up to seventimes in five years, across both rural andurban settlements. Armed conflicts in bothcities and rural provinces have led todisplacement and disintegration of a societyin which local networks have conventionallybeen the backbone and guarantee ofindividual security and social support.However, an unemployed male refugee inHerat District 6 stated:

I know only one of my neighbours here;he is a relative. I cannot rely on the

3. Urban Development and the Legacies of War

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community; I just try to solve myproblems myself.

Even though family ties remain strong, despite(and some might argue as a result of) twodecades of armed struggle, the capacity oflocal safety nets and networks of reciprocityto provide social security has undeniablysuffered. Some refugees and IDPs havedeveloped elaborate coping mechanisms,sometimes spanning provincial and evennational borders. However, there are manyurban dwellers with few connections on whomthey can rely, with widows and nomadiccommunities being the most particularlyvulnerable individuals and groupsrespectively.25

Recognition of continuing urbanisation andthe resulting pressure on existing urbansystems has to be at the centre of any viablereconstruction strategy. A growing budgetfor urban development and an increasingnumber of infrastructure projects indicatesthis is the case. Nonetheless, complexproblems require comprehensive and well-coordinated solutions that tackle social andinstitutional issues alongside the physicalchallenges of reconstruction. A malehousehold head in Kabul District 17 illustratedthe juxtaposed impact of physical destruction,lack of employment opportunities andmigration when he said:

We are originally from the Guldara partof Shomali and have been living here foralmost two years. When we came backfrom Pakistan, where we had been stayingfor four years during the Taliban era, wefound our home and lands and gardensin our village destroyed. Nothingremained. We came back to Afghanistanbecause we did not have any good incomein Pakistan. We were also having problemswith the heat. A lot of people in Pakistantold us there would be work in Kabul,now that there was peace in our country.Yet I haven’t seen any work opportunities

here, so I had to open this shop, next toour house. We have built this houseourselves after receiving permission fromthe local commander.

Many had experienced physical destructionas a main driver of migration. Said a fatherof five in Kabul District 17:

We are originally from Shomali, but wehave been living here for almost threeyears now. We had been in Iran beforefor six years, where I was working as adaily labourer. With the peace in ourcountry we decided to come back toAfghanistan. We wanted to go to our ownplace in Shomali but found it destroyed.Nothing remained. Therefore we decidedto rent a house. Now we are living here,but the rent is rising steadily.

However, it was not only those who weredisplaced who suffered from the physicaldestruction and social dislocation of war. Amale respondent living with his family inHerat District 7 related the experience of hisfamily:

We have always been living here. This isthe place where the jihad against theSoviets started. They destroyedeverything here, so most people fled,but we were too poor to go anywhereelse — so we stayed. Now we have thisplace and we actually have a title deedfor it. We are lucky, in a sense.

Those who own houses or have title deedswere not necessarily better off than tenantsbut they were at least relieved of one sourceof vulnerability. As a result of rising rents,tenants sometimes reported that theyreconstructed parts of a house in return forthe temporary right to stay. A 40-year-oldwoman whose husband had died 14 years agoand who lived in a destroyed building in KabulDistrict 1 explained:

25 The social experience of returning refugees and IDPs is elaborated upon in Section 4.1 on land and security of tenure.

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Our own house was completely destroyedduring the war so we moved into thishouse. The owner of this house lives inKarte Naw. He is not asking us for therent; he is a kind man to us. We alsoreconstructed some parts ourselves.

Other residents in the same neighbourhoodwere less fortunate: “I had not been payingmoney but one month ago the owner cameand asked me to pay 400 Afs [US$8]” said a42-year-old woman who was living in adestroyed building protected by plastic covers.“We had our own private house in this locationbut during the last war it was burnt.”

Respondents to the field research frequentlystated as their single most importantchallenge the need for a place to stay thatwas well serviced and recognised by the localauthorities. However, informal dwellings nowconstitute the bulk of Afghanistan’s urbanhousing stock and many people interviewedexpressed doubt as to whether municipalitiesand the central government would be in theposition to provide them with safe, secureand affordable l iving and workingenvironments. A male respondent from MazarDistrict 7 speaking for a group of eleven Kuchinomads said:

You know, we have nothing to do withthe government people, we are not givinganything to the government and thegovernment has never done anything forus except for vaccinating our children...We don’t feel close to the government;we have had nothing in 35 years and wewill never have anything. The only thingwe really want from the government iselectricity and nothing else! All we needis electricity.

Service priorities varied. Of particular concernto female respondents was health care. Saida 45-year-old mother of four children, oneof them chronically ill, who lived in KabulDistrict 17:

There is neither a clinic nor any hospitalnear to where we live, and I have to take

my daughter far away to the city centre,where I have to pay 50 Afs [US$1] toreceive advice and treatment for her.Sometimes I have to wait for hours.

Unavailability of medical services isundeniably a more severe problem in ruralareas. However, research suggests that formany migrants to the city, urban in-migrationmight increase proximity but it does notnecessarily improve access to health services,something that should remain a priority inurban areas.

Education did not arouse much attentionamong older interviewees, especially men.However, younger male respondents regularlyemphasised their desire to continue schooling.Their experience of education was often oneof years of interrupted study and patchyattendance in different locations. An 18-year-old male respondent in Kabul District 17pointed out:

Our income is just enough for us and wecannot save anything for our future.However, if the situation in our countrygets better in terms of security andeducation I am going to finish myschooling, and then I am going to studyat the university.

Female respondents were more reticent aboutdiscussing educational opportunities buteagerly discussed the acquisition of additionalskills. Most sought training in weaving, sewingand office work.

A comprehensive urban development strategyrequires addressing the challenges of physicalreconstruction and development alongsiderecognition of social and other services, aswell as the social support networks thatcharacterise the daily struggle of ordinaryAfghans. This is critical to strengthening thetrust between those who govern and thosewho are governed and in improving theresponsiveness of government to urbancitizens, as well as the effectiveness of urbaninterventions.

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3.2 The political and bureaucraticinheritance

Important in understanding the urban politicallandscape in Afghanistan is to recognise thatit includes people and institutions acting bothin and on the city. In other words, politicalalliances and economic partnerships do notonly include actors within cities themselves.Supra-urban political and economic arenas,whether at the provincial, national or evenregional level can be influential in determiningurban politics and can have consequencesfor urban development. There are manypeople poised to take advantage of theopportunities presented by reconstructionand development, and some with sufficientinfluence or leverage to do so. Rapidurbanisation, the physical legacy of war,rising land prices and inflated rents havegiven rise to a variety of actors withcompeting interests that share common goals.These are often antithetical to the needs oraspirations of vulnerable urban dwellers.Hence cities in Afghanistan as elsewhere aresites in which political and economic powerare constantly being sought, maintained anddefended.

Official or bureaucratic institutions alsoinclude those acting in the city, namelymunicipalities, as well as national levelgovernment departments acting on the city.Competing interests are pertinent here aswell, with different government organisationsseeking to increase or maintain their influenceand assert their competence over citymanagement. Such goals are undermined ina number of ways.

• First, the influence and expertise of allgovernment departments tends to beeroded by dated approaches to planning,alongside practices and procedures thatare inappropriate to the demands ofcontemporary Afghan cities.

• Second, official influence is compromisedby the need to constantly struggle toreconcile limited resources with the

yawning need for investment in urbandevelopment in the wake of war.

• Third, in post-war Afghanistan urbanbureaucracies have suffered from arelative lack of attention and resourceswhen compared to the kind of investmentoffered in the form of humanitarian aidand for rural rehabilitation anddevelopment.

• Fourth, lines of responsibility in relationto departmental and organisationalresponsibilities are not sufficiently clear.While sub-national government inAfghanistan and its relationship with thecentre is clear on paper it is often opaquein practice.

• Fifth, a great deal of information is keptoutside the public domain and there isinsufficient information sharing andtransparency on the part of municipalitiesand other organisations involved in urbandevelopment.

One of the greatest challenges facing theurban sector in Afghanistan is the lack ofcommunication, coordination and cooperationbetween the different organisations andinstitutions involved in urban developmentand governance. The formal or official divisionof labour between the policy and planningfunctions of national government and themanagement functions of municipalities isnot evident in practice. In terms ofgovernance, there are few effective structureslinking the wealth of locally generatedinformation and experience to the level ofurban planners and policymakers. In theory,socially embedded institutions for communitymanagement and local governance such asthe shuras should constitute the conduit,either directly or through the loya jirga. Inpractice this rarely happens. Hence, a priorityfor government and donor agencies is tofoster communication and cooperationbetween the various actors operating in andon urban development and between theseagencies and representatives of a wide rangeof community interests. This is a prerequisite

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26 Evans, A. et al. A Guide to Government in Afghanistan. Kabul: The World Bank and Afghanistan Research and EvaluationUnit. 2004: 7-9.

27 The new Constitution was adopted by all 502 delegates of the Loya Jirga (Grand Council) on 3 Jan 2004.28 The Law was translated from Dari by Eng. M. Sharif and Eng. Y. Safar and the English version was compiled and edited by

Dr. Pushpa Pathak, UN-Habitat, Kabul, 2004.29 Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, Ministry of Justice, Electoral Law for Municipalities, Official Gazette No. 814,

December 2003.30 Article 11-1, Municipal Law of Afghanistan, Decree No. 29, 1379 (2000).

for more coordinated urban management andeffective urban governance. With thesepolitical and bureaucratic constraints in mind,the following sections cast light on the areasof government impinging on urbandevelopment.

3.3 Municipalities and urban management

Afghanistan is a unitary state with ultimatepolitical authority vested with the centralgovernment in Kabul. However, municipalitiesare de jure self-sustaining autonomous bodies,responsible for providing services andcollecting revenues from local taxes, fees,licenses, rents and proceeds from sale ofproperties.26 Article Six of the Municipal Lawstates that Kabul Municipality is part of thenational government. Each province has aprovincial municipality (sharwali wolayat),which in principle constitutes a separate levelof government, with provincial municipalitiesbeing part of local (provincial) administrationunder the overall control of the Ministry ofthe Interior (MoI).

Towns and cities function within the limitedmandate provided by the 1964 Constitutionand more recently under Article 141 of the2004 Constitution,27 which states that:

To administer city affairs, municipalitiesshall be established. The mayor andmembers of municipal councils shall beelected through free, general, secret anddirect elections.

This is in line with government commitmentto install democratically elected governmentsat the national and local levels. The legislativeframework for municipal government is theIslamic Emirate (Government) of Afghanistan,

Ministry of Justice, Decree No. 29, 1369(1990) amended in 1379 (2000).28 In addition,the Electoral Law for Municipalities waspassed in 2003 in order to manage theelectoral affairs of the municipalities andtheir districts. According to this law, mayors,members of municipal councils and districtassociations are to be elected for a term ofthree years, with the mayor being electedindirectly from among municipal councilmembers on the basis of a secret ballot.29

Municipalities are largely self-sustainingfinancial entities in that all revenues belongto the municipality (see Table 2). As suchthey are the only government entities outsideof central government with some measureof fiscal autonomy. However, municipalrevenue collection is regulated by the Ministryof Finance (MoF) and rates for all taxes andfees collected are set in Kabul. Both ordinary(operational) and development expendituresare based on revenues collected by themunicipality, with 45 percent of municipalrevenues meant to fund the ordinary oroperational budget and 55 percent thedevelopment budget.30 In reality in the citiescovered by this study almost all revenue wastaken up with the ordinary budget.

A range of local revenues finance municipalbudgets. Potential revenues are significantand include, for example, the safayi (a servicecharge and property tax), a rental tax (KabulMunicipality takes the equivalent of onemonth’s rent per year), other property andbusiness taxes, license and other fees andfines. In Herat various innovations have beenintroduced to swell the municipal coffers andpromote municipal financial sustainability,for example, investment in the constructionof wedding halls and hotels to generatemunicipal revenues. By contrast, in Mazar,

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31 Adapted from Evans et al., op cit.,10.32 Ibid, 7-9.33 GoA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 5.

little effort has been made to engage inrevenue enhancement measures .Municipalities, while having some limitedautonomy in budget preparation andexecution, are dependent on the MoI forapproval of the budget and staffingestablishments32 and in Mazar complaintsfocused on this oversight function of the MoI.

Despite the relative autonomy of municipalfinance and the potential for revenuegeneration at the local level, resourceconstraints prevail. Demand on resources alsogrows as urbanisation increases andmunicipalities appear unable to provideadequate infrastructure and services to theirresidents within existing means. Investmentfrom central government or other sourcescannot be ruled out, particularly for citiesthat are less able to generate significantrevenue. Nevertheless, rates and taxes requirereview. For example the last time propertieswere valued for the safayi was in 1978 andthe highest property tax currently paid isequivalent to US$4 per annum.33 In addition,not all municipalities have an equivalentresource base and few are able to enforcesanctions in relation to non-payment.

In provincial cities municipal expenditurerequires the approval of the provincial governorand provincial governors exercise informalcontrol over municipalities and municipalfinances. This study’s research suggests thatthere was some confusion on the part of anumber of interviewees about the boundarybetween municipal and provincial financesand fiscal relations and greater clarity isnecessary not only in the rule books but inday-to-day practice.

There is also a need for greater clarity on thefunctions and responsibilities of municipalities.Chapter Four, Article 16 of the Municipal Lawof 1379 (2000) l i sts wide-rangingresponsibilities and competencies ofmunicipalities. These relate to infrastructuredevelopment, including for example:construction of physical facilities such ascanals and ditches, public latrines andbathhouses; and construction and maintenanceof public roads, markets, commercial, culturaland civic centres (see Table 3).

Some of these functions are recognisable ascrucial municipal responsibilities, for example,environmental protection and public healthand land and property management. When

Structure

The municipalstructure (departmentsand numbers of staff)is set by the MoI withthe agreement of theprovincial governor

Table 2. Formal municipal relations in Afghanistan31

Administrative Arrangements Fiscal Arrangements

Personnel

The appointment ofjunior staff is approvedby the governor,middle ranking staff bythe relevant minister,while senior staff areappointed by thepresident

Revenue

All tax and fee ratesare set in Kabul.However, municipalrevenues are collectedand remain in themunicipality and fundall municipalexpenditures

Expenditure

The “ordinary” (oroperational) anddevelopmentbudgetary allocationsfor the municipality areprocessed by themunicipality andapproved by the MoIwith agreement of thegovernor

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viewed comparatively, other responsibilitieslisted are competencies less commonlydevolved to the municipal level. Whether ornot this is the case it is clear that the rangeof responsibilities is extensive. Moreover, incooperation with other government lineministries, municipalities can also becomeindirectly involved in the construction ofsewerage and water supply systems, housing,energy supply, communications, public health,education and sports facilities, usually in animplementing role. Capacity at the local levelis insufficient to rise to the challenge of suchwide-ranging responsibilities.

There is a tension between the de jureoversight of municipalities and municipalmayors by the MoI and the de facto autonomy

of many activities and actors at the locallevel. Provincial municipalities requireapproval from the MoI, via the governor, notonly for their budget but also theirorganisational structure and tashkeel (staffingestablishment of approved posts). This is apoint of contestation between Kabul and thelarger provincial municipalities. Herat, forexample, is not only relatively self-sufficientbut itself oversees surrounding ruralmunicipalities “even to the extent that allrevenues are often turned over to theprovincial municipality, which in turn paysall expenses.”34 Although the municipalitiesin the five largest secondary cities areexpected to implement infrastructure, landand housing programmes in collaborationwith line ministries, capacity is variable and

34 GoA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future,108.

Table 3. Sample responsibilities of municipalities

Service delivery • Public health and environmental protection,notably sanitation and sewage treatmentand solid waste management

• Street lighting and planting greenery• Provision and maintenance of parks and

recreational amenities• Assisting in the maintenance of law and

order

Planning activities • Implementation of master plans• Management of land and buildings• Distribution of plots for residential and

commercial purposes• Expropriation of land for development• Prevention of informal buildings

Revenue generation and management • Collection of revenues from municipalproperties and taxes from shops, marketsand residential buildings

• Complaints and redressal• Setting and controlling prices• Licensing• Data collection• Providing legal support

Governance • Promoting public involvement in city services• Strengthening capacity in society

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there is competition over roles andresponsibilities between them.

