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hibits all nuclear weapons and

leads ideally to global nuclear

disarmament where the threat

of

nuclear war is minimized.

This article is concerned with

several initiatives that could be tak-

en

in

order to follow the Nuclear

Right Path and perhaps achieve

global nuclear disarmament.

U.S.

GOVERNMENTOLE

On July 16, 1945, the world’s

first nuclear weapon was detonated

by the United States of America

(U.S.) in a remote desert region of

New Mexico aptly named Journado

del Muerto (Journey of Death).

Code-named “Trinity,” the test

explosion gave birth to the Nuclear

Age and set humanity on a long

and perilous ourney with an uncer-

tain future [1]. The atomic bomb-

ings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

followed soon thereafter and, sub-

sequently, the unconditional sur-

render of Japan. Thus ended World

War I1 and Nuclear War I.

By using nuclear weapons, the

U.S.

perhaps avoided one million

casualties by not having to invade

Japan, and thus became the

world’s first nuclear superpower.

However, by releasing the nuclear

genie, the U.S. initiated a nuclear

arms race of enormous proportions

that now threatens the survival of

the human race. It therefore seems

morally correct that the U S

should now serve as the world

leader in seeking to contain the

nuclear genie through initiatives

that will

help

to prevent future

nuclear

war(s).

A good beginning

is to consult the opinions of mili-

tary experts who have direct expe-

rience with the potential use of

nuclear weapons.

U S GENERALSPEAK OUT

AGAINST UCLEAR EAFQNS

In July 1994, General C.A.

Horner, commander of the

U S .

Air Force Space Command, sur-

prised the nation and the world by

declaring

[ 2 ] ,

“The nuclear weapon is obso-

lete; I want to get rid of them all.”

General Horner based his argu-

ments on moral principles when he

stated [3]:

“Nuclear weapons are such

a

gross instrument of power that

they really have no utility they

are best used to destroy cities, and

kill women and children that’s

morally wrong ”

General Horner was most con-

cerned about countering the new

military threat from smaller, less

stable nations who might obtain

nuclear weapons and/or other

weapons of mass destruction. He

argued that it will be very difficult

to convince other nations to not

develop nuclear weapons when the

U S .

has thousands of them. It

should be noted that General

Horner was “talking long-term”

and that nuclear disarmament

would require similar commit-

ments from Russia and the other

nuclear weapon states [2].

In December 1996, two retired

American generals made public

statements in favor of a world free

of nuclear weapons[4]. General A.

Goodpaster (former supreme allied

commander in Europe) and Gener-

al

L.

Butler (former commander-

in-chief of the

U.S.

Strategic Air

Command) released a joint state-

ment that recommended the

nuclear weapon states reduce their

nuclear arsenals in phases “to the

lowest verifiable levels consistent

with stable security.” The ultimate

objective “should be the complete

elimination of nuclear weapons

from all nations.” The next day, a

total

of

61 retired generals and

admirals from 17 nations (includ-

ing 19 Americans) issued a similar

statement for the eventual elimina-

tion of nuclear weapons.

Generals Goodpaster and But-

Fig.

1 .

Diagram illustrating the nuclear fork in the road with the Nuclear Right Path leading to global nuclear

disarmament.

6

IEEE Technolog y and Soc iety Magazine

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999

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ler were later featured in a televi-

sion documentary [ ] that repre-

sented their views as well as those

of other military leaders. The fol-

lowing points were emphasized:

0 The only real purpose for U.S.

nuclear weapons is to assure that

they are not used against us or our

allies. This can be accomplished

at any level of nuclear weapons

as long as we are not at a great

disadvantage. Thus, the U.S.

could reduce its nuclear arsenal,

in conjunction with the other

nuclear weapon states, to 100-

200 warheads. This is the lowest

verifiable level consistent with

stable security.

0 Total nuclear disarmament car-

ries the risk of cheating. Howev-

er, the risks associated with a

world full of nuclear weapon

states far outweigh the risks

associated with a world where

nuclear weapons are prohibited.

0 The argument that the U.S.

needs nuclear weapons to main-

tain stability is a dangerous one.

That is, other nations can

use

the

same argument to justify their

acquisition of nuclear weapons.

0 In 1968, the U S . signed the Non-

Proliferation Treaty and thereby

pledged to pursue systematic and

progressive efforts to reduce

nuclear weapons on a global

scale with the ultimate objective

being elimination of these

weapons. In July 1996, the Inter-

national Court of Justice ruled

that this agreement is an obliga-

tion to achieve nuclear disarma-

ment under international control.