Thus far the discussion has related by andlarge to provincial cities. As the capital andprimate city of Afghanistan, Kabul Municipalityconstitutes a special case. Article Six of theMunicipal Law clearly states that Kabul ispart of the national government. It has muchgreater autonomy than the provincialmunicipalities and its mayor has ministerialstatus. Without the involvement of the MoIthe mayor of Kabul and senior staff areappointed directly by the president and thebudget is approved not by the MoI but theMoF. Kabul Municipality has greater capacitythan other municipalities and indeed isexpected to implement upgrading projects,the construction of roads, canals and drainsand solid waste management programmesusing guidelines from the relevant lineministry. It is precisely its anomalous positionwith the status of a “ministry” that sometimesputs Kabul Municipality in competition withline ministries also responsible for urbandevelopment.

Overlapping responsibilities, competitionbetween agencies operating in the urbanenvironment and poor communication andinformation flows to ordinary citizensincreases urban vulnerability. There was asignificant degree of confusion amongrespondents about where to turn to in orderto address service delivery shortcomings. Forexample, in Kabul the fact that the CentralAuthority for Water Supply and Sewerage(CAWSS), which is part of the MUDH, isresponsible for water provision and sewagesystems (and not the municipality) was largelyunknown. One recently arrived refugee inBagh Ali Mardan in Kabul said:

After arriving here I went to themunicipality to submit the documents toget a tap in my house. I even paid themsome money, but they have not doneanything so far.

Another example from a hillside communityin Kabul District 17 saw residents approached

by “officials” [they did not know whichministry these men were working for] andasked to pay 1,000 Afs [US$20] so that cablesfor electricity could be provided. Two monthslater electricity was only available to a fewresidents at the foot of the hill. A secondapproach was made, this time for 2,000 Afs[US$40], “to extend the cable network tohigher levels.” The informant who recountedthis incident was unable to afford the paymentat that time and eventually ended up buyinga generator.

There is something of a gap between thelegislation governing the roles andresponsibilities of municipalities and therealities of urban management on the ground.There is also some considerable variety fromone urban centre to the next. Much dependson both adherence to and interpretation ofthe Municipal Law, the resources at thedisposal of or utilised by local authorities,and the extent to which these aresupplemented by funds from the centre(apparently rarely) or provincial coffers(seemingly significantly in the case of Herat).

3.4 National government and urban policy and planning

The vision for the urban sector as articulatedin the National Development Framework(Physical Reconstruction and NaturalResources) is to:

• Invest in a balanced urban developmentprogramme across the country to createviable cities that are hubs of economicactivity, and organically linked to ruralareas; and

• Develop urban areas in a balanced mannerthrough housing and infrastructureinvestments, thereby reducing over-crowding, improving access to basicservices and generating employment andeconomic growth.

A number of government line ministries alsohave responsibilities for urban policy andplanning. These include the MUDH, the MoI

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35 Ibid, 5.36 The issue of land is taken up in more detail in Section 4.

(which controls municipal administration andtraffic management, except in Kabul), CAWSS,the Ministry of Transportation (MoT) and theDepartment of Public Works. Confirmed ininterviews and as pointed out in the TechnicalAnnex on Urban Development of SecuringAfghanistan’s Future: “Functionalresponsibilities and roles remain unclear orinappropriate and, as a result, there is a lackof appropriate urban policy.”35 This wasunequivocally confirmed by the presentresearch.

An urban policy is beginning to take shapethrough the development of the NationalUrban Programme (NUP). The NUP isambitious in scope and was conceived largelyin Kabul. A number of interviewees outsidethe capital had not heard of the NUP althoughthis may be because it was only beginning tocome together in June 2004, not long beforeresearch for the study took place. The NUPalso constitutes an attempt to provide aframework for informing the wide range ofongoing urban activities and initiatives at thecommunity or neighbourhood level that arelargely uncoordinated and without cleardirection from the centre. The NUP has sixpriority sub-programmes to achieve itsstrategy of sustainable, secure, prosperousand inclusive urban centres in Afghanistan.These are focused on areas such asgovernance, land, urban revitalisation andinfrastructure.

The NUP is clearer in terms of its goals thanin guidance as to how its sub-programmesmight realistically and practically beimplemented. Moreover, a number ofconstraints exist that relate to the currentmanagement structure of the urban sectorthat threaten to retard the admirableintentions for the urban sector contained inthe combined vision of the NationalDevelopment Framework and the NUP.

While municipalities are primarily responsiblefor implementation of the policies and plansof line ministries operating in the urbansector, the following are the somewhatcontradictory responsibilities of the MUDH:

• Formulation and implementation of urbandevelopment policy;

• Development of master plans;

• Development of rules for the preparationand implementation of urban projects forthe construction of industrial and civilbuildings;

• Improvement and control of quality ofconstruction;

• Construction supervision;

• Renovation of public buildings; and

• Construction of public buildings throughits construction enterprise.

There is also potential confusion over landregistration, which is implemented by anumber of agencies. For example,municipalities distribute land and maintainrecords for tax purposes, but the registrationof ownership has to be formalised by theSupreme Court or District Courts, dependingon the case, as well as the national surveyingand mapping agency (Afghanistan Geodesyand Cartographic Head Office) that historicallyhas undertaken cadastral mapping.36

An expatriate engineer engaged in urbanreconstruction in Kabul spelt out theimplications of poor communication andcoordination for day-to-day delivery:

We do not have sufficient staff in theministries and municipalities. The mainobstacle is coordination and cooperation.In Kabul I encounter a problem with the

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municipality not wanting to cooperatewith those agencies that have to solveseveral problems inside the city likewater, electricity and telephones. Theyare blocking each other through lack ofknowing who is responsible for what andthey are not able to share responsibilityand it makes it really complicated. Theydo not compete but just ignore eachother and if they cannot decide who doeswhat, things just stop unless someonefrom above solves the problem.

The national government’s move towards thedevelopment of a cohesive urban policy isfurther put at risk by financial constraintswithin the urban sector and the need forgreater strategic control to ensure policycohesiveness. The central government inKabul attempts to centralise locally generatedfunds but in fact there is de facto decentrali-sation. In the provincial municipalities studied,it was clear that local governors retainedconsiderable autonomy over local revenuecollection and expenditure and that citymayors were more certain of resource flowsfrom this quarter than from Kabul.

The pace of urban growth, institutionalweakness and limited financial and humanresource capacity all suggest that a flexibleand partnership-oriented approach to citymanagement is required. However, thisrepresents relatively new thinking in thecontext of Afghanistan where bureaucratsexhibit a strong desire for central steeringand a fixation on the order and certaintyprovided by master planning. Master planningrarely keeps up with the spontaneous growthof cities and has given way to strategicapproaches to development and planningthat is consultative and communicative. InAfghanistan, however, disillusionment withpolitical structures and factionalism aftermore than two decades of fighting has leftprofessionals suspicious of participatoryprocesses and with a preference for technicalsolutions. While understandable, this isproblematic in terms of moving towards anurban development strategy based onpartnership rather than state delivery.

3.5 The role of internationaldevelopment agencies

The vision for the urban sector in Afghanistanis being taken forward with significant supportfrom international agencies. Several donorsand implementing organisations are currentlyinvolved in urban issues and capacity building:the United Nations Assistance Mission inAfghanistan (UNAMA), the World Bank, theEuropean Commission, UN-Habitat, thegovernments of the United States, Japan,Sweden and Switzerland, the GermanDevelopment Bank, international and regionalorganisations (such as the Aga KhanDevelopment Network, Aga Khan Foundation,CARE, Afghan Civil Society Forum, BangladeshRural Advancement Committee and CaritasGermany), as well as local organisations suchas the Afghanistan Research and EvaluationUnit and a number of others engaged inconstruction and engineering projects. So farthere is no institutional framework for projectcoordination among these different actors,apart from the Urban ManagementConsultative Group (UMCG), which is a criticalarena for coordinating and harmonising workin the sector. Working groups on more specificurban issues have been proposed but not yetimplemented. This is a matter of someurgency, as coordination of the internationalactors and sequencing of their activities, inconcert with Afghan sector specialists, is apriority.

Despite a discussion forum for the urbansector there is still a tendency for someagencies to simply get clearance from theMinistry of Foreign Affairs and get on withtheir own projects. This may well be becauseof problems within the MUDH and itsfunctioning. But for urban development tobe effective and sustainable, coordinationof the urban sector has to be reclaimed forthe ministry. One urban professionalinterviewed reported a senior official in theurban sector saying the following in a meetingwith a donor agency:

Listen, understanding is the preconditionfor ownership. I do not understand what

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you are talking about. You need to explainthings better if you want us to haveownership.

A prerequisite for understanding andownership is information and this needs tobe shared.

Members of the international organisationsmentioned above were as likely to expressconcern over coordination and informationsharing as staff of municipalities and theMUDH. A critical issue in this regard iscommunication and here the UMCG, amongothers, can play an important facilitativerole. Better communication among urbanactors may also help to address politicalresentment on the part of Afghans over donorsspending the bulk of resources on setting uptheir own programmes rather than investingin Afghan reconstruction. It would also preventsuch bitterness spilling over into technicaldebates, for example, over planning prioritiesand sequencing or ways of visioning the city.Some tension was also evident between NGOson the one hand, and donor agencies, privatecompanies and consultants working with theMUDH and municipalities on the other. Anengineer illustrated this through an exampleof water supply in Mazar-i-Sharif:

In Mazar we have over 400 hand pumpsinstalled and in the network just somewells but there is no control over them,no maintenance, no water qualitychecking which should be theresponsibility of the municipality but itis not there. It is some kind of emergencymeasure but a dangerous one in a waterscarce c ity because they lackunderstanding. They leave it to NGOsand even they do not obey internationalstandards and regulations. So even ifthey are doing good it is out of controland no one feels responsibility for it andall the tools for maintenance andoperation and control are completelymissing.

In the end, it is the everyday citizen thatsuffers. The resentment of ordinary people

towards development processes over whichthey have little understanding and less controlcan be seen through the words of a father ofthree in Mazar-i-Sharif, District 7 who said:

We are really angry at all these foreignNGOs that have come here; they conductlots of surveys but nothing happens.There are more NGOs than people inAfghanistan. They should either workharder or close their offices and go backto their home country and stay with theirfamilies.

One reason that NGOs in particular are seennot to be delivering effective urban servicesis that although located in the cities, theirwork is often targeted at rural areas.However, the security situation has preventedmany NGOs from being able to leave theirheadquarters in the cities and some haveturned to providing support to low-incomeurban settlements. Yet being relatively newto the urban field, they sometimes lack theexpertise to coordinate their activities withother urban agencies and effectively representand serve vulnerable communities.

Phot

o —

Dan

iel E

sser

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37 This term is borrowed from Cleaver, F. “Moral Ecological Rationality, Institutions and the Management of Common PropertyResources.” Development and Change. 2000; 31:361-383.

38 Beall, J. “From Social Networks to Public action in Urban Governance: Where Does Benefit Accrue?” Journal of InternationalDevelopment. 2001. 13(7):1015-1021.

39 See, for example, Boesen, op cit., Hunte, op cit., Schuette, op cit., and d’Hellencourt et al., op cit.

3.6 Socially embedded institutions

The term “socially embedded institutions”37

is used to refer both to social networks ofsupport such as among families and kin orneighbours and friends, as well as cooperativeand collective activities undertaken towardsproviding community-level management ofurban infrastructure and services in theabsence of government provision. Elsewherea wide range of social and associational siteshave been harnessed in the interests ofdevelopment programmes, or relied upon inthe absence of them. In Afghanistan too thereis increasing interest in the developmentalpotential of social networks and community-llevel organisation for urban managementand local governance.

Despite the commonly held view that kinshipnetworks, reciprocity and community-levelrisk pooling are eroded by urbanisation andless evident in urban areas, it has been shownmore recently that this is not necessarily thecase and cooperation is alive and well inmany cities of developing countries.38

However, this occurs where there is somethingto share or to organise around in the firstplace. In the wake of war this is not alwaysthe case and heightened vulnerability andinsecurity can erode this potential. Priorresearch in Afghanistan,39 as well as thefindings of this study, show that urban socialnetworks have become severely fractured byhostilities and the displacement of people.

3.6.1 Reciprocal relations and networks ofsupport

Outside of formal organisational structures,people at the street and community levelonly occasionally team up to pool resources.Residents were found to have very limitedresources and were reluctant to see demands

made upon them. As one community elderin Herat District 6 stated:

We have limited communication amongeach other. When we talk, we talk aboutproblems — but we cannot help eachother because we are all poor.

A 25-year-old woman in Herat District 7 said:

We have some contact with ourneighbours. When we have problems suchas borrowing dishes and using them fora night, then they help us. But, you know,everyone here is poor. Whenever thereis a bigger problem like crime orsanitation, then we turn to the wakil andhe appeals to governmental offices, butI haven’t seen any results so far.

Increased social fragmentation is a cause forserious concern. Vulnerability leaves littleroom for largesse. Statements such as “somefamily members live here as well, but theyare too poor to help us” are as common andalarming as the widespread disintegration ofgozar or neighbourhood level social structures.Declining mutuality was a particular problemin Kabul where it appears to be a product ofboth forced and voluntary in-migration andthe resulting diversity of settlements...........

While some respondents reported occasionaldiscussion and even collaboration with theirneighbours, many also said they didn’t knowanyone else in their street. One man livingin District 3 said, “Yes, we do have neighborsaround us and they are looking like goodpeople to us, but we don’t have any specificrelationships with them.” He went on to saythat once the neighborhood got together todo some street cleaning because the trucksfrom the municipality never came “but youcan’t say that we talk or help each other ona regular basis.” Another woman in KabulDistrict 16 lamented:

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40 The term by which elders are known in Mazar-i-Sharif.

We are not in touch with anyone hereand we have no one who supports us. Wealso haven’t sat together with otherfamilies to make a joint decision. I don’ttalk to our neighbours regularly becausethe men in my family would not like that.There’s no one to trust. Only our mencan go to some places to complain. I don’tknow these places; maybe my husbandknows better. Ask him.

As a response to the attrition of mutualsupport and an increasing dependence on theurban cash economy, residents often turn toshopkeepers to borrow money, although thepreferred means of support remained the(extended) family. This is the case even whenkin are widely scattered, as appears common.

3.6.2 Community-level collective action

Conflict-induced migration and socialfragmentation not only left urban dwellerswithout close and trusted social contacts butalso deprived them of political access. Verticalconnections between government officialsand residents were mixed. Respondents’comments suggest a widespread perceptionthat links with government entities are almostentirely absent. Access to local decision-making structures remains blocked for thoselacking wasita (political connections andleverage). Wasita tended to rest with themale elders. In Kabul, where the majority ofmale respondents said they trusted theirwakil-e-gozar (neighbourhood “advocate”formally representing a certain number offamilies), female respondents regularlydemanded more say in local decision-makingprocesses.

The capacity of wakil-e-gozars (wakils) orkalantars40 and the local shuras — community-level groups of elders often linked to localreligious bodies such as the mosque — tosolve problems was acknowledged asimportant. However, they were also signalled

as problematic. Several respondentscomplained about the self-interest andineptitude of their representatives. Said oneman in Kabul District 16: “In case of problemswith water or electricity we should go to thewakil, yet he just listens to people but doesn’tdo anything about it.” Although a number ofelders did seek benefits on behalf of theircommunities, others did not. Moreover, manyresidents did not perceive them to belegitimate representatives, either becausethey made no visible effort on behalf of theircommunities or because their interventionshad little impact. Critics were often youngermen or women. Said one adolescent malerespondent in Kabul District 17:

The wakil is responsible for this area. Herecently collected money from most ofthe houses saying he would try to bringus electricity, but so far we have notseen anything happening except havingsome cables in some of the streets, forsome of the houses.

Almost all female respondents felt that theirconcerns were not listened and respondedto by the wakils. A 14-year-old girl in HeratDistrict 9 explained:

I think it’s a problem to be poor and tobe a woman. You see, the men team upin the mosque and they have a shuraboss, but the girls and women are notallowed to be members of the shura.

A female teacher and the oldest of threewives in the same Herat district complained:

We have a shura here but women are notallowed to become members so theycannot defend their rights. The men cando what they want. The women are alsonot allowed to contact the municipality.

Another woman, a mother of three in HeratDistrict 6, confirmed this view:

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There is a shura but just the men candecide, not the women. Actually, thereis not a single female member in theshura...The men who are shura membersdo nothing for the area, nor have wereceived any service from themunicipality.

In Kabul District 17 a mother of four illustratedhow neglect on the part of elders is not simplybenign but prevents collective action on thepart of women wanting to help themselves:

Once all the neighbours got together togo to the municipality because we hadno water and no electricity, but the wakildid not support us...We also don’t haveany proper sanitation system and ourtoilets are in bad condition. Yet, becausethe wakil said we wouldn’t achieveanything by talking to the municipalitywe did not go. The problem is, we canonly turn to our wakil or to our eldersto help us, but nothing is happening.

Newly arrived respondents also said they felt“disconnected,” sometimes underlining thatthe wakil would refuse to speak out on theirbehalf. A mother of seven in Herat District9 complained:

We moved here more than a year ago,but we have no relationship with theneighbours. Neither they come to us norwe go to them. We cannot rely on thecommunity at all. The wakil of the gozaris the person to whom we could tell ourproblems to but he does nothing. Thereis a shura but they are only there for therich people.

The role of the shuras as legitimaterepresentative institutions, while deeplyentrenched, is increasingly questioned giventheir lack of connectedness andrepresentation of poor individuals, vulnerablegroups such as ethnic minorities or recentarrivals in their areas, and women. To alimited extent, alternative grassroots civilsociety organisations (CSOs) have emerged

in some urban areas and are challenging oldways of doing things. They have been nurturedby international organisations but manyoperate under funding constraints. All CSOsrisk interference on the part of localauthorities and provincial leaders.Furthermore, there is a tendency in urbansettlements for communities to be encouragedto support particular political factions orleaders en masse and this potential exists asmuch for CSOs as for shuras.

It is important not to over-romanticise therole of community organisations. Socialnetworks and local-level organisations arefrequently embedded in asymmetrical socialrelationships. Often engagement with politicsor government bureaucracies means thatexisting hierarchies or inequalities simply getreinforced. This is confirmed by theeffectiveness with which less vulnerable urbancitizens are able to organise themselves inrelation to urban management andgovernance. For this reason people in poorurban communities often assign a high valueon external agents and it is in this role thatintervention by donors and NGOs can beparticularly useful.

3.6.3 Corruption and connections

Corruption was found to be an area of seriousconcern in the context of service provision.Respondents in the household-level interviewsin Kabul mentioned that they had gone toKabul Municipality and had been asked topay for a particular service (e.g. for theirnames to be put on the land distribution list,for the provision of water and electricity,upgrading of the sewage system). Paymentscan reach up to 7,000 Afghanis (US$145).However, having paid, they then never hearback from the municipality, nor have theyreceived any land or service. It is suspectedthat public officials use the payments tosupport their admittedly meagre income(between US$35 and US$100 per month). Amale Pashtun respondent in Kabul District 17said:

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I have not gone to the municipality forhelp yet because I know that the muni-cipality is not going to listen to us, becausewe are poor people and we don’t haveany type of recommendation or money.

A respondent in Kabul District 16 madea very similar statement:

Cemet Khana [where he lives with hisfamily] does not have any publictransportation lines, so we are using theMacrorayan or Qala-e-Zaman Khan lines.

I have gone to the municipality severaltimes, but so far there has been noresponse. Without paying them moneyor showing recommendations frominfluential people you cannot tell themanything.

Nonetheless, the types of corruption describedabove are particularly worrisome, for threereasons. First, they undermine the alreadyweak confidence of residents in the systemof urban management. Indeed, both femaleand male respondents repeatedly pointed

Box 2: An example of intra-district inequalities: Hazaras in Mazar District 10

Mazar-i-Sharif’s tenth district, southwest of the city centre, is both ethnically and spatially divided in two.A Pashtun father of three who lived in the district explained: “This area is divided into two parts, one partwhere the Sunnis live and the other where the Shi’ites dwell. It is like a desert there and looks quite scary!I wouldn’t go there.”

Ariana is indeed inhabited mostly by Sunni Muslims, the majority living in middle and upper-middle classhouseholds, with formally constructed houses, shops and workshops close by. Ahle Chapan, on the contrary,is made up almost entirely of Hazara households, many involved in carpentry and brick making. Here one-storied mud houses dominate the architectural landscape. Ahle Chapan is located further away from themain paved road and sources of transport. It can only be reached by crossing one of two small concretebridges. Cars are virtually absent; donkey carts are the main means of transportation. The already weakmobile phone reception dies out shortly after crossing the creek that divides the two neighbourhoods.

The task of conducting comparable interviews in the two areas immediately became a challenge whenresidents of Ahle Chapan expressed anxiety, saying they did not want to be interviewed. Less than a minuteafter approaching them an armed guard rushed towards the group, asking what the three researcherswanted. He subsequently explained that due to recurrent attacks on residents and a recent case of murdersome men were now patrolling the dust roads by foot to “protect” the approximately 800 families.

A widow was tearful when relating the devastation to her family and their assets as a result of the conflictwith the Taliban. Her disadvantage was compounded by her exclusion from local-level assets and structures.The male head of the local education centre, located in Ariana, explained: “The Sunnis who live in thisneighbourhood are richer than the Hazaras of Ahle Chapan. The reason for this is the Taliban regime’scruelties; they suppressed them and also killed a lot of them.” He also pointed to significant differencesin service delivery and quality:

We have a Karachi system here, but over there in Ahle Chapan people are too poor to pay the collectors,so no one goes there and does the job. The same with sanitation: they don’t have any contacts in themunicipality and cannot pay for private collection of night soil, so they end up having lots of hygieneproblems.

One of the key themes of this study is illustrated by this example from Mazar: even though social cooperationor cohesion can reduce certain risks, it cannot substitute for investment in basic services or replace privateor collective financial assets. The head teacher emphasised:

Here in Ariana the situation is better than in Ahle Chapan. But this doesn’t mean that we don’t haveany issues. For example, we were promised by the local community organisation that they would diga deeper well but nothing has been done. So in the end we rely on what we earn ourselves to makethings happen.

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out that the “municipality people [such asworkers, waste collectors or tax collectors]have never come to this neighbourhood.”Moreover, there are no provisions withininstitutions of government to establishmechanisms for dealing with residents’concerns, complaints and suggestions. Second,

corruption reduces the prospects forestablishing sound taxation systems, thussignificantly depleting the municipal resourcebase. Lastly and significantly, corruptionreduces the asset base of already vulnerablepeople.

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4.1 Insecurity of tenure,affordable housing and urbanland management

Millions of people in developing countrieslive without adequate security of tenure orproperty rights. The problem is particularlyacute in urban areas where the costs of accessto legal land and housing are high and risingfaster than incomes. This is very much thecase in urban Afghanistan, which has seenhousing destroyed through decades of war,as well as high rates of urbanisation as theconflict abated, through refugees and IDPscoming into the cities. In Afghanistan, as inother developing countries, this has led tohousing shortages and high land prices andrentals, while leaving local authoritiesoverwhelmed by the demand for land, servicesand housing. Strict building standards andregulations deriving from the days of masterplanning, as wel l as burdensomeadministrative procedures based on idealnorms rather than the realities of localcircumstances, have made inevitable a risein informal construction, even among middle-income urban dwellers, as people helpthemselves in the absence of alternatives.

Informal settlements are estimated to housebetween 30—60 percent of the population ofcities in developing countries and in the shortterm at least, regularisation policies arewidely recognised as the only realistic solutionto improving the housing conditions of theurban poor.41 This is increasingly the casefor urban Afghanistan as well, although thereis still considerable resistance to therecognition, regularisation and servicing ofinformal settlements. Wariness is

understandable given that people do notalways construct homes in areas that aresuitable for servicing. The hillside settlementsof Kabul are good examples of the challengesposed for Kabul Municipality and governmentdepartments concerned with extendingservices. Nevertheless, the concentration ofurban settlements also offers opportunity,given the lower per capita costs ofinfrastructure development and services whenphysical conditions are hospitable.

Problems in accessing affordable shelter andinsecurity of tenure were found to beimmediate sources of vulnerability amongmany of the people interviewed. High rentswere prevalent across all three cities. In thecapital city, a diminished housing stockalongside the influx of returnees, IDPs andthe arrival of expatriate development workershas meant that the availability ofaccommodation is squeezed at every level.This has exerted both an upward anddownward pressure on rents, which has adevastating impact.

In terms of urban vulnerability the qualitativeevidence suggests that a distinction needsto be made between those who own andthose who rent. Both may face financialpressures but the latter also run the risk of“forced mobility”.42 A male household headin Kabul District 17 recalled his experience:

I have been living here for almost sixyears. Before that, we were living inPanjshir in our own village, but due tothe flooding of our village we losteverything, including our land, home andgardens. Therefore we had to move intothis house...The prices have been going

4. Critical Challenges for Urban Management inAfghanistan

41 Durand-Lasserve, A. and V. Clerc. Regularization and Integration of Irregular Settlements: Lessons from Experience. UrbanMangement Programme Working Paper Series No. 6. Nairobi: UNDP/UNHCS/World Bank-UMP. 1996.

42 See Alden Wily, L. Land Rights in Crisis. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. March 2003 and d’Hellencourtet al., op cit.

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up during the past two and three years.Now, we would not be able to buyproperty anymore.

A 32-year-old woman from the same districtfurther illustrated the situation:

This is a rented house for which we pay3,000 Afs [US$60]. Before we came herea couple of months ago we lived in Baraki,also in a house that we were renting.The Taliban had burnt down our ownhouse in Shomali. We moved to this onebecause the house owner of our formerplace had asked us for an advancepayment which we could not afford.

A 50-year-old father of seven, living in thedestroyed city centre (District 1) expressedhis anxiety that he might end up withoutshelter for his family:

Every day the owner of this house iscoming and asking me to move out, but

what should I do? I just can’t afford topay him anymore, but you know howdifficult it is to find an affordable placefor nine people.

Kabul Municipality provides little assistancewith regard to shelter provision. Severalrespondents reported visits to KabulMunicipality to put their name on a list offuture beneficiaries of land distribution, butso far to no avail. In some cases, applicantswere told that they would have to pay a feefor this “service”, which some could notmeet. Financial constraints are exacerbatedby the lack of income opportunities. Quite afew returnees and newly arrived Kabulresidents found their hopes of a decent jobdisappointed. A young father of four inKabul said:

As you know, during the past two yearslots of people have come back toAfghanistan, therefore there is no workopportunity. I try making money at the

Phot

o —

Dan

iel E

sser

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bazaar, but the chances there are quitebleak as well because people can alsohire Pakistanis who come from theborderland. It’s not just Afghans at thebazaar!

In the meantime people are getting on withbuilding homes informally and repairinghouses destroyed in the war, whether theirown, those of their landlords or on landbelonging to people who have not yetreturned.

A critical consideration in making choicesabout housing is security of tenure. This isregarded by UN-Habitat as a fundamentalrequirement for the progressive integrationof the urban poor into city life and a basiccomponent of housing rights.43 Three issuescomplicate the right to housing in urbanareas. First, land and housing are not justshelter but are valuable assets and subjectto the vagaries of both formal and informalland and housing markets. This can stand inthe way of efforts to address housing poverty,particularly under conditions of housingscarcity as in urban Afghanistan. Second,most countries have cultural and religiouspractices that intersect with statutory landlaw, which influence access to land andtenure security. For example, ownership ofland and rules of inheritance often restrictequitable access on the part of women, asis the case in Afghanistan. Third, in manydeveloping countries, multifaceted landmanagement systems are complicated by theabsence of land records, corruption associatedwith housing allocation, and the operationof both legal and illicit land markets. Thisfurther skews access to land and insecurityof tenure.

In conflict cities such as in Afghanistan, accessto land and security of tenure are exacerbatedby the legacy of war and ongoing social

tension. In addition to problems that mighthave existed in the past — such as landshortages, inadequate access to infrastructureand services, or the concentration of land inthe hands of a privileged elite — additionalinsecurities and inequalities arise. Theseinclude damaged or destroyed houses, givingrise to housing shortages and land disputesdue to lost or traded land records leading tomultiple claims. Many urban residents wholeft the cities during decades of war couldnot access the land or homes they used toown on their return. IDPs who fled thecountryside for the relative safety of urbancentres and settled in abandoned houses,war-affected structures or informalsettlements now face chronic uncertainty interms of their tenure security. This isexacerbated by: escalating disorder createdthrough wrongful occupation, land grabbing,the production of illegal land titlingdocuments, the uncontrollable tactics ofprivate developers, confusion over landadministration systems and planningprocedures and no clear land policy. A strongargument has been made for putting landissues on the public agenda and to use theConstitution as a vehicle for establishinggeneral principles of property rights and landtenure security.44

The absence of an effective and coherentland management system in growing citiessuch as Kabul, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif hasprovided room for illicit dealings whether bypoliticians, government officials, privatemilitias or unscrupulous land developers. Inaddition to insecurity of tenure for the urbanpoor, ineffective land management meansreduced land revenue for the city, civicdisengagement from urban governance, adeteriorating urban environment for urbandwellers, and the potential for social unrest.Under such conditions urban land clearlyrequires special and urgent management.

43 Kajumulo Tibaijuka, A. “A Message from the Executive Director UN-Habitat.” Habitat Debate. 9(4): 2.44 Alden Wily, L. Land and the Constitution: Current Land Issues in Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation

Unit. November 2003.

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45 For a fuller discussion of land policy, planning and management in Afghanistan see Alden Wily, Land Rights in Crisis, opcit.

46 Ibid, 23-25.47 For a detailed study of urban land tenure see d’Hellencourt, et al., op cit.

4.1.1 Land management systems anddispute resolution

Urban land policy and administration inAfghanistan needs to be placed in historicalcontext. Inequities in land distribution havebeen reinforced over time by misdirectedpolicies that in turn have helped fuel conflictover land, which cannot be disassociatedfrom decades of war and political violence.45

Even prior to the war years land managementwas complicated in Afghanistan by severallegal regimes being applicable, includingcustomary law (rawaj), civil law (qanoonmadani), religious law (Shariat or Shar’ia)and statutory or national state law. Shariatis largely embodied in civil law in the formof the Civil Code of Afghanistan, a compilationof Islamic law texts that constitutes the mainhandbook of all courts of law in Afghanistan.It comprises 2,416 articles and as many as1,000 of these are relevant to land matters.Customary law sometimes departs fromShariat and the Civil Code and all areapplicable only where state law does notapply. Frequent regime change in Afghanistanover the last century has had a confusingimpact on state law and has given rise to 60or more different land laws andamendments.46 It is worth noting the formalinstitutional processes governing landadministration. These are dealt with at lengthelsewhere and are covered in less detailhere.47 At the same time it is important torecognise that informal institutions andpractices often predominate in urban landmanagement and this report points to anumber of examples illustrating this............