If the nuclear weapon states fail

to achieve this goal, other nations

may seek nuclear weapons argu-

ing that the U.S. (and the other

nuclear powers) have demon-

strated that they are needed “to be

a player in the world.” The net

result would be a less secure situ-

ation for every nation on earth.

Conventional weapons can do

just as much damage as nuclear

weapons due to recent advances

in technology. The

U.S.

has

overwhelming superiority of

conventional forces.

Suggested steps towards nuclear

disarmament include the fol-

lowing:

0 Disassembling nuclear

and allowing on-site veri-

fication.

Continue progress with

the START treaties by ~

securing Russian ratifica-

tion of START I1 and

negotiate START 111.

0

Include all nuclear weapon

states in negotiations to the

lowest levels possible

(perhaps down to 100 to

200

nuclear weapons).

0 Account for all fissile

materials that could be

used to make nuclear

weapons.

THENUCLEARON-PROLIF-

ERATION

TREATYNPT)

The NPT was established in

July 1968, to help deter the spread

of nuclear weapons. The five

nuclear weapon states (U.S., Sovi-

et Union, Great Britain, France,

and China) agreed, under Article

VI of this treaty, as follows:

“to pursue negotiations in good

faith on effective measures relating

to the cessation of the nuclear arms

race at an early date and to nuclear

disarmament, and on

a

treaty on

general and complete disarmament

under strict and effective interna-

tional controls.”

Note that this agreement does

not actually compel the five

nuclear weapon states to reduce

their nuclear weapon arsenals.

Rather, the agreement is to pursue

nuclear disarmament “in good

faith’ without strict deadlines [6].

Despite its lack of specificity, the

NPT has been credited with limiting

the spread of nuclear weapons.

However, some nations have not

signed the treaty; notably India, Pak-

istan, Israel, and Cuba. And there

has been at least one cheater (Iraq).

It is worthy of note that theU.S.

and the former Soviet Union made

significant progress in nuclear

arms reductions via the START

agreements.

Today, the U.S. and

Russia continue these efforts to

control nuclear arms, nuclear

materials, and to prevent nuclear

smuggling. What is lacking, how-

ever, is

a

concerted, joint effort by

all five of the declared nuclear

weapon states to engage in reduc-

tions of nuclear arms and the con-

trol of fissile materials. This must

be a priority in the near future if

the non-nuclear weapon states are

to continue their confidence and

commitment to the

NPT.

As an example of a loss of con-

fidence in the NPT, India followed

its recent round of nuclear tests by

derisively calling on the five origi-

nal nuclear weapon states “to get

rid of their own atomic arsenals

rather than preach abstinence to

India” [7]. The new Prime Minister

of India, A.B. Vajpayee, reacted to

a demand by the five nuclear

weapon states (plus

41

other

nations) that India and Pakistan

should stop testing nuclear

weapons and join the global cam-

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paign to eliminate these weapons.

Vajpayee insisted India has the

right to defend itself and referred

to endless meetings and seminars

on disarmament but no steps to get

rid of nuclear weapons.

The decision by India to con-

duct five nuclear tests seems to

have been motivated by President

Clinton’s decision to allow U.S.

satellite technology to be exported

to China. Also included was tech-

nology that helped China improve

their guidance systems for long-

range ballistic missiles (the tech-

nologies to orbit satellites and to

guide long-range missiles are sim-

ilar). According to Rep. D.

Rohrabacher (Chairman of the

House Science subcommittee on

space and aeronautics), “The Indi-

an detonations are a predictable

result of America’s upgrading of

China’s missile technology” [SI.

There is concern that China may

share this missile technology with

its Pakistani ally. The end result

could be a nuclear arms race in

southeast Asia with the emerging

nuclear weapon state, Pakistan,

serving as one-half of a possible

pincers strategy if China chal-

lenges India in some future con-

flict. It is noted that China and

India fought a border war some 30

years ago. As evidence of an accel-

erating arms race in Asia, India

plans to build a nuclear-powered

submarine and equip it with

nuclear warhead missiles [9]. Rus-

sia has agreed to help India com-

plete this project by the year 2004.

Another Asian nation that could

develop nuclear weapons in the

near future is North Korea who

recently suggested it might reopen

a nuclear power plant that is capa-

ble of producing plutonium for

nuclear weapons [lo]. The power

plant was closed in 1994

as

part of

an agreement to acquire two light-

water nuclear reactors with help

from the U.S.

In summary, the NPT has had

some success but its greatest fail-

ure is not moving decisively to

8

reduce the nuclear weapon arse-

nals of all five declared nuclear

weapon states, including China.