Formal land administration is carried out inAfghanistan by the following organisations:

• The Cadastral Survey Department;

• The Land Office (Imlak);

• Municipalities;

• Primary courts; and

• The Special Property Disputes ResolutionCourt.

Yet the responsibilities of these organisationsare often confusing and overlapping, thereforemuch of land administration remains informal.More on these organisations is provided below.

The Cadastral Survey Department

The Cadastral Survey Department isresponsible for organising land surveys, landsettlement and land registration affairs. TheMinistry of Finance in collaboration withUSAID established the department in 1963.The intention was to categorise and managelanded property for taxation purposes. In1965 land was surveyed in Kabul and eightother provinces, expanding into furtherprovinces at a later date. Today the CadastralSurvey Department is located in Kabul, with16 Regional Directorates in Kabul, Kandahar,Herat, Balkh, Nangarhar, Parwan, Kapisa,Ghazni, Helmand, Farah, Faryab, Jawzjan,Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan and Paktia.Based on cadastral survey law, land ownershipis distributed as follows:

• Private land (arazi shakhsi) (agriculturaland gardens);

• Government land (arazi dawlati)(agricultural and gardens);

• Government barren land (arazi lamazrodawlati);

• Residential areas (sahaat-e-maskoni);

• Industrial and professional works (kasabakari wa sanati);

• Pasturelands (alafture); and

• Forests (jangalaat).

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The cadastral maps and documents werewidely used in the course of the first andsecond rounds of land distribution during the1978 land reform process. Large parcels ofland were sub-divided and ownershiptransferred, changing completely thecadastral maps, documents and registrationsystem with the Land Office. However,changes were made on blueprint copies withthe original standard maps being leftuntouched. Two decades of conflict saw thedestruction of documents held in theprovincial Cadastral Survey RegionalDirectorates, leaving as the only source theCadastral Survey main archive in Kabul.However, these are in relatively goodcondition and possibly can be used for landtitling purposes, although this does not appearto be automatic practice.

The Land Office (Imlak)

Imlak is an independent office that was setup and supervised directly by the Ministry ofFinance. During the 1978 land reform it cameunder the Ministry of Agriculture and LandReform and remains under the (now) Ministryof Agriculture and Animal Husbandry.However, today it deals with land registrationin both urban and rural areas. Transfer andregistration procedures are intricate andexacting.

Kabul Municipality

Kabul Municipality has responsibility for landacquisition and distribution in the city, beingthe relevant public juridical entity accordingto the Land Acquisition Law (LAL), OfficialGazette, Issue No. 794, 1421HQ (1379 HS),(2000 AC). Land acquisition is theresponsibility of the Municipality’s PropertyDepartment, which comprises twodirectorates, Acquisition and Technical andCost Estimation. Working in collaborationwith the Cadastral Department the AcquisitionDirectorate prepares property plans both forgovernment and private properties andfacilitates the issuing of title deeds. Accordingto existing municipal law, male citizensreaching the age of majority have the right

to a housing plot or apartment providedcertain steps and criteria are followed. Thedocuments issued by the municipality arevalid for three years and the owner is notauthorised to sell or mortgage the plot untilreceiving the title deed. This is forthcomingonce the owner has completed at least 40percent of the construction. If this does notoccur the land returns to the government.This regulation, which is widely known amongAfghan citizens, is one of the reasons for theboom observed in the context of micro-leveland small construction projects in provincialcentres. Even though those who build do notnecessarily possess a title deed, respondentsto the household-level interviews frequentlyexpressed the expectation that “thegovernment” would be unable to evict themand destroy the buildings once they haderected and completed a significant share ofthe overall project.

Primary Courts

Primary courts undertake the registration ofland. Both buyer and seller together confirmthe location of the property and officiallyrequest the transfer of title deeds. A courtorder is obtained on the basis of a circularform being filled out by the Imlak, themunicipality, the revenue office of theFinance Department, the Water andElectricity Departments and the MicrorayonMaintenance Department. The buyer andseller each provide two copies of a recentphotograph and two persons as witnesses.These persons go before a judge, whoendorses the payment of a deed tax to thebank, after which the title deed is transferredto the buyer.

The Special Property Disputes ResolutionCourt (SPDRC)

The SPDRC was established in 2002 and isaccountable to the Afghan Supreme Court.In September 2003 President Karzai decidedto divide it into two parts: the central courtfor Kabul and the provincial court for therest of the country. The impetus for theSPDRC was a sharp increase in the number

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of returning refugees and IDPs and resultantproperty dispute cases arising out of multipleland claims and squatting. They work in liaisonwith the responsible local courts and theSupreme Court, which also delegates casesto the SPDRC. At the time of the study, itappeared that only 113 cases had been dealtwith since the provincial chamber wasestablished, and only two cases solved.Although the number of cases is small itshould be noted that the number of claimantsaffected could be quite high. For example,in Mazar-i-Sharif, one case involves nearly500 claimants. The case argued that a Junbeshfield commander and his soldiers had movedin and forced local people off land allocatedto them by the municipality.

The chairman of the provincial court explainedthat there are two ways in which disputesare resolved. In the case of overwhelmingevidence, there is a straightforward winnerand loser. The chairman indicated that in his40 years of experience, in 80—90 percent ofcases, the claimant won. If the situation isless clear, the elders of the area in questionare invited to a group meeting. If no clearsolution can be found, the court tries tofacilitate compensatory measures throughthe land-occupying party making a paymentto the benefit of the losers. As the chairmanexplained: “Our goal is to bring about peacefularrangements. We are judges, we areresponsible for people’s property but alsofor ensuring functioning relationships betweengovernment, society and business.” However,an interviewee from an NGO concerned withland restitution cases said of the SPDRC:

It is functioning in Kabul but not verywell or not at all outside Kabul. And itdoes not deal with IDPs. Also it does notcover disputes if one side is thegovernment. If there is a case where thegovernment is one of the parties the casewill be addressed in the regular courts.So the latter are dealing with a lot ofthe cases that should go to the special

court. If the problem is with themunicipality — which is a governmentdepartment — you have to go to themunicipality itself for redress.

This interviewee went on to say that evenwhen a court or municipal order was obtainedit was difficult to enforce: “The police willnot necessarily enforce it. There are otherpeople telling them not to enforce it. A lotof our work is going to the police or theMinistry of the Interior over such matters.”.....

4.1.2 Constraints to systems of landmanagement

The official system of land acquisition,transfer and registration, and disputeresolution described above, though complex,is well documented and understood. However,a number of factors work against its effectiveoperation and development. There arehistorical and contemporary forces at work.Over the years land legislation has beensuccessively overruled. For example, duringthe Communist era, private property wasappropriated and although compensated thiswas at less than the market rate. Mujaheddinleaders also appropriated property duringthe 1980s and 1990s, rarely compensatingthe owners. During the Taliban regime,between 1996 and 2001, both governmentauthorities and armed commanders tookprivate property by force. Land and houseswere transferred many times over by way offorged title deeds in which the Land Officewas complicit, and made available throughthe primary courts. In recent years theproblem has increased further, with growingexamples of the occupation of private andgovernment properties by armed commandersand government officials that have beenwidely reported in the media.48

A generally held view was that despiteconfusion over competing legal frameworksand the difficulty in obtaining land titles,the real problems were associated with

48 Bashir Malik [no date]. Report on Land Administration (mimeo).

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implementation of the law or lack of it. Oneinformant stated that “we can get Karzai toissue decrees about this land, or that project,and those beneficiaries, but it is a guidelinenot a rule book in the end.” A governmentemployee explained things this way: “Theproblems do not come from a lack of laws assome say. It is the misuse of the existinglaws. People just grab the land, and thenthe laws are not applied.” Anothergovernment official went further:

If you want to obtain a title deed for apiece of land that you legally possess,what you have to do is pay at leastUS$3,000. Then you might get a duplicateif you are lucky. Seventeen thousanddocuments still have to be entered intothe computer system, so there is plentyof opportunity for additional incomes.Yet corruption cannot be crushed becausethe government is so weak. You need alot of coordination to do somethingagainst it. The wars have destroyed ourpolitical and social cohesion.

Consequently, the issues of urban land rightsand security of tenure for the urban poor areseverely affected by problems of corruptionand lack of enforcement of existing laws.There is a lot of coercion of vulnerable peopleto leave valuable land on which they aresettled and illegal occupation both with andwithout the tacit support of the legitimateauthorities. Take the example of a femalehousehold head in Kabul District 17 who says:

We have been living here for 15 yearsnow...During the last two or three yearsthe income of people working in the cityhas been increasing, therefore the rentshave increased as well. There is no oneto control them, because lots of peoplewho would have the power to do so arejust taking money and are involved incorruption...Everyone living here is poor;they cannot do anything against eachother, except for the powerful peopleof course, who can do anything they wantto do, like telling us to go elsewhere orasking for money so we can stay. I don’t

want to name these powerful people. Ithink you yourself know better than uswho they are.

Subsequently, this also creates insecurity oftenure for those who move in. One malerespondent in the same district explained:

We haven’t got enough money to buy aprivate house so we have been rentingthis house for two years now, but therent keeps rising every month. I live herewith my two brothers and their wivesand children. The original landownersclaim that they have title deeds fromPresident Rabbani’s time. I doubt thatbecause as far as I know thisneighbourhood is part of an unplannedarea. So if you ask me who rules, I tellyou it’s the people with the guns. Theysell them the land but they can also takeit back if they want.

Indeed, there is a close relationship betweenland grabbing, power and politics. Forexample, the governor of Balkh Province atthe time of the study, who is also an importantcommander exercising significant controlover the city of Mazar-i-Sharif, is engaged inan assiduous process of “buying up” land. Ashe seeks to consolidate his political positiondistribution of land will undoubtedly helpenhance his power. Minor commanders areinvolved in land grabbing as well, often forimmediate gain to compensate for anincreasing loss of influence as a result of therecent partial appeasement of the country.Either way, some informants reported thatland taken by commanders was often grabbedrather than purchased. For example, a 50-year-old mother living in Kotale Khair Khana(Kabul District 17) whose son is an officer inthe Afghan army reported: “This is our ownhouse; we built it last winter [2003—04].However, we don’t have the title deeds forthe land. It was just distributed by thegovernment to one of the commanders, whothen gave it to others.”

Ownership is consequently contested, oftenviolently and sometimes fatally. A male

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respondent living in a hillside neighbourhoodin Kabul District 16 explained:

This here is government land, but theyare building houses on the top of thehill, which used to be our rainfed land.When they had finished building thesehouses they were selling them to otherpeople. Now they are trying to get thewhole area under their control. One daythey came and destroyed the wall of oneof our houses. They wanted to occupy it;therefore we had to fight them. Theyinjured one of our relatives but wepersisted, because we want to keep this

land to build a clinic or at least a school.However the authorities don’t help us,and the pressure by those who try tooccupy it is increasing day by day.

An older male in Kabul’s destroyed centre inDistrict 1 warned:

We are having good neighbours aroundus; none of them do us any harm. But inthe parallel street, there are some peoplewho are powerful because they areinvolved in selling opium and poppy, sono one can stop them, not even thegovernment authorities, because they

Box 3. Insecurity of tenure among the Kuchis of Shadayee Refugee Camp

The Kuchis of Shadayee Refugee Camp are a telling example of how people can become powerless as aresult of struggles between local commanders, provincial authorities and the limited remits of internationalagencies. The Kuchis originally came from the Gulran District of Herat Province, about 80km from HeratCity. A nomadic cattle-rearing people, they lost access to their rural livelihoods through drought. They alsolost most of their own animals as well as rural employment opportunities and in 1978 they moved by choiceto Iran. Here the Iranian government confiscated their surviving animals but the men easily found work aslabourers. They were not war refugees and in fact expressed some support for the Taliban. However, theyhad to return to Afghanistan at the same time as war-affected returnees and therefore settled in ShadayeeRefugee Camp on the outskirts of Heart District Six, which is located to the far east of the city.

The Kuchis have been there for about three years but the camp is now being closed. While other refugeeshave returned to their places of origin, this was not a possibility for this nomadic community, which hasno land or home to which they could return. Testimony to the temporary nature of the camp is the lackof services. One unemployed male saw it as follows: “The municipality does not do any work in this area;the centre is so beautiful but they don’t pay attention to District Six where the poor live!”

As representatives of the community, the elders from the shura petitioned the Ministry of Repatriation inwriting and the then Governor of Herat, Ismail Khan, paid for them to travel to Kabul to put their casebefore President Karzai. The president allegedly told them they could stay. However, the local commanderin charge of the area, who is said to be linked to Ismail Khan, has refused them permission and has engagedwith them only by force. In addition, the majority of the land has subsequently been given to governmentemployees and soldiers, as one of the former governor’s projects to reward loyalty and strengthen hispolitical clout. The Kuchis, however, still believe they are entitled to a proportion of the land but areneither clear about the size and boundaries nor the legality of the documents they hold in this regard. Inthe meantime, as one of the elders explained:

They keep coming. There was a bulldozer destroying the houses around here. We are from Herat.Those who are from other provinces they can go to their houses but we have nowhere else to go ...but they say to us “you must go because the land belongs to the commanders.”

To be sure, this is a deprived rather than a destitute community and their insecurity points to vulnerabilityrather than absolute poverty. The men work as porters in Herat’s central bazaar and the children attendthe local school. One of the women put their case unequivocally: “We don’t want anything. We can solveall our problems ourselves. But we have nowhere to go and we want to stay here. This is what we wantfrom the government: we want to live here.”

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know all of them. They are occupyingother houses and if the owners of thesehouses come back and demand that theyleave they will kill them. No one daresto stand up to them.

A senior UN figure in Mazar concluded thateven when disputes are taken to Kabul forresolution, the rulings “are not effectivebecause you cannot get people to agree withthe outcomes” and “with no enforcement itreverts back to the rule of the strongest.” Asimilar relationship between politicalcompetition and power and tenure insecurityfor the most vulnerable urban dwellers ishighlighted in a case study from Herat,presented in Box 3.

Land grabbing is also prevalent in Kabul. TheNorwegian Refugee Council (NRC) assists poorand vulnerable people with land disputes.Their analysis of recent cases dealt with inKabul (Table 4), which they see asrepresenting only a fraction of land disputes,is revealing.

Table 4. Current NRC land dispute cases in Kabul49

Type of Cases Proportion of Cases

Cases of land grabbing involving commanders 13%

Cases involving disputes with government officials, people from 16%political parties or court judges

Cases of “pure” corruption, for example, demand for bribes from 7%municipal or court officials

Cases involving problems with the municipality, for example, 13%compensation claims from people being evicted from land allocatedto a road or development project*

“Not sure” category because the client has not come back or 15%the case is not concluded

Ordinary people with disputes — for example, two people disputing 36%ownership of the same house or piece of land or family membersquarrelling over inheritance issues

Total 100%

*This is on the low side as some municipality cases will fall into the cases involving government officials or corruption.

As can be seen from the NRC caseload, notall land disputes are the result of public andprivate corruption or political machinations.A lot of the cases handled arise out of familyand inheritance squabbles or because peoplehave been away for years on end and othershave occupied their abandoned houses. Sothere are running disputes over who has theright to live in a place or to sell it. As one ofthe caseworkers lamented, “It is difficult toknow the right answer in these cases. So itis chaos out there.”