CHINA:

HEEMERGING

MILITARYUPERPOWER?

China became a member of the

nuclear club in 1964 when it con-

ducted its first test of a nuclear

weapon. The nuclear byword for

China has been “never again” in

reference to what it claims to be

“nuclear blackmail” suffered at the

hands of the U.S. during the Kore-

an War and the Taiwan crises of

1954-1955 and 1958. Consequent-

ly, China’s current nuclear strategy

is designed to preclude nuclear

blackmail by adopting a city-

destroying deterrent posture 1 I].

With a population in excess of

1.22 billion and growing at more

than 12 million per year, China

faces unique challenges in meeting

the basic needs of its people. Its

population program, “the one child

family,” is crucial to their future

since “no supplier on Earth could

feed them if they fail” [121. If ever

faced with a starving population,

China might feel compelled to

expand its borders.

It is perhaps with these two

problems in mind (a hungry popu-

lation and nuclear weapons), that

prompted Mao Zedong, Chairman

of the Peoples Republic of China,

to shock the Russians in 1954.

Chairman Mao seemed to wel-

come the prospect of nuclear war

with the following statement 131:

“We may lose more than 300

million people.

So

what?

War is war.

The years will pass and we’ll

get to work producing more babies

than ever before.”

Today China is an emerging

economic superpower with the

potential to eventually challenge

the

U.S.

militarily. Currently, U.S.

intelligence sees China as a region-

al rather than global power. Its

nuclear arsenal includes 18 long-

range nuclear missiles of which 13

are reportedly targeted on U.S .

cities [14]. Overall, China has

about 300 nuclear warheads

deployed on land-based ballistic

missiles, aircraft, and submarines

151 Military modernization

includes converting from liquid to

solid fuel missiles and a slow

expansion of its ballistic missile

forces. However, with its enor-

mous industrial capacity, China

might be able to produce as many

as 1000 new ballistic missiles over

the next ten years 161.

China has been compared with

pre-World War

I1

Germany by

retired Air Force Col. W.J. Boyne

[171. Boyne sees China emerging

from the humiliation of past

defeats and using its arms industry

as

“the engine of its economy for

the next 20 years.” Eventually,

according to Boyne, China will

eclipse the

U.S.

both economically

and militarily. A possible scenario

is for China to continue its support

of Pakistan and to manipulate a

fourth (and final) war between

India and Pakistan [17] In the ash-

es of that conflict, China would

find room for expansion and per-

haps make its move for military

superpower status.

In view of the emerging status

of China, the U.S. would be wise

to include China in future negotia-

tions that seek to reduce the size of

nuclear weapon arsenals. It will be

much less problematic to work

with China now on nuclear

arms

reductions before a massive

buildup of Chinese nuclear mis-

siles occurs. A Cold War-type

competition between the U.S. and

China could be potentially disas-

trous for the U.S., both economi-

cally and militarily. It is better to

start working now with China on

an agreement that reduces nuclear

arsenals in a fair and equitable

manner.

REDUCTIONS

N

NUCLEAR

DELIVERY

YSTEMS

On December 8, 1987, the

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces

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(INF) treaty was signed by Presi-

dent Reagan and Soviet General

Secretary Gorbachev. The purpose

of the treaty was to eliminate all

U.S. and Soviet land-based nuclear

missiles with ranges between 300

and 3400 miles

[

181. The signifi-

cance of this treaty is that it was

the first to ban an entire class of

missiles [19]. The

U.S.

Senate rat-

ified the treaty on May 27, 1988

and by May 12, 1991, all U.S. and

Soviet missiles covered by the

treaty had been destroyed [20].

Some other features of the INF

treaty are as follows [181:

Central to the treaty is a very

comprehensive and intrusive ver-

ification regime established to

monitor compliance. Verification

includes on-site inspections such

as round-the-clock monitoring of

certain production plants, obser-

vation of the actual destruction

of the other party’s missiles, and

short-notice inspections of suspi-

cious sites.

0 Curiously, the nuclear warheads

removed from the INF missiles

were not required to be

destroyed. This was at the behest

of the U.S. apparently due to a

claim of “a shortage of nuclear

materials such as plutonium and

uranium” as well as a desire to

maintain secrets of U.S. warhead

designs.

Naval and aircraft nuclear deliv-

ery systems were not covered by

this treaty. Neither were long-

range, strategic nuclear weapon

delivery systems (ranges greater

than 3400 miles).

In retrospect, the INF treaty

serves as an excellent precedent

for future arms control agreements

that seek to reduce and eventually

prohibit all nuclear weapon sys-

tems by reducing their delivery

systems and destroying the materi-

als (plutonium and uranium) used

to make nuclear weapons.

It is proposed, then, to engage

the five members of the nuclear

club in negotiations to extend the

provisions of the INF treaty and

gradually eliminate all weapon

delivery systems with ranges

greater than

300

miles. It is also

proposed to initiate procedures to

dispose of nuclear weapon materi-

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The current

U.S.

strategic

nuclear triad consists of the fol-

lowing, as per the National

Defense Authorization Act for fis-

cal year 1998 [21]:

18 Trident submarines.

71 B-52 bombers

0 5 Minutemen and 50MX mis-

siles

These levels are consistent with

the START I treaty and will be

maintained until the Russian

Duma ratifies START 11.

The principal strategy proposed

here is to work towards the elimina-

tion of nuclear weapons by reduc-

ing their strategic delivery ~

systems.This can be accom-

plished by agreements to ~

reduce their numbers and/or

to restrict (or eliminate) test-

ing of long-range missiles.

Verification of compliance

with such agreements should

be feasible with existing

reconnaissance satellites and

other “national technical

means” described in [22], ~

since bombers, nuclear sub-

marines, and silo-based

ICBMs are highly observ-

~

able, as are long-range mis-

sile tests.

As regards restrictions on

missile tests, H.A. Bethe

indicates such tests are easy

to

verify and limiting such

tests “would more effectively

halt the development of new

weapons than would a comprehen-

sive nuclear test ban” [23]. As an

example of

a

recent missile test,

Iran successfully tested its Shahab-

3 missile which is capable of

reaching all of Israel [24]. The test

was detected by U.S. intelligence

~

satellites despite only about 100

seconds of flight before the rocket

exploded or was detonated. Note

that Iran has received missile tech-

nology from Russia, China, and

North Korea. One

U.S.

reaction to

the test was “renewed calls for

a

national missile defense system”

[24]. Shanebrook has discussed the

benefits of a world-wide ban on

the flight testing of long-range

missiles, as regards halting their

proliferation, and also reducing

pressures to weaponize space for

the purpose of attacking these mis-

siles while in flight [25].

The issue of a

U.S.

national

missile defense system is directly

affected by any international

agreement to reduce or eliminate

all missiles with a range in excess

of 300 miles. The need for such

a

system for missile defense would

be greatly alleviated by an agree-

ment of this type.

NUCLEARUYOUTLAN

R.M. Bowman has presented an

interesting idea on how to protect

the U.S. from ballistic missile

attack instead of continuing to

invest billions of dollars in a multi-

layered, high technology missile

defense system (since 1984, the

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U.S. has spent more than 70 bil-

lion on “Star Wars”-type systems).

The Bowman plan would take

money intended for missile

defense and use it to buy ballistic

missiles from other nations [26].

Presumably this would be part of

an international agreement to

reduce or eliminate ballistic mis-

siles. The purchased nuclear war-

heads would be dismantled and the

recovered fissile materials (pluto-

nium and enriched uranium)

mixed with natural uranium. The

resulting mixture could be used as

reactor fuel for nuclear power

plants and/or vitrified in glass for

storage as high level nuclear waste.

The Bowman proposal makes

sense for aiding a country like Rus-

sia which needs economic help

with its nuclear disarmament

efforts. The Russian economy has

been shrinking during the 1990s

and suffered a collapse of its finan-

cial markets in spring 1998. To pre-

vent another economic downturn

the International Monetary Fund,

in conjunction with the World

Bank and Japan, provided Russia

with a bailout package of 22.6 bil-

lion in loans “to rescue the coun-

try’s precarious economy” [27].

Russia’s economic woes are

probably a direct consequence of

its excessive military spending dur-

ing the Cold War period. Similarly,

the U.S. spent billions of dollars on

high technology weapons systems

and emerged from the Cold War

burdened by debt. It is even debat-

able if the Cold War had a winner

[28]. A recent report, issued by the

Brookings Institution, indicates the

U.S. has spent 5.82 trillion ( 5.82

x 1012) since 1940 on nuclear

weapons and related delivery sys-

tems [29]. This expenditure corre-

lates closely with the current

U.S.

national debt of 5.9 trillion, which

costs taxpayers an additional 240

billion per year just in interest pay-

ments. Thus a family of four, on

average, funds these interest pay-

ments at the rate of 5000 annually

[30]. And these interest payments

3

will continue d

injnitum

until

some effort is made to pay off the

principal of the debt. This same

family of four also suffers econom-

ically from long-term interest rates,

(such as home mortgages), since

U.S.

borrowing has a significant

effect on the loan market where

this extra demand contributes to

higher interest rates. In other

words, the

U.S.

nuclear war

machine has been purchased on

credit and no effort has been made

to pay for it. Perhaps the lesson to

be learned from all this is that the

US.-U.S.S .R.