Housing shortages, high land prices andescalating rents are putting pressure onhousing at every level. A widow living in theremnants of a destroyed building in Bagh AliMardan in the centre of Kabul explained:

I was living in Qalai Zaman Khan beforeI came here. That was in a rented houseand I was paying 300 Afs [US$6] permonth. Then the rent increased, so Ieventually had to move here with my

49 This table is compiled from information provided verbally by the Norwegian Refugee Council in 2004.

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Box 4. Insecurity of tenure on the part ofvulnerable family members

A widow used to live in Wardak in her husband’sproperty but moved to Kabul during the war. Herhusband died and her house in Kabul was destroyedduring the war. Her husband’s brothers took overthe house in Wardak and tried to cement theirownership of it through arranging the marriage ofone of her daughters to one of their sons. Theyalso tried to sell her plot in Kabul. The widow’scase was referred to the Norwegian RefugeeCouncil, who were able to protect her and herproperty...”for the time being at least”.

50 A shura is a consultative forum restricted to the elders of a community. A jirga is a wider decision-making forum at which,theoretically at least, all adult males can participate. They are said to base their decisions on Islamic law but they arealso heavily influenced by Afghan tribal custom.

51 Foley, C. Land and Property Disputes in Eastern Afghanistan. Kabul: Norwegian Refugee Council. 2004, 4.

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children. This is a private house thatbelongs to my neighbour. He is my cousin.I am not paying him any money for livinghere, but now he and his wife want torebuild it and have asked me to leave. Idon’t know where to go.

Among high-income groups, an increase inthe number of returnee Afghans who for thelast decade or more have resided in the West,as well as a large and growing expatriatecommunity, has put pressure on rents at thehigh-income end of the housing market. Thisin turn has put pressure on housing costs atthe middle-income level and so on down.

Add to this the massive damage of housingstock by war and conflict as well as the returnof less well-off refugees and the extent ofIDPs still living in the city, it is not surprisingthen that there are tensions withincommunities and families over access to orownership of land and houses. Hence anumber of land dispute cases involvesquabbles between family members over whohas the right to live in or sell a house or pieceof land. Invariably in such cases it is the morevulnerable family members who lose out, asevident from the case in Box 4.

4.1.3 Addressing land management andsecurity of tenure

Urban land management is seen as criticalbecause, in addition to issues of urban povertyand vulnerability, many among the Afghanelite lost property. High- and middle-incomerefugee families returned to find that theirhomes had been handed over to others. Fromthe perspective of urban management it isseen as a vital component of the overallurban revitalisation strategy because it is notpossible to set up a proper local revenuesystem without some idea of property valuesand ownership. Interesting comparisons canbe drawn with the experiences of Kosovo andTimor-Leste, related in Box 5. Nevertheless,urban land administration is difficult toaddress for two critical reasons. First, landgrabbing and land disputes involve verypowerful and well-defended interests.Second, the institutional infrastructure forcoordinating land administration andmanagement and enforcing the decisions ofcourts and other dispute resolutionmechanisms is weak. In other words, evenwhen the courts or public authorities issuefair decisions, there is no guarantee they canbe enforced because of the lack of a rule oflaw, with powerful commanders and otherelites seeing themselves as above the law.

As a result, many land and propertytransactions take place without official courtapproval, using customary documents ortraditional dispute resolution mechanismssuch as the shura or jirga.50 The shura andjirga are the “products of Afghanistan’spatriarchal, tribal society, which lays a strongemphasis on solving conflicts ‘privately’,within the family, village or clan.”51 Someargue that given the current lack ofinstitutional capacity within the officialsystem and widespread land grabbing andcorruption, these customary institutions are

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Afghans. Afghanistan’s legal system isbased upon principles of Islamic law andboth the courts, on the one hand, andshura and jirga, on the other, formallybase their decisions on Shari’a law.Although shuras and jirgas are notofficially recognised within the Afghanlegal system, judges often instruct two

Box 5. Post-conflict land management: lessons from Kosovo and Timor-Leste

Post-conflict administrations in countries like Afghanistan, South Africa, Kosovo and Timor-Leste have hadmany urgent land-related challenges to resolve. These have included the establishment or restoration oflegal frameworks, accommodating people dispersed by violence and resolving or pre-empting land disputes.The latter involves establishing rights, drafting laws and formulating policies and this is only possible in thecontext of effective institutions. In Tajikistan, for example, reliance was placed on existing institutions,while in South Africa and Kosovo entirely new institutional arrangements were put in place to deal withhousing, land and property issues.

In Kosovo the Housing and Property Directorate and Claims Commission (HPD/HPCC) was designed, developedand implemented with the cooperation of UN-Habitat to assist in the overall regularisation of the residentialproperty market. The HPD and HPCC have jurisdiction to receive and settle three categories of claimsinvolving residential property disputes: discriminatory practices of the former regime, informal transactionon residential property and property loss through usurpation, or illegal occupation, during the period March1989 to March 1999. Additionally the HPD places vacant or abandoned property under its administrationfor the placement of families in humanitarian need of housing, as well as provides a resource to the UnitedNations Mission in Kosovo and other institutions in relation to property law in Kosovo.

In Timor-Leste, although new institutions were created to deal with land and property, they did not havesufficient authority to address housing and property matters and destabilising disputes have persisted. InAugust 1999 the people of East Timor voted overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesia in a referendumsupervised by the UN. Chaos and the displacement of a vast number of people followed the vote and theviolent and destructive withdrawal of Indonesia in December 1999 included the killing of many East Timorese,the burning and destruction of countless properties and the loss of public and private land administrationdocuments and records. The need to deal with uncertainties around land rights was identified by the TimorLeste Joint Assessment Mission as one of the most immediate and urgent reconstruction priorities. Uncertaintyabout land ownership and the lack of a working land registry represented a real obstacle and a Land andProperty Unit (LPU) was established, alongside the drafting of a land, housing and property policy.

A particular challenge facing the LPU was the large-scale invasion of abandoned houses and buildings andan application and allocation procedure was developed. Mr Scott Leckie of the Centre on Housing Rightsand Evictions stated that “few issues confronting the people of East Timor are more pervasive and potentiallycontentious than those relating to the successful resolution of land disputes and relevant verification ofownership and tenure claims.” Nevertheless, resolving such claims has proved to be a real challenge forthe Transitional Administration and the current political leadership. Reflecting the urgency, when theDemocratic Republic of Timor-Leste gained full independence on 20 May 2002 it was swift to pass new landlaws that same year. However, although UN-Habitat assisted the Constituent Assembly with advice on landand property clauses for the formulation of a post-independence constitution, the final version containsonly the following singularly unhelpful reference to land and property: “The property, use and useful tenureof land shall be defined by law.” Ultimately progress has been frustrated by the lack of political will, sothat uncertainty over land rights has become pervasive and debilitating for citizens, government anddevelopment organisations alike and a serious threat to ensuring a stable foundation for future development.

Sources: duPleiss, J. “Land Plays a Key Role in Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” and Meeuwissen, J. “Land Managementin a Post-Conflict Society: The Timor-Leste Story.” Habitat Debate. December 2003; 9-10.

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potentially useful mechanisms for settlingland disputes:

At their best, they are the closest thingto democratic institutions in the countrytoday. They can reach decisions muchfaster than the official courts, arevirtually cost-free, are less susceptibleto bribery and are accessible to illiterate

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52 Ibid. This indeed resonates in the practices of the Special Property Disputes Resolution Court as described above.

parties to a dispute to first try resolvinghis or her differences through thismechanism.52

In terms of how they can assist with securityof tenure, customary institutions do notalways work easily with the concept ofindividual property rights and require carefulintervention. This may serve to protectvulnerable urban dwellers in the short termat least. However, the shura and jirga areproblematic arenas of decision-making notleast because participation is restricted tomen (and mainly the elders) and tend toserve ethnic majorities in their communalinterest, often to the detriment of otherethnicities — in particular with respect toKuchis. Furthermore, their deliberationsrarely operate in favour of women and thereis little to suggest that they are less open tomanipulation or corruption than otherinstitutional forms. Nevertheless, as long asthere is such widespread distrust of the courtsamong ordinary Afghans and as long asgovernment officials and the police arevirtually absent from the everyday lives ofaverage residents or worse, are part of theproblem rather than the solution, the informalmechanisms towards resolving land disputesprovided by the shura and jirga remainimportant, including in urban areas.

USAID together with Deloitte and Touche areundertaking a vast formal land titling exercisein Kabul. This is an important initiative.However, development projects, land disputesand the growth of informal settlements arecontinuing apace. With this in mind a goodexample is being set by the World Bank’sKabul Urban Reconstruction Project (KURP),which is including land management alongsidethe upgrading process. While the documentsissued do not constitute legal title to theland according to Afghan law, they affordsome security of tenure. It is intended thatthere can be harmonisation of land recordsand titles in the longer term, which is not anexaggerated expectation given the dynamics

governing such processes in the recent past.Something that needs to be monitored overthe course of KURP and other similar projectsis whether the upgrading process itself mightlead to further tenure insecurity as improvedservices potentially give rise to increasedrents.

Furthermore, putting in place a coherentland management system is complicated bythe fact that different governmentdepartments adopt different approaches tothe issue. Taking Kabul by way of example,the municipality has sold off land at knockdown prices to municipal and ministerialstaff. The current mayor has a rather scepticalattitude towards private sector developmentin terms of land, which, in the context ofboth regional history and local customs, hesees as a resource and a source of power forlocal government. He aims to accumulateand develop as much municipal land aspossible, sell it off and buy and developfurther land, in the interests of swelling themunicipal coffers. A similar strategy is beingpursued in Herat City, where the mayorreported land purchase and propertydevelopment — for example banqueting hallsand hotels — as a key strategy for achievinglocal financial autonomy and sustainability.Not only might this strategy prove moredifficult in Kabul but also the municipality isoperating with a model that contrasts withthat of the MUDH, which is very private sectororiented in relation to land and propertydevelopment. Not only does the ministry aimto support large private sector developmentsin partnership with international consultingcompanies, but many of the staff in theministry themselves are involved in privateconstruction and property developmentcompanies.

Addressing the issues of land managementand tenure security can be assisted by drawingon the experience in these matters of donorscurrently working in Afghanistan. In addition

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to USAID support for a large scale formal landtitling programme, the World Bank has takena lead in incorporating informal tenuresecurity exercises within an area-baseddevelopment strategy. UN-Habitat has a longtrack record in undertaking community-ledinformal land titling, within an incrementalprocess of formalising informal landadministration arrangements. This would befeasible in Afghanistan in coordination withNGOs working in urban communities andinvolving the Loya Jirga and shuras in aprocess led by the MUDH.

4.2 Extending and sustainingurban services

The urban services challenge involvesaddressing both the maintenance backlog inalready serviced areas as well as extendingservices to more recently occupied andinformal areas. Critical to encouraging theparticipation of urban residents in urbanservices provision, whether throughinvolvement in delivery or maintenance orpayment of user charges, is a level of securityin urban living. Fundamental here is securityof tenure because insecurity inducesreluctance on the part of urban residents toinvest physical and emotional energy orresources of any kind into an area of whichthey may not remain a part. Where securityof tenure exists, this research demonstratedthat many Afghans have learned to cope withfinancial insecurity and prioritise investmentsthat have a sustainable impact on their livingconditions. For example, reviewing a rangeof activities at the project level, it is clearthat some communities prioritise initiativeswith long-term effects (such as fixing thesewerage and water supply) over projectsthat aim to improve individual incomes, forexample through cash-for-work schemes.Infrastructure improvements that focus onrepairs, road maintenance or temporaryshelter, for example, and also provide

employment and skills development obviouslymeet the preferences of residents withgreater and lesser financial and tenuresecurity.

4.2.1 Water supply and sanitation

In addition to the issue of access andentitlement to land, extending urban servicesinvolves recognising the prevalence of largeinformal settlements and engaging with them.Putting pressure on residents by threateningto remove existing houses is not onlypolitically unviable, but constitutes a stepin the wrong direction in terms of realisticurban management given that informalsettlements house well over half of all urbanresidents. However, people construct informalsettlements in areas where it is not alwayseasy to extend infrastructure and services,which has to be undertaken in the contextof prudent urban management and anticipatedissues of environmental sustainability. Forexample, in Kabul the water supply is limitedand a falling water table is in evidence. Thisis also of concern given plans for a satellitecity for 200,000 inhabitants to the north ofthe capital, a project pushed by a majorbilateral donor. One key informant heavilycriticised the project, calling it an unviablepursuit and a “real estate deal” involvinginfluential Afghan investors who were buyingcheap land in the designated area with theaim of bailing out later on. The informantalso claimed that the cost per family wouldbe ten times the average cost of usual housingschemes.

Efforts by UN-Habitat to introduce eco toilets,in the form of twin tank latrines, constitutea low tech and prudent response to issues ofsustainability. However, they require botheducation and commitment on the part ofcommunity members and are difficult tosustain without ongoing support.53 Communityeducation projects on basic hygiene have

53 As these toilets involve separating wet from dry night soil they are easier for men to use than women and more likely tosucceed among adults than children.

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also been launched, e.g. run by the NGOAction Contre la Faim in Kabul and Mazar,and seek to create an understanding of theneed to maintain minimum distances betweenlatrines and wells. Even in Herat, arguablythe best serviced large city in Afghanistan,some residents continue living in dire hygienicconditions. Says a mother of seven in HeratDistrict 9:

... there is also no proper sanitationfacility — the children go to the desert;the older people have to go in the yardof the house and then cover it up.

4.2.2 Solid waste management

While secondary waste collection54 is wellmanaged in Herat, this is not the caseeverywhere else. For example, in Kabul,collection from transit points is not alwaystimely. Moreover, after the resistance ofnearby village residents, the initial site forthe largest waste facility in the Kabul areahad to be relocated. Rubbish is currentlybeing dumped eastwards of the city, but dueto an inefficient collection system andcapacity shortages, about half of the dailyamount of litter remains in the city. Thereare some positive signs that primarycollection55 of solid waste has been welldeveloped in some of the low-income areasof Kabul through community mobilisation andmanagement.

Problems of solid waste management inAfghan cities were found to be similar tothose found elsewhere. As a woman in HeratDistrict 9 put it: “We really have a problemwith litter here in our street. We just put itanywhere we want.” However, there werealso some areas of success in this arena. Alorry driver in Kabul District 16 pointed outthat there was occasional collaboration amongresidents and that they were using their ownresources in the process:

Sometimes we do get together and dosome work in our streets. For example,when the municipality had not come herefor a long time and the waste was pilingup, we collected everything and I usedmy own truck to transport the waste tothat place near the main road where themunicipality could see it.

UN-Habitat introduced a system of primarywaste collection known locally as the “Karachisystem” into a number of cities. It appearsto work best when it does not rely on thecommunity itself but rather when thecommunity contracts with a micro-entrepreneur. A mother of five in HeratDistrict 6 explained their situation:

Waste is not collected here by themunicipality, but by people withwheelbarrows. Every family has to payten Afghanis [US$0.20] per week for thisservice. Sanitation facilities areinsufficient; the waste is taken away bythe farmers who use them for agriculture,but we have to pay for this removal aswell. There is also no electricity. Duringthe winter we buy wood for heating; thisis really expensive — every four kiloscosts us 20 Afs [US$0.40].

Community mobilisation can be difficult toorganise and sustain in contexts ofvulnerability, insecurity and low levels oftrust. The issue of affordability is equallyimportant, as explained by a Mazar housewifefrom District 10:

Waste is really a problem here. Therewas the Karachi system but it finishedand the municipality did not step in tocollect the waste, even though this wouldhave to be done every ten days...Fortunately we can afford electricity andwater because of my husband’s income

54 Secondary collection is from a transit point or transfer station within a city to a final dumping site outside it.55 Primary collection refers to the removal of garbage from the neighbourhood. This can either be through a door-to-door

collection service, most common in better off areas or through street level collection, for example from bins or a designatedplot where waste is dumped.