Cold War was (and

still is) very costly and any other

such competition (for example

with China) should be vigorously

avoided.

Another consequence of the

Cold War is that the U.S. must pro-

vide world leadership in achieving

nuclear disarmament. This means

helping nations, economically,

with nuclear warhead dismantle-

ment as per the current Cooperative

Threat Reduction (CTR) program

that “assists the states of the former

Soviet Union in destroying nuclear

weapons and disposing of the plu-

tonium before it can fall into the

hands of terrorists” [26]. The

U.S.

has committed

300

million to

this

program and should expand it by

purchasing nuclear warheads from

other nations that commit to

nuclear weapons disarmament.

In addition to destroying existing

nuclear weapons, it is also necessary

to stop producing weapons-grade

fissile materials such as plutonium

and highly enriched uranium.

A

step-by-step approach to a global,

verified ban on the production of

fis-

sile materials for nuclear weapons

has been proposed by Fetter and von

Hippel [31].

The key nation in achieving a

global agreement to prohibit all

nations from producing fissile

materials for nuclear weapons is

China. The basic difficulty is Chi-

na’s concern with U.S. intentions

to develop defenses against longer

range missiles than current sys-

tems [32] and possible U.S. efforts

“to loosen the constraints of the

ABM Treaty” [31]. China fears

such defenses could easily neutral-

ize its relatively small nuclear

force and again leave China sus-

ceptible to nuclear blackmail.

Thus, China prefers to maintain its

option to counter U.S. (and possi-

bly Russian) missile defenses by

expanding and modernizing its

nuclear weapons arsenal in order

to overwhelm such defenses [32].

This chilling scenario brings to

mind the potential use of radiolog-

ical weapons (e.g., the cobalt

bomb) as a possible countermea-

sure to strategic defense systems as

discussed by Shanebrook [331.

Thus, all human life on earth could

be at risk.

NUCLEAR IGHT ATH

The Nuclear Right Path to glob-

al nuclear disarmament requires a

commitment of leadership from the

U.S. to vigorously promote new

initiatives that seek to reduce, and

perhaps totally eliminate, all

nuclear weapons from earth. These

include, but are not limited, to the

following:

Multilateral, phased-reductions

in strategic nuclear weapons

delivery systems.

Complete cessation of all flight

tests of long-range missiles.

A

global nuclear warhead dis-

mantlement plan with effective

economic incentives.

A firm commitment from all

nations to stop producing fissile

materials for nuclear weapons.

Besides Russia, the key nation

in future negotiations to reduce

nuclear weapon arsenals is China

which faces unique challenges in

providing for its burgeoning popu-

lation and who stands today at the

threshold of economic superpower

status. Before China faces the

decision on whether or not to

embark on the road towards mili-

tary superpower status, it is imper-

ative to engage China in negotia-

tions to reduce nuclear weapons in

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conjunction with the U S and

Rus-

sia. If this is successful, other

nuclear weapon states could be

induced to follow this example of

arms reductions possibly leading

to global nuclear disarmament.

The final goal should and must be,

a nuclear-free world.

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pp. 3-8.

Letters

(Continuedfrom page

5 )

been involved in sticky ethical problems, as you (we)

now are, and I have some suggestions.

1)

It is both our (as members of the IEEE-SSIT)

responsibility and your responsibility

as an

elected

EC Chair, both from a need as well

as

an ethical posi-

tion to maintain the Ethics Hotline.

2) I

question whether the ExCom can, on their

own, cut the Ethics Hotline off, if we refuse to cut it

off. The full board of directors maybe can, but proba-

bly not

the

ExCom on their own.

3) I suggest we get the backing of the SSIT board

(and even better the backing

of

the Society, by

a

spe-

cial ballot) to continue the Hotline and then reiniti-

ate the Hotline. This will force the ExCom

to

get the

full

BOD

o deal with the issue. If the BODsides with

the ExCom we may want to go to the press.

4) Although a circuit theorist,

I

believe theory

should be put into practice. One

of

the jobs

of

our

Society is to put ethics into practice. If we can’t put

our resources into the reinstatement of the Ethics Hot-

line, we should disband the society.

Robert

A

Johnson

L e Fellow

IEEE

Tustin, C A

IEEETechnology and Society Magazine Summer 999

3

Shane Brook 1999

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Transcript of Shane Brook 1999