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Box 6. Connecting the “urban village”: Chahar Asyab and Shewaki in Kabul’s District 7

Chahar Asyab and Shewaki are neighbourhoods located in the outskirts of Kabul District 7. Residents arepredominantly Pashtun; mujaheddin leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar had one of his strongholds in this areawhen the battle for the capital became increasingly intense during the early 1990s. Due to security concernsthe principal researchers were unable to conduct interviews in these areas; the team of three interviewerstherefore consisted of one Afghan senior researcher and two Afghan assistants.

One of them described their initial impression when they arrived in the area:

We went to Elyas Khail, which is a rural settlement in the Chahar Asyab District, almost like a village.It was far away from the main road and included 600 households. After talking to various people onthe street our impression was that it was not possible to do interviews in respondents’ homes. Theypreferred us to sit down and talk with the authorised people, such as the representative of the village.They were very doubtful of us.

The elders subsequently stated that they were unaware of the legal status of the land they settled on butinsisted that all houses were “private”. They pointed out that they did not receive any municipal servicesbut were in contact with the district representative. However, they claimed not to have received muchassistance so far. “We went to the district representatives to get connected to the public transportationsystem, but they did not accept our request, even when we told them that we would be willing to pay fiveAfs per person [the usual fare is 2—3 Afs per person], they did not accept that” says one respondent. Anotherman stressed the absence of potable water, saying: “We don’t even have drinking water, and we are carryingwater with our donkeys and cars to the village from wherever water can be found. No one has asked usabout our problems so far or has come to help us.”

The team then moved on to Shewaki, which according to the researchers appeared slightly more “urban”due to a higher density of buildings and a somewhat more structured outline of roads and settlements.Three in-depth interviews were conducted, one of them with the wakil of a neighbourhood. He said:

The land here belongs to two men. Most of the people have their own houses and have built themwithout assistance from organisations or the government. But for those who are renting expenses haverisen steadily. Two years ago the monthly rent for a shop was 400—500 Afs [US$8—10] but right nowit is around 1,200—1,500 Afs [US$24—30]. On top of this shop owners have to pay taxes. Some of thepeople had to move away because of the high rents. I have nothing to do these days. I was relying onthe income of my land, but right now I am jobless because of the recent drought.

As in other districts visited, basic collective action worked particularly well in the context of waste collection.More surprisingly however, the access to and use of water, a potentially more controversial pool resourcethan maintaining a clean environment, has not caused any significant conflicts so far despite its scarcity.Says the wakil, “the water system is terrible here, because in this whole area there are just three handpumps and one well. One hand pump was built by an international agency some years ago, so all of thepeople were going and getting water from here. Still, so far there has not been any major dispute aboutwater. People manage to get along.” In general, disputes among the residents were clearly regarded to beless pressing an issue than the need to connect the neighbourhood to basic urban services despite its remotelocation and to provide both political stability and security of housing.

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as a traffic policeman. He earns 3,500Afghanis [US$70] a month, which isenough to pay for these services. Ourtwo daughters go to school and our songoes to the kindergarten. We also havea good doctor who is our neighbour, sowe can easily see him and he treatsus well.

Some large neighbourhoods are not servicedat all and when residents are poor or insecurethey are either unable or unwilling to investin their immediate environment. One exampleencountered in Mazar-i-Sharif was half of anentire district being without services. It isperhaps not coincidental that the unservicedsection was home to another excluded

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56 See, for example, Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC). Take the Guns Away. Kabul: HRRAC. September2004.

Our children go to school, but we don’tfeel secure here because recently somechildren got kidnapped. Residents of thisarea managed to arrest the threekidnappers and informed the securitypeople, but after a couple of days themen were released. They probably bribedthe security personnel. The residentseventually decided to capture them againand killed them.

While it is difficult to validate these claims,kidnapping is a source of wide anxiety thathas been reported in other studies as well.56

Moreover, it was a concern for respondentsin all three cities studied. Those who raisedthis issue emphasised that short distances toschools were important to decrease the risk.In addition, long distances travelled bychildren mean they have to cross main roads,exacerbating not only their vulnerability todrive-by abductions but also physical dangerfrom traffic accidents.

Indeed, another crucial urban managementissue is the increasing density of traffic,particularly in Kabul. In a recent study onyouth vulnerability, children mentioned thattheir greatest fear was to be run over by acar. Pollution (mainly from car and truckemissions) is an additional health risk factorthat has to be countered by developing andimplementing effective regulative frameworksand standards. This will require coordinationwith the Ministry of Public Works and ideally,given the problem of unemployment in thecity, should be pursued in the context oflabour intensive strategies. However, publictransportation in Kabul and Herat (to a lesserextent also in Mazar) received a positiveresponse from residents in terms of reliabilityand affordability. This included provisionboth through public transportation systemsand informal private transport networks.

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minority in the city, the large Hazaracommunity. Here, people lived in relativeisolation and without electricity, wastecollection, regular transportation orprotection by the local police.

4.2.3 The wider urban environment

An important aspect of the urban environmentis public safety. Despite anecdotal evidencethat the level of crime was increasing inKabul, very few respondents in theneighbourhoods studied actually mentionedfeelings of insecurity. Some pointed tooccasional robberies in the street, althoughthese seldom lead to casualties or resultedin injuries. While people saw crime as lesssignificant among their myriad problems,insecurity was nonetheless a problem,especially in the case of groups that werevulnerable as a whole. For instance, in theHazara community of Mazar, the young menhad formed themselves into a local militiaand were patrolling the area because incidentsagainst residents were reported regularly.

Local policing is poorly provided at theneighbourhood level. When arrests are madethe system of law and order fails to prosecuteor impose sanctions. For example, threerespondents complained that those arrestedby the police had been freed after paying abribe. It is unclear whether these accountsreflected a general dissatisfaction withinstitutions of public security, or whetherthey were confined to specific incidents.However, a number of respondents expressedfear of their children being abducted, whetherfor ransom, child labour, prostitution or organtransplantation. Two of those interviewedclaimed that they personally knew of caseswhere children had disappeared and laterbeen found mutilated. A woman telling herstory in a community centre in Kabul’s eastdistrict said:

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Working towards sustain-ability also requires takinglimited energy resourcesinto account, a significantchallenge in Afghan citiesthat cannot be avoided.Poor electricity meansthose who can afford ituse their own generators.Not on ly are fue lresources for generatorslimited but the practiceleads to a dependency onglobal markets. In thecase of low-incomeh o u s e h o l d s w h e r egenerators are not an option, wintervulnerability to the cold stands to removesources of wood and other local options forfuel for heating.57 These issues are importantin illustrating that the dangers inherent inthe urban environment in Afghanistan relatenot only to the legacy of war but the hazardsof reconstruction.

4.3 Planning and managingAfghanistan’s urban future

The most critical challenge facing the urbansector in Afghanistan is to update currentapproaches to urban planning andmanagement. In effect this means giving upthe commonly held commitment both toexisting master plans and the professionalpractice of master planning. There is a widelyheld view among urban professionals inAfghanistan of planning as design. There isa need to extend the imagination of plannerstowards thinking about strategic urbandevelopment, as well as responsivemanagement that can engage with changesat the city level. This in turn entails a morecollaborative and communicative approachto planning and management, both at thecity and sub-city levels.

Clearly this constitutes a challenge, as manycurrent urban planners are wedded to existingand familiar approaches and practices.Further, there are few young professionalscoming into the system who have capacityin new methodologies, systems andequipment. Yet Afghanistan is blessed witha wealth of well-trained Afghan returneeswho represent an opportunity for themodernisat ion of urban planning,management and practice. As one advisorput it:

We should hire more exile Afghans with20 years of international experience inGermany, Pakistan or France and pay forEnglish interpreters if necessary, ratherthan have more international staff whodo not necessarily understand our cultureand who don’t speak our languages.

The impatience with central and masterplanning preferences on the part of someexpatriate donors and advisors has not beenhelpful, as changes take time and effort andoccur only once new ways of doing things areinternalised and owned.

A public sector reform process has begunthrough the creation of an Independent

Phot

o —

Dan

iel E

sser

57 See Grace, J. 100 Households in Kabul: A Study of Winter Vulnerability. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.August 2003.

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Administrative Reform and Civil ServiceCommission funded by the Open SocietyInstitute. At present it is at the stage ofconducting research, with research units inKabul and the field areas (which include theprovinces Herat, Balkh and Nangarhar) andis targeted at provincial governments.Ultimately the processwill be extended too t h e r l e v e l s o fgovernment. As one oft h e r e s e a r c h e r sexplained, capacitybuilding is the main goal but if this is notsuccessful then at least organisational changewill ensue, despite the fact that it will be achallenge:

If you cut an old person he will not agree.If you say you are not capable and do nothave skills he will be angry. If you cutsomeone and say we do not want thisfunction they will also complain and standagainst us. In the restructuring if youhave one person selected the chief willstand against us because we chose in theopen system. It will take a very long time— up to ten or fifteen years. It is not ashort-term programme.

Both Afghan and international staff involvedin urban policymaking and planning havelamented the fact that the call for capacitybuilding has so far not been met in practice.There is a prevailing and unsustainablereliance on non-Afghan expertise. While thiswas an appropriate response to immediatepost-war reconstruction, the shift fromemergency conditions to development nowneeds to be made, in the recognition thatconflict (if not war) is and will remain a partof Afghan life for the foreseeable future.Hence, expatriates need to be replaced orredeployed over time through a process ofhiring a higher percentage of returningrefugees with the necessary qualifications,supporting at the same time their immersioninto the challenges of contemporary urban

Afghanistan, as well as enhancing the capacityof educated Afghans.

In this context, the tendency to rely on short-term training fixes has to give way to asequenced and more strategic approach tocapacity building, which will have to be

planned, budgeted forand implemented in theshort, medium andlonger term. Thefoundations for thisapproach exist in the

NUP and it is important that the goals andaction defined therein are implemented, forexample: seminar- and workshop-basedcapacity building in the short term, a clearcommitment to on-the-job training in thecontext of ongoing programmes and projectsin the medium term, and in the longer term,skills development and education throughcurricula development and support touniversities and technical colleges.

Capacity building is ultimately about creatingunderstanding and commitment by graduallydevolving responsibility within clearly definedand realisable frameworks. The NUP is animportant starting point for the creation ofbetter functioning cities in Afghanistan, butits lack of concreteness and its unclearfinancial viability leave room for question.There are also institutional issues at stake.Rejuvenation of urban planning andmanagement promises to be difficult becauseremuneration and working conditions in thepublic sector are not optimal. While Afghanswho remained see government jobs as theemployment option of choice, not leastbecause they have found ways ofsupplementing their income with privatedevelopment activities in the sector,returnees or younger professionals of calibreare unlikely to be attracted to low paidpositions in a fairly moribund public sector.Hence capacity building and institutionalrestructuring in the urban context is criticallylinked to strategies towards public sectorreform.

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The shift from emergency conditions to developmentnow needs to be made, in the recognition thatconflict (if not war) is and will remain a part ofAfghan life for the foreseeable future.

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5.1 Creating links between stateand society

Achieving effective urban management inAfghanistan means balancing and prioritisinglimited resources against overwhelming needs.This is above all a political process and onethat requires attention to urban governancein a context where expectations of and trustin government is at low ebb. Under suchcircumstances an urgent task is to improvechannels of communication betweengovernment agencies and agents andorganisations of civil society. Traversingvarious levels of authority are traditionalsystems of accountability and justice. Thesealso need to be taken into account.

Community organisers interviewed for thisstudy repeatedly underscored the importanceof moving from local-level conflict to local-level cooperation. In practice, reported

experiences were mixed. Three key challengeswere identified:

• First and foremost, beneficiaryidentification and coordination withmunicipal employees were frequentlyheld up or completely stymied by local-level corruption.

• Second, reliance on community mobilis-ation to supplement or substitute for poormunicipal or other government servicesrequires trust among neighbours and long-term commitment to living in an area.Both are in short supply in mobile andinsecure post-war urban environments.

• Third, community development in citiesneeds to be harnessed and coordinatedwith a diverse landscape of public andprivate players at multiple levels:min i s ter ia l , c i ty , d i s t r ict and

5. Moving Forward: Addressing the Challenges toUrban Governance

Phot

o —

Dan

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neighbourhood. However, existingmechanisms of interaction lack legitimacyand inclusiveness of all citizens. As such,they are not likely to render desirableresults in terms of reducing vulnerability.

Turning things around will involve a gradualprocess but persistence may well berewarded. A number of urban residentsinterviewed for this study expressedunderstanding over the backlog in servicedelivery and slow responsiveness to theirneeds. In fact, only a few shared the opinionoffered by a 35-year-old woman in KabulDistrict 16: “We want the government to helpus in every aspect of our life.” Mostrespondents were realistic if pessimistic aboutthe situation in which they found themselves.Said a male respondent in Kabul District 17:

I can understand that the governmentdoesn’t come here. The governmentdoesn’t have time to think about thisarea, because they have to deal with somany things. They need more time. Maybein the future they will help us, but fornow there is peace at least. We have tohelp ourselves.

Citizens were also aware of problems athigher levels of governance. For example, ajournalism student in Mazar District 7 sharedhis views about the lack of local-centralaccountability when he said:

Our kalantar spoke with the mayor aboutour problems regarding waste collection,sanitation and hygiene, but themunicipality hasn’t done anything forthis district so far. The centralgovernment should replace the mayor,but they cannot do it because there isno central government!

Nevertheless, the fact that the governmentis somehow absent in people’s lives issomething that needs addressing. Indeed thiswas one of the main themes that emergedfrom the household-level interviews and manyrespondents reiterated the need to developalternative routes for decision making and

mechanisms for implementation. A crucialissue for government, donors and NGOs ishow relations between government and thepeople and among residents themselves canbe strengthened.

Not only is there awareness among everydaypeople about the strengths and weaknessesof government but also a willingness to beengaged in a process of reconstruction thatholds some advantage. Building on sharedexperience and understanding of theconstraints of a post-war environment therewas evidence of the (re)emergence of ashared identity. Said one Mazar respondent:

We are all Afghan brothers, so we haveto help each other. Here in thisneighbourhood we meet regularly in themosque to solve the problems of thecommunity, and it doesn’t matter towhich tribe you belong.

Even though such sentiments might still berare and often contradicted by ethnic andtribal contestation, they do indicate thepotential for the reconciliation necessary tobuild social cohesion and trust in urban areas.This may be possible particularly in districtswith high percentages of newly arrived IDPs,whether permanent rural in-migrants or labourmigrants who “commute” between theirvillage and the city.

Similarly, residents were often found to haveshared interests but lacked the basicmotivation or incentives for collective andreciprocal action. Where this is evident is inareas such waste collection, localinfrastructure improvement, maintainingsecurity and low-cost examples of neighbour-hood assistance. There is a tendency forurban policy to rely or build on such examplesof reciprocity and self-help. This can erodethe scant resources of the poor and it isimportant that urban policy and planningtakes this into account and that in theirinterventions donors consider ways ofencouraging and embellishing the efforts ofvulnerable urban dwellers. On the part of

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government agencies and particularlymunicipalities, it is important that processesand mechanisms are established throughwhich citizens are given the opportunity toexpress their concerns, learn throughexperience and where the municipality candemonstrate it has taken their prioritiesseriously. Incentives need to be put in placethat encourage both community-level andmunicipal entities to cooperate, for examplethrough processes of “co-production”58 inthe context of targeted or area-based localdevelopment and through means that reducethe potential for political interference.59

Micro-level mobilisation and collective actionwere the main goals of the UN-Habitat-fundedcommunity development councils (CDCs).These were first established in Mazar-i-Sharifin 1995. UN-Habitat subsequently withdrewfrom their management, which now fallsunder the National Solidarity Programme(NSP) coordinated by the Ministry of RuralRehabilitation and Development. Differentorganisations are responsible for the oversightof different regions and Afghan-led communityfora (CF) maintain the local and micro-levelstructures. The extension of the CDC modelto rural areas has left experience in the citiessomewhat patchy. For example, CDCs arestill quite strong in Mazar-i-Sharif where theyoriginated but are less robust in Herat. Localcommunity centres still function in accordancewith basic democratic principles, includinggender equality, elections and fairrepresentation. As such, they offer analternative vehicle for those such as womenand youth who are less able to work throughthe shuras. However, tight resources andunskilled or inexperienced management havemeant that these councils are less involvedin community mobilisation and advocacy andmore focused on practical activities.Depending on the area these might include

sewing circles or educational activities suchas English lessons or computer classes.

The fora enjoy widespread acceptance withinmany neighbourhoods, despite occasionalattempts by local leaders to discredit themthrough allegations as to their prudence orhonesty or through clandestine interventionswith local authorities. One CF worker in Mazarexplained:

We have a big problem with the localgovernment. Commanders and gunmendo not like us. The governor is also notsupportive of our communities becausehe thinks we take power from him, andthe commanders interfere with the CFsthrough the mullahs, who say people inthe CFs are Christians. This is ridiculous,because we are all Muslims! Fortunatelythe central government is supportive ofus, and we work with the Ministries ofWomen, Labour and Social Affairs, andEducation. We are important to thembecause more than 3,000 students studyin CFs in Mazar. Once the local educationdepartment wanted to close down all theCFs, so we had to get a letter from theministry in Kabul to stop them.

For the CDC model to grow and evolve itclearly needs sound management andsustained funding that includes organisationaland operational costs. This in turn iscontingent to a degree upon the local politicalenvironment in which CDCs are immersed.As illustrated by the statement above, urban—national links can help ease the pressureunder which local civil society organisationsare operating. The CDC model is by no meansthe only one. NGOs are working withcommunities and community organisationsin a variety of ways. However, similarproblems to those reported in relation to CFswere found across a number of other NGO

58 Ostrom (1996) describes co-production as a system in which state and society members cooperate around a task or project,according to what they can offer and what each does best.

59 A bilateral donor is currently involved in building capacity for elected representatives that link up with the shuras. However,kalantars and wakils are still the major communication point for municipal employees, and processes of prioritisation andallocation remain vulnerable to manipulation.

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initiatives. In Kabul, for example,implementing agencies reported problemswith sustainability and scaling up due to highstaff turnover. Organisation-wide capacitybuilding and training at all levels of urbangovernance thus becomes crucial.

Developing engaged urban citizenship inAfghanistan is not merely a theoreticalaspiration but an urgent task. Achieving itdepends on strengthening the visibility of theview from below in terms of informinggovernment and fostering grassroots levelmobilisation and understanding of thestrategic imperatives of urban development,not only in individual neighbourhoods but ata citywide level as well. As evidenced by theinterviews, urban residents in Afghanistanwould warmly welcome efforts in thisdirection and demonstrate encouraging scopefor institutionalising local-level cooperation.

5.2 Creating links between actorsinvolved in urban managementand governance

The future of Afghanistan’s cities does notlie with urban citizens and municipalitiesalone. Inter-governmental relations areequally important. In an international contextwhere the trend is towards promoting greaterdecentralisation, the thrust in Afghanistan istowards centralisation. This is part and parcelof the nation-building project and efforts tostrengthen the authority and reach ofgovernment in Kabul. A tug in the oppositedirection, what above has been called defacto decentralisation, comes from localpower brokers, commanders and forcesseeking to maintain or extend regional powerand resources. Among urban citizens therewas considerable sympathy for a strongAfghanistan but a pragmatic acceptance thattheir own fates were often sealed at provincialor municipal level rather than by decisionsmade in the capital.

Among officials and bureaucrats there was astrong understanding of de jure workingsbetween central, provincial and local

government departments as well as some ofthe confusions and overlaps leading toinefficiencies in inter-governmental relations.An important forward trajectory in order toreduce these, as well as to strengthen thecoordinating role of the centre, must involveincreasing municipal and ministerial capacityat sub-national levels, in terms of bothresources and skills. This is necessary if theviews, insights and demands of citizens areever to be taken seriously at different levelsof government and for citizens to becomeappreciated and cooperative partners in urbandevelopment.

Improved communication and coordinationneed also to include actors in internationalorganisations, whether donor agencies orNGOs. Comparative perspectives andexperiences from other international contextsare absolutely critical in helping Afghansdecide on processes and priorities forthemselves. However, how they are used andshared is equally important. To date,structures and mechanisms for linking thewealth of locally generated knowledge,information and experience with knowledgeat the policymaking level are underdeveloped.

Immediate efforts are needed towards greatercommunication and cooperation betweendifferent government agencies, differenttiers of government, between the centre andthe regions, and between Afghan andinternational actors and organisations involvedin urban development. This must be seen asa prerequisite for increasing the leverage oflimited funds. Actionable recommendationsfor improvement in this key area of urbangovernance are provided in the next section.

While these are worthy goals that requirerelentless pursuit, it is also important torecognise the immediate reality of urbangovernance in Afghanistan and to work withit creatively, identifying the room formanoeuvre within it to address issues ofurban vulnerability. There is a blindinglyobvious need for urban development derivingfrom urbanisation and the legacy of war.However, it is also the case that the current

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political context demands immediate andvisible development projects. Both thegovernment in Kabul and international donorsneed to demonstrate with some urgencyinvestment on the ground. Both the peaceand the nation-building project depends onthe effective roll out of the National PriorityProgrammes.

There is a huge temptation under suchcircumstances to skip the early stages ofprogramme management in order to see fastresults, to implement from above withoutattention to what is going on below, or evento the side. In Afghanistan this may well bereinforced by the involvement of planners inmilitary structures in the urban sector. Wellmeaning though they might be, their approachis one that is concerned with ends ratherthan means. This could have long-termimplications for urban governance and thesustainability of the urban development, aswell as on approaches to urban managementand governance that become entrenched. Itis important that the rigidity of masterplanning is not simply replaced with otherkinds of rigidity in cities that are in a stateof social, economic and institutional flux andwhere iterative approaches are mostappropriate. As one urban professional putit: “There is no end state in the urban sector,it is all process and the end state constantlychanges.”

5.3 Recommendations

Some recommendations apply across theboard while other strategies are particularlyurgent in respect to each of the three citiesstudied. This section begins, therefore, byidentifying challenges and possible responsesthat are especially urgent for each of thestudy cities, before providing an overview ofimmediate measures, intermediateapproaches and forward-looking strategiesfor the urban sector as a whole.

5.3.1 City-specific priorities

In Kabul, a first priority is security of tenure.While the issues discussed here hold for theother cities as well, the situation isparticularly urgent in the capital. The issueof sequencing activities is important here. Itis not necessary or even possible to hold offon engaging with informal land markets andsystems of land titling until a formal titlingprocess has taken place. If efforts areunderway or can be started in the meantime,a process of ex post facto harmonisation cantake place. A second priority for Kabul is toclarify the relationship between KabulMunicipality and the MUDH and to enhancecommunication and coordination betweenthem.

In Mazar large sections of the city are notconnected to water and sewerage systemsand rely on private generators. In addition,employment generation is critical in a contextwhere a vast number of citizens areunemployed and where the city is a potentialsource of alternative jobs than those to befound working with or cultivating opiumpoppies. Again, the imperative of localeconomic development and employmentcreation is not confined to Mazar but wasparticularly evident in that small city wherealternative livelihoods were either scarce ordifficult. Institutional and budgetaryrelationships between provincial and centralgovernment and between the province andthe municipality merit particular scrutiny inMazar, where residents are being penalisedby poor performance in relation to the city.This is both on the part of the centralgovernment that has been unable tocoordinate or control the activities of factionalleaders acting in and on the city and on thepart of provincial and municipal governmentthemselves. Incentives for improved urbanmanagement and governance could becreated in provincial cities in particular,through an “urbanisation” of the NSP.60 It

60 The NSP’s main goal is to circumvent rural strongmen and to link local communities with the central government so thatpolicy leverage is increased while simultaneously supporting local development; see, for example, Boesen, op cit.

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may be worth considering this further inrelation to expanding the breadth of concernin the MUDH.

The situation in Herat warrants a criticallook at the dominance of privatised(re)construction and the liberal ideologyguiding the development process. Cushioningthese practices with programs facilitatingsocial inclusion appears expedient, inconjunction with affordable housing initiativesthat ensure that less affluent and connectedresidents can still live and work in the citycentre. However, the single most importantmeasure in Herat is undoubtedly the creationof a local civil society that provides a forumfor voicing dissent and that includes social,political and ethnic diversity.

5.3.2 Immediate measures, intermediateapproaches and forward-lookingstrategies

Certain common themes evolved across orrelevant to all three cities that are best dealtwith by coordinated, complementary action.The following lays out some key parametersfor programming and implementation.

Immediate Measures

• Work with and build on existing masterplanning skills (but not the master plan),for example, knowledge of regulations,roles and responsibilities, while at thesame time encouraging risk-takingbehaviour. For example, this could involveworking to service and secure unplannedareas.

• Work towards updating practice andcreating experience through existing area-based development programmes such asthe Kabul Urban ReconstructionProgramme (KURP).

• Promote educational visits to othercountries and demonstration projects,particularly in the region.

• Work towards immediate security oftenure for vulnerable urban dwellers at

the micro-level and in the context ofprojects, alongside larger land titlingexercises.

• Conduct issue-based workshops bringingtogether government employees (bothmunicipalities and ministries), privatesector, NGOs and CSOs with a view ofidentifying the contribution of differentactors to urban partnerships.

• Conduct capacity-building workshops oncitywide imperat ives in urbandevelopment and management for actorsless experienced in the urban sector.

• Create commitment to the NUP amongall urban sector actors through facilitateddiscussion, workshops and application toreal-life problems in Afghanistan so thatownership, communicat ion andcoordination are promoted.

• Set in place organisational mechanismsfor involving local representativesalongside government officials in decision-making processes that involve them. Thisshould ideally involve intermediaryorganisations with access and reach andbe backed with resources and concreteactivities.

• Ensure staff within the MUDH andmunicipalities are aware of the work ofthe Independent Administrative Reformand Civil Service Commission and itsimplications so that there areopportunities to respond.

• Build on public awareness of corruptionas an important cause of inefficiency andpoor delivery by setting up an urbanmonitoring group that can help tacklethe issues through exposure (e.g. mediaexpertise), community-level tracking (e.g.a report card system) and enforcement.

• Work to avoid the worst excesses ofpoliticised funding of infrastructure andservices in the urban sector by continuing

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to prioritise proper consultation andcoordination through a strengthened urbancoordination group.

• Extend the work being done on revenuegeneration and collection through theMoF to include the commissioning of astudy on municipal finances.

Intermediate Approaches

• Introduce participatory and collaborativeplanning as well as more strategic planningapproaches through a “learning-by-doing”approach in the context of new projectdevelopment and implementation, linkedto an operationalised NUP.

• Develop skills in working with informalityin housing, infrastructure and serviceprovision in the context of integratedarea-based development projects suchas KURP.

• Begin to harmonise informal security oftenure measures undertaken at theneighbourhood level or in the context ofprojects with formal land titling exercises.

• Develop integrated area-based projectsinvolving multi-sector partners and withtangible skills development and capabilitybuilding dimensions.

• Create organisational structures forregular consultation and communicationwith urban dwellers about local prioritiesand budgets.

• Strengthen the position of the MUDH sothat it can take on a stronger strategicplanning and coordinating role. This willrequire investment in skilled staff,equipment and advisors of an orderenjoyed, for example, by the Ministry ofRural Rehabilitation and Development.

• Clarify the role of the MUDH vis-à-vismunicipalities, especially in Kabul.

• Assess the growth and effectiveness ofthe urban monitoring group on corruption

via appraisals and consultation withrelevant agencies.

• Implement the NUP through governmentdepartments and donor coordination, withclear milestones and performancebenchmarks.

• Ensure the implementation of the NUPremains compatible with local prioritiesparticularly as they affect urbanvulnerability.

• Encourage local revenue generationactivities on the part of municipalities sothat fiscal sustainability in the mediumterm accompanies improved contributionsto and a better return ratio of resourcesfrom the MoI in Kabul.

• Strengthen the coordinating function ofMUDH in parallel with a developmentprogramme run from the centre,equivalent to the NSP. The delivery ofsuch a programme through MUDHprovincial departments would have theeffect of improving vertical inter-governmental relations and createvisibility of and trust in the capacity ofcentral government.

Forward-Looking Strategies

• Ensure all urban projects, programmesand plans are harmonised within thecontext of an operationalised NUP guidedby a strategic urban policy framework.

• Integrate on-the-job capabi l i tyenhancement with curriculum develop-ment in Afghan universities and technicalcolleges focused on urban planning andurban management but where relevant,still located within existing faculties ofarchitecture and/or engineering.

• Introduce and monitor infringements orviolation of land titles and security oftenure within an ongoing process of landtitling.

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• Extend integrated area-based projectapproaches to citywide developmentstrategies with local authoritiescoordinating a wider array of urbandevelopment partners.

• Strengthen citizens’ ability to engageproactively with the NUP and urbanplanning and management processes,through ongoing support and civiceducation by intermediary and advocacyNGOs.

• Strengthen and institutionalise structuresfor regular consultation and commun-ication between government organisationsand urban dwellers.

• Streamline MUDH and monitor theeffectiveness of new structures through

peer reviews and citizen satisfactionsurveys.

• Enforce anti-corruption measures throughsufficient funding, regular consultationamong regulatory and executive agenciesand monitoring accountability to citizens.

• Work towards a sustainable resource basefor the implementation of the NUP in allprov inc ia l centres and ensureinstitutionalisation of performanceimprovement mechanisms.

• Extend local revenue generation activitiesfor some enhanced fiscal autonomy onthe part of municipalities while ensuringreturns to central government andcohesion with national policies throughcoordination by a streamlined MUDH.

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ACF (Action Contre la Faim). KabulVulnerability Mapping. Kabul: ACF. January2004.

Alden Wily, L. Land and the Constitution:Current Land Issues in Afghanistan. Kabul:Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.November 2003.

Alden Wily, L. Land Rights in Crisis. Kabul:Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.March 2003.

Beall, J. “From Social Networks to PublicAction in Urban Governance: Where DoesBenefit Accrue?” Journal of InternationalDevelopment. 2001. 13(7):1015—1021.

Bhatia, M., Lanigan, K. and Wilkinson, P.Minimal Investments, Minimal Results: TheFailure of Security Policy in Afghanistan.Kabul: Afghanistan Research and EvaluationUnit. June 2004.

Boesen, I.W. From Subjects to Citizens: LocalParticipation in the National SolidarityProgramme (NSP). Kabul: AfghanistanResearch and Evaluation Unit. August 2004.

Cleaver, F. “Moral Ecological Rationality,Institutions and the Management of CommonProperty Resources.” Development andChange. 2000; 31:361—383.

d'Hellencourt, N. et al. Preliminary Study ofLand Tenure Related Issues in UrbanAfghanistan with Special Reference to KabulCity. Kabul: UN-Habitat. March 2003.

Evans, A. et al. A Guide to Government inAfghanistan. Kabul: The World Bank andAfghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.2004.

Foley, C. Land and Property Disputes inEastern Afghanistan. Kabul: NorwegianRefugee Council. 2004.

Bibliography

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Giustozzi, A. War, Politics and Society inAfghanistan 1978—1992. Washington:Georgetown University Press. 2000.

Government of Afghanistan (GoA). SecuringAfghanistan’s Future. Urban Technical Annex.January 2004.

Government of Afghanistan (GoA). NationalPriority Programmes — the National UrbanProgramme. Kabul, May 2004. Availableonline: www.afghanistangov.org/npp(accessed on 12th August 2004).

Grace, J. 100 Households in Kabul: A Studyof Winter Vulnerability. Kabul: AfghanistanResearch and Evaluation Unit. August 2003.

Human Rights Research and AdvocacyConsortium (HRRAC). Take the Guns Away.Kabul: HRRAC. September 2004.

Hunte, P. Some Notes on the Livelihoods ofthe Urban Poor in Kabul, Afghanistan. Kabul:Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.February 2004.

Laber, J. and Rubin, B.R. A Nation Is Dying.Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.1988.

Lefevbre, H. “Space and Politics.” Writingson Cities. Oxford: Blackwell. 1996.

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Schuette, S. Urban Vulnerability inAfghanistan: Case Studies from Three Cities.Kabul: Afghanistan Research and EvaluationUnit. May 2004.

Stigter, E. “IDP families in Herat City,Afghanistan — Displacement histories andintra-household decision-making with regardto departure, stay and return.” Forthcomingin International Migration Review. 2004.

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(1) Priority assessments

Political, economic, and social development issues and challenges as they pertain to urbangovernance in Afghanistan (current state; political, financial and organisational bottlenecks):

• Security of land tenure and access to land; role of planning• Employment and income generation• Sewerage, sanitation and health• Basic services provision: water, electricity, policing, transportation• Social inclusion and support networks

(2) Inter- and intra-organisational structures of competence, accountability, cooperationand conflict resolution among and within local (urban) and national-level institutions ofgovernment, e.g. municipality-Ministry of Interior; role of MUDH.

(3) Management issues with regard to efficiency of service delivery in the urban realm:coverage, frequency, quality, and responsibility.

(4) Links and leverages between governmental (local, national) and non-governmentalinstitutions (local civil society, international agencies) in the context of urban governance— degree of communication and cooperation in (re)construction, accuracy of needs assessment,extent of joint agenda-setting, accountability relationships and complaint managementmechanisms.

(5) Additional issues that the respondent would like to point out or comment on.

Lead questions:

• What are the three most urgent issues in [city] that [actor, agency] is responsible forand that you think need to be addressed in the immediate future?

• How are you/they going to address them?• Can these issues be solved? How? If not, why not? What would be needed to deal with

these issues successfully?• Do you think that [actor, agency], at the current stage and in the future, has

[a] enough financial resources[b] enough human resources[c] enough equipment[d] enough political influence?

• To what extent is capacity building taking place? Through which channels and mechanismsis [actor, agency] in touch with residents?

• In which areas is [actor, agency] cooperating with other agencies, organisations,governmental offices, local initiatives? Has this cooperation been satisfying for you sofar? What should and can be improved, and how?

Appendix A: Interview Guide for Key Informants

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a) List of key informants

Urban Governance, Urban Management and Vulnerability — List of Key Informants

Kabul

Name Function Organisation

Dr. Qiamuddin Djallalzada Deputy Minister

Tom Carter Advisor

Waheed Sultan AdvisorMUDH

Eng. Assadulhaq Ezmarai Head of Town Planning Dept.

Khuja Faizuddin Head of Housing Dept.

Wali Mohammad Akseer Head of Planning Dept.

Ghulam Sakhi Noorzad (n.a.) Mayor

Mohammad Ali Niazi Head of Policy and Coordination Kabul Municipality

Dr. Saheb Nazar Muradi Head of Control of Constructions

Abdul Basir Farahi Provincial Court Chairman SPDRC

Shahmahmood Miakhel Senior Advisor on Policing MoI

Katherina Lumpp Senior Protection Officer, OCM UNHCR

Soraya Goga Urban SpecialistWorld Bank

Robin Rajack Urban Specialist

Jason A.Girard Urban AdvisorUSAID

Charles Setchell Disaster Management Specialist

Rob Hager Team Leader Taxation and Municipal Finance Bearing Point

Pushpa Pathak Senior Urban Advisor CG Focal Point, MUDH

Eng. Mohammad Sharif National Human Settlement Officer, CGUN-Habitat

M.Y.Safar Land Management Consultant, CG

Lalith Lankatilleke Chief Technical Advisor

Nick Leader AdvisorUNAMA

Antonio Giustozzi Consultant

Bas Rozemuller Chief Technical Advisor, SEED International LabourOrganization

Bijay Kumar Country Director ActionAid

Jolyon Leslie Program ManagerAga Khan Trust for Culture

Anna Soave Project Leader

Mir Ahmed Joyenda Deputy Director, Communications AREU

Frank Steiner Project Manager Beller Consulting

Jalaluddin Ahmed Country Director BRAC

Michelle Kendall Project ManagerCARE

Eng. M. Farid Safi Program Manager

Anita Anastasia Project Manager GTZ, fr. Mercycorps

Jennifer Escott Legal Advisor NRC

Appendix B: Key Informants Interviewed

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Mazar-i-Sharif

Name Function Organisation

M. Younus Moqim Mayor

Eng. Mohammed Malik Head of Construction Dept. Mazar Municipality

Mohammed Sarwar Head of Planning Dept.

Faisal Programme Coordinator ActionAid

n.n. Head of Office Action Contre la Faim

Mr. Amomuddin Regional Director Aga Khan DevelopmentNetwork

Eng. Mohammed Director AREA

Glenn McKenzie-Frazer Customs Advisor Bearing Point

Eng. Islamuddin Regional Manager

M. Jawed CF Manager District 2 CFDO

Mr. Jaffar CF Manager District 10

Abdul Rahman Rasikh Commissioner Civil Service ReformCommission

Volker Huefing Head of ProjectsGAA

Martin Guth Construction Project Coordinator

Martin Ocaga Head of Office IOM

Simon Russell Head of Office NRC

Col. John Henderson Head of PRT PRT

Mr Aziz, Mr Mariam Project Leaders Save the Children UK

Michele Lipner Regional Head UNAMA

Eng. Zia Radyar Provincial Manager UN-Habitat

Anne Campbell Head of Office

Dr. Miwas Project CoordinatorUNHCR

Mr. Osman Project Coordinator

Nisa, Rasia, Obtal Field workers (focus group)

Siria Maniam Head of Office UNOPS

Herat

Name Function Organisation

Alhaj M. Rafiq Mujadidi Mayor Herat Municipality

M. Haqiq Regional Programme Manager AIHRC

Steve McKennan Taxation specialist Bearing Point

Mr. Mohiuddin (n.a.) Programme Manager BRAC

David Boyes Project Coordinator Catholic Relief Services

Selwyn Mukkath Project Leader

Jawed Ganji Head administrator DACAAR

H. Brommer Head of MissionDiplomatic mission ofGermany in HeratFranz-Xaver Vogl Head of Police Reconstruction project

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Peggy Sieller Head of Office IOM

Abdul Khaliq Stanikzai Regional ManagerSanayee DevelopmentFoundation

Tim Williams Project Coordinator

Abu Diek Head of Office UNAMA

Sayed Sadullah Wahab Provincial Manager UN-Habitat

Claire Bourgeois Head of Office

Maurizio Molina Associate Repatriation Officer UNHCR

Elizabeth Cossor Consultant

Baba Danbappa Resident Programme Officer UNICEF

Altaf Hussain Joya Regional Coordinator UNODC

Graham Livingston (n.a.) Head of Office UNOPS

Anne Bodine Head of Mission (Herat) USAID/PRT

Andrés González Head of OfficeWar Child Netherlands

Chris Mastaglio Project Leader

Gabriele Chrupala Head of OfficeWorld Vision International

Mr. Shafiq Director of Operations

b) Distribution of key informant interviews

Herat30% Kabul

40%

Mazar30%

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This research is part of a study of a policy-oriented research organisation (AREU) throughwhich we try to understand the concerns and problems of people living in Afghan cities.While we are not going to provide any direct assistance to you as a result of this study, wewill inform the municipality and the ministries about our findings. We hope that they,together with international agencies, will follow up on our recommendations. The interviewcomprises five areas and will take about 45 minutes of your time.

We would like you to tell us your story with regard to five topic areas and focus on thoseissues that are of greatest importance to you. We can assure you that we are not going topass on any names nor disclose anyone’s identity. No data on a single identifiable householdwill be passed on; apart from exemplary responses (quotes) we are only going to pass onaggregated data. We encourage you to answer our questions as accurately as possible, tellus when you want us to repeat or rephrase a question, and share with us any additionalconcerns you might have.

(0) Observation during the interview

• Number, size and equipment of room(s)• Number of people in the room; what are their relationships?• General state of facilities, hygiene/cleanliness, running water, electricity

(1) Access to land / shelter

Please tell us what it is like to live in this neighbourhood, why you moved here, where youlived before, and whether you intend to stay here.

Areas that we want to cover:

1. Since when do you live here?2. Where are you from originally (location/age; rural or urban)?3. How many times have you moved/been moved and why?4. How did you decide to live here? Do you know what type of land this area is (e.g.

government land, municipality land or private)?5. Have you built the house yourself, bought it (do you have a title deed?), maintain it for

exile relatives, rent it, or teamed up with others (whom?) to afford the rent?6. How much on your monthly income do you spend on housing? How has this changed

throughout the last two years?7. Have you heard of people in this neighbourhood who had to move away? Do you know

why? Do you think you will be allowed to stay here? Do you have to pay anyone or anyagency in order to be able/allowed to stay here? If you think you will not stay here,where do you plan to go, and why?

(2) Social networks and collective action

Please give us an idea of who you are in touch with regularly and who you can rely on forhelp and support. Are you making decisions together with other people, and are you thentrying to act collectively as a group to make your voice heard?

Areas that we want to cover:

8. Do you know your neighbours? Do you talk to them regularly? If not, why? Who do youtalk to on a day-to-day basis?

Appendix C: Interview Guide for Household-LevelInformants

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9. Do you consider yourself part of a group or a community that you can rely on if you needsupport or help? What makes you rely on or trust the other people?

family, ethnic, neighbourhood, same work or skill, other?10. Who do you turn to if there is a problem that concerns not only the people in this house

but also your neighbours (e.g. waste piles up, sewage is not working, no electricity)?11. Would you team up with others to address these issues? If yes, with whom would you

team up? Why? If no, why? Have you actually teamed up with others to solve problems?Which problems were you trying to solve? Have you solved them? How? If not, why couldn’tyou solve them?

(3) Livelihoods

Could you now please explain to us how you afford your expenditures, and who in this houseis contributing to your income?

Areas that we want to cover:

12. Which skills / formal training do you have?13. How does this household currently generate its income? Has this changed during the

past two years?14. Do you consider your income source sustainable? If yes, why? If no, why?15. If you could, what type of work you like to perform? What prevents you from performing

this work now?16. Who else is currently contributing to your income?17. Who in this house (this family) is working, and who isn’t? What type of work are those

who are working performing? Why are the others not working —e.g. no demand for skill, disability, not allowed, child care, other?

(4) Service delivery

Now we would like to know which services you receive, and under which conditions youreceive them. Do you have to pay for them? And do you feel secure in this neighbourhood?

Areas that we want to cover:

18. How often is waste collected in this street? Is this happening regularly? Is it sufficient,or is some of it left over? How often would it have to be collected to be sufficient? Isanyone asking you to pay for waste collection?

19. How many people are using the same sanitation facilities? Have you experienced problemswith these facilities? If yes, which problems? What have you done about it?

20. Do you have access to running water? Since when? Who arranged it? Are you paying forit? How much? Did you have to pay someone to get it?

21. Do you have electricity? In all rooms? How did you get electricity? Are you paying forit? How much? Did you have to pay someone to get it?

22. Do you have heat during the winter? How did you obtain it? Are you paying for it? Howmuch are you paying?

23. Do the children go to school? Where is the school? How do they get there? Are you payingfor the school? How much are you paying? If they are not going to school — why?

24. When you need to see a doctor or go to the hospital, is this possible? Do you have topay for these services? Whom do you have to pay? If you do not have access to a doctorand/or a hospital, why?

25. Do you feel secure in this neighbourhood? If no, why are you feeling insecure? Has therebeen any violent incident in this neighborhood? What happened? Has there been anyresponse or investigation by the authorities?

26. Is public transport within reach? Are you using it? If yes, do you have any suggestions

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how to improve it? If no, why are you not using it? What would have to happen so youwould/could use it?

(5) Representation, accountability, complaint management and improvement

We would also like to understand whether you can get in touch with people from the districtor the government, and whether anyone is representing you and your interests. Who hasbeen helpful to you in the context of your housing, income and service situation?

Areas that we want to cover:

27. Is anyone/any agency or public body formally representing you? Do you have a shura?28. Is anyone/any agency or public body informally representing you? In which setting does

this happen?29. Do you feel fairly represented? If not, why? When would you feel properly represented?30. Have you ever contacted the municipality in case of a problem (e.g. waste piles up,

sewage is not working, no electricity)? Have they listened to you? Could you contactthem? If not, why not?

31. Which (other) officials, agencies, individuals have been useful to you and how?32. Which officials, agencies and individuals have not been useful and why?33. Do you have to pay in order to obtain support from officials, agencies, and individuals?

Has the amount changed over the last couple of months?

— Priority assessment

Finally, we would like to know which of the following issues is most important to you. Whatis the problem that should be solved first or the service that is absolutely crucial for you,and why? What comes next? Please help us prioritise these issues from your perspective,and add anything that is equally or even more important to you.

34. Which of the following factors is most important to you in order to feel at ease (notworried) — and why? Can you rank these issues?

• Security of tenure (having a secure place to stay)• Stable source of income (earning enough to live without anxiety)• Receiving public services (such as schooling, access to health services, electricity, water,

waste collection)• Being represented, listened and responded to• Physical protection against violence and harassment• Other: (please specify!)

— Additional information

Is there anything else that you would like to address regarding your housing situation,contacts and people who can help you, your income and expenditures, the services youreceive or don’t receive, or your relationship with the authorities? What is it, and why isit important to you?

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Appendix D: Distribution and Location ofHousehold-Level Interviews

a) Distribution of Household-Level interviews

City Districts Total

Kabul D1 (11) D3, D13 (7) D16 (11) D17 (9) 38

Mazar-i-Sharif D2 (5) D7 (4) D10 (4) 13

Herat D6 (5) D7 (2) D9 (5) 12

b.1) Location of Household-Level Interviews in Kabul (map courtesy of UN-Habitat)

Kabul 52%

Herat 23%

Mazar 25%

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District 7:Aqebe Gumruk / Tashgurganeha

District 10:Ariana / Ahle Chapan

District 2:Karte Nowshad

b.2) Location of Household-Level Interviews in Mazar-i-Sharif (map courtesy of UN-Habitat)

b.3) Location of Household-Level Interviews in Herat (map courtesy of AIMS Kabul)

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ACF Action Contre la Faim

AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

CAWSS Central Authority for Water Supply and Sewerage

CDC community development council

CF community forum

CSO civil society organisation

HPD/HPCC Housing and Property Directorate and Claims Commission (Kosovo)

IDPs internally displaced persons

IOM International Organization for Migration

KURP Kabul Urban Rehabilitation Programme

LPU Land and Property Unit (Timor-Leste)

MoF Ministry of Finance

MoI Ministry of Interior

MoT Ministry of Transportation

MUDH Ministry of Urban Development and Housing

NGO non-governmental organisation

NRC Norwegian Refugee Council

NSP National Solidarity Programme

NUP National Urban Programme

UMCG Urban Management Consultative Group

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USAID United States Agency for International Development

Abbreviations and Acronyms

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Charahi Ansari(opposite the Insaf Hotel and Popolano’s Restaurant)

Shahr-e-Naw, Kabul, AfghanistanPhone: +93 (0) 70 276-637

E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.areu.org.af